Manhood and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902-1914

Mike O'Brien

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Résumé de l'article
En Ontario, la période qui s'étend de 1902 à 1914 fut témoin d'un intérêt particulier pour les questions militaires. La Milice, une armée de citoyens armés à laquelle participaient des milliers de jeunes Canadiens, formait alors la principale activité militaire de la province. Les défenseurs du service militaire considéraient la Milice comme une école de virilité où les jeunes hommes feraient l'apprentissage des vertus civiques. Cet article considère la question de la participation de la classe ouvrière à la Milice en portant une attention particulière à l'articulation du concept de masculinité et des questions de classe dans une société capitaliste industrielle. La Milice offrait plusieurs attraits pour les recrues de la classe ouvrière et présentait aussi d'importantes contradictions entre les réalités de classe et les idéaux de la société concernant chaque sexe. L'auteur approfondit notamment les rapports difficiles entre la Milice et les syndicats, ainsi que l'incompatibilité des notions d'une culture ouvrière fruste et l'idéal bourgeois de la masculinité.
IN MANY CULTURAL and historical contexts, warfare has been seen as a quintessentially masculine activity. The qualities of aggressiveness, bravery, and loyalty which "make" a soldier seem in many ways to define the very category of the "masculine." The soldier's trade, then, would seem fertile ground for the study of gender identities and ideologies. Yet remarkably little has emerged in the way of serious historical work on this question. Nor, for that matter, have labour historians given much attention to the participation of working-class men in military organizations. The present study will, however, attempt a preliminary step in the direction of understanding the interaction of gender, class and soldiering in a specific, and perhaps unexpected, context. While the term "warlike" hardly fits the Canadian self-image, military service was viewed by many Canadians in the early 20th century as a vital part of male citizenship. In particular, the years between the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902 and the onset of World War I in 1914 witnessed a major upsurge of interest in war and the military, constituting what one historian has called the "Moment of Canadian Militarism." This flourishing of Canadian militarism was centred primarily in the province of Ontario, Canada's largest and

2 The term "militarism" is used here to denote a particular ideology which takes as its primary foundation a belief that the advancement of military organizations, and service in such organizations by members of the male populace, provides benefits to society beyond the specific requirements of national defence. To early 20th-century socialists, such "militarism" was viewed as being primarily used "to uphold the prevailing order of society." See Karl Liebknecht, *Militarism and Anti-Militarism* (Glasgow 1917), 20.

most heavily industrialized, and thus most proletarianized, province. The interac-
tion between masculinity and military service in Ontario, with particular regard to
working-class participation in Canada’s citizen Militia, forms the primary focus of
this paper.

While Canada in the 1900s had a small “Permanent Force” of about 3,000
regular soldiers, the vast bulk of Canada’s military forces consisted of the Non-Per-
manent Active Militia (generally referred to simply as “the Militia”), a part-time
“citizen army” with units based in numerous cities and towns. By 1914 there were
roughly 30,000 militiamen in Ontario, organized into 9 cavalry regiments, 49
infantry regiments, 18 artillery batteries, and 4 companies of military engineers.
Service in the Militia was open to all male inhabitants of Canada over the age of
eighteen, provided that they were British subjects. On joining a local Militia unit,
a man committed himself to twelve days of military training per year for three years,
with a liability to be called out for military duty at any time. Thus Militia service,
except for those few men who remained past their three-year term as commissioned
or non-commissioned officers, accounted for only 36 days, a tiny fraction of a man’s
life.

One of the salient features of the Militia was its exclusively male character. During the period covered by this study, and indeed for many years after, no women
served in the Militia in any capacity. Any study of the Militia as a social institution
must take into account the place of “masculinity,” as a socially constructed
category, within both militarist discourse and Militia practice. “Masculinity,” as
shown quite effectively in recent scholarship, is neither an essential biological
category nor a universal behavioural “role.” Instead, its existence is cultural, the
ideas, traits and practices which constitute the “masculine” often being very
different at different times and in different places, and indeed eminently open to
contestation even within a single historical context. It is from this standpoint that
the present study will examine the issue. With respect to any theoretical under-

3It must be noted, in the context of the 1990s, that the Militia in Canada was an official force,
financed and controlled by the Federal Government. It should therefore not be confused with
the private right-wing armies currently flourishing in the United States.
4Militia Report, 1915, 44-5.
5Canada, House of Commons, An Act respecting the Militia and the Defence of Canada
(Militia Act), 1904, Art. 11.
6Militia Act, 1904, Arts. 69-87.
7For a succinct overview of recent theorising, see Nigel Edley and Margaret Wetherell,
“Masculinity, Power and Identity,” in Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, ed., Understanding Mascu-
linities: Social Relations and Cultural Arenas (Buckingham 1996), 97-110. A notable
discussion of the “social organisation of masculinity,” approached from the perspective of
psychoanalysis, can be found in R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Berkeley 1995), 67-86. On
“masculinity” in a Canadian working-class context, see Steven Maynard, “Rough Work and
Rugged Men: The Social Construction of Masculinity in Working-Class History,” La-
bour/Le Travail, 23 (1989), 159-69.
standing of this question, however, an important proviso must be made. Existing studies of the relationship between “masculinity” and the military, especially with respect to “military socialization,” tend to focus exclusively on professional soldiers, emphasizing their separation from the rest of society, generally from a tightly functionalist perspective. Militiamen, in contrast to professional soldiers, remained part of civilian society throughout their period of service, which was, after all, only part-time. Thus, Militia service, and the ways in which “masculinity” was constructed with respect to the Militia, must be understood as located within Ontario society as a whole. Besides “masculinity,” then, any social study of the Militia must take cognizance of such factors as ethnicity and, most importantly since capitalist social relations had emerged in full bloom in Ontario by the 1900s, class. As militiamen were not separate from civilian society, neither were they outside of the class-based structure of that society. While a shared “masculinity” could unite men as a “privileged” group in a patriarchal society, and had a definite role in shaping class relations, divisions of class and ethnicity cut across gender lines and made the category of the “masculine” itself problematic. Such at least was the case in Canada’s citizen army of the early 20th century.

While public interest in the Militia in Ontario waxed and waned during the 19th century, the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 provided a major stimulus to military pursuits, especially in Ontario, the province in which support for the war had been strongest. Boer War enthusiasm also marked the culmination of a general late 19th-century trend toward the glorification of irregular “frontier” soldiers. Many Canadians took great interest in the British Army’s colonial campaigns, which were often portrayed in a romantic light by journalists. Colonial adventurers like “Chinese” Gordon, Frederick Lugard, and Lords Roberts and Kitchener were held up as sources of inspiration, the emphasis in most accounts being placed on their individual strength of “character” and perseverance against

Moreover, many such studies tend to be both ahistorical and ethnocentric, drawing broad generalizations from the single example of the present-day United States Regular Army. For example, William Arkin and Lynne R. Dobrofsky, “Military Socialization and Masculinity,” Journal of Social Issues, 34 (1978), 151-67.

