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REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS


*Labour Before the Law* deserves a wide and appreciative readership. Fudge and Tucker offer compelling arguments about the increasing importance of the law to the lives and movements of workers and about the importance of labour relations generally to the contours of state formation in the first half of the 20th century. *Labour Before the Law* nicely blends published accounts, unpublished graduate manuscripts, and an impressive amount of original research. It ranges across the touchstones of labour history — yes, yet another account of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) — to lesser-known but highly revealing events such as the 1937-38 strike of lime miners in Blubber Bay, British Columbia, all the while maintaining an admirable consistency in its analysis. Fudge and Tucker also convincingly demonstrate the descriptive power of a Marxist approach to the law itself.

In the tradition of the famous *Industry and Humanity* by Mackenzie King, *Labour Before the Law* is a long book, and will no doubt remind some readers of why their choice to avoid law school was the correct one. But if the detail is sometimes too densely packed, the story is nonetheless thoughtprovoking. Fudge and Tucker begin their account with the rise of what they call “industrial voluntarism.” The beginnings of the 20th century witnessed an aggressive campaign on the part of employers to use a combination of injunctions and criminal law provisions to limit the effectiveness of strikes and sympathy actions such as boycotts. British legal precedents, including the 1901 Taff Vale decision, enhanced the effectiveness of civil actions against unions. At the same time, the right of freedom of association was not enforced, undermining the notion of state neutrality in labour relations. Tucker and Fudge highlight the complexities of governmental intervention during this period: responsible for the application and enforcement of criminal law, municipal and provincial officials played a central role in the early years of the twentieth century, while federal officials focused on creating bureaucratic mechanisms of conciliation. Because of this division, unionists were only too aware that legislative victories, scant as they were, could be easily eroded by magistrates with liberal definitions of watching and besetting.

*Labour Before the Law* argues that the regime of industrial legality that emerged in the years before World War I combined accommodation and coercion, not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing strategies. The passage of the IDIA meant that mandatory conciliation would become the preferred mechanism of the federal Department of Labour. At the same time, the IDIA served to increase the power of the judiciary. Injunctions continued to be a resort of employers looking to restrain union power, while magistrates frequently found themselves called...
upon to chair IDIA conciliation boards. Fudge and Tucker provide a succinct survey of the workings of the IDIA, drawing upon the work of Bob Russell and Jeremy Webber. In particular, they highlight the regional and occupational variations in the outcomes of the usage of the Act. Most important, they suggest that the IDIA met with "pragmatic acquiescence" rather than "normative acceptance." Unions continued to condemn the use of strikebreakers and restrictions on the right to picket, all the while recognizing that occasional victories could be won through federal intervention.

The chapter in Labour Before the Law on World War I is the book's weakest. It is short, and limited to events and policies that have been explored in detail by scholars such as Greg Kealey. At the same time, however, Fudge and Tucker should be commended for their valuable rethinking of the traditional chronology of labour history. Chapter Five covers the period from 1919 to 1925, challenging the traditional periodization that frames the labour revolt of 1919 in terms of wartime strife. Obviously, there is a great deal of wisdom in the traditional periodization: Order-in-Council government was one of the central grievances of the leftist radicals who briefly held sway over the labour movement in western Canada. As well, a host of other issues, from concerns with the rising cost of living to the resurgence of nativism, were inseparable from their wartime manifestations. Nonetheless, Labour Before the Law persuasively groups the battle for Winnipeg in 1919 with the fight for Cape Breton's coal mines in the early 1920s. Both dramatized the expansion of state coercion and the indelible markings of class relations on the character of industrial legality. Fudge and Tucker highlight the central contradiction of this period: while demonstrating its willingness to use coercion against so-called "irresponsible" unions, the federal government shied away from using similar measures against "irresponsible" employers who refused to recognize the instruments of collective bargaining devised by workers. Mountie batons would never be used in board rooms.

Tucker and Fudge also deftly explore provincial attempts to devise new regimes of industrial legality in the second half of the 1930s. These, however, fell far short of a Canadian version of the American Wagner Act. The most valuable contribution of Labour Before the Law is Chapter Ten, which covers the period from 1943 to 1948. This chapter should find its way onto many course syllabi alongside time-honoured accounts of the Japanese internment and "wartime jitters over femininity." These years witnessed a broad-based leftist renaissance, with organizing victories for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and electoral breakthroughs for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. In such a context, policies like PC 1003, which compelled bargaining, conciliation and arbitration, served to channel the labour movement into a new set of administrative procedures. True, these procedures owed much to previous legislation, such as the IDIA's tripartite board and the ban on strikes and lockouts during the investigation period. Taken together, however, the strands of PC 1003 demonstrated federal willingness to trade the recognition of "responsible" unions for industrial peace, although this new-found public legitimacy did not radically alter workplace relations.

Labour Before the Law persuasively argues for the continuing importance of local state officials to the regime of industrial legality promoted by the federal government. It also serves as a reminder not just that law in a liberal-capitalist society was shaped by class relations, but that its class-based dimensions were of fundamental importance. Just as important, this book is predicated upon conflict: there is not one hint of a Whiggish notion of linear progress in the account offered by Fudge and Tucker. This speaks, I think, to the context in which the book was written. If nothing else, the past ten years have revealed the very real limitations of indus-
trial legality as a political strategy. Rights like collective bargaining, once thought to have been won once and for all, have now been demonstrated to be all too fleeting, subject to the political designs of neo-conservatives who would rewrite the basic protections afforded by the Rand decision.

Most important, Labour Before the Law lives up to the promise of its title. More than twenty years ago, Ian McKay used the pages of this journal to lament the seemingly never-ending expansion of the "Mackenzie King industry." While clearly immersed in the minutiae of King's legacy, Fudge and Tucker have, I believe, produced an account that rightly puts workers front and centre.

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THIS BOOK PROVIDES information and insight into the development of new consensual relations involving unions, employers, and governments at the end of World War II in Canada. At the outset of Harnessing Labour Confrontation, Peter McInnis argues that there "is a notable gap in our knowledge [of] the transition from all-out war to peacetime reconversion" and promises "an investigation that provides a more nuanced account of the immediate postwar years." (6-7) He delivers on this promise, particularly in Chapter Two, dealing with the broad societal debate on reconstruction at war's end, and in Chapter Four on the place of Labour-Management Production Committees (LMPCs) in "consolidating a new era of routine state intervention under the rubric of cooperation." (114) Harnessing Labour Confrontation therefore has some very strong components. Unfortunately, as I explain at the end of this review, the book lacks the theoretical and analytical coherence that would allow it to be more than the sum of its parts.

The debate on reconstruction concerned both the shape of industrial legality and the nature of the nascent Canadian welfare state. (84) Peter McInnis notes that in 1945-46 the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) "viewed itself as the advocate not just of its own membership but of the Canadian working class generally" (58) and presented a broad corporatist vision of the future that contrasted with the strong preference of most private companies for a return to unfettered free enterprise. For a brief time, the result of this debate was quite uncertain; indeed, just prior to the onset of the Cold War, "citizens appeared ready to opt for a much more corporatist society over the return to business as usual." (64) McInnis argues that this "fervent debate ... had the potential to secure an expansive welfare state." (47) He portrays the struggle in Gramscian terms, pitting one ideological bloc that "defended the hegemony of free enterprise" against a second ideological bloc that "proposed a counter-hegemony of tripartite corporatism." (184)

Harnessing Labour Confrontation makes it clear that individual corporations and business lobby groups took the debate about reconstruction very seriously. In my own research on the Crowsnest Pass, I have found some highly ideological advocacy advertisements that ran in local papers just after World War II. An example is the quarter-page ad for the Imperial Bank of Canada that appeared in the Fernie Free Press on 5 September 1946. Titled, "Canada's Way of Life," the ad noted the bank's services to retailers and listed the bank's branches in Natal and Fernie, BC. Its primary message, however, was that the needs of Canadian consumers would be met by retail stores that epitomize the qualities defining the Canadian way of life: "individual initiative ... free enterprise ... personal responsibility ... the spirit of competition in service rendered the public." Harnessing La-
Labour Confrontation allows us to put such a local advertisement in a national political context. McInnis presents four advocacy ads purchased by four other major corporations that ran in the Financial Post in 1944 and 1945. (73-76) He argues, “That Canada’s largest banks and leading corporations found it necessary to present such images is a telling comment on the perceived threat to the status quo.” (72) The fact that this type of advocacy was extended to the Crowsnest Pass, a bastion of support for industrial unions and socialist politics, confirms McInnis’s conclusion.

The corporate offensive against unions and social welfare programs included the establishment of private institutes that scrutinized and countered union legislative proposals. These institutes promoted provincial jurisdiction over labour legislation (78) and undoubtedly lobbied very hard prior to the federal-provincial conference of labour ministers in October 1946 that discussed the possibility of a uniform labour code. Despite considerable provincial support for a uniform code, the federal minister, Humphrey Mitchell, actively discouraged such a step. (159) Big Business proved to be a very active and successful lobby group in the mid-1940s, just as it has been in recent decades.

Peter McInnis portrays “Teamwork for Harmony,” his chapter on Labour-Management Production Committees (LMPCs), as a corrective to existing postwar labour histories that have concentrated on “overt conflict and intra-union political rivalry.” (115) The chapter is quite successful because it presents rich empirical materials within a strong theoretical framework and posits interesting conclusions. One of those conclusions is that “LMPCs served to entrench a functioning model of industrial democracy on a micro-level, which in turn helped build confidence in the larger macro-level strategies under development for postwar industrial legality.” (124) While this judgment is supported by the sketchy documentary evidence available to the author, further research is needed to establish the ways that LMPCs articulated with union organizing, shopfloor militancy, and strikes in particular workplaces. Such research would also shed light on the validity of McInnis’s provocative assertion that the willingness of Canadian unions to participate in LMPCs and other cooperative ventures with management “spurred the development of a ‘split-level’ economy that favoured the strongest trade unions.” (144)

Harnessing Labour Confrontation includes reproductions of six intriguing government posters produced in 1946 on the theme of “Produce for Prosperity.” (130-143) These posters implored Canadian workers to cooperate and increase production in order to create more jobs and secure a higher standard of living. In addition, the posters presented gendered representations of labour, as did government literature on LMPCs. Peter McInnis’s analysis of the gendered assumptions in these materials is another reminder of the speed with which, at the end of World War II, “gender politics were ... returned to their prewar formation.” (137)

I have three main criticisms of this book, despite my appreciation of its many accomplishments. Firstly, at a number of different points in the text the author laments how the new system of industrial legality “stifled spontaneous worker self-activity.” (191; SA 3 and 125) But he fails to theoretically or empirically link this issue to the main theme in his narrative, namely the hegemonic struggle between the supporters of free enterprise on the one hand and the supporters of tripartite corporatism on the other. Secondly, McInnis condemns choosing sides when producing historical narratives (8) but then proceeds to choose sides at different points in his text (for example, the CCF’s “narrow class-collaborationist policies” make a cameo appearance on page 69). My problem is less with his choices than with his claim that history can eschew choices. To my mind the best narratives both focus on “complexities and ambigu-
Finally, Harnessing Labour Confrontation lacks the coherence that would have been provided by a consistent theoretical discussion or a unifying narrative of key events. From chapter to chapter, and even within chapters, the book reads like a collection of brief empirical studies rather than an integrated study of the period. These studies are effectively collected and organized by Peter McInnis, but they do not fit together as part of a bigger picture. Perhaps this is less the fault of the author and more an indication of the difficulty of researching and writing a critical labour history "on the 'national' level of civil society."(9)

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PAID WORK is becoming increasingly person- rather than place-based. "Officelessness" is a defining feature of our times. These are the leading premises of Laura C. Johnson's new book The Co-Workplace: Teleworking in the Neighbourhood (2003). By focusing on place of work and "new" work arrangements, The Co-Workplace makes a timely contribution to evolving understandings of the changing nature of work. There is growing attention to the spread of forms of paid work deviating from the post-war standard employment relationship, such as self-employment, part-time work, temporary work, and other dimensions of precarious employment in the Canadian labour market. Yet there is a dearth of social science scholarship on the types of work arrangements facilitated by technological change, the continuities and changes shaping so-called new work arrangements, and their gendered character.

