

# The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon and the UNITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia

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## **The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon and the UNITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia**

*by*  
*Ray Murphy*

### **INTRODUCTION**

This article examines the background to the establishment of the UN mandated military forces in Lebanon and Somalia. Its purpose is to explain how the background influenced the outcome of the operations, and the central role played by the US throughout, the primary contention being that the lack of support from the permanent members of the Security Council, especially the US, undermined the political base and viability of the operations from the beginning.

There are as many contrasts as there are comparisons in the form of peace-keeping adopted to deal with the conflicts that arose in Lebanon and Somalia. In the case of Lebanon, the mandate adopted was controversial and it was considered to be deficient in a number of respects. UNIFIL emerged from difficult negotiations that required a compromise by the parties to the conflict. While it was deployed with undue haste against the advice of many commentators at the time, its survival in what were often very difficult circumstances is testimony to the professionalism of those charged with implementing the mandate. However, this should not be seen as a reflection on the appropriateness of the UNIFIL mission and mandate.

The UN operations in Somalia were more ambitious in comparison, and they involved significantly more resources. Initially at least, they were also less controversial. The consensus and enthusiasm for involvement in Somalia changed quickly as “mission creep” set in and doubts were expressed about the efficacy of UN policy there. Apart from the loss of life on all sides, the real tragedy of US and UN intervention in Somalia was the failure to learn the right lessons. Events in Somalia should not be used to discredit second generation peace support operations, or to deny the imperative to respond that global human crises such as that of Rwanda or East Timor will present.

In order to analyze and appreciate the way events unfolded in respect of each mission, it is necessary to start at the beginning and examine the background to the establishment and deployment of the respective UN forces. It was

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at this stage that the foundation and overall policies were adopted that determined the response to the sometimes almost impossible scenarios presented in each mission area.

In his first report to the Security Council on UNIFIL, the Secretary-General outlined the three essential conditions that needed to be met for the Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Second, it must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. Third, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.<sup>1</sup> In 1983, the now retired Under Secretary-General of the UN with special responsibility for peacekeeping operations, Brian Urquhart, elaborated upon this when writing about the Multi National Force in Beirut and stated that successful peacekeeping depends, *inter alia*, on a sound political base, a well defined mandate and objectives, and the cooperation of the parties concerned.<sup>2</sup> The requirement of a well defined mandate and objectives was a somewhat glaring omission from the Secretary-General's otherwise pragmatic report.<sup>3</sup> Using these factors as criteria, the article focuses on the political and diplomatic background to the establishment and deployment of the UN forces in Lebanon and Somalia. It examines the challenges and dilemmas that confronted the UN forces, especially when the parties to the conflict failed to provide the required level of support, and the deficiencies in the organization and structure of those forces.

## **FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION TO DEPLOY UN FORCES IN LEBANON AND SOMALIA**

When the Lebanese civil war was at its height during 1975 and 1976, serious efforts were made to determine the feasibility and value of establishing a UN peacekeeping force there. However, no such force was established after strong reservations were expressed regarding its practicality in what was essentially a civil war situation.<sup>4</sup> There were similar reservations with regard to any form of UN intervention in Somalia on the same grounds, with the added dimension that Somalia was of no strategic or other significance to the members of the Security Council. There were also financial considerations to be taken into account, and there was considerable resistance at first from the US and Russia to plans for a more proactive UN policy in Somalia as both countries were in substantial arrears in peacekeeping accounts even before the operation began.<sup>5</sup> In both Lebanon and Somalia, the actual decision to intervene was taken against a background of ongoing civil war and a state imploding on itself. In the case of Lebanon, the decisive factor was that of third party intervention, namely the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1978.<sup>6</sup> At that time there was no real effective government, and the south of the country was dominated by Palestinian forces in and around the old city of Tyre, in an area often referred to as the "Iron Triangle."<sup>7</sup>

In common with most problems of this nature brought before the Security Council, the parties to the conflict in Lebanon only sought a solution within the framework of the UN when the problem otherwise proved insoluble. In this context, the major player not a direct party to the conflict was the US. Yet its role in the conflict in both Lebanon and Somalia was crucial, but in each case for different reasons. In the case of Lebanon, the real agenda was the Middle East peace process, but in Somalia it is difficult to discern any ulterior motive apart from recognizing and living up to its responsibilities as a major power, and a desire to rebuild the institutions of state in a war torn society. Though the policy of replicating Western democratic values in east Africa should not be underestimated, humanitarian disaster was the primary motivation for the UN and the US major post-Cold War intervention in Somalia.<sup>8</sup> The situation in Somalia was not some unresolved international problem deriving from the Cold War. But the Cold War had helped shape the crisis that led to UN intervention in 1992. The aftermath of the inter clan fighting had left it without any semblance of a state, and with no one party or clan that could conveniently be treated as the legitimate government and provide the UN with the "consent" required for the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This left the Organization with a number of serious dilemmas, one of the more significant of which was with whom to negotiate in the circumstances.

After the attempt to deploy an effective peacekeeping force failed, the consequent intervention planned for Somalia had no clear precedent in UN peacekeeping practice. The force could not be deployed at the request or the consent of a host government, or on the bases of an agreement between the parties. For that reason, the Security Council had to invoke the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter for the US led multinational force (UNITAF) and for UNOSOM II.<sup>9</sup> This was the first occasion this was done in order to deal with a conflict within a state's borders. It took place in the slipstream of success generated by the dramatic result of OPERATION DESERT STORM, and the deployment of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. A fundamental matter that did not seem to be appreciated in full was the unique and complex nature of the situation in Somalia.

The decision to intervene and deploy a UN military force, like the nature of the actual force ultimately established, was very different in the case of Lebanon in 1978 and Somalia in 1992. Neither crisis had developed overnight, and there had been many calls for assistance on the basis of the threat posed to the respective regions by the civil wars and the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Somalia in particular. Both crises also shared a common handicap from the beginning, in that the real focus of attention was elsewhere when it was decided to deploy UN military personnel. In the case of Lebanon, the US administration was primarily concerned with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the Camp David Accords. In the early 1990s on the other hand, the Somalia crisis hap-

pened at a time when the world's attention was drawn to the break up of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia.

The UN was often blamed for failing to resolve an intractable problem not of its making in Lebanon, and for failing to fulfill its ambitious program in Somalia. It is all too easy place the blame on an international organization that even its strongest defenders accepted had weaknesses. However, the UN can only succeed if it is given the support and the means to do so. When it appears to fail, the permanent members of the Security Council are quick to point the finger at the Organization itself and thereby deflect attention away from themselves.<sup>10</sup> But it was the Security Council, in particular the US, that originally sponsored the initiative to establish UNIFIL, and failed to give the Force the support it both deserved and needed to be effective. Furthermore, neither the US nor the Soviet Union put sufficient pressure on their respective allies in the region to cooperate with UNIFIL. From the outset it was clear the Force required that certain essential conditions be fulfilled before it could be effective.<sup>11</sup> In particular, it required the cooperation of the parties concerned. The actual fulfillment of these conditions was largely outside either the Secretary-General's or the Force's control. This was one of the primary reasons for the apparent inability of UNIFIL to carry out its mandate. In Somalia, after initial hesitancy, the US became one of the main backers of the operation. But the American aspirations for UN involvement were not matched by willingness to take the necessary risks or commit more resources than was deemed necessary to fulfill what were defined and limited objectives. In the end, the US effectively terminated the operation having hijacked aspects of the mission when its own unilateral actions backfired. The Clinton administration, in a classic damage limitation and deflection exercise, blamed the UN for what amounted to deficiencies in American policies.<sup>12</sup>

## **RESPONSE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES IN LEBANON AND SOMALIA**

### **The Case of Lebanon**

The controversy surrounding the actual adoption of Resolution 425(1978) establishing UNIFIL provides important clues to understanding the problems confronted by the Force on the ground. In contrast to the changes in the mandates and actual forces deployed in Somalia, the original UNIFIL mandate remained intact. It was the US that did the work behind the scenes and then made the formal proposal to establish a peacekeeping force.<sup>13</sup> The Lebanese government's strategy at this time was to internationalize and highlight the problem and thereby extricate itself from the regional conflict taking place in Lebanon between Israel, the Palestinians, and Syria.<sup>14</sup> The debate in the Security Council showed that while there was general support for the establishment of a peacekeeping force, there was no general consensus on what the mandate should be.

