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**This is an illustrated history of the Manitoba labour movement from the age of craft unionism in the late nineteenth century to the recent struggles against plant closures and layoffs in the 1980s. Commissioned by the Manitoba Federation of Labour, the book was written by CBC producer and journalist Doug Smith. According to the introduction, *Let Us Rise* seeks to enable Manitoba’s working people to locate themselves “in a tradition, to draw inspiration and insight from the example of those who have gone before [them], to provide a sense of context and continuity.” Unfortunately, Smith confines his text, for the most part, to a chronological survey of working people’s efforts to organize labour unions and improve their working conditions. In so doing, he ignores recent efforts to expand the definition of labour history and thus presents his readers with a limited, albeit important, account of their past.**

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Let Us Rise is made more accessible and popular by the inclusion of over 100 photographs, many of them full page. For the most part, however, the choice of photos is limited by the organizational theme to conventional images of union leaders and picket lines. Had the book incorporated more social history a greater variety of photos illustrating the work and lives of Manitobans would have been available to the author. In addition, the photographs are accompanied by cut-lines which run to approximately 100 words and are set in very small, difficult to read type. While this technique allows the author to provide mini-essays...
on a number of individuals and events that do not fit neatly into the text, the result disrupts the narrative and adds to the visual confusion of the book. Moreover, the layout is uneven and ill considered. White pages are left blank to emphasize chapter divisions, other pages are a cramped patchwork of photos, cutlines and text.

*Let Us Rise* is intended to serve as a popular introduction to the history of the Manitoba labour movement and to an extent it accomplishes this task. While it is an important first step, the author would have served better the interests of his readers by incorporating much that is innovative in the field of labour history and thus presenting a fuller portrait of their working lives.

Louise May & Andrea Smith
University of British Columbia & Langara College


**DANS CETTE MONOGRAPHIE** écrite dans un style très accessible, Andrée Lévesque nous offre une version approfondie de sa thèse de doctorat présentée en 1972 à l'Université Duke. L'auteure retrace l'histoire du bouillonnement idéologique des années 1930 au Québec, dans une nouvelle perspective: soit les efforts des communistes du PCC et des socialistes du CCF pour s'implanter au Québec à la faveur de la grande dépression, et la contre-offensive du clergé et des élites nationalistes face à cette nouvelle menace venue de l'extérieur.

Dans son premier chapitre, l'auteure nous brosse un tableau de la situation socio-économique du Québec au début des années trente. Exode rural, urbanisation galopante, faiblesse et fragilité de la structure industrielle basée sur une main-d'œuvre peu spécialisée et peu payée, importantes disparités régionales, écart socio-économique évident entre la minorité anglophone et la masse canadienne-française, voilà, parmi d'autres, les principales caractéristiques de la société québécoise d'alors. La crise viendra accentuer ces faiblesses et les rendre encore plus évidentes. Le chômage se généralise, les salaires diminuent, les conditions de vie et de travail se détériorent et, comme il se doit, la crise frappe d'abord les plus démunis et accentue l'écart entre riches et pauvres. Face au marasme économique, les gouvernements, tant au fédéral qu'au provincial, limités par leurs conceptions conservatrices, ne proposeront que des solutions partielles et insuffisantes, sans remettre en cause le système en place. Ne sachant pas répondre adéquatement au défi posé par la crise, ils ouvriront ainsi la porte toute grande aux groupes de gauche et à leurs propositions de réforme en profondeur.

Dans les trois chapitres suivants, nous avons droit, avec force détails, à la chronique des péripéties des communistes et des socialistes pour obtenir l'adhésion à leur thèse respective de la masse canadienne-française, "groupe prolétarien par excellence." Dans un premier temps, cette croisade se fait separate. Comme le démontre l'auteure, malgré l'opposition des communistes et les efforts du CCF pour se démarquer des premiers, leur impossibilité à attirer à eux les francophones, tant au plan du leadership que du membership, relève principalement de l'incapacité de ces deux formations politiques à comprendre et à rendre compte du nationalisme canadien-français. Venues de l'extérieur, les idées de gauche avaient une forte couleur anglophone et étrangère, alors que la clientèle visée était francophone. Le CCF, encore plus que le PCC, démontra une réelle incompréhension de la société canadienne-française, certains de ses dirigeants montréalais, issus de l'élite intellectuelle anglophone, allant même jusqu'à dire que les ouvriers canadiens-français étaient "illitres" et "émotionnels," et qu'il fallait par conséquent chercher des appuis dans la classe moyenne, intellectuellement plus apte à recevoir la bonne parole. . . D'ailleurs le CCF, qui s'appuie sur les clubs ouvriers, n'atteindra jamais le même degré de pénétration que le PCC qui lui, travaille au niveau de la base, dans les organi-
sations syndicales et les groupes de chômeurs. A cette faiblesse de base, commune aux deux partis, s’ajoutent les chicanes internes et les erreurs purement stratégiques, notamment lors des élections.


Le cinquième chapitre décrit les forces de droite et leurs efforts pour contrecarrer la menace communiste et la déviation socialiste. Si la gauche ne semble pas entraîner l’adhésion massive des travailleurs, les idées de droite connaissent un certain succès et se veulent le rempart contre la philosophie socialiste, d’autant plus dangereuse qu’elle est perçue comme essentiellement étrangère à la société canadienne-française. Ainsi, une bonne partie de la classe intellectuelle francophone opposera au marxisme la solution corporatiste, dont le PCC naît en tête. Comme le démontre l’auteure, le fascisme intègre, de type mussolinien ou autre, bien qu’il fit beaucoup de bruit pendant un certain temps sous l’impulsion de quelques chapeaux, demeure un phénomène essentiellement marginal, et l’image d’un “Québec fasciste,” telle que décrite par la gauche de l’époque, est exagérée. Mais la fièvre anticommuniste qui s’abat sur l’Occident durant les années trente, gagnera tout de même le Canada et prendra au Québec une dimension particulière. L’Eglise et la presse catholique sont sur les premières lignes et la guerre d’Espagne, où semble se jouer le sort de l’Occident chrétien tout entier, sera notamment l’occasion d’un véritable déferlement antirouge. Mais la lutte anticommuniste ne se fera pas seulement au plan des idées et la répression saura jouer avec virtuosité des différents instruments législatifs mis à sa disposition. Article 98 du code criminel, loi contre le vagabondage, loi du cadenas, l’arsenal est bien pourvu et relativement efficace. L’auteure affirme en effet que, en définitive, la répression “a beaucoup nui aux efforts d’implantation” de la gauche (p.145); elle ajoute qu’au Québec l’anticommunisme s’inspire du sentiment religieux et nationaliste et qu’il exprime un même temps une défense de classe, sans qu’il soit facile de déterminer dans chaque cas lequel de ces deux pôles domine.

Dans sa conclusion, l’auteure compare la performance respective du PCC et du CCF, et analyse les facteurs qui l’ont influencée. En définitive, ce sont les caractères particuliers de la société canadienne-française et l’incapacité de la gauche de les comprendre et de s’y adapter, qui expliquent en premier lieu son échec relatif au Québec: “ni le PCC ni le CCF, affirme Andrée Lévesque, n’ont réussi à se greffer sur un socialisme autochtone chez les francophones” (p.150). Face à cette faiblesse, l’anticommunisme conjugué de l’Eglise, de la droite et de l’État n’en sera que plus fort et ses coups porteront.

L’ouvrage d’Andrée Lévesque est intéressant et se lit avec intérêt d’une couverture à l’autre. Il livre le voile sur un chapitre méconnu de l’histoire sociale et politique du Québec. Les faits sont abondants, les précisions nombreuses et les pistes analytiques intéressantes. L’auteure a notamment le mérite de ne pas présenter le PCC, le CCF et les autres intervenants comme des blocs monolithiques et figés. Toutefois, l’ouvrage a le défaut de sa quinzaï; à être trop descriptif et factuel, il y manque le développement d’une véritable thèse, d’une interprétation d’ensemble sur
l'évolution idéologique et politique de cette période, qui aurait pu donner plus de souffle au texte et lui fournir un fil conducteur. Les conclusions sont souvent partielles, manquent d'intégration les unes aux autres et demanderaient à être incorporées dans une perspective plus large, notamment au plan historiographique. Néanmoins, le caractère novateur de la recherche de Mme Lévesque lui confère au départ une utilité certaine et la réflexion sur le matériel présenté ne demande qu'à être poursuivie.

Jean-François Cardin
Université de Montréal


CE LIVRE EST NÉ D'UNE AMITIÉ entre l'ex-militant du Parti communiste Gérard Fortin et le journaliste anglophone Boyce Richardson. L'ex-communiste a raconté sa vie et le journaliste l'a écrite en y ajoutant des passages de son côté pour expliquer ou situer dans le contexte social du Québec des années trente à vingt et un événement, un personnage ou une particularité de la société québécoise. Le tout donne une autobiographie intéressante, racontée à la première personne, un peu à la manière d'un roman. Toute l'énergie, la joie de vivre, la naïveté et l'enthousiasme de Gérard Fortin s'y retrouvent à travers mille et une anecdotes qui illustrent la vie de ce self-made-man.

Gérard Fortin a travaillé comme bûcheron, comme marin, et comme manoeuvre dans cinquante-six métiers; il a voyagé à travers le Canada et le monde; il a participé à la grève des marins canadiens de 1949; il a fondé l'Union des bûcherons au Québec; il s'est présenté contre Louis Saint-Laurent aux élections fédérales de 1953; il a été permanent du Parti communiste au Québec, membre de son exécutif provincial avant d'être expulsé en 1958. Puis, il s'est lancé dans les affaires, devenant même un associé des promoteurs du projet Concordia que soulevait les passions à Montréal au cours des années soixante-dix; il milita au sein du Mouvement Souveraineté-Association puis du Parti québécois, avant de se retirer à la campagne après le référendum de 1980. Richardson a bien raison de dire de Fortin que, "comparé à tous ceux qu'il a connus, on peut dire de lui qu'il a réellement vécu." (p.7)

"From his earliest years as a child in an impoverished, pious rural family in the country of Bellechasse, to his youth in the logging camps of the Quebec forest, to his emergence as an internationalist, radical and revolutionary struggling in the cause of the working class, and finally to his years of financial comfort and political frustration as a salesman, rent collector and real-estate man, Fortin's life offered almost a modern social history of Quebec, a bird's eye view of a society undergoing enforced change during the middle decades of the twentieth century." (p.8)

Né le 9 mai 1923 à Saint-Charles de Bellechasse, en face de Québec, Fortin est plongé rapidement dans la dure réalité de la vie. Sa mère meurt alors qu'il n'a que six ans, son père l'éleve brutalement et il quitte l'école après sa troisième année pour se consacrer aux travaux de la ferme. La forêt lui permet de s'échapper d'une vie sédentaire qui ne l'attirait pas et ce sera comme bûcheron puis comme marin qu'il découvrira le monde. Nourri d'un anticléricalisme féroce, Fortin adhère très jeune aux idées communistes qui lui sont inculquées par un vieux marin révolutionnaire. Il n'est pas tendre envers les compagnies qui exploitaient les travailleurs: ainsi, parlant de l'Imperial Oil, il s'écrie: "A bunch of bastards. If I may say so!"

C'est en arrivant à Montréal, en plein procès pour espionnage de Fred Rose, député communiste de Montréal-Cartier à la chambre des Communes, que Fortin et six de ses camarades marins décident d'adhérer au Parti communiste. "You're coming with me, lance-t-il à ses amis, you're going to buy some decent clothes, then we're going to join the Party." (p.78) Mais les choses, avec le parti communiste, ne sont jamais aussi simples. La militante qu'ils rencontrent au bureau du Parti leur explique froidement que les choses ne se faisaient pas comme cela, qu'on adhère pas au parti de la classe ouvrière comme à un club paroissial: "You have to be approved by your branch, recommended by members." La
reaction d’un gars spontané et direct comme Fortin ne se fit pas attendre: “Goddam! This was unbelievable. We were ready to pay $50 each to join, and here was this Party with a membership fee of a dollar a year refusing to accept our money! What kind of Party was this?” (p.79)

Fortin devait le découvrir bien assez tôt. Sans trop comprendre dans quelle galère il s’engageait, il finit par adhérer au Parti dans les régies, en étant présenté par un marin au cours d’une réunion de cellule du Parti à Québec. Puis, le Parti lui demanda de travailler pour le syndicat des marins, le Canadian Seamen’s Union (CSU). Il connut la grande grève de 1949, l’hystérie anticommuniste, l’arrivée de Hal Banks et de la pègre à la tête d’un syndicat de bouteille rival, les bagarres sur les quais et dans les tavernes, avant d’assister, impuissant, à la défaite complète du CSU. Ne pouvant plus travailler comme marin, Fortin devint organisateur pour le Parti à Québec. Il mit sur pied rapidement des cellules parmi les marins et les bûcherons, et dans le quartier Saint-Malo. Puis le Parti lui demanda d’organiser les bûcherons du Québec. Il fonda l’union des bûcherons (UB) et se heurta à la violence patronale, à l’épiscopat de Québec, à l’Union catholique des cultivateurs (qu’il appelait “l’union chérie des compagnies”) et, bien entendu, à la ferme volonté du gouvernement Duplessis de sortir l’UB des camps de bûcherons.

Fortin entreprit alors une véritable saga personnelle dans les forêts du Québec. Il se promenait de camps en camps, échappant aux gardes armés des compagnies, marchant de nuit en plein hiver pour ne pas se faire repérer, faisant signer des cartes d’adhésion à des bûcherons surexploités par les grandes compagnies américaines et anglo-canadiennes. Le gouvernement Duplessis, de concert avec ces derniers, dénonça Fortin et l’UB comme autant de créatures des communistes, payées avec l’”or de Moscou.” Comme le signale Fortin avec humour: “If only we’d had some of that Moscow gold that was supposed to be financing us…” (p.90) Mais cette propagande dis- créda Fortin et l’UB et le travail d’organisation des bûcherons initié par les communistes dans des conditions effroyables profita finalement à “l’Union chérie des compagnies”. “I suppose you could say we’d failed because we were Communists, conclut Fortin, but if we hadn’t been Communists, we wouldn’t have undertaken such a dangerous and foolhardy work at all.” (p.148)

Fortin fut rapatrié par le Parti à Montréal et devint cadre, à un salaire de $25 par semaine. Là, il connut les longues réunions, la diffusion du journal Combat dont il devint l’éditeur, les pétitions pour la paix, les échecs cuisants du Parti aux campagnes électorales, les chicanes de clans, la défection du groupe de Henri Gagnon, la crise de 1956 et le départ de certaines de militants écourtés par les révélations de Krouchtchev sur les crimes de Staline. Lui ne s’intéressait pas aux grands débats idéologiques, aux questions internationales. Il cherchait davantage à mettre en pratique ce qu’il avait appris sur le terrain, auprès des marins et des bûcherons, en amassant des fonds, en faisant signer des cartes d’adhésion, en organisant des cellules, en diffusant le journal, etc. Lorsque le Parti éclata, en 1956-1957, il tenta de poursuivre la lutte en accédant au comité exécutif du Parti au Québec, que Gui Caron et les autres dirigeants venaient d’abandonner. Mais il fut victime des luttes idéologiques intestines qui rongeaient le Parti et expulsé comme “révisionniste et agent de la C.I.A.” en 1958.

Le lecteur trouvera savoureux les chapitres subséquents, alors que l’organisateur communiste se transforme en agent immobilier, que l’internationaliste devient militant du Parti québécois et que le coureur de jupons finit par se marier tendrement… à 45 ans! Voilà un ouvrage rafraîchissant, qui est un témoignage vivant et direct sur les conditions sociales dans lesquelles un homme pouvait devenir communiste au Québec dans les années quarante et cinquante. Laissons Fortin conclure: “It is common for people who have left their lives as Communists behind them to recant and apologize for their past, to attack the cause that they served for so long. I do not feel any such need. I have no regret at having passed so much of my life in this work. (…) my objective was to better the lives of my fellow workers. I don’t think that’s anything to be ashamed of.” (p.154)

Bernard Dionne
Professeur au Cégep de Saint-Jérôme
WITHIN THE LAST YEAR in Saskatchewan there were two major lockouts, of civic theatre workers in Saskatoon and food wholesale workers by Safeway. The Devine Conservative government also legislated 12,000 provincial workers back to work in the face of a growing rotating strike movement. In 1982 over 400,000 days were lost to strikes compared to 12,000 in 1984. Such patterns, of a decline in workers’ militancy and a rise in employer confidence shown in the use of the lockout weapon, hold true across Western Canada’s troubled resource economies. While British Columbia wood exports face American protectionist barriers, prices for the mainstays of prairie provincial development — oil, potash, and wheat — have plummeted.

In this climate of economic trouble, virtually every province has rewritten its labour code to make union organizing, collective bargaining, and job security, more difficult to exercise or protect. Social wages, such as the amount paid to single employable youth in Saskatchewan, have been slashed. Food banks dependent on private charity and often run with demeaning and irrelevant means tests, have reappeared like some dreary replay of the 1930s. At the same time provincial governments have tried to buoy up private investment through tax holidays, subsidies, and just plain giveaways, like Devine’s courting of Peter I’ocklington and his pork plants.

One of the main arguments in any marxist theory of the state is raised by Murray Knutilla in his study of the prairie farm progressives’ relations with the federal state. By examining two farm lobby campaigns, a successful one in getting favourable grain marketing legislation, and a failure in the effort to remove the tariff, Knutilla argues that the bourgeois state is not simply “the executive committee of the bourgeoisie,” but “a site of class conflict.” In contrasting the progressives’ victory over the private grain traders and their failure to out-influence the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, Knutilla also identifies some direct and indirect ways to measure lobbyist influence that could be used in future studies. Knutilla is careful to state that he is not a pluralist but that marxists can have a more sophisticated view of class conflict within the bourgeois state.

It is Glen Makahonuk’s essay, on the
emergence of the Saskatoon working class, however, that turns our attention to that central group, the urban waged working class. Makahonuk emphasizes two aspects of prairie labour's formative years: workers' material conditions and their class responses to the vagaries of a new, raw capitalism. Thus we get a picture of the farm service economy with its groups of railway, print, and building trades workers in the primary labour market and the unskilled labourers, women and children in the much harsher secondary labour market. Such conditions and problems as hours of work, occupational safety, unemployment, wages, housing, and public health are presented to build a composite portrait of a working class in formation.

Labour's response, over the period 1906-1919, complements this survey of conditions. A brief profile is drawn of organized labour, early contracts, and the pattern of strikes, which culminated in 1912 at the height of a building boom. Makahonuk also reveals the early lobbying strategy of labour's leaders, ruling over unions that are as much social welfare clubs as collective bargaining agents. We see union leaders involved in pre-war lobbies of city council and the province over regulating child and female labour, fair wages, and unemployment. Logically, to exercise the most effective lobbying presence, labour moved to elect its own occupational representatives. Thus in 1914 and in 1918 a labour alderman was elected.

The break with this reformist lobbying tradition came with the Winnipeg General Strike. By June 1919 over 1,200 workers were striking in sympathy with Winnipeg workers. Like the Winnipeg Strike Committee, the Saskatoon Strike Committee issued its own essential services permit cards, thus starting an unconscious process of dual power in which the workers were establishing their own authorities, rather than bargaining and lobbying within the limits of the private economy and the capitalist state. But without a socialist party to consolidate the solidarity movement of 1919, this wave of struggle collapsed when Winnipeg was crushed. Not even a One Big Union local was formed.

These historical essays are followed by articles more concerned with the contemporary scene. Two fine essays by Bob Sass and Ray Sentes look at the class politics underlying the establishment of health and safety legislation, and the class bias behind the actual concepts and numerical values of physical hazard standards. Following the American Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, the new Blakeney NDP government introduced a similar act in 1972 with the establishment of joint management-labour health and safety committees, allowing for a more sensitive on-site regulation of occupational health concerns. This act, Bob Sass states, rests upon "three rights: the right to know, the right to participate, and the right to refuse." In 1973 the right to refuse unsafe work was added to the act. AS Bob Sass points out, under the NDP a majority of health and safety concerns were resolved successfully, though a significant number were not. This situation has deteriorated under the Conservatives since some of the most bitter strikes in the last year, farm machinery workers at Smith-Roles in Saskatoon and the present Lanigan potash miners strike, involve health and safety matters.

To move from physical hazards regulation to regulating the work process itself, the NDP signed the first Work Environment Board agreement in 1981 with the province's Potash Corporation. Few employers have imitated this next step, actually encroaching on management's rights over the work process. It is apparently all right to humanize the work place physically, or at least it was in the 1970s when there was some money, but employers are not about to concede control over "their" production.

As opposed to Sass's rather optimistic account of the NDP's corporatist strategy, and as a former health and safety union representative, I would add the need for independent class organization on occupational health, for a separate union health and safety committee that fights to entrench health and work rights in collective bargaining.

Ray Sentes' essay on the class bias of health standards is quite illuminating. Much of Canadian legislative standards is actually drawn from a private American health and safety association, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, which despite its title is composed largely of corporation employees. Sentes also reveals how
regulatory concepts such as Threshold Limit Values have become corrupted, being redefined as averages rather than ceilings on maximum exposures. Even more shocking is the fact that many of the numerical values quoted have no basis in serious research or are based upon outdated studies.

The Politics of Work in the West concludes with two essays looking at the employers' ideological offensive. Rob White explores the redefinition of 'Right to Work' as a matter of individual opportunity over collective social rights, such as the universal right to a job and economic security, while the employers' economic offensive is the subject of a piece by Jim Sheptycki. In the latter essay Sheptycki first presents Marx's theory of economic crisis, particularly the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, drawn from Chris Harman's Explaining the Crisis, and the example of how Saskatchewan's Conservatives have cut labour costs and moved to support private investment, the latter taking the province from a surplus budgetary position to a two billion dollar debt today. As Rob White shows, the Tory argument that more private investment will in the long run lead to more jobs may by a myth. Between 1982 and 1984, 43.7 per cent of investment went to natural resources and utilities where only 3.3 per cent of the workforce is employed.

Presented by the editors as a set of studies organized about the sociology of work this collection reveals the class nature of the work process under capitalism, and shows how the work process is the focal point of class struggle between workers and employers at the point of production. Given the variety of disciplines represented by the essayists, however, what gives the volume some coherence is a common marxist method of analyzing western producers and workers and their struggles in the past and present.

This multidisciplinary approach has some weaknesses. From a historian's perspective there are some remarkable factual errors, as in Knutilla describing Thomas Crear, the Progressive federal leader, as a Liberal cabinet minister in the early 1920s, or in missing the significance of Sir Lomer Gouin, the chief protectionist proponent in the Liberal cabinet. The editors should have consulted experts in fields other than sociology given the historical character of many of the arguments presented. It is also too bad that the editors did not report on the informal presentations and debates, especially that of Larry Brown, chief executive officer of the Saskatchewan Government Employees Union, after which a lively debate ensued about whether to wait to vote NDP in the next election or to engage in direct economic struggle.

Finally, what answers do these various authors have to the present crisis? Two trends of thought stand out. One, a rather naive academicism, notable in the last two papers, calls for the building of "an alternative constructive hegemony," that is, a different set of ideas. This idealistic call to arms under something like the banner of "social rights" is based upon a tradition of academic marxism focusing on a reformist interpretation of the Italian communist revolutionary, Antonio Gramsci. Contrary to this, a majority of the participants implied the need for renewed working-class organization, whether through the New Democratic Party or on independent socialist lines.

Robin Wylie
University of Saskatchewan


**SINCE THE FIRST EDITION** of the guide was issued in 1978, the field of political economy has experienced diversified growth with political economists producing much new work on various aspects of Canadian society. This book covers a vast range of research and writings. The reading list is divided into seven areas: factors of development, nation and gender, class formation, factors of dependency, underdevelopment, culture and ideology, state and politics. These areas are further divided into 24 sub-areas and introduced by differ-
ent contributors who briefly highlight the current research and debates in the field, identify issues for further research, and provide a bibliography. The first edition was compiled by Drache and Clement alone.

In their introduction the editors discuss the major debates and theoretical models used during the past decade to explain the process of development and change in Canada. Dependency theory, the Panitch-Drache controversy, and the Keynesian model are reviewed and evaluated and new theoretical questions for the 1980s are put on the agenda. The editors attempt to establish that no present theory is adequate to understand the large setting of the economic and social relations of Canadian capitalism. In their view Marxists "stress the similarity of social relations of all advanced capitalist countries," whereas Innisians emphasize "the specific relations in a given capitalist society and the reason for that specificity." They call for a new approach which will enable us to understand the "relationship among the institutional processes, the existing level of social and economic cohesion, and Canada's role in the North American economy." In developing this new theoretical perspective, they see that political economy faces a range of new challenges which come from feminist theory, the rise of the political right in Canada, and from within Marxism itself.

Much useful work is cited on different aspects of Canadian economy and its relations with other countries, on the roots of Canada's "under-developed" industrial structure and its continuing integration into the new international division of labour; on Canada's dependent status as a staple-producing country, semi-industrialized and highly vulnerable to American whim; on the triumph of monetarism and the participation of Canadian banks in the international banking activities; and on the nature of the economic crisis and imperialism.

In analyzing regional disparities and inequality in Canada, Arthur Davis's contribution on a metropolitan rather than a hinterland area certainly comes as a surprise. His bibliography on Ontario emphasizes the function of Ontario as the imperial centre of Canada. The reading list in this fifth section covers native people and different regions in Canada, except for Quebec which is considered together with women under the topic of nation and gender.

The Canadian state has acted as a social regulator in a wide range of areas particularly in regards to economic development. The reading list on the state in section seven covers government policies, the rise of federalism, and political parties. It focuses on policies that have been introduced to deal with regional disparities and on policies to promote and to regulate the development of energy resources. It also deals with the nature of confederation, the impact of various staple commodities on federal-provincial relations, external influence and the Canadian federal system, etc. It is made clear that political economists have shown little interest in analyzing the much more successful bourgeois parties and that pluralist writings dominate this field.

Since 1978, the issue of class and class formation in Canada have received considerable attention. Paul and Erin Phillips suggest that "... class analysis has tended to ignore the fact that, at least until second world war, the majority of Canadians were neither capitalists nor wage-workers...." In their bibliography they therefore emphasize readings concerned with independent commodity production. Jorge Niosi concentrates on the capitalist class, its links to the state and political system, its ethnic composition and its regional development. Craig Heron's and Greg Kealey's list of readings indicates the massive growth of studies on working-class struggles and labour organization.

The literature on women has expanded very rapidly in the last decade. Feminist writing has been crucial in the rethinking of gender and politics and has revealed a deep, underlying sexism in social and political thought. The readings in this section are explicitly critical and cover a range of issues including sexuality, power and resistance. While some progress has been made, the very existence of a special bibliographic section on women is an indication that political economy has, for the most part, just begun to take sex differences into account.

The publication of this guide is a welcome development and it is highly recommended to students in the field of political economy. This document should stimulate Canadian studies and assist in developing the quality of Canadian social science. Having said this, I would..."
also like to make a few more critical comments and observations:

(1) A few lines on each contributor could help those who seek more information to contact a specialist in the field and could further communication and debate; (2) Although the division of labour in this new edition of the guide promotes co-operation among Canadian political economists, the contributors and predominantly from Central Canada. An even greater contribution from scholars on the periphery should be encouraged in the third edition; (3) While the guide provides a selective, but extensive bibliography, English language references predominate. A true political economy of Canada needs to pay even closer attention to recent studies done in French. (4) A wealth of Canadian literature exists which should be a crucial source of insight into society and culture. A section on Canadian literature could add a new dimension to this guide. (5) I do agree with the authors that we need new research and a new more comprehensive theoretical perspective. Contrary to the author's view, however, I do not see Marxism as a theory which stresses convergence and ignores the specificity of advanced capitalist countries (xi). While developing a new theoretical perspective is fine, the original works in political economy should not be forgotten. The next edition might include somewhere a reference to Capital and other classics of that ilk.