In the Co-Workplace, Johnson brings together historical and contemporary assessments of the benefits and hazards of home-based work for women, building on her own previous scholarship on industrial homework and telework in the public sector, and an inquiry into alternative visions of work arrangements. The goal of the book is to explore possibilities for maximizing the benefits of working off-site and minimizing problems conventionally associated with home-based work by developing the concept of the co-workplace. The co-workplace is a neighbourhood-based facility combining private workspaces and shared facilities and services. (4) Johnson's futuristic vision involves a hybrid facility designed to enable the self-employed and waged workers to work independently yet break their isolation by connecting with their colleagues and clients through access to sophisticated telecommunications technologies and the creation of new social spaces of place-based interaction. Variations on this type of facility already exist in the telecommunications-equipped satellite centres operated by large and small firms, occupation- or industry-specific centres, such as shared workspaces run as cooperatives for writers, artists, and designers, and collective workspaces in co-housing developments. Johnson argues that the co-workplace offers an antidote to the challenges posed by a variety of types of home-based work, from telework to industrial homework. She contends further that this type of facility is well-suited to women home-based workers given its capacity to reduce the stresses associated with co-location or the attempt to engage in paid work and care-giving in the same physical space (i.e., the home). Johnson employs a multi-disciplinary and multi-method approach to advance her arguments and to develop the co-workplace concept. She relies primarily on secondary research into the history of home-based work, open-ended interviewing, focus group research, and a survey of potential planning
initiatives. The most original chapters in the book explore workers' experiences of offsite work, their ideal work arrangements, and their evaluation of a set of six alternative scenarios. Chapter two provides a brief history of homework in the west. Drawing on the work of Eileen Boris, Johnson casts the evolution of homework as a story of women's waged work being pushed in and out of the home, demonstrating that the process of industrialization is not unidirectional but varies by geography and industry. At a conceptual level, the chapter establishes that the sexual division of labour and the idea of "home" as the domain of women are basic to the institution of home-based work. Establishing this foundation enables Johnson to highlight continuities characterizing patterns of home-based work of earlier generations and patterns of the current era, such as homeworkers' economic dependence and inferior wages and working conditions. It also allows her to reveal changes brought by new communications technologies. On the subject of change, Johnson differentiates her account by arguing that telework has produced a more diverse group of homeworkers and, consequently, the motivations for homework have changed. Among some professionals and some workers using information technologies in their daily activities (a group distinct from knowledge-workers), the pursuit of home-based or off-site work is driven less by employer demand and more by personal preferences, including "balancing family responsibilities with paid work," an aversion to long daily commutes, and the desire for local community.

Complementing the dual emphasis on continuity and change in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 examines the pros and cons of home-based work. This chapter evaluates two competing claims: Haddon's claim that social factors counter any flexibility offered by telework, versus Duxbury et al.'s contention that home-based work not only offers workers flexibility in scheduling, but is less stressful due to the limited work interruptions. Ultimately, Chapter three finds many problems with the home office due to the poor conditions of home-based work, teleworkers' experience of the "electronic leash," and the porous boundary between work and home. Yet Johnson is careful to emphasize the benefits of off-site work. Chapter four, in turn, explores these benefits, examining two forms of telecommunications-equipped offices (i.e., the single-employer satellite and the multi-employer telecentre) and the organization of three facilities (Canada's first suburban telecentre operated by BC Tel, a small telecentre established by a Canadian firm in a mid-sized urban centre, and a suburban telecentre in Washington DC developed by the US federal government). These case studies represent three distinct models. The BC Tel telecentre offers a permanent workplace for workers from different divisions of a single company. The Washington-based telecentre represents a more transitory workplace since it was designed to offer workstations on an as-needed basis to home- or office-based workers. Finally, the telecentre in a mid-sized Canadian city offers a hybrid model, providing some permanent workstations and some workstations that may be booked as needed. Based on interviews with workers and managers, Chapter four ends by affirming the telecentre as a desirable facility since it "introduces a physical boundary between work and home ... that helps some teleworkers to keep work from overtaking their lives." (36)

Johnson advocates developing co-workplaces sensitive to the desire of many (particularly women) workers to work near home but not in it. While Chapter four issues the challenge of "reinventing the office," (48) Chapters five through seven explore the merits and shortcomings of shared workspaces to develop the concept of the co-workplace and to test six scenarios with workers. By examining various experiments with shared workspaces, Chapter five ad-
dresses the question: what do the resource centre for interior designers, the telecom satellite, and the office wing of a housing cooperative have in common? Chapter six shifts to test the co-workplace concept based on focus group research conducted in conjunction with Women Plan Toronto, a non-profit community organization. The main finding here is that occupational and class dynamics, as well as geography, affect home-based workers' views on the co-workplace concept; for example, more than any other category of workers, home-based garment workers are concerned with health and safety. Yet there is general agreement among workers on the merits of the co-workplace concept. The workers surveyed find the location of the co-workplace in the neighbourhood and the presence of shared facilities (i.e., daycares, meeting rooms, and collective kitchens) appealing. Not surprisingly, given the six scenarios in Chapter seven, including a large renovated house, an industrial loft, a high-rise residential apartment, a community centre, a heritage bank and retail space, the focus groups deemed the residential high-rise, followed by a converted heritage building in a location well-serviced by public transit, to be the most promising spaces for co-workplaces. The scenarios presented in Chapter seven are nevertheless fictitious. Hence, the Co-Workplace: Teleworking in the Neighbourhood ends with an assessment of obstacles to making the co-workplace concept viable. For Johnson, the advantages of the co-workplace include its potential to separate work and living spaces, create collective workspaces outside the single firm, encourage community economic development, reduce automobile use, and, above all, accommodate workers with family responsibilities. Yet zoning rules based on the separation of the private and public spheres, home and workplace, represent a profound barrier.

Johnson's optimistic vision and concern to humanize home-based work, raised throughout the book but especially in the concluding chapter, are laudable. My concern, however, is that despite the inclusion of a focus group of industrial garment workers, the model co-workplace facility is driven by the norm of the professional or semi-professional worker. The occupational heterogeneity envisioned in this futuristic facility is innovative. Indeed, the concept holds promise for professional workers seeking independence, autonomy, and geographic proximity to home. Yet professional workers are just one segment of people engaged in these "new" work arrangements. Others are occupied by workers in precarious employment, whose employers may use work arrangements as distancing tools or vehicles for abdicating responsibilities related to the provision of extended benefits, statutory benefits, and occupational health and safety, as well as for downloading the costs of the equipment and supplies onto workers.

The Co-Workplace: Teleworking in the Neighbourhood addresses important and timely questions related to shifting spaces and geographies of work — it is required reading for scholars studying the changing nature of work. However, for the co-workplace concept to truly reflect Johnson's desire for humanizing home-based work, a broader array of policy issues related to labour and social regulation require more focused attention. This call is particularly pressing given the two basic features of this institution that Johnson so skillfully raises at the outset of the book — the sex/gender division of labour and the idea of "the home" as the providence of women.

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Ian MacLachlan, *Kill and Chill: Restructuring Canada’s Beef Commodity Chain* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001)

THE ECONOMIC, political, and environmental importance of Canada’s beef industry has become more apparent following the discovery in 2003 of a single case of ‘Mad Cow’ disease in Alberta, and contamination of Walkerton, Ontario’s municipal water supply in 2000, in part because of its proximity to a cow-calf operation. Ian MacLachlan’s study, *Kill and Chill: Restructuring Canada’s Beef Commodity Chain*, provides a much-needed historical context for understanding these events, particularly in light of a remarkable “metamorphosis” in key elements of the beef commodity chain since the late 1980s.

MacLachlan, a University of Lethbridge geographer, had good reason to examine changes in the beef commodity chain “from the calf to the hamburger” at this juncture. Lethbridge is located at the centre of “feedlot alley,” a region of Alberta where intensive cattle-feeding on factory-like farms with as many as 50,000 head of cattle has created cow pile problems of truly extraordinary proportions. More troubling than the “apocryphal” June wedding marred by the stench of fresh manure, are the municipal boil-water orders that “have become an accustomed part of domestic life” in the region’s communities. The emergence of massive meatpacking plants employing thousands of unskilled workers in the region because of its notoriously anti-labour political climate is equally disturbing.

This thorough and well-researched study provides an effective overview of Canada’s beef industry from its origins in the late 19th century to the year 2000. MacLachlan’s spatial and predominantly economic framework of analysis demonstrates convincingly “the close relationship between consumers, processors, and producers in a long commodity chain that persists despite sweeping structural changes in every link from farm to firm to final demand by consumers.”(10) The study provides substantial analysis of the complex structural factors that reshaped the beef-cattle industry during the 20th century. His approach, however, is one in which the perspective and agency of workers is overshadowed by a celebration of shrewd owner-managers and their clever accounting practices. MacLachlan also remains studiously noncommittal about government actions and policies, even though, as the author demonstrates, they have always played a key role in the industry’s development. As a labour study there is scope to deepen analysis of the largely post-union era of the 1990s by linking reduced wages and declining working conditions more directly to ethnic, racial, and gender hierarchies. Similarly, although MacLachlan demonstrates dramatic regional shifts and the growing influence of the United States, he does not speculate about the larger significance of these developments.

*Kill and Chill* is organized in three sections around the production, processing, and marketing of beef. Some chapters are more technical and will appeal to the specialist, but others, particularly his engaging analysis of “postmodern” marketing strategies and fickle consumer attitudes, will be of interest to anyone who shops for meat.

The book’s strength lies in the author’s careful elaboration of structural factors that dramatically changed links in the commodity chain from the calf farm to the supermarket meat counter, drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. MacLachlan identifies regulatory and technological changes as key factors behind three “revolutions” in the beef commodity chain during the 20th century. Between 1890 and World War II industrialization of the meatpacking process through a division of labour and reliance on the railway fostered development of an agroindustrial complex of fully integrated meatpackers and associated busi-
nesses at the heart of major urban centres across the country. The federal Crow Rate, which discouraged the breeding and feeding of livestock in the west, and the difficulty of transporting dressed beef, made central Canada the heartland for beef manufacturing jobs. In the postwar era efficient refrigerated truck cattle liners replaced railways and public stockyards, fostering direct-to-packer sales and the construction of beef plants in smaller centres in the west, to bring the processing stage closer to the raw material.

MacLachlan demonstrates that several factors combined to rapidly transform the feeding and meatpacking elements of the beef commodity chain in the 1990s: gradual elimination of the Crow Rate since 1983, new irrigation technologies that expanded Alberta’s capacity for cattle feed crops and feedlots, the development of “boxed hermetically sealed beef,” and new American ownership. Centred in Ontario throughout much of the 20th century, feeding and meatpacking shifted west, particularly to Alberta. Between 1976 and 2000 the proportion of Canada’s slaughter cattle herd located in Ontario dropped from 40.5 per cent to 18.4 per cent, while the proportion in Alberta rose from 29 per cent to nearly 66 per cent. Industry ownership, which had remained firmly in Canadian hands for nearly a century, shifted to two large US-based concerns, IBP and Cargill Foods, “each operating a single continental-scale beef plant in the heart of Alberta’s feedlot country.”(329) It is no coincidence that these changes were accompanied by the collapse of a once-strong and remarkably successful union movement in the meatpacking industry.

MacLachlan takes an ambivalent stance toward power dynamics within the cattle-beef industry. Using the term “oligopsony,” he describes the beef commodity chain as among the most “imbalanced” of Canada’s agroindustries because “15,000 calf producers sell feeder cattle to 400 feeders, who in turn sell finished slaughter cattle to a dozen or so meat-packing plants.”(5) Yet, in his discussion of public allegations of profiteering during World War II, MacLachlan defends meatpackers, emphasizing the industry’s low margins. On the environmental front MacLachlan describes the actions of an Alberta feedlot operator who dumped 30 million litres of cattle pen run-off in a tributary of the Bow River in 1997 as an “appalling” example of “negligence and irresponsibility.” But he offers no comment to place in perspective a government fine of $120,000 that resulted from charges under both the provincial environmental and federal Fisheries Acts.

Similarly, MacLachlan does not lament organized labour’s loss of power in the meatpacking industry since the mid-1980s. Using a Commons-style approach, MacLachlan’s examination of labour centres on the rise and decline of the remarkably successful United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) and its successors during a forty-year hiatus from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s, in an otherwise dismal century for meatpacking workers. MacLachlan attributes the union’s strength to a labour shortage during World War II, favourable labour legislation, and postwar economic growth, rather than emphasizing the politicization, determination, and industry of workers as a result of their Depression and wartime experiences. In the postwar period workers forged an effective system of pattern bargaining with the major companies, who cooperated in part because this form of bargaining took wages out of competition within the labour market. By the 1980s UPWA’s successors had achieved skill-based wage rates that were virtually uniform across the industry and the country, which “made semiskilled meat-packing workers among the highest paid manual workers in Canada in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.”(235)

MacLachlan is critical of industry leader Canada Packers for creating “instability” by allowing wages to rise so high at mid-century. Yet he does not ac-
knowledge that low wages, high turnover, and high injury rates in post-1980s packinghouses have created a new kind of instability. Large-scale beef plants were purposely located in small-town Alberta where "a rural populist political culture ... has never been supportive of the labour movement."(246) The author’s celebration of greater ethnic diversity, a more youthful workforce, and a larger proportion of women in the massive meatpacking plants of the 1990s ignores the correlation of this “progress” with a substantial drop in wages and less worker control over conditions of work. Repeated attempts to unionize workers have failed. It also ignores the high social welfare costs and social tensions generated by large-scale immigration to small towns like Brooks, Alberta.

MacLachlan has provided a comprehensive historical survey of the beef-cattle industry in Canada that raises important questions about its social and environmental costs, the political economy of the west, particularly Alberta, and the influence of the United States. It is also an engaging read for anyone who buys and eats meat. For all of these reasons Kill and Chill is a valuable addition to the literature on an industry that continues to hold an important place in the national historical narrative.