Furthermore, all parties involved were critical of aspects of Resolution 425(1978) itself. Even at this very early stage in the creation of the Force, the lack of political consensus within the Security Council, which was to hinder the effective functioning of the Force thereafter, was already apparent. The mandate ultimately agreed did not reflect the problems associated with the presence of the PLO in southern Lebanon and the Israeli determination to occupy part of this by proxy.<sup>15</sup>

The fact that the whole debate and Resolution 425(1978) ignored the central element of the crisis in the Middle East, a resolution of the Palestinian problem and the need for a comprehensive settlement of the overall Middle East question, caused many members to vacillate in their express support for the establishment of the Force. In the event, the establishment of a peacekeeping force with ambiguous and unrealistic objectives and terms of reference was agreed to hastily in order to solve the immediate crisis.<sup>16</sup>

The urgency of reaching some agreement on the crisis precluded the Security Council from considering a more long-term solution. It is hardly surprising therefore, that UNIFIL encountered major difficulties in implementing its mandate. This same urgency was also the main determinant in deciding the extent to which the US consulted the other members of the Security Council and the parties involved in the conflict. The exact extent of the consultations with Israel is not known. However, it is almost certain that as the US's strongest and most reliable ally in the region, it was both informed and consulted on the initiative. It is also evident that Israel was not happy with all its aspects but was forced to succumb to American pressure; as a result Resolution 425(1978) was greatly resented in Israel.<sup>17</sup>

At this time the US' primary concern in the Middle East was the Camp David Accords and concluding the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.<sup>18</sup> The Lebanese government had requested the US to sponsor the peacekeeping initiative as it realized that America was the only country likely to be able to bring about sufficient Israeli cooperation. This premise was certainly true, however, they seem to have overlooked the dilemma that the US would face in the Security Council, as guardian both of Israel's and of Lebanon's interests. The Lebanese appeared to have exaggerated their own importance to the US and Lebanon's significance in American foreign policy.<sup>19</sup>

The early years of UNIFIL's deployment and abortive attempts to carry out its mandate, also coincided with a series of crises in American foreign policy. First, the Iranian Revolution took place. Then the seizure of the American hostages in Teheran occurred. This series of related events, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, preoccupied the final 14 months of President Carter's term in office, much to the detriment of other significant foreign policy issues.<sup>20</sup> Consultation with certain parties was also difficult. While Resolution 425(1978) specifically mentioned Israel and Lebanon, it did not refer to the PLO as it was

not recognized as an official party to the conflict. However, the cooperation of the PLO was necessary to ensure the success of UNIFIL. The PLO's initial reaction to the Resolution was strongly critical of its failure to tackle what it perceived as the real problem in the Middle East, namely the question of Palestine.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, the leadership did give certain assurances but serious problems arose later when PLO elements refused to cooperate and clashes occurred when UNIFIL attempted to deploy in and around areas controlled by the PLO.<sup>22</sup>

When the proposal to establish UNIFIL was made, the situation was not unlike that of Somalia in that some senior UN officials expressed strong reservations regarding the Organization assuming such a role.<sup>23</sup> There was grave concern at some of the assumptions that US policy was based upon. An Israeli withdrawal from all of south Lebanon was central to the success of UNIFIL's mission, yet it was not clear that Israel would cooperate fully. How was a peacekeeping force to restore Lebanese government authority to an area where it was non-existent, when the Lebanese army was divided and the government concerned probably couldn't maintain control for very long anyway? There was no clear policy either on how the peacekeeping Force would deal with the various armed elements, or what action the Force would take if the Israelis did not withdraw completely. In the end, the urgent necessity to do something to alleviate the immediate crisis while there was some broad consensus in the Security Council meant that such misgivings had to be put aside. A resolution establishing a peacekeeping force in a region of such conflicting American and Soviet interests had to be a delicate balance of political pressure and persuasion. A minor change in emphasis risked causing either superpower to exercise its right of veto. Further prolonged discussion could therefore have jeopardized the whole initiative.<sup>24</sup>

### **Security Council Fails to Support UNIFIL and Lack of Cooperation from the Parties**

In his report on the implementation of Resolution 425(1978), the Secretary-General outlined three essential conditions that had to be met for the Force to be effective.<sup>25</sup> These could be said to be essential conditions for any peacekeeping force, whether in Somalia or Lebanon. The fact that the Secretary-General felt constrained to expressly state them in this manner indicated that he was concerned some of the conditions might not be fulfilled.

The most important of the conditions was that the Force receive the full backing of the members of the Security Council at all times, but in particular the permanent members who proposed or supported its establishment. S/he is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council. Once a Force is established and deployed, the overall direction of the operation is also the Secretary-General's responsibility, acting on behalf of and being answerable to the Security Council.<sup>26</sup> The importance to the Secretary-General

of proper support and guidance from the Security Council cannot be overestimated. This support has not always been forthcoming and is often too ambivalent in its nature. The serious problems that this can cause were evident during the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC).<sup>27</sup> As late as 1986, the Secretary-General declared that this condition identified in 1978 as essential for the Force to be effective had not been fully met.<sup>28</sup> This unusual step of openly criticizing the organ to which he himself is responsible indicated the frustration felt after so many years of trying to make UNIFIL more effective, particularly when the reasons for the failure were outside his control.

In regard to the second of the conditions identified by the Secretary-General as being essential for the effective operation of the Force i.e. that it receive the full cooperation of the parties concerned, unfortunately, many of the parties did not cooperate as anticipated or as promised in some cases. In particular, the Israelis and their allies in south Lebanon, known generally as the *de facto* forces or the "South Lebanon Army," deliberately harassed UNIFIL and prevented it from carrying out its mandate. Some of the problems that have arisen in this regard are directly related to other assumptions made concerning the deployment of the Force. The ill defined reference to an area of operation was the most serious such flaw. However, it was impossible to be more specific at the time, as discussions in the Security Council and consultations with the governments of Israel and Lebanon revealed profound disagreement on the subject.

The dangers of not defining the precise area of operation became all too evident when UNIFIL troops from the French contingent attempted to deploy around key PLO strongholds.<sup>29</sup> The PLO put up strong resistance to the French presence in this area and this was combined with a diplomatic campaign in New York by Arab States on their behalf. The PLO therefore considered that UNIFIL should not be deployed there either. The matter was complicated by the so-called "Cairo Agreement" which legitimized the PLO's presence in Lebanon and supposedly governed its activities there.<sup>30</sup>

At the time, the Force Commander and the Lebanese government were in favor of taking stronger action against the PLO within UNIFIL's area of operation.<sup>31</sup> However, UNIFIL was not a combat or enforcement mission, and the PLO stronghold had been bypassed by the much more militarily capable Israeli Defence Forces. Furthermore, UNIFIL was a very precarious political creation and it is almost certain that the Soviet Union, and the pro-Palestinian lobby at the UN, would have strenuously objected. It is no surprise that deployment in the area "was not pressed."<sup>32</sup>

In the circumstances the Secretary-General had no option but to reach some negotiated settlement with the PLO. If a firm stance had been taken against the PLO at this stage, it would have been equally important to take similar action against the *de facto* forces. It is probable that neither the US, nor the Soviet Union, would have been willing to support such a policy in the Security Council.



Many of the contributing countries, including Ireland, would have been unwilling to continue supporting and supplying troops to a Force suffering the numbers of casualties that offensive action of this nature would entail. It would also be incompatible with the respective foreign policies of certain of the troop contributing countries, as well as being clearly outside the terms of reference of the Force that it would only act in self defence.

As events unfolded, it became clear that the Israelis and Major Haddad's Forces would not cooperate with UNIFIL. There were strong objections to the agreements concluded with the PLO.<sup>33</sup> If the UN did not take full control of the PLO territory, then it would not be permitted to deploy in the areas controlled by the *de facto* forces.<sup>34</sup> From their perspective, UNIFIL was allowing the PLO to re-establish itself in its area. This was not true, but having backed down from confronting the PLO, it was not unreasonable to assume it would do so again in this case.

By the time the Lebanese government decided to revoke the provisional recognition given to the leader of the Israeli backed *de facto* forces, Major Haddad, much valuable time and ground had been lost.<sup>35</sup> As far as Israel was concerned, it had fulfilled its part in the implementation of Resolutions 425(1978) and 426(1978), which, it was claimed, did not require control of any area to be turned over to UNIFIL.<sup>36</sup> This was a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the resolutions in question and was not even supported by the US. The scene was now set for further hostilities and confrontation. Over the next number of years, Israeli backed *de facto* forces not only harassed UNIFIL, but also indiscriminately shelled and fired on its positions. They also attempted to seize UN positions, and were indifferent to the safety of both UN and civilian personnel.<sup>37</sup>

### **The Case of Somalia**

Peacekeeping in Somalia, if that is the correct term, was complex and difficult. In effect it was a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, and nation building. There were so many changes of direction and strategic goals that it is not possible to generalize. Somalia brought the terms "mission creep" and crossing the "Mogadishu line" into the everyday vernacular of commentators and observers. With the full backing of the US, the Secretary-General, and the Security Council embarked on an expansive and ambitious program that many in Somalia perceived as an attempt to establish a *de facto* trusteeship.<sup>38</sup> The result of these series of UN military engagements in Somalia was to bequeath a legacy that profoundly affected US and UN policy on peacekeeping and related matters thereafter.<sup>39</sup>

The UN was deeply involved in Somalia, particularly in the field of humanitarian assistance, well before it ever considered deploying military observers and peacekeepers in 1992.<sup>40</sup> Although there is a long history to the

conflict, it was the overthrow of the regime of Siad Barre in January 1991 that marked a significant stage in the deterioration of the overall situation there.<sup>41</sup> The withdrawal of UN relief agencies in early 1991 was a fatal decision for the people of Somalia. At this stage, although lawlessness and anarchy were rampant, famine was not widespread. The necessity for some form of non coercive intervention by the UN to prevent the humanitarian situation worsening was obvious.<sup>42</sup>

The slow response of the UN inevitably meant lost opportunities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at an earlier stage. Such approaches have a fairly good chance of success without great expense and the need for a large military presence.<sup>43</sup> However, the lack of an early and effective response must be considered in the context of other events happening at that time. Despite the end of the Cold War, the UN still faced crippling financial difficulties, and its peace-keeping role was over stretched dealing with, among others, major events in the former Yugoslavia and in Cambodia. Intervention in a civil war or internal conflict situation presents special difficulties, and this explained in large part the view of those at UN headquarters that the response to Somalia should be limited to delivering humanitarian aid. This view was also significantly influenced by the US and Russian reluctance to become involved.<sup>44</sup> This was not unlike the policy and reluctance of the UN with regard to intervention in Lebanon also.

