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Peacekeeping, Politics, and the 1994 US Intervention in Haiti

by *Philippe R. Girard*

INTRODUCTION

On 19 September 1994, the first elements of a 23,000 troop-strong multinational force headed by the United States landed in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Their mission was to restore Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power and to push out the military junta headed by Lt. Gen. Raoul Cédras that had overthrown Aristide three years earlier. In the longer term, US President Bill Clinton and his UN backers hoped that Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, as the invasion of Haiti was called, would help ensure Haiti's democratization and its economic development. US troops stayed in Haiti until January 2000; the last UN troops left in February 2001.¹

Peacekeeping missions, such as the US intervention in Haiti, have become more and more frequent since the end of the Cold War. By 1994, the United Nations was involved in no less than 20 separate peacekeeping operations, 15 of which had begun since 1989.² For rich countries, otherwise spared from the horrors of war, peacekeeping has become the most common form of warfare, with missions ranging from feeding starving Somalis (1993) to ending the Rwandan genocide (1994) and protecting ethnic minorities in Kosovo (1999). A pressing question for policy makers and military officers alike is: what makes or breaks these operations? Do they fail because of defeats on the ground, as during the deadly October 1993 Mogadishu gunfight that left 18 US Rangers dead, or do these skirmishes' significance pale in comparison with that of political leadership?

Even though they involve ground troops, fighter jets, and helicopters, sometimes under NATO command, and can include deadly pitched battles, peacekeeping operations constitute a form of combat singularly different from traditional forms of warfare. To paraphrase Clausewitz, peacekeeping, more than the continuation of politics by other means, is a political war, one in which political factors, both in the invading country and in the country being invaded, not actual fighting (most of which is usually low level), determine whether the operation will be successful. Atypical goals are the first major difference between peacekeeping operations and traditional warfare. Nominally at least, these operations' objectives are not conquest, security, or economic gain, nor even to achieve some form of recognizable military victory, but to provide relief, democratize, and pacify.

Because these wars are waged to achieve peace, and because the lack of compelling strategic interest makes heavy sacrifices unthinkable for the invading force, fighting methods are equally anomalous. Even though local strife can cause thousands, or even hundreds of thousands (in Rwanda's case) of deaths, there is a strong desire on the part of the invading party to neither die nor kill. Rather than bomb and destroy the country they invade, peacekeepers offer billions of dollars in aid to help rebuild it; rather than occupying and annexing the country, they hope to withdraw as soon as feasible and let local forces take over police and administrative duties.

The preeminent role played by local actors is the third, and last anomaly. Since the goal is

to help, and since the means emphasize restraint, invading forces seek to collaborate with, rather than eradicate, potential enemies. Traditional laws of war, which target combatants for death or imprisonment, and insist that civilians should be left out of the fighting, are often turned on their head. Civilians and combatants are undistinguishable in the chaotic environment that prompted outsiders to intervene in the first place. In Haiti, for example, the US military showed a willingness to rely on the local military to help control civilians, for they feared unrest more than organized military opposition.

Adding some degree of complexity, the 1994 US intervention in Haiti, following the US military's nomenclature on peace operations, started as a Peace Enforcement Operation (PEO), i.e., "the application of military force . . . to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." Then, following an eleventh hour agreement with the junta, it shifted to a peacekeeping operation (PKO), i.e., "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement . . . and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term solution."³

The United Nations-backed US intervention in Haiti displayed the three main characteristics of peacekeeping interventions. Official goals were lofty and idealistic. The United States made little use of its overwhelming military superiority, preferring to rely on local forces to avoid being bogged down in a hazardous political environment. Local factors, namely, the role played by Haitian leaders, determined the eventual failure of the operation. From the initial decision to intervene, to the techniques employed to carry out these objectives, and finally to the outcome of the operation, the political environment, not military factors, shaped events.

Ambiguous Ends

In his September 1994 address to the nation, four days prior to the intervention, Clinton explained to the American people that he had decided to invade Haiti because he was concerned by the vast number of human rights abuses following the September 1991 coup that had sent democratically-elected Aristide into exile. "Haitian dreams of democracy became a nightmare of bloodshed," Clinton said. "May God bless the people of the United States and the cause of freedom."⁴ Clinton and other US government officials repeatedly emphasized their dedication to Haitian democracy in public.⁵

But other, more political motives were probably also at play. The Congressional Black Caucus and Representatives from Florida, whose support was essential to help pass Clinton's legislative agenda, insisted on a US intervention in Haiti.⁶ According to Rep. Major Owens (D-NY), Haiti would have been a secondary priority for the Clinton administration "if we had not pressed. I think that in the final analysis, the fact that [Clinton] wanted a positive relationship with us [the Black Caucus] made him look at the situation very seriously, and made him move in a forceful way, more rapidly than he intended to."⁷

Restoring presidential credibility was another imperative. The press,⁸ members of Congress,⁹ and the American public¹⁰ accused Clinton of being an incompetent Commander-in-Chief, and his advisers told him that invading Haiti would help him look strong and presidential.¹¹ Clinton similarly believed that one could not achieve

presidential greatness without being involved in climactic events like wars.¹² In this context, a quick, easy invasion of Haiti, by pushing out a military regime that had defied US injunctions for three years, could silence accusations that the United States and its leader were weak-kneed.¹³ "Obviously, the use of force in foreign affairs can erase an image of weakness and vacillation, leaving an impression of resolution and toughness in its place," wrote longtime friend and campaign strategist Dick Morris.¹⁴

Haitians themselves played an important role in prompting Clinton to intervene. Political repression, along with the economic embargo the international community imposed on Haiti following the 1991 coup, incited an estimated 150,000 Haitians to leave their country, many of them for Florida.¹⁵ Clinton thus faced a dilemma: either allow Haitian boat people inside the United States, and possibly lose the 1996 presidential election,¹⁶ or send all refugees back to Haiti, which gave credence to criticisms that there was a racist bias against black Haitians.¹⁷ Both alternatives (Clinton chose the latter) were political stinkers. In April 1994, reflecting the mood of many black liberals in the United States, Aristide denounced the US refugee policy as "a cynical joke. It's a racist policy. It's really a way to say we don't care . . . It's true it's a genocide, it's true it's a holocaust. It's true it's a cynical joke."¹⁸

Finally, Aristide's campaign in favor of a US invasion of his own country, aimed at regaining the presidency at any cost, should not be overlooked. Aristide's relationship with the United States was most complicated. Inspired by the left-wing theology of liberation during his years as a priest of the slums, and an heir to the Haitian tradition of anti-Americanism, Aristide publicly denounced the "cold country to the north [the United States],"¹⁹ as imperialist. On the other hand, he quickly understood that it would be difficult to regain power without the military might of the US armed forces. As a result, he made three pointed demands in June 1994, asking for a US military intervention,²⁰ immediately followed by a declaration that he had "never" called on US officials to intervene militarily.²¹ He also privately, and repeatedly, lobbied top administration officials, such as NSC members Anthony Lake and Richard Feinberg, for an intervention.²² These demands, relayed by well-connected lobbyists paid by the Haitian government in exile, explain in part the Clinton administration's sense of urgency in a crisis that involved no key US strategic interests.²³

Whether one takes Clinton's rhetoric at face value, and describes the invasion of Haiti as a crusade on behalf of Haitian democracy, or concludes that these ideals hid lower, more crafty motives, the absence of any compelling US strategic interest in Haiti, and the resulting dearth of precise orders, typical of similar peacekeeping operations, had a great impact on the conduct of warfare. When US troops landed in Haiti, the various factors that had pushed Clinton to intervene quickly disappeared. Aristide came back to power within a month. Presidential credibility was restored the minute the invasion unfolded successfully and could only be endangered by a long-term commitment that would bring few rewards and, possibly, US combat casualties. Haitian boat people, now coming from a democratic Haiti, could easily, and legally, be turned away. Aristide and the Black Caucus stopped accusing US foreign policy of being racist. US troops found themselves involved in an operation whose very justification was now uncertain and struggled to adapt.