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Coal was the basic fuel of the 19th century. Highly prized as a source of power for factories, railways, and ocean steamers, it was also used to heat dwellings, generate electricity, and provide light. The Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) began to mine coal on Vancouver Island in the mid-19th century, after Aboriginals brought local deposits to its attention. For the rest of the century, the industry was dominated by two companies, the Vancouver Coal Mining and Land Company, successor in 1862 to the HBC at Nanaimo; and the Dunsmuir family, which developed collieries from 1869 at Wellington, Extension, and Ladysmith; and further north at Union. The industry declined after World War I, although mining continued for another generation.

Vancouver Island miners were noteworthy for their heterogeneity: Aboriginal inhabitants, Chinese and Japanese immigrants, and newcomers of European background all labourd at the mines. Among these groups, the ethnic British formed a plurality. And it is on them that Belshaw focuses.

Colonization and Community is serious and well-crafted, reflecting fifteen years of reflection on the University of London dissertation on which it is based. It fills a gap in the historical literature, which has paid scant attention to working-class emigrants from the United Kingdom. And it is the unique scholarly monograph on Vancouver Island miners, although it complements some fine popular works — history written without footnotes — notably Lynn Bowen’s two books.

Belshaw also makes a strong contribution in his use of demographic data. He challenges the conventional view of this frontier mining community’s overwhelming maleness and youth, offering evidence of family migration to the region, a significant female population, and high numbers of children. He also demonstrates high levels of geographic mobility and occupational change among the mining population.

The book is organized thematically: chapters are devoted in turn to the development of the Vancouver Island coal industry; the situation of potential emigrants and actual immigrants; the work of the mine and the standard of living it
yielded; class- and race-based conflicts in these coalfields; residential mobility and occupational change; and finally to the culture of the coalfields.

Considerable immigration was needed to meet the strong demand for labour at the large mines in operation on Vancouver Island by the 1870s. But as a site for British emigrants, it had considerable drawbacks: its extreme distance, the cost and discomfort of the voyage, the difficulty in returning home. Success in luring immigrants was limited, as was the ability to retain them once they arrived. Belshaw argues that British miners arrived with high expectations — which were disappointed. They responded both with workplace protests and by leaving the mines.

Viewing high nominal wages as a major lure, Belshaw seeks to compare the standard of living of the immigrant British miners with their experience in the United Kingdom. Because white boys were not nearly as widely employed in Vancouver Island mines as they were in the United Kingdom (or in contemporary Nova Scotia for that matter), immigration failed to produce expected improvements in living standards because mining families had recourse to relatively few secondary wage-earners and faced a higher cost of living on Vancouver Island.

Unique in late 19th century Canada was the significant Asian presence in British Columbia. Familiar with contemporary racist discourse, white miners levied a series of allegations against their Chinese counterparts: they depressed wages, took jobs from boys, discouraged European immigration, caused accidents in the mine, and acted as strikebreakers. European miners pushed for Chinese exclusion — with mixed success. Between 1850 and 1914 there were over a dozen significant strikes, reflecting a pattern of militancy in the coalfields in defence of white miners’ skills and their authority in the workplace. These strikes were frequently marked by violence: the Dunsmuirs called in the militia to aid evictions from company housing in 1877, 1890, and 1901. In contrast to flourishing mutual aid societies, trade unions failed to gain a purchase in the Vancouver Island coalfields — in part because of the implacable hostility of the Dunsmuirs — until the Miners and Mine Labourers Protective Association emerged at Nanaimo in the 1890s.

Miners moved. They migrated from place to place. And, at least on Vancouver Island apparently, they moved out of the mine to other occupations in large numbers. Using a variety of evidence, Belshaw concludes that roughly half of the mining workforce persisted over any given decade. He claims additionally that “perhaps all [miners] — sought out alternatives to work in the pits” (160); and that one-half of Vancouver Island miners moved themselves or their sons out of the mine to operate farms and other small businesses like boardinghouses and shops, as well as to other occupations. (165)

Belshaw’s treatment of the miners’ culture aims to demonstrate a colonial “recalibration” of British practises. The rough and the respectable co-existed in the coalfields: drink and gambling (prostitution is unmentioned) co-existed with churches, friendly societies, the Mechanics’ Literary Institute, amateur theatre, brass bands, schools, and the rituals of funerals. The displacement of cricket by baseball is emblematic of how the British became British Columbian.

The book has weaknesses. Miners’ identity was tied closely to their mastery of a craft, their control over entry to that craft, and the customs associated with their experience of the mine. All were based on their experience underground, which Belshaw makes modest efforts to explain. Another aspect of his treatment of miners’ identity is problematic. The claim that on Vancouver Island men’s identity as miners was “fluid and temporary” (174) undercuts the book’s over-arching argument about the making of the British Columbian working class. How can a working class be made if the
mine was a way station on the route to a farm or small business? Is Belshaw not developing a position here on how the working class of British Columbia failed to make itself?

I am also uneasy with the overtones of the condescension of posterity heard in anachronistic observations of “squandering one’s youth” (175) as pit boys; and in the description of “grimish clusters of humble homes.” (213)

While the book is solidly researched, it reflects limited use of the extensive coal mining literature from Nova Scotia. While Belshaw rejects arguments about “western exceptionalism” in Canadian working-class history, he fails to develop the comparisons that would allow for an authoritative treatment of the question. The British-dominated Vancouver Island coalfields resembled in many ways contemporary Nova Scotian coalfields.

He also overlooks key 19th century trade journals like the Canadian Mining Review, the British Columbia Mining Record, or the Transactions of the Canadian Society of Civil Engineers. The age of the original research is reflected in the failure to use the 1901 manuscript census, accessible to researchers since 1993. Only the 1881 manuscript census appears to have been exploited in depth. And there is a tendency to slip into examples from the United Kingdom when suitable evidence from Vancouver Island is wanting.

Despite these reservations, this book warrants a place in the libraries of historians of the working class.

Robert McIntosh
Library and Archives of Canada


CANADIAN POLITICAL economy, as a vibrant academic and scholarly tradition, has receded from view over the course of the past few decades. The neo-liberal government agenda with its attendant hegemonic discourse stemming from the Mulroney era accompanied by the signing of NAFTA and the heralding of Canada’s place as a prominent player in the drive to globalization among the G7 represents one set of factors that might explain why Canadian social scientists do not take more seriously Canadian political economy work and research. Another equally compelling set of factors is related to the increased pressure on universities to play a more prominent role in research that will benefit government and corporations, accompanied by targeted funding for such research and pressure to seek private corporate sponsors rather than continued reliance on public coffers for university funding in general as opposed to specific programs and components.

So it came as a pleasant surprise to read this book and to find that the authors situate themselves squarely within the tradition. Chapter Two of the book, “The Global and the Local: Understanding Globalization through Community Research,” offers a thoughtful overview of Canadian political economy, situating it within the larger critical tradition of the effects of capitalism on labour forces, specifically those residing in rural towns and connected to manufacturing. While the authors remind us that global capitalist expansion is not new, their work does focus on what they refer to as the “new economy.” Winson and Leach inform us: “Community is the crucible in which globalization finally works itself out. It is where the rubber hits the road.” (43)

The aim of the book is to explore the effects of the “new economy” of the 1990s...
on the manufacturing labour forces in five Ontario rural communities. In 1992 the authors began research in three communities in Wellington County. At that time they interviewed workers laid off from the Canada Packers plant in Elora. Over the course of the next two years they interviewed workers laid off in the towns of Harriston (which lost its Canada Packers dairy plant) and Mount Forest (the Westinghouse plant closed at about the same time). Chapter Three contains historical sketches of all five communities and records the histories of the chief employers in those towns. For example, they characterize the firm of Bissell which operated in Elora from 1901 to 1954 as “emblematic of small town manufacturing,” exemplifying the values of “industrial capitalism” practised by a class of indigenous manufacturers. (53-54)

In 1997 the authors expanded their studies to include the town of Amprior, located in the Ottawa Valley, a new “high-tech Greenfield site” due to its proximity to “Silicon Valley” north. Beginning as a single-industry town reliant on the huge McLaughlin sawmill and the timber trade of the late 19th century, the town’s labour force became reliant on employment in low-technology manufacturing (requiring relatively unskilled labour) after the mill shut down in 1929. The community passed through two subsequent phases: manufacturing pipes for the nuclear power industry and the more recent location of a Boeing plant and two firms that manufacture hardware and software for electronic communications. The fifth community included in the study is the single-industry town of Iroquois Falls in northeastern Ontario, the town with the most consistent history in terms of reliance on a single industry; namely, pulp and paper. Of the five communities, it is also the one with the most militant unionized workers, and the authors argue that this factor has been important in preserving well-paid unionized jobs. However, new technology and mergers have taken their toll, not so much on the older workers, many of them able to secure early-retirement packages rather than being laid off, but on young workers. The practice of young men working summers while in school and then taking their places in the mill, often without graduating from high school, has virtually ended.

The main argument is that in all five communities, secure well-paid jobs with benefits have been lost and workers forced to take on “contingent work” involving casual part-time or on call work at low pay and with few benefits. The authors outline the process in each of the communities. While the types of industry differ, the nature of the jobs has become increasingly the same, as companies strive to lower costs by eliminating highly paid work involving acknowledged skills by either shutting plants down (and moving to lower-cost areas in the United States and Mexico) or by introducing technology that replaces one type of worker by another with an overall downsizing in the total labour force employed (especially in the case of Iroquois Falls).

While class and class consciousness are highlighted by the authors (the conservative, often anti-union mentality, of rural small-town southwestern Ontario is compared to the more militant community of Iroquois Falls), Winson and Leach also note the importance of at least two other structural factors: age and gender. Many women were able to find relatively well-paying stable jobs in the manufacturing plants in southern Ontario, allowing them a measure of independence that many lamented when they lost their jobs after having worked for several decades. Because of their familial responsibilities, including the care of children and/or elderly parents and relatives, women were not as mobile as many of the men. Thus, for women, contingent labour meant finding part-time minimum-wage work in the service sector (like fast food restaurants and grocery stores) or looking after the children of other working parents (qualifying them as “small businesses” despite the low financial rewards). When a major-
ity of a town’s labour force found itself unemployed, even this latter option was no longer available. Men’s search for employment meant that they were often forced to take two or three part-time jobs that required travelling large distances. Even with several jobs, men reported themselves unable to earn the level of wages they had previously enjoyed during their manufacturing careers. Alongside lost jobs was the lost community of work enjoyed when people had long histories with a particular employer or in a particular plant. In Arnprior, the location of high-tech firms also introduced a “casualization” of labour since many jobs were contractual. In addition, workers commuted from outside to work in Arnprior and thus the expansion of jobs with the location of new businesses did not necessarily mean work for the local labour force. In addition to statistical information, the authors also provide information gleaned from interviews with workers in all five communities.

The factor of age has been mentioned in regards to Iroquois Falls. Overall, many of those who were laid off in all of the communities studied had worked for several decades and were looking forward to retirement. It is difficult for these workers, many without advanced education or skills outside of their particular work environments, to find other jobs. Health problems also become more pronounced for older workers and financial problems are exacerbated with the loss of health benefits at work. Commuting long distances to work several jobs, including different shifts, adds to stress levels and health risks. Women reported stress caused by becoming reliant on their husbands for financial support, many for the first times in their lives, in addition to reduced self-esteem resulting from loss of a job and a steady income, as well as a husband who may also be laid off and sitting at home feeling worthless. Both men and women reported not even having enough money to go and have a cup of coffee with friends or for gas to go visit friends and relatives. The effect on the next generation of workers is potentially devastating. Jobs held in the community and passed down through the generations have been lost and young people are forced to relocate or to take low-paying temporary work if they wish to remain in the community. This trend has been strengthened in Iroquois Falls because government jobs have also been lost as the public sector goes through retrenchment and a new round of centralization.

Winson and Leach demonstrate through their five case studies the imperative of keeping the political economy approach visible and vital, especially during this current period of globalization, periodic and cyclical recessions that lead to corporate mergers or relocations to cheaper sites outside Canada, alongside a neo-liberal government ideology that justifies such moves as somehow good for the Canadian economy. This book explores the effects of these decisions on workers living in rural towns in Ontario. The authors explore the effects on rural communities and the impact on rural manufacturing populations in particular. This is perhaps where the biggest weakness of the work becomes apparent. While it is clear that rural communities are threatened by the loss of their major employers, there is not enough in the study that makes these towns, and the people who live and work in them, come alive on the page. There are not many quotes from the interviews and those that appear are sketchy. The reader does not get a sense of “community,” reading this book. The Canadian political economy literature contains good examples of case studies that bring community case studies to life. The authors had a rich source of interview data that they could have integrated into the study in a far more interesting way. As it stands there is much repetition rather than an analysis that focuses on the communities themselves and on the people who live in them as unique individuals coping with forces largely outside their control. A final point has to do with the putting to-
gether of the volume by the press. Missing is the appendix and the majority of the endnotes in Chapter Three.

In conclusion, a critical approach that questions the received wisdom of corporations and governments on the benefits of globalization for the Canadian economy is sorely needed. We also need more research on communities that tracks the effects of these changes on working people and their families, in a manner that makes the communities come alive for the reader.