Parvin Ghorayshi
University of Winnipeg


IN MANY WAYS Sault Ste. Marie was an odd place to open a steel plant in 1901. Far from most markets and poorly located for reliable raw materials, it defied the emerging logic of the industry. Yet the charismatic entrepreneur Francis Hector Clergue had swept up politicians at all three levels of government in his vision of corporate grandeur in “New Ontario,” and extracted the necessary state largess (especially tax concessions, cash handouts in the form of “bounties,” orders for rails, and new tariffs) to get production started. The magnificent edifice he had constructed began to crumble by 1904, however, when Algoma Steel’s parent company, the Consolidated Lake Superior Corporation, had to be reorganized and refinanced. Clergue’s legacy to the Sault thus became not a vision realized, but a set of crippling structural constraints created by financial indebtedness to absentee foreign owners and an overspecialized steel plant. It took another determined capitalist, Sir James Dunn, and the generous help of the federal government, to pull Algoma out of that quagmire four decades later.

This, in brief, is the story that Duncan McDowall tells so well in his fine new study of entrepreneurship at Algoma Steel. It is not a “company history” like, say, William Kilbourn’s glowing account of Stelco’s growth, The Elements Combined. It is a much more detached, critical look at how one corporation in a key Canadian industry emerged and limped through years of hard times, before finding its feet in the new economic climate of the 1940s and 1950s. There is not much here on the internal management of the firm, since McDowall is, probably correctly, more concerned with external market forces and managerial or entrepreneurial abilities to cope with them. He sketches in a great deal of useful information on the general state of the Canadian steel industry that is not readily available in other secondary sources. But at the core of his study is the irascible, irrepressible Sir James Dunn, whose voluminous personal papers provide the backbone of the analysis. In fact, the book is above all an examination of the continuing importance of entrepreneurship in the age of large, impersonal corporations.

The book also provides some lessons in capitalist ethics. Dunn was the kind of capitalist who gave the system a bad name. Ruthless, secretive, cynically contemptuous of small-scale investors, and downright greedy, he lived (before winning control of Algoma in 1935) os-
tentatively off the avails of stock manipulation and corporate promotional work that won the respectable title of "investment banking." Like Clergue, he was also eager to work behind the scenes at Queen's Park and on Parliament Hill to get the necessary concessions for his projects — most notably, a highly questionable 1935 Ontario legislative act that gave him control of Algoma Steel and shut out the smaller bondholders.

The close collaboration of corporate and state officials was crucial to Algoma's success from the beginning, and none played a more important role than C.D. Howe. As Canada's minister of munitions and supply during World War II, Howe made sure Algoma not only had a wartime boom, but also got federal help in a massive programme of modernization of production facilities. "Businessmen like Clergue and Dunn were able to co-opt [politicians'] public ambitions and to press them into the service of private capital," McDowall writes. "They learned to flatter politicians' ambitions with their schemes of development for private profit." (258-9)

The book might have been strengthened with a fuller consideration of the impact of all this wheeling and dealing on the community that was created by Clergue's original project. For much of the first 40 years of this century, the working men and women of Sault Ste. Marie lived with the consequences of shoddy investment decisions and faulty corporate planning, most particularly in the form of chronic underemployment. When they tried to unite to win a better standard of living at the end of World War I, they were beaten back, and during the next World War Dunn (who believed that Labour had destroyed the fabric of British society) resisted their renewed efforts vigorously. McDowall touches lightly on life in the Sault, but the full social implications of the corporate intrigue he documents so well remain indistinct behind the vivid figures Clergue and Dunn and the external world of investors and state officials in which they operated.

McDowall has nonetheless produced a solid, smoothly written analysis of an important slice of Canadian industrial life. We need more books like this.

Craig Heron
York University


By 1914, it has been estimated, some 170,000 Ukrainian immigrants had come to Canada from the two Austro-Hungarian provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna. Most of these immigrants were, according to Clifford Sifton, the "stalwart peasants" in "sheep-skin coats" who were so desperately needed to transform the Western Prairie into a Canadian Garden. The Ukrainian settlers brought to the New World a peasant mind with its fascinating mix of pessimism and hope as well as their stubborn will to endure despite famine, pestilence, and Anglo-Saxon racism. There were, in fact, two quite distinct surges of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada during the pre-1914 period. The first, directed at the pristine prairie frontier of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta virtually ended in 1905. From 1905 to 1914, the second wave of Ukrainians was largely drawn to the mines and mills of industrial Canada and to the burgeoning urban centres.

Jeroslav Petryshyn's Peasants in the Promised Land is an attempt, as he puts it, to view the Ukrainian immigration "processes from the perspective of both the host society and the immigrants." (x) In this noble attempt, Petryshyn is not very successful. His description of the Canadian world in which the Ukrainians found themselves breaks no new research ground. Moreover, it is remarkable for the lack of any sophisticated empathy for the social, political, and cultural forces shaping the emerging English-speaking consciousness during the Laurier years. Peasants in the Promised Land falls far short of the treatment of the same problem in V.J. Kaye's Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada 1895-1900, and nowhere in the text does Petryshyn explain where his work goes beyond that of Kaye, whose important pioneering work received surprisingly little attention either in the text or in the footnotes of Petryshyn's book.

Petryshyn's descriptive analysis of the Galicia and the Bukovyna which the immigrants left behind contains a great deal of
useful and sometimes interesting material. Petryshyn is particularly impressive in his account of the activities of the North Atlantic Trading Company, a key immigration recruiting agency effectively used by Clifford Sifton. But his discussion of Dr. Josef Osleskow's key role in the immigration movement is superficial. Petryshyn could have made much more of the way in which anti-Semitism seemed to permeate the immigration movement as well as the crucial role of oral tradition.

Even though there may be little that is new and innovative, or particularly interesting, in Peasants in the Promised Land about the Ukrainian immigrant experience in the Canadian West in the pre-1905 period, there is some useful information in the latter section of the book about the Ukrainian “Labour and the Socialist Perspective.” Many Ukrainian labourers, despite their peasant backgrounds, were not afraid of trade unions, nor were they hesitant to participate in strikes. Some would become ardent socialists and their socialism would help them to integrate themselves into both industrial life and Canadian society. Other Ukrainian workers would be satisfied with the solace proved by competing Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant Churches, or by the escape provided by alcohol and the dream of returning, sometime, to the Old Country. This could have been an important, suggestive, and ground-breaking book. Alas, it is not. Though published in 1985, the manuscript was obviously completed in 1978 and it is stamped by this fact. And, moreover, the book seems to have been carefully avoided by all copy-editors. There are scores of awkward transitions, convoluted sentences, and poorly conceived and articulated arguments. There are, however, a number of stunning photographs which in themselves convey much of the essence of the Ukrainian immigration experience in the 1891-1914 period.

THIS IS AN important book. It received quick and strong blessing in the Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, the bible of Quebec historians, where Serge Courville described it as “nuancé” and “impressioniste.” Even before publishing Peasant, Lord, and Merchant, Allan Greer had staked out important turf in Lower-Canadian history, with his 1978 article on literacy in Quebec and his more recent articles in Academis and Labour/Le Travail, where his willingness to tackle the heavies of our economic history was displayed.

Three Richelieu parishes - St Ours, St Denis and Sorel - are put under the microscope in Peasant, Lord, and Merchant. As late as 1691 the area was subject to Iroquois raids and it was only in the eighteenth century that agricultural settlement spread through the lower Richelieu seigneuries. In 1722 Sorel and St Ours were organized into parishes; St Denis became a parish in 1740. The century 1740-1840 covers what Greer calls the end of the pre-industrial era. Through his parish focus - Greer, crosses the conquest, the shockup in the Montreal-based fur trade, the “agricultural crisis,” and the rebellions, resuscitating the importance of the seigneur in this feudal environment. Given the weakness of church and state, seigneurial manifestations - the domain, mill, manor house, seigneurial justice, and the commons - were of real importance in local life. Most significant, the seigneur was an essential ingredient in the property-holding system, summed up by Greer with the northern France dictum of “no land without a seigneur.” (91)

Greer takes the gloves off with liberal historians who object to the term feudalism to describe life in the St Lawrence Valley. His lower Richelieu farmers are “peasants” who function within the feudal mode of production.” (xi) By this he means that the largely self-sufficient peasant household was locked into a dependant form of land proprietorship in which the fundamental social relation was the exaction of peasant labour to support the dominant classes, essentially the clergy and seigneurs. With this problématique, Greer will have no truck with the Eccles' tradition of seigneurialism as paternal; rather it was a finely-tuned system of appropriation that included “a clever hedge against the erosion of fixed

G.A. Rawlyk
Queen's University

Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 1740-1840 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985).
money rents” and that made a “mockery of legislation intended to protect the peasantry.”

Parallel to the feudal reality of the lower Richelieu were the circuits of merchant capital. Merchants marched to a different economic drum than the seigneurs or clergy: merchant accumulation resulted from exchange. In accepting Maurice Dobbs’ fundamental point of the compatibility of feudalism and merchant capitalism, Greer presents two examples - rural merchant Samuel Jacobs and the employment of Sorel peasants as engage’s in the fur trade.

A German Jew who arrived in Canada in 1759 as a victualler to the British army, Jacobs settled in St Denis in 1761. Although he speculated in industrial production (distilling, potash) in Quebec City, stave-cutting and timber-rafting on Lake Champlain, and shipbuilding, his primary economic activity was in the wheat and retail trade. Cheap Jamaican rum was Jacobs’ “battering ram to break into the habitant’s self-sufficient household economy.” With liquor as the merchant’s primary “foothold in the precapitalist world,” Jacobs entrapped his peasant clients in the consumer cycle with a network of retail, shipping, storage and credit facilities: “The general pattern found in much of the world, rural Quebec included, is one of commercial capital introducing a worthless or harmful habit of consumption as a means of initiating or increasing trade with a population whose life is not already organized around buying and selling.” (157-9)

Credit brought mortgages, the lands of failed debtors, and tenants who worked repossessed farms.

Samuel Jacobs was thus a rural merchant who cohabited nicely in St Denis with feudal structures. Greer’s second example - the employment of Sorel peasants as engage’s in the fur trade - confirms the compatibility of feudalism and merchant capitalism in the sector of international trade. Sorel was a favoured source of labour for the Northwest Company. A “semi proletarian” occupying “a position between that of a peasantry and that of a working class,” (185) Sorel males were less likely than urban labourers to organize or to resist employers and when their labour was not needed they could be dispersed to their farms. For the period of the 1790s Greer was able to find employment contracts for one third of the adult males of Sorel. (181) Greer includes a salvo against Fernand Ouellet who says “not a word” about merchant exploitation of the peasant condition. (255)

For its discussion of diet, family strategy, illegitimacy, and inheritance, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant is must reading for students of Lower Canadian history. It confirms that much of the productive research in Quebec rural history (one thinks of Christian Dessureault on Saint-Hyacinthe, Lise St-Georges on l’Assomption, Sylvie Dépatie on l’île Jésus, Mario Lalancette on La Malbaie, and Françoise Noel on the Upper Richelieu) is coming from micro-studies of small regions.

After these kudos, a few regrets can be permitted the reviewer. From an interpretative point of view, a sense of totality, of the individual (particularly the peasant), and of larger political relations is missing. Peasant resistance is vague and the political tradition of the three parishes is missing (although this is promised in future work).

Rich in interpretative insight, Greer is surprisingly sparse in his methodological explanations. His sources are important: the censuses, parish records, notarial archives, and a scattering of other primary sources such as lawsuits and bishop’s correspondence. Given the sharp controversy over the relative value of these sources, Greer’s comments are parsimonious. Almost no mention is made in the introduction of parish registers; only the patient reader of a footnote (263) will have his judgement on their value. Only the digger into appendix two will learn that he used 110 inventories after death and discover his comments on their representativeness.

From the sidelines it is perhaps too easy to demand from a first book the political-culture analysis of a Gareth Stedman-Jones and the methodological jackhammer of a Maurice Agulhon. Put simply, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant is one of the best books of the last years on Lower-Canadian history.

Brian Young
McGill University

**HISTORIENNE DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ irlandaise de la ville de Québec et descendante de Jeremiah O’Gallagher, initiateur de l’érection de la croix celtique de Grosse-île au début du siècle, Marianna O’Gallagher nous offre une courte étude sur cette station de quarantaine. Livre commémoratif enraciné dans le souvenir des communautés immigrantes qui sont passées à la Grosse-île, il veut témoigner de la souffrance de ces “boat peoples” du XIXe siècle, déchets humains et marginaux rejetés par la révolution industrielle anglaise, qui ont peuplé notre pays dans la première moitié du siècle dernier.**

Ce livre constitue une première en ce sens qu’il aborde un sujet relégué aux oubliettes par la plupart de nos historiens professionnels en dépit des nombreuses archives qui sommeillent dans divers dépôts à travers le pays. L’immigration dans ses aspects socio-politiques et culturels comme objet d’histoire a eu la portion congrue dans l’historiographie québécoise. Qu’une historienne, en dehors du monde universitaire et de la recherche subventionnée s’attaque avec passion en solitaire et sans soutien financier à l’histoire de la plus importante station de quarantaine sur la côte Atlantique du Canada, cela mérite notre attention. Marianna O’Gallagher défend aussi avec chaleur l’idée de transformer le site de la quarantaine de Grosse-île en parc historique national. Son livre s’inscrit comme un plaidoyer en faveur de la protection et de la mise en valeur de cette île.


Lors de sa fondation en 1832, la quarantaine de Grosse-île fait l’objet d’un débat politique et parlementaire important. D’un coté le gouverneur Aylmer veut une quarantaine sous contrôle militaire tandis que la Chambre d’Assemblée du Bas-Canada, où domine le parti Patriote, exigerait jusqu’aux troubles de 1837 des bureaux de santé issus du suffrage populaire et une quarantaine sous son contrôle. Au débat politique se superpose un débat médical et sanitaire sur l’étiologie et la contagion du choléra asiatique. Contrairement aux croyances populaires, la majorité des médecins de l’époque croit que le choléra n’est pas contagieux, donc la quarantaine est-elle vraiment nécessaire?

En appuyant sa recherche uniquement sur une lecture partielle des journaux, Madame O’Gallagher commet des erreurs inévitables et devient incapable d’inscrire son texte dans des perspectives historiques. Pour bien comprendre les enjeux socio-politiques et sanitaires qui ont donné naissance et ont accompagné le développement de la quarantaine, l’auteure aurait dû consulter minimalement les journaux de la Chambre d’Assemblée du Bas-Canada et leurs riches appendices et les multiples fonds d’archives fédéraux, surtout la correspondance du Secrétaire-Civil (RG 4 A1). En ne consultant pas aux Archives de la Ville de Québec, les procès-verbaux du Bureau de Santé de Québec pour l’année 1832, l’auteure ne peut comprendre l’essentiel. Il en est de même pour l’enquête mise sur pied par le Gouvernement du Canada-Uni après le tragique été de 1847. De plus, une lecture des travaux de Geoffrey Bilson sur le choléra au Bas-Canada s’avérait indispensable et n’a pas été faite.

Ces carences au niveau de la recherche amènent l’auteure à commettre des omissions ou des erreurs factuelles. Par exemple, elle oublie de mentionner que d’autres sites ont été envisagés avant le choix de Grosse-île (Beauport et le trou Saint-Patrice à l’île d’Orléans). Elle ignore que l’Hôpital de la Marine n’a ouvert ses portes qu’en 1834, puisqu’elle en parle durant l’épidémie de 1832 (p. 24). L’auteure affirme qu’il est mort à la Grosse-île autant de personnes en 1832 que dans la ville de Québec (p. 26). Cette affirmation est absolument sans fondement.

En mettant accent sur les événements exceptionnels de 1832 et 1847, l’auteure néglige de parler du développement de la quarantaine...
sur le plan juridique et législatif. Comment fonctionnait-elle sur plan de l'accueil et du séjour des immigrants? Seulement sur l'aspect médical et sanitaire, on aurait eu beaucoup à apprendre sur la manière dont on recevait, inspectait, nettoyait et contrôlait les immigrants. Sur tous ces aspects, l'auteure est silencieuse. Aucune mention n'est faite des diverses communautés ethniques qui sont passées par la Grosse-Ile.

Le livre contient de nombreuses photos qui ne sont pas mises en valeur et qui auraient du être intégrées au texte. Les nombreux documents d'archives reproduits (p. 115-181) sont complètement inutiles et peuvent donner la fausse impression que l'auteure a consulté de nombreuses sources manuscrites. La bibliographie est d'une pauvreté désespérante.

Finalement le livre de Marianna O'Gallagher s'avère très décevant pour l'amélioration de notre connaissance sure la quarantaine de Grosse-Ile. En négligeant d'étudier les débats politiques et sanitaires sur la quarantaine, l'auteure s'est privée de sources d'inspiration qui auraient donné du coffre à son travail. Ce livre aura au moins le mérite d'inciter les historiens professionnels à œuvrer sur un sujet presque tabou dans l'historiographie québécoise: l'immigration.

Rejean Lemoine
Québec


DEPUIS UNE DOUZAINES D'ANNÉES, Parcs Canada supervise un programme de recherche qui a pour but de retracer l'histoire de la canalisation et des canaux dans la vallée du Saint-Laurent. D'ailleurs, certaines de ces investigations ont déjà été publiées sous forme de monographies; on a qu'à penser aux travaux d'Edward Bush et de Karen Price sur la construction du canal Rideau (1826-1832) ou à ceux de Larry McNally et de John Willis sur les mutations technologiques au canal Lachine de 1846 à 1900. L'ouvrage de P.-André Sévigny constitue un des derniers nés de ce vaste projet.

En choisisissant d'étudier la main-d'oeuvre des canaux du Richelieu de 1843 à 1950, l'auteur a voulu combler une lacune de l'hi storiographie ouvrière trop souvent axée sur l'industrie urbaine et peu sensibilisée au monde de l'ouvrier rural et aux conditions de travail dans les entreprises d'Etat. Il est vrai que les grands travaux publics (canaux, chemins de fer, etc.) entrepris par le gouvernement au XIXe siècle ont fait l'objet de quelques recherches ici et là; mais, dans la plupart des cas, les historiens se sont arrêtés à la phase de construction de ces ouvrages. Or, en ce qui concerne la présente enquête, l'auteur a délibérément fait abstraction des ouvriers qui ont érigé le canal Chambly et l'écluse Saint-Ours pour concentrer son attention sur les personnes qui ont fait fonctionner ces ouvrages, leur statut, leurs tâches et leurs conditions de travail. Pour ce faire, certaines sources inédites ont été mises à contribution, dont les registres de la correspondance administrative des canaux (92 volumes) couvrant les années 1852-1920. Mentionnons aussi l'utilisation des rapports annuels du ministère des Travaux publics et le recours à une douzaine d'entrevues orales réalisées en 1975 auprès d'ex-employés du canal Chambly.

Mis à part le chapitre 1 consacré à l'histoire, l'ouvrage se subdivise en cinq parties correspondant chacune à diverses étapes dans l'évolution de la structure opérationnelle du canal Chambly: phase d'improvisation (1843-1852), phase d'organisation (1852-1867), phase d'expansion et de crises (1867-1896), phase de "second souffle" (1896-1920) et phase de déclin (1920-1950). Durant la première phase, le canal Chambly disposait de moyens plutôt modestes. Ainsi, en 1843, peu après l'inauguration, l'organisation du canal ne comptait qu'un seul maître éclusier, de ce qui restait le plus important tâche du maître éclusier: faire des sondages pour connaître quotidiennement la profondeur du canal, inscrire ces données dans un registre, examiner les laissez-
passer des bateaux, mesurer le tirant d'eau de ces derniers [...] et expliquer les règlements [aux capitaines]" (p. 44). Après la saison de navigation qui durait en moyenne 219 jours par année, les éclusiers étaient généralement utilisés pour effectuer des travaux spécialisés de réparation dans les ateliers du canal. Ce faisant, ils travaillaient à l'année longue et bénéficiaient d'un statut d'ouvrier permanent.

A partir des années 1860, le bureau des Travaux publics autorisa le recrutement d'une main-d'œuvre saisonnière au canal Chambly, d'abord sur une petite échelle puis, par la suite, de façon courante. Cette catégorie à part d'employés comprenait les aides-éclusiers, les haleurs qui dirigeaient les chevaux de touage et les ouvriers de la construction à qui l'on assurait des tâches comme la réfection des remblais et des ponts, le dragage du canal et le montage de certaines pièces d'équipement (cadres d'écluses, quais, etc.). Règle générale, ces journaliers de la construction étaient engagés au printemps pour une durée variant d'une à quatre semaines. Leur salaire se situait en 1867 entre 0.90$ et 1.50$ par jour selon le métier ou l'occupation. Les travaux d'élargissement du canal entrepris en 1869 et en 1878 de même que la relance des activités commerciales sur le Richelieu au début du XXe siècle, grâce à l'exportation du bois de pulpe vers les États-Unis, auront pour effet d'accroître le nombre d'ouvriers d'appoint et de façon courante. Son analyse du faible impact des innovations technologiques - notamment l'introduction de l'électricité de 1890 à 1920 - sur les métiers d'éclusier et de pontier ne manque pas non plus d'intérêt et mériterait d'être approfondie ultérieurement.

Toutefois, au niveau de la présentation de certains aspects, on en est quasiment réduit au néant ou encore à la répétition de lieux communs de l'historiographie traditionnelle. Ainsi, l'auteur nous révèle vraiment peu de chose sur l'insertion du canal Chambly au sein de l'économie locale de la vallée du Richelieu. Qui étaient les principaux utilisateurs du canal? Jusqu'à quel point la prospérité économique de la région était-elle essentielle pour la survie du canal? Est-ce que le traité de réciprocité conclu entre le Canada et les États-Unis en 1854 a eu des retombées sur l'activité maritime et l'activité économique générale de la vallée du Richelieu? Quels furent les effets de l'achèvement du Champlain and St. Lawrence Railway qui reliait Montréal à Rouses Point, dans l'état de New York, dès 1851? Voilà autant de questions qui demeurent sans réponses.

Dans un autre ordre d'idées, l'auteur semble adhérer beaucoup trop facilement à une conception idéalisée des rapports sociaux. Faisant allusion à la société québécoise au XIXe siècle, il affirme: "Nous sommes à une époque où les relations personnelles étroites, l'entraide, la protection du faible par le fort constituent des valeurs humaines et morales..."
Conscient des faiblesses de la thèse de H.C. Pentland, il soutient néanmoins que le concept de paternalisme bienveillant est parfaitement valable pour "décrire les relations qui existaient au XIXe siècle entre les employés des canaux et l'ingénieur-surintendant" (p.35), étant donné la gestion gouvernementale de ces ouvrages. Certes, on ne peut nier l'existence de diverses formes de concertation paternaliste entre patrons et ouvriers, même au niveau de l'entreprise industrielle au XIXe siècle; mais s'arrêter à cette constatation constitue une grave erreur. Il faut savoir décodier les documents. Dans le cas de la main-d'œuvre au canal Chambly, l'auteur n'a pas su reconnaître dans les problèmes d'alcoolisme, d'insubordination et d'adaptation aux longues heures de travail, des formes primitives de résistance ouvrière, pas plus qu'il n'a su percevoir dans la menace de grève des éclusiers au début des années 1850 ou encore dans les doléances des journaliers pour obtenir la parité salariale avec les permanents en 1874, des formes de solidarité silencieuse.

Globalement, on ne peut pas non plus passer sous silence l'ambiguïté qui entoure l'ouvrage. En effet, dès le début, l'auteur nous annonce sa volonté de se démarquer des courants traditionnels de l'historiographie et d'orienter sa recherche dans une perspective d'histoire sociale des travailleurs. Pourtant, à l'exception du chapitre 4 portant sur la crise économique des années 1873-1896, il ne parvient guère à nous livrer autre chose qu'un produit descriptif, peu détaché du contexte institutionnel, plus proche de la chronique ouvrière et administrative.

Robert Tremblay
Université du Québec à Montréal


EARLY CANADIAN HISTORY was a two-way street, says Bruce Trigger in his latest book: Europeans had to adjust to Indian ways of seeing and doing things, and Indians, in turn, had to adapt to European tastes, traditions, demands, religious fervour, gadgets, even diseases. Trigger wrote the book, he says, in part to convey the contents of his oversized Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660 to a wider audience, in part to bring that earlier work up to date, and partly to wake Canadian (and, presumably, American) historians into paying more attention to these northeastern Indians in their renderings of colonial history. He has a point, though exaggerated. His fellow Canadian, Cornelius Jaenen, has paid a lot of attention to Native Americans in his fine books and articles on New France, but, then, Trigger virtually totally ignores Jaenen (except for references in the bibliography). It leaves one wondering how well this manuscript was refereed.

The book notes that French interest in Canada, until the colony was taken over by the crown in 1663, was chiefly commercial; mainly furs furnished by the Indian nations. Ah, but there were problems and complications with this simple arrangement. Although there was a fur monopoly licensed by the viceroy, the monopoly always had to cope with rival Basque and French traders — basically, illegal merchants who operated at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, hawking their wares at attractive prices and lubricating the transaction with alcohol. So the monopoly established Quebec City and Three Rivers to interpose itself between these entrepreneurs and the fur-laden flotillas of western Indians. Then there was the problem of keeping the Indians from the Dutch at Fort Orange (near present-day Albany), the Dutch who found themselves forced into an alliance with the powerful Mohawk after the Mohawk had scattered the rival Mahicans on the other side of the Hudson River. In the years to come the French would secretly welcome limited Mohawk harassment of Canadian Indians since it prevented the latter from taking their pelts to the Dutch. The Mohawk, however, had other ideas on the matter.

Compounding all of this was the righteousness of the Recollets and Jesuits, who vigorously opposed Godless company agents living with and allegedly corrupting their Indian flock. The Recollets were a special thorn in the flesh to the company through their
vigorous promotion, with Champlain's support, of French colonization coupled with Indian settlement on French-style farms. Fur merchants, naturally, were less than warm to the idea of settlement, French or Indian, fearing it would divert Indian hunters from their primary task of trapping furs. They were relieved to find an ally in the Jesuits, who also took a dim view of Indian and French settlement. Yet the Jesuits were too soft on the Five Nations Iroquois, thought the merchants; they worried that the Iroquois mission would result in a French-Iroquois alliance that would encourage further Iroquois piracy against French-allied Indians, and so cut into company profits.

But all this is only half the story. And this is Trigger's point. The Indian nations had their own agendas, their own modes of operation, their own concepts and arrangements of trade, which the French were obliged to accommodate, as exasperating and confusing as that was. Unfortunately, much of this side of the story is puzzling and, to western ears, even bizarre.

It begins with the annihilation of the St. Lawrence Iroquoians sometime in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Trigger says they were dismembered by the Micmac, Montagnais, Huron, and Five Nations, for reasons that remain obscure. He discounts the suggestion that European epidemic disease had left them vulnerable to this ganging up, but I think he is wrong. Cartier's journal reeks of disease, indeed even documents a major outbreak (mysterious to Indians and French alike) in Stadacona (later Quebec City) in the winter of 1535-36. Be that as it may, by the turn of the seventeenth century the primary battle lines were drawn: Montagnais (with Huron and Algonkin support) against the League Iroquois. The French (through Champlain) joined the fracas on the side of the former.

And herein is an important lesson: French trade arrangements with these Indian nations were more than just commercial affairs, they were also alliances — Trigger calls them political alliances — as the French soon discovered. Indeed, trade for these northeastern Indians was a peculiar institution. The earliest European copper, brass, iron, and glass beads were prized more for their spiritual virtues than any utilitarian function they might have (many of these goods being buried with the Indian dead in the sixteenth and even seventeenth centuries). Trigger suggests that the arrival of these exotic items stimulated a mortuary cult among the Iroquoian groups in the northeast, but I think his logic is flawed here. It seems more likely to me that something else did the stimulating (disease perhaps?), and these goods (together with native artifacts) were interred in vast numbers in response. Indians, it seems, were interested in acquiring European hardware in these early years, at least, mostly to give it away within their tribal network — for the sake of prestige. Our concept of "prestige" does not do justice to this phenomenon, which, I submit, we barely understand.