Early mediation efforts had limited success but did secure agreement on a ceasefire between the leaders of two major factions, General Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi, and the deployment of a UN technical team. Although the policy of dealing with leaders like Aidid and Mahdi was based on pragmatic considerations in that the UN probably had little option in the circumstances, it ignored their record as leaders of groups that were responsible for serious breaches of human rights and humanitarian law during the conflict.<sup>45</sup> The UN emphasis on the importance of a good working relationship with all the parties may be a barrier to confronting recalcitrant leaders effectively.<sup>46</sup> Even worse was the fact that the policy was inconsistent throughout the period. Such policy shifts did little to inspire confidence among traditional Somali leaders and elders, and it must have been somewhat bewildering for the "warleaders" also. There were other less obvious factors at play in the lead up to UN intervention. Aidid was opposed to any deployment of UN personnel and to a ceasefire.<sup>47</sup> He perceived this as a means of freezing the *status quo* and preventing him from defeating Mahdi, which he considered he was in a position to do in a relatively short time. There was also significant historical animosity between Aidid and the new Secretary-General that would influence events throughout the period of UN involvement.<sup>48</sup>

## **Deployment of UNOSOM I**

As the situation in Somalia during early 1992 continued to deteriorate, the need for some form of intervention to improve the security situation became even more imperative. Aid workers and the general population were being harassed and terrorized, and there were reports of crop failures in the agriculturally rich region to the south.<sup>49</sup> It was against this background that Mohamed Sahnoun was appointed the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia, and soon afterwards the first UNOSOM ("UNOSOM I") mission was established.<sup>50</sup> Resolution 751(1992) was the legal basis for the UN attempt to deploy a small number of ceasefire observers and a small force of security personnel for the protection of humanitarian relief operations in the capital.<sup>51</sup> Though such a move was certainly warranted, it was likely to be considered threatening by Aided and it had not been endorsed by him.<sup>52</sup>

Nevertheless, the deployment was based on traditional peacekeeping premises, i.e. the consent of the parties. However, this was a failed state and the application of conventional thinking and methods was not appropriate. Not surprisingly, there was poor cooperation from the factions and outright opposition from others, which led to long delays in the deployment of these units and a consensus that it was completely ineffective. The linking of action to the agreement of the warlords at a time when Somalis were starving damaged the credibility of the Organization in the eyes of Somali people. It was also an abdication by the Security Council of its responsibility, and a lost opportunity for early intervention. Agreement and consensus is preferable, but given the humanitarian crisis, a deadline should have been set for intervention to impose a ceasefire and secure humanitarian aid.

The Bush administration had initially opposed the deployment of 500 armed troops as it was concerned with the escalating cost of peacekeeping in an election year, despite the fact that the overall cost was small in comparison with other operations.<sup>53</sup> This was an untenable position to adopt and in the circumstances, it was not surprising that the Secretary-General grew frustrated at what he saw as the West's preoccupation with "a rich man's war" in the Balkans, while it was prepared to ignore the plight of the people of Somalia.<sup>54</sup>

It was evident from the Secretary-General's report in July that the situation continued to be critical, and in an effort to begin the process of rebuilding the Somali state, the Special Representative had begun negotiations with traditional elders and political leaders.<sup>55</sup> Sahnoun's delegation pursued a strategy of putting the clan system to work for Somalia.<sup>56</sup> This bottom up approach had much to recommend,<sup>57</sup> and it was a means of restoring the political balance in favor of more traditional leadership that had been consistently urged on UNOSOM by the Uppsala Advisory Group.<sup>58</sup> The slow response of the UN may indeed have been the result of structural rigidity and bureaucracy.<sup>59</sup> But the scale and complexity of the problem did not have a precedent for the Organization to follow. Do you

deal with the warlords, and if so in what way? There were no political structures, and the physical infrastructure was almost not-existent.

The actual plan to establish a traditional peacekeeping operation with the mandate to use force if necessary to protect the food convoys was well conceived. The decentralized concept and the engagement of regional organizations and all Somali factions in control of territory had much merit. Had it been successful it would have cost very little in comparison with what was to follow. The truth was that UNOSOM 1 was never really given a chance to succeed. Several serious problems were created by wrong and unjustified moves of the UN management, both at headquarters and by some agencies' representative in the field.<sup>60</sup> These hampered Sahnoun's efforts which led to strains in relations, but his primary sin in the eyes of the UN hierarchy was to make his views known publicly. After "arduous negotiations," and with the help of local elders, Sahnoun obtained the consent of Aidid, Mahdi, and other faction leaders to the deployment of the 500 armed UN "security personnel" to protect aid coming through Mogadishu port. This was not the victory it seemed as Aidid and others probably realized that the aid could be hijacked as soon as it left the port anyway. However, before these even touched down in Somalia, the Security Council agreed to increase the size of the force to 3,500 at the request of the Secretary-General.<sup>61</sup>

Unfortunately, Sahnoun was neither consulted nor informed of the decision in advance.<sup>62</sup> This undermined his authority and made him appear duplicitous in the eyes of Aidid. From the point of view of the Secretary-General, it was a logical progression given the deteriorating security and general situation in Somalia. Aidid was enraged at the lack of any consultation, and it added to his sense of grievance and insecurity at the growing UN involvement. Furthermore, the leaders of the neighboring countries, who had been supportive to date and kept informed of events by Sahnoun, were also ignored.

One other incident that occurred was also to have a profound impact on the trust gained by UNOSOM and the UN up to that point. It became known that a Russian plane with UN markings and chartered by a UN agency had delivered currency and military equipment to Aidid's major rival in the north, Mahdi.<sup>63</sup> It later transpired that the plane was doing some unauthorized "moonlighting." A proper investigation should have been held into the incident and appropriate action taken. This added to the difficulties of the UN personnel on the ground. The incident rekindled all the earlier fears about a partisan UN approach to the conflict, and, although false, the rumors and circumstantial evidence were not rebutted in the proper way. Unfortunately, the criticism of the UN by Sahnoun did not help his already troubled relationship with headquarters.<sup>64</sup>

### **Options Facing the Secretary-General and the Deployment of UNITAF**

UN intervention in Somalia arose from the urgent need to respond to the famine and appalling suffering of the Somali people. The response was slow and deliberate; each Security Council resolution expanded and modified the role of UNOSOM. As the situation deteriorated and the operation floundered in late 1992, the Secretary-General faced up to the dilemma and outlined five options.<sup>65</sup> The first was to continue with peacekeeping, i.e. a consensual and non-forceful mission. This option did not seem viable, given the nature and scale of the problems. A second option was to withdraw, but this would have been an unacceptable public admission of failure that might also have been interpreted as setting a bad precedent for ongoing operations in the Balkans. A further option was to be more assertive and forceful in the capital, in the hope that this would have an influence in the country as a whole. Alternatively, a UN enforcement mission could be launched under its own command and control. However, it is unlikely that the UN possessed either the capability or capacity to do so, then or now. Not surprisingly, when the US indicated that it would be prepared to spearhead a UN sanctioned forceful mission to establish a secure environment for humanitarian operations, the Security Council agreed.

At first the US was reluctant to become involved. The Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali also put pressure on President Bush pointing out, among other things, the growing perception among the countries of the South that the US manipulated the UN only when it served US interests, as in the Gulf War. While the US was prepared to act unilaterally, they were understandably anxious to have international support on the ground and in the Security Council.<sup>66</sup> It seems that the actual decision to intervene was taken by President Bush. No doubt this decision was influenced by criticism from non-governmental agencies, Capitol Hill, and the Clinton camp. But it was probably a conclusion by the military that they could "do the job" if called upon that had most influence on the president. The decision was generally popular with the American public and with Congress, and President-elect Clinton endorsed it.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, even before the operation was mounted there were those who questioned whether it was appropriate or necessary.<sup>68</sup> In any event, it should have been evident from the beginning that the conflict in Somalia was not going to be of the short, sharp, overwhelming kind that politicians and military planners, especially in the US, believe is vital to sustain a public consensus for involvement.