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MARGARET KECHNIE provides an historical account of the early years of the Ontario Women’s Institutes (WI), during which WI grew from a single autonomous local women’s organization in Stoney Creek, to a province-wide network sponsored by the provincial government. In contrast to previous accounts of the WI from “the bottom up” — i.e. from the perspective of its grassroots membership - Kechnie recounts the WI’s early years from “the top down” — from the perspective of the men who were provincial government officials in charge of the new organization and the female cadre of instructors who were hired to disseminate the latest research in domestic science. The book ends in 1919 when the 900 separate branches with 30,000 members were consolidated into the Federated Women’s Institutes of Ontario, a province-wide organization which henceforth elected its own officers, albeit under the supervision of a male superintendent employed by the Ontario Department of Agriculture.

As a state-sponsored, non-government organization, the WI is a quintessentially Canadian institution: one of those odd beasts that are neither state fish nor civil-society fowl, but somehow seem to thrive in our particular climate. The Ontario story brought to life by Kechnie was to a large extent mirrored throughout Canada as each province adopted the same basic model and joined a national federation. From Canada, the WI spread throughout the English-speaking world as the Associated Country Women of the World, an organization whose global reach and influence earned it observer status at the League of Nations and thence the United Nations. Throughout this past century, the WI has been an important fixture of rural communities in Canada and beyond. The formative events in Ontario provide a basis for understanding the organization’s proliferation.

The WI had its origins in the agrarian-reform, country-life movement based at the Ontario Agricultural College in Guelph. As a product of the late 19th century Progressive era, its goals were to modernize agricultural production, to encourage young people to stay on the farm, and thus to revitalize the countryside as the repository of democratic values. The Department of Agriculture established the Farmers’ Institutes in 1885 as the official vehicle for agrarian reform, but farmers were suspicious of the agricultural experts from Guelph. In an effort to bolster the Farmers’ Institutes, the Department of Agriculture established a separate, parallel women’s organization. While the men were instructed in agricultural techniques, the women would receive instruction in the new domestic science.

Kechnie debunks once and for all the WI’s own account of its origins, according to which Adelaide Hoodless, the wife of a wealthy Hamilton industrialist, established the WI after her infant son died from drinking unpasteurized milk, and made domestic science her life’s work. With what appears to be a touch of personal animus, Kechnie argues that Hoodless was marginal to the WI, and a figure of ridicule among professional do-
Domestic scientists employed at the Ontario Agricultural College who designed the WI curriculum. More significantly, Kechnie demonstrates that the problem of contaminated milk was in fact largely neglected by the WI, as women were rarely instructed in basic home-pasteurization techniques. In part due to this neglect, farm children continued to suffer from high rates of tuberculosis long after urban children began drinking pasteurized milk from commercial creameries. While the creameries worked with government to solve the contamination problem quietly, they were anxious that lingering problems not be publicized. Kechnie argues that government sponsorship prevented the WI from tackling this and other controversial issues of agricultural industrialization. More typically, its version of domestic science consisted of instructions for a layette of Egyptian cotton (from Mrs. Adam Beck of Ontario Hydro fame) or for “spotless napery” in the care of invalids, with virtually no recognition of the fact that few rural households had running water, electricity, or cash for household amenities.

The WI's original domestic-science mission failed to elicit much enthusiasm among farm women, who, for the most part, were more engaged in the fundamental business of generating income to underwrite the farm operation. Yet the organization expanded, for a variety of reasons examined by Kechnie. State sponsorship played an important role. Compared to other women's organizations, the WI was exceptionally privileged in having patrons at the center of provincial and national politics, access to touring professionals from Guelph, and direct subsidies. Stable operational funding allowed the WI to be exceptionally accessible; for example, the annual membership fee in 1911 was twenty-five cents, compared to one dollar for the Women's Christian Temperance Union. But state sponsorship alone cannot explain the WI's expansion; after all, the Farmers' Institutes failed to proliferate despite receiving a larger subsidy ($25 per branch in 1904, compared to $10 for the WI). Another factor was the organization's official non-partisan and non-sectarian mandate. While limited in practice by the Orange-tinted universe in which the WI operated at that time, this mandate at least enabled women of different Protestant denominations to associate with each other.

While the above factors aided the WI's proliferation, they were probably not sufficient. One of the more interesting contributions of the book is Kechnie's finding that the organization took off when it spread beyond the farm, and small-town women became active in the organization and gravitated to administrative and executive positions. Under the influence of wives of small-town merchants and other notables, the WI moved beyond its original narrow and uninspiring focus, and took on broader issues relating to the overall quality of rural life, such as raising funds for hospitals and libraries, and campaigning for immunization. Thus the WI became a fixture of small-town life, more along the lines of the Masons or the Elks than an agricultural-producers organization, in spite of the intentions of the Department of Agriculture. Kechnie concludes that "for women in rural communities ... to have been empowered and politicized by the process was something no one expected.... If anyone “stole” the WI from the Department of Agriculture, it was the women of rural Ontario." (139-40) Such are the paradoxes of a government-sponsored, non-government organization.

This book fills an important gap in the small, steadily-growing literature on the Women's Institutes. Kechnie has constructed an engaged narrative based on the abundant archives of the Ontario Agricultural College, the Ontario Department of Agriculture, the Federated Women's Institutes of Ontario, and personal papers. Since she is the only scholar to have examined many of these archives in such exhaustive detail (and may be the only person ever to do so) it seems a
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shame that the book does not include tables and charts to flesh out some of the quantitatively based generalizations. Nevertheless, she brings an appropriate sense of balance to the analysis. The impact of Kechnie's findings goes beyond the period covered, and beyond the WI itself. The organization's early transformation described in her book clearly helped to reinforce a growing culture of community service that subsequently contributed so much social capital to rural Ontario over the past century.

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L'OUVRAGE DE MATHIEU DENIS arrive à point. La dernière décennie avait vu la parution d'études portant sur les « grands » du syndicalisme québécois tels que Madeleine Parent, Michel Chartrand et Louis Laberge. L'attention est cette fois-ci tournée vers un cadre intermédiaire, au passé certes moins flamboyant, mais très révélateur sur le mouvement ouvrier au cours des décennies 1940 à 1980.


Le militantisme syndicaliste et socialiste de Morin est abordé en profondeur dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage qui a pour titre « Droits humains, syndicalisme et action politique sous Duplessis ». On y apprend que Jacques-Victor Morin obtint son premier poste permanent dans le mouvement


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mentionnés dans le livre. Il faut saluer l'initiative de Denis Mathieu et ses amis, car le milieu ouvrier québécois des décennies 1940, 1950 et suivantes a été éclairé d'une autre perspective, celle d'un cadre intermédiaire.

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Indhu Rajagopal, Hidden Academics: Contract Faculty in Canadian Universities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002)

FRUSTRATED PART-TIME Canadian university faculty, as Indhu Rajagopal painstakingly discovered, often see themselves as marginalized in “a job that they love, [where] they face obstacles in their day-to-day work that threatens to weaken their spirit and proficiency. They are exasperated that the university denies their continuing presence. They feel that it ignores their perspectives — their reasons for teaching part time, their aspirations, their attitude towards their work, their role in the universities, and their place in the collegium.” (88)

Rajagopal, Associate Professor of Social Science at York University, set out to learn more about these frustrations and the perspectives of these part-time professors, whom she labels “hidden academics.” She is clearly sympathetic — she was a part-timer for many years. (xiii) Her goal was to examine the impact of a changing university teaching environment on the rising number of “part-time profs,” whom she identifies as an exploited class. The result, as presented in some 330 pages generously sprinkled with more than 50 tables and figures (plus academic paraphernalia), is at once enlightening and frustrating, opinionated and derivative, pertinent yet somehow dated.

Perhaps a mixed result was inevitable — Rajagopal found that data on part-time academics was remarkably sparse given their growing importance since the 1970s. As a result, she laboured long to develop a major statistical record intended to support her study. The data is impressive; however, because the process took so long to come to fruition, many of her observations have the ring of the 1980s and early 1990s — something of a disappointment in a book published in October 2002. To be sure, the citations, data, and the “multiple regression analysis” of the statistics for the early 1990s are impressive. Recent material, in contrast, is less tightly focussed and more reliant upon anecdotal and secondary sources. The book seems to teeter along with something of a “split personality,” sometimes broadly opinionated and wide-ranging; sometimes very much an academic’s tome, replete with statistical commentaries and supportive citations.

Still, the evidence here is wide-ranging, the data analysis statistically sophisticated and informative, the findings impressive and convincing. Rajagopal reveals the gulf that divides full- and part-time academics; no surprise there, but the analysis digs deep. Her conclusion that part-time issues need to be looked at within the contexts of the political economy — as a “class struggle against the managerial powers” — is based on a strong understanding of the issues and careful assessment of data of unprecedented depth. She shows an academic world where full-timers live in a socially constructed, ideologically driven setting where matters like collegiality and equality are a “powerful fiction.” That “fiction,” that “construct” sees the full-time professoriate simultaneously expressing concern for the fate of part-time “colleagues” while serving as “managers responsible for hiring, firing, and administering” them. (236, 242)

Even more interesting, and less common, is Rajagopal’s assessment of divisions within the part-time professoriate. She recognizes that part-timers are a very diverse population in terms of gender, experience, degree achieved, discipline,
and university “type,” among other factors. Among her most effective ideas is that of “Classic” versus “Contemporary” part-timers. “Classic” part-time teaching — often at professional schools — is a sound (if still often exploitative) use of “real world” personnel to provide specific “training.” “Contemporaries,” on the other hand, more often still dream of full-time positions and live a hand-to-mouth existence by teaching many courses, whether across disciplines, or at various schools, a group accurately labelled by Rajagopal as “freeway fliers” (74) (The writer of this review has several hundred thousand kilometres of such teaching experience). One might note, too, that the work assumes that part-time pay is low — it is low compared to full-time academics, but one might ask low-wage labourers for their opinion. We all live in socially constructed environments.

Quibbles aside, recognizing that part-timers are not a monolith is a valuable feature of Rajagopal’s book; so too are the revelations (based on her survey) of the “mutually contrasting perceptions” (177) of part- and full-timers. She reveals complex interactions born of a political economy that exploits part-timers for economic and ideological reasons. Governments reduce funding; so part-timers become necessary. Part-timers teach frequently, thus suffering “degradation” not only of work circumstances but a “deskilling” reminiscent of the impact of industrialization on crafts workers. (237) Surely, the full-time academic ideology concludes, “real professors” would research and publish too!! Yet when part-timers research and publish (as is often the case) Rajagopal concludes that full-time academics are either unaware (social links are weak) or indifferent (that is not what they were hired to do). The circle is thus closed. Part-time status, for most, becomes self-reinforcing, either because it is what “Classics” do, or because “Contemporaries” have to “make a living.” To add further complexity, many part-timers report that they love their “calling” and would make the same “career” decisions again if given the chance. (169) Rajagopal’s dealing with these complex issues through statistically sophisticated analysis based on sound theory deserves applause.

Rajagopal is at her most forceful in emphasizing the especially dire situations faced by female part-time academics. An entire chapter on “Invisible Women” is supplemented by discussion of “feminization” throughout the book. The clear “voice” on women’s issues is welcome, but Rajagopal tends too often to quote other scholars in making her case. For instance, she quotes American researcher Shelley Park’s view that the academic “proletariat” is “disproportionately female.” Yet Rajagopal’s statistics for Canada show otherwise. (65, 68, 246) Obviously, international works should be consulted, but the border remains a real factor. Similar is useful but not identical. Overall, the book is replete with quotations; indeed, she closes the book with a rather unremarkable quote. (258)

Several other issues give one pause. Presentation is a particular concern. Rajagopal’s book is well organized; both the introduction and each chapter make her intentions quite clear. But her writing often shows the worst features of statistically-driven analysis. Was it really necessary to provide data within the text (in brackets) when the same material was presented in tables? Page 50, for instance, offers over two dozen bits of information in brackets, when the same data follow in tabular form! (51-53)

Secondly, at times it seems that the hard-won evidence just “must” be heard. The same testimony is heard severally (take the Quebec “freeway flier” quote repeated on page 145). And there is a sense of “déjà vu” as one works through the chapters — perhaps inevitably, one begins to anticipate the sections on “Classic” part timers, on “Contemporaries,” on the full-timer perspective and so on. All in all, one might wish that Rajagopal had
paid slightly greater heed to the maxim that evidence matters, but so does readability.

These issues of presentation should not diminish Rajagopal's work. She has made the "hidden academics" of Canada more visible; here, the anecdotal observations of part-timers gain academic confirmation. Will it matter? Rajagopal's work on the human costs of "better managed" academic institutions deserves wide readership among those interested in Canadian universities. Ironically, her book provides compelling clues that change is not likely in our academic "ivory towers." In the main, part-timers will stay well "hidden." But at least Rajagopal provides fascinating and abundant evidence that change should come.