Some treatments of war and masculinity ignore these factors completely. For instance, Paul Fussell’s much discussed The Great War and Modern Memory (London 1975) draws extremely broad generalisations from the experiences of a small segment of the British upper-middle class. The applicability of his argument to Canada has recently been questioned in Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver 1997), 5-6.


both external and internal challenges. Colonial wars were seen almost as a form of "sport," with particular resemblance to that favourite tradition of the British upper classes, "the Hunt." A similar phenomenon emerged in the United States, where journalists revelled in the exploits of "Indian fighters" on the western frontier, Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders in the Spanish-American War, and various overseas military adventurers. Such ideas of war as something other than a struggle between masses of professional soldiers aided its acceptance as a legitimate activity by "respectable" Canadian society. It fit in well, moreover, with the Canadian nationalist self-image of being an "unmilitary" people, whose main struggles were against weather and wilderness rather than against other nations. This tended to be reinforced by Canada's memories of its own "small wars," such as the 1885 North-West Rebellion. Canada's Boer War experience also seemed to confirm this notion that war was "more a manly triumph over the obstacles of nature than massive and indiscriminate slaughter."

The post-Boer War period also saw the rise of a specifically militarist movement in Canada, embodied in such organizations as the Toronto-based Canadian Military Institute (CMI) and the pro-conscription Canadian Defence League (CDL), paralleling the growth of a similar movement in the United Kingdom. These organizations counted among their membership many leading figures from the professional and commercial middle classes, but drew little or no support from the working classes. Other institutions, particularly those of a right-wing cast such as The Loyal Orange Association, lent their support to the militarist cause, as did prominent academics like Queen's University's G.M. Grant. While Ontario

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15 David McNab, "Peter MacArthur and Canadian Nationalism," Ontario History, 64 (1972), 5.


17 Berger, Sense of Power; Anne Summers, "Militarism in Britain before the Great War," History Workshop, 2 (1976), 104-123.

18 Berger, Sense of Power, 237.

19 Orange Sentinel, 13 August 1908; Page, "Canada and the Imperial Idea," 36, 38.
clergymen were split on the question of military service, many lauded it for teaching men "obedience, respect and reverence for authority." Such attitudes drew heavily on the "muscular Christianity" which became a major force in 19th-century Protestantism, stressing the link between physical strength and prowess and moral restraint and self-control. Militarism was added to the mix in the numerous hagiographies of men like Sir Henry Havelock, "hero" of the Relief of Lucknow in 1857, whose "exemplary" life was seen to combine the roles of Imperial soldier, evangelical Christian and devoted "family man." Such association between Imperial jingoism and Christian morals tended to bolster the social "respectability" of military pursuits, both in Britain and in Canada. While the effect of militarism on Canadian society can be easily overstated, the CDL having by 1912 attracted only about 800 full members, it should be noted that opponents of militarism in Canada were alarmed at how the increasing amount of militarist propaganda had "warped and perverted the sober sense of the people." A salient feature of militarist discourse was its invariable appeal to "masculinity," or, more commonly in the parlance of the time, "manliness." The concept of "manliness" constituted a culturally constructed "gender ideal," a particular set of traits which were held to constitute "manhood." Such ideals are, of course, subject to change over time, with certain traits taking precedence over others at any given time. Of significance here is that from the late 19th century, "manliness" came increasingly to be constructed in militaristic terms, the "warrior" becoming the quintessential "masculine" figure. One prominent Toronto militarist, for instance, claimed that "courage is to a man what chastity is to a woman—the one indispensable virtue." The correspondence between "manliness" and prowess in war can be linked to the influence of the "martial races" theory, prevalent in British military circles, which held that some "racial" groups were by nature better soldiers than others. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, for instance, a popular hero in Canada as well as...
as in Britain, made much of the supposed superiority of the “warlike races” of Northwestern India over the “effeminate peoples” of the South. 28 Here we see the gender ideal emerge clearly as a normative standard; the “masculinity” of the warrior juxtaposed against the “femininity” of the supposedly weak and ineffectual. 29 The misogyny underlying this ideology is clearly evident in one officer’s claim that any boy who “does not like drill and military exercises ... is not a boy and has been put into pants by mistake.” 30

Within Canadian militarist discourse, part-time citizen soldiers were valued much more highly than were professional “mercenaries.” The “Militia myth,” a notion that highly motivated amateur soldiers were more effective in modern warfare than regular troops, was a salient feature of early 20th-century Canadian military thought. 31 While the former were viewed as exemplars of a patriotic devotion to duty, the latter were frequently seen as, in the words of one Canadian Militia Minister, mere “bar room loafers.” 32 This image appeared to have been confirmed by the experience of the Boer War. Many Canadians believed that in South Africa their volunteers had performed as well as, if not better than, the overly-disciplined British regulars, who were generally seen as “low-bred mercenaries,” hardly the equal of patriotic citizens. This was seen as evidence that any patriotic Canadian “with sane direction and a little genuine honest rifle shooting ... could beat the world.” 33

There was, as well, another side to the “Militia myth”: not only were citizen soldiers held to make better soldiers, they also supposedly made better citizens, imbued with a sense of duty greater than that of those who were not trained to arms. The link between “masculinity” and the concept of “citizenship” in the context of early 20th century Canada was much more than rhetorical, given that women were denied the franchise and thus could not participate fully in the rights of the “citizen.” Arguments about military service and “good citizenship” were almost invariably framed in the language of “manliness.” The CDL touted the Militia as “a school of manliness” in which men could be “educated physically, intellectually, morally and nationally.” 34

28 Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, 2 (London 1897), 532.
30 Lt-Col. William Hamilton Merritt, Canada and National Service (Toronto 1917), 188.
"Manliness," however, separated not only men from women, it separated men from "boys." Maurice Hutton claimed that military training could turn a boy "from a hooligan into a self-contained, restrained and self-respecting person." Here, of course, the language of "manliness" came to stand in for the politics of class. C.F. Hamilton maintained, for instance, that military training would result in "physical improvement" in men, especially those of a "more depressed ... social position," and in addition promoted "positive mental improvement" with regard to "promptness, a sense of duty, the power of working in concert [and] the habit of accepting instructions from authorized persons." William Hamilton Merritt, an outspoken promoter of universal military service, claimed that working-class recruits would learn "the discipline of the heart, which is ... natural to the better class of men and carries the coarser natures along with it." It was, of course, common at the time for middle-class ideologues to treat working-class adults as if they were unruly "children." "Maturity" came increasingly in this context to be equated with middle-class ideals of self-control and obedience, not to mention with industrial discipline. The rhetoric of "manliness" in militarist discourse of the 1900s seemed indeed to have been directed as much toward building a quiescent labour force as a battle-worthy army.

Claims that military training would create "a healthy and law-abiding citizenry" drew favourable support from such middle-class groups as the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). The supposed function of the militia as a vehicle for socialization took on an even greater importance for militarists in what was a period of growing industrial unrest. Referring to the question of labour as a "bug-a-boo," Merritt condemned "labourers who are not loyal ... and whose only interest is a Union and not a Nation." He saw military training as a way to stem the growing socialist movement he claimed was spreading north from the United States, concluding that the "false notions" of socialism would dissipate if "all classes of men, brought together by the common duty of military service, should mix freely with each other."

Yet, as one historian has noted, the claim by militarists that military service would reduce crime and other social disorders was never backed up by any hard empirical evidence. It is, in fact, rather hard to see how 36 days spent learning

40Merritt, Canada and National Service, 13-4.
42Haycock, Sam Hughes, 173.
parade-square drill, marksmanship, and rudimentary tactics could have altered young men’s characters sufficiently to produce any great beneficial effects for society as a whole.

