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*If you were familiar* with Tina Loo’s earlier work on criminal justice history, you might expect that you could predict the general approach of her new book from its title, *Making Law, Order, and Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871*. There would be a chapter on the development of the criminal courts, sprinkled with observations on the symbolic and ideological uses of the criminal law, a chapter on the role of the legal order in the subjugation of the First Nations, a chapter on the importance of the criminal law in the formation of the colonial state which succeeded the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) regime, a few chapters, perhaps, on particularly significant trials or uses of the criminal law.

Yet you would be wrong. The “law,” the “order,” and the “authority” of the title have almost everything to do with the economy and rather little to do, directly, with the enactment or enforcement of the criminal law in British Columbia in the 50 years before the colony joined Confederation. Loo is concerned with a seeming contradiction in what she terms “laissez-faire liberalism”: how “a strong central state and the intervention of the law and the courts were necessary to aid the pursuit of individual gain.” (4) Combining the meticulous research on legal structures and institutions of the old legal history with the quantitative techniques of social history and theoretical insights drawn eclectically from anthropology, geography, and the new legal history, she pursues her goal by charting the spread of small debt courts, rates of litigation in the county courts, the intricacies of debtor-creditor law, the rise and fall of imprisonment for debt, the interaction of formal and informal law in the gold fields, the provisions of HBC employment contracts, the nature of justice in the mining courts, and much more. In short, Loo is concerned with the role of law in implanting a European style economy on the territory now known as British Columbia.

This terrain has been under-explored by legal, social, and economic historians of Canada. Economic historians have tended to see law as an epiphenomenon: Michael Bliss’s *Northern Enterprise*, for example, has no discussion of either bankruptcy and insolvency law or of the development of the business corporation as a distinct legal entity. Social historians tend to treat legal records as a data bank without always comprehending their situation within the legal order as a whole. Legal historians have often been eager to chart the development of the kinds of legal structures and institutions discussed by Loo, but unable to inform their work with the theoretical considerations which would make it more accessible to non-specialists.

*Making Law* manages to overcome many of these obstacles. Aside from a penultimate chapter subtitled “Law, Crime and Colonial Identity” which examines the response to the 1864 killing of eighteen whites by Indians at Bute Inlet, each of the chapters deals with some as-
pect of the administration of civil justice. These chapters are quite distinct and often organized around a particular legal event or illustrative piece of litigation, but are ultimately united by the thematic commitment to the development of "laissez-faire liberalism" as the basis of the colonial legal order.

The contrast between the Hudson's Bay Company "club law," which idealized a "paternal and discretionary authority that came from a system of mutual obligation," and the independent settlers' vision of a "formal, rule-bound arena in which competition [between formal equals] could occur without unfair advantage or interference" occupies the first two substantive chapters. Loo then examines the geographic spread of courts across Vancouver Island and the mainland in the light of Anthony Giddens's analysis of the extension of power as a spatial problem. With the courts set up, Loo proceeds to study who litigated in them and why, concluding that "[litigation in British Columbia was ... an expression of a certain kind of community: a community of individuals who were strangers to one another, and who, in the course of pursuing their own self-interest, came up against others doing the same thing." The newness, diversity, and mobility of the colony's settlers, she concludes, made informal dispute resolution difficult, heightening their dependence on the formal legal order. Loo then examines these tensions in more detail in chapters devoted to two causes célèbres of the 1860s.

In spite of this somewhat formidable subject-matter, Making Law is a pleasure to read. The author possesses the all-too-rare ability to incorporate rich factual detail and wry contemporary observations on frontier justice without losing pace or sacrificing theoretical rigor. One discovers that in the new El Dorado bankruptcy matters made up the largest single subject of the Supreme Court's business in the 1850s (28.9 per cent), while over 97 per cent of actions in the inferior courts dealt with debt recovery (10 per cent of which dealt with wages alleged to be due). The surroundings in which this litigation unfolded, however, were less than imposing. The Supreme Court sat at New Westminster in "an austere frame structure measuring 40 ft by 20 ft, ... [with] an open floor, rattling windows, and old sooty cotton lining and ceiling, in many places torn to shreds and fluttering in the breeze like a bird of evil omen over the seat of justice." Inevitably in a work which can claim to be pioneering in many ways, in the Canadian context at least, the analytical terrain is ploughed fairly roughly, and the ultimate fertility of the soil remains untested. The chapter on the impact of geography on the organization of the justice system promises, in the reviewer's opinion, more than it delivers. It also suggests problems with Loo's general thesis. Faced with vast distances and rugged terrain, colonial administrators had little choice but to allow a high degree of discretion and authority to local magistrates. JPs did not have to sit in pairs and had jurisdiction throughout the colony, with the result that a single justice of the peace, almost invariably without legal training, decided "all but the most serious civil and criminal cases." The Small Debts Act gave these magistrates "virtually unlimited powers of arrest in suits involving relatively small amounts of money," while an 1865 ordinance gave them powers in bankruptcy and insolvency equal to those of the Supreme Court. The county court, for its part, was insulated from appeal by an 1866 ordinance.

Loo is too quick to see in these moves the establishment of "predictable and standardized ways of dealing and [controlling] ... a far-flung, culturally diverse, and mobile population." That may well have been the intention (perhaps hope would be a better word), but the result of such extensive local discretion was almost bound to be local and regional variation in the administration of the law, rather than any blanket application of the
diktats of some central authority. Loo comes closest to exposing these contradictions in her chapter on the "Grouse Creek War," which examines a dispute between rivals to a particular mining claim. This chapter presents a fine example of the tensions between formal and informal law, between centralized norms and local experience, which Loo handles quite skilfully. She rightly concludes that "the existence of multiple meanings of law placed limits on its authority," but does not incorporate this insight into earlier chapters, where the grasp of the colonial state is seen as co-extensive with the reach of its legal institutions.

For all the book's emphasis on the economy, there is rather little reference to either economic theory or the economic history of Canada or the Northwest United States. Nor is there much reference to the conflict between European and Native conceptions of property. Curiously, Loo chooses a chapter from the annals of criminal justice history (the Bute Inlet killings), as the vehicle for studying the construction of a Native Other within European British Columbia's society and legal order. A confrontation which directly pitted Native against European conceptions of property would have better suited her overall theme, and would have allowed her to distinguish between Europeans' views of Native culture (which were often positive and sympathetic) and their views of the Natives' economy (which were uniformly negative). When the echoes of Bute Inlet had died away, the conflict over property and economy remained.

These criticisms should not deter anyone from reading this book. It is a highly valuable contribution to Canadian legal, social, and economic history, which treats themes relevant to the entire New World.


This book makes an important contribution to Newfoundland historiography. Previous accounts of the period of the late 18th and early 19th centuries have generally distinguished or separated — implicitly or explicitly — the political/legal/constitutional development of the colony from the internal development of the fishery. Colony and fishery proceeded pretty much along their separate courses, and before 1832 Newfoundland typically has been regarded as sui generis, quite distinctive from any of the more regularized colonial establishments of British North America because of its lack of the usual political institutions and its reliance on a single non-agricultural resource. By bringing fishery and colony together through the court records of the Surrogate Court (1785-1825) and the Northern Circuit Court (1826-1855), Cadigan has provided a new context for Newfoundland in this period.

As Cadigan makes clear, despite its political laggardness and constitutional incompleteness, Newfoundland shared in the development of law and judicial institutions that was one of the major characteristics of the period 1785 to 1850 in every jurisdiction of British North America. Each jurisdiction adapted the law to suit its own circumstances. Québec/Lower Canada blended French and English precedents as part of the adaptive process, while other colonies worked within the framework of the English common law system. In all the colonies, however, constructing a legal/judicial system to enforce contracts and to adjudicate complex credit relationships was a matter of highest priority. The creation of legal institutions was in many respects more important than the establishment of representative assemblies, as Red River, British Columbia, and Newfoundland
could attest. Local conditions greatly affected the outcome on both the civil and the criminal side. On Prince Edward Island, the land question made it inevitable that the security of land title and tenure would be important considerations in the legal mix. In British Columbia, the gold rush made mining law important, as Tina Loo has recently demonstrated in her book *Making Law, Order, and Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871* (Toronto 1994). In Newfoundland, not surprisingly, the fishery was most critical. In all three colonies — and in all the others as well, including Red River — the relationships among merchants and between merchants and customers had to be regulated through the courts. In a time and place in which capital was in short supply, monetary value could be expressed in a variety of currencies, and credit institutions were simultaneously primitive and extremely cumbersome, how could it be otherwise? It has taken us a long time to appreciate that the colonial legal and judicial systems are not only important for what they reveal about society and culture, but as key political-constitutional developments in their own right. What is happening with the courts and the law is arguably as important as what is happening in the assembly or councils. Moreover, the legislative record usually offers us virtually no entree into the arcane world of the law.

Cadigan’s analysis of the relationship between the judicial system and its clients as revealed in the court records has two important parts: first, there is a discussion of the household economy of the fishery, including the master-servant relationship; secondly, there is a discussion of the merchant-master relationship, otherwise known as the “truck system.” In both parts his work is very suggestive. Cadigan’s discussion of the household economy of the fishery is useful in several ways. In the first place, he documents the many similarities between the fisher household and the farmer household more familiar on the mainland. Newfoundland exceptionalism has often been predicated in large measure on the uniqueness of the fishery. While some aspects of the fishing enterprise were certainly not replicated elsewhere, in its unremitting exploitation of family labour, the resident fishery had much in common with the family farm to be found elsewhere in British North America. Inheritance patterns and strategies also follow typical agricultural patterns of the time, although what constitutes the estate may be quite different. In the second place, Cadigan is able to cast much new light on the role of women in the Newfoundland family economy. He suggests that women’s labour was even more closely integrated into the fishery than the family farm, although much depends on which family farm is involved. Cadigan prefers the market farms of Upper Canada as a contrast. On the other hand, if we are talking about a marginal subsistence farm where the head of household is off much of the time involved in other activities, there is probably less difference between the Newfoundland situation and the one in New Brunswick or Nova Scotia. While Cadigan emphasizes the importance of women to the development of the resident fishery, no more than his predecessors does he manage to explain the dynamic by which a supposedly male-dominated enterprise generated such substantial numbers of female settlers. On the truck system, Cadigan’s analysis is both useful and measured. He appreciates that the merchant and his associated credit system, however baneful in many respects, were a necessary part of the fishery. It is easy enough to criticize the exploitation of the merchant-settler relationship, but hard to conceive of an alternative arrangement in the context of the period.

Given his perspectives, it is not surprising that the author tends to see the real political problem in Newfoundland as residing less with the merchants than with the reformers, who manipulated public opinion (and our subsequent view of Newfoundland development) throughout much of this period. His account of the
reformer/Liberal orchestration during the 1830s of the attack on Chief Justice Henry Boulton is particularly instructive in this regard. A cynical view of the reform movement is consonant with most recent scholarship on British North America, suggesting yet another way in which this important study integrates Newfoundland into larger historiographical and interpretive patterns. Certainly the island emerges from the pages of Hope and Deception in Conception Bay as a place where distinctive patterns were not necessarily in the larger dynamic sense exceptional. The Newfoundland of this study fits quite nicely into the picture of colonial British North American that has been developing over the past few years.

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Scott W. See, Riots in New Brunswick: Orange Nativism and Social Violence in the 1840s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993).

SCOTT SEE has written a book to dispel the still-resilient notion that Canada is and has always been a “Peaceable Kingdom.” He charges that in the 1840s “Canada experienced social violence that easily matched the virulence of episodes in England, Wales, France, Ireland and the United States in the same period.” (209) To make this claim, See analyses crowd actions in three New Brunswick communities.

See studies episodes of “social violence” between groups of Irish-Catholics and members of the Orange Order in Woodstock and Fredericton in 1847, and in Saint John in 1849. In each community, violence erupted when members of the Orange Order gathered to commemorate the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, and groups of local Irish-Catholics attempted to stop them. Such battles have often been interpreted as recurrences of old Irish antipathies in new lands. See disagrees; he views these riots as part of a larger pattern, not of Old World tensions but of “a larger native-immigrant confrontation in North America.” (204)

Bloody crowd actions represent just one facet of this confrontation and so the riots themselves occupy relatively little space in this book. Instead, See concentrates on the local conditions which shaped ethno-religious tensions. The three communities shared important commonalities. They were all settled by Loyalists and retained strong British and Protestant identities. In the 1840s each experienced a depression and the economic disruptions of industrialization. Into this situation came large numbers of poor Irish-Catholics fleeing the famine. Their arrival strained the already fragile economy, and threatened religious and ethnic homogeneity. Social violence repeatedly erupted from this mixture.

See argues that while New Brunswick branches of the Orange Order operated within the context of the loyalism and anti-Catholicism of the parent organization, they constituted a “distinctively Canadian organization.” (75) The majority of members were native-born, and even those born in Ireland had lived in New Brunswick for a considerable period of time before joining the Order. In addition, the Order gained power because large numbers of Protestants who never became members nonetheless supported its doctrine and its actions.

The composition of the Catholic crowds is harder to determine, in part because they did not constitute an organization or coherent group. However, See is able to trace many of the Catholic men who were arrested after each riot. Of those he can identify (admittedly a more stable group than those who never appeared in censuses), See finds that they were not the young, indigent transients decried in most sources. Instead, most were employed, lived in the community, ranged in age, and were not recent famine-era immigrants, but men who had
lived in New Brunswick for at least a few years at the time of the riots.

See is sensitive to the position of Irish-Catholics in New Brunswick, but his discussion of this community is not always clear. Although he notes that all Irish-born Catholics living in New Brunswick were not indigent victims of the famine, he repeatedly discusses “the Irish-Catholics” (often referring to members of a crowd) as if they were a coherent entity. At least two of the crowds seemed to be composed of neighbours from Irish-Catholic ghettos (including women), but See does not speculate upon the differences between these groups and a more organized crowd of men who faced Orangemen in Woodstock. See also never fully addresses the question of why Irish-Catholics responded so strongly to the July 12th celebrations. Since local conditions shaped the encounters, the “cultural baggage” of Irish-Catholics cannot explain their reaction. See does not fully explore what the New Brunswick Orange Order’s public celebrations meant to their Irish-Catholic neighbours. Their powerlessness shaped their reaction, but See never explains why this sense of powerlessness manifested itself in violent responses to the Orangemen’s provocations.

See analyzes New Brunswick communities by employing concepts more often used in American historiography. Nativism shaped the interaction between Protestants and Irish-Catholics; as he writes, “the native-born and Protestant community in New Brunswick articulated and defended a British colonial nationalism.” (11) Irish-Catholics were defined as outside of this nationalism, and a threat to it. Many New Brunswick Protestants blamed poor Irish-Catholics for the problems they were facing and the Orange Order exploited such fears. As such, the Orange Order was merely one part of a larger attempt to institute Protestant Loyalist hegemony over the new immigrants. In the late 1840s the Orange Order sought to do this through vigilantism. See characterizes the Order as “acting as a para-military group,” that “sought to ensure colonial order, Protestant ascendancy, and Loyalist principles during a bewildering period.” (12) Violence died down in the 1850s, in part because of improved economic conditions and a decline in Irish-Catholic immigration, but also because the Orange Order, with the help of the military, politicians, and the courts, had restored Protestant hegemony. As See writes, “Orangemen won the battle of the 1840s.” (185)

See’s use of the concepts of nativism and vigilantism helps illuminate the New Brunswick crowd actions, but his discussion of racism is less convincing. Protestant English attitudes toward Irish-Catholics are often analyzed as racist, and studies of Protestant American ideas about Irish-Catholics in the 19th century have shown the ways in which Irish-Catholics were sometimes portrayed as racially different from Protestant descendants of Anglo-Saxons. Yet See does not demonstrate that Protestants in New Brunswick towns saw the Irish-Catholics in their midst as not simply inferior but as racially different. They may have done so, but See must do more to back up his assertion.

Despite some shortcomings, Riots in New Brunswick makes an important contribution to the history of national identity and ethnic relations in Canada. Scott See presents a local study with broad implications for historians of Canada. Riots in New Brunswick is both sophisticated and an ideal monograph to introduce undergraduate students to controversial issues in Canadian history.

Maureen McCarthy
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THE MARITIMES have been the source of some very good social history in the last two decades. This solid collection of essays continues in this tradition, combining new and familiar papers to explore the worlds of Maritime women in the 19th century. The collection effectively fills a gap in our understanding of Canadian women's history and of Maritime regional history.

The essays fit well into the established topics of North American women's history. Janet Guildford examines the feminization of teaching in Nova Scotia, arguing that because separate spheres constructed women as nurturers, it allowed them to move into teaching but ultimately undercut their claim to professional status. Sharon Myers' study shows that despite their ideological relegation to the private sphere, working-class women worked for wages and engaged in labour militancy, though not always on the same terms as men. Philip Gerard and Rebecca Veinott explain how Nova Scotian property law evolved in terms of a conservative view of the family, which saw women in need of protection, rather than a liberal model, which emphasized individual rights. Suzanne Morton finds African-Nova Scotian women in a diverse number of public sites, though occasionally using separate spheres rhetoric to claim protection or respectability. Judith Fingard's article examines the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty, speaking to the growing literature on domestic violence and reform. Hannah Lane analyses Methodist women's religious experience in St Stephen's, New Brunswick. Gwendolyn Davies shows how some women injected themselves into the literary public while exposing the confining nature of the domestic realm. Among the essays, Rusty Bitterman's examination of women in the Escheat movement stands out, especially his much-needed critique of existing literature on women's place in rural development.

The essays contribute to other areas of the regional history of the Maritimes. Some, for example, help us understand aspects of regional politics. Gail Campbell examines women's pre-suffrage political participation in New Brunswick, showing that women were knowledgeable participants in the political process through extra-electoral methods like petitioning. Scholars interested in understanding Maritime political history should heed Campbell's reminder that formal institutional politics are only a part of a broader political culture in which diverse social groups participate even if they are excluded from voting. Bonnie Huskins' examination of women in urban public celebrations gives us another slice of this public culture, showing how separate spheres constrained women's appearance in public celebrations but eventually allowed limited space for women as a real or symbolic presence. Understanding Maritime political culture, then, means more than understanding how the public sphere was gendered masculine, but also the ways that its gendering was uneven and even resisted.

The essays by Morton, Fingard, Guildford, and Campbell will be familiar to readers of Acadiensis, but their inclusion strengthens the collection as a teaching tool. Indeed, because the collection covers the key topics of women's history so effectively, it could be used with great success in women's history courses.

The collection might have been strengthened had some of the contributions more consciously deconstructed the separate spheres framework, both as a Victorian ideology and as an analytic tool for women's history. This is not to say that the concept has no use—as the editors point out, however much we expose contradictions in separate spheres, it had ideological power in this period. But in this collection, separate spheres (as a theme) occasionally seems out of focus.
and (as an ideology) somewhat fixed. Although one gets the sense by the end of the collection that separate spheres could be a dynamic and fluid notion, few of the essays address this theme explicitly. Instead, the main tension here is between the ideal and the real, when both sides of that comparison might have been more slippery than these essays let on. One way to correct this problem might have been to make race and class more conscious concerns in each of the studies. Most of the essays do not deal explicitly with how separate spheres was articulated as part of an ongoing process of white bourgeois class formation. If race, for example, was thought of as implicated in the experiences of both black and white women (albeit in quite different ways), separate spheres might have become a more dynamic and intriguing theme. That said, the collection still stands as a solid contribution to both regional history and Canadian women's history.

Steve Penfold
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TO SAY THAT *Quest of the Folk* is one of the most important books to be published in Canadian history in years minimizes its significance. This first full-fledged Canadian study in the "new" cultural history ranks easily with the best American or British monographs in the field. Ian McKay has opened the door to new avenues of inquiry in Canadian history, specifically, the examination of the complex workings of modernity in Canadian society. *Quest of the Folk* deals with the ways in which Nova Scotia cultural producers and state tourism constructed the idea of "the Folk" between 1920 and 1950 as the key to Nova Scotia's culture and history: like other North American antimodernists, they upheld "the Folk" of the countryside as the antithesis of everything they disliked about modern urban and industrial life, thereby erasing the influence which urbanization, capitalism, class, and ethnic differences played in the province. This development is treated in a multi-layered analysis which draws on neo-Marxist theory, Gramscian models of cultural production and hegemony, Foucauldian structuralism, and Jackson Lears' *No Place of Grace*.

McKay focuses primarily on Helen Creighton, Nova Scotia's most famous folklorist, and Mary Black, the influential handicrafts revivalist, but their careers are merely the prism through which he covers wide-ranging currents in trans-Atlantic culture, including an examination of the Folk under conditions of postmodernity and as part of the politics of gender. The notion of "the Folk" adopted in Nova Scotia derived from a long history of Western thought which exalted the simple and the elemental; it was popularized with the rise of Romanticism, as Herder, the brothers Grimm, and many subsequent writers developed the idea that the culture of the Folk — their tales, music, and crafts — embodied a society's natural core before it was complicated and corrupted by modernity. Folk culture was also the wellspring of nationalism, and this had enormous political ramifications, as McKay deftly argues. The idea that "the Folk" represented an unchanging social essence and solidarity marginalized those whose culture did not reflect the older, "traditional" way of life — such as workers and socialists, with their politics based on class. The image of a lost Golden Age followed by degeneration buttressed reactionary political views infused with an entropic sense of historical decline.

McKay argues that this antimodernism took shape in Nova Scotia as a myth of "Innocence." Drawing on Gramsci and Benedict Anderson, he explains how Nova Scotia cultural producers came to imagine their province as essentially
innocent of the complexities and anxieties of the 20th century. Where Victorian Nova Scotians took pride in their society’s newspapers, scientific achievements, and universities, “Innocence” placed folklore, folksong, witchcraft, superstition, the “simple life,” and oral tradition at the core of Nova Scotia’s identity. The tourism industry depicted Nova Scotia as “therapeutic space,” and cultural producers promoted ideas about Nova Scotia that emphasized its Scottish character, its lost “Golden Age,” its symbolic landscapes of insularity, rockbound coasts and the sea, and a view of the muscle-bound masculinity of the archetypical Nova Scotian male.