So the Indian nations made alliances with the French, for trade (whatever that concept meant to them) and support against their enemies (usually the Five Nations). The ideal arrangement for an Indian tribe was to have the French trade all to themselves, to keep their demand for French-made goods low, and to furnish only sufficient beaver pelts to satisfy their limited wants. But prevailing forces made this formula impossible to maintain. The French insisted on making contact with tribes farther and farther west, thus bypassing their erstwhile partners; French-allied tribes found themselves sapped by Iroquois raids, epidemic disease, and even famine; and eventually many became dependent on these French supplied goods which they had tried so hard to hold at arm's length. Demoralization quickly followed.

It is a long story, and an intricate one, and I have not done it justice in these brief lines. Trigger is to be congratulated for putting together such an immense quantity of scholarship. One might argue with his interpretations, as I have done, but one still admires him for having performed that Herculean task.

Calvin Martin
Rutger's University

AS A SCHOLARLY enterprise, the "new labour history" of the United States has been a startling success. Each year, its practitioners pile up more and more prestigious awards for their books. Its originally innovative interpretations have become the orthodoxy in an increasing number of cases. And major research universities, which rarely offered labour history courses 20 years ago, now include labour history as a regular part of the undergraduate and graduate curriculum. Viewed as a political project, the new labour history has had more mixed results. Although new labour historians have often been veterans of the New Left of the 1960s, they have failed to find political movements with which to connect their work in the 1980s. Nor has the official labour movement—or even rank-and-file insurgents—embraced or disseminated their work with much enthusiasm.

Encouraging exceptions can be found to this tendency for the new labour history to become an academic rather than political and popular pursuit. The Massachusetts History Workshop, for example, has organized historical commemorations and reunions for a variety of labour groups. Local activists have organized labour walking (or bus) tours in such cities as Detroit, Baltimore, and the District of Columbia. State labour history societies and union-sponsored courses have also bridged the gap between academics and unionists. The American Social History Project at the City University of New York has mounted a full-scale effort to present the new labour history to union and community college audiences through print and audio-visual materials.

This engaging volume of 14 brief essays is an important addition to this small but growing effort to popularize the findings of the new labour history and to present them to a non-academic audience. It originated as a series of essays in the social democratic newspaper, In These Times. And the editors of that series, Paul Buhle and Alan Dawley, have brought the essays together, in the words of the back cover, as an "introductory text for students, union cardholders, and the general public." (73)

Actually, Working for Democracy offers few of the negative or positive features of a "text." On the one hand, the writing is generally much lighter, more vigorous, and less didactic than that in most texts. On the other hand, the book is far from a comprehensive survey of the American working-class experience, as the editors freely admit. But if Working for Democracy is not a survey, its precise focus is sometimes hard to pin down. The title, the foreword by the late Herbert Gutman, and the book jacket suggest that the book centers on the "politics of American workers from the Revolution to the present in terms of broad struggles for power in society at large." The majority of the essays address this theme, but others are only tangentially related to it. And the editors' own preface describes the book more broadly as "a new treatment of workers' history." (xii)

The book succeeds less as a text or survey and more as a "discussion document" for groups interested in the American labour past. It is particularly well suited for discussion groups that want to bring the insights of history to bear on current labour problems. And the essays are at their best when they raise broader questions based on the episodes that they recount. James Green's "Labor and the New Deal" is a model in this respect; it explicitly asks readers to consider "the losses" in labour's entrance into the New Deal coalition and suggests alternative possible strategies. David Montgomery's thoughtful essay on the Minnesota Farmer Labor party similarly asks difficult questions about the nature of a labour party and how it would "operate within the American political framework." (73) Both would be ideal starting points for discussions of labour's political strategy.

As with most collections, the essays presented here vary considerably in style, tone, and focus. Alfred Young, Eric Foner, and Nell Irvin Painter, for example, offer clear and concise overviews of major topics in labour history. They provide, in effect, informative mini-lectures on mechanics in the era of the American revolution, workers and slavery, and black workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other essays are somewhat narrower in focus or purpose. Despite its title ("Blacks and the CIO"), Richard Thomas's article concentrates on the Negro Labor Councils of the early 1950s. Alan Dawley, although covering a wide period of time (the civil war to the end of the nineteenth century) and a large
topic (labour's political responses), is primarily interested in presenting a brief for independent political action and in rescuing the Social Revolutionaries (an anarcho-syndicalist splinter from the Socialist Labor Party) from the condescension of posterity. Similarly, Paul Buhle's sweeping essay on socialists and wobblies raises some interesting questions about the meaning of the labour movement and labour political action that transcend the particular period he addresses.

The essays share more in their political and interpretive perspective, since they are generally written from within the American left. Yet there are important variations. Nell Painter, for example, writes more favourably of the New Deal coalition than does James Green. George Lipsitz in his very stimulating essay on "Labor and the Cold War" is more critical of post-war Communists in the labour movement than is Richard Thomas. And Barbara Wertheimer's consideration of "Women Workers" evinces much greater sympathy for the official labour movement than does Manning Marable's forcefully-argued article on "Black Insurgency." The editors might have usefully highlighted some of these differences in their preface, since they make the book more useful as a discussion document. The addition of an annotated bibliography and a list of labour history films would have also enhanced the book's value for labour educators.

In general, the essays avoid the tendency of much popular labour history to present an overly romantic or heroic picture of past labour struggles, although Franklin Rosemont's lively discussion of the early workingmen's parties sometimes takes on a rose-colored hue. The collection steers clear of romanticization in part because it incorporates (as much of the new labour history does not) the not-always-happy experiences of blacks and women workers. It is hardly surprising that Mari Jo Buhle's essay on "Women's Labor and Politics" ends with the "unrealized goal" of "equal treatment."

But the collection avoids depicting the labour movement as always heroic or triumphant, it is less successful in explaining why millions of workers have refused to join unions, working-class parties, or even strikes. The structural and cultural factors that have circumscribed the political and economic power of American workers are topics that might have received fuller attention. Such factors require particular consideration, given their connection to contemporary crisis of the American labour movement, a topic eloquently documented in Sidney Lens closing essay. Nevertheless, this useful collection offers considerable material for reflection and discussion, particularly for those unionists and activists seeking a way out of labour's current impasse.

Roy Rosenzweig
George Mason University


JOHN BODNAR'S The Transplanted is a major intellectual achievement. Compared to such recent competitors as Thomas Sowell's Ethnic America, Thomas Archdeacon's Becoming American, or Stephan Thernstrom's edited Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, Bodnar's book stands out for its analytical sophistication, its avoidance of simplistic dichotomies, and its rejection of all too prevalent stereotypes. If other scholars in the field follow his lead, it may well place future discussions of immigration and ethnicity on an entirely new plane. Yet, notwithstanding these impressive accomplishments, labour historians who come to the book mainly for insights into the connections between ethnicity and class may be unsatisfied with his analysis of that relationship.

Bodnar has succeeded at the two most critical tasks confronting any would-be synthesizer: first, to summarize and generalize about large numbers of monographs and case studies without oversimplifying or losing the fine texture of detail, variation, and exception; but, at the same time, to put the details into a new argument which provides explanations that go beyond the case studies on which a synthesis rests.

His command of the literature not only in
ethnic history but also in such related specialties as labour, urban, family, and demographic history is awe inspiring, and includes European as well as American scholarship and a substantial selection of unpublished dissertations. I have not read anything else recently which included as many citations with enticing titles unfamiliar to me. He summarizes the findings of this literature clearly and ably and on that ground alone the book deserves high praise and wide readership.

But even more thought provoking for labour historians is the larger argument Bodnar fashions out of these summaries. Bodnar implicitly rejects key assumptions of two dominant paradigms — classical Marxism and modernization theory — which have shaped much of the discussions in both labour and ethnic history. While he “does not seek to render unimportant ethnic or even class analysis,” he argues that there is “a meaningful level of analysis... beyond the older view that immigrants were members of a particular ethnic group or that they were only humble workers.” (xvii) Immigrant communities were seriously fragmented, he argues, and “immigrant adjustment” cannot be explained simply in terms of either culture or class as a clash of “immigrant and American culture” or a conflict “at the point where foreign-born workers met industrial managers.”

Instead his focus is on individuals and families “at all the points where immigrant families met the challenges of capitalism and modernity: the homeland, the neighborhood, the school, the workplace, the church, the family, and the fraternal hall.” At each of these points immigrants made a variety of choices. Yet such an emphasis on individual and familial choices does not mean, Bodnar argues, that immigrants can be understood as the atomized and uprooted individuals of some versions of modernization theory. Individuals are not necessarily individualistic.

While individuals and families made a variety of strategic choices, Bodnar recognizes that they all operated within the common constraints imposed by a capitalist economy, and all reacted to these constraints with a common priority — the economic well-being and integrity of the family unit. Immigrant communities all displayed high levels of communalism and social solidarity. People helped each other, but the most fundamental unit of solidarity was not the ethnic groups of class but the family. This family priority did not preclude ethnic, class, or ideological loyalties, but all wider attachments could only command mass support when their demands were consistent with the prior demands of family and kin. The common constraints imposed by their position within a capitalist system stimulated patterns of wider loyalty, but never without some tensions and contradictions.

Above all else Bodnar is sensitive to the range of variations in immigrant experiences and behaviour. His immigrants are not the disoriented peasants of Oscar Handlin’s The Uprooted, not the upwardly mobile achievers of Thomas Sowell’s Ethnic America. Such archetypes certainly did represent parts of the immigrant experience, but they fail to capture the many different immigrant trajectories or to explain why behaviour and experience varied in the ways they did.

His discussion of emigration and immigration, for example, demonstrates the inadequacy of a simple push-pull model based on differences in wages and opportunities between the Old World and the New. Rates of emigration varied widely between nationalities, between regions, and between economic groups in ways which do not correlate with economic differentials. For most nationalities, Bodnar explains, immigration displayed a distinct chronological cycle based on the timing of particular social and economic changes. Capitalist development intruded on immigrant homelands in two ways. First, new transportation networks and expanded urban industrial production flooded the countryside with cheap manufactured goods that undermined the livelihoods of rural artisans and household producers. Second, expanding urban populations provided opportunities for the commercialization and reorganization of agricultural production. Where transportation links impeded the spread of factory goods or where topography and other factors limited the attractiveness of large scale commercial agriculture, emigration rates were low. In the regions most affected by the spread of cheap manufactured goods and the widespread commercialization of agriculture, emigration usually followed a two-stage cycle.
with an initial cohort of craftsmen, artisans, and small, independent farmers — the groups most immediately threatened by capitalist development of the countryside — followed by a later, larger stream of those "just below the level of respectable artisans and independent owners," such as more marginal owners and their children. At each stage, in virtually every major immigrant group, the most impoverished and most oppressed were underrepresented in the emigrant stream.

Bodnar displays similar sensitivity to analytical complexities in his analysis of the internal structure of immigrant communities. Where other scholars have stressed cultural solidarity and homogeneity or contrasted the values of entire nationalities, Bodnar stresses the internal contradictions within national groups. Such contradictions, based on the continuities of Old World conflicts, the divisions between regional and religious sub-groups, and the internal class structures of immigrant communities, cropped up time and again, Bodnar shows, in immigrant churches, fraternal societies, political organizations, and unions.

His emphasis on the importance of the internal class structure of immigrant communities, and in particular, the role of the immigrant middle class as a competitor with labour and radical organizations for the loyalties of immigrant workers, is an important insight for labour historians. But other parts of his treatment of ethnicity and class will strike many labour historians as inadequate.

Labour historians have generally recognized that class and ethnicity have been closely intertwined in the United States since the great surge of Irish and German immigration in the 1840s and 1850s. For most of the next 100 years, the majority of American workers were what we have come to call "ethnics": immigrants, their children, and blacks. As John Bodnar clearly understands, the converse has also usually been true: most urban immigrants were working class. But other parts of his treatment of the relationship between ethnicity and class will strike many labour historians as inadequate.

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It is not completely clear to me whether this conception of class is an inadvertent function of the topical organization of the book or an intentional challenge to the Thompsonian notion of class as historical process which most new labour historians have adopted. Each of the major chapters in the book is a topical essay organized around Bodnar's central themes of the way capitalist development shaped the range of immigrant possibilities, the variation in individual choices, and the centrality of family life in determining choices and pursuing strategies. But while this topical organization is historiographically and intellectually useful, none of the chapters deal consistently or chronologically with long term processes of change. How did capitalism, Bodnar's central backdrop, change during the century from 1840 to 1940 and how did changing patterns of capitalist development alter the nature and position of ethnic communities, the ethnic hierarchy within the United States, the attitudes of various nationalities, the possibilities open to them? Did immigrant unions, churches, fraternal societies function differently in eras of prosperity or in eras of war or depression?

This static approach is most evident in the final chapter in which he attempts to summarize his theoretical position and relate the individual, and largely private, focus of much of the book to the larger theme of "the relationship between immigration and capitalism." (207) The connection, he argues, is in the creation of what he calls "The culture of everyday life." Immigrants did not fully understand the nature and meaning of capitalist development, but "somewhere in time and space all individuals meet the larger structural realities of their existence and construct a relationship upon a system of ideas, values, and behavior which collectively gives meaning to their world and provides a foundation upon which they can act and survive. Collectively their thought and action are manifestations of a consciousness, a mentality, and ultimately a culture." (208)

If all this sounds a little vague and general, succeeding paragraphs do not help very much to flesh it out. What exactly was this "culture of everyday life?" Which "system[s] of ideas, values, and behavior" is Bodnar attributing to immigrants? What was the content
of those values? Where did they come from? His answers are less than satisfying.

He appears to come closer to specifying the content of this culture when he reminds his readers that it "was ultimately the product of a distinct inequality in the distribution of power and resources within the system of capitalism," and, "it would be convenient to call this a culture of the working class." But cautioning that it "was not tied that simply to the means of production or the workplace and was not simply the prerogative of laborers," he backs off with a series of disclaimers.

In the end he is prepared only to make a general statement of a pragmatic immigrant mentalité which was a "blend of past and present and centered on the immediate and the attainable." (21) There is certainly some truth and a good deal of usefulness to such an effort to construct a generalization about the immigrant frame of mind, but after 200 pages of detailed and sophisticated analysis this is a disappointing finale which dodges the most important questions the rest of the book effectively raises. Where and when do we find the culture of everyday life? Was it the same everywhere? Are differences between the Irish in Boston in the 1850s or the Germans in Chicago in the 1880s or Poles in Detroit in the 1930s important in any way? If it is not "tied that simply to...the workplace": (what recent labour historian would argue that any meaningful conception of working-class culture was?) then what was the relationship between ethnicity and class, between "the culture of everyday life" and working-class culture? To what extent, at different times, did or did not different nationalities of working-class immigrants have similar values and habits?

Bodnar's culture of everyday life seem, then, like a timeless abstraction. Yet much of his earlier discussion could be interpreted in ways quite consistent with some analyses of class development. His emphasis on the centrality of individual choices and family loyalties can be read as no more than an empiricist's insistence that labour and ethnic historians avoid imposing their own values on their historical subjects and start their analysis with a clearer recognition of how most immigrants and most workers viewed the world. His discussions of both emigration and immigration are not inconsistent with arguments which emphasize how the emergence of capitalism altered previous social relationships. Undoubtedly Bodnar was aware that some historians would express misgivings about his "culture of everyday life," and he disclaims any hope of reconciling "the long standing debates between advocates of a class-based history and a past explained by cultural imperatives." On that score he is too modest. No partisan of that debate in the future will be able to ignore his book.

Richard Oestreicher
University of Pittsburgh


WHERE DO BLACK WOMEN fit in American history? Until recently broad surveys of the national experience settled for victim or Mammy typologies, if they referred to black women at all, and more specialized inquiries into black, women's or labour history advanced our understanding not much further. Black history tended to focus on enslaved or free men, women's history on the white native born and immigrant, especially from the industrial working class or urban middle class, and labour history on struggles of working men on the job, in unions, or at the polls. Although each literature shed light, directly or reflectively, on some black American women, the lives of most remained in shadow and poorly comprehended. Jacqueline Jones's Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow presents a comprehensive historical account of this relatively neglected group.

How can their history best be grasped? Jones quite properly places them in two linked yet competing settings, the paid work force and the family. Slave women by definition produced their owners' crops and reproduced their labour forces. Victorian notions about female delicacy protected them not at all from heavy labour or harsh punishments. During the
half century following emancipation, the great majority of black women lived in the South, where many worked as sharecroppers and where later increasing numbers worked as servants in towns. Poverty, high mortality rates, and the lack of steady, well-paid jobs for black men made the middle-class ideal of full-time home making unattainable to all but a relatively few black women. Migrating northward in this century, hundreds of thousands took the menial service jobs reserved for them in the cities. Government policies during the Great Depression ravaged the sharecroppers, public relief agencies discriminated against blacks generally, and the wartime full employment economy gave blacks, men and women, only the briefest entry into the industrial plant or the office block.

If the cotton picker and domestic suggested victimization, they showed different faces to their families, communities, and churches. Indeed, while devotion to their families impelled them to enter a labour market segregated by sex and race and compelled them to work unremittingly for low pay, they derived hope and satisfaction denied them on the job at home and in their own communities. Jones chronicles the exploits of black women who bravely protested abuse, but she also discusses broader social trends: the roles black women played as healers, church leaders, shock troops for protest movements, bearers of family and kinship histories, and exemplars of the Afro-American "ethos of mutuality." Economic necessity took them away from home, but they guarded family autonomy and reserved time to be with their children whenever they could by shifting from gang labour into sharecropping, commuting to domestic jobs rather than "living in," and taking clerical or blue collar work instead of domestic service.

What is the importance of Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow? It is the only thorough introduction to the history of black women from slavery to the present, from southern fields and towns and in northern cities, and thus it cannot and should not be ignored. Jones relies on all the important secondary literature and an impressive number of primary sources. More than a record of mistreatment and misery, the book examines how and why millions of poor women endured and overcame trying and de-meaning circumstances. White male patriarchy comes in for a drubbing, but Jones is also sensitive to tensions that often divided black men and women, black and white women, black parents and children. Neglect and spicely usually characterized the policies government, businesses, and unions took towards black women, but Jones gives credit to those enlightened public agencies, businesses, and progressive unions that behaved humanely and courageously. The book presents important correctives to cliched assumptions about black matriarchy, the black work ethic, the contemporary crisis in the black family, and the allegedly redemptive effects of free market capitalism in a racially stratified society.

Jones notes that some progress has been made recently but at great cost. Civil rights bills, federal protection for voter registration, and affirmative action programmes have enabled a minority of black men and women to enter the middle class and blacks generally to enjoy more open access to public service and exert greater political influence. A far larger number, however, have suffered enormously from inflation, unemployment, dead-end jobs, a government intent upon reducing deficits by debiting the poor, and a growing mood in the white public generally of resentment and unconcern for the poor. Black power, feminism, New Deal kinds of government programs, and militant unionism have failed to address effectively the pressing problems of this burgeoning black underclass in which women are overrepresented. If solutions to current problems are unclear, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow prevents a needed and useful analysis of the historical workings of racial and sexual exploitation that uniquely impinged upon the lives of black women, while at the same time bearing witness to the strength of character, love of family, and cultural resources that enabled most to live as well as just survive, to overcome as well as merely to endure.

John O’Brien
Dalhousie University

FOR THE PAST several years, the annual Lowell Conference on Industrial History has explored a wide range of themes regarding the nature and evolution of industrial society. The 1980 and 1981 conferences focused on "The Social Impacts of Industrialization" and "The Relationship of Government and Industry in the United States." The 14 essays and several comments in this collection were delivered at the 1982 conference on "The Arts and Industrialism" and the 1983 conference on "Urbanization and Industrialization."

The works in the first section, "The Arts and Industrialism" (which is subdivided into discussions of architecture, literature, and the visual arts), set out to examine "the ways in which the growth of an industrial society has shaped the aesthetic of the modern world and to see how the arts in turn shaped our understanding of industrial society." (8) John Stilgoe's "Central Stations and the Electric Vision, 1890 to 1930" and Patricia Hills' "The Fine Arts in American Images of Labor from 1800 to 1950" are the most interesting essays in this section. The former examines the evolution of electric power stations from their early haphazard forms in the 1880s to the 1920s, when they had penetrated deeply public and private culture: from the toy clamshell cranes in penny arcades and electric trains in homes to the company-sponsored tours of station houses which offered the public a chance to admire these new forms of beauty, power, and efficiency. Although Stilgoe's approach is a familiar one, he reveals actual and metaphorical aspects of industrial development that contain fresh and important insights into the transformation of industrial civilization. Patricia Hills' sweeping essay uses the fine arts to explore the "attitudes and beliefs which the artist and/or his patrons held about work, about the working classes, and about America" between 1800 and 1950. (120) This is a wonderfully instructive and useful introduction into the tensions between an early artistic nostalgia which ignored new industrial relations and latter-day efforts — and barriers — to present an unsentimental view of the urban proletariat and growing class struggles. Hill is equally concerned with analyzing art, artists, and the influence the patronage system had upon both.

As for the other pieces, Richard Candee challenges the importance of Lowell as the first planned industrial community and argues that its architectural patterns and social organization had their roots in the "Waltham factory form." (34) Essays by Michael Folsom, David Gross, and Cecelia Tichi explore a wide range of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literary images of and responses to industrialization. Laurence Gross' brief but intriguing essay on proletarian literature of the 1930s and 1940s examines how one group of radical writers "promoted a revolt against economic and literary 'laws' which both condemned people to the ravages of oppressive exploitation and demanded that literature ignore their fate." (110-11) Moving to the visual arts, David Jaffe explores the impact of antebellum commercialization upon rural portrait artists, while William Stott offers a brief discourse on photographic styles and images of the 1930s.

The essays in the second section, which focus upon the process of urbanization and the social and cultural dimensions of the industrial city, should prove more useful to readers of this journal. John Bodnar's "The European Origins of American Immigrants," one of the best essays in the book, offers a revisionist view of the events and motivations that led Europeans of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to migrate to the United States. Drawing upon an impressive body of secondary literature, he argues that the bulk of immigrants were not "impoverished peasants fleeing the ruins of agricultural Europe or eager entrepreneurs seeking to exploit the riches of a new urban-industrial order." Rather, they were pragmatic people located "in the middle and lower-middle sections of their homeland's social structure" who, unable to obtain sufficient land to survive in commercial agriculture, came to America to improve their material fortunes; some dreamt of returning home while
others adjusted to their new life. (270) Francis Couvares' equally impressive essay on urban culture seeks to explain the "relatively successful incorporation of immigrant-stock, working-class people into American society in the twentieth century." (295) He challenges the more familiar portrait of mass culture as a destructive and depoliticizing force and argues instead for the need to see it as a complex phenomenon capable of alternately encouraging incorporation, resistance, and accommodation to dominant values. The new culture of the twentieth century, he concludes, "did reconcile the children of immigrants to America," but not necessarily "to that version of America which most of their employers preferred." (304)

Susan Hirsch's and Janice Reiff's original essay on the "mechanisms creating and supporting job segregation" in the twentieth century explores the extent to which these practices were determined or reinforced by local ethnic, racial, and gender prejudices, and were not simply the result of autonomous company decisions. (278) Eric Lampard offers a conceptual schema of urbanization as a process of changing ecological systems and population concentrations. While his descriptions of macro and micro dimensions of urbanization provide important theoretical models, only the most dedicated will make their way through the dense and jargon-ridden prose. Sam Warner's essay, which dovetails nicely with Stilgoe's, uses the evolution of an early Boston engineering and utility management firm as a way of tracing the cultural consequences of electric power and modern technology upon community development. Like many conference collections, the essays are of uneven quality and originality. Yet scholars of industrialization and working-class life will find these pieces useful for their varied ideas, methodologies, and extensive bibliographies.

Steven J. Ross
University of Southern California

THIS IS A STUDY of the campaign to organize women garment workers in America between 1880 and 1917, the formative years of this country's industrialization. The book opens with an outline of the situation in the clothing manufacturing industry in the period under investigation: its pronounced fragmentation, mechanization of the working process and its consequences, ethnic and gender composition of the labour force, and working conditions in different branches of the industry. The following chapters depict, in chronological order, the efforts of a committed group of middle-class suffragists, the Women's Trade Union League, and a growing number of workingwomen leaders to unionize the female labour force in the clothes-producing shops across the country. The vicissitudes of this struggle are presented against the backdrop of recurrent economic recessions that crippled the developing campaigns, declining skill levels and ethnic divisions among the workforce, changing coalitions, splits, and realignments within and between segments of the American union movement (the AFL, the United Garment Workers of America, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, which were racked by multiple ideological and personal tension), and the vacillating, generally reluctant attitude toward the workingwomen's causes on the part of union officials, coupled with indifference of the majority of the industry's male workers. The study ends with an assessment of the 35-year-long campaign and its defeats and victories. In 1889, discouraged by the failed efforts to mobilize women wage-earners to resist industrial exploitation, Leonora Barry, General Instructor and Director of Woman's Work for the Knights of Labor, described American workingwomen as "apathetic and submissive, accepting without question any terms which employers offered"; by 1917, women workers comprised 50 per cent of the garment union's membership in the country.

The book's main contribution lies in its painstakingly detailed account of the events and individual and collective actions that made up the history of the unionization of female labour in the American garment industry. It is based on rich documentation, including

statistical industrial reports, organizational records (conventions, proceedings, grievances, correspondence) of the AFL, UGW, ILGWU, ACWA, and WTUL, newspaper articles, contemporary studies investigating the working conditions in the garment industry, and personal papers (notes, speeches, memoirs, letters) of people involved in the campaign — the latter particularly valuable in providing revealing insights into the motives, goals, and interpersonal networks of activists involved in the movement. Labour historians, especially those interested in the history of working women of America, should find reading McCreesh’s study a profitable experience.

While undoubtedly informative, the exclusively narrative character of the study, unguided by any clear analytical scheme, at the same time constitutes the book’s major limitation. Although subsequent chapters usually open with a brief (re)introduction of the underlying problems confronting the overall campaign (or a particular phase) to organize women in the garment industry, the discussion soon loses them as it moved to minutely reconstruct various aspects of the developing actions, each involving a number of personalities, factions within organizations, and dissenting opinions. Even a highly interested and determined reader is all too often forced to stop, and, unaided by the author, to take stock of the main arguments being advanced. The reader plods through a dense narrative detailing personal rivalries within the WTUL compounded by the League’s disagreements with AFL and ILGWU leadership over suffrage, class, and union issues; confronts repeated assessment of the role played in the unionization struggle by the “activist” romantic idealism of East European Jewish workingwomen employed in the major garment industry centers as opposed to the “passive,” home-bound orientation of the Italians, and to the still different attitudes of American-born workingwomen in smaller towns; and must digest moment-to-moment descriptions of particular strike actions in various shops and localities. What could in fact be the book’s primary strength, a multifaceted interpretation of a complex, uneven process becomes, without the organization of argumentation and analysis, a self-inflicted weakness, creating a sense of somewhat chaotic over-abundance.

In the introduction McCreesh states that her study has three major purposes: to show how women workers contributed to the “rationalization” of the clothing manufacturing industry; to explore the cross-class alliance between wage-earners and middle-class allies which provided the format for unionization and successful strikes; and finally, to analyze “the social, cultural, and ideological components of the various participants” in order to explain how different women responded to the challenges of industrialization. (xiv) Of these three, the book actually addresses in full only the second issue. What it is really about — and the reader is left to extricate this from the intricacies of the narrative — is the “dialectic” of the unionization movement making its difficult way through the multiple contradictions and tensions embedded in the cycles of industrial development, the different class and cultural ethnic traditions of workers and their allies, conflicting ideologies, and male dominance in the spheres of organization and work.