But “masculinity” in the discourse of militarism was not a totalizing category unto itself; rather, it was linked inextricably to ethnicity, particularly that of the dominant element in Ontario’s population. As a cultural movement, Canadian militarism was tied closely to support of the British Empire as well as the capitalist socio-economic order. Militarists tended to be outspokenly anti-American in their rhetoric, particularly with respect to what they saw as the northward spread of “non-British” culture and ideas. The close ties between Canadian trade unionists and their counterparts south of the border was of particular concern to Ontario’s pro-Imperialists. Militia service was particularly attractive in this respect, given that, of all of Canada’s social institutions, the Militia had perhaps the strongest connection to Britain in this period of growing “continentalism.” Militia service was embraced most heartily by Canadians of British birth or descent, the commanding officer of London’s 7th Fusiliers noting in 1912 that about 60 per cent of the membership of the regiment were “Old Country men” who had emigrated to Canada. The whole militarist construction of “masculinity” in Canada was to a degree ethnically based, reflecting a “British” notion of “manliness” derived in large part from Charles Kingsley’s “muscular Christianity” of the 19th century, in which “manliness” was linked to a revival of English cultural chauvinism. Indeed, particularly in colonial contexts, “manliness” came to be seen as a defining characteristic of “Britishness,” against which the ethnic “other” was measured and, in most cases, found wanting.

Given the Militia’s status as a primary bastion of “British, Orange, Imperialist society,” and its embrace of an explicitly Anglocentric notion of “masculinity,” its position with respect to Ontario’s diverse ethnic makeup was, at best, ambivalent. Many of the traditions and icons of the Militia tended, for instance, to be both anti-French and anti-Irish Catholic. Despite the sizeable francophone population in Eastern Ontario, there were no French-speaking regiments in the province, and anti-French sentiment, either implicit or explicit, was frequently a feature of the

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43 For example, see J. Castell Hopkins, Continental Influences in Canadian Development (Toronto 1907).
44 *Canadian Annual Review* 1906, 289, 301-3.
46 A recent study of this aspect of colonialism is Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinities: The “Manly Englishman” and the “Effeminate Bengali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester 1995).
rhetoric of the promoters of militarism, particularly in celebrations of the suppression of the 1885 rebellion. Canadians of Irish Catholic descent were similarly not within the range of favoured ethnic groups. Resistance to the “Fenian Raids” of 1866 and 1870, considered by many to be one of the foremost accomplishments of the Canadian Militia, was seen as having been a defence not only of Canada but of Protestantism. The position of the Militia with respect to Ontario’s other ethnic groups was likewise problematic. While some militarists saw Militia service as a way of assimilating new immigrants, particularly those unfamiliar with the country’s largely British traditions and institutions, others saw the Militia as a bulwark against the growing immigrant population. The Militia Council claimed in 1905 that in Canada “the enormous influx of population containing ... a large proportion of aliens” gave added importance to the militia’s role in maintaining the “civil power.” In a 1903 strike against power companies in Niagara Falls, the Militia were called out primarily to “awe the strikers.” This action had apparently as much to do with racism as with class antagonism, the Hamilton Spectator noting that the local authorities wanted to take advantage of the “excitable nature” of the striking workers, who were mainly “Italians, Negroes, Poles, Hungarians and Croatians.” The contrast between this stereotype and that of the “manly” Briton, clearly indicates an ethnic aspect to the construction of military “masculinity” in Canada.

Some of Ontario’s ethnic groups did, however, find a place in the Militia, notably the Scots, who fit (if somewhat uncomfortably) into the general category of “British.” From the late 19th century, several “Highland” infantry regiments were formed, providing a link between the military and the cultural identity of Canadians of Scottish origin or ancestry. In many cases, “Highland” regiments tended to be such in name and appearance only, members often having no connection to the Highlands of Scotland. The popularity of these units had more to do with the romantic appeal of Highland dress, and with such storied exploits as those of the “Thin Red Line” at Balaclava, than with any actual ethnic affinity. Some

50 There were no Irish regiments in Ontario until October 1915, when the 110th Irish Regiment was formed in Toronto. Canadian Army, The Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army (Ottawa 1964), 243.
52 Canadian Defence, December 1911, 162; Beahan, “Filling Out the Skeleton,” 35.
53 Militia Department, Memorandum from the Military Members of the Militia Council to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sessional Paper No. 130 (1905), 4.
54 Hamilton Spectator, 3 November 1903.
55 This phenomenon was not unique to Canada, “Highland” regiments were formed in various other parts of the British Empire. John Keegan, “Inventing Military Traditions,” in Chris Wrigley, ed., Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor (London 1986), 77.
56 Willett, Heritage at Risk, 32.
members of Ontario’s aboriginal communities, notably the Six Nations Iroquois, also managed to find a place in the ranks of Canada’s part-time army. Military service, particularly among the Iroquois, descendants of Britain’s 18th-century allies, was a popular pursuit in the 1900s. Over 200 “chiefs and warriors” from Six Nations Reserve were present in the ranks of the 37th Haldimand Rifles at Niagara Camp in 1908, making up over half the regiment’s active strength. Moreover, they accounted for almost all the second- and third-year men in the unit, and Captain J.S. Johnson, one of the company commanders, was a member of Six Nations. Iroquois militiamen were also prominent in the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry, and made up the entire strength of the regiment’s highly-regarded baseball team. Frederick Onondeyoh Loft of Six Nations, in addressing the CMI in 1909, proclaimed that his people were “instinctively soldiers” and that their traditions of “chivalry” could make a valuable contribution to the Militia if even more were encouraged to join. The men of Six Nations were thus able, within the Militia at least, to participate in the same “masculinity” as British Canadian men. But unlike the Scots, the cultural distinctiveness of aboriginal recruits was not formally embraced by the Militia.

Ontario society was divided not only with respect to ethnicity, but along lines of class, and these divisions were evident in the social structure of the Militia. Class affiliation, as in the British Army, was most marked in the distinction between officers and other ranks, but there was one important difference between Canada and Britain in this regard. While officers in the British Army and auxiliary forces were drawn largely from men of (usually landed) “private means,” Ontario for the most part lacked such a “so-called leisure class,” and consequently drew most of its officers from the professional and business classes. Thus Canada’s military leadership was much more middle-class in its orientation than was its British counterpart. As in Britain, however, the “hoi polloi” were excluded from the officer corps. Officers had to be able to afford expensive uniforms and kits, and those who lacked the means to keep up either the appearance or the “social obligations” of officer status were effectively shut out from higher rank. Any flaunting of “superior” social status by Militia officers, however, drew criticism from those who did “not want to perpetuate in Canada those old world distinctions that prevail[ed]

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57 Toronto Globe, 20 June 1908.
58 Ware, Seventh Regiment, 148-9. The constitutional position of First Nations peoples in Canada’s citizen army was problematic, however, given that they did not enjoy any of the rights of Canadian citizenship. J. Dempsey, “The Indians and World War One,” Alberta History, 31 (1983), 1.
in the old country." Promoters of military service clearly felt a need to keep up at least the appearance of egalitarianism and meritocracy within the citizen army.

For young officers, the social exclusiveness of the commissioned ranks was a prime attraction of Militia service. The officers’ messes of the larger city regiments were frequently as grandly appointed as the most prestigious private clubs, though without high membership fees. A position in the officer corps could also be an avenue for social mobility, providing as it did an opportunity to mix with community leaders who filled senior posts in local regiments. Militia officers were often first in line for political patronage appointments, and service was seen as a useful way of making political contacts. Local units, meanwhile, were “political machines” in another respect, with even minor appointments being doled out as partisan patronage. Indeed, in 1884, one American critic referred to the Canadian Militia as “a kind of military Tammany.” Particularly strong were the Militia’s ties to the Conservative Party. In 1904, the Ottawa Free Press called the militia “a Tory hive” in which almost all senior positions went to Conservative party supporters.