One of McKay’s major objectives is to demonstrate that the Nova Scotia cultural producers who took up the concept of the Folk were engaged in a politics of cultural selection. They excluded aspects of the past that could have helped people think historically about alternative outcomes or about patterns of power and privilege; their myth was not the product of outright invention or hoax, but the process of cultural hegemony at work. From this perspective, McKay examines how Helen Creighton entered the world of folklore scholarship in the late 1920s, and sharing the anglophilia of Halifax’s élite, adopted a British concept of folklore which measured aesthetic worth in terms of a canon of Elizabethan ballads. A sojourn to Indiana University in the 1930s introduced her to a more inclusive idea of folklore, but she was not a cultural relativist and rejected the approach to folklore developing at the University of Chicago which treated it in socio-cultural context. Instead of considering how people adapted to modernity, or addressing issues of class, she saw the Folk as those who unwittingly guarded the lore of the Folk. For her, this meant that true Nova Scotian Folk lived in fishing or farming communities, theoretically far from capitalist social relations and the stresses of modernity; they did not work in factories, coal mines, lobster canneries, or domestic service. Her canon emphasized sea-faring songs, and she denounced political influences which she thought threatened organic unity: she was concerned about Edith Fowke’s leftist leanings and interest in songs of industrial protest, and in the 1960s, she attempted to have the RCMP investigate Peter Seeger, the symbol of efforts to tie folksongs to progressive politics.

In the handicraft revival in Nova Scotia, McKay shows that the hand of the state was more visible. Industrial capitalism had marginalized or destroyed so many crafts that by the 1940s, the Nova Scotian countryside was no haven of traditional handicrafts, and the so-called “tradition” had to be reinvigorated by conscious state policy of teaching Nova Scotians to produce quality handicrafts for tourists. Under the aegis of the Department of Industry and Publicity, Mary Black promoted state-directed professional development, technical training, and expert assistance in the modern use of design and colour by skilled Europeans who would dissuade Nova Scotians from using “garish” colours and encourage them to depict nature “properly.” Black was a liberal progressive professional, guided by the ideals of efficiency, competitiveness, moral therapy, and commerce; she wanted to see handicrafts integrated into the market. But, as McKay points out, her ideas fed directly into antimodernism rather than encouraging an understanding of Nova Scotia’s socio-economic development which saw the loss of the handicraft tradition as a product of the economic hardships faced by coal miners, carpenters, and farm women, who naturally steered their dependents away from working with their hands.

This is an extraordinary book which is bound to stimulate debate. McKay hopes it will help to shut down the kinds of successful mythomoteurs that have been at work in Nova Scotia. It will certainly stir up controversy in that province for its criticism of cherished individuals and traditions. McKay observes that as
deleterious as the concept of the Folk has been to Nova Scotia society, it was not the invention of "insensitive, ignorant Canadians" but was constructed from within by local producers who commodified the concept of the Folk in order to develop marketable products — they were playing to an audience but were also attempting to allay their own fears about modern industrial society. Nova Scotians were not alone in this development, and every region of Canada requires this kind of investigation. Hopefully, Quest of the Folk will transform the study of 20th-century Canada through its demonstration of the value of studying culture in its broadest sense.

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UNTIL RECENTLY, the critical literature on the social work profession has tended to emphasize the role of this overwhelmingly women-dominated group as agents of social control. An extreme example is Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present (Boston 1989), in which both the welfare state and its employees in the United States are seen unproblematically as agents of the hegemonic ideology. More recently, some attention has been paid to historical divisions on ideological lines among social workers in the work of Linda Gordon and James Struthers, among others. Like much of the work by social work academics, these authors illustrate the contradiction between social workers' efforts to be accepted as "scientific" professionals with university training working with individuals with problems on the one hand, and agents of social change on the other.

The focus in most such work is on the clients of the welfare state and social workers' perspectives are seen as important because they are the front-line agents of the state in implementing the state's wishes. Their decisions, case by case, and their recommendations regarding procedures have an impact on what state policies will look like in practice.

Gale Wills' book breaks new ground because it focuses not on clients but on social workers with an emphasis on their position as employees. She provides a careful analysis of the social forces that directly and indirectly have shaped the work of social workers. In particular, she examines the largely unsuccessful struggle of Toronto social workers to gain agency independence from financial federations controlled by the city's corporate elite and to win a degree of social worker input into the operation of the fund-raising operations. The corporate leaders were not interested purely in doing good work in the community; they used their control over charitable fund-raising to "constrain the activities of the Welfare Council and the social agencies" and to ensure that the collective voice of the social agencies, when the Social Planning Council was founded, would not be used to make propaganda for an extension of social insurance or other redistributive state programs.

Even before the Great Depression, notes Wills, while the social workers were engaged in a battle to establish the legitimacy of their work as a profession, they were also working to establish their autonomy from the patriarchal, hierarchical corporate elite who exercised financial control over the agencies that employed them. The Toronto Child Welfare Council, breaking from traditional notions of charity and the family, made the "fundamental rights of childhood" a cornerstone of its thinking during the Depression and, on the basis of this philosophy, campaigned for minimum wages for families. The business-controlled Federation for Community Service, which raised funds for the agencies, was not impressed
and tried to absorb the Council in order to stop its social reform activities. Their leaders vilified as Communists, the member agencies disbanded the Council and formed the broader Toronto Welfare Council as the organization that spoke for the united concerns of social work agencies. Though the social workers may have appeared to have succumbed to the pressures of the financial leaders, this was disproved by the practices of the new Council. Bessie Touzel, the first executive director, proved as radical and as militant as Margaret Gould, her predecessor in the Child Welfare Council, and it was not long before she too was labelled a Communist. Under her leadership, the Council became involved in community coalitions pressing governments for adequate relief levels and publicly-operated affordable childcare.

But the social workers were not able to shake off the pressures from the businessmen who collected the monies that their agencies required. During the war, the Community Chest was organized with fund-raising and social planning functions combined. The impact of this union on social workers' ability to speak out was palpable: a business campaign in 1947, led by Edgar Burton, chief executive officer of Simpsons' department store, led to the withdrawal from circulation of a carefully-prepared study of the cost of living in Toronto. Burton had been aghast when he saw Simpsons' workers handing out materials that used the study to demonstrate that he was paying wages below the social minimum outlined by the Council.

Progressive social workers worked afterwards to establish a social planning council separate from the fund-raising organization. But, faced with business community antipathy to such a move, the social agencies decided to take a half-step. They set up a social planning council outside the Community Chest but invited leading businessman Wallace McCutcheon to chair their committee on reorganization. McCutcheon became the first president of the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto in 1957 and the Council's board was stacked with insurance industry executives who formed a phalanx against any whisper of the need for state medicine.

Wills suggests, along with previous authors, that most of the women in the social work profession were sufficiently enamoured of the male corporate world's technocratic approach to problems to become active participants in the kind of conservative politics that produced the Social Planning Council. But her retrieval of the more radical practices of many social workers demonstrates that the victory of more conservative approaches was hardly the result of a purely internal struggle among social workers. Social workers, after all, were employees and vulnerable female employees at that. "The woman in social work became dependent on her male supervisor, on a male-dominated financial federation for her livelihood, and on male colleagues for her access to the power structures of society." (137-8)

One problem in Wills' account is that it is often difficult to determine the extent to which socialist and proto-feminist forces in the period under study were defeated by corporate pressures and when they were indeed submerged by the misgivings of more conservative-minded social workers. What is clear is that the latter often owed much to the former because a woman who had decided to make an independent living as a social worker soon found that fund-raising federations would have some say as to whether she could achieve that goal and that their thinking was often motivated by whether she was perceived as pressing viewpoints inimical to those of capital.

Alvin Finkel
Athabasca University

**TIME EXERTS** a subtle influence over historical scholarship. Had this book been published only two years later it is quite likely that its conclusions would differ, but also that the author's intellectual stance *vis à vis* the subject might also have shifted. For this book was conceived and written as the welfare state was in full bloom. Then liberals and social democrats discovered, even as they defended the ideals of the welfare state (and their self interest) to the last ditch, that as a totality it could not be afforded and as an instrument in many important respects it has not worked. Now almost everywhere the edifice of the welfare state is being demolished with more glee than regret by Newts and son's of Newts in the North.

It is now possible from a variety of perspectives (left, centre, and right) to look back on the welfare state, reflect on its meaning, and draw conclusions. This then is the fruitful season of the historian. Unfortunately James Struthers took on the task of writing the history of welfare in Ontario in the long twilight of the "administrative state." The author has not been liberated by time or ideological distance from the mindset of the period. As a result the book thus plays heavily upon irony — high ideals contrast with meagre accomplishments — and paradox — the proverbial want in the midst of plenty. It seemingly assumes the permanence of administrative structures and focuses more upon bureaucratic battles than the changing experience of welfare in Ontario. Like the liberals and social democrats whose feeble efforts are under scrutiny, the author tacitly assumes the project of eliminating poverty could have been accomplished if only the political will had been mustered. Seen from the Nineties that is a very Sixties form of nostalgia.

Struthers begins his survey of the evolution of welfare programmes in the province of Ontario with a very useful and important literature review in which he classifies writing on the subject into six broad schools: functionalist; culturalist; social democratic; marxist social control; and neo-institutionalist. This historiographical essay is in many respects the high point of the book despite the fact that the author comes to rest arguing "all of the above." In the conclusion he reverses the process by showing how each perspective fails to account convincingly for the paths followed in Ontario.

Between the introduction and conclusion, eight chapters, some of which have previously been published as articles, survey the evolution of policy in Ontario from the introduction of Mothers' Allowances at the end of the Great War to the placement of the capstone of welfare state, the Canada Assistance Plan in the late 1960s. Each chapter is based upon a prodigious amount of archival research in government and political records with the emphasis on federal and provincial levels. Municipal organizations are less satisfactorily handled, although Struthers has obviously made a considerable effort to see the impact of policy changes where local archival holdings permit. Each chapter focuses on a single topic — Chapter Seven, for example, chronicles the War on Poverty in Ontario in the mid 1960s — concentrating upon the mobilizing campaign that stimulated action, a review of the pressures (usually fiscal but sometimes deep cultural biases) that produced the half measures that ensued, ending with an evaluation that political and bureaucratic compromises critically undermined programme effectiveness.

The focus is kept tightly trained on provincial public policy throughout. It is somewhat unsettling to read 275 pages on the history of welfare in Ontario in which the Salvation Army and the numerous community based welfare efforts are largely ignored. Private efforts, whether by religious organizations, philanthropic foundations, unions, or social agencies are discussed only when they converge as pressure groups around the public
Therefore inevitably much of what might be thought of as "welfare" lies outside the author's viewfinder. The neglect of Native people in the policy discourse and the significant political effort of women are properly attended to. The poor are seen largely through the eyes of others as clients, caseload statistics, political allies, and only in the 1960s do they begin in Struthers view to acquire some degree of agency. Of course, they have had it all along though by different means.

This book represents a good and perhaps necessary beginning — with the narrowly defined politics of welfare — but its limitations are regrettable. Given the salience of welfare reform on the current political agenda, a book like James Struthers *The Limits to Affluence* ought to have represented a major contribution by the discipline of history to an important contemporary debate. But as it is, Struthers' book will likely be considered by most policy makers to be beside the point, at best a useful reference tool and at worse a compendium of error. Perhaps some social workers and bureaucrats will look back wistfully on a golden age of bureaucracy. It is instead a book for other historians. The topical division makes for some useful narrative essays dealing largely with the origins of particular programmes. The historiographical essay usefully classifies what has been written into tidy piles. The problem is that Struthers has constructed a book around a "within critique" of an ideology at a time when the ideology was fundamentally under attack. It remains to be seen how far the process of dismantling will go before the dialectic reasserts itself. But it is unlikely that for a long time to come a historian will be able to take up this subject with the essentially Whiggish belief that there is a finite quantity of social workers, bureaucrats, and dollars sufficient to conquer poverty.


The tension between maintaining a shared identity and a common sense of purpose among union members, while at the same time acknowledging and responding to people's various and often conflicting interests, has historically been one of the fundamental dilemmas faced by labour unions. This tension is particularly acute in the case of large industrial unions with heterogeneous constituencies, where members' interests are determined as much by differences of sex, skill level, and cultural identity as by their shared experience of exploitation. As the past decade of scholarship on women workers has amply demonstrated, organized labour's traditional reliance on a unitary definition of working-class interest as the foundation of union solidarity has reinforced white, native-born, male workers' reluctance to acknowledge the special concerns of women and other marginalized workers as legitimate union issues. Rather than operating as a vehicle for advancing social and economic equality, unions have all too often contributed to, and indeed, extended, existing inequalities of race, ethnicity, and most particularly, sex. This is a serious problem that warrants considerably more attention, from both scholars and unionists, than it has yet received. Pamela Sugiman breaks new ground in her detailed examination of women's struggle for recognition within one of the most powerful of Ontario's industrial unions, the United Auto Workers (UAW), and constitutes an important and timely contribution to our understanding of the contradictions that have frustrated women's efforts to achieve full equality in the workplace.

Tracing the development of female gender consciousness among UAW women from the union's origins in the late 1930s through to the 1980s, Sugiman
argues that women justified their appeals for better wages, working conditions, and job security by strategically invoking the UAW's policies on labour unity and social justice while, at the same time, endorsing prevailing social norms of proper femininity. Her argument constitutes a novel perspective on what has become a lively debate about the historical value of unionism for women. Although UAW women’s activism was animated by a unionism that accepted gender difference as natural and inevitable, it was not, she contends, ultimately incompatible with the development of a feminist sensibility.

Her analysis hinges on the insight that ideals of social justice are historically specific, just as people's subjectivities are rooted in the cultural assumptions of their time. As members of one of the most politically active and socially conscious unions in Ontario, UAW women were encouraged by the union’s rhetoric of labour unity to struggle “shoulder to shoulder” with their union brothers for better wages and working conditions. But the union’s conception of labour unity incorporated an uncritical acceptance of existing gender ascriptions which discredited women’s legitimacy as wage-earners and relegated them to a subordinate position in the union. Sugiman identifies a historical progression in UAW women’s engagement with this contradiction, which took various forms according to shifting historical circumstances. The parameters of these expressions of entitlement were determined, she argues, not only by the material constraints of the union contract and women’s bargaining position within the union, but also by the less tangible, but equally significant, considerations of men’s and women’s presuppositions about gender identities and gender relations.

Drawing on a large number of interviews and considerable archival research, Sugiman argues compellingly for an upward trajectory of female activism and consciousness within the UAW, culminating in the feminist resurgence of the 1960s and 1970s. In the absence of the legitimating discourse of a viable feminist movement, she contends, UAW women negotiated improvements in their status within the union using the ideological tools at hand. When popular opinion condemned wage-earning women and endorsed female submissiveness, as it did in the 1930s and 1940s, women auto workers sought ways to cope with workplace problems rather than change them. Working primarily in sex-segregated work areas, Sugiman found, they avoided union politics and centred their working lives instead around their personal relationships with other women. During economic booms, when the union was strong and women workers enjoyed relative stability and job security, as in the 1950s, women became bolder, using the grievance procedure to protest inadequate wages and to try to improve their working conditions. At the same time, they deployed prevailing gender distinctions advantageously to justify demands for respectful treatment and a work environment that afforded a measure of human dignity. And when feminist ideas began to gain currency in the mid 1960s and 1970s, they used the language of gender equality to call for fundamental changes in the workplace and to lobby for sweeping political reform.

There is a tendency, when studying women unionists, to equate female agency with working-class feminism. Sugiman avoids such easy characterizations, offering instead persuasive evidence that this was, indeed, feminist, as opposed to merely female, political activism. The most compelling is her account of the pivotal role played by UAW women in the political lobby that was instrumental in achieving Ontario Human Rights legislation, passed in 1970, that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. With this legislation behind them, UAW women were finally able to win battles they had been fighting for years, eliminating sex-specific language in collective agreements and job classifications, and winning seniority rights and
wages identical to those of their union brothers. The advances made by UAW women in the 1970s, Sugiman argues, are partially, but not solely, attributable to the cultural legitimacy accorded to women's demands for equal rights as a result of the newly-emerging feminist movement. Of equal importance to the sisterly solidarity that animated the gender politics of this era, she contends, was the female culture that had been growing within the union over the previous decades.

Although one chapter of the book deals specifically with the gender politics of UAW men, this is almost exclusively a book about women. As such, it inverts the traditional approach of labour history, which has dealt overwhelmingly with men. Sugiman defends her decision on the grounds that a comparative examination runs the risk of making women appear, once again, merely derivative. The point is well taken; rarely, if ever, are studies of men found wanting because they fail to compare their subjects to women.

Limiting her inquiry to a few key union locals, Sugiman presents a detailed and complex analysis that, by illuminating the particular, explores the subtleties and nuances that define specific situations. These details, in turn, become key pieces of a larger puzzle. Yet, some of the questions raised by this research suggest the advantages of including a broader perspective. Sugiman diagnoses the UAW's inadequate response to inequities of gender, like those of ethnicity and race, as arising primarily from union men's resistance to sharing power, union leaders' unwillingness to renegotiate white male-dominated union structures, and the masculine bias of union culture. But the UAW's failure to address adequately the problems of racism and sexism exemplifies the more general failure of unions to operate as vehicles of social reform. An examination of this collective inadequacy would, of necessity, take into account additional contradictions, such as those that inhere in the relation between organized labour and capital, unions' position in the organizational environment, and the imperatives of bureaucratic sustainability.

The continued existence of an underclass of workers who, by virtue of sex, ethnicity, age, and myriad other distinctions are particularly susceptible to exploitation, benefits not only white, male workers of the dominant social group, but also capital and the state. Must we not, therefore, consider how the power relations within unions are mediated by government policy, as well as by the attitudes and vested interests of the most powerful union members? The impetus for a more gender-conscious politics within the UAW, as Sugiman shows, arose almost exclusively out of the female subculture that existed in defiance of, and defined itself in opposition to, the union's elected leaders. What does this suggest about the potential for progressive social change within existing union structures? Does the compromise that was forged between organized labour and capital in the years immediately after World War II, and which is only now showing evidence of erosion, mitigate against the emergence of such oppositional movements within unions? Is political stagnation the inevitable consequence of union security?

Sugiman's evidence also provokes intriguing questions concerning the relation between union consciousness and female gender consciousness. Women's legitimacy as wage-earners, Sugiman tells us, was affirmed within the UAW, in principle if not in practice, and women who had become "union-wise" learned to use union structures to win improvements in the workplace. But it was women's culture, rather than union culture, that was pivotal to the process of women's empowerment. Indeed, the female subculture Sugiman describes as growing out of shop floor friendships was construed as an alternative to the union, which appeared androcentric and hostile to women. In other words, the culture that fostered female gender consciousness reflected the particular circumstances of women's work
lives, but was distinct from, rather than part of, the union. Did union structures or philosophies play more than an instrumental role in this development? Or was women’s gender consciousness only indirectly related to their union activism? Was it their experience of unionism, or the experience of confronting a common adversary — ironically, their own union — that prompted gender consciousness among UAW women?

This is a thoughtful and carefully researched study that begins to fill one of the glaring omissions in Canadian labour history. At the same time, it provides an intriguing new dimension to the very topical and important project of reconstructing women’s labour history. And as with all pioneering work, the questions it raises are as important as the answers it suggests. Not only labour historians, but anyone who is concerned about the declining relevance of labour unions would do well to consider the implications of both.

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*The 1917 Russian Revolution* and the subsequent formation of the Communist International, dedicated to the worldwide export of Soviet-Style communism, understandably caused considerable consternation throughout the west. In Canada, much like in many other countries, the authorities responded with “security screening,” the history of which is the topic of this interesting new book. The goal of security screening can be simply stated: to establish trustworthiness; to determine whether or not a particular individual constitutes a risk to the security of the state. The means of achieving that goal, and their efficacy, is what Hannant’s book is all about and, as he demonstrates with comprehensive research and new materials brought to light only because of the *Access to Information Act*, no matter how laudable or simply stated the objective, achieving it with any degree of reliability was much easier said than done.

The focus of this book is how the authorities actually went about their work, and following some introductory and comparative material, Hannant begins with an exposition on the history and scientific foundation of fingerprinting. Without a doubt, the genesis of security screening was the communist threat; what made it possible, Hannant points out, was the development of technology that made it practical to fingerprint millions of citizens and then record and store the information in some useful way. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was naturally involved, and the origins of its security screening system during the interwar period are carefully explained. The interwar work was only child’s play compared to the big challenge that occurred during World War II when security screening began on a massive scale. While Hannant understates the nature of at least some of the internal threats, most notably those posed by communists and their friends (even after the “character” of the war changed), he painstakingly describes the nuts and bolts of the security screening system as the loyalty of civil servants, soldiers, industrial workers, and sailors come under review.

For some reason, Hannant cannot understand why the authorities would take a dim view of communists in key positions. Take the case of the security screening of the merchant marine. Led by determined hard-core communists, the Canadian Seamen’s Union, which represented civilian sailors, had shown, on several occasions during the war, that it was capable of serious mischief and acting contrary to the national interest. Hannant, however, concludes that labour control, not subversion prevention, was the real objective of the security screening. While there is
probably something to that, the authorities were legitimately concerned about the havoc that could be committed by Canadian communists on board strategically placed ships. Unfortunately, one of the side-effects of this security screening cure was the creation of a blacklist that Hal Banks, the SIU boss, later exploited to the hilt as the means of enforcing his control.

Quite clearly, the strength of this book is in its research. Hannant has, the notes reveal, made use of many heretofore unmined sources. There are weaknesses too. For a story with a very human dimension, we learn nothing about the successes of the system (surely there were some) and extremely little about the victims of the process (there were many). What we do learn is that the system inordinately relied on a technology that failed to deliver and that the processes employed were ham-handed, at times unlawful, and frequently devastating in their consequences for many individuals as matters entirely unrelated to security were regularly used to deprive employees of jobs. However, instead of placing the story in a human context, it is squarely situated in an ideological one. Hannant would have us believe that the government came largely to rely on the system not simply for the security screening of left-wingers (a goal which it failed to achieve), but as a means of exerting widespread and continuing social control which was all the more indefensible because, unlike some of the other wartime fetters on civil liberties, which were not only relatively limited, but also subject to some form of appeal and review, it was covert. Moreover, and even more outrageous in Hannant’s view, it survived the end of the war. Canada is many things and its record for protecting liberties during and after wartime leaves a lot to be desired. But one thing it never became (or even came close), was a police state.

William Kaplan
University of Ottawa


IN THE MEDIEVAL GRAIL romances one of the archetypal symbols is of a Waste Land suffering a prolonged drought where the reproductive forces of nature have been halted. The task of the questing hero, whether Gawain, Perceval, or Galahad is to restore the land to health, to vitality, to make it green again. Certainly as the editors and authors of this fine collection, based on lectures and papers presented at a conference on social welfare held at Bishop’s University in Lennoxville, Québec in 1991, make clear, Canada is becoming a “waste land” as the neo-conservative/neo-liberal stripping of the welfare state continues unabated. The book provides an assessment and analysis of the making of Canadian social and labour market policy in the context of two intersecting themes: globalization and neo-conservatism. The volume is divided into three parts: Political Economy in Transition, Canadian Social Welfare Policy, and Canadian Labour Market Policy.