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The 1990s were arguably the most significant period of change in Canadian labour market policy since the end of the World War II. Federalism, Democracy and Labour Market Policy in Canada represents an important initial evaluation of the scale and the significance of this change. As Tom McIntosh makes clear in his opening chapter, restructuring Canadian labour market policy is inherently complicated by the fact that it involves the disentangling of federal and provincial jurisdiction of the programs of unemployment benefit, income support, social assistance, training, and education. Indeed in training alone, in the early 1990s over 300 separate training programs were offered by different levels of government. However complicated, during the 1990s the major features of these changes included a move away from federal and provincial governments from passive income support towards more active labour market measures and a drastically reduced federal Employment Insurance (EI) program which occurred as provincial governments cut social assistance programs and redefined their eligibility criteria. Simultaneously, the 1990s witnessed a significant re-scaling of labour market governance as the federal government sought to offload many of its responsibilities to the provinces through a series of labour market development agreements (LMDA).

Federalism, Democracy and Labour Market Policy in Canada begins with chapters by McIntosh and Haddow that review the book's central arguments while detailing the broad political and institutional context of labour market policy in Canada. McIntosh argues that moves towards greater decentralization in labour market policy are not inherently neo-liberal, but rather must be seen as a redefining within federalism of how policy frameworks are developed and implemented among governments. Haddow argues that while employment issues are clearly important to Canadians, labour market policy has not registered significantly politically. Furthermore, despite some attempts in the 1990s to develop greater stakeholder representation and democratic input into labour market policy through the creation of labour force development boards federally and provincially, their nearly universal failure means that policy development remains the principal preserve of the political and bureaucratic executives of government with only business having significant influence on policy.

McIntosh and Boychuck provide a valuable review of the impacts of the disentangling of income support in Canada. Cuts in EI by the federal government occurred at the same time social assistance was restructured by the provinces. The recipients were increasingly composed of the long-term unemployed. Furthermore, as they stress, the redefining of EI and social assistance has combined with trends
in the labour market towards part-time and contingent employment and more dual-income households and led to an increasing proportion of the workforce being left without coverage by both EI and social-assistance systems. But while the authors explain how governance of income support has been disentangled in both policy framework and implementation terms, they present little information about the impacts of these changes on the increasing percentage of workers not covered by either EI or provincial social assistance.

Klassen’s chapter examines another feature of this disentanglement — the series of Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs) which occurred as the federal government sought to transfer its responsibilities for active labour market policies such as information provision, job training, and subsidized or created employment. These agreements coincided with a marked decentralization within Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) which cut the number of local offices while giving greater discretion to local officials and contracting out services to the private sector and non-profit groups. HRDC also moved from block funding to community colleges for EI recipients to direct grants and loans to individuals on EI to purchase training. The process, however, has been very uneven. Different provinces have come to different agreements with the federal government ranging from full transfer of responsibilities in the cases of Quebec, Alberta, and New Brunswick to co-management and strategic partnerships in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. However, no agreement has yet been negotiated with Ontario since there continue to be significant disagreements between the province and Ottawa over the amount of funds to be transferred. Furthermore, as Klassen emphasizes, while LMDAs have been justified on the basis of increased accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness, there are risks that such moves may not accomplish these goals.

Thus the promise of cost savings and increased sensitivity to local labour market needs may prove hollow, with equity compromised by “creaming” as training is focused on the most trainable, and equality and labour mobility among different provinces and regions declines. Relatedly, while LMDAs may reduce federal-provincial conflict, a lack of nation-wide agreement on training standards may lead to declines in the portability of skills.

While the dominant narrative of the 1990s was a withdrawal of the federal government from direct involvement in training delivery, McBride and Stoyko’s chapter on youth and the social union makes clear that this remains one area in which the federal government has retained the initiative and is remaining active. Indeed, they argue that while the 1999 Social Union Framework ostensibly sets out rules for federal-provincial information-sharing and a commitment to a co-operative federalism, there are some who view the federal government as using the vagueness of the agreement to expand their role in the youth field. This is in part due to the fact that, unlike shared-cost programs, youth initiatives give the federal government a high visibility. They also allay concerns within the government that radical cuts in social transfers by the Liberals have undermined the prospects of younger workers that are evident from the latter’s much higher than average unemployment. This being said, like other chapters in Federalism, Democracy and Labour Market Policy in Canada, McBride and Stoyko’s contribution sees current trends as leading away from unilateralism towards a more sophisticated regime of intergovernmental collaboration.

Federalism, Democracy and Labour Market Policy in Canada then offers an important overview to the shifting of federal-provincial governance structures of labour markets. Especially useful is the chapter by McIntosh and Boychuk who document in detail the extent to which Ca-
nadian workers are increasingly being left exposed to the vagaries of the labour market as EI and social assistance are rolled back. However, the book has some shortcomings. It is largely descriptive and while McIntosh makes some allusion to a shift from Fordism to post-Fordism there is little reference to broader theoretical perspectives as to what is driving the restructuring of labour market policy governance in Canada. More importantly, I would disagree with McIntosh that the decentralization of labour market policy in Canada is just a complex redefining of federal responsibilities, rather than one that is neo-liberal in character and crisis-driven. As Jane Jensen wrote over a decade ago, class politics and neo-liberalism in Canada have often been expressed in the form of redistributive conflicts within federalism. Thus, much of what many of the authors in this contribution view as governance disentangling is also consistent with many aspects of neo-liberalism or what Jamie Peck has termed a “centrally orchestrated erosion of the work-welfare regime from below.” For example, LMDAs are less a rational re-ordering of governance responsibilities than an instrument of the federal government’s desire to reduce its deficit. They can be associated with significant cuts in funds transferred to the provinces. Furthermore the rhetoric and the policies of both federal and provincial governments has encouraged both labour market flexibility and the individualization of employability. Finally, the impact of workfare programs, which is not addressed in great detail in this volume, is not simply about redefining eligibility criteria for those on social assistance, but about reducing the marginal wages of workers in the lower echelons of the labour market.

To their credit many of the authors in this volume realize the contradictions of policy disentanglement. Thus Klassen and others point out the dangers that EI and social assistance cuts, largely conceived during the employment recovery of the mid- to late 1990s, will mean that increasing numbers of workers will be unprotected in the next economic downturn. Seen in this light, the disentanglement process during the 1990s may be less a rational re-ordering of federal-provincial responsibilities than setting the context for the next crisis.

Tod D. Rutherford
Syracuse University


OVER THE PAST twenty years, governments of every political stripe have pursued neoliberal policies that cumulatively have transformed Canadian society. In that time we have seen the deregulation of airlines, trucking, and financial services; drastic reductions in spending for social programs, health care, and public education; an undermining of the country’s Unemployment Insurance system; a weakening of Old Age Pensions and child benefit programs; reduction in the minimum wage; privatization of public services; sharp reductions in public sector employment; and relentless attempts to enable the corporate sector to take over the country’s public health care system. This comprehensive domestic program has been complemented by the promotion of international trade agreements whose purpose is to enshrine capitalist priorities and to ensure that governments whose policies conflict with those priorities face the threat of international trade sanctions.

Aside from those working in and studying telecommunications, few people noticed when corporate forces began to promote radical changes to the system of regulated telephone monopolies that prevailed across North America 30 years ago. This model, created at the turn of the 20th century, arose in response to wide-
spread abuses of phone companies' unregulated monopoly power, which was being exercised in a manner that left entire groups of customers without service and which subjected those provided with service to widespread price gouging. In a few instances — notably in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba — government-owned phone companies were established in response to these corporate abuses. But the approach that was applied most widely involved compromise with corporate power. This model of regulation, which was introduced across North America, entailed a trade-off that granted legal protection to privately-owned telephone companies' monopoly status in exchange for their acceptance of the requirement that they provide service to all customers within their operating areas at reasonable (i.e. socially regulated) prices.

Rideout explains that the heart of this social model lay in the system's series of internal subsidies. Under the regulated scheme, regulators allowed monopoly phone companies to charge premium prices for their long-distance service, which was until recently used primarily by corporations and wealthy individuals. In exchange, the monopolies were required to use a significant portion of the revenues generated by their premium-priced service to provide local service at affordable rates throughout their operating areas.

Corporate users were never happy with this arrangement, which effectively required them to pay for the provision of phone service on a universal, affordable basis. But for decades they had no realistic alternatives. By the 1960s, however, the advent of new technologies offered corporate users the possibility of escaping from the socially regulated model in pursuit of a system that offered them lower long-distance rates and that would be shaped to their needs rather than those of the general public. To this end, corporate communications users in the US formed enormously powerful lobbying groups that focused their efforts on undermining the system of social regulation by supporting the introduction of competition in long-distance phone service.

Continentalizing Canadian Telecommunications provides an invaluable history of corporate efforts in both the US and Canada to undermine social regulation and to substitute an approach that prioritizes meeting corporate communications needs. This history is important in its own right. But given what has transpired over the past twenty years as the neoliberal tidal wave has washed across North America and the rest of the world, the fact that the corporate-driven attempt to transform society was first applied in this sector imbues its history with special importance.

Much of this has been chronicled elsewhere. But Rideout's unique contribution lies in her decision to focus on the popular response to corporate efforts to undermine social regulation of communications and to put a corporate-dominated model in its place. She explains how popular forces in the US, including unions and consumer organizations, greeted the prospect of long-distance competition with open arms because they believed it would lead to a reduction in prices and constrain the power of companies like AT&T. What these activists did not realize is that as the system of social regulation was destroyed, they would lose the leverage they enjoyed over the industry.

When competition was introduced in long-distance service, prices for that service did, in fact, decline. At the same time, however, the price of local service, which had been kept low thanks to subsidies from socially regulated, premium-priced long-distance service, skyrocketed. In addition, once competition and deregulation took hold, monopolies allowed the quality of their local service, which had been closely monitored under the socially-regulated system, to deteriorate. And once these companies no longer needed the same number of people to maintain a high standard of service quality, American phone companies issued
pink slips to tens of thousands of phone workers. In short, the experiment with the introduction of deregulation and long-distance competition proved to be a corporate dream and a social nightmare.

The final section of Rideout's work focuses on the different response that Canadian unions and consumers' organizations took when the issue of competition and deregulation arose in this country. Benefiting from the American experience, these groups made common cause with Canada's provincially-owned phone companies to oppose the introduction of deregulation and competition when the CNCP company applied for permission to compete in the provision of long-distance service in this country in 1984. The combination of strong cooperation among the social groups opposing the CNCP application and the relatively weak corporate effort on behalf of CNCP — an effort that was much less elaborate than the effort on behalf of competition and deregulation that had been mounted in the States — resulted in a denial of CNCP's application by the CRTC in 1985.

Unfortunately, the story's ultimate ending is not a happy one. Learning from their mistakes, the corporate sector mounted a second effort to introduce telephone competition and deregulation in Canada that was much more serious and sophisticated than the first. By forming corporate users into pro-competitive coalitions, lobbying the government, advertising and promoting their position through corporate-funded think tanks while they applied sophisticated divide-and-rule tactics among the organizations that had formerly opposed competition and deregulation, the forces promoting the overhaul of Canadian telecommunications were ultimately successful.

We have been exposed to such an elaborate and extensive array of corporate-driven political and propaganda campaigns that it is easy to forget how things used to be and how we have arrived at the current conjuncture. Vanda Rideout provides readers with a comprehensive history of the corporate-driven transformation of the country's phone system as well as the extensive popular efforts that were made to resist it. In the process she offers readers invaluable insights into the corporate strategy that was applied early on to communications and later in other sectors to create the business-dominated arrangements that dominate society today. Social activists interested in reclaiming the world from these forces would do well to familiarize themselves with Continentalizing Canadian Telecommunications: The Politics of Regulatory Reform.

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Telecommunications Workers Union
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Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press 2002)

THIS IS A MAJOR WORK in Canadian history, already acknowledged by its having won the Canadian Historical Association's 2003 Macdonald Prize. The book documents the creation of Indian reserves in the province of British Columbia through various phases from 1852 to 1938, arguing that the lines demarcating "Native space" are the "primal lines" upon which modern British Columbia is based. Although focused on "space" and boundaries, the book deftly links space and labour and so is of importance to the study of labour and Canadian history, generally.

Harris is an exceptional writer and reader. In his last book, The Re-Settlement of British Columbia, he brought an international literature on power and colonialism to bear on Canadian history. Making Native Space is informed by that same post-modern literature but takes a step back, wanting "not to get too fancy with colonialism." Here, he
prefers to see how historical events were inscribed onto maps, then onto the landscape which now determines the "haves and have-nots" of British Columbia society. Over 50 maps in the book by cartographer Eric Leinberger leave little doubt about the residual nature of the one third of one percent of British Columbia that is now "Native space."

Labour, it turns out, was central to the shrinkage of Native space. Canada is founded, Harris says, on "the displacement of a people from their land and its re-possession by others." (xxiv) This blunt inequality has been papered over, not only to justify it, but to make it seem a positive virtue. The justification drew on notions of ownership provided by the great political economist John Locke. Locke argued that property can only be owned when it is removed, through the investment of labour, "out of a state that nature hath provided."

It is through the ideas of Locke and Swiss jurist Émeric de Vattel that space and work become linked. Aboriginal people did labour, but, in European eyes, they did not invest it appropriately. Hunting and fishing, even slash-and-burn agriculture, did not improve nature, rationalized the agrarian Europeans. As de Vattel argued: "Those who still pursue this idle mode of life [hunting and gathering] ... [have] no reason to complain if other nations ... come and take possession of a part of those lands." Displacement was actually good for Aboriginal people, in a Lockean view, because it introduced them to private property and commerce, to Christianity and law; their losses would be more than compensated by the enhanced value of their labour and any remnants of their land they laboured on.