Planning for the invasion left soldiers unprepared for the challenge of devising an occupation policy in line with shifting political imperatives. Starting in October 1993, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) in Norfolk, Va. had created a working group whose task was to plan an invasion of Haiti -- a "forcible entry," in military jargon -- that received the code-name "Dragon's Blood" or OPLAN 2370.²⁴ The XVIIIth Airborne Corps started detailed planning in January 1994.²⁵ According to the invasion plan, five entire battalions of paratroopers, traveling on 60 C-130 and 45 C-141 transport planes, were to take over 41 different targets in Port-au-Prince, the capital, and Cap Haïtien in the north. With 8,000 paratroopers, this was the largest US airborne operation since World War II. Marines would simultaneously launch an amphibious attack against Cap Haïtien, while AC-130 Specter planes towered overhead.²⁶ Adm. Paul David Miller also made the radically novel suggestion that two aircraft carriers, the USS *America* and the USS *Eisenhower*, be entirely stripped of their planes and transformed into landing pads from which helicopters could quickly ferry troops in and out of Haiti.²⁷ Within days, the force was to peak at over 20,000 troops, equipped with everything from helicopter gun ships to M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles, to face a mere 7,000 Haitians.

On 2 June 1994, the Pentagon ordered that a second plan, based on a non-forcible entry, be prepared; this plan received the name OPLAN 2380. On 2 September, planners met in Washington to draft yet another plan, OPLAN 2375, which incorporated elements of both existing options. Probably puzzled by the erratic itinerary followed by US policy, the Pentagon thus had three different options: the first, 2370, asking for Joint Task Force 180 (the 82nd Airborne) to fight its way into Haiti; the second, 2380, planning to employ Joint Task Force 190 (the 10th Mountain Division) as a purely peacekeeping force; and the third, 2375, incorporating elements of both plans.²⁸

There was only one major problem with the invasion plan: it was never carried out. On 18 September 1994, planes loaded with paratroopers took off from Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg, NC, while an invading fleet, including two aircraft carriers, steamed toward Haiti. But Clinton, who hesitated until the last minute to risk US casualties for non-essential objectives, had also sent a negotiating team headed by former US President Jimmy Carter. The team, with a few hours to spare before the first troops airdropped on Port-au-Prince, signed a deal with the junta-nominated president, Emile Jonassaint. The Carter-Jonassaint agreement offered political amnesty in exchange for a promise that Aristide would be allowed to return to Haiti on 15 October. This was a most generous proposition considering that the junta was hours away from being kicked out of power *manu militari*. Remarkably adept at negotiating with a weak hand, Cédra also managed to obtain before his departure a month later US payments and services worth \$1 million.²⁹ In the meantime, US and Haitian soldiers would have to cooperate -- whatever that meant.

This threw the US force into disarray. Soldiers had updated their will and life insurance policies, put war paint on, boarded the planes, taken off, and prepared for combat, excited that the entire 82nd Airborne was involved, only to learn that the operation was off. The emotional letdown was tremendous. Encumbered by their parachutes and equipment, and secretly hoping that the plane was going to turn around again, some paratroopers refused to unrig until they were back on the ground. Dreams of glory and hopes of medals

withered away.³⁰ Aboard an amphibious assault force, a mere 20 miles from its target, Cap Haïtien, 1,800 Marines learned that the invasion was cancelled just as, painted with camouflage, they were receiving their loads of ammunition. "We were so pumped up and ready to go," Lance Cpl Rian Smith complained. "Now this!"³¹

All of the careful planning proved useless. When the invasion was called off at the last minute, the Pentagon suddenly abandoned the forcible entry plan (OPLAN 2370), shied away from implementing the more benign 2380, and settled on a plan similar to 2375, which it called "2380 plus:" a peaceful, but muscular, entry, designed to ensure that Cédras' forces would not renege on the Carter-Jonassaint agreement.³²

Planes already in the air turned around, then remained on standby for 24 hours (in case fighting did occur), then were unloaded and refitted with new equipment. In the meantime, the 10th Mountain Division (scheduled for the peacekeeping part of the mission) was rushed to the scene, finding none of the facilities the 82nd Airborne should have secured during the night assault. No one was there to welcome and orient soldiers at the airport, so troops typically arrived after nightfall, slept outside, during rainstorms if necessary (September is the rainy season in Haiti), and spent the following morning finding their units. They then commandeered a warehouse in the adjacent industrial complex, rid it of goats, human feces, spider webs, and rats, and called it home. Portapotties and showers were in short supply. Soldiers made do by rushing outside, naked, during tropical showers.³³ Field conditions are generally notable for their lack of comfort, but many soldiers, in oral history interviews conducted in October 1994, doubted that these sacrifices were worth it given the morally dubious nature of their new mission: collaborate with, not kill, the Haitian soldiers who had supported Cédras' regime.³⁴

The exact goals of the operation, as set out by the Commander-in-Chief, were too equivocal to form the basis for a precise occupation policy. During the days immediately preceding the invasion, Clinton delivered two addresses to the American people. The first, on 15 September, was highly idealistic, describing in minute detail the human rights wrongs the United States ought to right. The second, on the 18th, justified the Carter-Jonassaint agreement by stressing that it "minimize[d] the risks for American forces." The first speech would have warranted an ambitious, active occupation policy, conducted in opposition to former human rights abusers Clinton labeled "thugs," while the second implied that force protection was paramount and that the thugs -- upgraded to "military leaders of Haiti" -- were now friends.³⁵

Because of the ambiguity of Clinton's agenda, and because existing contingency plans did not correspond to the political situation created by the Carter-Jonassaint agreement, it was up to commanders on the ground, first Hugh Shelton (September-October 1994), then David C. Meade (October 1994-January 1995), to determine policy. When offered two options, one emphasizing the restoration of a democratic order at any cost and the other aiming to limit US combat casualties, they chose the latter. This emphasis on force protection was particularly felt in the capital, Port-au-Prince, which was under Meade's direct supervision, less so in Cap Haïtien and rural areas.

The reasons for this reluctance to take risks, most of which had little to do with the actual military situation in Haiti, were numerous. Ever since Colin Powell's anti-interventionist

"doctrine" set forth in 1992, the Pentagon had been wary of getting bogged down in peacekeeping operations such as the one in Haiti.³⁶ After the 1992 election, the Commander-in-Chief, whom his opponents described as a draft-dodging, anti-gun Democrat who supported the presence of gays in the armed forces, was often seen as an interloper by a conservative institution emerging from 12 years of Republican presidents. The rank-and-file, wary of Clinton's intentions, frequently, and approvingly, quoted Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS)'s comment that Haitian democracy was not worth a single American life.³⁷ The Somalia debacle further reduced interest in such missions.