Ewa Morawska
University of Pennsylvania


WINTERS HAS ADOPTED an argument increasingly popular with liberal historians, that is, the analysis of social movements as religious phenomena. The argument, which serves largely to discredit radical politics as Utopian, is difficult to make, for it is necessary to re-define religion so broadly as to make it unrecognizable. Winters constructs a syllogism to “prove” the IWW was a religion. For his first proposition, he borrows from Paul Tillich to suggest that religion is “ultimate concern.” For the second, he argues that the IWW had an ultimate
concern, namely solidarity; therefore, the IWW was a religion. \textit{Quod erat demonstrandum}. But a logical argument composed of false propositions is still false. Tillich's definition of religion is hardly a universally accepted one; indeed, it is hard to know what to make of a line of reasoning that would allow god, solidarity, and presumably baseball and sushi, equal opportunity to become bases of religion. To compensate for this, Winters goes further, to define religion as "a system of beliefs and symbols which seeks to develop in the working class a sense of solidarity and class consciousness, and a motivation to engage in a class struggle against the evil forces of capitalism, toward the end of creating a new order, a 'commonwealth of toil,' in the shell of the old." (II) But this definition is absurdly circular: the IWW is religious, for religion is the ideology of the IWW. The definition is so far removed from the accepted one that it renders the concept useless as an explanatory tool, while it is vague enough to make Karl Marx, the Strasser brothers, Joe Hill, and Ernst Rohm religious figures and comrades. It also excludes Christ, Muhammad, and Buddha.

If the theoretical framework is shaky, the methodology is little better. Winters suggests that self-avowed atheists in the IWW were in fact religious. But what does it mean if Elizabeth Gurley Flynn agreed that "in a certain sense" socialism had been her religion? Or that several Wobblies claimed for the prison records that the IWW was their religion? If, as Winters points out, Ralph Chaplin thought he had a religious experience when reading Whitman at age 18, does it mean his claims to atheism at age 30 were merely self-deception? None of Winters's examples shows any meaningful parallel between the IWW and religion, and there would be no connection even if Bill Haywood was photographed flogging the \textit{Watchtower}; that would only prove he was religious.

Winters's next tack is to analyze the religious character of Father Thomas Hagerty and Eugene Debs to argue that the IWW "derived its critique of capitalist America through a radical, prophetic interpretation of Christianity." (15) But he has picked two poor examples. Whatever the character of their religious beliefs (and these are by no means as clear as Winters suggests), Hagerty was not part of the IWW after the founding convention, while Debs left in 1909 after playing a minor role. To strengthen his argument, the author plays up the fact that Hagerty was on the committee that drew up the famous Wobbly preamble. Arguing, correctly, that the preamble was an important part of the IWW ideology, he advances the claim that it "resembles, in tone, the prophetic books of the Old Testament." (19) This notion is never argued for or supported, save for a footnote to a dissertation that compares the preamble not with the Old Testament but with Joachim of Fiore. That this twelfth-century Cistercian monk has also been compared with Nazism suggests the parallels to the IWW might be less than profound.

From Hagerty and Debs, Winters draws in George Sorel to try to imbue the Wobblies with religion. Sorel's impact on French syndicalism is by no means clear, and his influence on the American movement is even less discernible. While the IWW was certainly syndicalist, it took great pains to distinguish itself from the European variants so favoured by William Z. Foster. And while Winters gives the publication date of Sorel's \textit{Reflections on Violence} correctly as 1908 on page 29 and incorrectly as 1905 on page 87, it was not translated into English until 1914—rather late to infuse the IWW with a "powerful religious mythical value." (30)

The analysis of the Little Red Songbook is equally turbid. Much is made of the fact that many Wobbly songs used hymn tunes. Little attention is paid to the equally numerous songs that used Tin Pan Alley or folk tunes, and when they are mentioned, they receive twisted treatment. For example, it is hardly self-evident that when Joe Hill sent Casey Jones to hell a-flying he was expressing an "alignment with an essentially Christian value system." (54) Surely one can hope to see one's enemies afflicted with the torments of hell without becoming converted in the process.

There is a kernel of truth to the IWW-as-religion argument. Melvyn Dubofsky and others have pointed out an element of millenarianism, though this has often been exaggerated. Fred Thompson, the official historian of the union, suggested in a letter quoted by Winters that in both churches and the IWW
people met and preserved values. He goes on to stress that the similarity ends there, "unless you go to such points as that the walls are vertical. . . . seating arrangements much the same, and even meeting procedures anthropologically similar." (7-8) To make much more out of the comparison it is necessary to distort the English language, beg questions, and make banal generalizations from scraps of carefully selected evidence. Winters would have saved himself a great deal of pointless work if he had read more of Sorel, who warned: "The study of religions ought always to remain historical, thus demanding a strict contact with the concrete; this rule banishes all possibility of finding dialectically any analogies between the profound psychological reasons that explain socialism and those that animate Christian belief." [34x558] Mark Leier
Simon Fraser University


THIS FASCINATING and significant collection deals with theatre as a historical mirror both of working-class culture and of left-wing versions of what working-class culture ought to be. Although in their introduction the editors tend to the dogmatic and the sectarian—"all of the cultural production discussed in these pages consists of performances by live actors enacting a conflict between individuals or social groups"—the data they present in fact covers much of that far broader range of theatre which was germane to working-class people. (4) Agitprop, pure and simple, or in its latter-day Brechtian epic form, which seems to be the editors' notion of correct theatre, has been but part of those rich and varied working-class theatrical experiences presented with texture and liveliness in these pages.

Chronologically, the story breaks into three segments. Melodrama characterized nineteenth-century popular theatre, trailing off in the first two decades of the twentieth century. American agitprop began as early as 1913, but flowered in the 1930s, by 1935 being performed by over 400 companies. Preceded by isolated experiments, a renaissance of working-class oriented theatre, which is now over a decade old, exists today in at least 32 companies.

In his brilliant essay, "'The Theatre of the Mob': Apocalyptic Melodrama and Preindustrial Riots in Antebellum New York," Bruce A. McConachie demonstrates convincingly the interaction between theatrical ritual and social behavior. Roughneck artisan B'hoys flocked to Bowery theatres where they saw melodramas in which the wrongs done by villains to the traditionally-conceived natural order of charity, brotherhood, and moral righteousness were avenged apocalyptically at the conclusion of each drama. Just as the audience of these plays was purged "through staged actions of vengeance, so [did] riot achieve a similar catharsis among its participants." (40) Beyond drawing this thoughtful parallel, McConachie demonstrates that in at least two instances, in 1834 and in 1849, when 23 men were killed in the Astor Place riots, specific, heated theatrical disputes spilled into the streets, triggering mob action, where riots provided a collective, activist framework for the kind of popular cultural revenge portrayed in the melodramas.

Of course not all melodramas workers attended were apocalyptic, and workers enjoyed many additional forms of popular entertainment, including historical tableaux, minstrel shows, and farce as well as billiard parlours, freakshows, whorehouses, and saloons, all of which contained their own dramatic structures. Only one essay, that by Francis G. Couvares on late nineteenth-century Pittsburgh, does justice to this richness and diversity of working-class culture. Couvares's portrait of polymorphous plebeian pleasures is made all the more vivid by its contrast with the anti-entertainment asceticism of the singularly dour Pittsburgh Presbyterian elite, which forbade almost all public pleasures to its own class. In dealing with this hedonistic working-class demi-monde, Couvares quotes Gareth Stedman Jones, who
has commented on London music halls, that such popular culture was "both escapist and yet strongly rooted in the realities of working-class life." (52) Such a range of expressiveness characterized nineteenth-century German-American, Yiddish, and Italian popular culture, as subsequent essays by Carol Poore, Mel Gordon, and A. Richard Sogliuzzo demonstrate. Unfortunately, none of these essays carries us very far into possible interpretations of these widely attended modes of theatre. For instance, the question of ethnicity in its relationship to class is barely discussed. Thus we discover only a bit of the life-affirming breadth of actual working-class oriented theatrical experience which runs spiritually contrary to the editors' insistence on the centrality of issue-oriented theatre as the central form of working-class theatre, an affirmation which nevertheless pops up like Charlie Chaplin through the interstices in the editors' neo-puritanical ideological grid.

Agitprop had its heyday early in the depression. Interestingly, this form may well have had American origins, in the Paterson Strike Pageant of 1913, about which Linda Nochlin writes here, where Jack Reed staged an reenactment of their epic struggle by 1,500 silk worker-strikers before a 15,000 person-strong Wobbly rally in Madison Square Garden. Subsequently, class ritual theatre flourished more widely in the new Soviet Union, from where it spread to western Communist Party workers, most notably in Germany. It made its way back to the United States among leftist German immigrants, some of whom attended the Prolet-Buehne, founded in New York in 1928. Soon the Worker's Laboratory Theatre began English language agitprop, first through translating German plays presented by the Prolet-Buehne.

Not only the left made use of popular pageants and theatre with themes related to working-class life. Hiroko Tsuchiya analyzes the uses American middle-class Progressive made of plays with casts of workers, directed at workers, which stressed the virtues of hard work, Americanization, and good, clean fun in the effort to "reform" working-class street life, popular entertainment, and work values. More chillingly, in his probing and wide-ranging essay, Douglas McDermott shows that the Nazis made even more successful working-class use of agitprop and the German pageant tradition than did the German Communist Party.

McDermott believes that agitprop is extreme by definition, and gains popularity only in times of social unrest. Then, "Matters are so extreme that discussion is over. What remains are partisan conclusions and the necessity to motivate people to act on those conclusions." (137) McDermott also argues that left-wing American agitational theatre could only exist when there was an effective political movement which could attempt to carry out such theatrical proposals. The Communist Party, with its revolutionary line, esprit de corps, and funds, provided such a broader political setting for American agitprop, but only until the Party shifted to popular frontism in 1934. At that point, communist-oriented worker's theatre moved into an alliance with bourgeois anti-fascists. This meant a return as well to more universalistic theatrical themes and more traditional forms of presentation. The New Deal Federal Theatre Project (1935-39), which John O'Connor discusses, absorbed most agitprop personnel. To a degree, revolutionary declarations were watered down, but radical, pro-union themes were played to far vaster audiences than the pre-Roosevelttian leftists ever dreamed of reaching. Such plays as Clifford Odets Waiting for Lefty were not so much backtrackings as sophisticated and powerful reworkings of traditional agitprop theatre, both in form and in substance, for a truly mass audience.

The Federal Theatre Project, one of the favorite New Deal whipping boys of Congressional reactionaries, was destroyed in 1939, at about the same time the Stalin-Hitler pact and the Soviet invasion of Finland decimated the American Communist Party. Deprived of both its political bases, left-wing political theatre collapsed, the last gasp being the Jefferson Theatre Workshop in New York, which folded in 1950.

In the final essay in this collection, Daniel Friedman chronicles the rebirth of working-class oriented theatre, dating from 1959, when R. G. Davis founded the San Francisco Mime Troupe. In 1965, Davis' student Luis Valdez, discussed by Theodore J. Shank in the penul-
timate essay in this collection, formed El Teatro Campesino among the Chicano United Farmworkers during their monumental grape strike. In the past decade, as Frieman demonstrates, the number of such theatres has grown slowly but steadily, among South Dakota farmers as well as on the streets of New York. Many contemporary working-class oriented theatres have been influenced by the epic theatre of Brecht, although at least one theatre activist, Maxime Klein, of the Little Flags troupe in Boston, rejects such "hoched-up presentational shit" as unrelated to the needs of working-class people who, according to Klein, prefer theatre "founded on the dead center of reality." (239). Where some worker-oriented theatres adapt agitprop, others have rejected such an approach. As R.G. Davis, founder of the modern revival, puts it, agitprop is "didactic rather than dialectical [and] often skips over fundamental problems to facilitate immediate gains." (138)

Of course, agitprop always had been simplistic by intention. Some involved in such theatre, such as Davis, have become engaged artistically and intellectually beyond black and white presentations. Luis Valdez, who formerly did agitprop among the farmworkers during their heroic strikes now believes that the immediate crisis for that union has passed, and with it the need for such a theatrical mode. He has moved towards theatre based on both mystical Mayan rituals and everyday urban struggles in order to sensitize the public to these other fundamental aspects of Chicano culture.

As so often in studies of worker's culture, we are left with the tensions between the political perceptions, the often romantic desires of activists, and a broader sense of the cultural experiences of actual workers. It is never quite clear, except in McConachie's discussion of antebellum apocalyptic melodrama, just how much this theatre was of and by as opposed to for the workers. In this context, it ought to be emphasized that with the partial exception of the early depression period, this has not been a large modern movement. To take just one contrasting case, Charlie Chaplin, as Couvares mentions, was an enormously important working-class oriented theatrical figure, reaching the largest of audiences. Yet as a film actor he does not count in this story.

I would not disparage the valiant struggles of contemporary actors to re-forge a working-class theatre, nor in any way suggest that this is anything less than a provocative and engaging collection of essays. Still, we are left with the great big aesthetic, theatrical, and class problems of what sense to make of Bruce Springsteen, not to mention T.V. or Sylvester Stallone or the wildly popular agitprop actor-director in the White House.

Michael Fellman
-Simon Fraser University


INJURY AND DEATH are significant aspects of most industrial jobs, but particularly notorious is the slaughter that has occurred and still occurs in the North American lumber industry. Falling trees, rolling logs, flying cables, and unco-operative chainsaws are all hazards in the woods that have taken a high toll in human limbs and lives. Andrew Mason Prouty, abhorred by the omission of the theme of injury and death in writings about the Pacific Northwest logging industry, has addressed this serious issue. The title of the book refers to a comparison of men killed in a four-month period in the Washington lumber industry during 1920 with the number of men killed in the Spanish-American War and exemplifies the passion Prouty brings to his subject.

The task Prouty sets himself is straightforward: "to search the sources and to examine the safety record of the logging industry of the four West Coast jurisdictions—the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and the province of British Columbia—and to record why and how many men have lost their lives in the timber industry since it began here more than a hundred and fifty years ago." (xvi) Using timber trade journals, hospital records, and the reports of the workmen's compensation commissions, Prouty succeeds in showing the
extent of death in the woods. From the late 1800s to 1981, the author estimates that 17,889 workers lost their lives in the forests of the West Coast, a horrifying figure indeed. (165)

The body count, which could have been set out in two or three tables, however, is not the whole story in this book. Prouty fleshes out the statistical skeleton with observations on the history of logging, descriptions of camp life, and accounts of how workers met their end. A cursory first chapter traces the history of the North American lumber industry to 1890. The following three chapters deal with the West Coast in the years from about 1890 to 1923. For a number of good reasons Prouty explores this period in some depth: these years saw the emergence of the large lumber companies, the introduction of extensive use of steam-powered machinery in the woods, and the development of high-lead logging. The final chapter quickly sketches the safety records and programmes in the four jurisdictions under study, with an emphasis on the workmen's compensation commissions between 1911 and 1981, safety inspection procedures, and first-aid developments. There is no discussion of camps or the work experience for the post-1930 period.

For the most part Prouty's account is descriptive, but beneath the surface an explanation for the slaughter is suggested. The boss loggers were old-fashioned, showing callousness and indifference to the death toll and having no sense of social justice. The loggers were young, unmarried, full of machismo, and reckless. It was this combination that produced the waste of human lives in the woods. The arrival of the workmen's compensation commissions after 1911 led to pressure on the companies, a restraining of the impulses of the workers, and a decline in the death rate. Unfortunately, Prouty does not put the slaughter in the larger contexts of economics or industrial relations. The circumstances that gave rise to the creation of the compensation commissions after 1911 led to pressure on the companies, a restraining of the impulses of the workers, and a decline in the death rate. Unfortunately, Prouty does not put the slaughter in the larger contexts of economics or industrial relations.

Other fruitful lines of inquiry are also absent from the book. In the introduction Prouty suggests that "the uninterrupted maiming and killing which went on for five generations in the dripping woods... must also have left other psychological or social impacts, marking, if not scarring, those who were there." (xix) This social and psychological terrain, however, is not explored. Prouty mentions the...
black humour of the loggers (" 'Ole, he went down between two logs and stayed a couple of hours. I guess he quit his job. ") (xv), but he only comments tersely that such jokes are unfunny, rather than probing the function of such stories in coping with the day-to-day reality of facing death in the woods. Likewise, the social dimension of the deaths in families and lumber communities is not addressed.

For anyone who doubts the significance of death in the logging industry or questions its extent, More Deadly Than War is a sobering book. Also of interest and the descriptions of camp life and woods jobs, though the perspective of the boss loggers is overstated. For those seeking a broader discussion of the gruesome statistics in terms of the economic context, industrial relations, and the social community of loggers, this book provides few insights.

Gordon Hak
Simon Fraser University


WRITTEN MORE FOR a general audience than for academic specialists, This Mighty Dream analyzes the development of popular movements for social change in America during the last century. Downplaying the importance of leftist ideology and of charismatic leaders in protest movements, the authors trace and interpret what they term the "underground" history of American working people, emphasizing community organizing—from the bottom up—as they assay the record of agrarian protest, struggles in labour, and the Black drive for freedom.

This Mighty Dream resulted from an interpretive program and traveling exhibit sponsored by the Arkansas Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), which in the early 1970s organized both working and welfare poor in Little Rock in campaigns for free school lunches, tenant rights in public housing, and augmented hospital care for the impoverished. By 1974, spurred by the first "energy crisis" and its soaring utility bills, ACORN burgeoned to a dues-paying membership of more than 50,000 in 25 states. Organizing the unorganized, ACORN opposed urban renewal schemes in Detroit, tenant evictions in Reno, and housing policies for the poor in Philadelphia. More recently, ACORN moved closer to mainstream dissent, aligning with a coalition of labour, church, and minority peace groups to challenge Reagan administration foreign and domestic policies.

For its strategy and tactics, ACORN drew upon the unique experience of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, established a membership dues system akin to labour's, and organized in ways similar to recent welfare rights organizations. Hence This Mighty Dream becomes both a search for—and celebration of—the roots of America's indigenous protest tradition. Madeleine Adams and Seth Borgos, ACORN activists themselves, recall the ethos of "participatory democracy" that characterized the New Left in the 1960s as they argue that mass-based movements and the conflict they generate are the primary agents of social change. The movements analyzed here all responded to immediate and specific grievances experienced by masses of people at the bottom rungs of society. And although their goals varied, they all embraced collective modes of action.

Grassroots protest, the authors argue, differed from socialist and Marxist movements on the political left. Where the latter deemed ideology crucial to elevating social analysis above crude and narrow categories, protest movements resisted "vanguards" in favour of numbers and found greatest meaning in the exigencies of struggle. Protest movements that emerged from specific social classes—the farmer's alliances, steel workers, tenant farmers, and Blacks—all recruited on a mass basis and often accommodated a wide range of political values and loyalties. The cement which held these movements together was their shared commitment to specific programmatic goals and their engagement in such forms of mass
Successful organizers, Adamson and Burgos argue, have been both visionary and calculating, free from “the tyranny of organizational detail,” but exacting critics “not only of the existing order, but of efforts to change it.” The authors consequently address the mechanics of organizations among the poor, highlighting such themes as the recruitment of new members and fund-raising, the means organizations have used to expand to new areas, the reasons certain targets were chosen, and why certain issues became popular when they did.

Organizers of mass protest movements have also learned from experience that mass movements do not operate in a weightless environment. Burgos and Adamson explore such constraints as existing power structures, the cultural assumptions of given movements, and the limitations and frailties of movement organizers. Richly illustrated with photographs, cartoons, songs, posters, and other movement artifacts, This Mighty Dream also reveals the relationship between mass protest movements and electoral politics. As the movement of industrial workers to organize in the 1930s, and the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s suggest, movements can generate sufficient disruptive effects to break the grip of ruling groups. Equally important, protest movements can generate unexpected though powerful byproducts. The Black freedom movement, for instance, exerted its greatest impact not in dismantling segregation or destroying racism, but in augmenting the status, self-image, and power of other theretofore unorganized groups including women, native-Americans, Hispanics, the handicapped, the elderly, and homosexuals.

Some readers will question the book’s argument that political elites or charismatic leaders cannot change national values, and that mass agitation alone serves as the catalytic agent for social change. In the 1930s, for example, Huey Long’s Share Our Wealth movement embraced the unorganized poor, but would have gone nowhere without its colourful leader. The same can be said for Father Charles E. Coughlin and his depression-era movement for social justice. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that these movements and those headed by Upton Sinclair (End Poverty in California) and Francis Townsend (old-age pensions) had more impact than the Southern Tenant Farmers Union in pushing the Roosevelt administration toward welfare reform.

Other readers may criticize the book’s lack of documentation, or the volume’s minimizing of the contribution of European radicalism to American labour protest—and to those groups seeking to destroy labour by identifying it with communism and anarchism. Nevertheless, Adamson and Burgos have addressed in a meaningful way many practical questions of organization and action. Students of mass protest—and dissenters themselves—will find much to ponder in the authors’ discussion of tensions between central direction and local autonomy, the convergence of political strategies and direct-action tactics, the pursuit of immediate benefits compared to broader social goals, and the important divisions of race, gender and class.

Geoffrey S. Smith
Queen’s University


DAVID NYE, an Associate Professor of American History at Denmark’s Odense University, has produced this 60,000 word volume on the use of photography as a means of communication by General Electric. His work covers the years from the 1890s to 1930, a period which he views as an integrated one for the corporation.

One million photographs are stored in the General Electric Archives in Schenectady. Nye argues that these pictures were an important, integral part of GE’s attempts to convey corporate images to diverse groups of viewers. The existence of the photos and the uses to which they were put are, to the author, “a metaphor for its [GE’s] cultural hegemony.”
By the 1920s, GE photos were being seen by millions of eyes annually, in a wide variety of venues. Sometimes working secretly, the company expanded its advertising budget by 600 per cent during that decade. Nye does a solid job of demonstrating the origins of and links between advertising and public relations. He demolishes the concept of the photograph as a relatively unmediated slice of reality and warns of the grave perils to the incautious historian who accepts them as such. Taken as a group (and Nye argues that: that is the only way to comprehend their meaning), the photos were used as a tool for manipulating various sectors of society with which GE interacted.

Nye notes that all the major genres of the GE photos required considerable arrangement and preparation. Powerful conventions governed their production and use, whether they were shots of machines, executive, or workers. He contributes some detailed descriptions of the work of the GE photography department to document this. Incidentally, for labour historians, an excellent depiction of the work process used by the employees of that department is thus gained.

Each photographic subject was displayed differently. Utilizing the GE Review to reach engineers, the company tried to project an image of the corporation as a fosterer of value-free scientific progress. The photos of machinery used were universally isolated from actual scenes of their use by a work-force in specific, profit-making locales. In its Monogram, read by middle and high-level managers, the photos used portrayed the company as a caring family or tribe. Scenes of the workplace stressed the image of corporate space under sure managerial direction, buttressing the push toward scientific management.

Nye also does a good job of analyzing the photos used in GE's general advertising campaigns, which began with the sale of light bulbs. These photos linked GE, modernity, and enlightenment to foster a concept that could evolve into the "progress is our most important product" slogan. He also documents the secret use of company propaganda in the lively debate over the public ownership of utilities. Curiously, the photo almost disappears from this important section, since Nye notes that its use might have compromised the covert nature of GE's campaign.

For labour historians, two sections of Image Worlds may be of particular interest. The first is his discussion of the use of photos of workers, especially those which appeared in the Works News, sent to all blue-collar employees from 1917 to 1938. Here, his essential argument is that the pictures taken of GE workers before 1910 show some male individualism and project an aura congruent with workers' control, but that this disappears after that date. With the installation of a system of welfare capitalism in the 1920s, Nye claims that the photos try to show harmonious, non-unionized work relations, with a heavy focus on recreational activities. These latter are used as a distraction from industrial conflict. Another theme is the GE Americanization program, designed to turn workers into citizens. Twenty interesting reproductions illustrate these points, but beyond reading the Works News little other research on workers is manifest. Probably because of this, labour historians will not find much new here. Nye over-emphasizes the de-skilling of GE production workers in the twentieth century. He has a tendency to consider or depict all immigrant workers as pre-industrial in experience. Stressing this theme, he even portrays an 1892 strike of craft workers in Lynn as an attempt by the corporation to tune rambunctious pre-industrial plebes to the new industrial rhythms.

Nye downplays the intensity of the 1914 to 1922 labour battles at GE and presents a confused version of corporation labour relations in those years. He minimizes the importance of the war, the red scare, and the prosperity of the 1920s in the suppression of labour unrest, explicitly arguing that GE's welfare capitalism was a more important factor. Surprisingly, the author neglects the crucial role of turnover reduction as an impetus towards corporate adoption of these welfare programs. The photos displayed in the book do an excellent job of re-inforcing his points about Americanization classes, but are much less conclusive as evidence for his other points. His elaborate conclusions about the portraits used of women workers are poorly documented in the pictures he shows us. Finally, his depiction of Steinmetz as a company symbol and
The second area of special interest to labour historians is Nye's assault on the new social history of the past 20 years. While it has provided a "salutary corrective" to the old focus on high culture, Nye maintains it is fatally flawed. He argues that it lacks its own concept of culture, "believing that assembling many parts was enough." The result, for Nye, has been a puerile sub-division of experience. Leaving aside the fact that I know of no social historian who believes that "assembling many parts" is enough, for one who considers that we have really just started to examine such topics of the new social history as the twentieth-century American worker, such a post mortem may seem premature. Furthermore, it neglects the hottest trend of the past few years among social historians, precisely the attempt to summarize what has been learned so far and to integrate it with other areas of historiography. To illustrate my point, I ask merely that the reader compare any major U.S. history textbook of the past two or three years with their counterparts of 20 years earlier to see to what extent the new social history has already been assimilated.

Nye claims that his discussion of the photos and of GE's communications methods will provide a "holistic approach" that "incorporates many of the findings of social history into a larger pattern that links these disparate spheres together." I do not find that Image Worlds fulfills this large promise. It is nevertheless an excellent discussion of GE's use of photography and it is coupled with some perceptive evaluations of GE's attempts to manipulate various groups of persons through its communications.

Mark McColloch
University of Pittsburgh

timate responsibility, gave him a unique opportunity to observe as well as to lead. As such, Keenan's career offers the historian a means to penetrate the closeted and suspicious world of American labour leadership.

Keenan was successful in that world because he was a conformist who exhibited many of its best known characteristics - a hawkish anti-communism, strong Catholic influence, a deep commitment to the pluralist orthodoxies of American industrial relations, reverential patriotism. But Keenan appears to have been less dogmatic than others in his attachments, ready to explain rather than simply to assert them. That degree of openness, combined with the enormous range of his activities, makes Keenan's life a suitable vehicle for an exploration of the ideology and ambitions of American labour leadership in the war and post-war periods. That, at least, is what one might expect from a book with this subtitle. Unfortunately that is not what one gets. Both the reader, and Joe Keenan himself, deserve better treatment.

Christopher L. Tomlins
La Trobe University


THIS IS AN IMPORTANT BOOK, opening up a subject on which historians have tended to repeat one another without doing their homework. Conventional wisdom (which I too have parrotted) has it that when Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660 the English Revolution came to an end and organized radicalism fizzled out, apart from a few isolated conspiracies by religious fanatics. If historians had thought about it more, we would have realized that it is very unlikely that the powerful radical movements of the 1640s and 1650s could have faded out so easily. Emigration, we said; government repression and use of agent provocateurs; divisions among the radicals. All these factors were there but they do not explain the absence of organized opposition. Professor Greaves, well-known as a historian of non-conformity, has shown that organized opposition was there.

He has for the first time undertaken the laborious task of collecting all the evidence for the years 1660-3. He has used especially state papers, but also private correspondence, local records, and records of non-conformist congregations. We suspected that the restored monarchy was unpopular; he has now supplied proof. He has also shown that there were organizational links between the six or seven conspiracies whose existence was known but which had previously been studied in isolation.