Harris lays out the debates that swirled around the displacement of indigenous peoples in the 18th and 19th centuries but emphasizes that philosophy was less the cause and more the rationale. The displacement of Native people had more to do with a potent settler land-hunger which overwhelmed the weak paternalistic re-
Commission), the colonial sources that the book is largely based on do not accord it much prominence. Harris is led to conclude Aboriginal resistance had little effect. Perhaps, but this bears more exploration.

Recent studies on manifestations of colonialism have emphasized the dialogic nature of the process, that it was not one-sided. Scholars of missionary proselytization like John and Jean Comaroff and Michael Harkin point to the interactive aspect of colonialism. With respect to a dialogue around land, understanding Aboriginal notions of space and ownership seems critical to understanding the unfolding encounters of Aboriginal people and Europeans.

Pre-European boundaries between Aboriginal people, cultures, and resources determined the distribution of Aboriginal people in British Columbia, their wealth, and their willingness to engage the newcomers. The book documents the etching of the primal lines of colonialism, but there are earlier boundaries that underlay the reserve system. These are the real primal boundaries. Aboriginal people in British Columbia were not amalgamated in reserves far from their homelands as in the United States, they were not confined by the pass system as they were in the Prairies, and they were not dissuaded by laws banning their ceremonies, including those that transferred property. The history of colonialism is lopsided if we focus on the colonial archive and the role of Europeans. Aboriginal engagement and resistance with colonialism account for what survives as “Native space.” Colonization has superimposed others on former Native spaces. But when modern treaties get signed or Aboriginal rights become more clearly delineated, it will be along, at least in part, the primal boundaries established by Aboriginal peoples.

As a result of the focus, what Harris’ notion of Native space does not capture is the mobility through space that has been so much a part of the pre-contact and then work-force experience of Aboriginal people. Aboriginal movement on and off the reserve, their use of Crown land, important especially in the sparsely settled north, Native space in urban areas and work sites, like canneries or hop fields, all lie outside its focus. Yet, these have always represented an important aspect of Native space up to today when half the registered Indians in Canada do not live on reserves.

Although the notion of Native space is rather circumscribed, as a study of the colonial side of the creation of the reserve system, the book is superb. It deserves to be read by historians and Canadians interested in the history and resolution of Aboriginal claims to just treatment. Harris dedicates his book to an uneasy colonist, Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, who in 1860 pushed Native people off their land at cannon point to build a sawmill, but who, by 1880, was one of the province’s few defenders of Aboriginal rights. There is an obvious reflection of the conflicted colonist in Harris, whose family homesteaded Native space in the Kootenays. A self-acknowledged beneficiary (with all non-Aboriginal Canadians) of the appropriation of Aboriginal space and rights, he concludes with an extended chapter dealing with contemporary Aboriginal land issues. Here he proposes “a politics of difference” which acknowledges that settler society is here to stay but includes, on moral and practical grounds, a redistribution of land and wealth to Aboriginal people. After reading this carefully documented book, most non-Aboriginal Canadians will join the Sproats and Harrises in the ranks of uneasy colonists.

John Lutz
University of Victoria

THIS BOOK is a welcome addition to the handful of academic studies of contemporary municipal politics in Canada. Its focus is on the major party of the Left in the City of Vancouver. That party, called the Coalition [originally the Committee] of Progressive Electors (COPE), has been an important force in Vancouver politics since it was formed in 1968. It shared power in a centre-left coalition on the municipal council in 1982-86 and controlled the School Board in 1980-82 and 1984-86 (although the provincial government dismissed the Board and put it under trusteeship mid-way through the latter term). After more than a decade and a half in opposition, COPE came back to power in November 2002, winning control of the School Board, the Parks Board, and the municipal council. Larry Campbell — the model for feisty coroner, Da Vinci, on Da Vinci’s Inquest on CBC — became mayor, and as such is now the most prominent “progressive” politician in the province of British Columbia.

The fact that there is any sort of party in control of its municipal council makes Vancouver unusual. The city has had a party system of sorts since the late 1930s, although there have been long periods in which the right-wing NPA (Non-Partisan Association) has been overwhelmingly predominant. Vogel’s book focuses on a period of great hope and massive disappointment for the Left in Vancouver. In 1990, Jim Green of the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA) ran for mayor under the COPE banner and gave the incumbent, Gordon Campbell, a close race. COPE took half the seats on Council, and hoped to build on that strength in the next election. The following year, the NDP took control provincially under Mike Harcourt, who, although never part of COPE, had worked closely with it as Mayor of Vancouver in the early 1980s. Unfortunately for COPE, the NDP provincial government lost popularity very quickly, and COPE itself suffered disastrous defeats in the 1993 and 1996 municipal elections (it only slightly recovered in 1999). Vogel began her research in 1992, when COPE was trying to open itself up to the new social movements in hopes of establishing a wider and more effective coalition. She brought her study to an end after the new-style COPE suffered its second great defeat in 1996.

There is a brief postscript to the book that deals with COPE’s stunning and in many ways surprising success in the 2002 elections. The reader who wants to understand how COPE re-built itself after it reached its nadir in 1996 will not find an answer here. The focus is very much on the political issues and experiences of the 1980s and early 1990s. Vogel sees that the challenge COPE faced in that period was much the same as the one that other orthodox, labour-based parties of the Left had faced. The new social movements demanded a new politics, but it was not clear how that new politics could be accommodated without abandoning the core concerns (and the core constituency) of the old socialist movement. Vogel does a good job of summarizing the differences between a Marxist or labourist perspective on the one hand and new social movement theory on the other. Her prose is clean and clear, which is not often the case in discussions of this kind. She sets out her own, neo-Gramscian position as an alternative, and brings that perspective to bear in analyzing similar cases elsewhere (Eurosocialism, American civic radicalism, the Montréal Citizens’ Movement), as well as the case that particularly concerns her. She offers a good brief summary of the political history of Vancouver, and connects her story to the changing economy and demography of the city. There is much that is useful here, especially for those who are relatively unfamiliar with Vancouver or with debates on the Left after the 1960s.
That said, the empirical core of the book is in its study of the internal politics of COPE in the 1992-97 period. Again, there is much that is of interest, but the account is surprisingly brief and thin, given that Vogel did so much primary research (archival study, interviews, and direct observation). The main struggle was between those who wanted to keep COPE true to its organizational and ideological principles and those who wanted to open it up to a broader range of progressive social forces. The people in the second group got their way, but there was no electoral or organizational pay-off in the short term. Vogel interprets this failure in neo-Gramscian terms, but there is not enough detail in her account to make this interpretation convincing. The larger question to which her story relates is the connection between parties of the Left and the new social movements (environmentalism, feminism, multiculturalism, Native rights, gay and lesbian rights, etc.), but Vogel tells almost nothing about the organization and activity of social movements in Vancouver. She says almost nothing about the substantive issues that people were discussing at the time. She scarcely says anything about the NDP, even though the NDP were in power (with a predominantly Vancouver leadership) throughout that period. The federal NDP caucus gets even less attention. It is as if COPE were a huge, powerful organization that dominated politics on the Left, rather than a weak municipal party struggling for survival. Vogel recognizes that weakness implicitly, but she seems not to see that her neo-Gramscian approach demands a much wider analytical frame than she offers us.

One curious feature of the book is that it fails to recognize how extraordinary it was that the Communist Party of Canada had played such a “key role in COPE from its inception in 1968 until the early 1990s.” (81) Vogel notes the deleterious effects of the split in (and ultimate collapse of) the CPC in 1989-92. “In a real sense, the end of the CP created a vacuum within COPE that has never been adequately filled.” (82) Indeed, but what a thing it was that this relatively mainstream political party relied so heavily on Communist organizing — not in the 1930s and 1940s, but in the 1970s and 1980s. The organizers were relatively orthodox Communists, not Maoists. How did they do it, when their comrades elsewhere were so obviously failing? Vogel gives us no insight, because she treats the Communist role as an unremarkable fact about COPE. It was an open secret in Vancouver that the Communists were a major force within COPE, and yet this had much less effect on the party’s electoral appeal than one might have expected.

The other curious omission is any discussion of the role of local government. Municipalities do not have the same constitutional status as provinces. Their legislative powers are limited, their fiscal resources are meager, and they are extremely vulnerable to the policy decisions of the senior governments. In Vancouver’s case, the city proper includes less than a quarter of the population of the metropolitan area. Many of the key local services are under direct provincial control. The challenges faced by a progressive municipal government — be it the Harcourt-led council of the early 1980s or the one controlled by Larry Campbell and COPE now — are qualitatively different from the ones that a provincial or federal government faces. The COPE activists were aware of this, but Vogel gives us little sense of where that awareness led.

A neo-Gramscian perspective leads to the recognition that politics is ultimately a struggle for hegemony. Municipal politics can only be one element in such a struggle, but it is nonetheless an important element. Vogel is right to see that the success or failure of COPE is a crucial part of the story of the Canadian Left. She might have written a big book on the subject: a book that viewed the wider politics of the Left in Vancouver through the prism of COPE and that related that wider politics to the politics of other communi-
ties. Such a book might have enabled some new thinking about political possibilities. The book she has actually written is smaller and less challenging. It frames the struggles within COPE in the same terms that were being used fifteen or twenty years ago. Up to a point that is fine, but it ought to be evident now that the frames we used then were more defective than we knew. Vogel's book poses two important challenges: to broaden and deepen the study of local politics, so that we begin to understand how and why people are mobilized politically; and, to rethink the simplistic nostrums of Left politics (not excluding the ones now associated with Gramsci's name).

Warren Magnusson
University of Victoria


WITH THIS VOLUME, Kathryn Carter addresses "the need for a Canadian collection of women's diaries." (ix) "The premise underlying this work is that the best history is biography and that reading the details from lives of individual women can do much to broaden and challenge our understanding of Canadian history." (6) The professional historian will demur that it does not necessarily follow that the best history is autobiography, in which category diaries, insofar as they are a construction of self, rightly belong. Yet Carter is moving beyond a narrow scholarly understanding of history, and "encouraged contributors ... to get away from the notion that the diary is of service mainly to social history," directing attention instead "to the ways in which and the conditions under which these texts are written." In their separate and distinctive ways, her contributors, whose background and expertise, ranging from English literature through history, women's studies, and educational studies to dramatic theory, reflect today's broad interdisciplinary interest in diaries, did just that.

In her introduction, Carter anticipates potential challenges, providing a thoughtful justification for all the reservations readers may have, yet without quite resolving the issues in which those reservations are grounded. To the purist who wonders at the inclusion of Dorothy Duncan MacLennan, wife of the redoubtable Hugh, a woman raised in the United States, who, in many ways, considered herself an "outsider," she responds that this is a "collection of excerpts from diaries written ... by twenty women who are Canadian or who wrote in what is currently called Canada." (4) "The selections are not meant to be equivalent to one another in any sense," but rather "represent some of the widely varying functions of diary writing and constitute an eclectic group designed to stimulate discussion." (9) Scholarly and general readers will appreciate the editor's decision to include "chunks of diaries," rather than edited excerpts. (8) Acknowledging the need, or perhaps anticipating the scholarly reader's desire, for an overarching or even an underlying theme, Carter resorts to "two fictions to structure this collection," first a narrative, "the story of an artist's [diarist's] growth to maturity." (10) Thus we move from "turbulent beginnings" through "conflict and confusion," "hesitation and pause," "exploration," "love, loss, and work," to "reflective endings." This might have worked effectively had the editor not resorted to the second fiction, a chronological implication organization, on the grounds that "diaries are in dialogue with history." (10) The inescapable implication that early diarists represent "turbulent beginnings" while present-day diarists represent "reflective endings" is not altogether satisfying.

Yet The Small Details of Life is a thoroughly enjoyable book, testimony that "the dense, rich fruit of the diary is the
seemingly minor details nestled among "big" events." (20) The diaries are made more accessible by the introductions; clearly, the contributors were in dialogue with their diaries. Perhaps for this very reason, the introductions are as eclectic and varied in their approaches as are the diaries. This does not mean that they are uneven, for they are all engaging and useful. Indeed, Carter deserves high praise for the quality of the editing, with each contribution a separate little gem. I found no errors of style and only one of substance: universities opened their doors to women in the 1870s, not in the 1860s, with Mount Allison leading the way in 1872. (15)

The approach is multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary despite a few specific points of meeting among the contributors. All attempted to provide a sense of the historical milieu in which the diary was written. Most also considered the extent to which their particular diary represented a construction of self. S. Leigh Matthews' introduction to the 1830 diary of Frances Ramsay Simpson succeeds in situating Simpson very effectively within the broader historical context, while also raising just enough issues about Simpson herself and the cultural and personal forces at work. More often, however, the balance is tenuous. The academic reader might have wished that the contributors had read each other's introductions, as it is only through cross-pollination that interdisciplinarity can reach full flower. Dialogue among contributors might have served to highlight consistencies or to resolve apparent contradictions. Robynne Rogers Healey, in her introduction to the diary of Sarah Welch Hill, offers the useful caution that "single diary excerpts should not be taken out of context and assumptions made about an entire life based on one or two entries," (57) a point reinforced by Edna Staebler's comments with reference to her own diaries. (454-56) The reader wonders whether this caution would apply equally to the Crease women, Susan Nagle, Constance Kerr Sissons, Caroline Alice Porter, or Mary Eidse Friesen, all of whom, like Hill and Staebler, kept diaries over long periods. On another level, as Carter points out, "the expectations and norms of a culture or community at a given historical moment will inflect diary content." (10-11) How then, to reconcile the striking contrast between the diaries of two women writing at the same historical moment, in 1901? Rosalind Kerr characterizes the diary of Constance Kerr Sissons as fairly typical of a period when women's journals were "expected to enhance the public reputation of the family of the writer." (186) Writing in the same year, Phoebe Mclnnes, unlike Sissons, fails "to censor scandalous family secrets." (186) Perhaps the explanation lies in class or community. Yet K. Jane Watt's introduction to the Mclnnes diary provides compelling evidence of women's new freedom and changing societal attitudes during an era that saw the advent of the bicycle and a concomitant change in women's fashions. That new freedom signalled increased opportunities for women, reflected in the growing number of career women after the turn of the century, a societal shift mirrored in the lives of the volume's later diarists: journalist Miriam Green Ellis, poet and book illustrator Dorothy Choate Herriman, novelist Marian Engel, and writer Edna Staebler.