The partisan nature of the Canadian Militia was particularly galling to the British generals who were sent to supervise administration and training. Major-General Ivor Herbert, for instance, complained that officers in rural regiments were nothing but “political hacks” while city regiments behaved more like “social clubs” than military units. This politicization of the officer corps contributed, of course, to its social exclusiveness, and belied to some extent the image of “classless” masculine solidarity which promoters of Militia service sought to achieve.

While Militia service was clearly advantageous to would-be officers, its attraction to men who would join as private soldiers with little hope of attaining commissions was less obvious. Indeed, for the most part, the Militia in the early 20th century had much less problem finding officers than it did in persuading men of more humble social background to join the ranks. Some branches of the service, though, carried their own sort of prestige. The cavalry, for instance, tended to be rather restrictive in its membership since both officers and other ranks had to
provide their own horses for training. This tended to keep men of a proletarian background out of cavalry regiments, a point not lost on military leaders. The requirement for horses helped assure, according to one senior officer, that these units were "composed of men who ha[d] a stake in the country." Indeed, in the 1890s, Major-General Herbert claimed that having too many working-class men in the ranks could lead to problems when the Militia was required to deal with labour disputes. He advocated the creation of a higher proportion of cavalry regiments, since these consisted primarily of men from the "better classes." Specialized corps like the Canadian Engineers, meanwhile, drew much of their membership from the emerging professional classes. The 5th Field Company, formed at Kingston in 1910, was composed almost entirely of students from Queen's University. Yet the bulk of Ontario's Militia units were infantry regiments, which for the most part lacked the social prestige of other branches of the service, and whose membership consisted mainly of men from the labouring classes.

Service in the infantry could, however, also be an attractive proposition to working-class men, particularly when it came to the larger and more prestigious urban units. There were clear advantages in belonging to one of the "better" urban infantry regiments, particularly one led by a charismatic and enthusiastic commanding officer. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pellatt, for instance, an eccentric Toronto millionnaire and commanding officer of the Queen's Own Rifles, was a great lover of military pageantry and never hesitated in lavishing money on his regiment for uniforms, accoutrements, training and trips to Buffalo and New York City. Service in the Queen's Own Rifles became so attractive in the early 1900s that the regiment was generally a couple of hundred men over its officially established strength, and in 1906 the regiment was authorized to expand from one to two battalions. Toronto's other infantry regiments, the 10th Royal Grenadiers and the 48th Highlanders, were also frequently over-strength during this period, a reflection

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74 Austin Seton Thompson, Spadina: A Story of Old Toronto (Toronto 1975), 194.
no doubt of Toronto's status as the "military capital" of Canada. These regiments, along with other big-city units like Ottawa's Governor General's Foot Guards and Hamilton's 13th Royal Regiment, formed an unofficial corps d'élite of the Militia, drawing largely on the white-collar working class for recruits.

The Militia was particularly attractive to white-collar workers at a time in which their "middle class" status appeared in jeopardy due to declining pay, status, and opportunity for social mobility. Since senior Militia officers were also often important employers of labour, joining the Militia could be a step toward gaining civilian employment for young, inexperienced men. Moreover, the Militia provided such men with an "exclusively male bastion," one of increasing importance given the ever-greater number of women entering the clerical work force and threatening that occupation's "masculine" status. In such circumstances, membership in the militia was not only "a badge of respectability, but a clear affirmation of manliness." In some respects, the obsession with things military may have formed part of a masculinist backlash against "first-wave" feminism by those who felt their social position to be endangered. One should be careful, however, not to over-generalize here. The "white-collar" nature of the Militia may not have been so great outside the major cities of Toronto, Ottawa, and Hamilton. It is somewhat questionable whether a smaller city would have had a sufficiently large white-collar workforce to sustain a 600-man infantry regiment.

Bolstering the cultural appeal of the Militia was its British-style "regimental" system, which placed the regiment, a unit of roughly 600 to 800 men, as the central focus of identity and loyalty for its members, rather than fostering allegiance to the army as a whole. Indeed, it is rather misleading to refer to men joining an entity called "the Militia;" rather each man joined a local regiment with its own unique customs and network of surrogate "kinship" relations. The regiment, with its strict hierarchy and rules of deference, was perhaps the quintessential "patriarchal" institution, its commanding officer being referred to commonly as the "Old Man." Regimental ideology was characterized by an obsession with lineage, genealogy,

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77 Denny, "Canadian Military Forces," 49.
79 Miller, "Montreal Militia," 60; On changes in Canada's white-collar labour force, see Graham S. Lowe, "Class, Job and Gender in the Canadian Office," Labour/Le Travailleur, 10 (1982), 11-3.
80 On the effects of the late 19th-century "challenge to manhood" in the United States, see Kimmel, "Contemporary 'Crisis,'" 137-146. A slightly different view can be found in Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 11-4. On Britain, see Brian Howard Harrison, Separate Spheres: The Opposition to Women Suffrage in Britain (New York 1978).
and continuity, and with the minutiae of uniforms and decorations. The regimental system, moreover, actively fostered a paternalistic relationship between officers and men. Indeed, military historian John Keegan has compared the British regiment, as an institution, to a “large, comfortable Victorian county family.”82 The sense of “belonging” provided by the regiment was, one might add, of particular importance given the social dislocation consequent to the development of industrial capitalism.

Canadian regiments were, like their British counterparts, territorially based, each unit drawing its strength from a particular city or county. This fostered a strong sense of shared identity between the unit and the local community. As one local resident noted of the 41st Brockville Rifles, “in the old days the Rifles was Brockville and Brockville was the Rifles.”83 The territorial affiliation of Militia regiments was vital to the success of recruiting, adding as it did to the Militia’s local prestige. This relationship tended generally to be symbiotic, Militia regiments being seen as important assets to communities. Local community leaders and journalists were often effusive in their praise of local units, particularly in smaller cities like Brantford and Peterborough, where the presence of a well-turned-out Militia unit was both a source of civic pride and an asset to “boosterism” in small but growing cities.84 Militia service gave working-class men an opportunity to participate more fully in a civic life generally confined to the middle classes.

The local Militia also played an important role as “public spectacle.” Ceremonial parades by local Militia units were a common feature of various local celebrations, and regimental bands in particular were a major attraction at public events.85 Tactical exercises by the Militia frequently drew large crowds of spectators, who came to cheer the military prowess of their “soger boys.”86 The Militia consciously played up to the widespread interest in things military. Units in Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, Brockville, and other centres often held public “field days” at Thanksgiving and other public holidays, performing military manoeuvres for the entertainment of local crowds.87 Local councils and societies, especially in smaller centres, arranged for “sham battles” in their locales, hoping to attract “famous” regiments from Toronto or Hamilton which would assure maximum attendance.88 Such demonstrations were more for show than for any true military purpose. As one writer noted, Militia training “sometimes seemed to have as much to do with the
social columns in newspapers as with the Military Gazette." That the Militia enabled men from the labouring classes to participate in, rather than merely observe, public spectacles, was a further boon to recruiting.