In December 1992, acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794(1992) and determined that "the magnitude of the human tragedy [mass starvation] caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of human assistance, constituted a threat to international peace and security."<sup>69</sup> In authorizing UNITAF, a large multinational force led by the US, to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible" a secure environment for humanitarian relief

operations, the Security Council took an important step in redefining its role in the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>70</sup> This was a familiar UN euphemism for authorizing the use of force and it was in stark contrast to the UN intervention in Lebanon, which occurred along traditional peacekeeping lines and for which there were established precedents. Implicit in the resolution was a recognition that the situation was beyond that to which the normal rules of peacekeeping would apply. Its adoption reflected a new consensus on what constituted a “threat to peace” justifying military enforcement action under Article 42. Article 39 was interpreted as including a humanitarian disaster caused by mass starvation. This was a significant precedent from the more traditional approach to the use of force under Article 42.<sup>71</sup>

Like the enabling resolution in respect of UNIFIL, Resolution 794(1992) was the result of both political and pragmatic considerations, and as such it was not a perfectly crafted document. It would have been preferable if the objectives of the mandate had been precisely defined and limited in time in order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post conflict peace building.<sup>72</sup> It was ambiguous in certain important respects, but it was clear that like Resolution 425(1978), it also required the cooperation of the parties in Somalia in order to be effective. It was also evident from correspondence from the Secretary-General to the Security Council and to President Bush, that he perceived one of the primary objectives as being to neutralize the heavy arms of the regular forces of the factions, and to disarm irregular forces.<sup>73</sup> In the final draft of the resolution this objective was dropped in favor of more neutral language, which was more acceptable to all members of the Security Council. This was a significant omission that subsequently contributed to the most important difference in interpretation of the objectives of the mandate by the US and the Secretary-General, i.e. the issue of disarming the factions.

The Secretary-General had also recommended that the mandate be defined to include a country wide intervention to be carried out under UN command and control; and a specific time limitation within which disarmament would take place, after which the operation would be handed over to UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>74</sup> The Security Council instead opted to authorize a “unified command and control system” which would reflect the offer made by the US to manage the operation. In this regard the Council had little option, as the US would not accept UN command in almost any circumstances, and certainly not when leading enforcement operations under Chapter VII.<sup>75</sup> For this reason, despite the fact that the UN approved the UNITAF mandate, the Organization neither organized nor commanded the troops that were sent to fulfil it. This was one of the most significant differences between UNITAF and the UNOSOM I and II missions. It was also a feature that distinguished it from the traditional model of command and control adopted for UNIFIL and other peacekeeping operations.<sup>76</sup>

Although there was liaison between the existing UNOSOM force and the Secretary-General’s representative on the one hand, and UNITAF, it was evident

that the US was in the driver's seat and it would determine policy and strategy. This was not as unreasonable an arrangement as first might appear. The US was supplying the majority of the troops and the bulk of the military hardware at its own expense. Furthermore, there had been no misrepresentation by the US of the terms under which it would command the operation. Resolution 794(1992) placed emphasis on establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Security Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peacekeeping operations, and there was no mention of a plan or terms of reference as to how this could be achieved. In this regard the long-term strategic goals of both the UNIFIL and UNITAF operations were anything but clear from their respective enabling resolutions.

The process of implementation was bound to give rise to varying interpretations that inevitably lead to political difficulties at the highest level and military dilemmas on the ground. The difference between the approach adopted by the US, and that proposed by the Secretary-General, were all too apparent in the latter's first report on UNITAF to the Council.<sup>77</sup> These constituted fundamental differences that could not be glossed over at a later stage. The US did not seem to appreciate the nature of UN peacekeeping operations, and the political and military constraints under which any UN led operation must function. Nor did it appreciate that a force cannot operate under a peace enforcement mandate, even if motivated by humanitarian considerations, and later revert to a traditional peacekeeping role with the consent of the parties. This was even more apparent later when US forces carried out offensive operations as part of the UNOSOM II mission.

As part of a strategy to alleviate the fears of developing states about major power interference in the internal affairs of other states, the US was not mentioned by name in Resolution 794(1992).<sup>78</sup> While this was indicative of the level of political compromise, it amounted to little more than a cosmetic exercise that could only prove counter-productive in the long-term. It was also contrary to an open and transparent system of decision-making. As OPERATION RESTORE HOPE was getting into full swing, Boutros-Ghali promised the people of Somalia that the Force would "feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political economic and social reconstruction."<sup>79</sup> The Security Council also authorized the US to deputize on its behalf, and significantly, linked human rights issues to a threat to international peace and security. Expectations of what might be achieved by American involvement were high in New York and on the ground in Somalia, but though successful in ensuring delivery of food-stuffs to the starving, UNITAF failed to seize the opportunity to achieve much more at the time.

## **The Dilemma of Disarmament and the Creation of a Safe Environment in Somalia<sup>80</sup>**

The UNITAF stage of the overall Somalia operation was generally considered successful.<sup>81</sup> Despite UNITAF's Chapter VII mandate, the US relied heavily on traditional peacekeeping principles. This would have been admirable in another context, but neutralizing the clan's heavy weapons and disarmament was essential to creating a secure environment, and achieving the long-term strategy of handing over to a peacekeeping force. It is easy to portray an operation that sets itself limited goals as an unqualified success when it fulfils these limited objectives. The reality may be somewhat different, especially if the force has the capability to achieve much more. UNITAF was such an operation and in its execution of the mandate it avoided the main obstacles to a long-term restoration of peace.<sup>82</sup>

The American refusal to live up to the consequences of its intervention was especially damaging to this critical issue.<sup>83</sup> With around 30,000 troops, under a unified system of command, UNITAF certainly had the capacity to disarm the warlords.<sup>84</sup> But the political rhetoric did not translate into effective action on the ground. Instead, it chose to evade this difficult task by requesting that weapons be moved out of the areas "controlled" by UNITAF to other locations. Although adopting such an approach did avoid confrontation and inevitable casualties, the policy was flawed as a concentrated effort to remove and destroy the Somalis' heavy weapons, including the infamous "technicals," was an achievable goal at that time that would have laid the ground rules for the subsequent UN operation to follow. It would also have been an ideal way of showing serious intent to restore order. The UN and the Somalis themselves had expected disarmament to take place. UNITAF could also have used the clan leader's agreement to disarm in the Addis Ababa Accords of March 1993 to argue that it was an impartial force facilitating this agreement. Failure to do so meant the failure to create a secure environment in which some degree of normality was restored, and those with the most weapons continued to wield most power.

In the conduct of US military operations abroad, a major factor is the avoidance of incurring casualties and as a matter of policy the US decided not to disarm the factions as this may have led to exposure to risk. In fact, the US may be said to operate a zero casualty policy.<sup>85</sup> The US marines commanded the operation, and the experience with the Multi National Force in Lebanon was an important influence on their thinking.<sup>86</sup> Such a policy would not have been possible if Resolution 794(1993) had not been the result of political compromise and ambiguous in regard to the crucial issue of disarmament. It may be the case that the US considered that the planned UN force intended to succeed UNITAF could deal with this issue, but it is hard to accept that they could have been that naive.

The warlords, in particular Aidid, realized that they would not face a serious challenge from UNITAF and that by biding their time, it would be replaced



by a militarily weaker UN force. There were no long-term strategic or political objectives that might threaten the warlord's supremacy, and it soon became apparent that adopting a wait and see policy was the most prudent response until UNITAF left. By the time the US formally acknowledged that disarmament of the clans was necessary, it was too late.<sup>87</sup> Of the false promises made by UNITAF, it was the claim that it had created a secure environment that really angered the aid agencies.<sup>88</sup> It seemed that despite pleas by the UN to remain longer, UNITAF wanted to ensure the mission was deemed a success and that the situation was ripe for a handover to UNOSOM II in May 1993. Although a much less militarily capable force, the mandate of UNOSOM II was much wider and sufficiently imprecise to "offer many hostages to fortune."<sup>89</sup> Acting under Chapter VII, the new force would not be constrained by the issues of consent or the use of force in self-defence. The "demands" on disarmament, and "requests" for national reconciliation and the "consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia" contained in Resolution 814(1993) were easy to make but later proved impossible to achieve in the circumstances.<sup>90</sup>

## **PROBLEMS OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS IN UNIFIL AND UNOSOM II**

### **Problems of Command and Control**

UNOSOM II took over formally from UNITAF/UNOSOM I on 4 May 1993.<sup>91</sup> This was not as early as had originally been planned, but there had been no major crises in the mean time and the US could claim to be handing over the ship in good shape. A new US administration was now at the helm, and one of the primary concerns was ensuring President Clinton was not exposed to risk in a foreign intervention handed on from the Bush administration. But the US had invested a lot of energy and prestige in Somalia and it could not now slip away quietly. Nor could it be seen to allow the follow up operation to fail, and in these circumstances the US continued to play a leading role in every facet of UNOSOM II's organization and mandate.<sup>92</sup> In many ways this suited the UN Secretariat and Boutros-Ghali, who realized that the operation depended on American military and political support. The US agreed to provide logistical and tactical support under a complex command and control arrangement, but this among other things was later to cause a serious rift between the Clinton administration and the Secretariat.<sup>93</sup>

While in theory the US had handed back control of the operation to the UN, the reality was much different. A convenient mechanism to allow the US to ensure that one of its own officers retained full command of US troops in Somalia was put in place by the appointment of General Thomas Montgomery as Deputy Force Commander. It was no coincidence either that an experienced NATO officer would command this "strange and fragmented operation," or retired American Admiral Jonathan Howe would act as the Secretary-General's

special representative.<sup>94</sup> The Force Commander reported directly to the Special Representative, who in turn reported to the Secretary-General. This gave significant influence to the US, even if it did not formally command the mission. In addition, this complex system was made even more cumbersome by the decision of the US to establish a Quick Reaction Force outside the UN chain of command.<sup>95</sup> This amounted to the establishment of a parallel US chain of command that was intended to exist alongside, but independent from, the UN command structure. It is difficult to describe this set up as other than a recipe for confusion and ultimate disaster. How it was intended to operate in times of crisis in the context of an already complex multi-dimensional operation involving around 30 nations and many non governmental organizations, is a question that must not have been addressed seriously by military planners in Washington and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. The continued American domination proved to be a mixed blessing for UNOSOM II, and events showed that the structures put in place proved unable to maintain cohesion under pressure and ultimately contributed to the demise of the force.<sup>96</sup>

The issue of command and control was closely linked to the final condition that the Secretary-General considered essential for the effective operation of UNIFIL, i.e. that it function as an integrated and efficient military unit. Many officers who served with UNIFIL since 1978 consider that this condition has not been met, and it is the consensus among participants and commentators that this was not the case with UNOSOM II either.<sup>97</sup> While it would be futile to argue to the contrary in respect of UNOSOM II, the situation of UNIFIL is worthy of further analysis. The Secretary-General's own choice of words was unfortunate in that it may create the impression that the Force established was to be a conventional military unit properly constituted for traditional military operations. This is not the case. The UNIFIL mission, even if unclear in certain respects, was a peacekeeping mission based on well-established principles and precedents. Even today, peacekeeping is a relatively novel military concept and the mounting and conduct of such missions is very different from conventional military operations.