Intelligence provided to the troops made it easier to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Haitian soldiers. Probably influenced by the junta's earlier accusations, relayed through the CIA and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), that Aristide was a maniacal, tyrannical Communist,³⁸ reports likened Aristide supporters to an anti-American lynch mob. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) even told US troops that a murderous anti-Aristide paramilitary group, the FRAPH, was merely a political party.³⁹ According to a counter-intelligence officer who participated in the Haiti mission, Army intelligence officers "were very much anti-Aristide . . . We only received anti-Aristide information."⁴⁰

In the case of the 10th Mountain Division, which constituted the bulk of troops stationed in Port-au-Prince, combat fatigue was also to blame for the refusal to undergo dangerous missions. In addition to regular training missions, the division had been deployed to Florida after Hurricane Andrew struck (August-September 1992), then to Somalia for two difficult tours of duty, before heading to Haiti. Constant deployments created severe family problems, including divorces. In the words of a civil affairs officer from JTF 180, "the thing that all of us have noticed, that's really been alarming to all of us . . . the 10th Mountain Division seems to have come out of their experience in Somalia with a siege mentality."⁴¹

A US force actively involved in local affairs would also be more difficult to extricate, so soldiers viewed their passivity as a guarantee that they would leave quickly. A mere one month into the invasion, Col. James L. Campbell, Chief of Staff of Joint Task Force 190, argued that the US force had already achieved its mission and that the time had arrived to call in the UN. "Just by the nature of the beast, every day longer we're here, we're going to embrace more neat ideas in terms of the safe and secure environment."⁴²

Many soldiers doubted that anything could be achieved anyway. The political adviser to the 10th Mountain Division commander confided that "I still believe that we should not have intervened in Haiti . . . Haiti has a way of defeating the best of our intentions."⁴³ Col. James S. Gulick, as director of the civil military operations center of JTF-190, could have helped rebuild Haiti, but did not for lack of trust. Noticing the high level of corruption in Haiti, as well as casual disregard for basic maintenance, he saw no reason to improve infrastructures, preferring "to help the Haitians help themselves."⁴⁴

Culture shock also made American troops more than willing to follow strict orders to limit contacts with the local population. An information packet on Haitian culture and history distributed to American soldiers aimed at increasing cultural awareness, but it contained so many inaccuracies that it proved counterproductive. As a result, many soldiers saw all Haitians as Voodoo sorcerers ready to throw magic powders in their face

and to attack them with HIV-infected syringes.⁴⁵ Some Haitians were partly to blame for US circumsppection regarding Voodoo. The junta's puppet president, Emile Jonassaint, who moonlighted as a *houngan* (Voodoo priest), had threatened to make use of his Voodoo powers.⁴⁶ US soldiers deployed to the countryside were often taken aback when faced with accusations that a former *Macoute* (supporter of Jean-Claude Duvalier) was also a zombie. In the island of La Gonâve, locals asked a GI to arrest a 70 year-old woman accused of being a werewolf.⁴⁷

Washington's indecision, first setting grandiose plans to save Haitians from their army, then cutting a deal with this army to limit US casualties, had made the exact goals of the intervention unclear. This gave US commanders much leeway in drafting an occupation policy. Lacking purpose, uninterested in Haiti's future, reluctant to risk their lives in a dubious fight, they decided that force protection, not democracy, was the order of the day.

Limited Means

Destroying infrastructures and breaking the backbone of a state, not rebuilding a country and training cadres, were the missions US soldiers had traditionally been equipped and trained for, so peacekeeping would have called for radically new thinking. It was not needed. Given the ambiguity of the orders they received, US commanders decided to do little, a mission that they could easily, and did, carry out. They made force protection the most important, or even the only, objective of what remained, nominally at least, an operation to restore democracy. This meant delegating all dangerous tasks, including policing duties, to Haitians.

Orders were strict. Despite the tropical heat, soldiers had to wear full body armor at all times. The military hierarchy reacted strongly whenever it spotted a soldier with sleeves rolled up on CNN. It was not uncommon for senior officers on an inspection tour to personally implement the dress code, rather than delegating such tasks to lower-ranking servicemen. Green Berets were particularly targeted.⁴⁸ Soldiers working in the port argued at length that falling in the water while clad in Kevlar and a helmet was dangerous before they were allowed to adapt their gear.

Gen. David C. Meade, who commanded the 10th Mountain Division and took over as head of the entire multinational force in October 1994, insisted that his troops stay inside heavily protected barracks, and that they not talk or give food to anyone outside. Peacekeeping limited itself to a few mobile patrols, conducted by troops with orders not to stop, step off their vehicle, or establish roadblocks.⁴⁹ Even though the invasion plans made heavy use of the US Army's ability to fight at night, it took two weeks before American soldiers organized night patrols. Such strict orders contradicted FM 41-10, the standard field manual on civil-military affairs, which encourages "direct involvement with the civilian populace" and lists among an occupying force's main duties the protection of law and order and the prevention of human rights abuses.⁵⁰

An attempt to reduce the availability of weapons among the local populace also met with limited success for lack of proactive policies. The multinational force raided some Haitian Army compounds, including the heavy weapons unit at Camp d'Application, but stopped short of attacking every weapons cache and conducting widespread body searches. All too frequently, Haitians accused their personal enemies of owning weapons,

further diminishing the US desire to carry out such raids, and forceful seizures eventually gave way to a mere weapons buy-back program.⁵¹ Twenty thousand weapons were seized during the first three months of the occupation, but an estimated 200,000 guns remained in circulation.⁵²

The force's extreme caution was less marked in rural areas, where Special Forces, not 10th Mountain Division light infantry troops, were deployed. Displaying the braggadocio associated with their *esprit de corps*, Green Berets often refused to wear body armor, showed little respect for the dress code, and sneered at the troops barricaded in Port-au-Prince, who did little and feared everybody.⁵³ Far away from the scrutiny of their superiors, obliged to control thousands of square kilometers with small 12-man A-teams, they did not hesitate to mingle with the local population and to take sides -- often against local Haitian Army tyrants. They prided themselves on being unconventional, resenting that someone from headquarters would criticize them for violating the dress code or alcohol policy.⁵⁴ One A-team leader narrowly avoided court-martial for overstepping orders.⁵⁵ An intelligence officer attached to the 10th Mountain Division received a dishonorable discharge for insisting that the US Army should investigate human rights violations in Haitian prisons despite orders not to do so.⁵⁶

Law enforcement was the thorniest issue. Asking US troops to patrol the streets and to arrest criminals would most certainly have put US lives at risk, so Shelton and Meade shied away from it. On the other hand, a complete breakdown of law and order would have been even more likely to undermine the goal of force protection, so one needed to find someone, preferably not American, willing to police Haiti until a new police force could be trained. Luckily for US soldiers, there was already a force present in Haiti willing to, and experienced in, quelling demonstrations and arresting troublemakers. Unfortunately for Haitian civilians, this force was the very Haitian Army that had spent the previous three years harassing supporters of Aristide.