Related to the "public spectacle" aspect of the Militia were its distinctive and often colourful uniforms, which provided men with an opportunity to "dress up" while maintaining a distinctively "masculine" orientation. Indeed, the "glitter" of military dress and accoutrements was seen by contemporaries as one of the prime attractions of military service. The characteristic hussar uniform of busby, pelisse and tight-fitting trousers was in particular valued for "the extraordinary effect it produce[d] not least in the feminine heart." Highland kilts and sporrans, which added a "striking appearance" to their already-strong ethnic appeal, were a particularly popular choice of military dress in Ontario, notwithstanding the reported bashfulness of some men when it came to baring their legs in public. Uniform styles were, of course, subject to fashion. After the Boer War, khaki uniforms, which had become associated with "real soldiers," came briefly into vogue as a "manly" form of martial dress. In 1903, Hamilton's 13th Regiment exchanged scarlet and black for khaki, which many volunteers thought was more "glamorous" than "old-fashioned, commonplace scarlet." Within a few years, however, as excitement over South Africa gradually waned, the men agitated for a return to scarlet tunics in order to compete with the sartorial spectacle of the newly formed 91st Highlanders. In general, though, as the anachronistic nature of bright blue or scarlet military garb became increasingly obvious, the Militia gradually switched over to more "businesslike" khaki uniforms. By the spring of 1914, even the 48th Highlanders had discarded their distinctive white shell jackets for khaki.

Regimental and company armouries, meanwhile, provided an important social space for militiamen. The local armoury or drill hall often functioned like "a professional club or meeting place," providing facilities which would otherwise be beyond the means of men of limited financial resources. The London armoury, for instance, became "a downtown rendezvous and second home," providing

89 Augustus Bridle, Sons of Canada: Short Stories of Characteristic Canadians (Toronto 1916), 160.
90 Debates, 26 June 1900, 8293.
91 Keegan, "Inventing Military Traditions," 70.
92 Cornwall Freeholder, 24 June 1904; Hamilton Spectator, 23 May 1904.
95 Beattie, 48th Highlanders, 16.
96 Stone, "Organisation of the Canadian Militia," 293.
officers, NCOs, and men with “attractive and homelike club rooms with comfortable furniture, a piano, magazines and papers, card and table games." An attractive armory, which could provide such a “club” atmosphere at no cost to members, was generally seen as a major stimulus in recruiting. Armories were used frequently for banquets, parties, and other “little blowouts,” held for officers and men on holidays and after annual inspections. Squadrons or companies which lacked properly outfitted armories generally had problems maintaining interest on the part of militiamen. The Earl of Dundonald, a former Commander of the Militia, noted that “cold and comfortless” drill halls, many of which were “nothing more than stores cupboards,” discouraged enlistment, and argued that the construction of armories large enough to provide social space would be well worth the cost.

Armories, like the regiments which trained in them, could be a major source of pride for the local community, further cementing the link between the Militia and civilian society. The armory in Lincoln, for instance, was “used for concerts and stage attractions, a skating rink in winter and an exhibition hall at the fair.” When a new armory, one of the largest in Canada, was completed in Guelph in 1909, the local District Commander told the crowd assembled for its grand opening that “You have not an Armory here, you have a palace.” Sam Hughes, Militia Minister from 1911, was particularly attuned to the importance of attractive armories in building up both regimental esprit de corps and local support for the Militia. When he became Minister of Militia in 1911, he embarked on an ambitious scheme of building a “vast network of new armories.” In keeping with the tradition of patronage in the Canadian Militia, the “first and biggest” of the new facilities was erected in Hughes’ home town of Lindsay.

The Militia also provided ample opportunity for men to take part in organized sports. Sports engaged in by Militia units included baseball, basketball, ice hockey, lacrosse, rugby, wrestling, tugs of war, and pushball, to mention but a few. Indeed, at times competitive sports seem to have taken on as much importance for Militia units as matters of a purely military nature. The 8th (Gananoque) Field Battery, for instance, prided itself on being a “top-notcher” in sports as well as in

97 Ware, Seventh Regiment, 158.
98 Militia Department, Report by General Sir John French upon his inspection of the Canadian Military Forces, Sessional Paper No. 35a (1910), 14.
99 Hamilton Spectator, 24 January 1903 and 28 November 1903.
100 Militia Report, 1913, 106; Debates, 30 June 1903, 5708; 8 October 1903, 13429.
102 William F. Rannie, Lincoln: The Story of an Ontario Town (Lincoln 1974), 159.
103 Leo A. Johnson, History of Guelph, 1827-1927 (Guelph 1977), 306.
105 Ware, Seventh Regiment, passim.
artillery practice. Sport fit in well with the increasing emphasis on "competitiveness" in the social construction of "masculinity" which characterized the growth of industrial capitalism. It also provided the Militia with a link to working-class culture, where sport was assuming ever greater centrality during this period. There was, however, some ambiguity in the middle-class response to the Militia's embrace of athleticism. From 1901, Hamilton's 13th Regiment staged boxing matches to supplement regimental funds, but these events were soon shut down when the local press complained about the way they led to the Militia being associated with "violence." Clearly, some forms of "violence" were more acceptable to middle-class morals than others, swords and rifles being somehow less vulgar than fisticuffs. Moreover, the spectacle of "real" violence outside of the "respectable" constraints of the military's strictly-ordered hierarchical structure rattled paternalistic sensibilities in a way that the idea of preparing for wars in faraway countries with exotic names never could. "Battles" happened in places like Omdurman or Magersfontein, while male violence, particularly associated with the working classes, could and did occur much, much closer to home.

Besides offering the opportunity to engage in public spectacles and organized sports, the Militia provided other positive incentives to members of the ranks. Within regiments, commanding officers frequently awarded prizes for marksmanship in order to encourage rifle practice. For the best shots, there was the opportunity to attend district and national competitions and, for the very best, a chance to compete for the King's Prize at Bisley. Cavalry regiments, meanwhile, awarded prizes for signalling and horsemanship, and prizes were given out in artillery units to reward proficiency in gunnery, horsemanship, and other skills, and to stimulate competition, held to be "the predominant instinct in both man and beast." Again, the "competitive" ideal of "masculinity" came into play. Some senior officers complained, though, that prizes had come to be seen as an end in themselves, rather than as a means of achieving "military efficiency."

Another attraction of Militia service, particularly in the more affluent city regiments, were the frequent trips by Militia units to various towns and cities in Ontario and New York State. For a number of men of the 7th Fusiliers, a Dominion Day trip to Ottawa in 1906 was the first time they had been away from London overnight. Such trips were usually paid for out of regimental funds to which officers

106 Gananoque Reporter, 2 July 1910.
109 Brown, Brown and Greenhous, Semper Paratus, 121.
110 Goodspeed, Battle Royal, 65.
111 Bull, Brock to Currie, 326.
113 Militia Report, 1910, 69.
and men contributed, although for very special occasions the Militia Department footed some or all of the bill. 114 One of the biggest Militia events of the Edwardian period was the celebration of the Quebec Tercentenary in 1908, in which contingents from all Ontario Militia units participated. 115 On occasion, even overseas travel was a possibility. In 1910, to celebrate his regiment's fiftieth anniversary, Henry Pellatt took the Queen's Own Rifles, at his own expense, to the United Kingdom for manoeuvres with the British Army at Aldershot. 116 Another opportunity came in 1911, when 706 Canadian militiamen were selected for a trip to England to attend the Coronation of King George V. 117 Such opportunities for travel would normally have been well beyond the means of most working-class Ontarians.