This is truly a Canadian collection and, taken together, the diaries tell a uniquely Canadian story. The diarists represent a broad spectrum of Canadian society, ranging from the wealthy Mina Wylie to Elsie Rogstad Jones who came of age on a Depression-era Saskatchewan farm, from the well-known author Marian Engel to the otherwise invisible Mary Dulhanty preparing for life as a "working girl" in the 1920s. Above all, these women reflect the shifting Canadian demographic. Among the early diarists, only New Brunswick's seagoing Amelia Holder had long-established roots in her community. Sarah Welch Hill was one among many British gentlewomen of her
generation to settle in southern Ontario. In the far west, British Columbia was colonized, first by the British, represented here by the Nagles and the Creases, and then by central and eastern Canadians, such as the McInneses. On the Prairies, Caroline Alice Porter, whose diaries "give us an extraordinary glimpse of a prairie family," (242) was raised in Prince Edward Island. She and others like her helped "Canadianize" the American, Norwegian, and Mennonite settlers who came after, represented here by the Puckettes, the Rogstads, and the Friesens. As Kathryn Carter states in her introduction, "this is a book for anyone who has stood in a cemetery reading the brief epitaph of an unknown woman, wondering at the details: What pleasures did her body know? What losses did she survive? What was the rhythm of her day?" (4) It will, as Carter hoped, stimulate discussion.

Gail G. Campbell
University of New Brunswick

Roberta Hamilton, Setting the Agenda: Jean Royce and the Shaping of Queen's University (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002)

THIS EXCELLENT book fulfils the test of a good historical biography. It reveals important aspects of the subject's world; and it is constructed and written faithfully according to an archival base.

Roberta Hamilton inherited a rich and plentiful hoard of archives, both the written and spoken word, and as well, generated many more by her own search for the significance of her subject. Jean Royce in times gone by may have been considered an unlikely protagonist but Hamilton recognized in her life an opportunity to display important and novel insights about women, universities, Canadian society, and gender. Her introduction sets a scene which is both analytical and dramatic. The biography subsequently flows in a more or less chronological narrative.

The drama arises from the ending of Jean Royce's career as Registrar at Queen's University after over 30 years. In the early 1960s Jean Royce virtually embodied the university. Powerful and influential, she was almost universally admired. When in 1968 after her retirement she was awarded an honorary degree, in the company of other recipients including Pierre Elliott Trudeau, it was she who received the only standing ovation. The ceremony was a generous and apparently fitting tribute to a woman who had come to symbolize one of Canada's great educational institutions. Yet in fact Royce had not retired voluntarily. She had been dismissed. Her friends discreetly kept this knowledge secret until 1992, ten years after her death. Roberta Hamilton delves behind the mystery. Why was Royce so important? Why was she fired? Why did she keep quiet about the circumstances of her departure from office?

While the author generates curiosity and tension from these rhetorical questions, she sets out other issues which enlighten readers about important social trends of 20th-century Canadian society: lifestyles of single women, changing patterns of academic life, women and the professions, social mobility, feminism between the times of suffrage and the women's liberation movement, and a close look at the development of a good, "sometimes very good," Canadian university. The biography bears out the author's confidence that Jean Royce's life reveals important and tantalizing glimpses of areas which have only recently become part of historical enquiry.

Jean Royce spent her youth in St. Thomas, Ontario, born in 1904 to David Royce, a cooper at the local flour mill, and his wife Katherine, a housewife. Jean's sister Marion was the "star sibling," good at exams and editor of the high school magazine, who won a scholarship to McMaster University. Jean's grades were not good enough for a university scholarship. So she trained to be a librarian and worked for a while before registering as a
full-time student at Queen’s, supporting herself financially, at the age of 23. During summers she worked in the university library and then got a job in the Registrar’s Office. After graduation Royce eventually worked as an assistant to Registrar Alice King and after her death was appointed to the position.

The position was pivotal for both students and administrators. Royce was responsible for admissions and student awards and generally oversaw the progress of students through their academic careers, counselling thousands of students in personal meetings. At the same time her office was “the centre of academic housekeeping” and smoothed the way for countless academic committees and administrators. In the words of Hamilton’s title, Royce “set the agenda” and seems to have been quite omnipotent in the Queen’s administration until the appointment in 1961 of Dr. J.A. Corry as Principal. This was a time of huge expansion and restructuring in universities across North America, and the new principal wanted fresh staff to direct these new developments. In 1964 he tried to get Royce to leave but she soldiered on. Eventually in 1968 the Principal dismissed the Registrar. The pill was sweetened by discretion, the awarding of an honorary degree, and Royce’s appointment to the Board of Trustees.

Nevertheless the experience was personally devastating for Royce who suffered illness and depression. Eventually she bounced back: her identity was not completely dependent on paid work. Throughout her life she had a full life away from the office, and her resources of character enabled her to overcome the shock and disappointment of her final days on the job.

Travel was a regular enjoyment. She first applied for a passport in 1933 and practically every summer after World War II travelled to Europe, both alone and with friends. She went to cities in the United States and liked to visit art galleries and the theatre, often writing accounts of her experiences for her book club back in Kingston. She was a staunch member of the International Federation of University Women and would organize trips to coincide with their triennial meetings.

Remaining single, she did not lack friends, both male and female. One of the most interesting domestic details documented by Hamilton is Royce’s regular dining arrangements. For many years she lived in an apartment in a house on the Queen’s campus and every evening she dined with a couple of friends, the meal cooked by May Macdonnell, Professor of Classics. Setting the Agenda provides a fascinating insight into the way a single woman could forge convenient and satisfying support systems.

This is an important and appealing study and my only regret is that Hamilton was reticent about how she became involved. A biographical project began in 1991 when five women decided to record Royce’s achievements at Queen’s. Hamilton later inherited this incipient record, which was augmented by responses to appeals for information, interviews and conversations, and intensive archival research. Hamilton also mined an oral history project undertaken by the Dean of Women in the 1970s, “Hidden Voices: The Life Experiences of Women Who Have Worked and Studied at Queen’s University,” which included half a dozen interviews with Royce herself. Hamilton duly acknowledges the help from hundreds of people but does not explain what it was that drew a professional sociologist to this lifestory. “Engaged, sometimes obsessed, for several years,” Hamilton in her book now allows a multitude of readers to become acquainted with Jean Royce’s achievements and her deep and rewarding personality.

Mary Kinnear
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STEPHEN CLARKSON’s *Uncle Sam and Us* is, without a doubt, an important contribution to Canadian political economy. Proceeding with theoretical sophistication and impressive empirical detail, Clarkson aims to clarify how, and to what extent, external forces associated with globalization and transnational integration have affected the Canadian state. Examining both the structural changes that have transformed the political framework of the Canadian state and the paradigm shift from postwar Keynesianism to neoconservative governance, Clarkson provides a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the often greater causal importance of the choices and policy decisions made by domestic political actors during the period when economic globalization was accelerating.

*Uncle Sam and Us* confronts simplistic versions of the now popular “globalization thesis” by rejecting the suggestion that the demise of Keynesian welfarism and the transformation of advanced capitalist states was the inevitable consequence of external forces associated with economic globalization. Clarkson reveals just how important domestic political and ideological choices have been to the transformation of the Canadian state over the past two decades. External causation is not denied. Indeed, Clarkson contends that institutions of continental and global governance, such as NAFTA and the WTO, now serve as a “supraconstitution” that is at the very heart of structural changes to the Canadian state’s political framework. All the same, the book’s principal message is that the functional changes associated with the neoconservative turn in state policies and governing practices are best explained endogenously, with reference to the decisions of domestic political actors.

Stephen Clarkson is a well-known University of Toronto political economist with a history of political commitment to Canadian nationalism and the motivating ideals of Just Society liberalism and social democracy. While he forsakes nostalgia for the Keynesian welfare state (KWS) and claims to reject the notion that there are certain roles the state “should” play, he is explicit about using the KWS as the standard by which he measures and assesses the neoconservative turn. Indeed, the numerous personal anecdotes offered in *Uncle Sam and Us* suggest that it is precisely Clarkson’s nostalgia that has led him to ask whether Canada is losing control of its destiny in the face of globalization. Clarkson is troubled by the extent to which the Chrétien Liberals embraced neoconservative policy prescriptions. As such, the real purpose of his effort to understand recent history lies in his desire for a better future. By clarifying the relative importance of the external versus the domestic roots of the neoconservative state in Canada, Clarkson hopes to determine whether it is possible to save the Canada that he and others were committed to building during the heyday of the KWS. If the neoconservative paradigm shift was domestically determined and the social achievements and sense of national identity associated with Canada’s KWS have not been completely eviscerated, then domestic politics really do matter and there is hope for a progressive response to globalization.

Few treatments of the rise of the neoconservative state in Canada are anywhere near as comprehensive as *Uncle Sam and Us*. With no fewer than twenty discrete chapters, the range of political and policy changes that Clarkson ably analyzes is quite impressive. The first section of the book explores several dimensions of recent structural changes to the political framework of the Canadian state. In these chapters Clarkson weaves together an understanding of the emergence of institutions of continental and global governance with a longer-term his-
historical perspective on the Canadian-American relationship as a "constitutional order" and an understanding of how many recent changes in Canadian federalism — such as the Agreement on Internal Trade — constitute the domestic ingestion of globalizing principles. By examining the growing significance of global governance and its impact on the structure of the Canadian state, and then exploring the redistribution of federal, provincial, and municipal powers within the Canadian state, Clarkson builds a convincing case for embracing the notion of the state as a "five-tiered governing structure" in which the character and extent of state activity at the municipal, provincial, federal, continental, and global levels change over time in an interrelated manner. It is from this perspective that Clarkson understands recent structural changes to the Canadian state. While he discusses Canada's participation in the construction of the new forms of continental and global governance, Clarkson purposefully highlights the role of these institutions of global governance as "external" sources of structural change to the Canadian state.

Fully two-thirds of *Uncle Sam and Us* focuses on dissecting postwar developments in major areas of Canadian public policy. Concerned as he is with the rise of neoconservatism, Clarkson puts his energy into revealing, and then understanding, policy changes associated with the functional workings of the Canadian state. With the postwar KWS as his reference, he explores how the state in the Mulroney/Chrétien era fulfills functions that came to be expected of it in the Diefenbaker/Pearson/Trudeau era. The economic policies Clarkson examines include macroeconomic policies such as taxation and monetary policy, the regulation of sectors such as banking and telecommunications, trade and investment policy, and interventionism in the form of industrial policy. But he does not stop there. *Uncle Sam and Us* goes on to examine the neoconservative paradigm shift in social, labour, environment, cultural, and foreign policy. The general conclusion that flows from these detailed and insightful chapters is that it was the embrace of neoconservatism by Canadian politicians and bureaucrats that explains the substantial, and often parallel, policy changes that ushered in a dramatically altered approach to governance beginning in the early 1980s.

Clarkson's theoretical starting point is a Weberian notion of the sovereign territorial state. In keeping with the traditions of Canadian political economy, he notes that even before the current era of accelerated globalization, the broader "constitutional order" of the Canadian state was determined by our position in the international and continental political economy. Analytically, Clarkson embraces the significance of distinctions between structure and agency, as well as between the causal processes associated with large external forces and the decisions of domestic political actors. One of his overriding goals is to highlight the causal significance of the agency of domestic decision-makers. In doing so, he hopes to convince readers that a way forward toward a more progressive and democratic political order can be imagined and realized. By advancing this analysis he does a service. Clarkson reminds us that politics and the state do, indeed, matter, and the way we are governed is determined by agents that the public ultimately controls. This is a politically powerful and important message.