Despite Haitian soldiers' poor human rights record, US troops proceeded to rely on their services for day-to-day law enforcement. The first weeks of the occupation were thus marked by an odd business-as-usual atmosphere: the Haitian Army policed the streets, occasionally shooting pro-Aristide demonstrators, while American troops, thousands-strong but cloistered in their barracks, remained largely idle. "We are not in the business of doing the day-to-day law and order," explained the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a 20 September White House briefing.⁵⁷ One hour later, Haitian soldiers, who were dispersing a crowd that had come to welcome US troops in the harbor, beat to death Benykel Dédé, a coconut vendor and father of five children. American soldiers were also present, but they did not intervene.⁵⁸ Adding insult to injury, State Department spokesman Michael McCurry announced that the multinational force had no intention of prosecuting the culprits.⁵⁹

The only major confrontation between US and Haitian soldiers took place in Cap Haïtien, where a US Marine occupation force had landed on 20 September 1994.⁶⁰ During the following days, pro-Aristide crowds frequently held demonstrations, which Haitian soldiers put down ruthlessly. To prevent such violence, 14 US Marines surrounded a police station on the afternoon of the 24th.⁶¹ A large crowd formed, throwing insults and

various pieces of garbage at the policemen occupying the post. At 7:00 PM, two Haitian soldiers got into an argument. One reached for his gun, and the other raised his Uzi. Feeling threatened, Lt. Virgil Palumbo shot both of them in the chest and his fellow Marines immediately unleashed a deluge of fire, spraying the building with 1,000 rounds. On the US side, only one Haitian-American Navy linguist, José Joseph, was wounded, but 10 Haitian policemen lay dead. Under the cover of darkness, all remaining Haitian soldiers in the city, 400 in all, fled.⁶²

The incident could have created a rift between the US and Haitian armed forces and marked the beginning of a forceful occupation policy, but it had the exact opposite effect.⁶³ As the Haitian police fled Cap Haïtien, the Marines were obliged to take over all law enforcement duties, and commanders in Port-au-Prince foresaw the day when the complete breakdown of the Haitian Army would force them to become Haiti's reluctant protector. Becoming pro-consul of Haiti was Shelton's greatest nightmare.

I almost had to worry more about the complete collapse of the FAD'H [Haitian Army] . . . because, for all their faults, they still were an institution that had some organization to it that you could, in fact, hold accountable for some things and could provide . . . some amount of stability in the country which you wouldn't have if you had nothing, to wit, Cap Haïtien. And I thought to myself, if we got that throughout the country, Port-au-Prince with 1.2 million for example, versus 60 to 85 thousand people up in Cap Haïtien . . . 1.2 million people with no police force and no military and no nothing here then we're the only thing left. And so I had a personal interest in trying to keep the FAD'H from collapsing totally and complete anarchy taking over.⁶⁴

US troops thus did their best not to humiliate their Haitian counterparts and encouraged them to leave their barracks, patrol the streets, and maintain order. Unfortunately, the muscular way in which the Haitian Army and its supporters understood law enforcement again led to some well-publicized excesses. On 29 September 1994, Aristide supporters held a demonstration in Port-au-Prince to commemorate the return of the capital's mayor. Right-wing gunmen launched a grenade at the demonstrators, killing 5 and wounding 60.⁶⁵ The following day, Haitians again demonstrated to celebrate the third anniversary of the 1991 coup. Emboldened by the sight of American military vehicles they hoped would protect them, they approached the headquarters of the main pro-junta paramilitary group, the FRAPH. But the vehicles were only passing by, on their way to establishing roadblocks on Ave. John Brown (the main road to the wealthy suburb of Pétienville) in order to prevent violence against the elite, and FRAPH members shot and killed at least six of the demonstrators before the crowd retaliated and killed two members of the FRAPH.⁶⁶

US troops' collaboration with the Haitian Army it was initially supposed to disarm became more difficult to justify after Aristide's return on 15 October 1994. Aristide was viscerally opposed to an army that had supported his right-wing enemies, but he had as yet no functioning government, so disbanding the Haitian Army would have meant that the US Army would have had to take over policing responsibilities. This was contrary to Clinton's promise that "the vast majority of our troops w[ould] come home in months, not years."⁶⁷

Creating a local, independent Haitian National Police (HNP) was the solution to this

conundrum. Haitian policemen could take over policing duties that the Haitian Army had previously been responsible for. The existence of a local police force, aside from keeping Haitian nationalists quiet, also allowed the US Army to claim that Haiti had become "a secure and stable environment," which meant, under UN Security Council Resolution 940, that the UN force could step in.⁶⁸ Finally, a "neutral" police force -- composed in large part of recycled Haitian Army soldiers -- could be a useful counterweight to Aristide's political ambitions. Because dependency on US troops and mission creep were anathema to the 1994 US command in Haiti, training of a Haitian constabulary was the first long-term mission undertaken by the multinational force, one that was characterized by hasty, insufficient training of police cadets and the use of former Haitian soldiers in the new police force.

International Police Monitors, whose mission was to train the new police and to monitor its human rights record, started arriving in Haiti in October 1994. To facilitate the transition from the army to the new police, they and a US Department of Justice program, ICITAP, set out to train an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF).⁶⁹ The name change, from Haitian Army (FAD'H) to interim force (IPSF), was deceptive.⁷⁰ Despite the nominal change, Haitian Army soldiers formed the bulk of the interim force. Thirty-four hundred of Haiti's 7,000 soldiers made their way into the interim force. A rapid screening process conducted by the Haitian Army itself, the Aristide government, and the State Department vetted out the most notorious human rights abusers, but the vast scale of the junta's crimes (3,000 to 5,000 dead) makes it likely that many perpetrators were hired as policemen. The nominal 5-day training session on human rights they took part in was insufficient to change their definition of law enforcement. By October 1999, no fewer than 673 police officers (out of a force of 5,300) had been dismissed on corruption, human rights, and other charges committed as policemen.⁷¹

Nine hundred Haitian refugees repatriated from Guantánamo formed the remainder of the interim police force. Despite the fact that they were not tainted by their association with the junta, and that they had undergone a longer, 21-day training in addition to the week-long regular training, the Guantánamo refugees were subordinated to former soldiers, wore a different uniform, and carried no weapons.

Members of the permanent national police, known as Haitian National Police, started training in February 1995. To expedite the process, each month a class of 375 cadets (raised to 750 by August) started their short four-month preparation. Members of the National Police were deployed starting in July 1995, and the interim police was completely phased out by December 1995. Fifteen hundred former Haitian soldiers made their way into the supposedly new and apolitical police force, the *Police Nationale d'Haiti* (PNH), which numbered 5,000 people.

Collaborating with the Haitian Army, then creating a national police with many of its former members, paid off militarily. In contrast to the first US occupation of Haiti (1915-34), when the Marines invaded the island with great ease, only to find themselves faced with a rural insurrection that was only subdued five years later, the first six months of the 1994 occupation only saw five armed confrontations between US and Haitian soldiers, resulting in only one combat fatality on the US side--Sgt 1st Class Gregory Dale Cardott, who died at a roadblock incident on 12 January 1995.⁷² But the decision to collaborate

with human rights violators, then the rapidity with which policemen were trained and deployed, both of them motivated by a refusal to endure casualties or stay in Haiti for too long, weakened Haiti's democratization process from the outset.

Disappointing Achievements

Aside from Aristide's return as president of Haiti, the long-term goals Clinton and the UN set were twofold: democratize the country, and develop it economically.⁷³ Success would be measured by social indicators, not by how many armored divisions were crushed, so it was heavily dependent on the political environment Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY operated in. Short-lived, superficial foreign support might doom it, as might an uninspired local political elite.

