

Brunn, Stanley, ed. *11 September and Its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror*. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004.

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viding proposals on future steps to be taken. The final essay complements its predecessor, but the latter is presented by one of the persons in attendance at the second Trento conference while the first presenter is expressing his thoughts as an outsider to the conference.

With the PrepCom having completed its assignment in 2002 without an acceptable solution, the tasks were then taken up in the next phase by the working group of the Assembly of States Parties, the point at which we now stand.

The essays are comprehensive. A list is included of participants who were Trento conference attendees. For the uninitiated in this field, a paper and pen is recommended to keep track of the various proposals made by their proponents and their reasoning. It is a crossword without a solution found on another page, but no less intriguing.

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Brunn, Stanley, ed. *11 September and Its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror*. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004.

Stanley Brunn's *11 September and Its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror* is a collection of 11 essays which offer insight into the geopolitical implications of the murderous attacks that took place on 11 September 2001. The essays are very loosely related and the introduction of the book does not bind their themes with any main theoretical or paradigmatic framework. In addition, the book lacks a general conclusion. Consequently, there is no way in which all the themes of the essays could be adequately discussed here and certainly no invidious distinctions are implied with regards to those essays that cannot be mentioned here.

In the introduction, Brunn briefly summarizes the main arguments of the authors and then suggests 10 research themes, beyond the scope of this book, that merit further research. These themes include, most notably, the role of religion in foreign policy; the manipulation of the 11 September atmosphere by non-democratic states to de-legitimize their domestic opposition and minorities; border security; refugees and political prisoners; impacts of 11 September on pre-dominantly Arab and Muslim states; and the pre-emptive strike policies (the issue of Iraq).

In the second essay, Richard Mansbach argues that the terrorist attacks of 11 September did not cause fundamental changes in global politics but "sharply reflected those changes . . . [making] much of international relations theory seem hopelessly obsolete." (p. 16) The changes that Mansbach is referring to include

the shifting cast of global actors, the decline of the territorial state, the rise of multiple identities and loyalties, and the declining distinction between foreign and domestic politics.

While I would agree with Mansbach on the changing cast of global actors as well as the rise of multiple identities, I would argue against the decline of the territorial state and obsolescence of much international relations theory. If anything, the tragic events of 11 September placed security issues back at the forefront of international politics and showed that significant non-state actors have to be hosted and/or supported by a territorial state. Both the primacy of security issues and the predominance of the state as “the” main international actor are emphasized by the realist paradigm. Therefore, the events of 11 September could be, at least partially, explained by the realist paradigm. In addition, the issues of identities and the role of non-state actors, both at the heart of 11 September, are emphasized by the constructivist and liberal paradigms respectively; although both of these paradigms focus on “positive” roles (for example, the role of international institutions) and “benign” identities and international norms (for example, “democratic” as an identity of a state and the nuclear-taboo as an international norm). The lack of focus on negative identities (radical Islamism) and on “bad” non-state actors (terrorist groups) does not mean that these paradigms are obsolete as Mansbach suggests. A shift in the focus, within the main frameworks of these paradigms, could provide the conceptual tools and the explanatory variables necessary to explain the terrorist attacks of 11 September.

In a third essay, James Anderson discusses the relationship between 11 September and American hegemony. Anderson provides a simple typology of strategies toward allies (unilateral versus multilateral), different forms of power (civil versus military), and different ideologies of globalization (neo-liberal versus neo-conservative), and he concludes that the Bush administration’s overall foreign strategy could be described as “unilateral multilateralism,” with “unilateral” describing the bent toward what President Bush sees as “America’s interest” (withdrawing from the Kyoto protocol, for example) and the “multilateralism” describing the “Coalition of the Willing.”

In an interesting, post-structuralist piece, Margot Kleinfeld discusses how 11 September affected strategic troping in Sri Lankan domestic politics. Kleinfeld shows how the two Sri Lankan domestic rivals, the People’s Alliance Government and the Tamil Tigers of Tamil-Eelam, used the dominant discourse associated with the 11 September attacks and their early global responses to brand their adversary as terrorist, and to recode the political and conflict narrative in 11 September terms. Kleinfeld’s article discusses the strategic power of narrative as well as the emerging trends of representing any kind of political violence as global terror. Although Kleinfeld’s article focuses on Sri Lankan politics, her argument could be applied to other cases where the 11 September atmosphere and rhetoric were manipulated by many governments, especially authoritarian ones, to de-legitimize their domestic opposition and brand them as terrorists.

In another article, Francois Debrix analyzes and sketches the ideological intent of what he calls “tabloid realism”: a sensationalizing, persistently conservative discourse of national security in foreign policy literature. Found in the literature authored by Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “tabloid realism,” according to Debrix, not only seeks to grab the attention of the public by providing an overtly panic-stricken representation of international affairs, but also proliferates fear-inducing images of current realities to influence policy-making decisions.

Although Debrix successfully highlights the pessimistic perceptions of “tabloid realism” and the alleged ideological intents of its authors, he does not focus enough on its empirical flaws. If 11 September was a clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations, how could the main allies of the US in the war against the Taliban be the Islamic Northern Alliance? And if there is a clash between the Russian-Orthodox civilization and the Islamic one, how can the main ally of the Russian Federation and predominantly-Christian Armenia be the Islamic Republic of Iran?

In conclusion, despite the loosely-related themes and the lack of an elaborated discussion of geopolitical issues directly related to the rise of *al-Qaeda* in Afghanistan, or the geopolitical causes of anti-Americanism among radical Islamists, the book provides several well-developed analyses about the emerging world order and international relation theory, terrorism, American foreign policy, and political effects of narratives.

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Marten, Kimberley Zisk. *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Those interested in peacekeeping and what it has evolved into over the past decade need to locate a copy of Kimberley Zisk Marten’s *Enforcing the Peace*. Appropriately titled, it explores the role of military forces not just in ending violence, but in rebuilding entire states. That exploration follows two paths. The first retraces the “complex peacekeeping operations” of the past 10 years. Marten uses that term to “highlight [the] interwoven military, political and economic components” which, she claims, distinguish those operations from their simpler predecessors. (p. 4) The second path leads further back to examine American, British, and French colonialism around the turn of the twentieth century. The resulting comparative analysis thoroughly dissects “the notion of