For rural regiments, and increasingly from 1908 for city regiments, the main event in Militia life was their two weeks summer training, when thousands of men gathered in regional camps located in various parts of Ontario. While offering an opportunity for practical training, camp was generally a mixed blessing for the men. While food was rarely in short supply, camp life was hardly one of luxury. 118 Though the experience of "roughing it" may have been attractive to some recruits, available evidence indicates that harsh living conditions in camp were more often a disincentive to Militia service. The open-topped canvas latrines used in most camps were very unpopular and, combined with the general neglect of proper facilities for the comfort of the troops, tended to discourage men from returning to camp after their first year. 119 Matters improved considerably when the YMCA began to set up facilities, including dry canteens, post offices, and reading rooms, in the camps. 120 Moreover, the locations of most camps were far from ideal, with conditions ranging from the muddy quagmire of Rockliffe Camp, near Ottawa, to the "choking dust" of the artillery camp at Petawawa. 121 No matter where camps were located, the Militia had to cope with the difficulties of conducting military activities in red serge jackets and black woollen trousers in the fierce heat and humidity of the Ontario summer. 122 But despite these obstacles, Militia officials endeavoured to attract men to training by making summer camp a cultural as well as a military experience. During the evenings, men participated in picnics, singalongs, practical jokes and the ubiquitous team sports. 123 In Niagara, visiting the

114 Ware, Seventh Regiment, 55-6.
116 Barnard, Queen's Own Rifles, 92-103.
117 Belleville Weekly Ontario, 4 May 1911.
118 Brantford Expositor, 22 June 1903.
119 Militia Report, 1905, 35, 48; Debates, 3 April 1907, 5747.
120 Militia Report, 1907, 5.
123 Brantford Expositor, 9 June 1909.
nearby Militia camp became a favourite activity for the local population, one encouraged by Militia officers. According to contemporary accounts, "lady visitors" in particular were made welcome. In fact, some men found the opportunity to meet women from other communities to be a major benefit of Militia service.

While occasional participation in Militia social activities by women was sometimes encouraged, the nature of that participation was tightly circumscribed, and they were rigidly excluded from any formal membership in its social institutions. The Militia provided men with an all-male milieu for engaging in sport and other leisure activities, not to mention an opportunity for "playing at soldiers." As such, it fit into a pattern of "homsocial" male institutions in the early 20th century, characterized by the "rituals of aggression and competition [which] became important mechanisms for male bonding." Linked to its "bonding" aspect was the growing importance placed from Victorian times on the idea of "male friendship" or "manly love," a running theme within the contemporary discourse of militarism and imperialism. The Militia "ideal" was, however, an emphatically heterosexual "masculinity," proponents often placing an emphasis on the benefits to "virility" of military training. The lines of gender and sexuality were drawn sharply. Yet the occasional transgression of gender boundaries did occur, even if only in jest. At their annual field day in 1905, before a crowd of 10,000, officers of London's 7th Fusiliers, dressed in formal women's clothing, held a "Powder Race." One officer later recalled, one assumes with tongue in cheek, that "Lieut. Andrews was a gracious lovely in a new blue gown." Sexuality, though, was rarely discussed publicly by either militiamen or militarists; the heterosexuality of the subject was taken utterly for granted.

Despite its various social attractions, the militia frequently had to cope with a severe shortage of volunteers, particularly in rural counties where the rank and file was made up primarily of agricultural labourers and sons of farmers. In some cases it was a struggle simply to keep rural units in existence. Interest in the militia in these areas would ebb and flow, military matters often losing out in the competition for public attention to other social, political, and economic matters. Low pay was

125 Ware, Seventh Regiment, 56.
126 Willett, Heritage at Risk, 57.
129 Ware, Seventh Regiment, 50.
frequently cited as a leading cause of such apathy.\textsuperscript{131} To cope with personnel shortages, some commanders were forced to enlist "immature youths" in order to bring their units up to training establishment.\textsuperscript{132} At least one rural company commander found a rather creative way to provide a positive incentive for men to attend summer camp, one which played on the "social" aspect of the Militia. He would schedule a dance in the local armoury to be held a few days after camp ended and to which all young women of the community were invited. Only those men who had attended camp, however, were permitted entry. As a result, the commander reportedly "never failed to bring out a full company."\textsuperscript{133}

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to Militia recruiting, however, was the often-problematic relationship between the Militia and the Ontario working classes. In particular, the citizen army frequently fell afoul of organized labour. While trade unions tended to dislike militarism in general, and resented the frequent practice of staging military displays on Labour Day,\textsuperscript{134} more significant in a material sense was that one of the mandated duties of the Militia was the maintenance of domestic law and order in cases where police forces proved inadequate to the task.\textsuperscript{135} In practice, this usually involved intervention in industrial disputes, that intervention being in virtually all cases to the advantage of employers. Between 1902 and 1914, the Militia in Ontario was called out nine times "in aid of the civil power," eight of these instances being strikes.\textsuperscript{136} While some writers have claimed that militiamen, particularly those of a white-collar background, "responded with enthusiasm" to call-outs in aid of the civil power, they do so based on rather scanty evidence.\textsuperscript{137} For the most part, "strike duty" was extremely unpopular, one Militia officer calling it "the most disagreeable and at the same time the most thankless service that can fall to the lot of the soldier," and in particular the citizen soldier.\textsuperscript{138} Another officer pointed out in 1903 that no man ever joined the militia in order to be "a cheap policeman," particularly artisans who might find themselves "directly opposed to

\textsuperscript{131}Militia Report, 1905, 35; Militia Report, 1909, 57; Ottawa Citizen, 4 July 1903.
\textsuperscript{132}Militia Report, 1913, 101.
\textsuperscript{133}Debates, 19 March 1912, 5473.
\textsuperscript{134}Toronto Globe, 15 September 1910.
\textsuperscript{135}Militia Act, 1904, Art. 80-7.
\textsuperscript{136}Lt-Col. J.H. Allan, "Military Aid of the Civil Power in Canadian Industrial Disputes, 1876-1925," Occasional Papers on Canadian Defence Policy and Civil-Military Affairs, 2 (1972), 48-50. The only case of aid to the civil power unrelated to industrial unrest during this period occurred in 1913, when troops were put on alert after students of Queen's University rioted following a rugby victory over McGill. Kingston Daily British Whig, 11 November 1913.
\textsuperscript{138}Lt-Col. Henry Smith, "Military Aid of the Civil Power," Selected Papers of the Canadian Military Institute, (1900), 74; Goodspeed, Battle Royal, 64.
[their] own personal chums, to the members of [their] own union.” Militiamen often resented the fact that “pro-management magistrates” tended to call out troops when they were not really needed.

“Strike duty” tended to have an adverse effect on both the efficiency and morale of militia units, and often marred relations between the part-time soldiers and others in their communities. This was compounded by the problem of lost civilian pay while on call-out and of frequent delays in receiving military pay for “strike action.” In some cases, militiamen faced the danger of losing their jobs if they absented themselves from work to break up strikes, employers generally having little interest in bourgeois solidarity when it meant sacrificing their own profits. Action in strikes also, quite understandably, drew the ire of organized elements of the working class. Resolutions calling for an end to the employment of the Militia during strikes came frequently at conventions of the Trades and Labor Congress (TLC), especially after incidents when the Militia appeared to have intervened on behalf of employers. But the membership of the TLC, a moderate, trade-based organization, generally voted down extreme measures such as calling for the disbandment of the Militia or banning union members from enlisting. While the TLC abjured from condemning Militia service outright, some unions took a harder stand. In Toronto on 21 September 1906, for instance, the International Brewery Workers vowed to enforce a prohibition against union members joining “the state or local militia,” a rule passed by the union’s American leadership.