### **Deficiencies in the UN Organization and Structures**

The UN Organization does not have a military branch.<sup>98</sup> Despite the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), problems remain at Secretariat level, and the *Brahimi Report* recommended that a number of structural adjustments be made to address current problems.<sup>99</sup> The conduct of peacekeeping operations has been on an *ad hoc* basis to date, and due to the inability of members to agree to a comprehensive set of guidelines to govern all UN operations, this is likely to remain the *status quo*.<sup>100</sup>

In order that the Force be acceptable to the Security Council, to the parties involved and to the international community, it is necessary to ensure that there is a wide geographic distribution and a political balance among the contributing

states. This is often detrimental to the smooth operation of the Force as an integrated military unit. When disparities in culture, training, and experience are taken into account, it is remarkable that a multinational force can operate at all.

There were more serious problems in respect of UNOSOM II. The command and control mechanism was complex.<sup>101</sup> When this was applied to a multinational force with a difficult mandate in a failed state like Somalia, the overall effect was a recipe for disaster. The problem of double allegiance has arisen in respect of UNIFIL and the UNOSOM II mission. However, it was much more acute in the case of UNOSOM.<sup>102</sup> It is now accepted that contingents will consult their national governments on decisions which may not conform to defence or foreign policy directives back home.<sup>103</sup> Serious problems did arise in the course of the operation in the Congo, when contributing states disagreed with UN policy, in particular its apparent reluctance to take stronger action to resolve the situation in Katanga.<sup>104</sup> In the case of UNIFIL, no similar problems have arisen.<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately, one of the practical lessons from UN involvement in Somalia (and the former Yugoslavia) is that the organization "cannot manage complex-political military operations."<sup>106</sup> However, the well publicized differences between the commander of the Italian contingent and the UNOSOM II force commander show how serious this problem was in Somalia.<sup>107</sup> It caused serious operational difficulties on the ground and seriously hindered the effectiveness of the Force at a critical period. Other contingents had less publicized difficulties in this regard also. As contingents are usually placed under the operational control, and not under the full command of a force commander of multinational forces, this is a problem that will inevitably reoccur. There have still been occasions when national governments, most notably the French, have interfered in the operational affairs of UNIFIL.<sup>108</sup> The military effectiveness of UNIFIL was also hampered by the location of its headquarters, which was situated in the enclave controlled by the *de facto* forces.

The need for a comprehensive briefing and training for all personnel prior to commencing duty with a peacekeeping force is vital. Many regular officers, in particular those from large countries accustomed to a more aggressive conventional military role, must be given the opportunity to adjust to restrictions such as the use of force only in self defence and the lack of a proper military intelligence network. Taking into account the essential nature of UNIFIL and the many constraints under which it must operate, its success as an integrated and efficient military unit has been remarkable. In any event, a peacekeeping mission must be judged primarily by how it fulfils its political purpose and not solely on its military efficiency. If this is applied to the Somalia operations, then the intervention in all its manifestations must be judged a failure. Critics of UNIFIL can point to its military ineffectiveness in terms of its mandate, and to the costs of maintaining the operation. However, it did provide an international presence and restraining influence on the parties to the conflict, even if this was not at a

level many critics found acceptable. When the time was ripe, there was a pre-existing UN force on the ground to facilitate and confirm the Israeli withdrawal.

### **Reconciliation and Mediation Efforts in Somalia and Lebanon**

A criticism sometimes made of UN peacekeeping and military intervention is that it “freezes” the problem but does not solve the underlying causes of conflict. Efforts at national reconciliation and mediation by the UN in Lebanon and Somalia ultimately came to naught. But the varying approaches to nation building in each case help explain the fundamental differences between the two operations.

In recent years operations tend to be multi-functional in nature, and may include a nation building and national reconciliation policy. In this regard the mandate(s) governing the UNOSOM mission in Somalia was significantly different from UNIFIL.<sup>109</sup> UNOSOM II was, as Boutros-Ghali had pointed out, the first operation of its kind. It was not constrained by the issue of consent, or by the rules governing the use of force in peacekeeping operations. The mandate for fostering national reconciliation was contained in Resolution 814(1993) which authorized UNOSOM II, under Chapter VII, “to assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation.”<sup>110</sup> In fact, national reconciliation was an integral part of UNOSOM’S mandate from the beginning.<sup>111</sup> There was no similar mandate in respect of Lebanon, and while assisting the government there in restoring its authority in the area could be interpreted broadly, it did not mean nation building or even facilitating national reconciliation.

The conflict in Lebanon also had to be seen in a regional context, and it was inextricably linked to the wider security and geopolitical concerns in the Middle East. This made finding a resolution to the conflict very difficult and it prevented the UN from playing a significant role in a resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict. For this reason the UN was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading to the first serious attempt to resolve the conflict since the establishment of UNIFIL, i.e. the Israeli-Lebanon Agreement of 1983. Under the Agreement, the military and other concessions granted to Israel were inconsistent with UNIFIL’s mandate and continued presence in the south.<sup>112</sup> By assigning a very minor role to UNIFIL, it appeared to grant a significant victory to Israel.<sup>113</sup> Israeli policy was consistent and well-known, but what was surprising and difficult to understand was the role of the US in the whole affair. The US representative at the UN had supported UNIFIL’s continued existence in January.<sup>114</sup> Now it appeared to play a major part in an agreement that effectively excluded the UN from any real role in southern Lebanon. A proposal to ensure the safety of Palestinians in camps was fraught with difficulty and had the potential to involve UNIFIL in Lebanon’s factional war in a similar way to that of the Multi National Force.<sup>115</sup> The US believed it could convince Syria to accept the

agreement, an optimism not shared by UN personnel.<sup>116</sup> A combination of factors worked against the Agreement from the start. Later the UN was permitted to play a more central role in the second significant round of negotiations to secure an Israeli withdrawal that were convoked by the Secretary-General in late 1984 and early 1985.<sup>117</sup>

The Israeli position during the “Naqoura talks” can be summarized as attempting to gain advantages through negotiations that they were unable to gain militarily, a strategy that was not acceptable to other parties. The Lebanese position was unrealistic and even irresponsible given the communal violence that would follow a unilateral Israeli withdrawal.<sup>118</sup> In addition to war reparations, the Lebanese insisted on an unconditional Israeli withdrawal. There were to be no arrangements for Israel’s security apart from UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. Israel accepted UNIFIL had a role to play after the withdrawal, but this was not the same as agreeing to rely exclusively on the UN to secure Israel’s northern frontier.

In the event, neither the Naqoura talks nor the 1983 Agreement produced any agreement on an Israeli withdrawal acceptable to all parties. While the failure of UN efforts can be attributed in part to unrealistic demands made by the Lebanese at the behest of Syria, certain of the Israeli conditions were inconsistent with Security Council resolutions since 1978. These conditions amounted to a demand for approval by the UN for the continued occupation of part of Lebanon and recognition of their surrogate militia there. This would have made a mockery of UNIFIL’s original purpose and the intentions of the Security Council, in particular the proposal to deploy around Sidon. Such a move would have shifted responsibility from the Israelis to the UN for inter communal violence. It seemed the parties prior to the negotiations misled the Secretary-General and that from the beginning there was little hope of finding agreement.

The UN efforts at reconciliation in Somalia were more proactive than those in Lebanon, but they too failed to achieve any long-term success.<sup>119</sup> Among the factors militating against success was the initial controversy such efforts generated, not least because they failed to take cognisance of the post-Barre Somalia and they found support among those who no longer held power and influence in the country.<sup>120</sup> Conventional analyses at the time tended to blame deficiencies in policies and personalities within the US and the UN, and the Somali body politic.<sup>121</sup> These may have underestimated the complexity of the factors adversely affecting efforts at reconciliation, but the policies and mistakes of the UN exacerbated this situation. UNOSOM I might have succeeded if the intervention had been earlier and the strategy advocated by the Secretary-General’s special representative, Sahnoun, was pursued. The approach of rebuilding a society from the “bottom up” had much to recommend it. If it had been combined with an even-handed and firm policy on disarmament from an early stage, and the resources were applied to restoring the police and justice system in particular, then matters might have worked out quite differently.