Global economic restructuring, underway since at least the mid 1970s, has been forcing relentlessly an agenda of neo-conservatism on the state and public policy. In the editors’ Introduction, and Philip Resnick’s chapter, the philosophy of neo-conservatism is given a thorough airing. While there is not a great deal that is new here, both provide brisk and compelling syntheses that serve to remind us of just how powerful this movement has been and how “neo-conservative policy prescriptions have sought to shrink the size of the state and to curb its scope, to restore the primacy of market forces, and, particularly, to dismantle the social welfare state, which is still alleged to be excessive, an obstacle to the creation of wealth, and a drain on the state’s ability to compete economically in international
markets.” Resnick concludes with a thoughtful discussion of what he calls the “question of moral vision.” At the end of the 20th century the left’s transformative vision is in tatters, at least in part because of the heavy emphasis placed on the economic level of human relations instead of the moral and political.

Resnick also astutely points out that the neo-conservative agenda has been far from a glowing success. Policy failures have been commonplace: high budget deficits, low economic growth, and large trade deficits. Picking up this theme Leo Panitch stresses the importance of “democratizing the welfare state,” arguing for an alternative social policy that would require institutional transformation fuelled by participation, empowerment, and mobilization. Patrick Kerens skilfully guides us through a complex philosophical examination of the concept of need. In many respects his intellectually nimble discussion is one of the book’s most engaging chapters and certainly its most challenging. Caroline Andrew takes a postmodern stab at the discipline of political economy and its impact on contemporary social policy. She weaves into her account a number of crucial considerations: multiple social identities, women, racial, ethnic, and visible minority groups, and the slippery and shifting boundaries between public and private. Rounding out Part I is Robert Mullaly’s trenchant assertion that the restructuring of the welfare state can be fully explained only if we view it as a class-based institution. Mullaly displays considerable scholarly range as he challenges much of the current literature on the restructuring of the welfare state.

Part II contains chapters on decentralized social services, native health and social services, AIDS, poverty, health care cutbacks, social assistance and employability for single mothers in Nova Scotia, Newfoundland’s social and child welfare policies, and standards of living for mothers and children. These are keenly observant pieces and encompass both empirical and theoretical material. Ken Battle, as usual, is fully on top of his material and delivers us a discerning analysis of poverty issues. A number of themes emerge, but two in particular stand out: the desperate need and search for alternative models of social policy in a dark, neo-conservative time of stark and brutal restraint; and the close connection between social welfare and labour market policy which receives a full assessment in Part III.

The seven chapters of Part III capture effectively how the game gets dicier, larger, and more unpredictable once labour market policy is factored into the public equation. Labour market policy, as the authors in this section fully demonstrate, now has the status of a key policy area and encompasses a wide range of problems, including international competitiveness and regional development. Leon Muszynski takes us on a theoretical excursion that successfully links institutional labour market economics and political sociology, leading to the conclusion that high levels of employment security and high wages will inevitably create high productivity and a strongly competitive international presence. Rodney Hadlow’s excellent chapter on “Canadian Organized Labour and the Guaranteed Annual Income” (GAI) provides an incisive historical account of the GAI debate since the 1960s with the emphasis being on the post 1984 period. Labour’s collectivist stance has been that social policy ought to include full employment and retraining in addition to universal social programs. But, since GAI schemes are geared for the most disadvantaged, often with work incentives built in, it is, in essence, liberal or ‘commodifying’ social policy. Hence labour in the 1980s has viewed it with skepticism, particularly when GAI proposals were floated as alternatives to full employment and universal social programs.

In an Epilogue, the editors acknowledge that although rightist, anti-state ideologies have dominated the past decade, much of the neo-conservative/neo-liberal
revolution has been a failure. This book, they maintain, suggests that alternatives do exist. However, the neo-liberal revolution seems to roll on and on and things do seem to be getting worse. Continuities and Discontinuities is perhaps overly optimistic, perhaps a bit too liberal! While it contains much that is instructive, it fails to offer, in the end, a penetrating critique of postmodern globalization and its devastating effects on the possibilities for a renewal of the positive state. Books of this kind, while excellent in themselves, are no more than flickers of light, almost extinguished, in the darkness, fallen structures, and Waste Land of the 1990s.

Allan Irving
University of Toronto


NORTH AMERICAN CANAL WORKERS toiled in an environment that made 19th-century shop floors look like enlightened workplaces. In forceful and often poetic prose, Peter Way seeks to understand the lives of ordinary canal workers in the relatively brief but energetic wave of canal construction from the late 18th to mid-19th century. Way scrupulously avoids creating a romanticized portrait of these workers; neither does he adhere rigorously to classic labour theory of class development. He succeeds in his reconstructive endeavours, but his tendency to blur the boundaries between late 20th-century ideals and the experiences of his subjects, coupled with pervasive judgmental overtones, serves to erode some of his more important assertions. Part narrator, part analyst of a formidable volume of evidence, and part dramatist, Way creates a lively study that in his words is a “darker, more desperate chronicle” than that of most contemporary workers.

Way carefully traces the emergence of canal building from the 1780s. As he does so, he places flesh on the bones of the men and women who toiled on and near canals large and small, including the Chesapeake & Delaware, the Beauhar­nois, the Lachine, and the Wabash & Erie. Canallers, consisting of slave, indentured, and free labour, were some of North America’s most exploited workers from the late 18th to the mid-19th century. As tentative initial projects gave way to a constructive frenzy by the early decades of the 19th century, free canallers found themselves rapidly losing whatever modest assistance they had previously enjoyed for quarters and subsistence. By the end of the canal era, Way maintains, crass contractors and owners had essentially relegated their workers to a form of wage slavery.

Way’s superlative research and lively writing allows him to bring the reader practically on site as workers jockeyed dilapidated wheelbarrows, hacked through bug-infested wilderness, and wrestled boulders from the paths of artificial waterways. His portrayal of lives both on and off the job are so vividly presented that they linger on the reader’s mind long after the equally impressive statistical data on wages and living expenses fade. The author meticulously distinguishes between labour systems, including slaves that were favoured in the American South, indentured workers that were prevalent in the early period, and free labour — comprising both native-born and immigrants — that transcended the era of canal construction. As he works an international canvas, Way effectively exposes the immense complexity of a seemingly narrow subject.

Indeed one of Way’s greatest contributions is to avoid the parochial tendency of historians to confine themselves within national boundaries; instead he envisions the process of canal construction in a North American context. After all, he asserts, canal building was the continent’s first international industry. While he
finds much that is common in the process of canal building in British North America and the United States, Way is careful to explore the distinctions as well. For example, he elaborates on the fact that the Canadians experienced a greater degree of collective violence along their canal systems than did their American counterparts. Way attributes this chiefly to a chronological lag, because by the 1830s — the beginning of intensive canal construction in Canada — most traditional amenities were fast disappearing and workers increasingly found themselves locked into cycles of despair. The dramatic number of violent eruptions that broke out along the canals were shaped by poor living and working conditions, depressed wages, and ethnic and religious tensions. In a point that should be well considered by North American historians, Way argues that the forces of the state steeled themselves to grapple with labour conflict; in Canada especially they moved swiftly — and successfully — to quash any hint of proletarian insurrection.

The work's theoretical leitmotif that canal workers lacked meaningful choices leads to a troublesome paradox that undermines Way's conclusions. On the one hand we are led to believe that workers had essentially no control over their lives. They were brutally exploited by contractors and owners; they suffered an alarming degradation in the work place and in their shanty hovels along the canals; and perhaps most appalling, they seemed stripped of their dignity and even a sense of class consciousness. Way contends in the bluntest possible terms that the workers had little influence on history: the capitalists won. Yet on a seemingly antithetical tact, Way wants us to find meaning in these workers' lives; they are somehow ennobled by virtue of the sheer misery they endured. Here Way makes a solid assertion that a worker's transiency was not aimless, for mobility was indeed a bargaining tool of sorts. Unfortunately, Way is so successful with the former line of reasoning that he risks leaving his readers unconvinced of the latter. They may even wonder why these workers were worth the explorative candle in the first place. This is dangerous terrain indeed for a labour historian to tread.

In addition to finding problems with conflicting messages, some historians might take great exception to Way's assertion that they continue to focus most of their research energies on skilled labour and class construction at the expense of understanding the lives of ordinary unskilled workers. This criticism seems more applicable to an earlier generation of historians. In addition, the author skirts dangerously close to adopting the ideas and language of decidedly middle class or elitist contemporary chroniclers, such as J.S. Buckingham and John Mactaggart. Most jarring to this reviewer, however, is Way's assertion that canal work somehow appropriated family life altogether; this is couched in a language that embraces an abstract family ideal. No doubt nuclear families experienced dramatic stresses in the shanty villages that dotted the canals, and most certainly we would not want to emulate them. Nonetheless, families were certainly responsible for constructing and strengthening cultural and religious traditions. Way's judgment that these communities were not "vibrant and entirely healthy" smacks a bit of our era's pop psychology.

Way's strength is his unflinching ability to avoid romanticizing his subject, and he is best when he unfolds his evidence objectively and, whenever possible, he allows his subjects to recount their own stories. Unfortunately, his use of sarcasm and anachronistic terms only serves to undermine his more compelling assertions. Examples of this abound, but most egregious are his word plays on Christian morality (including anachronistic phrases such as "God squad" and "kinder, gentler"), his subjective analysis of the prevalence of alcohol in canal society (here he borrows almost undiluted the sentiments of 19th-century temperance advocates), and his proclivity to use harsh
terms that ill-apply to humans (such as "beasts," "herds," and "goons"). While we might find passages such as "Adam Smith seemed to meet Confucius" mildly amusing at first blush, they tend to erode Way's more thoughtfully reasoned points. The author overplays his hand as he seeks to champion the downtrodden, but his impressive documentation alone leaves little chance for the reader to escape the point that these workers and their families suffered mightily at the hands of impersonal capitalists.

On balance, Way's work is a careful and imaginative study that at times suffers from an overwrought presentation. The author's nimble ability to trace the fortunes of an important work force in a truly North American context, his mastery of an international literature on labour, class, and ethnicity, his vibrant prose and sensible organization of seemingly disparate themes, all combine to yield what should become an enduring work of labour history. It is with the judgemental and at times flippant tones of a late 20th-century author that readers might find themselves least impressed. This work deserves careful consideration for its important contributions to the history of unskilled labour; it also demands a rigorous filtering on the part of its readers.

Scott W. See
University of Vermont


"WORK TAKES PLACE everywhere yet finds cultural representation almost nowhere," Nicholas Bromell writes in this acute and exceptionally thoughtful inquiry into the connections between work and literature during what was once called the American Renaissance. Whether massed in demonstration, out on strike, at home, or at their leisure, workers figure abundantly in word and picture; but "in how many paintings, sculptures, poems, plays, stories, novels (or TV shows, movies, and advertisements) do we find not just workers ... but men and women working?" The point holds as true for the 19th-century labour press — which always preferred manly action to representations of mere, daily labour —as for the dime novel, the Horatio Alger tale, or the canonical works of American literature. Bromell does not attempt directly to fill that gap in these readings of the language of labour in Thoreau, Melville, Warner, Stowe, Douglass, Hawthorne, and their literary contemporaries. But in focusing on the division between mental and bodily work, the "higher" work of the mind and the "coarser" work of hands and body, he goes a long way toward explaining the silences and ambivalences even a putatively work-obsessed culture harbours about work.

The mind-body distinction set the very language of labour, Bromell makes clear. From Noah Webster's distinction between the manual and mental arts, those "in which the hands are more concerned than the mind," to the reformers' program of education and self-culture, to the labour radical's plea for class awakening, the dichotomy was everywhere. The vertical understanding of mental and bodily labour naturalized class divisions. "The more a man labours with his mind," Theodore Sedgwick maintained in 1836, "the higher he is on the scale of labourers; all must agree to that whether they will or no. ... It is upon this ground, that there have ever been, and ever will be, high and low, rich and poor, masters and servants." That a craftsman's brains might not all be under his cap, but in the very ingenuity of his (or her) hands, or the aesthetics of the fingers, was, within the reigning language of labour, all but impossible to express. The very materiality which gave labour its productive capacity and value simultaneously stained and degraded it.

To illuminate these conceptual chasms, Bromell is drawn most strongly
to those early 19th-century writers who, in one way or another, managed partially to surmount them. In *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, he shows Harriet Beecher Stowe attempting to seize, as a model of literary production, the inescapably bodily character of maternal labour. In the sailors' work in *Redburn*, he shows Melville struggling to overcome his own internationalization of the divisions between body and labour, love and toil. Beneath the strenuous, ego-denying spirituality of Susan Warner's *The Wide Wide World*, he catches the eruptions of imperfectly repressed materiality. Above all it is Thoreau who, in Bromell's reading, comes closest to writing about work free of the divisions between mind and hand. In *Walden*, he shows Thoreau attempting to forge a language of "natural" work, work which (contra Locke) did not depend on the mind's "possession" of the body and, therefore, the labourer's mastery of the land "possessed," work which was not a "making" or a "subduing" (not a matter of rivets and anvils, as Thoreau complained over Carlyle's writing) but a form of being. These are brilliant textual readings, succinctly and lucidly crafted.

In keeping with the currents of contemporary literary scholarship, Bromell does not wholly resist the temptation to take the work of writing as the master trope of work itself. But in two chapters which deserve a wide reading among historians of 19th-century labour, he brings that same acuity to the language of everyday labour. In a chapter on the exhibits of the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanic Association, he shows the labour of hands and mind coming apart before one's eyes, as "invention" triumphs — in symbol as it did in material fact — over the embodied skill of the crafts. In a brilliant reading of the narratives of Frederick Douglass and others who escaped from slavery, he shows how, within the contradictions of human ownership, the slaves could find in their labour — the very sign and essence of their unfreedom — an arena of freedom itself.

*By the Sweat of the Brow* is a work of especially penetrating literary criticism, deeply informed by history. It is all but impossible, putting it down, to see labour in the same way again.

Daniel T. Rodgers
Princeton University


IN 1948, HISTORIAN Richard Hofstadter included a vivid and memorable portrait of Abraham Lincoln in his *The American Political Tradition*. That portrait stressed the ambitious Illinois politician's sincere and consistent commitment to the "free labour" capitalism of the antebellum North, a social system that he credited for ensuring the individual's opportunity to ascend the social ladder. Thirty years later, Gabor S. Boritt substantially deepened and elaborated on the connection in Lincoln's thought between capitalist development and the "right to rise" in his *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream*.

The present work by Olivier Frayssé, associate professor of American studies at the University of the Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III, originally appeared in French in 1988; the elegant translation is the work of Sylvia Neely, associate professor of history at Saint Louis University. Frayssé's bold, stimulating, learned, insightful, but uneven study takes the aforementioned depiction of the mature Lincoln's political-economic outlook as its point of departure. (The notes and historiographical essay repeatedly credit Boritt's work, although, surprisingly, they contain no reference to Hofstadter.) He then sets out to refine and modify this portrait and especially to contextualize it — to identify not only continuities but also changes over time in Lincoln's intellectual and political stance and to stress
the role played in those changes by the era's economic, social, and political realities. Frayssé places particular stress on the interplay between evolving class relations and Lincoln's personal place within and reaction to them.

Born into a poor family in Kentucky, the young Lincoln became from an early age profoundly alienated from agricultural labour in particular and rural life more generally. This assertion constitutes the leitmotif of the book as a whole. "For Lincoln," the author tells us, "the earth meant death," and the kind of agriculture that he saw around him was a dreary, mind-numbing affair, "the archetype of the painful, degrading activity imposed on man for his sins." (29, 33-4) Frayssé is well aware of the sharp contrast between this view and other, heavily romanticized images of Lincoln as happy hayseed and sturdy son of the soil. As he sees it, the man's deep-seated aversion to the land and a fairly obsessive drive to escape it formed the driving force behind Lincoln's personal odyssey. They shaped his family relations, occupational choices, and intellectual and partisan (Whig) affinities.

Frayssé is especially interested in Lincoln's political stance toward landed property, the rural classes, and especially land reform and how these changed over time. He finds the young Lincoln somewhat inconsistent, combining pro-bank, pro-infrastructure, and revenue-minded fiscal policies of the type favoured by Whig leader Henry Clay with support for "pre-emption" laws (which bolstered the land claims of actual settlers and were generally identified with the Jacksonian Democrats). But following the economic downturn of the late 1830s, the author continues, Lincoln purged his own platform of the Democrat admixture, opposing pre-emption, endorsing higher land taxes and higher prices for publicly-owned land, and generally championing the interests of wealthy title-claimants, creditors, and speculators against those of hard-pressed settlers and debtors. Lincoln's selection of personal and political associates in this period (lawyers, speculators, grain dealers, and cattle barons) reflected the same kind of choices, and his personal fortunes improved markedly.

The author finds a second shift, but a more protracted one, beginning somewhere in the late 1840s and reaching maturity only in 1861. The prime mover this time was the escalating sectional conflict. Frayssé finds Lincoln slow to recognize fully the stakes involved in both the South's demand for annexing Texas and the subsequent war with Mexico. But the Lincoln whose personal experiences had made him an ardent exponent of "free labour" capitalism was, by the late 1840s, becoming increasingly alarmed by the aggressive expansionism of the slave-labour system. According to Frayssé, Lincoln's growing preoccupation with and determination to resist the "Slave Power" eventually led him to modify once again his attitudes toward plebeians and agriculture. At least two complementary considerations were evidently at work here. First, Lincoln recognized the need for a new, broadly-based, cross-class political alliance of Northerners; this required conciliating plebeian demands (by, among other things, stroking the labour movement and embracing the increasingly popular cause of land reform — in the form of "homestead" legislation). Second, "the adoption of a Homestead law and the extension of slavery were the two opposing ways of definitively settling the question of the status of the territories." (129) To check the latter method implied accepting the former.

This book displays some notable strengths and makes some valuable contributions to our understanding of both its particular subject, related topics, and the era as a whole. Successive chapters dealing with Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois bristle with knowledge about soil type, flora and fauna, land distribution, cultivation techniques, and the overall shape of local economy. Such erudition is all the more striking in a scholar based so far
from the relevant source materials and conducting his research in a second language. Another gem is the book’s discussion of economic and social networks among the Illinois Republican party leadership, especially the identification of the “substantial role” played therein by large landowners and sturdily bourgeois-minded Freemasons. And still another pregnant insight is the observation that the kind of limited “equality” for blacks that Lincoln defended against Democrat Stephen Douglas in 1858 and 1860 was “the equality of all men as workers”—the right, that is, freely to contract over one’s labour power. (169)

I mentioned at the outset that the book is uneven. Its treatment of the early labour movement, German immigrants, and Lincoln’s relationship to both is marred by more than a few factual errors and skewed assessments. One cause is the author’s reliance upon sources in these fields that have in many cases become outdated. Similar problems crop up in the book’s rendition of political history. Frayssé’s portrait of Lincoln’s political evolution in the 1850s draws attention to what is by any measure an important historical phenomenon. The transition from northern Whiggery to Republicanism in those years involved a marked shift to the left; the new party was more combative in its hostility to slavery and readier to make concessions on land reform, immigrant rights, and other issues close to the hearts of plebeian progressives. But too often the author burdens his argument with an interpretive load heavier than it can bear.

Perhaps the most striking example is Frayssé’s attempt to root Lincoln’s longstanding rejection of abolitionism in a conservative bourgeois respect for “the most sacred right, the right of property.” Since “abolition of property, even if only partial abolition, is indeed the most serious threat ... in a society founded on private ownership of the means of production,” the author asserts, Lincoln “was ... genuinely in favor of maintaining slavery in the South.” (123)

This is wide of the factual mark. Lincoln was an advocate neither of property per se nor of deliberately “maintaining slavery in the South.” Like the great majority of northern Whigs, rather, he was firmly committed to a society in which labour was performed under conditions of legal freedom, which conditions he (and they) equated with an absence of economic exploitation. Their ideological objection to property in human beings and to labour extracted by physical coercion was equally clear and unencumbered by a sense of contradiction. (Otherwise, how explain their support for antislavery measures in the northern states or for those that applied to the territories, such as the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise?) They balked at translating those principles into a direct legislative assault upon slavery in the South on the grounds that, under the federal constitution, authority over such matters rested exclusively with the states and not with the central government. They did not invent this constitutional theory; it enjoyed nearly universal acceptance. Even the small antislavery Liberty Party tacitly acknowledged as much.

This misunderstanding exaggerates Lincoln’s conservatism during the 1840s and distorts the treatment of a number of related questions. Reciprocally, it lays the groundwork for an overblown assessment of Lincoln’s stinging verbal indictments of slavery during the 1850s. Lincoln at one point called it a system in which “You work and toil and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.” Here, the author believes, a Rubicon has been crossed, since “the principle that a man should not be deprived of the fruit of his labour was revolutionary” and “threatened the very foundations of capitalist society.” (170-1) But this observation substitutes an abstract (and highly conflict-ridden) capitalist society for the relatively immature one of Lincoln’s day, just as it substitutes the author’s understanding of capitalist productive relations for the view prevalent in the mid-19th century United States.
These weaknesses in political history do not detract from the notable strengths exhibited by *Lincoln, Land, and Labor*. Its emphasis on the economic and social context that moulded Lincoln is most welcome and exceedingly well executed. The author's mastery of the natural and legal environment is especially impressive. This is more than enough to earn his book the attention and admiration of its audience.

Bruce Levine
University of Cincinnati


WRITTEN IN THE GUTMAN mode, *Producers, Proletarians, and Politicians: Workers and Party Politics in Evansville and New Albany, Indiana, 1850-87* is a thoughtful and well-researched effort to understand the community sources of labour strife in two Ohio River cities in Southern Indiana through the middle decades of the 19th century. As readers of *Labour/L'Travail* well know, beginning in the late 1950s, Herbert Gutman produced a series of articles about working-class experience in smaller cities and towns during the Gilded Age (synthesized in "The Workers' Search for Power") that challenged many commonly held assumptions about labour: that workers received little sympathy from the rest of the community, that employers had a relatively free hand in imposing the new industrial discipline, and that a quest for wealth had obliterated nonpecuniary values. For Gutman such assumptions were more appropriate to the social environment found in large American cities during the Gilded Age than in the smaller industrial communities. Yet the actual experiences of working men and women with the social structure of power, while of interest to Gutman, were not nearly as important to him as was worker culture, or how workers "interpreted and then dealt" with these experiences. Animated by Gutman's methods and approach, the "new labor historians" that followed his lead often portrayed workers, in the words of one recent study, as coming to occupy a "world grown apart."

In contrast, *Producers, Proletarians, and Politicians* is one of a growing number of studies that question the notion of worker culture as an autonomous system of ideas and values. Taking into account the dynamic roles played by fraternal societies and by local party politics, Lipin explores how workers' social experience of industrialization was mediated through the agencies of culture, religion, and political power in the two Indiana communities.