But organized labour was not alone in its criticism of “strike duty;” in fact, many of labour’s complaints were echoed by both senior Militia officers and leading militarists, if for very different reasons. Use of the militia to break up a 1901 strike by Toronto streetcar workers led to a temporary downturn in militia recruiting in the city, and militia leaders worried that if the practice continued the attractiveness of the militia would be permanently damaged. Henry Pellatt, financier and militia colonel, was strongly opposed to the use of militiamen as strike-breakers, and in 1903 warned Militia Minister Frederick Borden against continuing the practice, though he had no qualms about using the Permanent Force to put down strikes. Militarists who touted the social benefits of universal militia service

139 Debates, 30 June 1903, 5711.
140 Allan, “Military Aid,” 6; Debates, 12 July 1904, 6512-6525.
141 Militia Report, 1911, 84.
143 Debates, 30 June 1903, 5711.
144 For example, see Proceedings of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (hereafter PTLC), 1902, 60.
145 PTLC, 1905, 42; 1907, 71; PTLC, 1910, 48.
147 Beahen, “A Citizen’s Army,” 71.
worried that the use of the militia as an instrument of class rule would sully its
"democratic" image. Captain C.F. Hamilton, a strong supporter of universal mili-
tary service, held that a special federal constabulary could "handle riots more
efficiently, and at a cost of far less class jealousy, than the employment of militia
arouses."148 Sam Hughes was similarly opposed to the practice of calling out the
Militia "to put down riots which were very often incited by aldermen and others
seeking to gain votes," particularly since militiamen were sometimes "called upon
to act against their personal friends."149 Such complaints reflected tension between
differing constructions of gender identity as embodied in trade unions' notions of
proletarian "brotherhood" on one hand, and middle-class militarist claims of a link
between "comrades in arms" which transcended class boundaries on the other.
While in the former case the appeal to "masculinity" was directed toward cementing
the solidarity of a class, in the latter it was directed toward fostering solidarity
between classes. Here the concept of "masculinity" itself was, to use a rather
militaristic metaphor, "contested terrain."

Contemporary accounts provide clear evidence of the divided loyalties of
militiamen recruited from the working classes. When two companies of the 44th
Regiment were called out to deal with a strike by local Grand Trunk Railway
workers in Bridgeburg in 1910, authorities were surprised to find that over half the
men called out were themselves on strike against the company.150 On other
occasions, militiamen displayed open sympathy for striking workers. Soldiers of
the 97th Algonquin Rifles, ordered into active service in September 1903 to halt
rioting by woodsmen in Sault Ste. Marie who were owed back wages, responded
to the situation by distributing food to the hungry "bush strikers."151 Ontario
militiamen were fortunate in that they saw no extreme cases like the 1913 strike in
Nanaimo, B.C., where the Militia spent nearly a year escorting strike-breakers in
and out of coal mines, or the ugly confrontations between soldiers and strikers in
Cape Breton.152 In most cases, particularly those involving part-time militiamen,
there was little or no violence, or at least no participation by militiamen in
violence.153 In one rare case where violence occurred in Ontario, during the 1906
Hamilton street railway strike, Permanent Force troops rather than the Militia were
involved.154 Such outbreaks were rare, however, and no strikers were killed by

149 Debates, 17 March 1904, 209; 12 July 1904, 6518, 6522.
150 Toronto Globe, 3 August 1910. On the 1910 strike, see J.H. Tuck, "Union Authority,
Corporate Obstinacy and the Grand Trunk Strike of 1910," Canadian Historical Association
151 Maj. G.L. Cassidy, The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945 (Toronto 1948), 2;
Toronto Globe, 29 September 1903.
152 Beahen, "A Citizen's Army," 75.
153 Judy M. Torrance, Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982 (Kingston 1986), 27-8; Allan,
"Military Aid," 39.
154 Hamilton Spectator, 22-28 November 1906.
Canadian soldiers in aid of the civil power. As one writer has noted, though, this was as likely due to luck as anything else, given the often "deplorable" standard of discipline in the Militia.\textsuperscript{155} The contradictions of class with respect to the Militia played out as well in the realm of culture, though in this case complaints emanated from the middle, rather than the working, classes. The "rough culture" of the Militia, particularly evident in annual camps, was in many ways a barrier to "the full attainment of middle-class status," a phenomenon similar to that which has been noted with respect to Toronto policemen.\textsuperscript{156} The disjuncture between the ideals of "respectability" held by middle-class social reformers and the reality of life in the Militia could be stark indeed. In many areas where, according to some, "religion ha[ ]d not yet gone out of fashion," there was much criticism of the "Godless and wicked" camps.\textsuperscript{157} In late June 1912, for instance, the Lord's Day Alliance in London passed a resolution condemning the Militia as an "evil influence" for allowing training in camp on Sundays.\textsuperscript{158} Others accused the Militia of encouraging a plethora of vices ranging from blasphemy to smoking cigarettes.\textsuperscript{159} Parents who saw Militia camps as "dirty, unsanitary place[s], noted for drunkenness and a wild holiday" were less than enthusiastic at the prospect of their sons joining the Militia.\textsuperscript{160} As one Member of Parliament put it, no mother who has a respect for her son, will permit that boy to go to the annual drills when she knows that the most he will learn will be to smoke cigarettes, drink whiskey and mingle with the worst elements in the community.\textsuperscript{161} In one notable case, a man who had come to watch the 2nd Dragoons on parade in Paris was shocked to see his own son present in the ranks without his permission, and immediately dragged the young man home. Later, however, pickets were sent out from the regiment to retrieve their missing trooper.\textsuperscript{162} In some cases, the behaviour of militiamen at summer camps "shocked county councils and caused withdrawals of assistance."\textsuperscript{163} One must note, however, that most of this "misbehaviour" would seem perfectly innocuous by late 20th-century standards. Of all the features of Militia culture, most contentious was the association between soldiering and the consumption of alcoholic beverages. In the early 1900s, having a few glasses of beer after training was a common ritual in both armouries

\textsuperscript{155}Allan, "Military Aid," 39.  
\textsuperscript{156}Marquis, "Working Men in Uniform," 260.  
\textsuperscript{157}\textit{Debates}, 30 June 1903, 5709.  
\textsuperscript{158}\textit{Debates}, 9 March 1909, 2305.  
\textsuperscript{159}\textit{Gananoque Reporter}, 13 May 1911.  
\textsuperscript{160}\textit{Toronto World}, 3 June 1912; \textit{Debates}, 29 May 1903, 3775-3777.  
\textsuperscript{161}\textit{Debates}, 9 March 1909, 2305.  
\textsuperscript{162}\textit{Brantford Expositor}, 9 June 1909.  
\textsuperscript{163}Merritt, "Patriotic Military Training," 260.
and canteens. Camp canteens, though, were viewed by temperance advocates as one of the worst features of militia training, subject to being “abused by the too free and easy soldier.” The beer canteen at Niagara Camp, for instance, was reported in 1904 to be “jammed every night.”\textsuperscript{164} The Dominion Alliance and the Moral and Social Reform Councils put pressure on the Militia to forbid the sale of alcoholic beverages in armouries and camps, and such agitation resulted in the prohibition of alcoholic beverages in some militia facilities.\textsuperscript{165} This was an unpopular move, not only with the men in the ranks but with the senior British officers who supervised Militia training. The latter adamantly opposed any ban on the sale of beer in camp canteens, arguing that such a measure would actually “increase the amount of drunkenness in camp” since men could simply go to local saloons and hotels to purchase hard liquor.\textsuperscript{166} The sale of beer in camps, on the other hand, could be kept within the control of the appointed authorities.\textsuperscript{167} Restrictions on alcohol consumption were, predictably, difficult to enforce. While officers would search campgrounds for “stray flasks,” sometimes only half-heartedly, men generally managed to get around regulations.\textsuperscript{168} After alcohol was prohibited in their regimental armoury, officers and men of the 7th Fusiliers simply “repaired to downtown cafes” after evening training sessions.\textsuperscript{169} Frederick Borden, however, was extremely reluctant to roll back any prohibition regulations, for fear of upsetting social reformers (who he referred to as “our lady friends”) and turning them into “enemies of the militia.”\textsuperscript{170} The problems of trying to ban canteens became clear when the sale of alcoholic beverages at Barriefield Camp, near Kingston, was prohibited in 1909 in response to agitation from temperance groups. For a few days, the ban appeared to be working, and that season’s camp appeared to be the quietest “in many years.” The Kingston Daily Standard proclaimed that the concern of officers that a ban “would only drive the soldiers to town for liquor ha[d] been disproved.”\textsuperscript{171} Within a week of the camp’s opening, however, the Medical Corps had to cope with numerous cases of delirium tremens, “a thing practically unknown in recent years,” after bottles of liquor had been smuggled into camp. “Many of the patients,” reported the Standard, “ha[d] gone practically insane through excessive use of liquor.”\textsuperscript{172} Moreover, several soldiers were arrested for drunken and disorderly behaviour on