In the beginning, democratization seemingly proceeded apace, as Haitians were regularly called to the ballot box. But the international community essentially equated the restoration of democracy with holding regular and clean elections, at the expense of a more comprehensive definition of democracy that would have included civic education, the rule of law, accountability, and viable opposition parties. A commission investigated human rights violations during the Cédras regime, but years passed before a few perpetrators were prosecuted; deputies passed laws reforming courts and prisons, but lack of funds hindered their implementation.

The United States, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank devised ambitious economic plans. Their development strategy emphasized private enterprise and free trade, backed by a massive infusion of foreign aid. This neo-liberal agenda, finalized at two meetings between the government of Haiti and international donors held in Paris in August 1994 and January 1995, emphasized improved tax collection, privatization of public companies, a leaner, more effective government, the use of non-governmental organizations to channel funds, and lower tariffs.⁷⁴ Haiti's destitution was so severe that foreign governments and institutions also pledged hard cash in addition to technical assistance. The Paris meetings resulted in pledges of \$1.2 billion, less than 25 percent of it provided by the United States, the rest by an array of 19 international organizations and 14 governments; by 1996, pledges reached almost \$2 billion;⁷⁵ by 1997, almost \$3.5 billion.⁷⁶ With an external debt reduced to less than \$1.1 billion in 1998, Haiti could not even qualify for the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) program.⁷⁷

Local support was essential for these reforms to succeed, but, despite the throngs of thankful Haitians who accompanied US troops during the first few weeks of the occupation,⁷⁸ Haitian newspapers quickly described the invasion as a "humiliation."⁷⁹ Aristide himself showed little gratitude.⁸⁰ Haitian opposition to US-sponsored economic reforms was the first catalyst, with Aristide warning on television that if "somebody . . . dares sell the state's possessions on behalf of privatization, I will have him arrested immediately."⁸¹ The presence of foreign troops on Haitian soil was the second main obstacle. Aristide, even though he had encouraged the invasion in the first place, warned that Haiti would not be "indebted to imperialism."⁸² In October 1995, a Port-au-Prince crowd pelted Tipper Gore's motorcade with rocks, chanting "Go Home Yankees."⁸³ One month later, when Aristide's cousin and former bodyguard, Deputy Jean-Hubert Feuillé,

was gunned down (Haitians blamed the CIA), Aristide threatened to "send back to his country" any foreigner who challenged his presidential authority.⁸⁴ In September 1997 and again in August 1998, the Haitian Parliament demanded the departure of all "foreign armed forces" from Haiti.⁸⁵

Haitian opposition to the occupation and to US-backed economic reforms was highly significant, for it increased political instability, undermined economic development, and angered foreign countries. After Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned in June 1997 because of Aristide's opposition to privatization plans and a corrupt parliamentary election, Haiti remained without a functioning government for 20 months (1997-99), until Aristide's successor in the Presidential Palace, René Préval, illegally nominated a prime minister and dissolved the parliament by presidential decree. The country then had a government, but no parliament for another 15 months (1999-2000), until fraud-plagued legislative elections took place. The opposition boycotted the November 2000 presidential election in protest and nominated its own president, which left Haiti with one government and one parliament, but two presidents (2000-2001). Two failed coup attempts preceded (August 1996) and followed (December 2001) the period.⁸⁶

Haitian politics, complete with betrayals, murders, and plot twists, were as captivating as a particularly brutal soap opera, but the protracted political crisis was nothing to laugh about. Consumed by petty political squabbles, the political class failed to oversee the basic missions of the state. As the number of foreign troops declined, the deficiencies of the quickly-trained, poorly-funded Haitian police became more evident. Young and inexperienced, or veterans of the murderous Haitian Army, and aware that sending criminals to the judicial system would not result in a rapid and fair judgment, policemen took to shooting first and asking questions later. In the first 18 months of its existence, the police killed at least 46 civilians.⁸⁷ The death toll was 31 in 1998 and 66 in 1999, few of them killed in self-defense.⁸⁸

With no functioning government, Haiti would not implement the reforms necessary to secure continued international funding, while political instability frightened away potential investors and tourists. The international community, which had set a series of reforms, including privatization of nine public companies, as prerequisites for the disbursement of foreign aid, froze the funds it had pledged. The economic impact was devastating. From 1995 to 1999, economic growth averaged two to three percent a year, barely enough to keep up with population growth. The human development index, a statistic including social elements such as literacy and health resources in addition to net economic wealth, was 0.4 (out of a possible 1) in 1998, which put Haiti last in the Western Hemisphere and 150th worldwide, down from 137th in 1990. The assembly sector (clothing, electric products, handicrafts), Haiti's most promising industry, employed a mere 20,000 people, down from over 100,000 in the 1980s.⁸⁹ Pressed for an effective anti-poverty plan, Aristide responded with an unrealistic, populist solution: France should reimburse a 90 million francs indemnity Haiti had paid France in 1823. Thanks to compounding interest, he calculated that France now owed Haiti exactly \$21,685,155,571.48, more than four times Haiti's annual GDP. France predictably refused.⁹⁰

IMF critics rightly pointed out that the ready-made set of reforms the institution insists on

in every developing country has not always proved successful, but the point was moot in Haiti's case. These reforms were a prerequisite for the disbursement of foreign aid, and refusing to adopt them resulted in Haiti's losing \$2 billion (out of a possible \$3.5 billion) in much needed help.⁹¹ Similarly, the low wages (approximately \$3 a day) paid by assembly factories were insufficient for Haitian workers to make a decent living, but, the cocaine trade aside, there were few available alternatives.

Angered by the Haitians' inability to seize this unique opportunity to lift their country out of poverty, foreign governments finally cancelled aid pledges, removed remaining troops in 2001, and abandoned Haiti to its fate. Despite all the great hopes raised after Aristide's return, Haiti remained a desperately poor nation run by a government known more for its fractiousness and its ineptitude than for its devotion to the teachings of Thomas Jefferson and Adam Smith. Opposition to Aristide's rule fed a rebellion movement that toppled him in February 2004; France and the United States, which had done so much to bring Aristide back from a previous exile, publicly welcomed the coup this time. As of May 2004, Port-au-Prince was once again patrolled by foreign peacekeepers, while a provisional government and local rebel forces controlled various parts of the country.

Lessons Learned

There are three main lessons to be taken from Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, each of which can be applied to other peacekeeping operations. First, shallow motives do not make for a successful intervention. Extensive, long-term international involvement is essential to solve the immense challenges faced by conflict-torn nations, but feel-good operations, as in Somalia, or look-strong operations, as in Haiti, are unlikely to invest the time, and human and financial sacrifices necessary to secure substantive achievements. For this reason, interventions motivated by short-term political interests, even when its promoters drape themselves in an idealistic mantle, are unlikely to succeed, unless these poor, divided nations also present a real strategic value, as was not the case in Haiti. Where key security interests were at stake, as in former Yugoslavia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001), popular willingness to endure casualties, remain involved for years, and spend billions of dollars made US policy makers' task easier.

Ensuring that one's means are adapted to a peacekeeping operation's specific needs is the second important lesson. Congressional Republicans kept accusing Clinton of mission creep, but timidity, not excessive zeal, marked the occupation. US troops, who later defeated Serbian and Serbian-backed forces in Kosovo and Bosnia, were effective in scaring the junta from power and allowing Aristide's return. As a military force trained to defeat armored divisions in the plains of Central Europe, however, the US Army proved much less effective when it came to disbanding the Haitian Army, ending human rights violations, and initiating the democratic and economic transitions. Even the 10th Mountain Division, a light division theoretically well suited for this type of mission, proved unapt. All the US Army could offer was armed force, which Haiti already had plenty of, and even that it was unwilling to provide given its fear of casualties.