An integral part of the reconciliation process was the need to rebuild the Somali police and justice system. But this was handicapped from the beginning by the requirement that resources for this program be obtained from voluntary contributions.<sup>122</sup> This was almost certain to assure its failure and showed the lack of commitment to a comprehensive strategic plan to achieve nation-building. In addition, there has been inadequate sensitivity to the political context and a failure to recognize that it must be built on indigenous traditions and involve the local population.

The problems in re-establishing the police and justice system derived primarily from the failure of the UN to treat the matter with urgency,<sup>123</sup> ensure proper consultation and funding, and implement a UNOSOM Justice Division's program.<sup>124</sup> This was despite the urgent need to prioritize civil affairs and re-establish the rule of law. Because of the security situation, re-establishing a viable police force was one of the key elements to restoring normalcy. It is also worth noting that there was no proposal for the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for Somalia. Somalis expected that the US would call for a war crimes tribunal, especially given the evidence of, *inter alia*, crimes against humanity by the Barre regime.<sup>125</sup> One interpretation of this is that the political will did not exist to do so, and that African lives were not equated with European lives. A less benign interpretation is that independent investigation might point to US and European and regional powers complicity with the Barre regime and others in Somalia.<sup>126</sup>

Resolution 814(1993) placed the UN at the centre of reconciliation in Somalia.<sup>127</sup> But Somalia was crowded for a time with those interested in peace-building, and not all the camps agreed among themselves or with each other about what the appropriate strategy should be. Given the lack of any central government or administration, it was predictable that local reconciliation was bound to have the most impact. In essence, all politics is local. Any observer with experience of conflict situations will testify to the relevance of the local situation to the detriment of the national. It is difficult for villagers to identify with national efforts if these do not translate into meaningful gains in personal security and well-being on the ground. Although the US special envoy, Robert Oakely, made worthwhile attempts to involve women's groups and others in the reconciliation process, these efforts were overtaken by events. None of the UN sponsored reconciliation conferences had any long-term impact. The Addis Ababa Conference on national reconciliation in March 1993 failed to exploit in full the apparent consensus among the major factions, and fudged on essential details that later led to disagreement among the factions, and among UN officials.<sup>128</sup> The commitment to disarm in the time frame agreed was unrealistic, and there was no real plan or mechanism in place to accomplish this. The different expectations of the parties and marginalization of Aidid led to conflict on the ground. The process and its aftermath seemed artificial and it is impossible to gauge if the initial consensus was in fact genuine. In the end, any consideration

of the efforts at national reconciliation in Somalia must take cognizance of many factors, but especially be aware of the centrifugal social, economic, and political forces prevalent in Somalia that undermined the process at every level.

## CONCLUSION

An often overlooked factor in the criticism of the UN is the fact that the Organization is resorted to by states most often when it suits their purposes and the problem otherwise seems insoluble. The situation created by the 1978 invasion of Lebanon was such an instance. This is not to say the organizational failures such as those identified by the *Brahimi Report* did not contribute to the difficulties, but this was just part of the problem.<sup>129</sup> The UN, the European Union and the Organization for African Unity have all found that responding to internal conflicts is very difficult. The establishment of UNIFIL was primarily sponsored by the US to facilitate a speedy withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 1978, and to ensure that the so-called Camp David Accords were not further jeopardized by Israeli actions. The Force would also help prevent the outbreak of another major conflict between Syria and Israel. Israel and the US, despite their otherwise strong links, did not always share perceptions as to what constituted a common threat in the Middle East region. Cooperation from the Israelis was vital to the success of UNIFIL. When it became clear that it was not forthcoming, the US never brought sufficient pressure to bear on the Israelis to ensure that they would succumb. The mandate agreed upon for UNIFIL was unrealistic and lent itself to different interpretations by opposite parties. Many elements of the overall plan for the deployment of UNIFIL had obvious deficiencies. In this way, its success has remained dependent on factors outside its control.

A number of recent multinational interventions, whether under the banner of the UN or an independent coalition, have often failed to make a long-term improvement in the crisis situation.<sup>130</sup> There has been a tendency to rely on short-term political expediency to the detriment of long-term strategic policies at the operational level. In general, the military component of multi-dimensional operations have developed a doctrinal approach that largely ignored the realities of the crisis environment and instead sought to rely on the limited version of the problem that could be resolved by military means.<sup>131</sup> This is a natural response from a conventional military that perceives its role as essentially limited to the provision of security, and even then, its first priority will always be its own security.

The Somalia experience shows that military establishments need to re-examine their role in complex political and humanitarian emergencies. In particular, there is considerable mistrust between civil and military components, and each must rethink its relationship with the other and coordinate their functions for the common good.<sup>132</sup> For a multi-dimensional peace operation to be effective, humanitarian and developmental aspects must be accorded equal status.<sup>133</sup>

Attempts at coordination by the military were interpreted as attempts at control. There is a need for the military to expand its concept of security to consider much more than “keeping the lid” on things, and to embrace the security of the local population, reconstruction, and rehabilitation. The failure to disarm the clans was a serious flaw in the implementation phase of the UN operations, but even this would have been insufficient without the creation of a safe environment. If you want to create a secure environment, then peace must be made with all the parties. The narrow focus on humanitarian and military issues meant the underlying political problems did not receive sufficient attention. What political agenda existed was overtaken by military events and the adoption of a coercive response.

The Lebanon and Somalia operations show the need for support from the members of the Security Council, irrespective of the nature of the operation. Both operations also illustrate that problems arise when missions are ill-defined, and this uncertainty was compounded in the case of Somalia by a dispute about the authority to use force. The *Brahimi Report* called for more robust Rules of Engagement (ROE) in operations involving intra-state/transnational conflicts and bigger and better equipped forces. It did not seem to take full cognizance of the fact that the use of force must be accompanied by political will, a clear mandate and strategy, a willingness to accept casualties, and a need for an effective command and control mechanism to ensure cohesion and uniform application. It also failed to address the issues raised by regional peacekeepers or coalitions of the willing acting under the authority of the UN.

Somalia shows that robust ROE and increased size are not enough, and while it is imperative not to employ an emasculated UN force, it is important to have a clear military and political strategy agreed to at the outset. The long-term strategy was unclear at the time of inception, but by the end of the operation it was non-existent. What efforts were made at rebuilding the war torn society were inept and imposed without sufficient attention to indigenous political, cultural, and social traditions. Instead of seeking to marginalize all the major warlords, the UN targeted Aidid. The problem was essentially political and not a result of the phenomena associated with the end of the Cold War, and lessons learned in the Congo during the ONUC operation in the 1960s and elsewhere were ignored. It was the neo-colonial attempts to shape and mould future Somali political arrangements that led to disaster. The unfolding events showed that the US and the UN forces failed to appreciate the contradictions and inconsistencies in their confused roles of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement. When this was combined with US domination, and key positions held by difficult personalities, it was hardly surprising that UNOSOM II became a major protagonist in a conflict it was supposed to help resolve. Nor is it true to say that the UN broadened the mandate against the wishes of the US; in fact the US drafted many of the resolutions, especially Resolution 814(1993) on nation-building, and presented them to the UN for implementation.<sup>134</sup>



These issues did not arise in the case of UNIFIL as this was an operation with an almost exclusive military focus. The political objectives were clear, but they were never intended to be the responsibility of UNIFIL; the Force would merely facilitate their achievement by international diplomacy. Nor was there a civil component to the mission. In the case of both missions, the Security Council acted as if the mandate would be self-executing once the troops were deployed. When the UNIFIL mandate proved impractical, the *de facto* mission of the force became the provision of a secure environment for the local population. It took nearly 23 years for UNIFIL to implement the mandate, but its ultimate success in achieving this goal may be said to have vindicated the role of traditional peacekeeping. The same may not be said of the intervention in Somalia. Apart from the loss of life on all sides, the tragedy of Somalia is the failure to learn the right lessons from a situation where the UN was called upon to fulfil a range of impossible and confused tasks.

### Endnotes

I am indebted to Dr. David Charters (Editor) and the referees for the advice proffered in regard to an earlier draft of this article.

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14. G. Tueni, *Une guerre pour les autres* (Paris: Jean Claude Lattes), pp. 200-04. Mr. Tueni was Lebanon's Ambassador to the UN at the time.
15. Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p. 289.
16. In this regard, the Secretary-General had this to say:  

when a peacekeeping operation is firmly based on a detailed agreement between the parties in conflict and they are prepared to abide by that agreement, it is relatively easy to maintain ... (e.g. UNEF and UNDOF) ... when, however, an operation is mounted in an emergency with ambiguous or controversial objectives and terms of reference, and on assumptions which are not wholly realistic, it is likely to present far greater difficulties. This is undoubtedly the case with UNIFIL.
- K. Waldheim, *Building the Future Order*, Robert L. Schiffer, ed., (London: Collier Macmillan, 1980), p. 45.
17. Conor C. O'Brien, *The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 584. See also N. A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts* (Boulder, CO and London: Westview/Foreign Policy Institute, 1984), p. 18.
18. President Carter was later to identify this as his most significant foreign policy achievement. Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (London/New York: Bantam, 1982). See also B. Reich and R. Hollis, "Peacekeeping in the Reagan Administration," in P. Marants and J.G. Stein, eds., *Peace Making in the Middle East – Problems and Prospects* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 133-55.
19. Edward E. Azar and Kate Shnayerson, "United States – Lebanese Relations: A Pocketful of Paradoxes," in *The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 219-75. See also Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 792; and C. Cruise O'Brien, *The Siege*, pp. 400-03.
20. H. Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982). Reich and Hollis, "Peacekeeping," pp. 133-34.
21. Interview, Lt. Gen. E.A. Erskine, Dublin, July 1986. Since the conclusion of the so-called Cairo Agreement in 1969 between the PLO and the Lebanese army, the PLO had certain military rights in Lebanon. The text of the Agreement is given by Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in the Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East*, Harvard Studies in International Affairs no. 39 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1979), pp. 185-87.
22. Document S/12620/Add 4, 05 May 1978.
23. Indar J. Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: Hurst, 1984), p. 109.
24. *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd. ed. (New York: United Nations, 1996), p. 88-89.
25. Document S/12611, 19 March 1978, was approved by Security Council Resolution 426 (1978), 19 March 1978. The essential conditions were that first it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Second, it must operate with the full cooperation of all the parties concerned. Third, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.
26. *The Peacekeeping Handbook* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1984), Chaps. 2 and 3, esp. pp. 33-35.