On the eve of the Civil War, both New Albany and Evansville were still small-scale manufacturing towns. After the war their industrial stories diverge. Ironically, Lipin distinguishes the paths to industrial growth of these two communities in ways similar to the distinction that Gutman drew between large cities and smaller towns. Antebellum New Albany was a steamboat-building town of some twelve thousand inhabitants. Its mostly prosperous and generally native-born carpenters, caulkers, and other skilled workers often militantly defended their artisanal rights. During the late 1860s, as the shipbuilding industry collapsed, extensive iron, plate glass, and woollen mills were opened that transformed New Albany into a factory town. Each of these large-scale enterprises employed a substantial workforce; the rolling mill and the glass works each employed 175 workers in 1870 and put out a combined product of over one million dollars.

But as factory production increased, a growing proportion of New Albany's workforce came to consist of younger, unskilled, French, German, or Irish immigrants who earned far less than their better-trained, skilled, native white or Brit-
ish immigrant coworkers. Thus an increasingly divided labour force confronted what Lipin depicts as the industrial barony of one man, Washington C. DePauw. Two decades after he migrated to New Albany in the 1850s, DePauw controlled local industry. Allied with DePauw was a mostly native-born and Protestant Gilded Age elite that played an active role shaping local affairs.

Evansville, with a population some two-and-a-half times larger than its upriver neighbour, developed a more diversified commercial and manufacturing economy after the war. Of particular significance to Lipin, unlike in New Albany, the earlier artisanal character of Evansville's economy persisted in the Gilded Age alongside much larger industrial expansion. Still, by the 1880s, steam-driven machines had replaced craft production in many of Evansville's industries, and nearly two-thirds of the manufacturing workforce laboured in workshops with more than twenty-five workers. As happened in New Albany and elsewhere, in Evansville, along with large-scale industry came greater differences among workers in skill and income.

Even though class lines hardened in both communities, the working class in postbellum Evansville, according to Lipin, was not as socially isolated as New Albany's. In Evansville, along with the continued presence of craft workers, was a greater number of middle-class white-collar workers and store keepers. In contrast, by 1890 New Albany had experienced a precipitous decline of the virtuous middle. In this community, popular interclass associations of the antebellum period, like the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, began, during the postbellum years, to draw in the more prosperous citizens, whereas in Evansville, the older intraclass ties persisted well into the Gilded Age.

Lipin finds that class and ethnicity reinforced each other in Evansville but did not in New Albany. By 1880, German immigrants and their second generation children accounted for 43 per cent of Evansville's workforce. The presence of a largely German working class prompted the creation of what Lipin refers to as the "politics of class division," essentially, the development of coalition politics. Evansville's local Democratic party, hoping to attract the German workers' support, responded sympathetically to labour's demands concerning such issues as control of the police and greenbacks. In New Albany, however, a divided working class made fewer demands of the city's political leaders, who, in any event, were fearful of antagonizing DePauw.

The wealth of detail in Producers, Proletarians, and Politicians makes the book a worthy example of how much we can still learn from investigating the communities where "workers lived and fought." Yet Lipin's elaboration of the Gutman model brings to mind David Brody's nearly twenty-year-old critique of the community approach to the writing of labour history in which he called on his fellow new labour historians to reconsider the narrow focus of "our research, our devotion to intensive local studies of workers." Without endorsing Brody's contention that work or the job rather than the community should be the starting point for labour historians, the question of how far, conceptually, the field of labour history has come remains a salient one. After all, Gutman himself used the 1874 victory of a labour party in Evansville as evidence that workers often engaged in local politics during the Gilded Age. More to the point, based on his exhaustive study, what conclusion does Lipin reach regarding working-class politics? From the examples provided by New Albany and Evansville, he determines that workers' faith in the notion of a neutral state meant that their political activity was essentially defensive, directed at restricting capitalists in using the state for their own purposes. This is little different from the conclusions about workers' political movements reached long ago by David Montgomery in Beyond Equality or
Alan Dawley in Class and Community. Thus the larger issue raised by Brody's critique — what is the relationship of all the particular stories to the overall pattern of workers' experience with industrialization in America — remains a compelling one for labour historians.

Brian Greenberg
Monmouth University


EGGERT DESCRIBES the transformation of Harrisburg from a preindustrial river town, to a modestly industrialized city, to a deindustrializing (by about 1900) state capitol. He divides his account roughly equally into two sections. The first half of the book deals with early developments, economics, and major figures along the road to a consolidated industrial city. The second considers fathers and sons among the entrepreneurs, industrial workers, craftsmen, and ethnic minorities. Labour relations in the final quarter of the 19th century and the role of politics in Harrisburg's development round out this section of the account.

Eggert's thesis is that industrialization happened differently in middle-sized cities copying the patterns of their cutting-edge predecessors. He alludes to works on other similar-sized cities to support the idea that a body of knowledge provides increasing evidence of this different second-tier industrialization, one which happened with less local impact, less conflict, fewer casualties, and less rapaciousness.

The author approaches his task with a broad interdisciplinary brush. He points out the rationality of blending histories of business, labour, and industry in the pursuit of the story of industrial development. However, available sources offer far more information on elites than workers, and the reader finds a much fuller account of developers than of participants on all lower levels, from manager to labourer.

Available source materials enable Eggert to provide a wealth of material about topography, the city's early development as a transportation centre, and lists of members of various elites and their activities. They also produce many unanswered questions. Following the path of available evidence, the narrative is unable to provide the balance hoped for in the plan set forth. The accumulation of facts does not create the thesis promised. Thus the investors are described in great detail, though their motives are often lacking or only speculatively described. Who had the money and where it went become clear, as do the actions of the social and industrial elite in the book's second half. The corporate records that would elucidate the results of these peoples' actions are thin, however, and details on the results of their actions for the other residents are even slimmer.

The author writes as if countering monolithic interpretations that offer descriptions of industrialization in the United States in which the unalloyed benefits of the craftsman's life in preindustrial history loom large. His knowledge of the literatures of the various relevant fields seems at times spotty and leaves him unable to sufficiently gauge and place Harrisburg's history in the broad context he strives to elaborate. The textile and shoe industries do not work well as exemplars of the patterns of craft response to industrialism through the 19th century, for instance. The book contributes to a growing body of literature but does not provide a basis to revise it.

Because he feels the craftsman's life to have been idealized in some accounts, he cavalierly dismisses any qualitative advantages it may have offered. He similarly dismisses any significant impact of the deindustrialization of the early 20th century. Scant evidence leads to a discon-
Interesting moments are glossed over: how did the iron companies raise output through "increased efficiency?" (270) Was there really no permanent factory labour in Harrisburg, or does its existence remain hidden from historians, as was the identity of the disorderly element in the railroad strike of 1877 from those recording the event? The identity issue, along with insightful comparisons of the comparative outlooks and treatments of young clerks and young factory workers, represent the skill he applies to understanding such factors, and the behaviour of others, where information is sufficient. Unfortunately for his thesis, he lacks the data to establish that Harrisburg was exceptional or that other scholars have created a one-dimensional interpretation of industrialization. In his attempt to establish such exceptionalism, he downplays such national trends as the discontinuities between ways of work emphasizing skill, creativity, and responsibility and those developed to eliminate all of those through the specialized division of labour in the interest of managerial control of the workplace.

Eggert set himself a task difficult for at least two reasons: his admirable interdisciplinary approach requires a very broad knowledge of several literatures, and local data is both thin and heavily weighted toward topics other than the nature of the experience of industrialization. The author works hard to attack both issues, but his efforts are frustrated by the available evidence and the incomplete interpretations of secondary materials. He adds to our understanding of industrialization but does not establish a corrective to the literature.

Laurence F. Gross
University of Massachusetts Lowell


**CHARTING THE VARIOUS WAYS** that class and gender have related, conflicted, and interconnected has been a chief and abiding concern of feminist historians for the past two decades. Ardis Cameron addresses this hoary problem, confronts newly fashionable topics such as cultural categories and popular memory, in addition to examining stalwart subjects like immigration, ethnicity, and popular protest. Not surprisingly, *Radicals of the Worst Sort* leaves some significant questions unanswered. For the most part, Cameron balances this heavy load with skill, making insightful points about the history of working-class women.

Cameron's work is divided into two parts, each roughly chronological and focused on a significant strike. The first part, "Self-Supporting Women and the Struggle for the Real," deals with the 1880s and 1890s. Cameron first outlines the movement of women workers into New England's textile towns. She then uses census and contemporary reports to create a demographic and social analysis of the "city of women" that formed in Lawrence's crowded neighbourhoods. She argues that the prominence of lifelong female wage work rendered female loyalties and support systems particularly important. Such traditions were in turn crucial in sustaining the highly visible female involvement in the militant yet unsuccessful 1882 strike against Pacific Mill. The years following the strike, Cameron continues, witnessed an extended attack on female economic independence and a concomitant pathologization of the "independent woman" in *fin de siècle* social and sexual discourse. The independent wage-earning woman, writes Cameron, "entered the twentieth century redefined, a social problem and a potential threat to national unity." (70)
The second part of the work, “Immigrant Women and the Fight for Bread and Roses,” takes *Radicals of the Worst Sort* up to the strike of 1912. Cameron begins by analysing the influx of eastern and southern European immigrants into Lawrence and examines the multi-ethnic urban enclaves they created against a backdrop of worsening working and living conditions. Mining the techniques of oral history and record linkage, she again argues that these neighbourhoods were fertile ground for the development of female networks of support and mutuality. Such networks were key to family survival and, perhaps more importantly, were distinctly political manifestations of “female consciousness.” (113) It was this consciousness that nurtured what Cameron dubs the “totality” of female militance evident in the famous “Bread and Roses” strike of 1912. Superintending the “neighbourhoods in revolt,” Lawrence’s women, “radicalized daily life allowing many who might have otherwise endured their ‘bad luck’ alone to join in the struggle and politicize hard times.” (165) Yet the years following the strike, Cameron’s “Epilogue” asserts, witnessed a prolonged assault on immigrant working-class culture in the name of “Americanization.”

Throughout this analysis, Cameron stresses how class and gender, public and private, personal and political, were experienced and contested simultaneously by the women of Lawrence. Her case for this is successfully made, but is hardly news to students of working-class women’s history evident in the famous “Bread and Roses” strike of 1912. Superintending the “neighbourhoods in revolt,” Lawrence’s women, “radicalized daily life allowing many who might have otherwise endured their ‘bad luck’ alone to join in the struggle and politicize hard times.” (165) Yet the years following the strike, Cameron’s “Epilogue” asserts, witnessed a prolonged assault on immigrant working-class culture in the name of “Americanization.”

Despite these and related silences, *Radicals of the Worst Sort* does suggest that the promises of working-class women’s history are being fulfilled. Born of feminism and nurtured by labour history, works like Cameron’s enrich our understanding of both female and working-class experience, and affirm that neither gender nor class can be understood separately. By addressing additional concerns generated by recent research and theory, Cameron’s work suggests that studies of working-class women will continue to generate new and challenging analyses.

Adele Perry
York University

Perhaps no figure is more steadfastly fixed in the historiographic imagination with the literal trials and struggles of working-class communism in America than William Z. Foster. Like so many others in the US workers movement, Foster was born of an American union of Irish republicanism and Irish Catholicism, his father a footloose example of hard-drinking combative masculinity, his mother almost a caricature of resigned feminine religiosity, frowning on her husband's militant Fenianism, impetuous business ventures, and neglect of the spiritual realm. The family lived in dire poverty, and most of the more than twenty children borne to Mrs. Foster died in infancy. By the mid-1890s a teenaged William had moved with the family to Philadelphia, where his social life was that of the street and his personal political economy from the age of ten one of hawking newspapers, apprenticed work in the craft metalurgy sector, and waged employment in the most industrialized foundry shops. In his street gang, the Bulldogs, the young Foster lived first-hand the debilitating fragmentations of race and religious prejudice at the same time as he learned early lessons in class solidarity during a violent 1895 street railway strike.

By the turn-of-the-century Foster's family ties were unravelling and by 1901 both of his parents were apparently dead. He began a decade-long tramp which took him to Havana and New York, Portland and Galveston. If he found work it was almost always temporary: fired from his job as a New York streetcar motorman because of his attempts to organize a union, he ended up in the lumber camps, railway construction projects, and port docks of capitalism's post-1900 boom. For a time he shipped out to sea, and touched down in England, Australia, Peru, and South Africa. Foster even tried homesteading. But the itinerant Foster's fundamental rootlessness was stabilized in his familiarity with railroad work, which was simultaneously waged employment, cultural context, and vehicle of mobility. And when he settled in Portland he looked for the social and political company of a militant brotherhood of socialists who understood the alienations and angers of the dispossessed. Rubbing shoulders with the ultra-left of Washington State, Foster found bits and pieces of attraction in the Socialist Party, Dr. Hermon Franklin Titus' Wage Workers Party, DeLeon's Socialist Labor Party, and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), whose 1909 free speech fight in Spokane impressed the young radical with its "excellent discipline."

As a correspondent to Titus' Workingman's Paper, Foster was learning the agitational ropes of the left-wing propagandist. He took a step further along this educational road when he travelled to Europe in 1910, granted informal credentials by Wobbly figurehead Vincent St. John. "The Saint," who baptized many a promising young militant in those years, no doubt funded a part of Foster's expenses in return for a promise of articles on European labour struggles for the IWW press and Foster's presence as an IWW representative at the International Trade Union Secretariat gathering in Budapest. Arriving in Europe in time to witness the French syndicalists in action during the 1910 railroad strike, Foster managed to get himself arrested for vagrancy on the eve of the Budapest conference. Upon his return to the United States he committed himself to the futile project of restructuring the IWW, trying to convert it to a propaganda league that would serve as a militant minority working to transform the mainstream American Federation of Labor into an industrial union, eventually forming the Syndicalist Militant Minority League in Chicago. Drawn to the anarchists of the utopian Home Colony near Puget Sound, Foster met his lifelong companion and future wife, Ester Abra-
mowitz, a practising advocate of free love who was destined to remain a shadowy figure as Foster moved into increasing prominence in the left struggle to build first, a syndicalist opposition, and then, later in the post-1920 years, the Communist Party (CP).

Chicago became Foster's organizing base. He rose high in the ranks of the Chicago Federation of Labor, playing a pivotal role in the 1918 campaign to unionize the stockyards of packingtown, where working-class unity broke on the back of racial exclusions. With the Great Steel Strike of 1919, Foster became the bête noire of America's working class organizers, a man feared and despised precisely because he galvanized proletarian loyalties at the same time that he could not be dismissed by the bourgeois order as alien and other. The product of American conditions, Foster's alien status was that of the worker; he was an outlaw, not because of his "foreignness," but because he demanded the organizational rights of unions for all labour, regardless of national origin.

As a "free lance" organizer in the general trade union movement, Foster grew closer and closer to the Communist Party, which had broken out of its underground cliquishness to become a presence in the broad workers movement by the early 1920s. It took Foster a while to move into communist circles and join the new party but he eventually did secretly join, in 1921, after travelling to the Soviet Union; he soon became a central figure in the "amalgamation" efforts to create industrial unionism through the Trade Union Educational League.

Never quite comfortable in the Party's inner circles, Foster was part of an early faction of American trade unionists that included James Cannon, who would ultimately break with Stalinism in 1928. Their first task was to deepen the Americanization of the Party and to consolidate its trade union core by loosening the hold over party power of the New York-based, largely foreign-born, intellectual wing, many of whom were holdovers from the Goose Caucus which had struggled to keep the Party underground and theoretically pure to the point of isolation from the masses of US workers. Led by honourable former Socialist Party left wingers such as C.E. Ruthenberg and Max Bedacht, the New York Germans were orthodox theorists and straight-laced purists. Bedacht never recovered from the unease he felt when he met Cannon for the first time and found the Kansas-born former Wobbly chewing tobacco. Ruthenberg and Bedacht had the misfortune to be aligned with John Pepper, seconded to the US Party from the Comintern, where he had been involved in the disastrous events of the Hungarian Workers Republic in 1919. Pepper's leadership of the Party was instinctually opportunist, and in his programmatic efforts to curry favour with the LaFollette Third Party movement, was a preface to the later Stalinist subordination of Marxist practice in a host of popular front debacles. With Pepper recalled to the Soviet Union in 1924, the personnel of political factionalism in the CP took a turn for the worse as Jay Lovestone replaced Pepper. Communist leaders, Foster among them, rightly regarded Lovestone as "ruthless, unscrupulous, and iron-fisted."

Foster and Cannon came to a parting of the ways in 1925, Cannon seeing political programme and loyalty to the Comintern as centrally important, Foster making control of the actual Party apparatus paramount. For years this coveted end would elude him, and for much of the later 1920s, as Stalinism tightened its grip on the international communist movement, strangling opposition of any sort, Foster endured personal and political isolation and a series of humiliating dressing downs from those who questioned his "communist" loyalties or denigrated his grasp of Marxist ideas. He remained in the shadows of Party leadership throughout the 1930s, an enduring if somewhat nostalgic symbol. Eventually he succumbed to a nervous breakdown. But his
vision of American mass production industrial unionism as the best hope for a revival of communism among the working class seemed vindicated by the momentous upturn in class struggle in the post-1934 years. Politically, however, these were years of Browder's control of the American Party, and while Foster challenged Browder in the 1940s he yet again stifled his anguished dissent in capitulation to Stalinist notions of "peaceful coexistence." When Browderism went too far, and its advocate had to be exiled from the Party of Stalin for his excessive popular front "deviations," Foster was, ironically, one of the few elder statesmen of American communism who could lay claim to the leadership of the Party. He took over the chairmanship of the Party, which was now to be run by a triumvirate of Foster, Eugene Dennis, and John Williamson. But this "victory" came quite late in Foster's political life: he was ill and he lacked a factional base or a rank and file constituency. Hounded by the FBI, living through the dark political night of McCarthyism, and something of a loner, Foster apparently derived little warmth from his relationship with his wife and not much more from his position of authority in the American communist movement. He lived throughout the 1950s under indictment for Smith Act prosecutions, free on $5,000 bail pending the recovery of his health. That never happened. After a series of strokes he petitioned the Supreme Court to release him from the terms of his parole, which confined him to the New York area, his stated desire being to travel to the Soviet Union. The government delayed issuing him a passport, however, until he appeared before the appropriate officer, driven to the building in an ambulance. Early in 1961 he went to the Soviet Union, most likely knowing he would die there. Eight months later, at the age of 80, he passed away in a sanatorium outside of Moscow. His ashes were deposited in Waldheim Cemetery in Chicago, placed near the graves of the Haymarket martyrs.

Edward P. Johanningsmeier gives us this portrait of Foster, and it is a remarkable book. Deeply researched, and drawing on the rich holdings of the former Central Archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow), now called the Center for Research and Preservation of Documents on Modern and Contemporary History, this book advances the historiography of communism in the United States considerably. Learned and reliable, it will be an important source for scholars for decades to come. Johanningsmeier tries to situate his study of Foster within contemporary concerns about the gendered representation of class militancy and the language of political opposition, but these are asides in what is essentially a traditional political biography. Some reviewers may find this disappointing. That is their problem. The details presented here, from the fascinating account of Foster's early family life, to the alienations of his wandering years as a hobo, and into the factional intrigues characteristic of life in the communist milieu from the early 1920s into the 1950s, are all part of the life of the militant minority. They explain the personal and the political. Foster saw the hard lives of his parents and watched his siblings die in childbirth or infancy: he never fathered any biological children of his own. Foster experienced, intensely and with great feeling, the alienated rootlessness of the dispossessed: he himself lived as an ascetic, dressed in second hand clothes, gave money away to passersby, and never succumbed to the desire to own much of anything. Foster knew well the price the American working class paid for its individualism: once in the party of the international working class he stayed with it, less often for the better than for the worse. The factional intrigues and political maneuverings that Johanningsmeier recounts are not so much stolid accounts of unimportant doctrinal wars on the isolated left as they are statements about the meaning of programme and principle as they are applied to
American conditions. This is especially the case for the 1920s, when the US Communist Party still retained the potential to be a revolutionary force, before Stalinism contained and destroyed its original Bolshevik currents.

Where I part company from Johanningsmeier is precisely around this issue of Stalinism. Communist Party historiography has reached something of an impasse of late, with the Theodore Draper-inspired literature emphasizing the Comintern-dominated character of American communism and ideologically equating communism and Stalinism, while a New Left-inspired historiography avoids this critical question of Stalinism by stressing the indigenous radicalism of the American communist experience, focusing on secondary cadre and local experiences. Johanningsmeier’s treatment of Foster may well appear to bridge this political and disciplinary gap, largely because Foster was such an unambiguous Stalinist from the late 1920s to his death and yet he managed to retain some of the romance of American communism by being the implacable defender of the militant working class and by being such a perennial “outsider” within the upper echelons of the Communist Party. But it is precisely in failing to challenge Foster’s Stalinism and explore more analytically how he accommodated himself to the ugly twists of every Stalinist “turn” that Johanningsmeier misses an opportunity to transcend the limitations of the current historiographic impasse. Ultimately, such a revisionist breakthrough may not be possible by focusing on those who lived within Stalinism. It is perhaps time that the history of communism in the United States address more frontally the personnel and politics of communism’s Left Opposition. In doing that there are none who will not benefit from a close reading of Johanningsmeier’s Foster.

Bryan D. Palmer
Queen’s University


IN THIS ASTUTE BOOK, Eileen Boris traces the attempts to regulate and prohibit industrial homework in the late 19th- and 20th-century US. Boris focuses on the public discourse on homework, with careful attention to the multiple perspectives of employers, trade unionists, women reformers, policymakers, and homeworkers themselves. She outlines the shifting arguments and fragile coalitions in the repeated public contests over a form of underpaid women’s labour that blurred the ideological boundaries between home and work.

The book incorporates and illustrates recent trends in US women’s history: it combines gender analysis with women’s history, and it emphasizes politics, as the subtitle states, more than social history. Boris demonstrates how constructions of gender shaped the discourse on homework, the labour itself, and the history of state intervention in the labour market.

In industrial homework, employers profited from traditional gender ideals by offering poorly paid piecework to women, especially mothers of young children, who worked in their own homes. Male trade unionists opposed a form of unorganized labour that undercut the higher wages of organized factory workers. With a sentimental version of home and motherhood, they argued that men should earn a “family wage” with married women spared from paid labour in the domestic sphere. Reformers entered the fray with concern for women, children, and consumers. Led by the National Consumers’ League and the National Child Labor Committee, they protested the sweated labour of mothers and children, and, along with unionists, pointed to the “diseased” conditions under which homework products were allegedly made. By the early 20th century, a coalition of reformers, dominated by women, turned to
the state to solve the problem of homework. Hampered by prevailing notions of "freedom of contract," they emphasized public health and special protections for women. They hoped for prohibition but settled for regulation.