\textsuperscript{164} Brantford Expositor, 20 June 1904.
\textsuperscript{165} Canadian Annual Review, 1909, 283-4.
\textsuperscript{166} Militia Report, 1902, 31-2.
\textsuperscript{167} Debates, 10 April 1902, 2546-2547; Desmond Morton, The Canadian General: Sir William Otter (Toronto 1974), 309-10.
\textsuperscript{168} Brantford Expositor, 3 June 1909.
\textsuperscript{169} Ware, Seventh Regiment, 158.
\textsuperscript{170} Debates, 10 April 1902, 2547.
\textsuperscript{171} Kingston Daily Standard, 21 June 1909.
\textsuperscript{172} Kingston Daily Standard, 23 June 1909.
Kingston streetcars. Rarely had there been a camp with “so much dissatisfaction.”

Matters reached a head when Sam Hughes, a near-fanatical devotee of temperance, became Minister of Militia in 1911. Hughes was long known for his condemnation of alcohol consumption in the ranks. In 1906, when commanding the 45th Victoria Regiment at Cobourg camp, he forced a private who “rolled into camp with ‘all sheets to the wind’” to turn in his uniform on the spot and leave the camp in his underwear to find his own way home. He had been responsible for the ban on canteens at Barriefield, and one of his first acts as Minister was to declare all armoury and camp canteens “dry.” This was received warmly in some circles, the London chapter of the WCTU passing a resolution thanking Hughes for banning alcoholic beverages and urging him to continue “his good work for the advancement and defence of honour and purity of manhood.” While popular with Ontario Methodists and other pro-temperance groups, Hughes’ policy did little to endear him to the rank and file of the Militia. “Do ye ken Sam Hughes / he’s the foe of the booze,” began what soon became a popular ditty in Militia camps.

Niagara Camp in 1912 saw a repeat of the same pattern seen in Barriefield three years earlier as men, denied beer within the camp, sought stronger drinks outside. It also touched off a dispute between Hughes and more practically minded senior officers. Brigadier-General W.H. Cotton declared the ban on beer in canteens “ridiculous,” noting that when canteens were shut down at Niagara “some of the hotels lengthened their bar rooms.” Henry Pellatt told the Toronto World that every bar in Niagara was filled with militiamen drinking whiskey, rather than “light drinks which are harmless.” Hughes, however, remained adamant; there would be no beer sold in camps while he was Minister of Militia. The ban on alcoholic beverages would remain in place until Canadian troops reached the trenches of the Western Front, where their British senior commanders placed much greater value on military morale than on the middle-class moralizing of Hughes and his supporters.

The controversy over drinking, however, was much more than a simple dispute between officers and social reformers; at its root was a contradiction within the very notion of “manliness” in a class-based social order. Not only was drinking a fundamental element of army life, it was, and indeed is, central to working-class constructions of “manliness.” Not only had taverns been important centres of

174 Kingston Daily Standard, 26 June 1909.
175 Peterborough Examiner, 22 June 1906.
177 Canadian Annual Review, 1911, 346; Toronto World, 4 June 1912.
178 Haycock, Sam Hughes, 145.
179 Toronto World, 5 June 1912.
working-class male culture in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but the ability to consume alcohol has been viewed as a measure of "hardness" by young working-class men. Middle-class temperance groups like the WCTU, on the other hand, explicitly attacked the "manhood" of male working-class drinkers, portraying them as "weak, selfish, irresponsible and violent," and thus the very antithesis of the Christian "manly" ideal. In this case, two constructions of "masculinity" emerged which were not merely in tension but appeared almost to be polar opposites. If the top-down cultural construction of martial "masculinity" was of the ascetic "warrior," from the bottom up it was more one of the hard-drinking "soldier."

With respect to drinking, as with "strike duty," the divergence between what militarism desired and what militarism got reflected nothing so much as the gulf between ideology and reality. Moreover, such contradictions illustrate the inadequacy of functionalist conceptualizations of "social control" or "socialization" in attempting to account fully for such complex historical phenomena as Canada’s citizen army. Indeed, any interpretation which holds that Militia service actually functioned as a mechanism of socialization simply reproduces the epistemological standpoint of early 20th-century militarists. That the concept of what made a proper "masculine" citizen rested so uneasily with certain other ostensibly "masculine" patterns of behaviour should speak volumes about the often ambiguous nature of gender ideals.

This study has sought to explore some of the gender and class implications of Militia service and militarism in the context of early 20th-century Ontario, and, it is hoped, has drawn attention to the problematic nature of viewing "masculinity" as an essential, totalizing category. At the same time, however, it has argued for the importance of contending ideologies of "masculinity" in shaping both class identities and military practice within a specific historical context. Class, gender and ethnicity have never been hermetically sealed categories, nor can any one of them


181 This point is brought out in a recent study of young working-class men in Wolverhampton. Joyce E. Cannan, "One thing leads to another": Drinking, Fighting and Working-Class Masculinities," in Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, ed., *Understanding Masculinities: Social Relations and Cultural Arenas* (Buckingham 1996), 114-25.


183 The "positive" image of the "warrior" is currently enjoying something of a comeback within the mythopetic men’s movement, shorn once again of any connection to actual bloodshed. See, for example, Robert Moore and Douglas Gilette, *King Warrior Magician Lover: Rediscovering the Archetypes of the Mature Masculine* (San Francisco 1990), 75-95.
be held up as the defining measure of social existence; instead, they form a complex and often contradictory matrix present within all modern capitalist societies. Thus the issues discussed here have clear implications for the study of labour history as well as for the history of men and the military. Meanwhile, much work in this area remains to be done. Quantitative work, for instance, on the demographic makeup of the Militia with respect to class, occupation, ethnicity and other factors is badly needed. As well, given that Militia service took up so little of members’ actual time, more study of its impact on their lives away from the Militia might yield valuable insights. In particular, one might examine the extent to which the “warrior” ethos and the rigid notions of hierarchy fostered by military service affected the domestic relations of militiamen and their families. And, as well, the whole question of “sexuality” with respect to the Militia as an institution needs at some point to be investigated in depth. To achieve such results, however, the prejudice of far too many social and labour historians toward anything which smacks of “military history” must be overcome. That, in the end, may be the greatest challenge of all.

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