27. D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Forces* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1964), p. 160. At one stage, in answer to criticism of his handling of ONUC, he reminded the Security Council that it was their responsibility to "indicate what you want to be done . . . but if no advice is forthcoming. . . then I have no choice but to follow my own conviction." G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 871st Pln Mtg, p. 96.
28. Report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, S/17965, 09 April 1986. para 51.
29. Document S/12845, 13 September 1978, paras 36-38; and *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 88-89.
30. The text of the Agreement is given by Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence*, pp. 185-87.
31. Interview Erskine. See also Tueni, *Une guerre*, pp.203-04; and S/12620/Add.5, 13 June 1978, para 13.
32. Document S/12845, para 37.
33. Letter dated 13 June 1978, from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General, Document S/12736. For the Secretary-General's description of the "accommodation" reached with the PLO, see Document S/12845 dated 13 September 1978, paras 39-42. It was agreed, *inter alia*, that UNIFIL would only deploy in areas physically used or held by the Israeli Defence Forces, and that armed PLO elements (140 approx. in six positions) in the UNIFIL area would be allowed to remain but these would not be used for military purposes.
34. See the reports in *The Irish Times*, 8 June 1978 and 19 June 1978.
35. Personal interview, senior Irish officer with UNIFIL at the time, Galway, March 1999.
36. Document S/12840, letter dated 8 September 1978, from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General.
37. *The Blue Helmets*, pp. 97-98.
38. Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia*, p. xix.
39. See generally, I. Daalder, "Knowing when to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeepers;" and William J. Durch "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990's," in William J. Durch, ed., *Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 1-34 and 35-68 respectively; also Theo Farrell, "Sliding into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine," *International Peacekeeping* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 194-214.
40. *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, p. 15.
41. Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia*, pp. 1-11; *The United Nations and Somalia*, pp. 9-13; Human Rights Watch/Africa, *Somalia Faces the Future – Human Rights in a Fragmented Society* 7, no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 13-16; and Lee V. Cassanelli, "Somali Land Resources Issues in Historical Perspective," in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp. 67-76.
42. See Tim Deagle, "Famine threatens Somali capital as thousands of refugees flock in," *The Times* (London), 23 May 1991, p. 11. See also Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia*, pp. 8-9.
43. Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia – The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994), pp. 5-11.
44. Cohen, "Intervention," p. 54.
45. *Human Rights Watch/Africa*, pp. 17-32.
46. See Steven John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, "Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment," in Jeremy Giner, ed., "Beyond Emergencies – Development Within Peacekeeping Missions," Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 17-35 at 24. See also Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 200-02.
47. John Drysdale, "Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences," Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 118-34 at 121.

48. This went back to the period when Boutros-Ghali was the Egyptian minister responsible for foreign policy at a time when the Egyptian government supported the Siad Barre regime. Interview, Mohamed Sahnoun; and Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia*, p. 19. See also Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia*, p. 21.
49. James L. Woods, "US Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 151-72 at p. 154.
50. Security Council Resolution 751(1992), 24 April 1992. It is referred to as UNOSOM I to distinguish it from the later UNOSOM II mission. Sahnoun was an experienced Algerian diplomat. See also *UN Chronicle* XXIX, no. 3 (September 1992), p. 14.
51. Resolution 751, 24 April 1992, para. 4. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, S/23829, 21 April 1992, esp. paras. 22-33 and 62-63.
52. In the Secretary-General report (S/23929, para. 23), he noted "that under the Agreements [with Aidid] the UN is to consult the parties before determining the number of security personnel required for the protection function."
53. The operation was to be established for an initial period of six months, at an estimated cost of \$23.1 million (S/23829 and Add. 1 and 2). See also *The Globe and Mail*, "If Sarajevo, Why not Somalia?," 22 July 1992, p. A18. Bush was also concerned with the perception that he had more interest in foreign than domestic policy in an election year. *New York Times*, 26 April 1992.
54. Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p. 55; and Elaine Sciolino, "UN chief has to direct peace efforts at US, too," *The New York Times*, 16 October 1993, p. A1.
55. See Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, S/24343, 22 July 1992, esp. paras. 21, 22, and 63. The sheer scale of the crisis was evident from Sahnoun's Report to donors' conference convened in Geneva on 12 October 1992, quoted in Sahnoun, *Somalia – the Missed Opportunities*, pp. 27-29.
56. See Sture Normak, "Building Local Political Institutions: District and Regional Councils," paper to the Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from the UN Operation in Somalia, Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Plainsboro, NJ, 13-15 September 1995, p. 3; and Walter Clarke, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia*, pp. 3-19 at p. 7.
57. Interview, International Concern worker in Somalia at the time, Galway, Ireland, January 1999. See also William Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy, Humanitarian Intervention and 'State Building' in Somalia," in Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 310-65 at p. 316.
58. This was based in the Horn of Africa Centre of the Life and Peace Institute of Uppsala. It was comprised of a number social scientists with expertise on Somalia drawn from a number of countries.
59. Interview, Sahnoun, 26 November 1993, Dublin.
60. Mohamed Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 5 (1994), pp. 5-13, at p. 10.
61. Resolution 775 (1992), 28 August 1992, para. 3.
62. Interview, Sahnoun; and Sahnoun, *Somalia – The Missed Opportunities*, pp. 38-39. See also S.M. Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1993), 68-69.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 39. There was some confusion as to whether the plane was still under lease to the World Food Program. The United Nations Office for Legal Affairs concluded that the lease contract remained in force at the time of the flight.
64. Sahnoun resigned after losing the confidence and support of the Secretary-General, Interview Sahnoun; see also Sahnoun, *Somalia – The Missed Opportunities*, p. 40. For a less sympathetic perspective, see Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p. 56.

65. Document S/24868 dated 30 November 1992.
66. Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, "Somalia," in Mayall, ed., *New Interventionism*, pp. 94-225 at 111.
67. James L. Woods, "US Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, p. 158.
68. Africa Rights, *Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment* (London, May 1993). OXFAM – America, OXFAM – UK, and CONCERN Worldwide supported it, while Medecins Sans Frontier and Save the Children opposed it. See STC press release "Imposing troops could destroy the effort," 26 November 1992; interview, Concern Worldwide worker in Somalia at the time, Dublin, 1999.
69. Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992, third paragraph of the preamble.
70. N.D. White and O. Ulgen, "The Security Council and the Decentralized Military Option: Constitutionality and Function," *Netherlands International Law Review* XLIV, no. 3 (1997), pp. 378-413 at p. 398; see also M.R. Hutchinson, "Restoring Hope: UN Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," *Harvard International Law Journal* 34 (1993), pp. 624-40.
71. Although the resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote, there was not the same unanimity among the members regarding the significance of the vote. Some seemed reluctant to recognize that they were creating a precedent that could be followed in the future. They stressed the unique nature of the situation in Somalia, and special emphasis was placed on the lack of any government. See S.C.O.R., 47th Session, 3 December 1992.
72. See the Secretary-General's recommendation, Document S/24868, 30 November 1992.
73. Document S/24868, 30 November 1992; and letter from the Secretary-General to President Bush dated 8 December 1992, reproduced in *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, p. 216.
74. Document S/24868 dated 30 November 1992.
75. See Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia*, esp. pp. 45-49; and generally, I. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeepers," and William Durch "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990's," in Durch, *UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 1-34 and 35-68 respectively.
76. It is also noteworthy that the costs of the operation were borne by the countries supplying troops and by the countries that contributed to a voluntary trust fund set up by the Security Council.
77. S/24992, 19 December 1992.
78. Hutchinson, "Restoring Hope," p. 632.
79. UN Press Release SG/SM/4874, 8 December 1992; and *UN Chronicle* (New York: United Nations, March 1993), p. 16.
80. For a general discussion on disarmament and demobilization in Africa, see C. Alden, "The Issue of the Military: UN Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in Southern Africa," in Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," pp. 51-69.
81. See Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia*, pp. 149-73; *The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996*, p. 35; and Woods, "US Decision Making During Operations in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 151-72 at p. 159; Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy," in Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 325; Farrell, "Sliding into War," p. 194; and Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos*, p. 74.
82. Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp. 59-60. Boutros-Ghali believed that three critical steps were needed: disarming the warring groups, establishing a secure environment, and creating a working division of labor between the US and UN on the ground.
83. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1996), pp. 70-85 at p. 75; and Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 239-53.