The result is a quite new picture of the first three years of Charles II's reign: of an England seething with discontent, with the discontented collecting arms and preparing for revolt. In 1663 the government received "simultaneous reports of surreptitious radical activity from one end of the country to the other." (159) The rebels were not desperate fanatics, expecting divine intervention on their behalf, as historians have condescendingly assumed. They were ex-army officers, clergymen, even persons of some substance in their localities like the wealthy Huddersfield clothier who thought that "the gentry were insupportable to the people." (197)

So successful is the author in rehabilitating the conspirators that he poses for himself a difficult question: why were all the revolts muddled, feeble, and pathetically unsuccessful? The main answer seems to be the one that Milton and Bunyan stressed at the time: the radicals were united only in hatred of the monarchy and the Church of England, divided on almost everything else. The conflicts and changes of government in the 1650s had fragmented the powerful coalition which defeated Charles I in the 1640s. Republicans, Cromwellians, old army officers, men whose land had been confiscated, advocates of religious toleration, advocates of a Presbyterian discipline, advocates of the rule of the saints: little united them except, loathing of the existing regime; many memories divided them.

A second answer is that many radicals accepted a providentialist view of history, and
concluded that the restoration of monarchy had been a divine judgment on a sinful people for failing to seize the chance of creating a decent society. From 1661 the Quakers, hitherto among the most militant of the sectaries, officially adopted pacifism and abstention from politics. This was not immediately accepted by all members of the Society, especially in the North. Quakers were active in many of the plots which Professor Greaves describes; as late as 1685 some Quakers took up arms with Monmouth. But the view that Christ's kingdom was not of this world, that it had been a mistake to try to win it by force of arms, spread among other sects as well as Quakers, thus adding divisions within sects to the divisions between sects.

Third, leaders were lacking. Many former Parliamentarians and Cromwellians had accepted the restoration of monarchy as a lesser evil than social revolution. They had made terms for themselves and were not going to run any risks. The name of Fairfax, former Commander-in-Chief of the Parliamentary army, was often mentioned by conspirators in the early 1660s; but there is no evidence and no likelihood that he was in any way implicated in their plans. Potential leaders had been skillfully picked off or had fled into exile: some had been shanghaied back to face a traitor's death. Others, like Lambert, Hutchinson, and Harrington, were held incommunicado in jail. Ludlow, whose name was invoked by conspirators more than any others, was in Switzerland. There is no evidence to connect him with any of the plots which Professor Greaves analyzes.

The government took full advantage of these divisions. It had informers and agent provocateurs everywhere. The poverty into which some former supporters of the Good Old Cause had been plunged made them highly vulnerable to corruption of this sort: so no doubt did the bickerings and jealousies within and between the sects, the consequence of defeat and demoralization.

So what has Professor Greaves's laborious research established? It has shown that "the return of monarchy in 1660 brought no cessation of revolutionary thinking or acting." (3) "The radical activities of the 1660s and beyond are a salutary warning against an excessive emphasis on periodization." (27) "The restoration period" was a continuation of the revolutionary 1640s and 1650s. Government policies were affected by knowledge of what Secretary Nicholas called in April 1661 "a general deverton in point of affection in the middle sort of people in City and country from the King's interest." (67) Bishops and Tory gentlemen in the House of Commons wanted fiercer repression; Charles II, realizing that repression without an army was counterproductive, wanted religious toleration in order to split pacifist nonconformists from their more belligerent brethren, and to isolate the latter. Parliament was now strong enough to frustrate the royal indulgence policy; the penal laws were consistently enforced only when Parliament was in session.

This produced a further weakness among the conspirators. "Radical political activity was greater among nonconformists in areas where they were more heavily outnumbered." (12) Where nonconformity was relatively strong, ties of neighbourhood counteracted the virulence of the persecutors. The violent men were those made desperate by a wholly alien environment. The desperate were not only nonconformists: they also included ex-army officers, unable to find employment, and purchasers of confiscated lands (estimated at 300,000 persons) who faced ruin.

Professor Greaves makes many interesting points. The county militia was the only force available for maintaining law and order. But "the generality of the people, of which the militia must consist" are "vehemently infused with the principles of disobedience to King and church." That was a Cheshire royalist in 1662. Similar reports came the same year from Somerset, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire. The militia, argued the Earl of Peterborough, is useless and dangerous, since it teaches "the use of arms unto more enemies than friends." (194) No wonder Charles II wanted a standing army.

In 1685 the militia was unreliable in opposing Monmouth's revolt; in 1688 it deserted James II.

In these years even Presbyterians were becoming a threat to the government, "as a consequence of their exclusion from the corporations and the established church," and from the commission of the peace. (101, 104)
Presbyterians were mostly richer and socially superior to other nonconformists, so their militancy was especially alarming. In 1662, fascinatingly, a group of plotters intended to make propaganda use of an apparently fictitious Popish Plot to assassinate the King and massacre protestants. Sixteen years later the idea was taken up by the Whigs.

Professor Greaves has listed every plot and every plotter of whom the government received reports. This mass of detail was necessary to establish his case and will be invaluable for those who follow the trail he has blazed. There is still a good deal of sifting to do. Informers and agents provocateurs have to earn their living, and are not always on oath. Professor Greaves gives good reason for supposing that historians have been too skeptical of this evidence, too ready to believe that the government was inventing plots; and he produces much confirmatory evidence. It may be that he overcompensates, and is too credulous. I certainly raised an eyebrow when he cited Bishop Parker as a "historian" who took the Northern Plot of 1663 seriously. Parker - Andrew Marvell's butt - was a turncoat propagandist, not to be believed on anything. My only other criticism is that Professor Greaves has missed the seminal work of Barry Reay on the Quakers, and so antedates and over-estimates their pacifism. But in general this is a most valuable work, which should make all students of the period do a lot of rethinking.

Christopher Hill
Balloil


IN HIS GREATEST ESSAY, "The Peculiarities of the English," Edward Thompson argued against the kind of Marxism which sought to find a "bourgeois revolution" in England. He objected to this essentialist kind of historical thought on the grounds that, "Minds which thirst for a tidy platonism very soon become impatient with actual history." Thompson's "actual history" of the creation of a modern state focussed on process, against the platonists' single event. English state formation was likened to a great arch, but one with many keystones: the longstanding independence of the common law tradition, the destruction of feudalism, the centralization of authority during the Tudor monarchy, and the limitations on royal powers in the seventeenth-century revolutions which stood alongside the reaffirmation of the primacy of the law. But, even then, the job was only partly done. In the Thompsonian reading, which this book elaborates at rather greater length, the seemingly arcane state relations inherited in the eighteenth century became the means through which social relations were reconstructed along capitalist lines - property became a thing, not simply a bundle of rights - and in the process the ruling class (a wondrously diverse and open ruling class it must be said, in contradistinction to Lawrence and Jeanne Stone's Open Elite, was cemented and its powers over the plebs were hegemonized. Then, in the early nineteenth century, the language of discipline triumphed in its material, categorical, and moral ordering of the people. It was thus at the end of a long process that the English state was made in its own image, and not in the image of some illusory form drawn from a flickering shadow.

The Great Arch is a very interesting book; it is absolutely jam-packed with ideas and information, the product of voluminous reading and an interdisciplinary approach to the project. If anything, I would say that the book is too short; especially the last section on the nineteenth century. In addition, rather too much attention is paid to what some people said to the exclusion of what most people did. This characteristic has manifested itself in two ways: first, for example, the question of the educational reforms of the nineteenth century is treated at the level of official discourse and debate, not on the level of historical practice which was far more conflicted than Corrigan and Sayer suggest; second, in their desire to remove themselves from that kind of Marxist
analysis which sees the state as "armed men and prisons" they have utterly neglected these armed men. Not a word is to be found in this book about the Army or the Navy and, most assuredly, while Britannia ruled the waves it was that fine old tradition of naval traditions - buggery, the lash, and the bible, according to Winston Churchill - which perpetuated this rule. Equally, the empire was kept in tow by armed men. In the same vein, it was astonishing to find not a single word on either the creation of the Bank of England or the legal nostrums which devised the limited liability company. In the history of English state formation, these capitalist innovations were two of the most brilliant moments; they greased the skids along which the social formation passed.

This neglect of practice - in terms of physical and economic force - is surprising. Perhaps it is the cost paid for attending to other matters. And, indeed, with regard to these other matters - routinization of behaviour and segmentation of roles - what Corrigan and Sayer have to offer is splendid. It is in regard to the imbricated discipline of state formation in everyday life that their book takes the usual historical discussion and elevates it by one whole quantum. Never before have historians of the English state accorded the restructuring of gender relations such a central position, but The Great Arch shows how wrong they have been in ignoring this central characteristic of bourgeois society. Rarely do other historians pay much attention to the 'anachronisms' and 'survivals' in the trappings of a distant past, but over and over again Corrigan and Sayer make us aware of the way in which the past continues to inflect the texture of the present. In their own words, they deal with an "immensely long, complicated, laborious micro-construction and reconstruction of appropriate forms of power; forms fitted to ways in which a particular class, gender, race imposes its 'standards of life' as 'the national interest' and seeks their internalization as 'national character'." (203) As they go on to say, "History cannot only be written from below," yet I would have thought that rather more attention might have been paid to that interaction between forms and practise, between appearances and realities. That may, however, be asking too much from a book which surveys 800 years of English history in a little more than 200 pages. Corrigan's and Sayer's reach may occasionally exceed their grasp but what they have grasped is held firmly.

The Great Arch is an unusual book in that it will be of interest to both absolute beginners and grizzled veterans. Each will learn new things about the subject; in particular, the veteran will learn a new way of seeing. In fact, the book's greatest achievement is that it shows us that the natural order of things was a cultural revolution, the result of a very peculiar strategy of state formation which was itself actively constructed through the transformation of pre-existing social forms. By paying close attention to this "actual history," Corrigan and Sayer should slake the thirst of some platonic minds. And, in so doing, they can pay no greater tribute to Edward Thompson from whom we have all learned so much.

David Levine
The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

Roger Davidson, Whitehall and the Labour Problem in Late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain (London: Croom Helm 1985)

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE among historians that the formation of labour departments and the increasing use of labour statistics, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were part of a broader strategy designed to solve an acute and widespread "labour problem." In Britain, contemporary observers associated this labour problem with areas of dysfunction within the labour market, more specifically with the breakdown of industrial relations, with structural unemployment and chronic under-employment, and with the detrimental effects of low-income destitution. Much less obvious are the motivations of the policy-makers confronted with such a problem, the relation between social policy and labour statistics, and the response and evolving status of statisticians. These are the foci of this inspiring work. Writing with the ultimate ob-
jective of contributing to the controversy about the significance and rationale of welfare provisions, the author promises "a critical examination of the human resources, motivation and statistical techniques which generated" the data base published by Whitehall departments. For Canadian labour specialists, this book serves, among other purposes, as a constant reminder of how uncritically we have relied on the Labour Gazette.

There are two broad categories of interpretations concerning the development of welfare provisions for the working-class. One category, singled out as the 'progressive' strand, offers an optimistic appreciation of these new welfare functions. They resulted from a "dynamic process of social regeneration" initiated by reformers, reinforced by new scientific approaches, and supported by a higher level of social consciousness among the middle classes. Davidson includes in this strand visions of welfare measures as victories for the organized labour movement. For this regeneration is said to have resulted from the convergence of "social engineering" from above and increasing working-class pressures from below.

Others have contended that these new policies and concepts emerged as tools of social control rather than of social transformation. Far from intervening against the prerogatives of capital, the state was called in to implement such measures to keep in motion the reproduction of capital and suppress class conflicts, thus safeguarding their parliamentary-democratic form of bourgeois rule. In this strand, the point is not to argue that the state was simply the instrument of the ruling class but to stress that it initiated welfare measures as a means to solve the disruptive effects of changes in the labour process and the inadequacies of the traditional forms of reproduction of labour power. Although social reform may offer the illusion of a series of progressive concessions to workers and socially-minded liberals, it was essentially a conservative strategy "to regulate the physical depreciation of Britain's workforce," "to increase its efficiency," and "to sustain industrial discipline and incentive." (11)

With his careful dissection of the inputs (Part II), the outputs (Part III), and the constraints (Part IV) of the production of labour statistics, Davidson's approach is clearly more structural than institutional. By inputs, the author refers less to the organization of the Labour Statistical Bureau, followed by the Labour Department, than to the whole productive structure of labour data, including its division of labour, its funding, the career pattern of statisticians, their access to policy-making, and their background and ideological motivation. His analysis of the output or "commodity structure" of labour statistics shed an interesting light on six main areas of investigation to which expertise was funded and how these funds were often drastically shifted from one area to another over the years. Although the range of enquiry may appear to be impressive, by Canadian standards, each of these areas exhibited "severe and significant limitations." Statistics of industrial unrest tended to monitor the more conservative sectors of trade-unionism, to ignore issues relating to occupational status, labour intensity or the impact of innovations on the labour process, and to exclude small disputes, whatever their significance. As for trade-union membership, about 68 per cent of it was recorded by 1900, but detailed evidence of this organized movement was drawn from a dubious selection of only 100 "leading unions." No relationship was established between wage costs and the costs of production, and, again, the wage and earnings data were based almost entirely on organized labour in only five industries. Similar deficiencies are discovered as well within the remaining three areas of investigation — living standards, unemployment, and foreign and colonial welfare provisions — so that, overall, there existed "a marked shortfall" between the investigative aims of the Labour department and its actual achievements.

Part IV of Davidson's book is highly commendable for its scope and masterly treatment of seldom related factors, its accuracy and inspired argumentation. It is here, in this "systematic analysis of the range of logistical, technical and ideological factors which produced this shortfall," that the author's contribution to an understanding of the limits and, by extension, the nature of early welfare capitalism in Britain becomes most evident. Above all, there was this consistent "minimalist philosophy" of the Treasury about collecting any kind of information for governmental use,
including financial data. This was particularly striking for speculative enquiries which had the potential of initiating new areas of government expenditures. As most Treasury officials were conservative, the development of labour statistics was further hampered by their prejudice against what they thought could add fuel to a socialistic strategy of government intervention. And had there been sufficient human and financial resources for a qualitative expansion of labour statistics, any correlation with other industrial and social data represented an unusual problem in Britain because these were often gathered by other departments which were either obstructive or unreliable. These “ancillary producers” — the Home Office, the Local Government Board, the Registrar General’s Office, and the Registry of Friendly Societies — were typically British but give us, nevertheless, some sense of how compartmentalized statistics have been instrumental in defining and restricting the range of welfare measures.

Apart from these logistical problems, ideological constraints were equally influential among the representatives of capital and labour, and within the Labour Department. Workers’ distrust for bureaucratic controls was enhanced by the reluctance of trade-union leaders to forward information on membership, strike benefits, and industrial unrest that could become valuable intelligence for employers and objects of manipulation by conservative officials wishing the enactment of more repressive legislation. Similar concern existed for enquiries about wages and earnings, as well as working-class expenditure patterns, for these could be projected in such a way as to show an “unduly optimistic picture of working-class condition” or to “provide an excuse for middle-class moralising” as to secondary poverty. “(208) As for employers, they regarded this labour-market intelligence as an encroachment upon their managerial freedom, which only reinforced their traditional reluctance to reveal part of their records to competitors and tax authorities. Labour statisticians of the Board of Trade accentuated this distrust by relying on indirect or highly selective data to compensate for this widespread resistance. And being aware that official data often established the parameters of the welfare debate, these statisticians further restricted the scope of their achievements through the bias of their own economic and social philosophy. As members of the labour aristocracy and the middle classes, they viewed the Board’s role in a somewhat liberal way, as eroding the worst forms of exploitation, but also as discouraging “idealistic schemes of social reconstruction,” by refuting statistically the basic principles and concepts of socialist doctrines. Labour statistics were designed to provide a data bank to make existing social administration more efficient; they were not to be understood as a quantitative basis for sociological research of labour markets and social relationships of production. Thus advances in statistical methodology were not always following the pace of the new statistical techniques which, however valuable scientifically, did not meet the overriding philosophy of these labour administrators and statisticians, best summarized as crisis avoidance.

This goal-oriented process of monitoring the “labour problem” implies that official labour statistics sustained the control functions of social reform and minimized the scope of welfare provisions. For instance, while arbitrators were denied vital information on profit margins and production costs of firms involved in disputes, employers could rely systematically on the labour intelligence provided by the Board of Trade. Similarly, minimum wage legislation was restricted to a few isolated trades as the Board depicted low-income destitution as an anomaly of the labour market and defined deprivation on the basis of a “narrow physical conception of need.” Because all of these issues were primarily market rather than welfare-oriented, labour intelligence became a means of social control to contain social unrest, to restore British productivity, and to justify existing policy options, rather than providing a basis for their critique and reappraisal. To sum up, labour statisticians not only reflected the social control orientation of welfare provisions; they actually played a major role in bringing about such an orientation and maintaining it. This volume presents convincing arguments and solid evidence for those who have contended that the political sphere should not be granted autonomy from the changing re-
quirements of capitalist accumulation. If the new functions of the modern interventionist state cannot be linked directly to the various accumulation strategies of the ruling class and if the social make-up of this bourgeois state is not to be associated unilaterally to the business elite, it does not follow that the political sphere behaves as some kind of classless institution divorced from existing socio-economic conditions and guided by objective scientific principles. In addition to these new functions one must consider the particular forms taken by this reform policy, forms which are still objects of great debate as these lines are being written. By constraining the terms of reference of the welfare debate within the existing social policy paradigm, the Labour Department discarded those topics and techniques most likely to lead to welfare forms detrimental to most accumulation strategies of the owners of the means of production.

This being said, Davidson does not take a very explicit position in the more recent Marxist debate concerning the nature of this articulation between the bourgeois state and the realm of capitalist accumulation. Should the state be seen as an "ideal, fictitious capital," a necessary political extension of the various factions of the capitalist class, because of the unregulated and often conflicting character of its activities? Or should its policies (functions and forms) be seen as derived from class conflicts and inter-capitalist rivalries generated by the crisis-ridden capitalist system, developing institutions and taking decisions on the basis of the outcome of these rivalries and conflicts? The former interpretation gives the political sphere a much more active role than the latter which sees the state as being essentially reactive and being shaped by the peculiar orientation of social antagonism. With his emphasis on the background of the individuals who worked in or influenced the Labour Department, Davidson suggests that these specialized state officials could have altered reform policy significantly had they been motivated by a different social philosophy and more open-minded to socialist principles. But he cannot venture what the outcome of such a radically different attitude would have been if such a new social policy paradigm had been engineered from above. In the long run, it remains questionable whether or not the Labour Department’s officials, or any state bureaucrat, had the influence and the power to initiate and maintain a policy that would have changed the course of capital accumulation. For even though the state may not represent an institutionalization of the general interests of capital, its continued existence in a specific form is shaped by capital accumulation and particular capitalist class relations, which it serves and reproduces. Any form of social policy which is perceived as a threat to this fundamental function of the capitalist state is bound to raise the general opposition of the capitalist class and of all those immediately interested by capital accumulation.

Jacques Ferland
University of Maine at Orono

Roger Penn, Skilled Workers in the Class Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985).

L’OEUVRE DU SOCIOLOGUE britannique Roger Penn est une étude empirique de la classe ouvrière située à Rochdale (Lancashire) en Grande-Bretagne, entre 1856 et 1964, mettant l’accent sur la division entre les ouvriers qualifiés et les ouvriers non-qualifiés dans la structure économique et sociale du village.

Penn a pour but avoué de démontrer que les théories marxistes sur l’aristocratie du travail (Lénine, E.P. Thompson, Hobsbawm, etc.) et sur l’homogénéisation progressive des ouvriers manuels (le de-skilling de H. Braverman, etc.), sont fausses. Il veut aussi prouver que ce genre de théories, devenu très populaire même parmi plusieurs chercheurs non-marxistes, est un genre que la sociologie britannique devrait éviter à l’avenir. Selon Penn, les données de sa recherche empirique sur l’écart de revenus existant entre les ouvriers qualifiés et non-qualifiés, et sur l’endogamie maritale de ces deux groupes d’ouvriers à Rochdale, pendant tout un siècle, démontrent l’impossibi-
lité des deux thèses appuyées par les Thompson, Hobsbawm, Braverman, etc. Tous ces chercheurs, dit Roger Penn, souffrent d'une télécologie marxiste les incitant à commettre des erreurs graves; leur "essentialisme" marxiste les ont amenés à déformer la réalité de la classe ouvrière, du moins en Grande-Bretagne.

Voici les résultats de la recherche entreprise par ce sociologue empiriste. (1) La classe ouvrière britannique a réussi, contre toutes les tentatives de la bourgeoisie à travers les époques concernées, à préserver intacte la division fondamentale entre les ouvriers qualifiés et les ouvriers non-qualifiés. (2) Cette division est une réalité économique prouvée par la constance de la division entre les revenus des qualifiés et des non-qualifiés, et maintenue en place par les délégués syndicaux au niveau local, en dépit de ce qui s'est passé au niveau national de négociations. L'écart entre les salaires a diminué depuis 1914 mais le travail à la tâche (piecework) a maintenu l'écart entre les revenus. (3) Cette division économique est restée constante entre 1856 et 1964 en dépit du fait qu'elle n'a rien à faire avec le niveau de compétence des ouvriers impliqués; la division entre "qualifiés" et "non-qualifiés" est une division politique dans l'atelier et la notion de compétence n'a rien à voir avec la nature de la tâche à accomplir. La preuve est que, entre 1914 et 1918 les femmes ayant moins de trois mois d'apprentissage ont réussi à accomplir les tâches des "qualifiés" ayant fait sept ans d'"apprentissage". (4) Cette division est très établie économiquement mais, à la rencontre des attentes marxistes, elle n'existe pas du tout dans le domaine social à l'extérieur de l'atelier. Les statistiques de mariage à Rochdale démontrent une endogamie de classe (la classe ouvrière manuelle) sans aucune référence aux métiers; ainsi, le lien social n'est pas dépendant du rôle économique.

La recherche de Penn ne porte que sur les données venant de l'industrie du machinisme (engineering) et de la transformation du coton, dans un seul village ouvrier de la Grande-Bretagne, entre 1836 et 1964. Néanmoins, Penn pense que sa recherche a réussi à accomplir les tâches des "qualifiés" ayant fait sept ans d'"apprentissage". Cette division est très établie économiquement mais, à l'endroit des attentes marxistes, elle n'existe pas du tout dans le domaine social à l'extérieur de l'atelier. Les statistiques de mariage à Rochdale démontrent une endogamie de classe (la classe ouvrière manuelle) sans aucune référence aux métiers; ainsi, le lien social n'est pas dépendant du rôle économique.

La partie théorique du livre de Penn est nettement moins convaincante que sa démonstration statistique. Ainsi, ses critiques de l'"essentialisme" (qui, au fond, n'est qu'une croyance dans la cohérence fondamentale de l'univers humain) en général ou des théories "essentialistes" telles que la théorie de la valeur-travail, ne sont pas très convaincantes. Sa compréhension de la théorie marxiste de la valeur est plutôt caricaturale. Penn est un empiriste sur qui les "forces mystérieuses de l'histoire", au-delà des capacités de la démonstration empirique par les statistiques, n'ont pas de prise. Bien qu'il ait vraiment réussi à souligner les faiblesses des théories de l'aristocratie du travail et de la déqualification progressive du travail manuel (dans le sens des revenus), cela ne justifie pas le dénigrement systématique de toutes les théories dites "essentialistes".

Par contre, sur le fond, nous pouvons sans difficulté accepter les conclusions réellement...
empiriques de Roger Penn. Une classe ouvrière divisée économiquement, mais non socialement, par la qualification qui est plus politique que technique, un groupe de leaders syndicaux à gauche sur la place publique mais à droite au travail—nous connaissons tous cela. Il nous suffit de penser aux professeurs et chargés de cours syndiqués qui travaillent dans les universités et collèges canadiens pour trouver un autre groupe qui fonctionne d'une façon parfois similaire.

Retenons aussi la description de Penn sur la nature de plusieurs syndicats britanniques, fondés par des artisans militants", transformés en syndicats industriels pendant les années 1920 sous la pression des capitalistes et des ouvriers non-qualifiés, mais comportant encore aujourd'hui une division dans les faits résultant de la domination de ces syndicats par les hommes de métier. Au Canada aussi, les "artisans militants" ont fondé plusieurs de nos syndicats vers la fin du 19e siècle. Quelques uns sont devenus eux aussi des syndicats industriels après la crise des années 1930, tels que les Teamsters et les charpentiers-menuisiers, du moins en ce qui concerne le gros de leurs effectifs. La grande différence est qu'en Grande-Bretagne la domination de ces syndicats par les ouvriers qualifiés est un fait plutôt caché alors qu'ici cette domination est au vu et au su de tous. Ce qu'on oublie facilement, par contre, c'est le caractère souvent "industriel" des effectifs des syndicats d'ici, alors qu'il est très bien perçu là-bas.

Voilà donc un livre qui a sans doute déjà fait beaucoup de vagues en Grande-Bretagne et qui mérite d'avoir le même effet ici. Espérons que ceux qui défendent les thèses attaquées dans ce livre répondront vite et bien, en évitant de rejeter les résultats de cette recherche uniquement à cause de l'empirisme un peu trop évident de l'auteur.

Kevin Henley
Université du Québec à Montréal

Patricia Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize: 100 Years of Fabian Socialism (New York and London: Methuen 1984)

**THIS CENTENARY HISTORY** of the Fabian Society is a thoroughly boring book. If you want to know about the times: Fabian minutiae — what teas were held in 1933 or the topics of public meetings held in 1924 — then this is the book for you. If you want to know, as I had hoped when I picked up this volume, something about the evolution of right-wing social democratic thought in Britain, then this book will waste your time. The author claims independence, but a reading of the brief introduction alerts the reader immediately to the coming uncritical celebration. And finally, it is a bad celebration — tedious, cumbersome, trivial.

Pugh tells us almost nothing about how the Fabians wrestled with the big questions and events of the last century, ideologically, theoretically, and practically. Even comments on police brutality at mass demonstrations in the 1880s, or the Bryant and May match-girls strike in 1888, or the horrors of the conditions of beggars and the unemployed, are dry and tend to suggest the Fabians were always outside and above such events (which of course they were, but rarely would they admit it). On the great questions the Fabians are painted as superficial: on the woman question they were lukewarm; by the Russian Revolution, after only a moment's hesitation ["More volatile socialists talked a great deal of nonsense about the Russian Revolution in 1917" (133)], they were unmoved; and during the 1926 General Strike some drawing room meetings were held.

The book tells us very little about how Fabians confronted the Great Depression, fascism, Stalinism, World War II, the miners' strikes of more recent times, and so on. The Falklands War is not even mentioned, nor is the Suez Canal crisis. The feeling you get from Pugh's history is that, as that external and irrelevant hurly-burly of the real world staggered through the last century, there was this much more relevant, certainly more comfortable, se-
cure fellowship of sanity and good sense which just carried on with meetings and teas and summer holidays, from time to time making comments and suggestions about the way things ought to be done. This, of course, is nonsense. The apostles of right-wing social democracy were very much directly involved in helping shape, or mis-shape, the contours of the world we now face.