State-level legislation led to federal regulation during World War I, both of which set the stage for the New Deal's more concerted attempts to address the homework issue. Women reformers and their trade union allies continued to push for prohibition with arguments about labour standards and workers' rights as well as about motherhood. Their efforts came to fruition in the piecemeal policies of the labour codes of the National Industrial Recovery Act and later the Fair Labor Standards Act. But with watered-down policy and inadequate enforcement, government intervention often seemed to have little impact on homework which rose and declined, it seems, primarily in response to economic and social change.

By the 1980s, during the Reagan administration, new proposals to deregulate industry fanned the smouldering flames of the once-raging homework wars. While modern reformers, who still opposed homework, dropped their emphasis on "sacred motherhood," conservative politicians coopted the language of liberal feminism to claim women's "right" to earn wages in their own homes.

Homeworkers themselves had limited access to the public culture in which the debates over their work were aired. But Boris adds their voices when her evidence permits. Not surprisingly, homeworkers rarely portrayed themselves as victims, although they acknowledged the poor conditions under which they laboured. They often took pride in their work and saw it as crucial to the family economy. Their wages, meagre as they were, helped women improve their families' standard of living and participate in the burgeoning consumer culture. In general, homeworkers opposed the reformers who hoped to "protect" them by eliminating their jobs.

Although the scope of the book is national, much of it focuses on immigrant homework in northern cities, especially studies of African-American lampshade makers in Chicago, Latina needleworkers in Puerto Rico, and native-born white knitters in rural Vermont. She addresses the emergence of suburban home clerical work in the computer age and the resurgence of urban sweater home labour with the new immigration of the 1960s and after.

Boris finds the various forms of prohibition, regulation, and deregulation lacking. Without spelling out her own legislative agenda, she calls for policies that acknowledge women's paid and unpaid labour and improve the working conditions of all wage-earning women. But more fundamentally, she sees state intervention of any sort as inadequate to the task. She looks to the "roads not taken: cooperatives, unionization, and community organizing ... as alternatives to the strategy of state regulation." (15)

This is a comprehensive and complex study. Occasionally, though, the narrative bogs down in the details of Boris' prodigious research. Readers may find themselves numbed by the exhaustive accounts of various state and federal policies. Nonetheless, the wealth of details is also a strength: for years to come, this book should stand as the definitive history of industrial homework in the United States.

Joanne Meyerowitz
University of Cincinnati


**THIS BOOK** provides a fast-paced and detailed description of Martin Luther King and the Chicago Freedom Movement, 1965-1967. In this gracefully-written and
carefully-documented account, James R. Ralph Jr. assesses the strengths and weaknesses of King’s venture into Chicago, places the Movement within the context of earlier civil rights programs in the city, and relates its progress to broader trends in national civil rights and politics.

Like most other accounts of King and Chicago, *Northern Protest* argues that the Freedom Movement accomplished far less than it set out to do. Seeking an end to slums and equal access to housing for blacks throughout the city, King and his supporters had to settle for the “Summit Agreement” of August 1966. In exchange for King’s promise to stop open housing marches, Mayor Richard Daley pledged to honour a number of ill-defined “commitments” to better race relations in general and improved access to housing in particular. The fact that the implementation of such commitments fell far short of their goal and that the Movement failed to accomplish more to assure the realization of its aims stemmed from a number of factors including a sometimes difficult relationship between the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and local Chicago organizers, determined opposition from the white neighbourhoods through which protesters marched, and the choice of open housing as a target at a time when many blacks and whites were reassessing their support of the entire non-violent civil rights movement.

Chicago in the 1960s already possessed an active civil rights movement and history. For years, such organizations as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and National Urban League had confronted racism and segregation in the city, and under the umbrella of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, worked with other like-minded associations in improving living, working, and educational standards for Chicago’s black citizens. King’s choice of the city as his major protest target for 1965 and 1966 energized the Chicago civil rights movement, but did not mesh smoothly with its organizational structure or tactics. In the end, the SCLC’s relatively short and intensive focus on open housing did as much to disrupt Chicago civil rights politics as it did to further the accomplishment of its objectives.

As for the nature of the opposition it incurred, the Chicago Freedom Movement aroused a form of white protest unlike that which King and the SCLC had encountered in the south. Instead of confronting law enforcement agencies intent on defending segregation, marchers in Chicago challenged middle-class white Americans defending their neighbourhoods and homes. The result undermined an already-weakening liberal civil rights coalition and deprived King of the sort of unifying symbol that voting rights and access to public accommodations had offered his southern campaign. The “right” of individual Americans to choose the community in which they lived and the persons to whom they might sell their homes, cut too close to the core of American middle-class values.

By the mid to late 1960s, such values were already staking out defensive ground against the civil rights movement in general and Martin Luther King Jr., in particular. Prepared to accord blacks basic civil rights in the public arena, white Americans were less-inclined to grant similar privileges in what they saw as private areas. Moreover, changes in the civil rights movement itself widened the rift in the liberal coalition. The urban riots in several cities between 1965 and 1967, and the accompanying rise of black militancy, effectively severed the sympathetic relationship that many Chicago whites had hitherto extended black aspirations.

Clearly, as Ralph suggests, the Chicago Freedom Movement encountered serious obstacles. Never fully in tune with longstanding local reform strategies, it encountered virulent opposition from its target white neighbourhoods at a time of significant transformation on the national civil rights scene. King’s effort to dupli-
cate his stunning successes of Birmingham and Selma, Alabama simply did not succeed. The Summit Agreement of 1966 was the best he could get under the circumstances. Yet, as *Northern Protest* also points out, not all was lost. In negotiating a settlement with Richard Daley, King in fact reinforced the traditional tactics of long-standing Chicago civil rights organizations by seeking incremental gains where spectacular accomplishments proved impossible. At the very least, the Summit Agreement compelled the city to reaffirm its public commitment to long-run solutions to Chicago's racial problems, and left behind a number of effective community organizations, particularly the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities.

*Northern Protest* is at its best when describing the evolution of the Chicago Freedom Movement and the obstacles which it confronted. It is an action-packed monograph filled with people and events which provides at the same time a powerful analysis of King's essential failure. It is particularly effective in placing King's efforts in the context of northern white opposition to open housing and changing white attitudes to the entire civil rights movement. Ralph is less effective when discussing important related issues which helped shape King's strategies and obstruct their goal. For one thing, he says much too little about the growing influence of the Black Power Movement upon events in Chicago and the rest of the nation. More importantly, although he pays full attention to the Movement's choice of open housing as its primary aim, Ralph fails to confront fully King's ideological shift from legal rights to a broader social program attacking slums and the poverty upon which they were based. *Northern Protest* recognizes this shift and it partially explains its effect upon the Freedom Movement, but rests its conclusions on too brief an assessment of King's own ideas. A more thorough discussion of what King was saying and writing about urban poverty along with expanded reference to his growing opposition to American imperialism in Vietnam and elsewhere in the world might have provided a different perspective on the Chicago Freedom Movement's tactics and goals. Ralph introduces such a possibility but does not exploit it fully.

*Northern Protest* is essentially a study of the Freedom Movement from the Chicago end of things. Admittedly King did not or could not make as many trips to Chicago between 1965 and 1967 as he would have liked. Yet the reader is left with the distinct impression that there was more to his thinking and actions regarding Chicago than that which appears in this book. If we can assume that a more thorough study of King's ideological shift to the left might point the way to a better understanding of his approach to Chicago, *Northern Protest* might offer a more effective assessment of Martin Luther King Jr. and the Chicago Freedom Movement than it already does.

Richard Paul Fuke
Wilfrid Laurier University


THIS BOOK is ostensibly about the movement to rationalize both the workplace and daily life in the name of efficiency, order, and higher corporate profits, as exemplified by the stories told by and about the father of scientific management, Frederick Winslow Taylor, the inventor of the mass-produced Model T, Henry Ford, and the prophet of the engineer, Thorstein Veblen. But it is not merely an analysis of the impact of Taylorism — here synonymous with "the culture of management" (5) — on the early 20th century United States. Cultural critic Martha Banta has stitched together a book "about theory-making" (ix) that questions the one best system, whether in narratol-
ogy or industrial relations. Drawing upon an impressive range of texts — from the elite writings of Henry Adams, William James, and William Faulkner through popular fiction, industrial relations treatises and reform exposes, to Buster Keaton's silent film *One Week*, anthropometric data, and Sears Roebuck ready-made houses — Banta has fashioned a collage to show that "my good ending may be your bad one." (327) She firmly rejects totalistic tendencies within literary criticism, finding in Taylorism "a paradigm for contemporary socioliterary theory ... marked by strong traces of the constant tension between containment and resistance to any damn-fool notion that there ever can be 'one best way'." (x) Perhaps consistent with her method, the parts of this imaginative reconstruction are more interesting than the whole.

Rather than focusing on workplace struggles, as have historians of scientific management, Banta illuminates "the uneasy mix of facts, values, and efficiency systems at the center of many turn-of-the-century American texts." (37) She offers astute readings. The culture of imperialism maintains Veblen's barbarisms behind a "thin veil of rationalism" (72), as expressed by Theodore Roosevelt's *Rough Riders* and Richard Harding Davis' *Soldiers of Fortune*. Henry James' *The Wings of the Dove* and *The Golden Bowl* reflect "the unholy alliance of barbarous instincts of acquisition and rationalistic managerial practice." (75) In *An American Tragedy*, Theodore Dreiser exposes "the disjunctions among the work ethic touted by the owners, the work procedures laid down by the managers, the machine technology installed in the factory, and the human element introduced by the employees' desires." (298) She even finds "true 'industrial democracy'" in the otherworldly hope of Faulkner's *The Mansion*. (320)

Her analysis of Taylor's 1912 testimony before a special House committee uncovers "linguistic gauntlets." (120) Through the use of animal analogies and "little story-dramas," (116) Taylor assumes the position of "the man of tact, experience, and common sense, one willing to explain patiently why an all-pervading ignorance blocks the path to 'the one best way'". (115) But Chairman William B. Wilson questions Taylor's beast fables, self-constructions, and "proclivity for shifting from personal opinions to generalizing statements." (122) Banta finds in this exchange evidence for an epistemology that claims that "beliefs ... have a history; ... [the] words and the material facts they simultaneously embody and obscure are crucial to the making of those histories." (125) This understanding of changing meaning separates Banta from the worst proclivities within cultural and literary studies.

But Banta is not satisfied with providing more expansive readings for literary critics. She engages with a central debate among historians: who speaks for the working class and in what terms? Using the voice of an "outsider" at a gathering of businessmen to discuss "Foreign Immigrants in American Industry," Banta breaks through "the narratives of brutality and betterment" in a manner rarely heard at the time. This workingman reminded the employing class: "'I and my people have created the industry by which we not only make our own living, but have enriched the lives of everyone else in America.'" He "refuse[d] to be considered 'a problem'." (109)

If working men could "cuss back," gender ideology inhibited wage-earning women from lashing out at a system that both recruited them for their cheapness and lamented their inefficiency and femaleness. Tales about women workers succumbed to melodrama and sentimentality; women appeared as objects of charity and reform and victims of modern, scientific production. While some deployed "business data" to forge "narratives about fragile womankind adrift outside the protective shelter of the home," even defenders of wage-earning women, like Josephine Goldmark, portrayed them
as weak, bound to their biology. (14) Goldmark relied upon science in *Fatigue and Efficiency* to argue for protective labour legislation, but her fighting "fire with fire" still generated melodrama. (128) Only in a National Consumers' League pamphlet by Sue Ainslie Clark and Edith Wyatt does Banta find women workers "placed within the modern world." (158) The resourceful housewives, defiant working girls, and radical women organizers of much women's history lay beyond Banta's boundaries. So she can only lament: "Would women ever get to tell modern stories about being modern heroines, not victims, not domesticated cows, not boys?" (166)

Banta moves from the shopfloor to the home where Ford replaces Taylor as her villain. Not only did "the Ford Sociological Department insist ... upon the tight fit between laborer, citizen, and homeowner," but the ready-made house industry adapted the assembly line to the standardization of the home. (215) Here are solid discussions, if not new ones, of Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Christine Frederick. Even alternatives to the single family home, like Edgar S. Chambless' collectivist Roadtown, partook of Fordist "standardization and rationalization." (227) Such opponents of "the one best way," Banta suggests throughout, failed to escape the forces of systematization.

Banta does not write history despite her claim to "ground theory-making within history." (xi) Labour historians might find her narrative strategies downright annoying as topical chapters, in some vaguely chronological order, move from one text to another, one fact to another, held together by intuitive insights and the author's perceptions rather than causality, influence, or material relations. Connections between disparate people, ideas, and objects unravel into a relativistic tour-de-force. But perhaps that is the point. As Banta asserts, "When the theorist takes care to include particularizing details that mediate totalizing typologies, he or she resists Taylorizing." (18) Thus the human factor (the historian as worker) triumphs over systematic theory-making or historical narrative.

Eileen Boris
Howard University


IN HIS 1989 FAREWELL ADDRESS, Ronald Reagan implored American schools to "teach history, based not on what's in fashion but on what's important." If not, he warned, we would suffer "an eradication of the American memory that could result, ultimately, in an erosion of the American spirit." Reagan's worries about the loss of "memory" acquire a particular poignancy in light of the knowledge that he was probably then suffering from the early stages of Alzheimer's disease. And, to further deepen the irony, Reagan's speech itself seems to have faded from public memory; apparently, it occasioned little comment at the time or subsequently. Yet whether consciously or not Reagan seems to have had here (as elsewhere) some feel for an emerging public issue. Although by 1989 we had already heard the opening volleys in the history wars — for example, Lynne Cheney's pamphlet, *American Memory*, and Diane Ravitch and Chester Finn's *What Do Our 17-Year-Olds Know?* — it was hard at that time to anticipate the all out warfare that would erupt in 1994 with, for instance, the attack on the National History Standard and the cancelling of the Smithsonian Institution's planned exhibit on the Enola Gay.

This volume, which was based on a conference "on the transmission of historical knowledge in American schools and popular culture" held at University of North Carolina in 1991, falls into the period of sporadic fighting that preceded the
pitched and sustained battles of the mid-1990s. It is dated because it does not refer to the most recent conflicts, but it is still quite timely because the issues that the book raises — what history should be taught in the schools? is historical "truth" possible? who controls the past? — are even more relevant today than they were in 1991.

The fifteen essays that make up the book are organized into four main sections; three of them survey arenas in which people learn about the past (schools and textbooks; films; and political culture) and the fourth, with essays by James D. Anderson, Bonnie G. Smith, and Dominick La Capra, looks at categories of historical meaning like race, gender, and context. As with most such collections, the package appears more neatly stitched together in the intelligent and well-crafted introduction than when you read through the individual essays. Though of uniformly high quality, many address rather divergent topics. For example, Robert Rosenstone offers perceptive insights into the conventions of mainstream and experimental historical films and Frances Fitzgerald provides a stimulating commentary on the use of the past in current foreign policy debates, but their concerns are very different from those of the authors of the essays on textbooks and schools, which centre largely on the issues of multiculturalism that have occupied public debate.

The issues in those essays will be familiar to most professional historians. Still, the essays often offer particularly clear and concise expositions of the issues, which makes the book useful for those who want to teach about this debate to their students. Moreover, some essays, such as Lynn Hunt's thoughtful defense of the much-attacked Western Civilization course, take less conventional positions on well-worked over issues. Although the essays generally come down on the multicultural side of the canonical debate, the collection ends with a more critical perspective from journalist Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., who argues for a "confident and compelling version of the common past." (211)

In general, the essays are at their best when they offer autobiographical or ethnographic accounts of the practice of history in the US — Daniel Gordon and Richard Roberts describing the teaching of western and non-western history at Stanford or Glenn Tetterton-Opheim explaining how he teaches Advanced Placement European History in Wilmington, North Carolina. These personal reflections are especially valuable when they offer us the voices and experiences of people who are sometimes absent from the debates over how the past should be taught. High school history teacher Alice Garrett, for example, offers us the wisdom of her many years of struggling to teach an American history survey that is both meaningful to her students and meets the rigid state-mandated curricula in North Carolina. Like many other good classroom teachers, she recognizes that "creative teaching employs themes and methods that will assist students in developing a more personal understanding of the past." (72)

Another less conventional perspective on the way Americans learn about the past comes from Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman who argues that "certain uncomfortable, inconvenient parts" of history (for example, the US role in destroying Nicaraguan democracy over the past century) "have been selectively unlearned." (162) Dorfman maintains that American films and popular culture play a crucial role in creating this "collective amnesia" by serving up stories that "pose problems and then relieve us, the audience of having to confront the pain of history, the pain of memory." (163) He then shows us how this false reconciliation operates in the popular film, Field of Dreams. Appropriately enough Dorfman makes his case in his own film, which was directed by Jonathan Beller and is presented here in a "print version."
Thus, the writer-turned-filmmaker and the film actor-turned-politician share a concern with the loss of the American memory, although they have rather different views about what is being forgotten and why it matters. Indeed, Kramer and Reid note that “all of the authors” in their volume “are concerned with the problem of communicating historical knowledge and interpretations within a culture that often ignores and trivializes historical understanding.” (2) *Learning History in America* does a fine job of documenting some of the most important sources of historical knowledge (some of the formal arenas where people learn about the past), but it has less to say about the informal settings in which Americans talk passionately about the past every day (the family dinner table, the holiday celebration, or the high school reunion) or about the way people receive the versions of the past presented by school teachers, filmmakers, or politicians. Unless we equally study these modes of popular history making and history understanding, we will not be on firm ground in either diagnosing the failure of American memory or comprehending the significance of the past in the present.

Roy Rosenzweig
George Mason University


IN A TIGHTLY WOVEN and compelling case study of the unionization of undocumented workers at a Los Angeles mattress factory, Delgado tests the prominent hypothesis that the undocumented are virtually impossible to organize due to temporary settlement and vulnerability to deportation. He studied a unionized plant that, like many plants in the Los Angeles manufacturing district, mainly employed undocumented workers. Delgado based his study on numerous interviews of workers (both pro-union and anti-union), employers, foremen, union organizers, during and after a hard fought campaign to organize a union at the factory. After a bitter and costly struggle, not only did the workers form a union they also won a contract.

One surprising contention made by Delgado is that “Bread and butter issues do not explain why workers organize .... The issue of dignity emerged time and time again ....” (17) According to the author the use of paternalism by the employer effectively shielded him from workers discontent until he could no longer maintain personal contact with his workforce and handed over plant management to supervisors who ran a roughshod policy. This allegedly opened the door for union organizing. This raises the question as to whether or not immigrant workers are susceptible to 19th-century forms of paternalistic control, possibly differentiating immigrant workers from native workers in this regard.

Delgado argues on the basis of his findings that the undocumented he studied are not temporary settlers and, more importantly, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is rarely a problem in the communities where the undocumented settle nor in the factories where they work. If such workers organize it is in good measure due to their extensive family and community networks and to their permanence which gives them a sense of belonging in the host society. Moreover, Delgado states, the “elements that promote or retard unionization among the undocumented are not unlike those that determine the organizability of other workers who are similarly located in the labor market.” (11) A major condition, however, is the commitment by unions to devote the time and resources to organize in the secondary sector of the economy. Delgado argues that if unions hope to regain the ground lost over the past several decades, leaders need to focus their energies on the vast and growing
secondary sector where immigrants, women, and blacks are concentrated. The study illustrates the potential political impact of the undocumented.

The book offers solid and effective arguments substantiated with interview material to support his thesis. However, at times the work becomes sketchy. For example, one wishes that the author had spent more space discussing the workers' community and the relation of the workplace to living space. Delgado devotes most of the study to an examination of conflict at the plant and legal protections for the undocumented, but only glances at the community where workers live and interact with other workers in similar economic circumstances. The political consciousness of the community may also figure prominently in a decision to join a union. One cannot forget that the undocumented figured prominently in the 1992 Los Angeles rebellion.

Gilbert G. Gonzalez
University of California, Irvine


IT WAS BOUND TO HAPPEN. "Political culture" is back. Drawing on the current interest in the social construction of reality, and rejecting as inadequate both interest-group and state-centred approaches to public policy, Frank Dobbin revives and revises the concept of national political culture. By examining the response of governments in three nations to the major technological innovation of the 19th century, the steam locomotive, Dobbin seeks to show how the United States, Great Britain, and France developed distinct and enduring approaches to regulating the economy.

For Dobbin, political culture refers to the set of practices, and the meanings given to those practices, that develop and are given institutional form within each nation's political system. Those practices and ideas, well developed by the early 19th century, in turn shaped the ways in which policy makers in each nation defined and responded to the new problems generated by industrialization. Dobbin contends that in France, absolutism enshrined an idea that democrats and socialists never challenged, that a strong central state was necessary to hold the nation together, and to protect it from local, selfish interests. As a result, France's railway policies emphasized the need for close national supervision of, and planning for, the railway industry. British political culture and parliamentary institutions emphasized the importance of granting sovereignty to individuals. During the early 19th century, British railway policy emphasized the importance of allowing private firms considerable freedom to organize and operate the railway system. As time progressed, Dobbin argues that the policy shifted slightly to emphasize the importance of Parliament acting to protect the sovereignty of individual railway firms, to prevent the industry from becoming too concentrated. American political culture, in a variation of British ideas on liberty, emphasized the importance of local community, self government and sovereignty, and the tyranny of centralized power. Initially, this resulted in limited national initiative, but active local government support of railway development. As this local activism became associated with corruption, American policy makers rejected all government supervision of the railways. Instead, what national and local state intervention existed was designed to allow the free market to regulate economic activity. Unlike Britain, the principles of free enterprise did not mean protecting individual firms, but rather meant protecting the market system, even if that lead to the collapse of individual railway companies.

This summary captures the essence of Dobbin's argument, even if it condenses a much more elaborate and well-docu-
mented study. Dobbin clearly and systematically examines the response of each nation to four functional problems faced by the emerging railway industry—planning, finance, technical and managerial co-ordination, and pricing. Readers of this journal will be surprised and disappointed to learn that, in Dobbin's view, labour relations does not constitute one of the main problems faced by the railroads in the 19th century. Even if eschewing an interest group approach means ignoring the relative political power and economic influence of labour organizations, Dobbin has missed an opportunity to examine the dynamics of class and politics by ignoring this issue. The recruitment, training, control, and discipline of a vast workforce represented a major challenge facing the railway industry, a challenge which state policies shaped directly and indirectly.