84. It had a number of well trained and "elite" units from European armies, such as the French Foreign Legion, Belgian Para Commandos, and Italian paratroopers.
85. Interview, Michael Sharf, former Attorney Advisor to the UN, US Dept. of State, with special responsibility for, *inter alia*, Somalia 1991-93, Yale Law School, USA, July 1999.
86. For background to the MNF mission, see Ramesh Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), esp. pp. 79-107.
87. Clarke and Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, p. 244.
88. Interview, Concern Worldwide worker, Dublin, 1999.
89. Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. The quote is from Lewis and Mayall, "Somalia," in Mayall, ed., *New Interventionism*, pp. 94-225 at 94.
90. Resolution 814, 26 March 1993, Section A, para 4 and section B, paras 7-14. See F. Tanner, "Weapons Control in Semi-permissive Environments: A Case for Compellance," in Michael Pugh, ed., "The UN, Peace and Force," Special Issue, *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 126-45 at p. 140.
91. In accordance with Resolution 814, 26 March 1993. It provided for a multinational force of 20,000 troops, 8,000 logistical, and 3,000 civilian support staff. The US also agreed to provide a tactical quick reaction force.
92. Ultimately this caused serious differences between the Secretary-General and the Clinton administration, see Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp. 92-102. For an overview of the experience of the larger European armies involved in Somalia, see Gerard Prunier, "The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 135-47. See also *Message from the President of the United States – A Report on the Military Operation in Somalia*, 13 October 1993 (US Government Printing Office, 1993) for US conditions on participation.
93. See Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp. 93-94; and Jonathan T. Howe, "Relations Between the United States and the United Nations in Dealing with Somalia," and Harry Johnson and Ted Dagne, "Congress and the Somalia Crisis," Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 173-90, esp. 179-84 and pp. 191-204.
94. This was the description used by Boutros-Ghali, see Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p. 93.
95. The United States also deployed a specially constituted Task Force Ranger, which remained at all times under the direct command and control of the commander in chief, United States special operations.
96. See Ray Murphy, "Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian and Irish Forces," *Journal of Armed Conflict Law* 4, no. 1 (June 1999), pp. 41-73, at pp. 56-62; and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Resolution 885(1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel, S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, esp. part v-vii.
97. This view is based on interviews with personnel associated with both missions.
98. While the Secretary-General has a Military Adviser, he does not have sufficient military staff employed in the Headquarters for the planning and organization of operations. Article 47 of the UN Charter provides for the establishment of a military staff committee. No agreements have been concluded to place armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council under Article 43 to date. Nor has the committee been involved in peacekeeping operations. See Bowett, *United Nations Forces*, pp. 12-18.
99. *Brahimi Report*, esp. Summary of Recommendations, paras. 9-18. See Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 281 (October 1993), pp. 52-61.
100. See *Comprehensive review of the whole question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their aspects* (New York: United Nations, 1976, Doc A/31/337).

101. See Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp. 93-94; and Murphy, "Legal Framework," pp. 56-62.
102. See Christopher Brady and Sam Daws, "UN Operations: The Political-Military Interface," *International Peacekeeping* 1, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-79 at 68-71.
103. Interviews, Lt. Gen. Walghren, Naqoura, October 1989; and Lt. Gen. Callaghan, Dublin 1986, UNIFIL Force Commanders.
104. R. Higgins, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo* (ONUC) 1960-1964 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1980), Chap. 8, "Relations with Contributing States," pp. 97-124.
105. Interview, Callaghan.
106. See Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), p. 5.
107. The Secretary-General considered that the Italians were a "mistake" and that as a former colonial power they pursued their own agenda, see Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p. 96. See also Brady and Daws, "UN Operations," pp. 59-79 at 68-71.
108. Interview, senior UNIFIL Staff Officer, Naqoura, Lebanon, October 1989. See also S/18348, 18 September 1996; and Ray Murphy, "UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon and the Use of Force," *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 38-63 at pp. 52-55.
109. See generally Omar Halim, "A Peacekeepers Perspective of Peacebuilding in Somalia," in Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," pp. 70-86; and Drysdale, "Foreign Military Intervention," pp. 133-34.
110. Resolution 814, 26 March 199, para. 4(c). This was a broad mandate which included: political reconciliation; the building of political and administrative structures; disarmament and demobilization of fighters; enforcement of the arms embargo from within Somalia; the re-establishment of the Somali police and justice system; the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; demining and rehabilitation and reconstruction. See generally Halim, "A Peacekeepers Perspective," in Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," pp. 70-86.
111. Resolution 751, 24 April 1992 and *The United Nations in Somalia*, pp.19-20; and S/23693, 11 March 1992, paras. 43-54.
112. The full text of the agreement was published in *Monday Morning XII*, no. 567, week of May 23-29, 1983. An abridged version was printed in *Keesing's XXIX*, pp. 32409-410. See also Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 142-53. Para 4 of the Annex on Security arrangements provided for a minor role for one battalion in the Sidon area.
113. Israel had repeatedly called for the withdrawal of UNIFIL in the months leading up to the agreement. H. Goodman, *The Jerusalem Post*, 8 May 1993. The Israelis let it be known that they wanted the Netherlands and/or Norway to supply troops for the Sidon area. See also Security Council Official Records, 2411 Mtg., 18 January 1983.
114. Security Council Official Records, 2411 Mtg., 18 January 1983.
115. Opposition to the Multi National Force grew during 1983, see Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 44-66; and Thakur, *International Peacekeeping*, pp. 79-106 and 171.
116. Interview, Callaghan. See J. W. Jabbara and N. W. Jabbara, "Lebanon, Gateway to Peace?," *International Journal*, 38 (Autumn 1983), p. 606; and D. Gilmore, *Lebanon – the Fractured Country* (London: Sphere Books, 1984), p. 188. It was also suggested that Syria could only be induced to leave if the US gave a commitment to persuade the Israelis to withdraw from the Golan Heights and the West Bank.
117. *The Blue Helmet*, pp. 104-05. Security Council Resolution 555(1984), 12 October 1984 and Resolution 549(1994), 19 April 1984, had contained a paragraph requesting the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the parties concerned.
118. The outbreak of communal violence was widely predicted at the time, interview, Capt. G. Humphries, Military Informantion Officer 1984, UNIFIL Headquarters, Dublin, July 1999.

119. The UN sponsored several major peace conferences and a number of national reconciliation meetings, but despite two significant national accords, the Somali parties failed to honor the commitments they had made. See *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, pp. 6-7.
120. See also Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia*, pp. 31-32.
121. See Ken Menkhaus "International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia," *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 42-67 and also published in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 42-63.
122. Resolution 865, 22 September 1993, paras. 9, 12, and 13. See also Walter Clarke, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 3-19 at p. 9.
123. It is noteworthy that the report emphasized the importance of civilian police personnel and civilian specialists in peace support operations, and recommended a "doctrinal shift" in their use, *Brahimi Report*, esp. Recommendations, paras. 2, 9, 10, and 16.
124. M. Ganzglass, "The Restoration of the Somali Justice System," *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 113-38; and also published in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 20-41. See also Halim, "A Peacekeepers Perspective," Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," p. 81. For general background, see *The Irish Times*, 17 February 1994.
125. Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia*, p. 18.
126. Ibid. Although the USSR had been the most enduring sponsor of Barre, the US had supported the regime for over a decade before its fall.
127. During the period from 1991 until early 1995, there were 17 known national level and 20 known local level initiatives. Not all of these were sponsored by UNOSOM, and regional actors as well as the US played a significant role.
128. Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes, and Toralv Nordbo, "Fighting for Hope in Somalia," *Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations*, no. 6 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 61-65; and Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia*, pp. 92-99.
129. *Brahimi Report*, n. 3.
130. J. MacKinlay and R. Kent, "A New Approach to Complex Emergencies," *International Peacekeeping* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 31-49 at p. 36. See also David Whaley, "Improving UN Developmental Coordination within Peace Missions," in Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," pp. 107-22.
131. MacKinlay and Kent, "New Approach," pp. 45 and 46. See also A. de Waal and R. Omaar, "Can Military Intervention Be 'Humanitarian'?" *Middle East Report* (March-June 1994), at 5-8; and T. Weiss, "Military-Civilian Humanitarianism: The 'Age' of Innocence is Over," *International Peacekeeping* 2, no. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 157-74. For a military perspective, see S.L. Arnold, "Somalia: An operation Other Than War," *Military Review* (December 1993), pp. 26-35; and W.D. Freeman, "Operation Restore Hope – A US Centcom Perspective," *Military Review* (September 1993), pp. 61-72.
132. Paul Diehl, "With the Best of Intentions: Lessons from UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 19, no. 2 (1996), pp. 153-77 at pp. 159-61. See also Kevin M. Kennedy, "The Relationship between the Military and Humanitarian Organizations in *Operation Restore Hope*," *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 92-112 and also published in Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, pp. 99-117. For a report on ways to improve this relationship, see George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict*, a report to the Carnegie Commission on Prevention Deadly Conflict (New York: December 1998).
133. See Hugo Slim, "The Stretcher and the Drum: Civilian Military Relations in Peace Support Operations," in Ginifer, ed., "Beyond Emergencies," pp. 123-40 at 134.
134. Sharf, interview; and Clarke and Herbst, eds., *Learning From Somalia*, p. 241.