Inevitably, especially in a book of 330 pages, the odd insight is expressed (but never pursued). There are three themes that recur (unadventerously, I think) throughout Pugh's lengthy encomium. These are: the incredibly smug arrogance of Fabianism; its deep but unadmitted ideological confusion; and its inability to grasp any but the most moderate of lessons from failure. The arrogance is pervasive. Beginning with claiming an unjustifiably large share in the initial founding and shaping of the Labour Party, the claims made for Fabianism become truly astonishing. While in one breath Pugh admits Fabianism's hesitant support for the suffragettes, she concludes with "By... supporting the franchise campaign with moderation... the Fabian Women's Group was able to build a firmer and far more reasonable foundation for the liberation of women than the suffrage movement could ever have achieved unaided." (116) Then Pugh talks at length of the enormous impact of Fabianism on the 1945-51 Labour government. To hear her account, Fabianism was responsible for virtually every major reform accomplished, though the author finally concedes, no doubt aware of how ludicrous her claims had become: "Of course, not all the government was of Fabian origin, not all the changes wrought were inspired by them or even approved by them, and many of their measures were modified in cabinet." (215)

Even during the Labour Party's deep malaise after the defeat of 1970, Fabianism knew the problem and what to do. The problem was simple: "the government's attempts had been frustrated by the increasing size and complexity of the problems." The solution again was simple, as Fabians resolutely organized "seminars... on the proper attitude of the Labour Party towards the problems." (261-2)

Some arrogance may be justified. After all, the Fabian Society did and does have a significant impact on the Labour Party. But the unadmitted ideological confusion is grating. This confusion is entirely understandable when one remembers it took the Fabians their first three years to conclude finally that indeed they were socialists. From their founding aim, "the reconstruction of Society in accordance with the highest moral possibilities" (3); to their later commitment to "complete revolution by gradual change" (85); to their naive belief, in the wake of the 1945 Labour victory, "that society might take a big leap towards regeneration" (214); to their 1983 decision "to reassert the moral basis of our beliefs" (276), Fabianism has been ideologically confused and contradictory. Its equivocations on the Boer War, early tortured considerations on colonialism, fear of class analysis, nervousness about mass movements, and aversion to militancy of any sort, all point to their underlying belief in the moral suasion of rational and decent members of the elite as the only viable route to social change. While Pugh admits there were errors made, she suggests that these errors probably would not have been made had the Labour Party listened more closely to the Fabians. And the lessons drawn from her assessment of these errors invariably suggest the need for more moderation. Of the disappointment at the achievements of the 1945-51 Labour regime Pugh's analysis is predictable: "Expectations had been too high and so disappointment was inevitable." (230) But as the post-1951 years of opposition went on, this disappointment turned into a sense of despair with which Fabianism was unable to cope. Moreover, Fabians and others had begun to realize that what had been set in motion in 145-51 had not been an incontrovertible success. Poverty, deprivation, ignorance, greed, envy and sloth still existed and thwarted the moral regeneration anticipated by the early Fabians as the outcome of economic and social reforms. Modern Fabians, deeply disturbed by this revelation, could not evince the conviction necessary to influence the labour movement. (248) Thus finding the road to painless social change illusory, the Fabians apparently just gave up for a time. Revived by the 1964 Labour victory, Fabians again rolled up their sleeves. The much more widespread disillusionment in the Labour Party after the 1970 defeat was this time not shared by the Fabians. The govern-
ment had done as much as it could and the trade unions had become increasingly unreasonable. Fabianism was discovering a new ground on the right from which to fight.

Fabianism's arrogance, ideological confusion and growing moderation as the proper response to the failure of the dream of revolution by gradualism and stealth all neatly came together in its response to the split in the Labour Party in the early 1980s. The departure of a handful of prominent MPs, disgusted by the Party's left turn, to found the Social Democratic Party (SDP), had its repercussions in the Fabian Society. After much debate the Fabians decided to stay affiliated with Labour, abandoning the SDP to its fate. The result, however, was not to move the Fabians closer to the growing left sentiment in the Labour Party, but quite the reverse:

To delegates fanning themselves with agenda papers, the Executive (in July, 1983) announced its determination to reinstate the Fabian Society as the prime interpreter of British socialist philosophy. It postulated that at the root of the Labour Party's recent troubles lay a stubborn adherence to certain socialist tenets irrelevant to the present needs and desires of the people.

It appears that traditional socialist "ideals and motives" are "outdated." Furthermore, "policy makers [in the Labour Party] were inhibited from producing solutions to present-day problems by the traditional rhetoric relating to property ownership and nationalization of industry." (276) The Fabian Society had originally named itself after Quintus Fabius Cunctator, a third-century B.C. Roman general, who advocated guerilla tactics against Hannibal and waiting for the right moment for a full-scale attack. After a century of skirmishes against capitalism the Fabians have now selected the moment for a full-scale attack. The target is not capitalism, however, but the left of the Labour Party.

The distance the Fabians have moved right is evidenced by a new notion of the meaning of equality:

Equality does not mean uniformity of income, power, possessions, or opportunity, but man's freedom to fulfill himself, to contribute what he can in society in his own particular way and to be respected for what he is, not for what others think he ought to be or can be manipulated into becoming in a grand scheme of a socialist state. (280)

The Fabian Society, after a century, has gone full circle. Rooted in liberalism at its birth, it has returned to the womb at its centenary.

In the end, then, reading this book is salutary for critics of right-wing social democracy. It reminds us that while tories and reactionaries are the assassins and gravediggers of the socialist revolution, right-wing social democrats, albeit with much wringing of hands and unctuous expressions of sympathy, are the undertakers.

J.F. Conway
University of Regina


This book originally appeared in German in 1966 and in an English translation in 1969. The need for its republication now is unclear, as no attempt has been made to update it in light of recent scholarship, scholarship which gives Grebing's study a decidedly old-fashioned appearance. In fact, the very process of abridging her original German study has reduced what potential value it has for an English-speaking audience. In the original, the large Catholic workers' movement was analyzed as an integral part of the workers' movement in Germany. These sections were important for her overall interpretation of the development of Social Democracy in Germany, and its importance as an alternative to the workers' movement's radical (Marxist) ideology. These sections are now summarized at the end of the book, leaving essentially an account of the rise and fortunes of the German Social Democratic Party and their labour wing, the Free Trade Unions. Her conception of "labour movement" is restrictive, namely, the party and trade unions as they operated at the national level. The focus is on the ideas of leading socialist thinkers like Marx and Lassalle and how their theories were translated into policy by labour leaders. Methodologically this
is traditional intellectual and political history, with some economic developments tacked on as background.

Grebing's interpretation of German socialism is explained by the concrete historical situation in which she wrote her book. This gives her work its double thrust. On the one hand, her thesis generally is part of the dominant interpretation of the SPD developed by West German historians (like Ritter, Steinberg, and Groh) sympathetic to the reformist stand of the party after its rejection of Marxism in its 1959 Godesberg Program. In this interpretation, the German labour movement was essentially reformist but burdened with a revolutionary Marxist ideology, which hid its true nature even from party leaders.

Grebing also wrote before the SPD entered the Great Coalition Government (between CDU and SPD) of 1966-69. She had grave doubts about the wisdom of such a coalition, given the fragile state of German democracy. While critical of the party's traditional dogmatism, she is by no means an apologist for its unthinking pragmatism after World War II. The intention of her study is didactic: "to furnish material for those who are directly involved in politics and who may find in the development of the German labour movements a—positive or negative—yardstick for their own actions." (8) As a survey, the implications and limitations of the dominant interpretation are clearer than in studies which are restricted to the pre-World War I period. The major question the book addresses is why the SPD failed in crucial moments of German history: in carrying through the Revolution of 1918 to create a stable democracy; most tragically, in defending the Weimar Republic against Nazism; and in playing a meaningful role in restructuring German society and the political system after World War II. She argues that the leaders of the party lacked (and she feared in 1965 still lacked) a realistic idea of what democracy entailed and did not tailor their economic goals "with a realizable utopia adapted to the conditions of modern industrial society and rooted in socialist aspirations." (172) Operating with an idealized and formalistic view of democracy, she argues that Germans have a tendency to avoid rather than confront conflict, and in this way, "the SPD unintentionally aids and abets the authoritarian tendencies in Germany." (171) In the utopian Christian critique of Marx by Buber and Tillich (which contains a concrete idea of a future society and which incorporates many of the insights of the young Marx's theory of alienation), she sees the possibility of constructing a viable socialist vision for the present. This is why her account of the Christian workers' movement is anything but marginal in the German edition.

Throughout most of its history, German socialism, she argues, faced two alternatives, which the party's verbal radicalism often hid. The choice was between social revolution (as developed in Marx's theory) or democratic social reform (which appeared as early as the Workers' Brotherhoods of 1848, which Marx ignored). The workers' parties of the 1860s and 1870s owed more to Lassalle's social democratic reformism than revolutionary Marxism. This interpretation means that she has to explain how the reformist ideology of the movement was replaced by one of class struggle. The answer she finds is the persecution of the authoritarian Prussian state, not the nature of German capitalism. The movement's radicalism is depoliticized as simple hatred of Bismarck. The Marxism adopted by the party during the period of the Socialist Law (1878-90) maintained only Marx's deterministic analysis of historical development, not his will to revolutionary action and intervention in the historical process. Having lost the sophistication of Marx's "dialectical unity of theory and practice," (59) the Marxism of the Erfurt Program of 1891 hid the gulf between ideological posturing and political action. The SPD's reformist practice could be semantically combined with revolutionary theory, although the latter had only psychological meaning, providing workers with an explanation for their unjust exclusion from national life.

The movement's pseudo-Marxism not only prevented a realistic evaluation of German politics, society, and economy. Internally, it functioned as an ideology of integration so that the political unity of the movement could be maintained. The ideology then (and this was true until 1959) justified party leaders' in their refusal to carry out a program of action which "would lead to the seizure of power." Here,
and this is an important sub-theme, the leadership only reflected the German working class as a whole, whose "unrevolutionary mentality" she notes. As her central categories of analysis are leaders and an undifferentiated working class, she cannot explain divisions within the workers' movement. Both the left and the right emerge as groups of isolated intellectuals with no mass following. The radical left around Rosa Luxemburg, for example, were a group of theorists who "disregarded the real attitude of the allegedly revolutionary masses." This perspective is important for her analysis of socialist support for World War I. The vote for war credits on August 4 revealed the extent to which the workers' movement, leaders and masses, were integrated into the Imperial system: "a complete identification with the national state." Here she is analyzing not government manipulation but a mass psychological process of nationalization, which had its origins in the pre-war period. Hence in 1913, she notes, the SPD deputies voted in favour of a new tax law for army increases.

Two points need to be made here. First, the issue was not simply militarism or antimilitarism, but a chance, through an inheritance tax, to strike at the power of the conservative aristocracy in Prussia. Second, at the subsequent Jena Congress of 1913, over one-third of the delegates condemned the vote (with delegates loyal to the executive being vastly overrepresented), a division which could just as easily be seen as prefiguring the subsequent split of the SPD during the war and the formation of the Communist Party after the war. Given her categories, however, sources of working-class opposition on the left or right cannot be explained.

Grebing's account of the workers' movement from 1914 to 1965 downplays workers' radicalism and minimizes the role of the Communist Party. War-time radicalism is explained as an "emotional pacifism," the reverse of the "emotional patriotism" of 1914. Hence the goals of workers in the Revolution of 1918-1919 were quite limited: "peace and bourgeois democracy." Splits in the workers' movement are important only so far as they affected SPD leaders in their unwillingness to act for fear of Bolshevism coming to power in Germany, a danger they overestimated. The real focus of the rest of her book is her analysis of how leaders were affected by the burden of the past, a burden which until 1959 had fateful consequences for both the workers' movement and Germany as a whole. The first of these crisis points was the Revolution of 1918. The Bolshevist danger and the lack of "a constructive, democratic socialist conception of state and society which would have enabled them to utilize the revolutionary situation" (102) meant that ultimately German Social Democrats were unable to create the social and ideological foundations for the new Republic. Demoralized and defeated, the party scrapped its promising Gorkitz Program (which foreshadowed the Godesberg Program by appealing to non-proletarian strata and advocating social reform within the nation-state), for the Heidelberg Program of 1925 which reverted to the Erfurt Program and restored the old rift between theory and practice. This adherence to certain conceptual frameworks from the pre-war period was responsible for its tepid response to Nazism and its lack of imagination in dealing with the depression, during which it supported policies inconsistent with the spirit of a democratic system.

These same timid bureaucrats returned after World War II, forming the organizational support for Schumacher's intransigent opposition on the national level (again a gap, as on the provincial and local levels, the SPD took a major part in reconstruction). In other words, the SPD's failure after 1945 to attain power (the situation when she wrote) was due to its dogmatism or unclear political conceptions, not American manipulation during the early stages of the Cold War or the fact that a large part of its traditional voting strength was now in the East. With the Godesberg Program, recognizing "the pluralism of ethical motivation which is involved in the political option in favour of democratic socialism," (166) Grebing sees a step in the right direction, for the SPD can now appeal to and make gains at least in Catholic working class areas. Her very real concern in 1965 with whether the new "popular party" (which when it came to power would give us such "democratic" measures as the Emergency Laws and professional prohibitions for political beliefs) could fulfill its role as the educator of the German people to a non-
authoritarian democracy, is what makes this book an interesting historical document in its own right.

Glen McDougall
Burnaby, B.C.


TWO CHARACTERISTICS OF THE socialist labour movement in Wilhelmine Germany have traditionally attracted students of working-class history: the coexistence within its ranks of revolutionary proclamations and moderate political behaviour and the development of an extensive and unified organizational base which tended to separate millions of workers from the bourgeoisie. At least since Robert Michels introduced the "iron Law of oligarchy" into the debate, observers have generally agreed that the latter characteristic dampened the revolutionary impulses of the movement. Two of the three sets of organizations that comprised the socialist labour movement — the political and union infrastructures — have been subjected to exhaustive examinations. Only studied piecemeal, the third set, the host of voluntary associations within which workers pursued collectively leisure time activities, is the subject of The Alternative Culture.

Drawing upon historical monographs, theoretical literature, and primary sources scattered across Germany in local, regional and national archives, Vernon Lidtke has done a masterful job of reconstructing an arena of associational life which by 1914 incorporated somewhere between 10 to 25 per cent of the members of the socialist labour movement. The impetus for the development of this network came from above and below. In the more congenial economic and political atmosphere of the 1890s, labouring people increasingly became engaged in recreational activities. Realizing that this tendency was drawing some of its constituency into clubs controlled by the bourgeoisie, labour leaders first encouraged the establishment of clubs composed solely of socialists and then sought to bring local associations into regional and national umbrella organizations. By the first decade of the twentieth century, national associations of choirs, bands, cyclists, athletic clubs, chess players, libraries, nature groups, drama enthusiasts, and the like were well on the way toward coalescing. Local chapters were normally dominated by men who ranged from 20 to 35 years old and were craft and skilled workers. For men who often worked close to a 60 hour week, they seem to have put considerable energies into their pursuit of leisure. For example, in the district of Chemnitz, singing clubs held on an average 44 practices a year, not to mention performing in concerts and workers' festivals of all kinds, and holding occasional social evenings. Aside from recreational opportunities, clubs also provided an extensive set of services for members. The Workers' Cycling Association, for instance, provided accident insurance, death benefits, legal assistance, free road maps, cycle stores, and repair shops. As Lidtke's map of the recreational terrain makes clear, by the eve of World War I the socialist labour movement provided for its members an "alternative" set of leisure time associations to those offered by the bourgeoisie in communities across Germany.

Alternative "housing" for leisure activities spawned the rise of an alternative culture. Lidtke's analysis of this culture marks an important contribution to the historiography of the German labour movement. Abandoning Guenther Roth's consensual model of a socialist "sub culture", which allegedly kept workers completely alienated from bourgeois society, Lidtke finds within these walls a diverse cultural mix that was only marginally influenced by Marxist ideology and routines in the workplace and at home. In part this mix emerged simply from the dynamic interrelationship of three factors at play in the routine activities of the clubs: the official function of promoting socialist identity and ideology, the desire of some members for "sociability," and the striving of others for "performance." Socialist ideas and symbols pervaded the publications of umbrella associations, the Festschriften of local chapters, and large and small festivals. But in the course of the recrea-
tional activities themselves, the language of class warfare inevitably gave way to "sociability": lighthearted enjoyment with one's friends. While socializing and ideology could comfortably coexist within a club — though some hardliners claimed that the former weakened the militancy of the movement — the motive of "performance" ran at cross purposes to several socialist principles. For one thing, the compulsion to excel at, say, singing introduced the ethic of achievement into a choir. Less talented singers were driven to the sidelines, as elitism subverted the community of equals. Singing contests increased, and as they did the notion of competition gained sway over that of cooperation. When choirs became more able, their interest in performing songs of protest and revolution waned, and they turned to more challenging bourgeois pieces such as those by Richard Wagner. Worse yet, though Lidtke does not mention in, the truly talented and competitive performers were likely to escape the socialist cultural milieu altogether. For their aspirations could often be better served in the higher levels of competition offered in bourgeois associations. Plainly, these tendencies, which were evident in many of the recreational associations, helped from a culture that was separate but similar to the bourgeois alternative.

By and large attitudes of the leaders of the movement actually reinforced this "natural" process of fusion with the bourgeois culture. The view that prevailed was that socialism should come to power not by rejecting bourgeois culture but by culling from it the best that it offered. Drama clubs were encouraged to perform the classics, poets to aspire to more than lyrics about life in the factory, and workers to draw their ideals from "higher" forms of existence than their daily routines. Only by going beyond a true "working-class" culture and using the plateau of the bourgeois experience as its point of departure would the labour movement be able to attain the millennium. Given the predominance of craft and skilled workers in the ranks of the socialist labour movement, it is not too surprising that this viewpoint seemed more to coincide with than to shape the attitudes within the clubs. The convergence of elitist attitudes from above and petty bourgeois aspirations from below explains the fact that no one seemed to be uncomfortable when local chapters of the Workers' Gymnastic Association honored Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the Turnvater of the staunchly conservative and nationalist German Gymnastic Association, as their patron Saint, when other clubs named themselves after Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and when the singers' festival in Hamburg in 1904 and 1905 focused on the operas of Richard Wagner. In each case the process of "culling" involved stressing each man's dedication to freedom and opposition to capitalist values, along with dismissing his particular historical sins. Although the author does not look at it this way, what the clubmen on the socialist left were doing was similar to the venture in idealism engaged in by the nationalist clubmen who directed the bourgeois alternative: namely, they both sought to "revitalize" the German nation by eliminating the pernicious influence of the propertied bourgeois and following the path laid out by the other half of the bourgeois couplet, "cultivated" men, in their efforts to build a better future based on "principles of universal humanitarianism." (201) While Lidtke finds admirable this goal of at least the socialists, I think that one should view just as skeptically the vaulted promises of socialist idealists as one does those of idealists of the nationalist stripe.

The efforts of the movement to legitimate the likes of Jahn, Fichte, and Wagner as the vanguard of the working-class movement is wonderful stuff, but it is not the only thing that makes this a rich and often fascinating book. Certainly, Lidtke convincingly makes his point that Ferdinand Lassalle, not Karl Marx, was the symbolic focal point and inspiration for the socialist cultural milieu prior to 1914. Such lines as "Not hatred against the rich do we preach, / but equal rights for everyone," (113) found in the movement's most popular song, Jakob Au-dorf's "Workers' Marseillaise," not only "embodied the spirit of the socialist labor movement," (114) but also made Lassalle its "personal symbol" (112) well into the 1920s. Well done! But the author loses me when he concludes from his research that somehow or other this socialist cultural milieu influenced the development of a labour movement that posed a "... radical alternative to existing..."
norms and arrangements," radical in the sense that it "rejected existing structures, practices, and values at almost every point." (7-8) Though this may be party true, I can only conclude from the evidence provided by Lidtke that when the revolutionary opening finally arrived in 1918-1919, the clubmen had been culturally conditioned to build bridges, not barricades, between themselves and the bourgeoisie.

Robert Hopwood
Queen's University


As E.P. Thompson's writing demonstrates, history can be a forceful tool with which to understand the present and thus it can help shape current political purpose and activity. One might be forgiven, if at first glance, it appears that Meyer's book on Lily Braun, a German feminist and socialist of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, will live up to this standard. The author claims, in his enthusiasm for the subject of this intellectual biography, that Braun "has things of great interest to say to today's women's movement" (xi) and offers "important insights for our own times." (191) Indeed, it should be true that an understanding of Braun's experience and thought would serve to illuminate current practice given that she was both an intellectual and an activist who analyzed and fought against patriarchy and capitalism, before, during, and after the time she was a member of the German Social Democratic Party.

There is no doubt that Meyer's account of the feminism and socialism of Lily Braun will be of interest to many feminists today (and socialists, too, for that matter) precisely because, as he notes, her ideas anticipated many of the issues which engage activist-scholars. In the course of her life, Braun developed positions on many of the specific problems facing women such as the double or triple day, health and safety concerns, maternity leave, the right to abortion, and access to education, but she did so within the context of larger philosophical debates. Thus, for example, she engaged in the "different but equal" arguments of the day and struggled to include reproductive labour as a worthy counter-part to productive labour in socialist theory and practice.

Braun's position on liberation and equality is strikingly current, so much so that many professionally trained historians will have visions of presentism dancing through their heads. Braun rejected a concept of liberation which would simply "masculinize" women and "convert the idea of equal rights and equal validity into the notion of equality in kind." (131) Thus she favoured maternity insurance and leave and other protections for working women without seeing them as a violation of the egalitarian principles of socialism as Clara Zetkin did. Nonetheless, in an apparently contradictory position, Braun argued strongly against special treatment for women within the organizational structures of the SPD.

Braun's views reflect the strong tensions and ambivalences that exist in the thought of socialist feminists. On one hand, she recognized that sexism was endemic and acknowledged that men enforced their dominance, often violently. On the other hand, she insisted that the real enemy was capitalism and blamed sexism on the culture and morality of capitalism. At the same time, she argued that women must liberate themselves and that while men might help women seek freedom, ultimately "men are incapable [her emphasis] of understanding large areas of concern in women's lives." (130) Because of these views, Braun believed that women from the SPD should seek to develop a women's mass movement which would cross class lines and which, through a popular front format, would work to achieve reforms leading to immediate improvements in women's daily lives. Working for and achieving reforms would also educate women and help them see that the real need was to transform capitalism said Braun.

Braun's position on the political uses of reform strategies questioned the orthodox line in the SPD and, as a result, she, with Bern-
stein, came to be labelled a revisionist. Meyer argues, however, that although Braun and Bernstein were in general agreement on many issues, Bernstein was a "second-rate" theorist, while Braun enriched and radicalized Marxism. In fact, Meyer claims that Braun was "a precursor of contemporary Western Marxists" (95) because "her idea of socialism revolved around the goal of self-transcendence through revolutionary praxis." (99) Furthermore, it was Braun's goal to "humanize Marxism by feminizing it." (111)

Part of what this meant to Braun raises one of the most contentious aspects of her overall philosophy. To Marx's theory of alienated labour, Braun added both a theory of alienated sexuality and alienated motherhood. For her, then, the humanist goal of self-actualization was realized not only through creative, satisfying work but through a love relationship (notably with a member of the opposite sex) and, for women alone, through motherhood. For Braun, women's highest fulfillment came through bearing children, the most human of all acts for it alone ensured the survival of the species. As Meyer points out, Braun's emphasis on the mother-child relationship as the most fundamentally human one often makes a woman appear in her writings as superior to men. But, argues Meyer, unlike the conservative or maternal feminist emphasis on mothering, Braun's maternalism was revolutionary. It was, as he puts it, liberation for motherhood (127) and it was based on the necessity for a socialist transformation of society, a rejection of traditional sexual morality, the destruction of the nuclear family, and the elimination of all forms of male dominance. It also implied communal schemes for house-keeping and child care and the involvement of men in parenting.

Meyer is laudatory about Braun's feminism and socialism despite the fact that in 1914 she seems to have turned towards militarism, nationalism, and authoritarianism to become a staunch supporter of Germany's war efforts. She vehemently rejected the pacifism of radical feminists and called on all healthy women to become mothers as an act of patriotic duty. While Meyer acknowledges that her position during the war until her death in 1916 sound amazingly like much of the subsequent position of the National Socialists, he is so enamoured of his subject that he concludes, not very convincingly, that in the end she would have fought fascism had she lived to see the rise of Hitler.

There is no doubt that Braun was a fascinating individual and that many of her pre-1914 ideas have great currency. Nonetheless Meyer's work is somewhat flawed. While he recognizes that separating life from ideology "is an altogether artificial separation" and while he claims that he will treat Braun's "private and public persons as a whole" (ix), Meyer fails to achieve the integration he so correctly observes is necessary. No real, living Lily Braun emerges to confront us and engage us in her practical and intellectual struggles. Whether this is because, as Braun said, men cannot understand some fundamental aspects of women's lives or whether the necessary sources for telling the complete story are unavailable is not clear. Whatever the reason, in the end, what could have been more than an interesting book is, instead, an incomplete and unsatisfying one.

Rebecca Coult
Athabasca University


THIS VOLUME PRESENTS a set of essays that, taken collectively, forge a new research agenda and offer insightful methodological approaches to the study of the middle classes on either side of the Atlantic. While North Americanists often talk as though there was a single middle class or middle-class experience, the collection's authors emphasize the uneven process of middle-class formation and the multiplicity of identities and experiences among the petite bourgeoisie — circumstances which they rightly attribute more to the uneven development of industrial capitalism than to any "national peculiarities." Although focusing on two
particular strands of the petite bourgeoisie, shopkeepers and master artisans, the essays explore three sets of class relations: between the petite bourgeoisie and working class, between petite bourgeoisie and haute bourgeoisie, and within the petite bourgeoisie itself.

The volume is divided into three sections: a superb introduction which discusses critical issues and approaches to the study of the petite bourgeoisie — regardless of national boundary; four broad essays that assess the petit-bourgeois experience in England, Germany, France, and Belgium; and, six in-depth case studies of petit-bourgeois life in specific cities or regions.

The common thread running through the collection is the determination to see the petite bourgeoisie as an intermediary class that achieved a sense of self-awareness and self-determination in the nineteenth century; as agents, not passive or duped recipients of change. Clearly influenced by recent debates in working-class historiography, the essays explore the importance and interrelationship of production, social life, ideology, politics, and the state upon middle-class formation. Crossick and Haupt use the introduction to sound the volume’s leitmotiv: the profound economic, social, and political heterogeneity within the world of small enterprise. We see how some masters and shopkeepers co-existed with the rise of large industrial and mercantile establishments, while others were pushed to the margins of bankruptcy; how ambiguous social and economic relations within the quartier produced both alliances and battles with working-class customers; how master and shopkeeper ideology variously led them into political coalitions with radicals, liberals, and conservatives; how increasingly similar conditions of capitalist development in the late nineteenth century brought previously fragmented petit-bourgeois entrepreneurs into common alliances aimed at protecting their “independence” and property from attack by large-scale capitalist enterprises. These general themes are given sharper focus in the four national essays. David Blackbourn, in what may be the collection’s best piece, analyses the social and economic bases for political behaviour among the German petite bourgeoisie. He challenges older portraits of the Middelstand as the inclusive and conservative representative of the petite bourgeoisie. The German petite bourgeoisie, he argues, was made up of a number of different strands, of which the Middelstand was but one small element. Blackbourn takes us into the arena of work, social relations, mobility, ideology, and politics and shows how the petite bourgeoisie developed as a heterogeneous, fragmented, ambiguous, and complex body with ties to the working class and bourgeoisie. While the Middelstand did attract the support of the prosperous, a large percentage of more marginal masters and shopkeepers rejected their reactionary politics and allied themselves with the SPD. Thus, concludes Blackbourn, the political behaviour of the petite bourgeoisie and their relationship to the state must be seen as complex and varied as their economic and social experiences.

Geoffrey Crossick’s two essays on shopkeepers and masters in Britain focus on the uneven effects of industrialization, upon the petite bourgeoisie and the ways in which “shopkeepers perceived the state and its relation to their problems.” (239) We see a petite bourgeoisie that, whether shopkeeper or master artisan, was forced to live a precarious economic existence; a petite bourgeoisie whose defence of independence led them on a political odyssey from radical-based alliances with artisans in the late eighteenth century to embracing the new urban liberalism of the 1840s to links with Tories after 1918. Yet, despite their occasional political forays, the shopkeepers’ commitment to free enterprise, individual initiative, and a laissez-faire state ultimately dictated against the development of a broad political programme that would promote or protect their class interests.

Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, sounding the volume’s leitmotiv, analyzes the uneven nature of economic, social, and political development among small masters and shopkeepers in France. Indeed, we see a three-tiered petite bourgeoisie: those with accumulated capital who occupied its upper levels; those with sufficient capital to maintain their independence; and the “proletarianized petite bourgeoisie” who survived only through “self exploitation.” These different experiences with financial dependence and social instability produced differ-
ent class attitudes and responses to capitalist and state development. Haupt, like Blackbourn, argues that those who have associated the petite bourgeoisie with political conservatism have looked at only a relatively small and elite element of the classes moyennes. While certain sectors did turn conservative in the early twentieth century, others remained committed to republicanism or socialism. The diversity of petit-bourgeois relations to politics and the state also forms the central theme in G. Kurgan-Van Hentenryk’s work on Belgium. He shows why some favoured an interventionist state while others wanted a neutral arbiter; why some entered into alliances with the ruling Catholic bourgeoisie, while others lined up with Liberals and Socialists.

The essays comprising the Research Focus provide a more detailed view of specific patterns in the evolution of the petite bourgeoisie. One of the key themes here is the need for greater precision when using broad terms like master artisan or shopkeeper. Not only were there tremendous variations between masters and shopkeepers, but also within specific trades and commercial endeavors. Clive Behagg’s essay on small producers in early nineteenth century Birmingham examines the factors that led some metal-working masters to remain committed to craft traditions, while others quickly plunged into the emerging capitalistic world. The critical distinction between these artisan small masters and petit-bourgeois small producers lay not in their wealth or the size of their workplace, but in their willingness to embrace the new forms and values of capitalist organization. The latter group prospered because they, unlike the masters, moved to rationalize the workplace, secure better credit and marketing arrangements, and embrace an ideology and culture that stressed the merits of competitive individualism over the collectivist and cooperationist ideology of the small masters.

While Behagg looks at the divisions among small producers, Alain Faure explores the fragmented economic and social world of Parisian grocers: the small group of prosperous elites, the large number of small and medium-sized shops, and world of the very small grocers — the “hucksters.” The interactions of petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie are illustrated in Faure’s analysis of how food store magnates, like Felix Potin, transformed the nature of the grocery business by adopting developments pioneered by large manufacturing and mercantile operations: large turnover, calculated scale of profits, loss leaders to attract customers, high-powered use of advertising, and manufacturing and warehousing of his own products. The end result of these measures was a segmented world in which large and small grocers divided their markets and would, in turn, become divided from each other.

Divisions between and within the worlds of masters and shopkeepers were equally pronounced in the countryside. Jean-Claude Farcy shows how different rates of adjustment to changing agricultural conditions and techniques created a wide range of intermediary positions among the artisans and small traders in rural Beauce.

Pursuing themes raised by Blackbourn and Haupt, Philip Nord examines the “political and ideological evolution of interest group organizations which purported to represent the modest French retailer” (175) between 1888 and 1914. Nord rails against the idea of seeing the petite bourgeoisie as inherently conservative or as the facile dupes of the political right. It is the political ideas of shopkeepers, not their political allies, that serve as Nord’s point of departure. In a very perceptive essay, he shows how, over the course of the century, the shopkeepers’ defense of republican ideals and local democratic independence led them into alliances with the left, the center, and the right. Although the allies changed, the issues remained constant: attacks against monopoly; opposition to concentration of political power (especially evident in the modern bureaucratic state); the preservation of economic independence (defined as autonomy of local shopkeeper life within the quartier). Shopkeepers drifted into conservative politics in the early twentieth century primarily because only the right would actively join them in a defense of “the virtues of smallness, independence, and family life.” (190) It was this defense of values, not innate conservatism, which governed their choice of allies.

A final piece by Josef Ehmer explores the relationship between industrialization and family formation in nineteenth century Vienna.
He shows how the rise of a petit-bourgeois capitalist economy altered the fundamental structures of the family and family-owned business among prosperous masters and led them to adopt modern bourgeois ideals of family relations: keeping children at home as long as possible; greater separation of work and family life; including sons in the transfer of capital and wealth.

These brief summaries cannot do justice to the complexities and rich nuances offered by the various essays. This is a terrific book; one that keeps the reader's mind churning away with new ideas and new avenues of inquiry. The volume is invaluable not only for Europeanists, but Americanists interested in issues of class formation and consciousness. Crossick and Haupt have compiled a set of essays that go well beyond the present writings on the American middle class. This is must reading for all social historians!

Steven J. Ross
University of Southern California


Reviewing Collections of articles is often a challenging endeavour, as one seeks to write coherently about contributions that share little more than a binding. Such is not the case, however, with the short volume under review here.

The themes that hold Women's Paid and Unpaid Work together are conveniently set out in the brief Introduction by editor Paula Bourne, in the course of her discussion of the rationale for the convening in 1984 of the workshop on the history of women's collective work from which the book emerged. A first theme concerns the invisibility of this collective work, work which, it is explicitly held, takes place in the paid and volunteer sectors only. Nonetheless, a second theme concerns the need to locate this work in a context that includes women's work in the home. The impression left is that the editor regards as unproblematic the fact that the collective, even organizational, aspects of domestic work are yet further hidden from history, an impression reinforced by her uncritical use of the language of "public and private realms."

A third theme can be drawn out of the discussion introducing the book's five substantive pieces, which were initially prepared as background papers for the workshop. Because the workshop was designed to encourage the writing of women's organizational histories as well as to increase knowledge of women's collective contributions to Canadian society, and because the book was designed to help "bridge the gap between the world of academic analysis and the world of action by and for women," it was important that these background papers be written in accessible fashion. Fortunately, all of them were.

The first of the background papers, by Ruth Roach Pierson, is essentially concerned to establish the connection between women's paid work in the labour force and unpaid work in the home. In this contribution, the connection appears to be a one-way street, with the oppressive imposition of their domestic work affecting their paid work, but not vice versa. Perhaps the reason for this one-directional argument is that her focus is on paid work, including working in the so-called "informal economy," which she usefully considers as an instance of the invisibility of women's work. Pierson also argues that the inferior position of women in the labour force is connected to various patriarchal structures — as distinct from attitudes — in society, although the concept of patriarchy is left untheorized. This is particularly surprising in the writing of an historian, in that the chief criticism levelled against the concept is that it is ahistorical.

In the second paper, Veronica Strong-Boag concentrates on the invisible history of domestic work. She argues that what is needed in order to render it fully visible is that domestic work be categorized into its component parts. She then proceeds to offer a fivefold categorization and to use it to organize a quick survey of 150 years of domestic work. Her innovation is to separate out the care of dependent adults and paid work in the home
as distinct categories of domestic work, although the latter is apparently included in part because of the "essential untidiness of human endeavours and their resistance to neat categorization," which casts something of a shadow on the insistence with which she presses her case for (a particular) categorization.

Unlike the other contributors, the author of the third paper, Margrit Eichler, is a sociologist rather than an historian, which may help explain why her approach is more analytical and less concerned with change over time. She is also alone in emphasizing social policy. Her key conclusion is that the failure to recognize and reward financially the socially necessary aspects of unpaid work, especially child care work, prevents us from achieving sex equality in employment. She is critical of two earlier sets of arguments for the importance of housework — again, the invisibility question is addressed — because they do not adequately differentiate what she terms the social and private components of housework. The approach expressed most starkly in the "wages for housework" movement, to wit that house work should be seen simply in terms of the reproduction of labour power, is criticized for overemphasizing the social utility of housework. The alternative which comes in for criticism is termed the "equalitarian family model," in which the solution to an unequal sexual division of labour is seen to rest with the redistribution of household responsibilities, responsibilities which for Eichler are appropriately defined as being only privately useful. Unfortunately, she cites no references as examples of this curious model, perhaps because her paper is a shortened version of a study prepared for the Abella Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, but for me at least the model was as a result difficult to locate.

In the last two papers, women's collective work of "associational activity," the subject of the workshop is addressed directly. Gail Cuthbert Brandt's is the more general of the two, relying on the research of others to offer a survey of Protestant voluntary organizations in post-Confederation Canada. Her conclusions are that in their long and rich histories these organizations, among other things, provided women the opportunity to develop administrative and communications skills, encouraged their movement into the helping professions, raised their consciousness of social problems, contributed to the improved legal status of women, and eventually helped break down the rigid ideological separation of public and private spheres. At the same time, she draws attention to their failures, as they had difficulty adapting to changed conditions and trouble coping with the enduring Canadian realities of class, region and, I would add on the basis of the evidence she marshals, nation. Finally, in what is more an exemplar of the kind of organizational history the workshop conveners hoped to stimulate than a background paper proper, Alison Prentice offers a preliminary examination of the early history of the Women Teachers' Association of Toronto. Cautioning against a "Whiggish approach" which can see only progress from feeble beginnings to current prosperity, and against its opposite number, a recital of repeated failures and shortcomings, she labours to unearth the personal histories of the Association's founders and members, the conditions under which they worked, the broader organizational context of the period, and the beliefs articulated and organizational style practiced within the WTA. Just as her account is one of both success and failure, so her conclusion is one of continuing dilemmas: of having to choose affiliation with either the women's movement or the labour movement, and of having to confront the oppressive bureaucratic structures of the school system by developing hierarchical structures of their own.

So, notwithstanding the different disciplines of the contributors and the different subject matters they examine, Women's Paid and Unpaid Work is of a piece. All the papers shed light directly on the question of invisibility. The accessible styles of presentation, already noted approvingly, can only assist the democratic processes of empowerment.

This is not to suggest, however, that the treatments are superficial. Not only is the reality complex, so also at points is the argumentation. Indeed, on the third of the unifying themes identified here, the need to situate paid and volunteer work in a context that includes domestic work, subtle but important differences of emphasis can be discerned. Eichler,
with her differentiation of social and private utility, seems to join Bourne in treating the public/private dichotomy as unproblematic, while Pierson, Strong-Boag, and Brandt are all in various ways explicit in rejecting any rigid conceptual distinction between public and private spheres. Because the distinction is ideological as well as material, because it is socially constructed and at times socially contested, to treat it in a more rather than a less problematic manner seems wise.

Differences of emphasis such as this serve only to underline the coherence to be found in a book that largely achieves the objectives set for it.

Hugh Armstrong
Vanier College


THE SOCIOLOGICAL DATA from which the interpretations in this book are drawn emerged from the Farm Women's Survey, sponsored by the National Opinion Research Center and the United States Department of Agriculture. The questionnaire, answered by telephone and in personal interviews conducted in 1980, sought to investigate the nature of women's farm work and management, their off-farm employment, and their membership in farm and community volunteer organizations. It included questions asked of 4000 women from all regions of the United States about the nature of the family farm operation and about their own sociological, educational, and family characteristics. Rosenfeld's careful analysis of the data and her extensive citations of the bibliography on farm women led her to conclude that the boundaries between "work" and "family" in the settings she surveyed become artificial, and that in fact what should interest us most is the connection between the two. Since her findings implicitly question the dichotomy in much of the literature on women's lives between the public and the private spheres, Farm Women, while surveying a shrinking percentage of the population (family farms are failing and their owners turning to other labour), is suggestive for scholars in many disciplines seeking to understand women's individual, family, and work lives.

Rosenfeld defines work as "efforts producing goods and services with and without pay on and off the farm." (269) As so much of the literature on women's employment has investigated paid labour force participation, family farms have escaped attention precisely because of the intimate connection between women's work with and without pay in that setting. That is, the myth of the home and the workplace as separate spheres has dominated many books and articles on women's work, just as it has popular conceptions of women's unpaid labour as less real and less important than work for pay. Rosenfeld's data force us to see the links in women's lives and in the economy between both kinds of work. Farm women, whether they own and manage their own farms or work with their families, also frequently work for pay off the farm. Their lower salaries, their irregular work force participation, and the service and clerical work they do for pay (these categories comprise 70 per cent of their paid labour) are explained by their responsibility for child rearing. Hence, quite like non-farm women, they are often dependent on their husbands' wages, thus continuing to provide child care as their time is worth less than men's, perpetuating their lower positions in the work force, coming full circle. By contrast, Rosenfeld found that the wider the range of a woman's farm tasks, the larger the proportion of farm decisions she made, especially decisions about production and distribution; if she combined extensive farm tasks with financial contributions from work off the farm, her decision-making power seemed to increase. Labour and financial contributions seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for women to have status and power.

Increasingly, both women and men are working off the farms. Women's contributions are more important the lower the family's farm earnings; they may also, when employed, be
providing non-wage benefits like health insurance to the family. Despite the importance of their work to the family enterprise, having children serves as a predictor of women's but not men's off-farm employment. The belief that women but not men have primary responsibility for household work and child care, often shared by both partners, may inhibit women's entrance into the labour force. Furthermore, labour markets are sex-segregated, limiting the work available to women. Ideological constructs within the family and the workplace constrict the economic scope available to farm women.

Often, sometimes instead of working for pay, women engage in volunteer activities in the interest of the farm family, participating in small, female-dominated, domestically-oriented organizations concerned with children and social welfare. Activism in such groups does not often provide pathways to politics and power in the world beyond the farm. Such data cause Rosenfeld to raise, but not to investigate thoroughly, one of the most important questions of the book: how do farm women themselves envision their status and their roles? She suggests that while they see themselves as farmers, they do not see themselves as a group defined by gender. They tend not to like the rhetoric of the women's movement, finding irrelevant its emphasis on access to traditionally male jobs. They also dislike what they consider its disparagement of the traditional family and of women's roles within it. Instead, they envision themselves as part of the family enterprise, their work undertaken to help the farm rather than themselves. Even though their own workplaces — the house and especially the kitchen — are often spare and inefficient, they justify enormous expenditures on machinery, for example, as more important than sharp paring knives for the family's survival to which they, their husbands, and their children contribute.

At this point, then, we need to enhance Rosenfeld's careful quantitative data with a perhaps more subjective sort of analysis. Farm women inhabit a rapidly, and perhaps frighteningly, changing reality. Their former expectations of economic realities are being threatened by foreclosures (it is estimated that in the next three years, one-third of farm families will be driven off the land), their cultural realities assaulted by what they deem a threat from other women who do not understand the kind of lives they lead, working hard in tandem with men and children. We need to hear from them whether they believe that an emphasis merely on equality will serve them well or ill. Based on their answers, scholars, farm activists, feminists and government officials may need to question the constructs and structures they have put in place to address farm women's needs. The words, ideas, and actions of the participants in various workplaces transform the settings that called them forth. Farm women's lives, like those of other workers, are in transition. We need to hear them and believe them as authentic and as endlessly changing so that they may better create the sorts of workplaces that work for their benefit, not to serve somebody else's ideology. Rosenfeld's book leads us toward listening, toward hearing that farm women themselves must shape their own cultural forms that work within their economic settings.

Eliane Leslau Silverman
University of Calgary


THIS BOOK is an example of the best and worst of American Sociology. Its strength is that it focuses on one of the central problems of the day - the differences between women's and men's experiences of the dynamics of paid employment and family life. As such it offers some interesting data analysis and provocative insights for future research. It is constrained, however, by its theoretical and methodological weaknesses.

Pleck argues that a central premise of contemporary feminism is that the domestic division of labour between women and men is unequal and is detrimental to women. He calls this "the role overload hypothesis" (15) which
“holds that the division of family work in two earner couples, deriving from traditional sex role ideology and husbands' low psychological investment in the family, is inequitable, a source of conscious dissatisfaction to wives, and injurious to their well-being.” (137)

Using multiple regression analysis on data about wives' and husbands' use of time from two American studies, the book tests “the major propositions in this critical hypothesis.” (137) His general conclusions are that while employed women still spend more time on their "family role" than their husbands, "overall, the preponderance of evidence is that men’s time in the family is increasing while women’s is decreasing." (146) Sex role ideology, as currently measured in attitudinal questions on survey interviews, does not explain the division of family work; the majority of wives do not want their husbands to do more in the home; employed wives’ overload does not have negative consequences for their well-beings; and, finally, a value shift in "our culture" toward greater family involvement by husbands means that all men, regardless of whether their wives are employed or not, are more involved than men used to be in parenting. (151)

Each chapter investigates one proposition. Each begins with a review of the mainstream American sociology of the family literature, which has advocated the positions relevant to the proposition - but does not deal with any other literature, especially other feminist literature. To add insult to injury, Pleck asserts that he has reviewed all existing studies, (73) thus presenting American Sociology as all while ignoring several relevant Canadian and British studies. From this literature review, he takes up particular issues and using statistical analysis of data from the two surveys, he offers his own analysis of the proposition.

There are numerous problems, both theoretical and methodological with this work. Had it been published as articles on research in progress it might deserve a more generous reception. As a book it is a failure and probably does not even deserve a detailed review. The following comments, however, suggest some of the more significant theoretical problems with the work.

Pleck claims that his work is informed by feminist theory, but in fact his work is weakened by its (unstated) liberal feminist theory and its failure to deal with the contributions of radical, socialist and marxist feminists. Worse, he misunderstands feminist theory claiming: "Feminism is a theory of the family - more specifically, a theory of family inequality." (16) This assertion is incorrect and shows either an unfamiliarity with feminist theory (something suggested by his bibliography, which includes only about seven sources which are seriously considered part of feminist theoretical debates - the whole huge genre of marxist studies on family household and the domestic division of labour is notably absent) or his failure to understand that theory (as the theorization of gender inequality, including the ways in which family household forms and the domestic division of labour are part of the structural, ideological, and psychological processes of that inequality); feminism theorizes the family but is not a theory of the family. Furthermore, he largely fails to differentiate various feminist theoretical traditions except to acknowledge marxism as one which he then gets wrong, claiming that it views "women as labourers exploited by men." (18)

While Pleck acknowledges (in one paragraph) the existence of feminist analyses of marital violence and sexual domination, (16) he completely ignores women’s economic dependency, male power (either breadwinner power or the power based on physical and sexual violence), and other forms of gender inequalities as potential explanations for the attitudes and practices of married women. Indeed it is indicative that he finds “a high level of time in work and family roles does not impair adjustment (a feeling of well-being about life in general and family in particular) in employed wives” (112) and he explains this by suggesting that while paid employment may cause more stress it also yields “more psychological rewards” (113), thus ignoring the question of whether an independent income may alter power dynamics.

Absent too is any appreciation of class differences, even in the most vague, watered-down guise of socio-economic status. Indeed, the only demographic variables used in his study are family life cycle stage and education, (53) No consideration is given to whether men’s involvement in household work and child care
varies by their class location, or even by the type of paid work they do, although he notes in passing that professional men tend to be more committed to their paid work than other workers. In contrast, Livingstone found in Ontario that proletarian industrial workers were more involved in all aspects of domestic labour than men in any other occupation. Luxton found that men working shift work were much more likely to do domestic labour than those working steady days. Pleck's failure to deal adequately with paid employment is even more glaring when he discusses women for his whole argument hinges on time spent in various jobs yet only in the concluding chapter does he explicitly note the fact that more women work part-time. He offers no indication of whether the number of hours worked (part or full time) or the duration of time employed or the relative amount of money earned by women or factors differentiating women's responses, although all these factors have been identified as significant by other studies. Nor are we told what child care arrangements these people have — surely something to take into account when considering employed women's experiences of child care.

Overall this is an irritating book precisely because it addresses such an important issue which Pleck obviously cares about and approaches logically and systematically. For those of us engrossed in the nitty gritty of statistical analysis of domestic division of labour, the book provides some useful jumping off points. For everyone else, it is best left on the shelf.
ing to deal with unfair union tactics, but apparently giving no thought to the possibility of resorting to unfair tactics itself. Such a sanitized scenario does not correspond to the typical case of union organization, and fails to confront aspiring managers with the difficult ethical choice that must often be made when trade unions are organizing. Does a manager stay within the limits of our labour laws and risk unionization, or does a manager use every means to resist union organization even though some of these methods are illegal? Surely this type of ethical consideration is fundamental to the practice of industrial relations in Canada, yet the issue is never clearly raised in this book.

A similar criticism can be directed against the case studies relating to the negotiation of the collective agreement. These bargaining scenarios do not raise the difficult ethical problem faced by management where the balance of bargaining power is clearly in its favour. Should an employer take advantage of this favourable situation and attempt to rid itself of the union? Drawing the line between hard bargaining and bad faith bargaining is one of the most difficult problems facing the industrial relations manager, yet this issue is not expressly raised in the book. A case study dealing with the negotiation of a first contract would have placed this issue squarely before the business student.

As a set of teaching materials this book provides an adequate examination of the Canadian industrial relations system. The descriptive passages do not analyze our industrial relations structure in great depth, but they do provide a good overview of the system. The case studies assume the existence of a trade union and provide business students with some understanding of how management must function in a unionized setting. The materials, however, do not raise the broader issue of the reluctance of management to recognize the legitimacy of trade unions. Why do employer unfair labour practices persist despite very clear legislative prohibitions against such conduct and why do so many cases of employer unfair labour practices go undocumented? These issues are raised in the historical capsule, but the material that follows does not provide the business student with any insights into the widespread reluctance of Canadian management to recognize the legitimacy of trade unions. Without a thoughtful examination of this issue, any study of the practice of industrial relations in Canada is incomplete.

Donald Carter
Queen's University

Most of the articles of this book are devoted to assessing the past and future effects of technological change on the content and structure of employment in the United States. The authors, mainly economists I presume, can be designated roughly as either Keynesians or Friedmanites.

Faye Duchin constructs several models of future technological change and evaluates their impact on employment and earnings. Assuming a rapid rate of technological change to the year 2000, she argues there would be heavy job loss, but this effect would be largely cancelled out by rising living standards (more purchasing power) and the labour needed to produce and service the new equipment. A benign conclusion to be sure, and one that ignores the possible presence of factors which contribute to overall employment declines. Her conclusions are complemented by the Levy-Bowes-Jondron study of five basic industries between 1960-80. The econometric model used in this study accounted for technology's direct impact on employment as well as its indirect effects, particularly the price reduction of goods allowed by labour-saving technology—a reduction which generates more sales and more jobs. Blithely ignoring the presence of monopolies and oligopolies, the model unrealistically assumes "competitive equilibrium," positing that prices of goods naturally fall as the organic composition of capital rises. The authors conclude that in the industries examined the negative employment effect of technology per se are
significantly smaller than effects arising from high wage rates (blaming labour for lost jobs) and level of output. A similar optimism colours Larry Blair’s contention that the private- and public-sector mechanisms now in place in the United States to adjust displaced workers to technological change are quite adequate.

The Keynesians’ view of the American economy is much more alarming. According to Eileen Appelbaum, manufacturing employment between 1968–78 grew by less than 4 per cent, while total employment increased by over six times this amount. Manufacturing employment shrank from 27 per cent of total employment in 1968 to 21 per cent in 1983. Employment growth occurred mainly in the tertiary sector, and the jobs created were, for the most part, poorly paid and defined as women’s work; of all the jobs created between 1971–81, about three of every five went to women. With the stagnation or decline of steel, auto, rubber, and textiles and the growth of electronics, space-related, and defense industries, manufacturing employment (as well as employment in general) shifted from the northeast and north-central regions to the south and west. Employment, then, declined in areas of good wages and strong unionization and increased in right-to-work states. High-tech industries, which have undergone substantial growth in recent years, offer little relief to the unemployed, since this sector is small and applies labour-replacing technology at a rapid rate. The nature of high-tech jobs reinforces the recent trend toward a bi-polar employment structure in the economy as a whole. High-tech jobs also are insecure, due to the propensity of companies like Wang and Atari to relocate in low-wage countries.

Lucretia Dewey Tanner examines the impact of computers on two government organizations—the Internal Revenue Service and the Post Office. Over a 10-year period of computerization of operations at IRS district offices, employment declined from 12,000 to 1,515. Computerization in the Atlanta region IRS office reduced the workforce from 1,451 to 120 employees. Between 1970–80 technological changes and productivity improvements (introduced with a QWL program featuring quality control circles) eliminated 65,000 jobs in the Post Office. In both the IRS and the Post Office most jobs created by advanced technology were highly routine, and many workers were downgraded in skills and pay.

In a ponderous article, Peter Albin argues that Taylorist modes of organizing work under computer-based technologies provide short-run savings in labour costs, but over the longer haul a flexible approach is more economical. This is due to the capacity of flexible arrangements to deal more effectively with production bottlenecks, to shift workers to the flow of work, and to encourage workers to devise innovations in work methods.

These distinct perspectives on the economy are summarized in articles by Kenneth McClennan (the business view) and Markley Roberts (the labour view). In the business view technology does replace labour. However, the adjustment is temporary and painless, and the unemployment effect is offset or overcome by the new jobs created by technological innovations (which allow markets to grow through the price reduction of goods). This view is oblivious to the distinctiveness of emergent and declining regions, industries, and jobs (and hence could benefit from an open-minded reading of Bluestone and Harrison, *The De-Industrialization of America*); it also ignores the growing propensity of American capital to seek investment outlets outside the United States. The present economic crisis is blamed mainly on high wage costs, which undermine the capacity of U.S. industry to compete on world markets. One remedy is the substitution of industry-wide wage settlements with local-level bargaining which reflects plant productivity and local labour market conditions. Other stock conservative answers include business deregulation, the granting of tax and other concessions to business, the restriction of government spending on social welfare measures, and the removal of trade barriers (free trade).

The labour-Keynesian perspective agrees that technological change per se is not a major source of overall job elimination, but that it (along with other factors) has eroded the wage structure in the United States and has severely disrupted the lives of significant numbers of people. The cause of the present crisis is attributed to employers’ failure to invest in the kinds of upgrading of plant facilities and hu-
man skills needed to meet international competition. Market forces, then, do not allocate people and resources to their most effective locations. What is required is the formulation (preferably through tri-partite bodies) of an industrial strategy to maintain aggregate demand and full employment.

The two perspectives evident in these articles certainly are distinct enough both in terms of analysis and policy, and there is much valuable information here. However, the book would have benefitted from the inclusion of radical/Marxist perspectives. Not only would this have broadened the debate and extended the range of policy alternatives considered, it also would have provided explanations of the present crisis which would have contextualized and penetrated the surface of the high-wage and lack of investment "explanations" offered by these conventional economists.

It is worth mentioning that this book contains an excellent, comprehensive review-summary of articles. In many cases, the reader can learn nearly as much from the summary as from the original articles.

James Rinehart
University of Western Ontario


This study presents a broad ranging analysis of deindustrialization and the reduced rates of economic growth that have produced seemingly intractable economic and social problems for most industrialized capitalist countries since the mid-1970s. The authors, Michael J. Piore, an economist who works in the institutionalist and structuralist tradition, and Charles F. Sabel, an innovative political scientist, join a significant group of researchers and writers whose point of departure in explaining and prescribing for United States' economic and social problems is the relationship of technology to its associated institutions.

Piore's and Sabel's thesis is that the establishment of the dominance of mass production methods in the nineteenth century over an economically viable alternative technology, flexible specialized production, is a critical event whose past and future consequences must be understood. This event is described as the first industrial divide. It is explained by a model of technical change built on the assumption that there is no natural technological path to economic progress. In this model the technological dominance at particular "branching points" of a given form of industrial production and organization depends on "its timing and the resources available to its champions.... Competition guarantees only that the weak must follow the lead of the strong, not that the strong have found the uniquely correction solution to common problems."

For the authors the current crisis of deindustrialization and economic stagnation has as one of its possible solutions a return to flexible specialized production in the United States and other developed industrialized countries. (When they speculate about a plan for worldwide industrial organization, they advocate continued mass production in less developed countries.) This choice is now possible because of American corporations' frantic and still unresolved search for new methods of industrial organization and production, and because advances in computer technology allow flexible production methods to rival mass production techniques in terms of unit costs of production. They maintain that flexible specialized production can also meet the growing consumer demand for customized products and is able to cope with increased uncertainty about resource availability and the composition of future demand. This conjuncture of events constitutes the second industrial divide - a unique situation in which another technological paradigm can evolve.

In arguing their thesis the authors provide an excellent description of unsuccessful attempts by large corporations committed to mass production techniques to cope with Asian competition.