Dobbin's analysis is open to other objections. Dobbin argues in his conclusion that he could not possibly refute existing theories in such a short book, but that he has simply offered some evidence in support of his own view. This modest claim cannot be allowed to stand. Throughout the book, he repeatedly argues for the superior explanatory value of his cultural approach. What he does not do is consider whether or not some of the policy patterns he observes might be explained in other ways. His attempts to dismiss alternative explanations is sporadic and frequently unconvincing. He argues, for example, that the obvious conclusion that British railways were financed privately because capital was readily available is false because British railway promoters had to create new institutions to attract capital and could not rely on banks for long term industrial loans. Surely the argument rests on the ability of private entrepreneurs to mobilize local capital, whatever its source. The United States lacked local capital in the early railway age, and therefore state and city governments had to provide support because of their superior ability to attract foreign, and particularly British, investment. American governments withdrew from this kind of support as the private firms became better able to attract this investment on their own.

In the end, I am most uncomfortable with a fundamental contradiction in this book. Dobbin offers an important critique of universal economic laws, and argues instead that ideas about efficiency, the market, and the problems to be addressed by public policy makers are socially and historically constructed. The radical implications of such a position, however, are undercut by Dobbin's presentation of continuity and national consensus in public policy. In particular, by concluding his analysis in the 1890s, Dobbin leaves the reader thinking that contemporary American policy makers who revere market mechanisms and price competition are the heirs of a longstanding and enduring political tradition and consensus. Dobbin ignores, however, almost a century of debate, conflict, and experimentation in the United States in which the market and price competition have not been universally trusted. In the case of the railroad industry, the 1906 Hepburn Act gave government regulators a measure of authority over many of the four functions Dobbin outlines. The 1920 Transportation Act introduced notions of planning and coordination into the American political forum, notions that became more widespread in America during the New Deal era. In short, although his use of culture is consistent with a radical critique of the "free market," Dobbin's analysis comes dangerously close to providing a false historical legitimacy to one segment of America's current political leadership who revere that free market. This is one of the dangers with any analysis that attempts to imagine a single, unified, and continuous national political culture.

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Magraw's history of the French working class from the late 18th century to World War II, with a post-face bringing the story up to the present, could have been entitled "A World We Have Lost." Written at a time of deindustrialization and of disintegration of the working-class movement and of the left in France, it is not a chronology of the triumphant march forward of the working classes. Rather, reflecting the present "dismal times," it is a pessimistic account of an evolution marked by discontinuities, false hopes, and defeats as well as victories. The heroic moments lie in the past, in the mid-19th century or in the 1950s.

This two-volume history is a wide-ranging study of the working class. The author examines the evolving conditions of the workplace and of the home, and the numerous corporative, economic, and political movements that represented the working class and its interests. This is a political history, focusing upon the political organization of the working class and on the state's and capitalism's response to the challenge that it presented. As well, by detailing the evolution of techniques and industrial organizations, Magraw offers a history of technology and an economic history.

The books' periodization reflects this double (at least) thrust to the study. The dominant division, which explains the break of the study into two volumes, is provided by the evolving economic and technological systems. The chapters themselves are articulated around the regimes and the political events which succeeded each other during the almost 200 years encompassed in the study.

The persistence of craft production well into the industrial revolution constitutes a peculiarity of French economic history. The survival of such production was in part made possible by specialization in luxury goods; it also attests to the resilience of the system. Handicraft production continued beyond mid-century through the intensification of work, the ruralization of production with the ensuing reduction of wages, the introduction of mechanical innovations, and the division of tasks. During this phase, which continued to the 1870s and which is covered in the first volume, the workers' movement was that of the artisans. Following E.P. Thompson’s pioneering approach, Magraw examines the process of the making of the "radical artisan." The question of the labour aristocracy, which is central to the study of English labour traditions and its divisions, appears less important in France because of the relatively narrow wage spread. Artisan workers in France were not only radicalized by their resistance to the deterioration of their living and working conditions and to the dilution of their trade, but they were also influenced by the French revolutionary tradition. In particular, the confiscated Revolution of 1830 and the agitation during the following five years enabled them to rediscover and reappropriate the language of 1789-94.

The year 1848 constitutes a high point in this process. But the radical artisans were defeated, first in June 1848 and then on 2 December 1851. For Magraw, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup and his authoritarian regime were the logical response of French capital which, unlike its English counterpart, was not sufficiently wealthy to buy off labour and with material concessions prevent it from seeking improvement through radical change.

The substitution of industrial for craft production was a long process hastened by the depression of the last quarter of the 19th century, the Second Industrial Revolution, and finally, the War of 1914-1918. In the second volume, Magraw examines the labour movement in the context of industrial society and within the framework of the search for the Republican synthesis. The radical artisan is no longer
the vector of the labour movement, although before the war skilled workers had taken the lead in opposing the timid and partial measures to introduce Taylorism.

The history of the working class movement and culture after 1871 that Magraw presents is often a bleak one. With the decline of craft production and of apprenticeship training, and with the extension of an inappropriate educational programme, came the development of a youth counter-culture and the appearance of gangs such as the apaches. Weakened by the repression following the Paris commune, dependant on leadership from the Republican bourgeois, the working class movement was further weakened by its internal divisions. The war which provided an impetus to industrial development also led, because of the deceptions following the peace, to the radicalization of the new working class. But this flurry of activity and radicalism, epitomized by the strikes of 1919 and 1920 and the creation of the Communist Party, subsided in the face of the onslaught of state and capitalism. In their participation in the recasting, or restoration, of bourgeois Europe — following C. Maier — French employers disposed of an arsenal of paternalistic and repressive measures.

The destruction of the radical traditions was thorough, to the point that the souvenir of the 1905 strike movement in the Lorraine, for instance, was entirely erased. Magraw, however, believes that the quiescence of the 1920s and early 1930s was in part deceptive. The massive, and apparently spontaneous, strikes following the victory of the Popular Front in May 1936 were in fact nourished by long-term seething grievances and discontent. Magraw seems to believe that revolutionary changes were possible in late spring of 1936 and accuses the Popular Front leaders of having been too timorous to seize the occasion.

Although destined to be betrayed by its own supporters, the Popular Front left an important legacy, not least of which was the rehabilitation of the Communist Party, metamorphosed into the PCF, and the development of a communist-dominated CGT. The claims of the party to the Jacobin heritage were strengthened by the participation of its members in the Resistance.

In the books' post-face Magraw reviews the changes that occurred after 1945. The 1950s, during which the Communist Party exercised a near hegemony over the working class through the CGT, marked the high point in the workers' movement, which, at the same time was ostracized from mainline society as a consequence of the Cold War. Working-class solidarity, however, was undermined during the years of prosperity by the movement of working-class children into tertiary employment and the arrival of immigrant workers to take on tasks refused by the French. This did not represent an entirely new development. Since the late 19th century employers had sought a solution to the labour shortages resulting from the low French birth rates and the reluctance to work in factories by drawing upon immigrant labour. As in the past, the relative docility of immigrants and the xenophobic reactions of the French weakened the labour movement. But the difficulties of assimilating the new immigrants intensified the problem. In the final analysis, however, it was not the prosperity, but the economic crisis of recent years that contributed most to the disruption of the working-class movement.

The trajectory of the working class was far from simple. Magraw's presentation even adds a few twists due in part to the vast scope of the study, to which a brief resume cannot do justice. Also, Magraw's history of the working class is based on numerous case studies. Beyond the peculiarity of the French example, each case or locality possesses its singularities. Continency also enters into play, making it difficult to establish general patterns. Interpretations vary, even, as is the case of Sewell, within the oeuvre of a single historian. Each affirmation requires nuances, which the author does do
leaving the reader at times disconcerted by the apparent shifts in position.

As a synthesis, Magraw's history is flawed. He has a tendency to present his material in the form of a series of summaries of studies. This approach leads to repetition, some of which could have been avoided by a more careful organization of the material. But this repetition also reflects the historiographic situation described above. One might also fault Magraw for not having fully developed certain aspects of the history that he was dealing with. In his discussion of the creation of the CGT in the pre-war period, he stops short of the congress of Amiens, and the question of the relationship between the union and the political parties is only raised later fleetingly. Similarly, one might find the presentation of the Popular Front movement incomplete, in particular the discussion of the unification of the CGT and CGTU, and the means by which the Communist Party obtained control over the unified CGT.

This history of the working class is undoubtedly not a synthesis to be put into the hands of neophyte students. But it is not on this basis that this study should be judged. What Magraw does offer is a massive review article. A few articles, mainly from the French language literature, have been overlooked. Such oversights seem inevitable. Without being absolutely exhaustive, A History of the French Working Class is a comprehensive, thorough and intelligent overview of the works in the field. This is an important contribution for which Magraw’s colleagues and advanced students can be grateful.

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L’auteure rend compte également du contenu et de l’évolution de la production écrite de Marie Guillot à travers l’hebdomadaire qu’elle a fondé, L’École émancipée (1910) et tous les périodiques auxquels elle a apporté une contribution significative et soutenue. Parmi cette imposante production journalistique et professionnelle, l’auteure privilégie ce qu’elle estime être les préoccupations majeures de Marie Guillot, soit: l’émancipation de l’école, des femmes et du syndicalisme.

Slava Liszek démontre que ces causes sont indissolublement et continûment liées aussi bien dans la pratique militante que dans la vie professionnelle de Marie.

Au terme du récit, la lectrice ou le lecteur a l’impression que la pensée de Marie Guillot se définit dans l’empirisme de l’action et de la réaction exclusivement et ne trouve son sens qu’à travers l’existence d’un réseau. Qu’en est-il de son apport théorique original au féminisme contemporain, au syndicalisme révolutionnaire ou à la pédagogie moderne? Ici l’analyse aurait gagné à aller au-delà des tribunes de congrès et des reconstitutions de réseaux. Elle aurait pu mettre à profit les études théoriques et documentées de Marie Guillot parues dans L’Ecole éman­cipée à propos de l’école géminée, de la neutralité scolaire, de la co-éducation de même que les études parues dans les Cahiers du travail, portant sur l’indépendance matérielle des femmes. Enfin, la contribution de Marie Guillot à La Vie ouvrière permettrait, d’une part, d’exp­liquer cette troublante liaison féminisme-syndicalisme révolutionnaire et, d’autre part, de comprendre les motifs de l’adhésion de Marie Guillot aux idéaux des chefs de la Révolution bolchevique entre 1914 et 1922. L’explication de cette communauté de vues et d’aspirations avec les bolcheviques nous apparaît essentielle à une juste appréciation des en­jeux du combat mené, entre 1922 et 1934, contre l’immixtion indue de « ces Russes qui nous fatiguent » comme le appelait Marie Guillot. (220)


Mais justement, du fait de cette enver­gure tant sur le plan de l’histoire du mou­vement ouvrier que sur celui de l’histoire des femmes, le récit était-il le genre app­proprié? Choix délibéré, nous dit l’aute­ure. L’appareil critique eut contraint le rythme du récit. Permettez à la lectrice d’en douter! L’appareil critique n’a pas comme seule fonction d’alourdir le propre du texte. Il a, en outre, la qualité de mettre en valeur la démarche de l’auteur, les résultats de sa recherche, sa crédibilité, d’engendrer la discussion et ultimement de permettre à la recherche de progresser. De plus, l’absence d’appareil critique accule le lecteur à poser un acte de conviction, voire un acte de foi. Cela devient d’autant plus périlleux lorsque, du même souffle, l’auteure avertit le lec­teur de son intention de « rendre compte d’un climat, d’un état d’esprit et de la subjectivité des protagonistes. » Nous ne croyons pas que l’analyse critique et la subjectivité des protagonistes soient in­compatibles en histoire des femmes et du mouvement ouvrier. Au contraire, là plus qu’ailleurs, elles nous semblent indisso­ciables.
S’adressant à un large public, l’auteure a jugé utile d’ajouter en annexe la liste des sigles et abréviations utilisés et des précisions concernant le fonctionnement de la Confédération générale du travail, C.G.T., de l’enseignement en France et du «sou du soldat.» Incidemment, il n’y a pas d’index des noms cités. Cela eut été utile pour les chercheurs.

Néanmoins, ceux-ci ne sont pas en reste. Pour satisfaire la «curiosité légitime des historiens professionnels,» l’auteure indique dans sa bibliographie les sources primaires exploitées. Leur recensement témoigne de l’ampleur et du sérieux de la recherche réalisée. Par contre, en ce qui concerne les sources secondaires, disons simplement qu’un certain nombre de courants historiographiques en sont absents, notamment la production nord-américaine.

En dépit des lacunes propres au genre du récit, l’ouvrage de Slava Liszek met fort habilement en relief la multiplicité des formes du mouvement social français durant l’entre-deux-guerres et son univers militant.

Cylvie Claveau
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La LITTÉRATURE prolétarienne est un objet d’étude malaisé, esthétiquement suspect, frappé par le malheur d’être né sous le signe de l’idéologie. L’historien littéraire ne s’en préoccupe guère, sinon pour le disqualifier davantage en le rangeant parmi la littérature à thèse. Pour cette raison, la littérature prolétarienne n’a été étudiée que de façon marginale et, sauf exceptions notables (dont l’Histoire de la littérature prolétarienne de France de Michel Ragon, parue en 1953 et rééditée en 1986 chez Albin Michel), à travers ses figures les plus connues, notamment celle d’Henri Poulaille. Cette lacune est d’autant plus regrettable que l’émergence et le succès même éphémère de ce courant sont au cœur des débats les plus urgents dans l’Europe des années 1930, de l’U.R.S.S. à la France en passant par l’Allemagne et les petits pays avoisinants.

Parmi ceux-ci, il en est un qui joue un rôle privilégié dans la constitution d’un imaginaire ouvrier francophone: la Belgique. Ce n’est pas un hasard si c’est de là justement que nous parvient aujourd’hui une étude remarquable qui, à travers plusieurs analyses circonstanciées d’auteurs spécifiquement belges, fournit bien davantage qu’une simple synthèse régionale du mouvement que l’on range habituellement sous le label prolétarien. L’auteur, Paul Aron, l’un des historiens de la littérature belge les plus qualifiés actuellement, brosse un tableau à la fois historique et sociologique de la littérature prolétarienne belge et permet de comprendre l’ampleur de ce phénomène, en particulier durant les années 1930. Pourquoi la Belgique produit-elle tant d’écrivains de cette mouvance? À cela plusieurs raisons, explique Aron, dont la moindre n’est pas la prématurité en littérature d’un naturalisme quelque peu différent de celui de Zola et qu’on qualifierait volontiers de naturalisme belge, allant de Camille Lemonnier à Neel Doff, qui fut aussi une correspondante régulière d’Henri Poulaille.

Mais la participation massive de la Belgique à l’avènement et à l’essor d’une littérature prolétarienne tient aussi à des facteurs socio-historiques. La structure fortement industrialisée du pays a favorisé la montée d’un mouvement socialiste, dès la fin du XIXe siècle, qui a fait une place importante aux écrivains, en particulier à ceux qui étaient issus de la classe ouvrière. Après les grands bourgeois que furent par exemple Verhaeren ou Maeterlinck, c’est vers des auteurs aux origines plus modestes que se tourne le Parti Ouvrier belge au tournant du siècle. Durant les années vingt, la problématique
se déplace davantage vers la gauche, représentée cette fois par le Parti communiste belge, dont l’organe (Le Drapeau rouge) s’ouvre dès 1926 à littérature expressément prolétarienne. Augustin Habaru, responsable de la page culturelle de ce journal et correspondant au même moment de L’Humanité, anime des rencontres à Bruxelles d’où surgiront, à brève échéance, les premières manifestations d’un mouvement collectif. Non seulement rassemble-t-il des auteurs belges jusque-là isolés sur la scène littéraire et politique, mais, fort de ses accointances avec Poulaille et surtout Barbusse (qui invite Habaru à diriger Monde en 1928), il devient bientôt l’indispensable relais pour ses amis belges qui souhaitent élargir leur sphère d’action vers Paris.

En 1929, Francis André, Albert Ayguesparse et Pierre Hubermont font paraître le «Manifeste de l’équipe belge des écrivains prolétariens de langue française» à la fois dans Tentatives, fondée un an plus tôt à Bruxelles, et dans Monde. Au lendemain de leur exclusion du PCB lors du congrès historique d’Anvers (1928), ces jeunes auteurs alors inconnus situent désormais leur action commune en dehors de la sphère strictement politique et à l’intérieur du champ littéraire, le belge et le français. Grâce à Habaru en grande partie, ils peuvent compter sur l’appui d’écrivains français de renom et se ménagent à Paris un espace certes, mais qui leur permettra d’y publier leurs œuvres et de collaborer à des revues influentes. D’un réseau à l’autre, les Belges ont l’avantage de l’«outsider», car, n’ayant pas à choisir leur camp, ils bénéficient de l’appui de personnalités qui ne s’entendaient guère entre elles. C’est d’ailleurs que leur permettra à un nombre d’entre eux de se reconnaître dans l’irénisme de l’«école populiste», mouvement qui se souciait peu de l’origine de classe et intégrait dans ses rangs tout écrivain manifestant «l’amour du peuple», pour peu qu’il témoigne à sa manière une «juste» compréhension à l’égard des réalités quotidiennes du peuple. On les retrouve donc un peu partout, au sein du Groupe des écrivains prolétariens (1932) associé encore à Barbusse et à Monde, mais aussi aux côtés de Poulaille, qui leur ouvre les pages de ses éphémères revues.

Qu’y a-t-il vraiment de commun chez ces écrivains prolétariens? Tous ne sont pas des ouvriers, loin s’en faut. C’est d’ailleurs là une des multiples causes de friction au sein même de ce mouvement hétérogène, jusqu’à ce que l’antifascisme rassemble les intellectuels de toutes origines. Tous ne partagent pas, du reste, les mêmes convictions idéologiques, comme le montrent leurs trajectoires fortement divergentes au moment où la guerre force chacun à prendre ouvertement position. Pour un Habaru, tué par la Gestapo en 1944, il y eut bien un Charles Nisolle, partisan nazi exécuté en 1947, et quelques Constant Malva, collaborateur repenti. Il est difficile, à cet égard, de porter un jugement général sur les écrivains prolétariens concernés par ces dérives, et l’on sait gré à Paul Aron de décrire celles-ci sans chercher ni à les excuser ni à les verser au compte d’un réquisitoire collectif. Seul constat général: la plupart de ces collaborateurs, faute d’appuis notoires, n’ont pas été épargnés par la justice comme le seront certains intellectuels mieux introduits dans la société d’avant-guerre.

C’est sur un autre plan que Paul Aron suggère de rassembler finalement les écrivains prolétariens: celui de la littérature. Bien qu’ils aient tous un style et un univers thématique différents, leur émergence entraîne une nouvelle tension au sein du champ littéraire de l’entre-deux-guerres. Le politique, loin d’absorber le littéraire, le contraint à se redéfinir. Ni Zola ni Jdanov ne semblent dire tous plus ou moins, cherchant désespérément leur place entre un naturalisme jugé trop littéraire et un militantisme trop aride. Leur écriture «vraie» renonce aux séductions du style, mais non à la littérature; elle tient du témoignage, non du document, de la fiction autobiographique, non du jour-
nalisme. Où la classer? Pour le savoir, il faudrait sans doute accepter l'invitation de Paul Aron et (re)lire ces textes qui, vieux d'un demi-siècle à peine, semblent venir d'un autre âge. Leur échec relève directement de ce que Walter Benjamin appelait l'«histoire des vaincus.»

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DANS CE VOLUMINEUX OUVRAGE, Brigitte Studer apporte la preuve définitive d'un phénomène révélé par de nombreux dissidents communistes: la subordination des partis communistes au Komintern, lui-même instrument de Staline. Il a fallu l'ouverture des Archives de la IIIème Internationale, à la suite de la chute du régime communiste, pour qu'un tel travail puisse être accompli.

Le cas du Parti communiste suisse est exemplaire. Quoique petit, ce parti n'en a pas moins joué un rôle crucial. Un de ses membres a été un des rares communistes étrangers présents au congrès de fondation de l'Internationale communiste: Fritz Platten, qui devait tragiquement mourir dans les purges staliniennes de la fin des années trente. Et surtout, Jules Humbert-Droz devait jouer un rôle important dans l'Internationale, comme l'un de ses fonctionnaires éminents.

L'ouvrage de Brigitte Studer est divisé en trois parties: «l'adaptation,» qui consiste en un récit historique des rapports de subordination du Parti communiste suisse au Komintern de 1929 à 1939; «l'organisation et les acteurs,» qui est une analyse des structures de subordination de la section suisse dans le Komintern et de la structure et du fonctionnement du Parti communiste suisse; «l'action,» sur le rôle de la section suisse comme «lieu de repli» organisationnel, «comme lieu de passage» et «comme relais propagandiste» pour le Komintern. L'ouvrage comprend également, plusieurs annexes: des documents, surtout des rapports d'émisaires du Komintern auprès de la section suisse; la composition du corps dirigeant du Parti communiste suisse; des notices biographiques de ce corps dirigeant; des notices biographiques de fonctionnaires du Komintern, ainsi qu'une importante bibliographie.

La première partie, le récit historique, montre bien que les interventions incessantes du Komintern dans la vie de sa section suisse paralysaient l'action de celle-ci et la rendaient incapable d'exploiter les possibilités que la situation nationale ou locale lui offrait. Le centralisme du Komintern avait un effet pernicieux que la lourdeur de l'appareil accentuait.

La deuxième partie contient une analyse poussée des écoles de formation du Komintern, dont l'intérêt va bien au-delà du cas spécifique suisse. Elle révèle en détails comment les cadres recevaient une formation qui en faisaient des instruments dociles du Komintern. Cette partie montre aussi l'imbrication de la section des cadres du Komintern avec la police politique soviétique, le NKVD. En outre, elle contient une remarquable analyse sociologique des membres du Parti communiste suisse.

La troisième partie montre l'importance de la Suisse comme «lieu de repli» pour les communistes allemands après 1933, ainsi que pour la Rundschau, qui remplace désormais l'Inprekor comme organe du Komintern. La Suisse sert aussi de «lieu de passage,» de relais durant la guerre civile espagnole, aussi bien pour les activités d'aide humanitaire, de transit de volontaires pour les brigades internationales que de fournitures d'armes. La Suisse est aussi un «relais propagandiste.» Les communistes suisses se portent à la défense de communistes emprisonnés à l'étranger, sont des «auxiliaires de la politique extérieure» soviétique, propagent une image favorable de l'URSS.
et dénigrent ceux qui la critiquent, comme André Gide après son retour d’URSS. Ils vont même jusqu’à défendre les ignobles procès de Moscou.

L’ouvrage de Brigitte Studer est remarquable. Il repose sur une documentation abondante: en plus, des archives du Komintern, Brigitte Studer a dépouillé systématiquement les archives publiques suisses, ainsi que des fonds privés et s’est entretenue avec plusieurs survivants du Parti communiste suisse. Aucun fait n’est avancé, sans être solidement étayé.