Finally, the age of white men burdened with their *mission civilisatrice* having ended, the eventual success, or failure, of a peacekeeping operation rests in the hands of the local government and population. Aid programs can only succeed if local elites are willing and able to make the most out of foreign money and to take over their nation's destinies after

foreign assistance is phased out, as was the case in Europe during the Marshall Plan. In that regard, Aristide, who had been so resourceful in inviting a US intervention, proved much less competent when the time came to make the intervention succeed, preferring to strengthen his populist credentials by attacking foreign donors and securing his power base by shutting out the opposition rather than working to alleviate Haiti's poverty. Peaceful people governed by competent and conscientious administrators rarely need to be peace-kept and nation-built in the first place, so the need for strong local political leadership presents the greatest challenge to the success of future peacekeeping operations, as well as the main reason for the political and economic failure of the 1994 US intervention in Haiti.

Endnotes

1. The 1994 US intervention in Haiti was initially supposed to be, strictly speaking, an "invasion" (US soldiers were to defeat Haitian soldiers and take over Haiti), but, due to a last-minute agreement, Haitian soldiers decided not to fight and the intervention turned out to be what one may call a "peaceful invasion." Similarly, the subsequent "occupation" consisted of UN (mostly US) forces occupying all strategic points, but they did so in collaboration with Haitian soldiers, then Haitian policemen. Only a few skirmishes took place and, from 1995 on, the number of foreign troops on Haitian soil declined markedly.
2. In 1994, the UN had peacekeeping missions in the following places: Angola (UNAVEM), Chad/Libya (UNASOG), Liberia (UNOMIL), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Rwanda (UNAMIR), Uganda (UNOMUR), Somalia (UNOSOM), El Salvador (ONUSAL), Haiti (UNMIH), former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), Western Sahara (MINURSO), India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Georgia (UNOMIG), Tadjikistan (UNMOT), Golan Heights (UNDOF), Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM), Lebanon (UNIFIL), and Gaza (UNTSO).
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub. 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, (12 February 1999), pp. 16, 17.
4. Bill Clinton, "U.S. Interests in Haiti," *US Department of State Dispatch* 5, no 38 (19 September 1994), pp. 605-07.
5. Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 1998), p. 184; William J. Clinton, *Continuation of National Emergency with Respect to Haiti: Communication from the President of the US*, *House Document 103-109*, 12 July 1993; Anthony Lake, telephone interview with the author (18 May 2001), Lake, "Tying Power to Democracy," *New York Times*, 23 September 1994, p. A35.
6. On the Black Caucus' role, see DeWayne Wickham, *Bill Clinton and Black America* (New York: Ballantine, 2002), pp. 102-04, 131, 145; US Human Rights Policy Towards Haiti, Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 9 April 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1993), p. 57; Patrick Elie, personal interview with the author (11 July 2001); Christophe Wargny and Pierre Mouterde, *Après bal, tanbou lou: cinq ans de duplicité américaine en Haïti, 1991-1996* (Paris: Editions Austral, 1996), pp. 156-57; Humanitarian Conditions in Haiti, Hearing before the Select Committee on Hunger, HR, 11 June 1992 (DC: USGPO, 1992), p. 28; "Members of the Black Caucus to Pdt. Bill

Clinton, 29 January 1993," folder "Situation politique en Haiti, 1994," Box 320.04 SIT, Collg e St. Martial library (Port-au-Prince). On the role of political representatives from Florida and New York, see Humanitarian Relief Efforts in Haiti, Hearing before the SWHA, Committee on Foreign Affairs, HR, 9 February 1994 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994), p. 10; Haiti: Views from Congress and Legislative Approaches: Hearing before the SWH, CFA, HR, 27 July 1994 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994), p. 34; Larry Rohter, "Foreign Policy: Florida Has One," *New York Times*, 22 May 1994: section 4, 1; Florida Office of Planning and Budget, *The Unfair Burden: Immigration's Impact on Florida* (Tallahassee, FL: Executive Office of the Governor, March 1994), opening page, iii, 9; Joaquin Avino, "Commentary: Views from an Affected Community," in Georges A. Fauriol, ed., *The Haitian Challenge: US Policy Considerations* (DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 38.

7. "Showdown in Haiti," *PBS Frontline* (14 June 1994). Aristide Prime Minister Robert Malval wrote about Aristide's "dragoons of the Black Caucus." Robert Malval, *L'année de toutes les duperies* (PAP: Editions Regain, 1996), p. 400.

8. Karen Elliott House, "Clinton Speaks Loudly and Carries a Twig," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 May 1994, p. A14; "Still a US Invasion. Still Wrong," *New York Times*, 2 September 1994, p. A24; Richard Falk, "The Free Marketeers," Richard Barnet, "Groping for a Security Blanket," *Progressive* (January 1994), p. 21; George Church, "Dropping the Ball?," *Time*, 2 May 1994, p. 53-57; Bruce Nelan, "Hurry up and Wait," *Time*, 20 June 1994, pp. 40-41; Jon Hull, "Anger from the Grassroots," *Time*, 29 August 1994, pp. 38-39; Kevin Fedarko, "Policy at Sea," *Time*, 18 July 1994, p. 20; "Clinton's Rolodex Problem," *US News and World Report*, 10 January 1994, pp. 25-27; "After Talking Tough, Getting Tough?," *US News*, 9 May 1994, pp. 48-49; "Don't Bother me with Foreign Policy," *US News*, 16 May 1994, pp. 36-38; "US Resolve, Needed Then and Needed Now," *US News*, 13 June 1994, p. 13; "The Sweets Sounds of Silence," *US News*, 11 July 1994, p. 68; "Turning the Other Cheek," *US News*, 25 July 1994, pp. 20-23; "The Limits to Leadership," *US News*, 12 September 1994, p. 96.

9. Congressional Record (1994), H2401, H2407, H2496-2503, H2588, H2617-2618, S4593, S4599, S5126-5129.

10. Dan Balx and Richard Morin, "Public is Losing Confidence in Clinton Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, 17 May 1994, p. A1; "Focus: Editors' Views," *MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour* (20 May 1994).

11. Dick Morris, *Behind the Oval Office* (1997; Reprint, LA: Renaissance Books, 1999), pp. 4-6; Dick Morris, *The New Prince* (Los Angeles, CA: Renaissance Books, 1999), pp. 165-66, George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (New York: Little Brown, 1999), pp. 308, 310; Anthony Lake, *Six Nightmares* (New York: Little Brown, 2000), pp. 259-61; Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, pp. 176, 178-9, 181; John McWethy, "UN Memos Say US Plans to Invade Haiti," *ABC World News Saturday* (11 June 1994); Steven Greenhouse, "A Haiti Invasion Wins Hemisphere Support," *New York Times*, 13 June 1994, p. A10; "UN View of Haiti Intervention," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 June 1994, p. A16; "UN Documents say America is Ready to Invade Haiti," *London Times*, 16 June 1994, Overseas News Section.

12. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, p. 217; Al Kamen, "For Lunch, A Course on JFK,"

WP (22 October 1993), p. A21; Bob Woodward, *The Choice: How Clinton Won* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 65; Jonathan Alter, "Citizen Clinton Up Close," *Newsweek*, 8 April 2002, p. 34.

13. There is no reason to doubt Bill Clinton's opposition to Raoul Cédras' junta, but Haitians accused Clinton's predecessor, along with the CIA, of plotting to overthrow Aristide, then to support Cédras. In particular, Emmanuel Constant, one of Cédras' most cruel henchmen, revealed that he was on the CIA payroll. On Aristide's claims that the US overthrew him, see Aristide, *Dignity* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1996), pp. 46, 49, 56, 61. For Constant's revelations, see David Grann, "Giving 'the Devil' his Due," *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 2001), p. 54.

14. Morris, *The New Prince*, p. 163.

15. William J. Clinton, "U.S. Interests in Haiti," in *US Department of State Dispatch* 5, no 38 (19 September 1994), p. 606.

16. Clinton blamed his defeat in the 1980 Arkansas gubernatorial election on his decision to accept Cuban refugees. David Maraniss, *First in his Class: A Biography of Bill Clinton* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 379; Morris, *Behind the Oval Office*, p. 5.

17. "Affidavit, Antoine Eustache," (19 February 1992), "Affidavit, Jennie Smith," (10 February 1992), Folder Haiti, Box 2, Human Rights Collection, National Security Archives, American Immigration Lawyers Association; *The AILA Human Rights Delegation Report on Haiti* (Washington: American Immigration Law Foundation, March 1993), pp. 22-23; US Human Rights Policy Towards Haiti, Hearing before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 9 April 1992 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1993), pp. 4, 57-94; Gilles Danroc and Daniel Roussière, *La répression au quotidien en Haiti, 1991-1994* (PAP: HIS, 1995), p. 50; US Policy toward Haiti, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 8 March 1994 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994), pp. 5, 9, 16; CR (22 November 1993), p. H10985; CR (1 February 1994), p. E44; "Opponents of Policy on Haiti Begin Fast," *New York Times*, 13 April 1994, p. A15.

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19. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, *In the Parish of the Poor* (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), p. 59.

20. Quoted in Howard W. French, "Doubting Sanctions, Aristide Urges US Action on Haiti," *New York Times*, 3 June 1994, p. A3; "Pdt. Aristide's Address to TransAfrica's 13th Annual Foreign Policy Conference, 3 June 1994," blue folder, box 320.04 SIT, Collg e St. Martial library, "Acta de la séptima sesi—n," 5, 6 June 1994; OAS, OEA/Ser. F/V. 1 MRE/ ACTA 7/94.

21. Scott Simon, "Pres. Aristide Says Haiti Needs Reconciliation," *NPR Weekend Edition* (25 June 1994).

22. Anthony Lake, telephone interview with the author (18 May 2001); Richard E.

Feinberg, telephone interview with the author (10 December 2001); Lake, *Six Nightmares*, pp. 138-39.

23. Former Maryland Congressman and Clinton fundraiser Michael D. Barnes, a partner at the Washington law firms Arent, Fox and Hogan, and Hartson, was Aristide's most influential lobbyist. For Barnes' role, see folder "Arent Fox (#2661)," folder "Hogan and Hartson (#2244)," Foreign Agents Registration Unit (DOJ); Tom Masland et al., "How Did We Get Here?," *Newsweek*, 26 September 1994, p. 26; Ruth Shalit, "Flack Attack," *New Republic*, 24 October 1994, p. 13; Catherine S. Manegold, "Innocent Abroad," *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, section 6, p. 38. See also Report of the Attorney General [for] 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, 475, folder "Kurzban and Kurzban (#4604)," folder "McKinney and McDowell Associates (#5139)," FARA.

24. John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The U.S. Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 65-66.

25. Major William B. Garret interview, in Cynthia L. Hayden, *JTF-180 Operation Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews* (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1995), p. 49.

26. John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The U.S. Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 106.

27. Bob Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion* (1999; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 2000), p. 59. Miller's idea, first used in Haiti, was also employed during the war against Afghanistan in 2001.

28. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, pp. 61-84.

29. Kenneth Freed, "US Gives Cedras a Lucrative Deal to Get Out of Haiti," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 October 1994, p. A1.

30. Shacochis, *The Immaculate Invasion*, pp. 75-76; Stan Goff, *Hideous Dream: A Soldier's Memoir of the US Invasion of Haiti* (New York: Soft Skull Press, 2000), pp. 38-39, 50, 93.

31. Quoted in Richard A. Serrano, "1,800 Marines Poised at Brink of Invasion; Then a Stand-Down," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 September 1994, p. A5.

32. Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion.'* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), p. 78.

33. Lawrence E. Casper, *Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 213.

34. See most interviews in Hayden, *JTF-180 Oral History Interviews and JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*.

35. Clinton, "U.S. Interests in Haiti," and "Announcement of Military Leaders' Agreement," in *USDOS Dispatch* 5, no. 38 (19 September 1994), pp. 605, 611, 612.

36. Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992-93), pp. 32-45; Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, 8 October 1992, p. A35.

37. Quoted in Paula Zahn, "Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole Discusses Impending Military Invasion of Haiti," *CBS This Morning* (14 September 1994); Lawrence P. Rockwood, telephone interview with the author (26 February 2001).
38. *CR* (21 October 1993), S14050; "The World Today," *CNN* (22 October 1993); Steven A. Holmes, "Administration is Fighting Itself on Haiti Policy," *New York Times*, 23 October 1993, p. A1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Hill Briefing about Aristide Renews Debate on CIA Role," *WP*, 24 October 1993, p. A28; Robert D. Novak, "Allegations about Aristide," *WP*, 28 October 1993, p. A23.
39. Larry Rohter, "Cables Show U.S. Deception on Haitian Violence," *New York Times*, 6 February 1996, p. A8.
40. Lawrence P. Rockwood, telephone interview with the author (26 February 2001).
41. "LTC Edward J. Anderson interview," in Hayden, *JTF-180 Oral History Interviews*, p. 306.
42. "COL James L. Campbell interview," in Hayden, *JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*, p. 51. UNSC Resolution 940 specified that the UN would take over after a secure and stable environment had been established.
43. "Douglas Watson interview," in Hayden, *JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*, pp. 60-61.
44. "COL James S. Gulick interview," in Hayden, *JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*, p. 127.
45. "CPT Berthony Ladouceur Interview," in Hayden, *JTF-180 Oral History Interviews*, p. 170.
46. Nicolas Jallot and Laurent Lesage, *Haiti: dix ans d'histoire secrète* (Paris: Editions du Félin, 1995), p. 171; Howard W. French, "Is Voodoo the Weapon to Repel the Invaders?," *New York Times*, 24 June 1994, p. A4. See also Jean-Michel Caroit, "Le vaudou sauvera-t-il les putschistes?," *Le Monde*, 9 August 1994, p. 7; "Manifestation ^ PAP contre l'intervention américaine," *Le Nouvelliste*, 9 September 1994, p. 1; Larry Rohter, "In PAP, the Signs of Invasion Are in the Air," *New York Times*, 15 September 1994, p. A8.
47. Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion,'* p. 154; Tod Robberson, "Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been, a Werewolf?," *WP*, 14 November 1994, p. A12.
48. Goff, *Hideous Dream*, p. 117.
49. "LTC Linton Graham interview," in Hayden, *JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*, pp. 35-36.
50. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manuel 41-10* (11 January 1993), pp. 1/4, 1/9.
51. Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, p. 221.
52. Marco Tulio Bruni Celli, UN Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights, *Situation of Human Rights in Haiti* (6 February 1995), E/CN.4/1995/59.
53. Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, p. 219; Goff, *Hideous Dream*, pp. 453-75.

54. Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion,'* p. 157.
55. Goff, *Hideous Dream*, pp. 453-75.
56. Lawrence P. Rockwood, telephone interview with the author (26 February 2001); "LTC Frank B. Bragg interview," in Hayden, *JTF-190 Oral History Interviews*, pp. 79-87; US vs. Lawrence P. Rockwood, II, no. 98-0488, Crim. App. no. 9500872; U.S. Policy and Activities in Haiti, Hearing before the CIR, HR, 24 February 1995 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995); Human Rights Violations at the PAP Penitentiary, Hearing before the SWHA, CIR, HR, 3 May 1995 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1995); 10th MD, *Civil Military Operations Handbook* (unpublished, 1 February 1992); Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, *Field Manuel 41-10*, 11 January 1993 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994); Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, 'Intervasion,'* pp. 171-74; Warren D. Hall, *The Obligation to Protect Human Rights: A New Legal Requirement for Commanders?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1996).
57. "General John Shalikashvili White House Briefing," *Federal News Service*, 20 September 1994.
58. John Kifner, "Haitian Police Crush Rally as American Troops Watch," *New York Times*, 21 September 1994, p. A1; Garry Pierre-Pierre, "Family Mourns Man Killed by Police," *New York Times*, 24 September 1994, section 1, 4. The changing nature of the mission also meant that some soldiers had a wrong set of ROE (rules of engagement) cards. Casper, *Falcon Brigade*, p. 201; Situation in Haiti: Hearing before the CAS, USS, 28 September 1994 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994), pp. 21-23.
59. "1994 Daily Press Briefing no. 135: Wednesday, 9/21/94," in Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, *US Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM*, January 1990-May 1996 4, no. 1 (Washington, DC: Department of State, June 1996).
60. The following overview of the Cap Haitien gunfight is drawn from "Rapport du Lt-Col. Josaphat sur les incidents du Cap Haitien," *Le Nouvelliste*, 27 September 1994, p. 1; Signal FM, "FADH Issues Communiqué on Cap Haitien Shooting," *FBIS*, 27 September 1994, p. 19; Eric Schmitt, "How a Tense Standoff in Haiti Erupted into a Deadly Shootout with the Marines," *New York Times*, 27 September 1994, p. A16; William Booth, "Crowds Ransack Barracks in Haitian City," *WP*, 26 September 1994, p. A1; Richard A. Serrano, "Marine who Fired First Saw Ambush," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 September 1994, p. A1.
61. The Haitian Army and the police were one and the same. Many soldiers, for fear of retaliation, did not even wear a uniform.
62. Booth, "Crowds Ransack Barracks in Haitian City," p. A1.
63. The Haitian head of the Cap Haitien military district unsuccessfully requested that the US Marines be court-martialed. "Rapport du Lt-Col. Josaphat sur les incidents du Cap Haitien," p. 1.
64. "LTG Henry H. Shelton interview," in Hayden, *JTF-180 Oral History Interviews*, pp. 64, 66.
65. Larry Rohter, "5 Haitians Killed as Explosion Rips Democratic Rally," *New York Times*, 30 September 1994, p. A1.

66. John Kifner, "Pro-Junta Gunmen Fire on Rally in Haitian Capital," *New York Times*, 1 October 1994, section 1, p. 1.
67. Clinton, "U.S. Interests in Haiti," *USDOS Dispatch* 5, no. 38 (19 September 1994), p. 606.
68. UNSC, S/RES/940 (31 July 1994). Soldiers initially hoped that they would be back by Christmas, but the deadline for the transition to a UN force was finally set for March 1995. UNSC, S/RES/975 (30 January 1995).
69. The Department of Justice's program was ICITAP (International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program), designed to help Latin American countries improve their judicial systems. Section 534(b)(3), *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (P.L. 87-195).
70. The following overview of the selection and role of the interim force is drawn from *Human Rights Watch, Security Compromised: Recycled Haitian Soldiers on the Police Front Line* 7, no. 3 (Washington, DC: HRW/Americas, 1995); *The Human Rights Record of the HNP* 9, no. 1 (Washington, DC: HRW/Americas, 1997).
71. Amnesty International, *Haiti: Unfinished Business, Justice and Liberties at Risk* (New York: AI USA Publications, 2000), p. 14. See also, Human Rights Watch, *The Human Rights Record of the HNP* 9, no. 1 (Washington, DC: HRW/Americas, 1997), pp. 17-25. One must point out that the previous police force, even more violent and corrupt, encouraged, rather than fired, "bad apples."
72. Michael McCabe, "Soldier from Cupertino Killed in Haiti," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 January 1995, p. A17; "Wife of Slain Soldier Said He Did Feel Safe in Haiti," *Wilmington Star-News*, 14 January 1995, p. 3B.
73. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga* (New York: Random House, 1999), p. 219; *Public Papers of the Presidents of the US: Clinton 1* (1995), p. 437; "Remarks by President Clinton, Boutros-Ghali, Aristide at UN Transition Ceremony March 31," *U.S. Newswire* (3 April 1995).
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76. World Bank, *Haiti: External Financing* (Dec. 1997), p. 1, microenterprise collection, USAID Library, PAP.
77. Axel van Trotsenburg and Alan MacArthur, *The HIPC Initiative: Delivering Debt*

Relied to Poor Countries (Washington, DC: IMF, February 1999), www.worldbank.org/hipc/related-papers/related-papers.html; US State Dept., 1998 *Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices* (Washington, DC: USGPO, January 1999), pp. 270-74; IMF, *Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative-Perspectives on the Current Framework and Options for Change* (Washington, DC: IMF, April 1999).

78. Eric Schmitt, "A Quick Landing to Cheers of 'Merci, Merci!'," *New York Times*, 21 September 1994, p. A14.

79. Pierre-Raymond Dumas, "Problèmes en perspectives," *Le Nouvelliste*, 26 September 1994, p. 5; "Le 'nasyonalis' tounen kolabo," *Libète*, no. 105, 7-27 September 1994, p. 1.

80. "He believes the United States helped remove him in 1991 and then brought him back, so they are even" one of Aristide's aides said. "It's like if I steal \$20 from you, then give it back to you, you are not grateful, you just think justice has been done." Douglas Farah, "U.S.-Haitian Relations Deteriorate; Disarmament Dispute, Contact with Ex-Ruler Infuriate Aristide," WP, 29 November 1995, p. A1.

81. Signal FM, "Aristide Speaks out on Privatization," *FBIS*, 4 October 1995, p. 8. See also Aristide, *Eyes of the Heart*, p. 32. Aristide also called for land reform, not privatization. "We will continue to work together so we can manage to assure that Haiti does not remain in the hands of a few people without being able to produce enough food for everyone." Signal FM, "President Highlights Land Reform at Commemorative Mass," *FBIS*, 19 October 1995, p. 30.

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83. "Tipper Gore's Staff Scared, but Unhurt in Stone-Throwing Incident," *AP Wire*, 15 October 1995.

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