The analytic concept of regulation links the "technological trajectory" associated with the first industrial divide to economic institutions and policy. This concept, adapted from
its usage by an important group of French economists, refers to the "institutional circuits that connect production and consumption as regulatory mechanisms." The current economic situation in the epoch of mass production is described as a regulatory crisis involving the role of the large corporation and the role of the Keynesian welfare state. A critical element in this analysis is the contention that collective bargaining and shop-floor union management relations in mass production organizations are elements in the regulatory crisis.

At the macroeconomic level it is argued that the automatic mechanism for maintaining aggregate demand for production through union wage negotiation has broken down because of wage inflation caused by real compensation (wages plus fringe benefits) increases in excess of productivity advances and because of the growing importance of non-union wage competition. At the macroeconomic level it is argued that the restrictive work rules characteristic of mass production enterprises are a barrier to the flexible methods of production needed for international competition in product markets. According to Piore and Sabel economic solutions to the regulatory crisis must deal with these problems that are associated with the American mass-production/mass-consumption economy.

In their description of the first industrial divide and the establishment of the dominance of mass production technology, Piore and Sabel explain the virtues of the vanquished flexible production technique and describe these advantages in diverse industries in various countries. These experiences create traditions that have been and can be built upon. There is also a discussion of current examples of flexible production technology in mini-steel mills, specialty chemical firms, industrial districts comprised of producers of fabrics and garments, and in high-technology industries. These examples are used to demonstrate the economic logic of flexible production and to provide confirmation of the authors' view of the viability of this technology. In a similar vein they maintain that the success of the Japanese economy and the ability of the West German economy to outperform other industrialized economies in the past decade can be explained in large measure by the fact that industrial organization in these countries to a significant extent maintained and built upon traditions of flexible specialization technology.

At the second industrial divide the authors favour the choice of flexible specialization technology as a solution to American deindustrialization. And it is in their discussion of the economic, political, and social conditions (the regulatory mechanisms) that are needed to accompany this choice that one finds a statement of their social and political philosophy. It is a mélange of welfare capitalism and American utopian socialism which is explained in their critique of the work of Robert Reich.

Robert Reich's *The Next American Frontier* presented the proposition that high unemployment and a falling standard of living in the United States had become an endemic problem because of the organization of industry into high-volume, scientific-management directed, standardized production units that were inefficiently managed by conglomerate corporate entities. He concluded that given the major structural change in the world economy - the new international division of labour - American industry could only succeed by developing "precision-manufactured, custom tailored, technology-driven products," and that these products require flexible systems of production. Such a system, according to Reich, could only emerge through tripartite co-operation by business, labour, and government.

Piore and Sabel criticize Reich because the tripartite form of regulation he views as necessary for implementing flexible production, industrial organization gives a central role to large corporations. They would accomplish the same goal by reinvigorating local and regional government which would coordinate training, research, credit management, marketing, environmental protection, and other elements of economic infrastructure. This coordination would allow flexible production units, many of them relatively small, to function efficiently. These local and regional "communities" would also allow for both competitive market performance of firms, while at the same time minimizing destructive wage competition and providing employment and income stability within the communities.

The community that is prerequisite for the success of flexible specialized production goes
beyond geographic and administrative boundaries. It is part of a political system which the authors call yeomen democracy, “a variant of individualism” without market liberalism. It is distinguished from market liberalism in the following terms. In market liberalism, property is to be used to the maximum advantage of its possessor, in yeomen democracy, property is to be held in trust for the community - its use is subordinated to the latter’s maintenance. It is this recognition of the indispensability of community that makes yeomen democracy - a form of collective individualism - the political analogue of the cooperative competition of craft production.

The policy conclusion presented in *The Second Industrial Divide* is that the best possibility for prosperity for the United States lies in the recognition and adaptation of the flexible specialization production paradigm and its realization through the political impetus that can be generated in a struggle for yeomen democracy. The authors acknowledge that other possibilities exist for solving American economic and social problems but they are less enthusiastic about these solutions.

The strength of this book is its attempt to examine seriously production technology and to place it within a broad economic and social perspective. In doing this *The Second Industrial Divide* deals with real problems and examines in concrete terms the relation between industrial organization, industrial relations and government economic policy. One should be sceptical, however, about the notion that we are at a unique point in the possible evolution of production technology. One should be critical of the utopian political solution proposed which in its analysis does not consider the Swedish model and its relative success in dealing with many of the problems which the authors consider to be at the core of the current crisis. And, finally, one must recognize that what is proposed is a solution by definition which does not make clear how and why the labour movement and other groups in society would and could come to support it.

Sidney H. Ingerman
McGill University


THIS BOOK EXAMINES the potential contribution of white collar workers to socialist political movements in the United States. Its thesis is that white collar workers’ contradictory class locations in a capitalist society cause contradictory political positions, thus limiting their progressive political role.

The theoretical literature on white collar workers, which Oppenheimer defines broadly, is reviewed thoroughly. He rejects convincingly the proposition that these workers are an elite with a potential for causing change or that they constitute a stabilizing middle force. Similarly, white collar workers are not really a new working class — there is too much variation in their occupations for the formation of a conventional class orientation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the sources and consequences of fragmentation in white collar occupations.

Oppenheimer’s survey of the evidence on office workers leads him to conclude that levels of control over them have risen, while job satisfaction and working conditions seem to be deteriorating. Alienation, rather than militant protest, is the common response to these circumstances. Female office workers most resemble a white collar proletariat, and they have reacted by a relatively rapid rate of unionization, which is also a function of the feminist movement and the impact of the economic crisis on them. Professionals, the true elite of the white collar work force, face a declining relative economic position and the threat of “deprofessionalization,” or loss of autonomy in their work. White collar unions are growing more rapidly than the traditional blue collar organizations, but they behave so much like other unions their potential to promote change has not been realized.

Historically, white collar workers have not constituted a unified political force, and that situation is unlikely to change in the contemporary United States. However, some segments of the white collar labour force could be al-
lied with other progressive groups to foster social democratic political goals.

This analysis is well argued, but suffers from several deficiencies. The most fundamental is the raison d'être of the book. It is not at all clear that "white collar workers" constitute a useful category for analysis, particularly for a Marxist. The long debate in the Marxist literature about white collar workers has not produced any convincing statement on their social class, a failure Oppenheimer addresses. White collar workers are so diverse on almost any dimension — job content, working conditions, authority, income, gender that it is difficult to treat them as a group. Thus, it is probably impossible to establish their relationship to the means of production. As a result, however, the conclusion that white collar workers as a group are in contradictory class positions is almost a statement of the obvious.

For a student of industrial relations, the book presents different problems. The theoretical framework used leads to some misstatements and the neglect of important facts. For instance, the author states that technological change has displaced many office workers. In fact, the introduction of computers, the major form of technological change in the recent past, has more often led to the proliferation of activities and an improvement in services than the direct displacement of workers. However, the creation of many clerical jobs has been forestalled, so there has been a real impact on labour markets. But the consequences of job displacement or job disappearance for workers, their consciousness, and society are quite different. Elsewhere Oppenheimer stresses the growth in white collar unions, without pointing out that most of this expansion has been in the public sector. The dynamics of union growth there are quite different than the private sector.

There is a flat assertion that employers want to divide labour organizations and play them off against each other. Anyone familiar with the efforts by Canadian governments and many employers to encourage the formation of union coalitions for bargaining will find that statement difficult to accept. Moreover, in the public sector, where most unionized white collar workers are found, governments in Canada and the United States have favoured large bargaining units and the parties have tended to engage in pattern bargaining which employers use to offset union attempts to whipsaw them.

The focus of the book is heavily American. Although it begins with a quote from White Niggers of America by Pierre Vallières and mentions Canada in conjunction with Western Europe on several points, there is no explicit discussion of Canada. This limits the interest or utility of the book for the Canadian reader, as well as neglecting an issue which the book might have profitably addressed, whether Canadian white collar workers have behaved differently than their American counterparts in societies so similar.

For readers of this journal, the major virtue of the book is its comprehensive and well-written review of the literature on white collar workers. Those chapters might be useful in courses on the sociology of work. Oppenheimer’s conclusions about the contradictory positions of white collar workers is a contribution to that literature. Political activists will conclude that the prescriptions of uniting white collar workers in a “political counterculture” with other progressive groups are vague and unhelpful. Persons interested in industrial relations of white collar workers will find the analysis naive and too general.

Mark Thompson
University of British Columbia

that had thrust America to the fore of the advanced capitalist world. Not surprisingly, the changing economic fortunes of the United States and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s altered the balance of international trade in management techniques, as a horde of academics and journalists rushed to divine the secret of Japan’s “success” and to spread the gospel to North America and elsewhere. "Willing Workers" is very much an example of this genre.

Although it purports to be a cross-national inquiry into the roots of variation in work behaviour, the study is essentially an attempt to explain what the author refers to as yaruki: the “willingness to work” or the “drive to work” exhibited by Japanese workers. This image of Japanese workers will be familiar to North Americans, since it has been relentlessly thrust upon us by the media, employers, and the state as part of the broader campaign to restructure work relations in the 1980s. Japanese workers take fewer holidays and sick days than their Western counterparts; they are less likely to be absent from work without notifying their employer; they arrive at work on time (if not early); they cheerfully put in countless hours of unpaid overtime; they are constantly searching for ways to increase their productivity and improve the firm’s performance; and so on. These characteristics are demonstrated by Sengoku through the use of survey data covering a handful of firms in Japan, the United States, and England, supplemented by interviews with workers and managers.

Statistical tables and graphs, however, take a backseat in "Willing Workers," Sengoku’s preferred technique being the anecdote. Through the recounting of a series of incidents and conversations—either observed at first hand or related to him—the author attempts to illustrate differences in work behaviour and probe into the factors conditioning different patterns of behaviour. This method could have been a fruitful way of peeking behind the curtain of statistics into the actual world of work, but in "Willing Workers" the result is a set of moralistic vignettes and crude stereotypes. Thus, Japanese workers are portrayed as honest, hard-working, dutiful and cooperative; American and British workers, by contrast, are pictured as lazy, dishonest, slovenly, and ill-mannered. As if this were not enough, he commits a cardinal sin of comparative analysis by continually framing his analysis in terms of the “strange,” hence misguided, behaviour of non-Japanese workers; as Val Lorwin cautioned some time ago, comparative analyses rooted in such a premise are flawed from the start.

But however much he has overdrawn the differences, there is no disputing the existence of different patterns of work behaviour in the three countries; and the study is largely devoted to explaining these. The first part of that explanation (Chapters 1–4) is reasonably competent: following in the footsteps of a number of other authors, Sengoku argues that variations in work behaviour have much to do with the different structures of work relations in the capitalist firm. (Though for our author, these are termed “employment” or “motivation structures,” a neat way of avoiding unpleasant questions about their connection to coercion or control.) Quite simply, as Sengoku accurately describes, the structure of work relations in large Japanese firms has been deliberately fashioned to create a pervasive dependency on the firm and to inculcate group behavioural norms that dovetail neatly with the requirements of capitalism.

As the root of this system is fear: the much touted system of “life-time employment” locks workers into the employ of a single firm by making it nearly impossible to find an equivalent job with another firm. The consequences of dismissal or quitting are therefore much more severe in Japan than in England or the U.S., where job changes are regarded as normal. Added to this is a series of supplementary techniques—enterprise unionism, an extensive system of company housing and other tied benefits, the sophisticated use of peer group pressure, performance-linked bonus systems, avoidance of symbols of class differences within the firm, all designed to reinforce the domination of employers and to defuse conflict and dissent.

None of this analysis is especially new; after all, Japanese and Western scholars have long identified factors such as these as crucial to the distinctive “style” of management in Japan. Indeed, in view of the considerable body of literature on the subject, it is surprising that Sengoku’s treatment is so simplistic.
No effort is made to analyze the historical roots of management practices in Japan; there is no discussion of how Japanese unions are integrated into the system of workplace control; the state’s contribution to the system (notably the relative lack of social security benefits) is not mentioned; the calculated exploitation of women workers is glossed over; and little notice is taken of the majority of Japanese workers, who do not work in the sectors characterized by permanent employment, and whose working conditions, low wages, and insecurity subsidize stability in the core sectors.

In any case, the basic point - that the structure of employment relations designed by Japanese employers has played an important role in shaping distinctive patterns of work behaviour - is reasonable. Sengoku is not content, however, to leave matters here (indeed, he is at times a little uncomfortable with the implications of his analysis), and so in the second half of the book (Chapters 5 and 6) he tries to explain why the Japanese system is in fact peculiar to Japan. (It is not, of course; but let us put this aside for the sake of argument.) There are two types of explanation traditionally mobilized to account for such differences, one rooted in social psychology and culturalism, the other focused on economics and politics. Unfortunately, Sengoku opts for the former (on the grounds that this research has led him to the conclusion that Japanese workers are motivated by the fact that “the job is there”) and the book degenerates into a confused discussion of the psychology of “belongingness.” At one point the author even finds himself arguing that international variations in workers’ attitudes can be traced, at least in part, to differences in the way mothers respond to the cries of their children. (While the mind might reel at the thought of the dominant classes in Western capitalism attempting to promote new methods of child-rearing as a way of enhancing control in the workplace, one should not forget the postwar campaign in North America, documented in Rosie the Riveter, which attempted to convince women to return to the home for the sake of their children.)

One final theme of the study needs to be mentioned. In the concluding chapter Sengoku draws attention to the changing attitudes of young Japanese workers, lamenting their adoption of (“Western”) attitudes towards authority, work and careers. Though the author’s despairing commentary on the “generation that awaits orders” reads like the admonitions of a disappointed parent, the discussion has the (unintentional) virtue of demonstrating the vacuity of explanations based on national psychology or character; for it is at this juncture of the analysis that a crucial point becomes clear: many of the characteristics earlier described as typically “Japanese” in fact pertain mostly to the generation of Japanese workers raised and brought into the workforce during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. The trouble is, Sengoku would rather decry new “attitudes” and behaviours than examine the specific material context from which work behaviour issues.

In sum, Willing Workers disappoints on several levels. This is regrettable because cross-national analysis of work relations is a potentially powerful tool for exploring the mechanisms through which work is patterned, control exercised, and dissent expressed. Still, it would be foolhardy to ignore the flood of books represented by Willing Workers; after all, Frederick Taylor’s ideas were once regarded as faddish.

Anthony Giles
University of New Brunswick

JOEL D. WOLFE begins his book by posing the question “Is participatory democracy possible in modern large scale organizations?” (3) It is an opening gambit which establishes an ongoing polemic with “elitist” theory and more particularly with Michels’ iron law of oligarchy. This of course is familiar terrain for students of democratic theory. Wolfe’s intention, however, is to erect a theory of participatory democracy which accounts for external or en-
environmental pressures upon organizations, which results in power for workers as opposed to power over them. He argues that this "requires a theory of power relations that explains how the majority of members can actually initiate and shape organizational policy in formal representative institutions." (5) Rather than articulating a theoretical construct in isolation, Wolfe sets himself the task of applying his theory of participatory democracy to the British Shop Stewards movement of World War I and also attempts to convey how such a theory might be related to the official institutions of labour and the Labour Party itself.

According to Wolfe, a theory of participatory democracy presupposes that rank and file workers will actively pursue control of their (elected) leaders when their sense of justice and moral indignation has been undermined by managers and their employers. More specifically, Wolfe contends that such "relative deprivation" may lead to community "autonomy" which transcends individual interests. In this way he argues that oligarchic tendencies can be overcome through "the development of class consciousness and collective solidarity at the workplace." (22)

Put simply, Wolfe develops a theory of participatory democracy which relies on 'bottom up' as opposed to 'top down' initiatives. The circumstances which are conducive to the former, he argues, are largely determined by external conditions. This sets the stage for the middle chapters of the book which describe in some detail the conditions during World War I that gave rise to participatory democracy.

Wolfe notes the increasing homogeneity of the workforce through the dilution of skills; an increasing amount of government authority and control over the organization of the war economy; a rise in prices and a decline in real wages; and a visible favouring of capital over labour. Paradoxically, this took place as (the bargaining power of labour was on the increase owing to inter alia) large increased in production and the effects of conscription. This led to the emergence of a shop stewards movement which truly represented industrial workgroups - democracy at the base, characterized by group objectives which were a response to environmental conditions.

A central theme of Wolfe's thesis is that the influence of the rank and file's policies inevitably drifted upwards into the elements of representative democracy, thus directly influencing the policies and behaviour of the official institutions of labour. As an example of this process we are told that the Miner's Federation adopted a firm policy against the Conscription Bill and articulated the doctrine of the defense of liberty and the right to fair treatment, all of which were rank-and-file initiatives. It is also suggested that railway and engineering workers "were able to channel and mobilise interest and support through official organizations and to develop alternative organizational instruments when official channels proved ineffective" and that this enabled the rank and file "to enforce leadership compliance and to inhibit self-interested action." (105)

Finally, Wolfe contends that rank-and-file influence also reached delegated institutions in the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. The watershed for such influence was the T.U.C. Conference in Manchester, "Labour After the War," which he argues formulated socialist principles. The Labour Party's peace policy is also presented as evidence that the osmosis had reached political concreteness (albeit of a parliamentary nature).

The book's conclusions offer the opinion that the external preconditions for participatory democracy "are recurrent, if not permanent in liberal democracies." (204) Moreover, participatory democracy is seen as "a value-rational response to exploitation and inequality" (212) and, Wolfe argues that there is "a growing minority (which) is pressing for greater participatory democracy in many advanced western industrial societies." (217)

Although this book provides a useful evaluation of participatory democracy in action during World War I, the theory itself as elaborated by Wolfe is deterministic. The reality of the years since World War I is that capitalism has to a large extent successfully incorporated the institutions of labour. The Shop Stewards movement after World War I was, effectively, and integral part of the industrial relations "system" long before the Donovan Commission suggested that their activities should be formalized. Despite the obvious increase in bargaining power for labour in this
period, the painful reality is that participatory democracy by itself does not ensure that representative democracy will not fall into the hands of an autocratic leadership. Capitalism retains sufficient power and flexibility to cope with radical initiatives, even when sponsored by rank-and-file involvement and control. In his famous pamphlet, “What is to be Done,” Lenin pointed out the limits to trade union consciousness and the need to develop broader political objectives which might propel workers towards a fundamental challenge of capitalism. Thus, although participatory democracy is a necessary precondition to wider societal change, it does not guarantee that such changes will take place. The optimism which Wolfe presents in his conclusion is a distortion of reality. His claim that “participatory democracy can...inspire citizens of the late twentieth century to mitigate if not resolve contemporary cries of injustice and inequality,” (217) relies on the existence of certain contextual factors which will supposedly set in motion the seeds of collective solidarity and class consciousness. Even a perfunctory analysis of contemporary capitalism would reveal that the representative and delegated institutions of labour would be unlikely to reflect rank-and-file initiatives in the face of overwhelming pressure from the representative institutions of capitalism. Thus, the success of participatory democracy or otherwise is firmly tied to an analysis of state intervention in industrial relations. Such an analysis might place the theory of participatory democracy in a more realistic perspective.

C.H.J. Gilson
St. Francis Xavier


IN THE EPOCH OF merchant capital, Africa supplied the plantations of the New World with the labour of some 15 million slaves. If slavery were not necessary to the development of capitalism, for several centuries it was at least important to it. With the nineteenth century, the epoch of slavery in Africa was gradually superseded by the era of colonialism. Here Africans were again made to labour for others but this time on African soil. Their masters remained largely unchanged—the British, the French, the Portuguese—all of whom had transported their antecedents across the Atlantic to Bahia and Barbados, Havana and Savannah.

Sharon Stichter is concerned with only one aspect of colonial and post-colonial labour, that is, migrants. These she defines as workers who move into and out of wage employment. The origins of migrant labour, she argues, were not wholly determined by the logic of externally-imposed capitalism but rather in the interaction between capitalism and the already-existing African economies. At first, the making of an African working class was inhibited by a number of local factors, the most important of which was the abundance of land in most of the continent. The consequence of this was that coercive measures had to be used almost everywhere that African labour power was to be appropriated by colonial regimes: “direct coercion and state-engineered rural underdevelopment played a far greater role in the creation of an African labour force than they did in European or American labour history. What the enclosures and population growth accomplished in England, and over population and rural stratification in Asia, state coercion and manipulation did in Africa.” The best historical chapter in this book focusses precisely on the subject of forced labour in the early period of colonialism and on the origins of labour recruitment for the massive mining development in southern Africa.

Where force was not used there were other factors which served to push Africans on to the labour market. The most important of these was the insecurity of the African food supply. Some of the causes of this were “natural,” Stichter seems to imply, while others were man-made. But she does not suggest with sufficient clarity that such scourges as slave-raiding and the depletion of wildlife, not to mention the infestation of tsetse, were often the corollary, if not of the direct, result of the same development of capitalism which led to
colonialism. Unlike England or even Asia, the African proletariat was formed at a time when capitalism was fully mature, even entering its last stage according to one notable theory. When she writes, thus, of the availability for wage labour of young males and slaves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Stichter neglects to mention that in most of Africa by this time the social relations of production had already been radically transformed due to the antecedent effects of merchant capital. This is to illustrate a small point but one which obtrudes throughout the book: by flicking back and forth from one society to another in order to demonstrate aspects of the problematic as a whole, it is more than a little difficult to gain any overall sense of the historical development of migrant labour. Stichter’s explanations of how the labour demands of the Europeans transformed the social and particularly sexual relations of production are nevertheless sound and convincing. It must be confessed that they are not only a welcome relief from the narrowly focussed local study, but they also allow insightful generalizations to be made. Nor is she exclusively concerned with the terminus of the migrants’ migrations, the work place. Taking up the question of the effect of migrancy on rural life, and in particular the African household, rich subjects in the annals of academic investigation, she argues for models significantly more nuanced than have hitherto been presented, her conclusion that today, as in the past, patriarchal control of women benefits capitalism by subsidizing the wages of migrants, leads her to a discussion of what Secombe has called “fertility regimes” and to the conclusion that the particular regime which applies to an African household is the result of “the specialization in cash crops and migrant labor, in varying combinations, together with patriarchal relations.”

Wage work in Africa remains the province of men, with only 10-15 per cent of women engaged in it in the most advanced African economies, with the exception of South Africa. This is in large part due to the fact that male migration depends upon female immobility. Without women in rural production and reproduction, as Stichter has noted, no social system could sustain the males in the plantations and mines. The best studies of the exploitation of African women as well as men come from southern, and in particular South Africa. Of these, the most moving is probably the work done by Jaclyn Cock on South African domestic workers. Stichter picks up on this and includes it in a penultimate chapter on women as migrants and workers which is the most painful and evocative in the book.

Closing with a focus on worker consciousness in contemporary Africa, Stichter pints to the complex trajectory which links the rural economy with labour militancy and explains the leading role in worker resistance played by settled workers. She holds out the hope for South Africa that “the homogeneity of certain work-place factors, such as barracks accommodation, influx control, job color bars and low wages, makes it possible for many migrants to continue to struggle collectively to better their situation.”

Michael Mason
Concordia


CHARLES BERQUIST HAS WRITTEN a superb book that should interest any reader involved in labour studies regardless of geographical boundaries. He has produced a stimulating example of analysis, synthesis, fascinating detail, clear writing, and compelling argumentation that examines developments among workers in four Latin American countries during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while providing hypotheses that are relevant to labour movements elsewhere. His opening chapter alone should be required reading for anyone interested in the continuing debate on dependency.

In four separate “essays” Professor Bergquist details the successes and failures of the working class in Chile, Argentina, Venezuela,
and Columbia. But within this broad framework he directs his attention to more limited foci. One of his principal concerns is to resolve a problem that confronts anyone dealing with labour in Latin America and, indeed, anywhere in the developing world: how to unite conceptually the diverse elements that comprise the labouring population and that have played a crucial role in the labour movements of their countries. Among the sectors Bergquist describes are the wage-earning proletariat and artisans in the urban centres, and the wage earners, peasants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, small farmers, and seasonal labourers, as well as combinations of all of these, in the countryside. His solution is an intriguing one. Rejecting the orthodox marxist and liberal approaches to the working class, he focusses instead on the export structure, specifically, the principal export of the country, and the workers involved in that export structure, in this case, the nitrate workers of Chile, the meat packers of Argentina, the petroleum workers of Venezuela, and the coffee workers of Colombia. Exploring the interaction between the export sector, labour, and the left, he concludes that these workers have played a vital role, not only in the direction that the labour movements have taken in their respective countries, but also in the overall political and economic developments of these four nations. By concentrating on the export structure and the differences within it, he can also explain the disparities among the various labour movements, thereby satisfying another concern which is to underline the unique nature of each labour movement. For example, by directing his attention to Chile's nitrate and Argentina's meatpacking industries, he finds the reasons why workers in the former country became committed to radical alternatives and fostered the creation of the strongest marxist party in Latin America, while workers in the latter accepted the corporativist, right-wing nationalism of Perón. His focus on the export structure is an (unstated) elaboration of the "staples" thesis that should be commonplace to all Canadian readers. But Bergquist is not narrowly deterministic. He recognizes the role of other factors, both internal and external, in explaining the successes and failures of the movements he describes. He discusses internal political, economic, social, cultural, and ideological elements: from the sexual jargon of the overwhelmingly male population in Chile's nitrate fields, to the horrors and squalor of the Argentine slaughterhouse floor, to the political fragmentation of the Colombian peasantry. And he provides full details of external pressures, such as the economic developments in the advanced capitalist nations that had profound repercussions on Latin America, and the international links of the left, especially between the various Latin American Communist parties and the Comintern which, as he shows, often produced problems for the increasingly nationalist Latin American workers.

Another of Bergquist's concerns is the workers' political activity. Critical of social historians who patronizingly argue that "workers, too, have a history" but then ignore their political role, he concentrates on this aspect, in large part because he views the workers' political participation as having been essential to the success of democratic forces in Latin America in the past and, by extension, probably in the future. His presentation of the national history of each of his regions from the perspective of the workers reveals that they have frequently rejected radical alternatives and accepted instead the dominant culture's view of society and development, supported traditional parties, and chosen bread-and-butter unionism. But, at the same time they have resisted the dehumanizing aspects of capitalist relations of production that characterize the workplace in advanced capitalist countries and have pressed for greater democracy, as well as improvements in their working and living conditions. And despite frequent setbacks and repression they have secured notable successes, the strong democratic system in Venezuela being one example. Bergquist stresses these accomplishments, thereby providing the book with a sense of optimism which is rare for works on Latin American labour but which is most welcome.

One weakness of the book is the wealth of detail, which at one level is informative and rewarding, but is so extensive that some of it can be explained only superficially, raising the suspicion that the author is sliding over important material that may disprove his thesis. Even Bergquist recognizes the problem, in his con-
clusion he admits that his thesis may have limit-
ed applicability and calls for more studies on
regions that he has ignored as well as those he
has included.

His appeal is likely to be answered. This
work is certain to be the centrepiece for numer­
ous theses, articles, and books over the next
decade as historians and others test his ideas
further. Moreover, it will probably produce a
similar response in labour studies outside La-
tin America since it is available in a relatively
inexpensive paperback edition and ideal for
courses on comparative labour history. It
deserves to be read widely as it sets the present
standard for Latin American labour studies.

Peter Blanchard
University of Toronto

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Labour/Le Travail 19 a publié un compte ren­
du du livre de C. Stewart Doty, The First
Franco-Americans par Pierre Ancil, et trois
lignes de son manuscrit ont été omises dès la
mise en page de la revue. Sans avoir changé
le sens du texte, l'absence de ces quelques mots
néanmoins porte à confusion, et la rédaction ai­
merait que les lecteurs prennent note qu'en
haut de la colonne à droite, à la page 248, le
suivant s'ajoute: "...méthode s'est faite l'épu­
sation de la forme et du style des manuscrits
d'origine, [fin de paragraphe et le début d'un
nouveau] La plupart des personnes interviewées
par les travailleurs de la WPA avaient
dans..."