On ne peut qu’espérer que des travaux semblables seront entrepris pour étudier d’autres sections nationales du Komintern. On pense évidemment au Parti communiste français, dont les propagandistes ont toujours essayé de voiler les rapports avec Moscou. Il serait aussi très intéressant d’avoir une étude sur le Parti communiste canadien, qui éclairerait les diverses péripéties de son activité.

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IN THE AFTERMATH of the near simultaneous collapse of both the “really existing communism” in the east and social democracy in the west, many academic Marxists have taken intellectual cover in the bewildering range of “alternative” theoretical nostrums. Some, who did not join the legions seeking cover amidst the now also collapsing genre of post-modernism, have turned to Polanyi or Schumpeter in an effort to find a socialism untainted by Marx. Others, and here Gerald Cohen and Bob Fitch, writing in a recent issue of the New Left Review, come to mind, have re-asserted the centrality of the thought of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Still others, including a number of so-called “analytical Marxists” have re-articulated visions of “market socialism.” It is against this last group that David McNally takes up the cudgels.

For McNally, in this well written volume, the “market in labour” is the defining market of capitalism. It is also the “market” without which market socialism loses its coherence. Thus, for McNally, a market socialism without a labour market is incoherent, while the inclusion of a labour market vitiates any claim by market socialists to socialism.

McNally builds his case against market socialism through an examination of the centrality of the rise of the labour market to the development of capitalism. It was the separation of direct producers from the means of production which was characteristic both of the historical primary accumulation of capital and the genesis of the labour market. In setting out this argument, McNally points to the ambiguities contained in the thought of Adam Smith. In particular, McNally sees the rise of the market in labour as the locus of the contradiction between Smith’s morality and his idealization of free markets — the so-called “Adam Smith problem.”

It was, in McNally’s view, the writings of Thomas Malthus which cut through these Smithian ambiguities and which, in ideological terms, set the labour market at the centre of the political economy of capital by explicitly linking the labour market to the question of poverty. This Malthusian recognition gave rise, in turn, to an array of nostrums intended to abolish poverty while leaving “the market” intact. Co-operation, labour exchanges, the institution of various forms of labour money, and other types of monetary reform all were touted as ways in which poverty could be abolished. Proudhon is singled out by McNally for special attention on this score.

Ultimately the message of this volume is reasonably straight forward. The market socialists of the late 20th century
are merely reworking — albeit in more sophisticated form — the remedies to poverty patented in the 19th century. Moreover, according to McNally, for failing to come to grips with the source, the defining characteristic of that poverty — the labour market itself — they are condemned to fail.

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ENZO TRAVERSO had to choose either between organizing his difficult subject around a putatively coherent Marxist theory or around intellectuals and activists who considered themselves Marxists — not quite the same thing. He decided on the second option, but, as his admirably informed and judicious study progressed, it seems that he could not escape the obvious need to sum up and juxtapose the views of his several protagonists, not only against each other, but to consider them within a framework of the bedrock beliefs, perhaps, one might say more accurately, the loosely-constituted dogmas that defined the orthodox Marxist position on the Jewish question. The debate was conducted over a century principally within the boundaries of Central and Eastern Europe, starting with the 1843 publication of Marx's Zur Judenfrage and ending with the Nazi destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943. Long before that heroic defiance occurred, there was little left of — and even less to commend — the Marxist idea of assimilation as the “solution” to Jewish identity. In the Marxist lexicon, assimilation was the step Jews would ineluctably be led to take after emancipation, an idea first set in motion during the Enlightenment, and associated most commonly with Moses Mendelssohn. Assimilation found its most faithful Jewish and non-Jewish adherents in Central Europe. Judaism, which was seen as an atavistic relic, both in its religious foundations and in the successive economic roles that Jews occupied from ancient to modern times, would simply disappear according to a general theory of linear and progressive capitalist development, leading, in Marx's words, beyond political emancipation to human emancipation. In other words, the last stage of history would eliminate all the historically determined and defining qualities that divided humankind. Jewish identity would vanish just as surely as all other identities, transforming all within a world composed of transparent human beings.

For all their reliance on scientific and positivist principles, a version of Messianism pervaded the debates. Though the presence of Messianic elements in Marxism was tracked down some time ago, it is endowed with fresh power in Traverso's book. For a number of Marxists, the religious aspects of Judaism were regarded as historically transitory. At the same time, they failed to recognize that the “final” stage of communism owed much to eschatology. Another kind of solution awaited Jews, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, and did not spare thinkers who devised their own Marxist amalgam. Walter Benjamin almost alone tried to tie secular Messianism to Marxism, and in doing so confronted Marxian doctrine at its weakest point — its anti-utopianism which claimed that no representation of the future is possible without it being first constituted materially. In his own personal tragedy, as well as in his fascinating but failed attempt to fuse theology and materialism, he saw that neither Jews nor the Jewish problem would vanish or be dissolved, and that the denial of Judaism as a spiritual sensibility was due to a fatal reductionism that subsisted on a Marxist version of historical inevitability. Traverso points out repeatedly that Marxist doctrine avoided serious discussion of the complex nature of Judaism, and he im-
plicitly includes in his critique the more notorious simplifications that Marxists tended to impose on the roots of anti-Semitism. That is why a figure like Benjamin stands out as a rebuke to the prevailing notions that disabled so many Marxists from seeing how Jewish participation in the making of modernity actually placed them in question in a wide context of change, rather than making them the question.

Many Marxists were uneasy that their loyalty to the prevailing ideology distorted their critical powers and weakened their positions in the practical political struggles that were to beset them as the non-Western European world plunged into a series of revolutions and war that demanded but rarely received a clear analysis of the nature of modern Judaism and modern anti-Semitism. The two are necessarily coupled, but were often not seen that way. Traverso reviews the positions of the principal Marxists in Germany and Austria — Engels, Kautsky, August Bebel, Eduard Bernstein, Otto Bauer, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Alexander Parvus, Victor Adler — and he alludes more briefly to others. But their self-consciousness as the authentic avatars of Marxism did not, as their theoretical efforts demonstrated, reveal either much originality or innovativeness. Those among them, who have been dubbed "non-Jewish Jews," including Marx himself, did everything to divest themselves of their origins, carrying further the process of assimilation initiated by their forebears, who had been prompted by a sense of liberation from a past that they thought was best jettisoned. In a specifically important way, the existence of cultural conventions of tolerance and the official measures of limited tolerance mitigated anti-Semitism sufficiently to encourage the expectation that it would in time fall by the wayside as the German population (though the conflicting and mutually hostile nationalisms of the Austrian Empire posed intractable problems) would fall behind a Marxist political pro-

gram to embrace internationalism and achieve a peaceful transition to a non-capitalist and ultimately non-alienated world. That this belief was still being propagated when some of the best minds realized that the hope of assimilation had faded is a proof of the power of self-deception.

The most informative and richest sections of the book are to be found in Traverso's discussion of Jewish Marxists in Russia both before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. Most of them — though Trotsky before his exile was an adherent of assimilation — saw it as historically and culturally naive in a society that not only consigned Jews to the Pale of Settlement, but a society in which the state organized periodic pogroms and effectively prevented Jews from gaining higher education. In Russia, Judeo-Marxism took its clues and found strength from the presence of a vibrant Jewish culture, based on Yiddishkeit, a movement of secularization and modernization that possessed Yiddish as a force voicing the concrete realities of Jewish life. The Bundists took an impressive lead in systematizing these perceptions, intellectually outshone the proponents of an East European Zionism that was somewhat distinct from Herzel's, and also in the face of opposition from Lenin and Stalin, whose anti-Semitism was fully developed long before he took power. To his credit, Trotsky would in his exile reverse his earlier pre-Revolutionary stand on assimilation, acknowledge its bankruptcy as a practical political strategy, and focus instead on the more pressing problem of Nazi anti-Semitism as the modern form of barbarism.

Figures who may not be as familiar are Vladimir Medem and Ber Borokhov, as well as the young Abram Leon, who died in Auschwitz. Traverso commends Medem for his non-linear analysis and his pluralism, his rejection of the false allure of assimilationism, his perception of the national character of the Jewish question in Eastern Europe, and his effort on behalf
of cultural national autonomy. But, according to Traverso, Medem’s critique of Western Marxism faltered on an optic too narrow to perceive the cultural differences that distinguished liberal from non-liberal societies. Like Medem, Borokhov set aside assimilationism as an error, but he went much further in his concept of nationalism, endowing it with a “material base” as a necessary condition of identity that he predicted would not vanish: “The growing national specialization does not assimilate the Jews, but, on the contrary nationalizes him.” (117) By 1917, he became a partisan of a Palestinian solution, advocating assimilation for the Arabs whom he thought would be naturally drawn to the benefits of a superior Western culture, a far cry from a multi-ethnic society that characterized Medem’s ideas. Reluctant to give up the notion of class, Abram Leon developed a theory of the Jews as a “people-class” which recalled Max Weber’s notion of “caste” or a “pariah people.” Judaism, for him, embodied the interests of a precapitalist merchant class. His economic analysis, which relegated Jews to “a historically doomed economic function,” caught between “feudalism in decomposition and a decadent capitalism” and which made them the prey of anti-Semites, signifies, as it were, a return to older categories that remained locked within a rigid theory. (215)

Traverso speaks about a renewal of Marxism, basing his hope on some of the perceptions of Benjamin, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Bundists who theorized on the possibility of detaching nation from territory. Obviously he sees the necessity of treating Marxism and communism as separate phenomena. Ten years after the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, Le communisme, a book by Dionys Mascolo, incarnated for Witold Gombrowicz, the Polish writer who had been living in exile in Argentina since the 1930s, some important materialist precepts. Gombrowicz was startled by the book’s “absolute knowledge about reality and absolute ignorance,” but above all by its author’s inability to understand the world because “he wants to impose himself on the world … and feels that the imposition is the only form of understanding.” Gombrowicz was led to declare that communism was not so much a philosophical as a technical question. He asked with bitter irony why, if communism wanted to transform material conditions, it gave so much attention to spiritual matters and why so little to material ones. Communism, it might be added, left out the redemptive power of Judaism and the spiritual content of Marxism. The major question remains, as Traverso’s book illustrates, how Jews fitted into but were never an integral part of the modern host societies in which they lived, yet were able to achieve, late in their histories, a cluster of voices to explain their condition. Together with their non-Jewish Marxist colleagues, they strained to develop a coherent theory, tried to impose it as an exclusive understanding on the world, but encountered a rather different reality. The most prescient of them laboured to acknowledge it. Most remained (Ruth Rischer is only one among many) unaware until too late that anti-Semitism had become a murderous doctrine, and that their labours had done almost nothing to prepare the world for so devastating a catastrophe. Traverso’s book is to be valued for opening these questions to rigorous inquiry.
(Germany, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Poland). As the author explains in the Introduction, the collapse of the state socialist regimes brought about chaos in the economy as well as in the minds of a great many people. The high, and largely naive, expectations, namely, that the switch to a market economy based on private property would bring about overall prosperity and the multi-party system would create real democracy soon proved to be false.

Neither the West nor the people in East-Central Europe were prepared to face the consequences of the collapse of the state socialist systems. As a matter of fact, even in spite of the accumulating signs, Western politicians or oppositional forces in East-Central Europe believed that the system could, and should, be reformed. (See for instance Solidarity's idea on the "limited revolution" or the Hungarian democratic opposition's long-standing position that an overall attack on the party-state would be impossible and suicidal.) However, for lack of historical antecedents, no-one could envisage the social and economic costs of returning from a state-owned, planned economic system to one based on private property and exposed to market forces. Also, the economic, social, and cultural developments in the past forty-odd years and their impact on people's expectations have largely been ignored in charting out the path of restructuration.

Of course, the abolition of the constraining factors imposed by the party-state on the free expression of ideas brought to the surface suppressed nationalist, chauvinist, and extreme rightist ideas as well. Paul Hockenos gives a well-researched, vivid, and rather detailed picture of the excesses and atrocities of neo-Nazi groups in Germany, the skinheads' attacks on Roma or Vietnamese and African workers and students in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania. The author also describes the role of the Polish Catholic church in the country's political and cultural life and its manoeuvres to superimpose conservative Catholic values on society.

In several places in the book (for example, in the chapters on Germany, Hungary, and Poland as well as in the Conclusion) the author denounces the idea of the ethnically based nation and the idea of the nation-state. He correctly points out that state borders in the area historically never coincided with one single ethnic group. Indeed, the area's major power, Austria — and since 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Empire — was a multi-national empire. After World War I, with the collapse of the Empire and the establishment of the so-called successor states (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and the annexation of Transylvania by Romania, a multitude of ethnically mixed states came in to existence. In contrast, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and about one-third of its ethnic Hungarian population became citizens of other countries. These events did not help to extinguish nationalist feelings in the area. After World War II the large-scale expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the forced repatriation of Hungarians from Slovak territory, and the collective denationalization of Hungarians and Germans sowed the seeds of nationalist sentiments.

The fictitious "brotherhood of socialist nations" swept under the carpet the existing tensions and animosities that came to the surface when the communist parties gradually turned to nationalism as their legitimizing ideology. After the demise of the one-party system, freedom of expression has been established, and long suppressed sentiments and feelings got free reign. The author describes manifestations of the dark side of the newly regained freedom. He also demonstrates the abysmal failure of the communist regimes to eradicate chauvinist, racist, and xenophobic ideas. He shows that a very large proportion of skinheads come from the working classes or are children of party and state functionaries. Similarly, leaders of ultra-nationalist parties (for example,
Istvan Csurska in Hungary) have been either linked to the ruling party or accepted positions and/or decorations and awards from the state. Hockenos is right in stating this fact, but he does not take into account that with a few exceptions (for example, Havel) most of the prominent figures of the democratic opposition were often active members of the communist party or in some position in the state apparatus. But it could not be otherwise in a totalitarian state.

The book is full of valuable information and details. It describes the background of the representatives of various leaders of nationalist and neo-nazi movements as well as the international connections amongst neo-nazi and skinhead movements. However, the author — although he occasionally makes a distinction between conservative and extremist leaders and movements — creates the impression that the two are equally dangerous for the fledgling democracies. True, conservatives are often prone to overlook racist excesses and condone harsh police measures against "unruly" minorities; they are the parties of "law and order." None the less, precisely because they are on the side of "law and order," they reject violent actions by a tiny minority of extremists.

Paul Hockenos also underestimates the results of the efforts to enlighten the younger generations in West Germany (before the unification) about the responsibility Germany has to bear for Nazi Germany's crimes. True, these were not fully successful, but 65 per cent of 18-34 year olds think, according to an April 1995 opinion research, that national socialism had overwhelmingly bad sides only, 71 per cent of the same age group acknowledge the army's co-responsibility, and even 65 per cent thought that the Wehrmacht was part of genocide. (Der Spiegel, 8 May 1995, 77) The author is right in emphasizing (chapter 2) that the GDR did not conduct systematic and convincing anti-fascist education and declined to accept any blame for the Nazi crimes. As if Hitler were West German only!

The elections in 1994 brought about the victory of the socialists (ex-communists) and their allies in Poland and Hungary. Although Meciar and his allies won the latest parliamentary elections in Slovakia and the Slovak National Party got ministerial posts, the extreme right did not prevail. The new Hungarian government, a coalition of socialists and liberals, signed a Basic Treaty with Slovakia, and negotiations are underway to agree on a Basic Treaty with Romania. These acts do not eliminate hatred, animosity, mistrust, and tensions, but lessen the chance of conflicts and may begin the slow process toward a democratic solution of the ethnic problems.

One of the causes of the right-wing extremism Paul Hockenos mentions is the economic and social turmoils caused by the collapse of the state socialist system. He, however, does not take into account, apart from some general statements, that the militarization of the economy placed an unbearable burden on the economy. Some economists (for example, the Hungarian András Bródy, a Marxist) calculate the military expenditures at about 20-25 per cent of the GDP. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon, the re-direction and modernization of the economy, coupled with the large-scale loss of the Eastern markets, exposed the vulnerability of the old structures. Paul Hockenos is right when he denounces the Western powers and the European Union for giving mainly lip service to helping the ex-communist countries in their efforts to join the European institutions. He does not hide his aversion of the economic measures imposed by the IMF and attributes to those a large degree of the current hardships. He also advocates a moratorium on the accumulated debts to Western governments and financial institutions. This is, however, a contested issue. Poland asked for, and received, a moratorium, while in Hungary neither the first democratically elected, centre-right
nor the new socialist-liberal governments instituted such a practice. And while the economic growth in Poland is somewhat higher than in Hungary, the overall social indicators (unemployment, etc.) are not too much different. Also, one should not forget that the bulk of the debt has been accumulated by Poland under Gierek and by Hungary under Kádár. The denouncing of the conservative Czech economic policy by the author is also a debatable issue. The Czech Republic has so far the best economic indicators and its unemployment rate is by far the lowest in the region. This brief review does not allow exploration of all the alternative interpretations, different from, or contradicting, the ones given by the author, it is an indication only that a more circumspect and more historical analysis would have improved the quality — thus the credibility — of the book.

And finally, while the intention of the author was to focus on East-Central European nationalism, conservatism, and neo-nazism, he mentions similar phenomena in the West only marginally (except in Germany). However, in the French presidential elections Le Pen's National Front obtained about 16 per cent of the popular votes (and close to 25 in the former "red belt" around Paris) and won the mayoral race in 3 large French cities, among others, in Toulon, France's fifth largest city. Csurka's extreme nationalist party won less than two per cent in the latest Hungarian elections. Contrary to Paul Hockenos' claim, the extremist phenomena, right-wing populism — as the American elections or the latest Ontario results show — represent an equal, if not even greater danger.

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READERS may be interested in this edited volume for several reasons. There is sufficient information in the nine country chapters (China, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand) for each of them to stand alone as case studies, but the book was also intended to provide a basis for comparisons among the countries. An attempt was also made to explain the patterns observed in the subject countries in accordance with the existing theories of trade unionism, and to draw on the findings from the subject countries to evaluate the validity and generalizability of the theoretical principles that had, heretofore, been based almost exclusively on the experiences of a very small group of advanced industrialized countries.

Readers who just want information on organized labour in the subject countries will be most interested in knowing whether or not the information presented in this volume is more complete, accurate, comprehensible, and up-to-date than what can be obtained from other sources. In the experience of this reviewer, it has not been too difficult to gather from other sources a bulky assortment of reasonably current English-language books, articles, and research papers dealing with various industrial relations issues in all of the countries covered by this edited volume except Malaysia and Thailand; but of course material focusing primarily on organized labour is less extensive. But though this volume is not the only available source on organized labour in most of the subject countries, the following chapters are to be recommended above most or all alternative sources: chapter 2 by Malcolm Warner on China; chapter 4 by Ponniah Arudsothy and Craig Littler on Malaysia; chapter 7 by David Levin and Stephen Chui on Hong Kong; and chapter 8 by Chris Leggett on Singapore.
In the case of some of the other countries, material that may have been current at the time it was written has already been overtaken by events, so that it now appears quite dated.

As indicated above, this volume was designed to be more than a compilation of free-standing country studies. The preface indicates that the authors all tried, in accordance with the principles of comparative analysis, to use a similar theoretical framework and to collect comparable data. The research strategy they adopted was supposedly one that “emphasized agreement on a few relatively straightforward research issues and an explicit, albeit flexible, framework that would guide the collection of data and analysis.” (14) This is, in principle, very commendable. For one thing, strict adherence to a common framework helps to alleviate the risk, so common in comparative projects where the situation in each of the subject countries is presented by different authors, that the contrasting perspectives of the authors will be conflated with the objective differences in the countries being discussed. A common theoretical framework, and comparable information on a standard set of issues, is, in any case, necessary to make meaningful comparisons, draw upon the valid insights of existing theory, and utilize the new research findings to confirm, qualify, or refute various theoretical propositions.

Though the stated goal would have been highly desirable, as it turned out the book does not appear to have been organized around a coherent theoretical framework. In the opening pages, twelve hypotheses are thrown out as representative of four very broad alternative theoretical perspectives (modernization theory and the convergence hypothesis, international labour market theory, comparative politics, and political sociology). There are problems in the way some of the hypotheses are formulated (some are vague and untestable; others are idiosyncratic and inherently implausible; and still others are clearly not relevant to more than one or two of the countries under consideration), but a more serious problem is the lack of correspondence among the hypotheses in terms of the causal factors and outcomes. Four of the hypotheses (the first, eighth, tenth, and eleventh) pose various sets of causal factors that are predicted to lead to “similarities” in union outcomes, but the other hypotheses posit relationships between a diverse assortment of causal factors and a hodge-podge of outcomes. A few pages later, the whole research design is said to involve a process of “analytic induction” that may either entail (1) looking for similarities in the pattern of unionism associated with similarities in the level of economic development and the nature of the party system, or (2) dividing the subject countries into broad categories on the basis of their patterns of unionism and then attempting to “identify and explore variables that might account for similarities and differences in unionism.” (16) Finally, at the end of the methodology section, a rather long list of explanatory variables are presented as the ones the authors recognized as potentially important determinants of union behaviours, even though the variables are not explicitly evaluated in each chapter. All of this gives the impression of vagueness, inconsistency, and lack of focus. It is, thus, not too surprising that the chapters were not organized consistently in a manner that would have facilitated comparisons.

In writing the concluding chapter Frenkel drew on additional information and analysis that was not always consistent with what was presented in the country chapters, and there was only minimal correspondence between his reasoning and that of the other authors. Much of the analysis was oriented around a newly introduced classification scheme. In this new scheme, there are three primary categories corresponding to the nature of the state/union relationship (state corporatism, state exclusionary, and state collaborative) and variations corresponding to distinctive structural features. This yielded eight variants for classifying the
nine subject countries plus Japan. (With almost as many variants as countries, it is hard to believe that the search for cross-national similarities could have resulted in dissimilar countries being grouped together, but there are still some unexpected pairs — China and Singapore as closely related variants of state corporatism, and Japan and Hong Kong as closely related variants of the state exclusionary pattern.) Each of the variations in this new classification framework is explained in some detail, but there is only a very superficial evaluation of the hypotheses that were introduced in the first chapter. With the final analysis based on the newly introduced classification scheme, the book’s overall conclusion — that factors relating to the role of the state and the political party system are the most important determinants of the nature of trade unions in the Asia-Pacific region — was inevitable.

Theories of comparative industrial relations that fail to take the experience of countries in the Asia-Pacific region into account are clearly inadequate. Frenkel and the other authors who contributed to this volume are to be commended for their efforts to remedy this problem. Some of the individual country studies do, indeed, contribute significantly to our understanding of trade union patterns in this region. For the purposes of cross-national comparisons, theory construction or theory testing, however, we still need a more coherent, sharply focused organizational framework that would allow for more systematic analysis.

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CÉLIVRE, édité par Momsen et Kinnaird, comprend une sélection de communications présentées au Commonwealth Geographical Bureau Workshop, atelier organisé conjointement avec l’International Geographical Union Study Group on Gender and Geography à l’Université de Newcastle upon Tyne (Royaume-Uni) en 1989. Cet atelier réunissait pour la première fois des chercheuses, principalement du Commonwealth, intéressées par le thème genre et développement. Les textes sélectionnés se veulent donc une contribution au corpus de connaissances et de réflexions produisant par les géographes sur ce thème.

Cet ouvrage, soulignent les éditeures, est construit sous le signe de l’unité aussi bien que sous celui de la diversité. L’unité des contributions provient de l’origine et du champ de spécialisation des auteures, presque toutes des géographes habitant les pays du Commonwealth, et du fait que leur culture du développement soit enracinée dans la tradition coloniale britannique et ce, qu’elles travaillent dans la métropole ou dans les pays du Sud. Quant à la diversité, elle se donne à lire à travers l’hétérogénéité des populations étudiées et l’utilisation des variables spatiales et temporelles comme facteurs explicatifs. En marquant ainsi l’importance du milieu de vie comme facteur déterminant les conditions de production et de reproduction, cet ouvrage sur les questions de genre dans les pays du tiers-monde, s’inscrit dans une perspective géographique. Selon les éditeures, «this approach is closely aligned with the postmodernist reinterpretation of a politics of identity as politics of location.» (4)

De cet effort pour faire ressortir la diversité des contextes découle une organisation des articles par continent. D’ailleurs cette division régionale corres-
pond assez bien à des différences réelles dans les conditions de vie des femmes et à des préoccupations spécifiques des chercheuses de chacune de ces régions, comme l'illustrent les chapitres introductifs de chacune des régions.

Malgré ces spécificités régionales, les éditeures soulignent que, pour les chercheuses du Sud, le champ d'intérêt «gender and geography» se confond avec «gender and development» alors que pour les géographes du Nord, la question «gender and development» s'inscrit comme une des composantes du domaine beaucoup plus vaste de la géographie féministe. C'est pourquoi d'ailleurs, malgré l'attention portée sur les variables spatiales dans certains articles, on peut se demander ce qui différencie ce recueil de texte des autres ouvrages traitant du thème femmes et développement ou, plus spécifiquement, ce que les géographes apportent de plus à cette question.

Cette remarque ne discrédite cependant en rien l'intérêt des études présentées ici. En effet, les chercheuses du Sud ont trop peu la chance de faire connaître leurs travaux et ce recueil comble cette lacune. De plus, le regroupement des présentations par région nous permet de saisir la diversité des modes et des conditions de vie des femmes du Sud. Cet ouvrage est donc une ouverture sur la pluralité et la créativité des femmes dans leur contexte respectif.

Sur le continent africain, les études sur les femmes sont en pleine expansion bien que les géographes tardent à suivre cette voie. Ardayfio-Scandorf, dans son introduction sur la région, constate que la géographie n'offre pas, en Afrique comme ailleurs, d'outils théoriques adéquats pour analyser les rapports hommes-femmes dans des sociétés patriarcales. Les géographes africaines adoptent donc des approches descriptives sur des thèmes touchant le quotidien, notamment sur l'environnement et surtout sur la gestion des ressources naturelles par les femmes dans les milieux ruraux. Deux des cinq articles de ce recueil portent sur ce thème. Toutefois, pour Ardayfio-Scandorf, la question femmes et environnement pourrait permettre le développement d'un nouveau «paradigme» sur la gestion durable des ressources à travers une approche centrée sur les populations (a people-centred approach to development). Cependant, elle souligne aussi l'importance d'élargir le champ «gender and geography» aux questions d'équité, d'intégration régionale et de paix et de l'analyser dans la perspective plus globale des transformations structurelles de l'économie.

En Asie du Sud, la recherche féministe apparaît bien établie mais les géographes qui y contribuent sont rares et isolées. Les travaux existants s'inscrivent dans le champ du développement par le biais de l'analyse des disparités régionales. Dans le présent recueil, les articles retenus sont assez diversifiés même s'ils abordent tous le rôle de productrice et de reproductrice des femmes et leur contribution à l'économie familiale.

Le tour d'horizon fait par Momsen et Lewis sur l'Asie du Sud-Est et l'Océanie montre que, comme dans la plupart des autres régions du tiers-monde, les études portant sur les femmes sont devenues rares. À Taïwan et à Hong Kong, Chiang note que les études féministes prennent graduellement de l'expansion, mais les géographes féministes sont là aussi, peu nombreuses. Dans l'ensemble de la région, les recherches disponibles portent en général sur l'interface entre les modes de vie traditionnels et modernes à travers l'analyse des migrations et des changements qui affectent le monde rural. Les études contenues dans ce recueil montrent comment certaines femmes développent de nouvelles activités économiques pour faire face à un contexte en changement tout en ayant à affronter les nouveaux types de rapports sociaux que cela implique.

L'Amérique latine, même si elle ne fait pas partie du Commonwealth, est inclue dans ce recueil par le biais des recherches menées par des géographes an-
glo-saxonnes. Selon le portrait que dressent Momsen sur l'ensemble de cette région et Calio sur le Brésil, peu de géographes latino-américaines mènent des recherches sur les femmes bien que le mouvement féministe y soit vigoureux. Il semble cependant qu'il y ait un espoir puisque de jeunes chercheuses, souvent issues des mouvements militants, manifestent de plus en plus d'intérêt pour ce champ de la géographie. Dans le présent document, les présentations portent sur les migrations féminines et sur l'organisation du travail au sein du ménage. La perspective adoptée s'appuie sur une analyse de l'organisation patriarcale du travail de production et de reproduction à l'intérieur des unités familiales, proposant ainsi un cadre explicatif de la situation des femmes que l'on ne retrouve pas dans les études plutôt descriptives contenues dans le reste du volume.

En dépit de la grande diversité des cas étudiés et des approches descriptives ou analytiques utilisées, l'intention première des chercheuses est de montrer les femmes comme des agents de changement dans des sociétés en profonde redéfinition. Cette perspective se révèle intéressante puisqu'elle contribue à faire connaître la contribution des femmes dans toutes les régions du monde, contribution que l'on a trop longtemps sous-évaluée ou passée sous silence. En définitive, et malgré la concision des articles et leur ancrage incertain dans le champ de la géographie, ce document constitue une source intéressante de données inédites sur les femmes du Sud. Il contribue ainsi à la définition d'une «géographie des femmes» — féministe ou non — qui, bien qu'elle ne soit que timidement ébauchée dans cette ouvrage, semble se dessiner dans les pays du Sud.

Cependant, une certaine confusion demeure à la lecture de cet ouvrage quant à la précision de ce que sont les champs de la géographie des femmes, de la géographie féministe et du «gender and geography.» Ces termes semblent se recouper et être synonymes. Pourtant, en Afrique francophone que je connais un peu mieux, beaucoup de chercheuses s'intéressant aux femmes hésitent à se qualifier de féministes. En est-il de même dans le monde anglo-saxon? Il aurait été intéressant d'avoir le point de vue des géographes de différentes régions à ce sujet.

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NOW THAT WE have all recovered from the shock of learning that the "end of history" is at hand, we must cope with the "end of jobs." Richard Barnet was among the first to announce the new end-time in his dour article in Harper's in September, 1993. Looking on the bright side in 1994, William Bridges gave us Jobshift: How To Prosper in a Working-place without Jobs, and the professional gadfly Jeremy Rifkin added his thoughts early in 1995 with The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era.

Futurists have a way of making thoroughly unpleasant news seem almost cheerful, distantly following in the footsteps of Friedrich Nietzsche when he proclaimed the end of God and morality in The Joyful Wisdom. Whatever spin we may choose to place upon it, however, the end of the full-time, secure job equipped with a sweet package of fringe benefits is not good news for working men and women.

But it is news upon which we may confidently rely. Jobs are coming to an end, just as the gap in wealth and income between haveves and have-nots is widening all over the world. In fact the two phenomena are interlocking parts of the same process. Since that otherwise unremarkable decade, the 1970s, a steady erosion of good jobs has taken place throughout
the United State, Canada, and Europe, with Japan close at their heels. Expectations that the services and professions would take up the slack in our post-industrial era, in the same way that factory jobs sprang up to take the place of farm labour a century ago, have proved illusory.

Those expectations have been shattered for two obvious reasons. First, the same technological revolution that made the farmer and the factory workers almost obsolete has now begun to decimate the ranks of the white-collar workforce. Computer-driven technology cuts ever more deeply into our need for everything from secretaries to middle managers. Second, the work that remains for human beings to perform — both manual labour and brain labour — is being exported to the Third World as rapidly as possible. The capitalist buys cheap and sells dear. Labour in the Third World, all kinds of labour, is cheap. End of discussion.

So employers have little incentive to provide fat healthy jobs for the toilers of the economically mature countries. The jobs that do not run away to the Third World are turned over to relatively inexpensive immigrant labour, the working native poor, and whoever is willing to work overtime or hold two or three jobs at the same time. Such jobs are increasingly part-time, “contingent,” and profoundly underpaid. The numbers of those entirely out of work have stabilized in the mid-1990s at about ten per cent of the workforce. In the first quarter of 1995, the reported rate of unemployment was above five per cent for the United States and Britain, above ten per cent in France, Germany, and Italy, and above twenty per cent in Spain. Rates may go much higher in the next century.

A welcome contribution to the discussion of joblessness is now at hand from two veteran sociologists, Stanley Aronowitz of the CUNY Graduate Centre and William DiFazio of St. John’s University. They supply a close analysis of the impact of what they call “sci-tech transformations of the labor process,” arguing that the answer to the problem is not further futile efforts to create more jobs, not massive programs of job training, and certainly not Luddite reaction against the robot and the computer, but a revolutionary change in our ways of defining human worth and rewarding work. (3) The age of jobs is over. It will not come back.

At the heart of the new reality, heralded by virtually all contemporary futures researchers, is the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy in which the most precious resource is not land, or raw materials, or even technology as such, but knowledge. The tendency is for most surviving work to centre on the control of living labor or its machine form.” (32) Those with the specialized knowledge to exercise this control are the lucky few who remain eligible for decent employment. Aronowitz and DiFazio give the example of the oil refinery industry in the United States, which employed 200,000 production and maintenance workers in 1960, but by 1991 employed fewer than 50,000. An “ever smaller number of people in virtually all occupations,” they write, can expect “satisfying and economically remunerative work. But for the immense majority, computerization of the workplace has resulted in further subordination, displacement, or irrelevance.” (33) The authors elaborate their thesis with probing analyses of recent economic and social theory and reports of on-site visits and interviews they conducted in the American workplace itself. Of special interest are the chapters on the impact of computerization on engineers and architects, research scientists, and academicians.

In the last half of the last chapter, they arrive at policy recommendations for dealing humanely and democratically with the jobless future. Their remedies are a mixed bag, ranging from free public child care and higher education, available in much of Europe already, to a radically shorter work week, a guaranteed minimum income, and a return to progressive taxation. They end on a utopian note:
"The development of the individual — not economic growth, cost cutting, or profits — must be the fundamental goal of scientific and technological innovation." (358)

As Michael Marien remarks in his abstract of The Jobless Future in the June 1995 issue of Future Survey, Aronowitz and DiFazio offer only "vague and idealized Old Left proposals quite the opposite of present rightward trends." They are good-hearted proposals, but what chance do they have of being implemented in this age of mercilessly galloping global capitalism and populist assaults on big government? Or do we need to consider still more radical remedies?

I also regret that The Jobless Future is too narrowly focused on the United States (although the rest of the world is not ignored), that the authors give only token attention to the joblessness caused by the export of work to the Third World as opposed to the ravages of sci-tech, and that they have offered so little speculation about their ostensible subject: the future. Credible detailed scenarios of what is likely to happen if their policy recommendations (or others) are not adopted would have made their study far more compelling. But this is an important book on a topic of urgent concern.

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THE YEARS 1925-1950, says Bernard Smith, demonstrate with particular force the inability of the United States to produce, or even show much sympathy for, a left politics of any but the most anodyne and limited kind. His book is intended to explain why. The events of the period, he reminds his readers again and again, seemed made to elicit at least a measure of support for change. Yet even in the midst of the Great Depression, and with European fascism making ominous and steady advances on the other side of the Atlantic, only a handful of US voters could be brought to support socialism and communism. Intellectuals — with a few exceptions — remained essentially conservative, as the character and ideology of the New Humanism and Southern Agrarianism showed. The New Deal's most radical phase — and it was not very radical — lasted only a short time. Journalists and politicians consistently — and wilfully — misrepresented Soviet actions and behaviour. And, after 1945, the rush to underwrite containment, the Cold War, and even the excesses of McCarthyism was close to all-encompassing. Given this, the blandness and complacency of the Reagan years (the book is, in a sense, really intended to explicate their lineage and descent) become the logical outcome of what by the post-war period was a deeply entrenched feature of American life: the inability on the part of most Americans to understand freedom, liberty, and the good in any other terms than those consistent with creation and maintenance of conditions maximizing individual economic opportunity.

Smith's rehearsal of these familiar themes derives its considerable interest from the colour given it by the author's involvement with the events and people he describes. A Marxist ("as I understand the term"), a New Yorker, a critic and editor, and a denizen of post-1945 Hollywood, he was close to the country's intellectual left throughout this extraordinary period. The sharply delineated nature of his character sketches certainly reflects his proximity to the people he describes — not to mention his deftness and insight as an observer. His treatment of these individuals involves a good deal more, though, than simply indulging a taste for gossip or a talent for verbal portraiture. Alive to the way the men and women he encountered embodied various and contradictory qualities, these — Edmun Wilson's snobbery and his social conscious-
nest, H.L. Mencken's elitism and his genuine interest in (some of) the people around him, Alfred A. Knopf's striking personal presence and his eye for good writing, Samuel Goldwyn's crudeness of manner and his acute understanding of popular taste — are juxtaposed in ways that show how rich a picture can come from an awareness of texture and nuance in what one is witnessing.

The importance Smith attaches to seeing things complexly becomes clear in his explanation of his fellow Americans' failure to support the radical left. It was, he argues, the inability of most Americans to take anything other than a limited and superficial view of politics and society that prevented them from sympathizing with — or even understanding — left actions and behaviour. Certainly his compatriots' failure to comprehend the difficulties of the Soviet Union's international position in the 1930s was rooted in a sense of politics and the international order bereft of any real appreciation of just how fraught their workings were. The failure of communism and socialism within the United States was the product of a similar sort of astigmatism. Unable to understand the ends of life in terms of anything other than an uncomplicated individual prosperity, immigrants, their children, and their grandchildren enforced an attachment to the status quo such that "I could see no possibility of radical change in our social and economic systems." The intellectuals' inability to grapple with what was happening around them was particularly striking. Shaped by the values and ideology at work in US culture generally, they were no more able to look beyond the constraints these imposed than anyone else. Their tendency to remain at the level of an essentially "liberal," "romantic," sentimental understanding of politics and reform was one manifestation of this. Granville Hicks' inability to stay the radical course was certainly rooted in an absence of any very sure grasp of what radical politics demanded. The peculiar hold American val-

ues had over those exposed to them was especially clear in the case of Albert Maltz: one of the Hollywood Ten, jailed for his unwillingness to cooperate with the House Un-American Activities Committee, he nonetheless remained an "innocent" whose basic "Americanism" gave his politics their defining "naïveté."

The intellectuals most affected by the imperatives of their culture were those the "moralistic simplicity" of whose leftist commitment became clear as "the movement to the right of the American intelligentsia" accelerated during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Whether, like Alfred Kazin, they traced their disillusionment with the left to the Hitler-Stalin pact, or whether their move away from it was rooted in the sort of accommodation to the status quo made by Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, their repudiation of their earlier commitment was a clear sign of just how superficial that commitment had been. Indeed, by embracing what in the United States passed for conservatism, they gave unambiguous evidence of the continuing capacity of basic American ideas concerning success, upward mobility, and "making it" to mould the outlooks and behaviour even of those who had once seemed immune to their appeal.

In the end, Smith is impatient with his fellow intellectuals, not so much because they failed to push for radical change in any very vigorous way, for even if they had the character of American society would have insured that not much happened, but because they lacked the sort of realist perspective that would have enabled them to understand the situation in which they were operating. In favouring such a perspective, and in commending the "skepticism" he associates with it, Smith's concern is to diminish the possibility of disillusionment and the reaction it brings. He ends, however, by sounding quite "conservative" himself: in his impatience with "sentiment," he makes concern for the workers and the poor something to be based on a paternalist sense of obligation and responsibility, and there is
even some backhanded praise for Henry Kissinger as the conduit through which a much needed kind of European realism was introduced into American life and politics.

From the vantage point of the mid-1990s, the book has some predictable omissions: the product of a mind formed in a certain period, it is written in terms of the understanding of radicalism which existed in that period. While, in consequence, the role of women is not ignored — Emma Goldman makes an appearance, Lillian Hellman several — anything approaching an awareness of the gendered nature of politics is conspicuous by its absence. "Race" enters the discussion only in its relation to recent immigration, which in its turn is considered as a factor strengthening the American commitment to the idea of the good life as definable in terms of money and material prosperity. But however one defines the ideological resting place at which Smith finally arrives, and whatever one decides he has missed en route to it, one will have no trouble conceding the fact that in making his journey he has seen much, and seen it interestingly and clearly. An astute observer of his society and culture, his explanation/demonstration of how they function to pre-empt a politics of class and class consciousness covers old ground in insightful, new, and provocative ways.

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ERNEST MANDEL, who died in July 1995, was often referred to as the world’s leading Marxist economist. But for decades Mandel was also a major figure in the Trotskyist Fourth International, and this collection of political writings reflects his preoccupations as a revolutionary socialist.

Most of the nine pieces included here originally appeared in publications of the Fourth International. Steve Bloom has helpfully categorized them as historical, relating to organizational questions, or concerned with Marxist theory or program. But from the opening youthful and idealizing "Trotsky: The Man and His Work" (1947) to the concluding "The Marxist Case for Revolution Today" (1989) Mandel is driven by the same overriding preoccupation: how to replace pernicious capitalism with a genuinely democratic socialist order.

Since 1914, he says, capitalism has entered “its period of historic decline” (145); it survives now “beyond the period of its historical legitimacy” and places “a question mark on the physical survival of humankind.” (201) The 20th century has been one of imperialist war and economic crisis accompanied now by the threat of nuclear annihilation, environmental catastrophe, and of mass starvation in the Third World. These phenomena derive from the capitalist contradiction between forces and relations of production which objectively puts socialism on the agenda.

Mandel contends that socialist transformation requires revolutionary parties firmly rooted in the working class. “Vanguard Parties” (1983) and “The Leninist Theory of Organization: Its Relevance for Today” (1970) are classic and impressive attempts to retrieve the Leninist theory of the party for contemporary politics. For Mandel, the party must provide the working class with revolutionary theory and programme, preserve the revolutionary experience during periods of defeat, and coordinate the many different struggles constituting a revolutionary movement. Failing this, spontaneous popular uprisings will be defeated. Contrary to Stalinist practice, the party’s internal life must be genuinely democratic, permitting factions and guaranteeing grassroots control.

For Mandel, the proletariat, now a greater proportion of the world’s popula-
tion than ever before, remains the subject of liberation. The globalization of capital means proletarian politics must be international, with struggles in the imperial centres, Third World, and bureaucratic states coordinated by a democratic international centre independent of any putative socialist motherland. In the Third World, he argues, Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution still holds; and "What Is the Theory of Permanent Revolution?" (1986) provides a lucid, comprehensive account of that theory. Written before 1990, the essays defend the Trotskyist view that Stalinist dictatorship will succumb to a proletarian political revolution. Mandel argues vigorously that socialist construction is necessarily an international process depending ultimately upon revolution in the advanced capitalist world and leading to the creation of a World Socialist Federation. He rejects Stalinist productivism, insisting on a determinedly democratic approach to socialist construction based on sovereign soviets and a multiparty polity. Democratic practice alone will assure the creation of socialist subjectivity and social relations, including the end of patriarchy.

Mandel will not thrill readers of a post-modern persuasion. He is the proponent of a robust "grand narrative," of macro politics, of the necessity and possibility of the revolutionary party achieving an "overall, total correct view of reality" (63), and so on. Indeed, one does not have to think discourse goes "all the way down" to be uneasy with Mandel's occasional jarring certainty, his ready distinctions between vanguards and broad masses, and his sometimes rather brutal subordination of matters like gender and sexuality to class.

Even for sympathetic readers, some of Mandel's claims are problematic. For example, Bolshevik programmatic weakness prior to 1917 calls in question the importance of long term party work based on "correct" theory. Mandel blames post-insurrectionary Stalinization on the shortage of working-class cadres, overlooking weaknesses in the Bolshevik theory of socialist construction, a subjective failure that elsewhere he implicitly recognizes. Nor can all this century's numerous examples of failed revolution be attributed to inadequate leadership as Mandel claims.

Seeing the Stalinist elite as a "hardened social layer" with a stranglehold on economic life, Mandel nevertheless denied the bureaucracy was a class. (97) In control of a transitional regime, he expected it to be relatively easily swept away in favour of a democratic order of workers' councils that would "consolidate and strengthen the system of collective ownership of the means of production and of socialized planning." (197) But Stalinism was not transitional to socialism; and Soviet planning was hardly collectivist ownership just waiting for consolidation. The bureaucratic elite was arguably a class; and in the post-Stalinist states it has scrambled to acquire capitalist private property or to profit from new opportunities for corruption. Years of Stalinism have discredited socialism, pulverized the working class politically, and derailed the struggle for proletarian democracy. As a basis for socialist construction, Stalinism was quite simply a disaster.

The current global neo-liberal offensive and weakness of proletarian politics may make Mandel seem hopelessly naive. No mass revolutionary parties have emerged; and there is little sign anywhere of the revolutionary stirring Mandel anticipated. But he reminds us that the 20th century has seen more than one surge and reflux of popular militancy, and that there is no reason to suppose that revolutionary upheavals are at an end. Without doubt the objective misery is there; what is lacking is precisely the appropriate political response that Mandel was struggling to devise.

Mandel's essays are a spirited affirmation of internationalism, macropolitics, political economy, and class analysis. Unashamedly committed to progress, he rightly refused to ignore capitalism's
myriad victims or to scrap what Marxism and Leninism offer to the struggle for emancipation. Unlike so many erstwhile leftists, Mandel refused to retreat: "Never was the equivalent of the 'Pascalian gamble' in relation to revolutionary political commitment as valid as it is today. By not committing oneself everything is lost in advance." (154) In these bleak times, such spirited engagement is a remarkable and welcome achievement.

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