At times Clarkson's focus on determining the relative importance of globalization as an external force versus neoconservatism as a domestic force has the effect of overstating the extent of the distinction between external and internal causal forces. To argue in favour of emphasizing the ideological decisions associated with the rise of domestic neoconservatism is to ignore the "global character" of the neoconservative turn. Clarkson's own introductory discussion of the empirical realities of globalization draws attention to "global-
ism" as the justifying ideological corollary of globalization, and he often uses the phrase "neoconservative globalism." With this in mind, more could be made of the "relationship" between globalization and domestic neoconservatism. Neoconservative globalism is a globalized paradigm that can be understood as both a domestic and an external expression, depending on how we identify its ideational roots and social base. The Canadian political elite are increasingly influenced by globalized epistemic networks. Thus, even as we emphasize domestic political choices, the distinction between domestic and external is blurred. Even apparently domestic institutional changes, such as the increasing control of the Department of Finance over social policy during the 1980s, are a part of a global trend. It is for this reason that some observers identify Clarkson's neoconservative turn as the emergence of a "globalized state form."

*Uncle Sam and Us* is a compelling book with a message of some political importance. It is deeply analytical, impressively comprehensive, and highly readable. It deserves the attention of all those who wish to understand, or influence, the character of the Canadian state.

Steve Patten
University of Alberta


AFTER SEVERAL DECADES of lament from Canadian medical historians regarding the lack of an analytical history of Canadian hospital health care, David and Rosemary Gagan have produced a timely and well-argued survey of a major facet of this history: the rise and fall of the secular voluntarist hospital movement. They tell the tale of the transformation of the Canadian public general hospital, in which 19th-century medical charity was reshaped in the fires of scientific medicine and industrial efficiency. In the late 1880s, Canadian urban elites who were dismayed by the poor physical state of the underclass and inspired by philanthropic zeal created charitable institutions to nurse the indigent ill. As these institutions and their sponsoring cities grew in size and capability, however, so too did the aspirations of voluntarist hospital administrators and allopathic physicians.

Gagan and Gagan set the early 1920s as the point by which the medical welfare institution was transformed into a factory to mass-produce health care for all social classes. The charitable mandate, though muted, was still fulfilled, as patients were reconceived as customers whose fees produced enough profits to dispense a grudging, no-frills, "free" service to those who could not pay. Trustees collaborated with doctors to establish hospitals as the centre of the medical economy, using emotional marketing campaigns to attract customers to an expensive panoply of medical and nursing services and promising them "All the Comforts of Home Without the Errors of Love." (42) Along the way, doctors' grip on medical monopoly strengthened as they negotiated the near-exclusive right to use hospitals as their workshops and proving grounds.

In a surprisingly short time, however, in spite of the application of industrial-sector cost-saving measures, exploitation of apprentice nurse labour, and intensive lobbying to increase government funding, the skyrocketing costs of hospitalization overwhelmed the resources of "patients of moderate means," whose cash payments for private rooms and special extras constituted the backbone of hospital revenues. In the crucible of the Great Depression, when income from patients, philanthropists, and municipalities dried up, and newly indigent patients in desperate need filled admitting rooms, many public hospitals found themselves
struggling to stay afloat. This resulted, in the authors’ analysis, in a “failed vision” of accessible hospital care that met the needs of neither patients nor doctors until its rebirth through universal insurance initiatives beginning in the 1950s.

A key strength of the text is its usefulness in contextualizing current dilemmas regarding health care funding and distribution. What mission should health care institutions and medical knowledge serve in society? Who deserves to benefit from medical expertise and technology? Who should pay, and how much? (181) These dilemmas, the authors demonstrate, remained unresolved through the first half of the twentieth century, and were by no means put to rest by the advent of federal involvement in health care. What was determined between 1890 and 1950, as this book unequivocally shows, was the inadequacy of a health care system that relied primarily upon philanthropic largesse, miserly governmental contributions, and revenue extracted from the already-sick citizen. The cost of illness had to be distributed among the healthy in order to ensure accessibility to care, a realization that inspired many hospital authorities to lead the movement towards health insurance.

The historical evidence laid out by Gagan and Gagan also serves as a critical reminder of the tendency for orthodox medicine and North American society in general to invest heavily in short-term curative technology at the expense of “medico-social,” “alternative,” and preventive services that might more effectively address the determinants of health and quality of life. Hospital administrators, whose spreadsheets tallied average patient stays, per diem costs, and above all cures, envisioned the hospital’s role as “an efficient factory for the production of scientifically mitigated health for public consumption at a fair price commensurate with its value.” (11) They strove mightily to divest the community hospital of responsibility for all but financially healthy, acutely ill, and quickly curable patients. Doctors, who had little to gain financially or professionally by the practice of social medicine or the treatment of incurables and indigents, likewise sought to establish the hospital as a site for quick, lucrative, and increasingly specialized procedures. The aged, the insane, and the chronically ill, who were found disproportionately among the indigent, were persona non grata at the “temple of science,” especially by the 1930s. (60) In the political economy of health care in the interwar period, the modernized hospital was reserved first for persons whose illness represented an immediate and reversible productive loss to society, or a potential profit to health care providers; those deemed beyond the reach of immediate medical intervention were shunted to under-funded custodial or convalescent care, where such existed.

Gagan and Gagan approach their “social history” with the assertion that “the social realities of the modern hospital became a microcosm of the social structures, processes, and conditions of everyday life.” (7) In the service of this institution-as-mirror perspective, they outline the roles and relationships of philanthropists, administrators, physicians, nurses, and patients, theorizing that social relations and divisions outside the hospital shaped relations within it. For example, as the authors explain, a highly-visible legacy of this period of Canadian hospital history was the multi-tiered approach to patient care, in which patients were spatially and administratively segregated according to their social class and sometimes race. Patients from the lowest social rungs could expect to experience similar disadvantages and discriminations inside the hospital as they did in their daily lives. But the hospital, a prestigious institution run by community elites and supported by local and provincial governments, did more than passively reflect outside social structures. Systems of segregation and regulation embedded in hospital architecture, management, and policy (at times subverted by individual health care pro-
providers), recreated the ideology of “less eligibility” in the realm of health care and reinforced the notion that social hierarchies were natural and just and fiscally necessary. If hospital authorities imagined their institutions as guardians of Canada’s physical and economic health, they also understood it as their public service duty to shore up the existing social order. Superior services available for a fee reassured paying patients that even in times of poor health their respectability and privilege would be upheld; unsavoury public wards, means tests, and “free” second-rate treatments reminded the indigent ill of their dependency and of the deference owed to their benevolent betters.

To summarize, Gagan and Gagan seem to theorize segregation in the hospital primarily as a conservative strategy to address the economic pressures caused by the necessity for treating indigent patients. It also needs to be identified as a manifestation of an ideology of class difference predicated upon the idea that the needs and wants and rights of individuals differed according to their social positioning. The significance of this assertion is amplified as we witness the erosion of our idealistic (yet always incomplete) universal access health system in Canada. The neo-liberal claim that the survival of universal access demands free market distribution of the best health care masks an ideology that measures human worth and deservedness in economic terms.

In a history in which the built environment and workplace culture figure so prominently, the absence of images in this book is disappointing. Hospitals in this era produced reams of self-promotional material, much of it in image form, commemorating or announcing various events or public rituals. These productions were part of the deliberate effort by hospital boards to justify the exalted place of their institutions in the community and nation, and to sell their products and services to individuals and governments. Moreover, the social divisions that the authors see reflected in hospital administrative practice appeared most strikingly in the floor plans and décor of buildings like the ornate Private Patients Pavilion at Toronto General, or at the Muskoka tuberculosis hospital with its private and public wards half a mile distant from each other. The lack of photographic material is to some extent offset by a set of statistical tables that well illustrate many of the authors’ points, and will be of considerable interest to researchers in the field of hospital history.

All told, For Patients of Moderate Means fills an oft-stated need for a critical survey of a key period in Canadian medical history, synthesizing a large number of smaller studies and older literature. Packed with detail, and drawing from a wide array of primary evidence, the text will undoubtedly prove useful to students of medical and social welfare history, and would serve well as an addition to public policy reading lists.

James M. Wishart
Queen’s University


PURSUING AN INTEREST in the utopian communities of North America’s West Coast, Justine Brown, who previously wrote on such experiments in British Columbia, explores the visionary aspects of southern California’s “movie colony” in this slim, deftly written book. Her story begins, however, a decade before the first motion pictures were made in Hollywood and a hundred miles further south, at Point Loma near San Diego, where in 1897 disciples of Theosophy set up Lomaland as a society in which to practice and espouse their spiritual doctrines.

Theosophy in fact shapes the narrative framework and principal themes of the book’s concern with Hollywood. This philosophical and religious movement was founded in 1875 by a Russian woman, Helena Petrovna Blavatsky, with
three key aims: to form a nucleus of the universal brotherhood of humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or colour; to promote the study of comparative religion, philosophy, and science; and to investigate the hidden mysteries of nature and the psychical powers latent in man (here I have slightly altered Brown’s terminology with wording from other sources). After Mme. Blavatsky’s death in 1891, leadership of the Theosophical society passed to a British woman, Annie Besant, among whose beliefs was that California held the potential to become a site for a new age of humanity, more healthy, enlightened, and fulfilled than what had come before. Lomaland was intended as a showcase for these potentialities.

After establishing this context, Brown shifts her attention northward to the west-lying suburb of Los Angeles that, at the turn of the 20th century, consisted largely of open agricultural fields dotted with a few residential bungalows. But pre-cinema Hollywood also had its Theosophical aspect, she notes, with its own small community of Annie Besant’s followers, called Krotona. In 1909 it also became the home of L. Frank Baum, author of *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* (1900), who was a Theosophist and, in the view of several critics, including Brown, espoused Theosophical principles in his many Oz books. In 1914 Baum established the Oz Film Manufacturing Company and supervised and wrote the scripts for three feature films based on his books produced in that year.

Krotona soon packed up and moved north and inland to Ojai, California, and Baum’s personal involvement in feature filmmaking encompassed only a single year. Yet a Theosophical thread winds through Brown’s further account of Hollywood’s rise to world dominance as a moviemaking capital. She contrasts her approach to that of a book that emphasizes, as she puts it, the “dark and uncanny” (28) side of Hollywood’s origins, Kenneth Anger’s *Hollywood Babylon*, which chronicles the sexual licentiousness and other amoral excesses that were unleashed in a raw community where beauty, youth, wealth, and unbridled freedom prevailed. Instead, she finds evidence of utopian optimism in Hollywood, of a positive desire to develop humanity’s possibilities to achieve a semblance of the divine. “The sun-soaked California dream and the exciting potential of the new medium of film were quickly intertwined and grafted together, soon becoming inextricable,” she writes. “What bears emphasis here is the degree to which certain film people became imbued with a sense of mission [her italics]; the prophecies related to California loaned their activities a certain glow of predestination.” (58-59)

Who were these missionaries, she goes on to ask, and to what degree did they influence Hollywood history? There are five figures on whom she primarily focuses. The first is D.W. Griffith, the pioneer film director whose epic film on the US civil war and Reconstruction period, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915), established motion pictures as a form for artistic expression and national myth in the United States. Next is Natacha Rambova, a self-made exotic (named Winifred Shaughnessy at birth in Salt Lake City) who married Rudolph Valentino, designed movie costumes and sets, and, according to Brown, played a role in defining Art Deco style. Then comes Sergei Eisenstein, the great Soviet director who visited Hollywood in the early sound era and became involved in an ultimately disastrous project to make a film in Mexico, financed by the California socialist Upton Sinclair. The fourth is William Randolph Hearst, the newspaper tycoon who built his own private Utopia, a repository for myriad art treasures of Europe that he collected, at San Simeon up the California coast. Last is Aldous Huxley, the British novelist, author of *Brave New World*, who became a Hollywood screenwriter and seeker of higher enlightenment through drugs and occult religions, a quest that in-
evitably brought him into contact with Theosophy.

From the perspective of an academic film historian, this is a quirky grouping, but never less than interesting and refreshing. In part they weave together through a series of connections to each other, and, as noted, to Theosophy. Eisenstein might seem out of place, for example, but he’s significant in part because of the fascination he developed for Mexican mystical religious practices and also because of Sinclair’s role in the tragic and senseless destruction of the Russian’s Mexican film. Sinclair becomes a figure of secondary interest as a maverick outsider who unexpectedly won the 1934 Democratic Party gubernatorial primary with his End Poverty in California (EPIC) program, which might be considered a political form of utopianism, and who was then crushed in the general election by, among other factors, the implacable opposition of the Hollywood establishment and Hearst’s newspapers. Hearst, besides inviting the Hollywood elite for sleepovers at San Simeon, was caricatured in Huxley’s satirical novel, *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan*. Huxley, so to speak squaring the circle, became friends with Jiddu Krishnamurti, who as a teenager in India was anointed by Annie Besant as a kind of messiah-figure for Theosophy, only later to renounce that role and settle in southern California.

Outside this chain of connections, Rambova’s importance derives from her practice of spiritualism and her role, along with the screenwriter June Mathis, in creating the Valentino myth. “Between them they invoked a thrillingly powerful god: Eros,” Brown writes. “Rudolph Valentino was unquestionably the most potent manifestation of Eros that Hollywood had ever produced. In fact, it may still be unrivalled.” (74)

I have left to the end the first of the author’s quintet, because her utilization of Griffith may be the most contestable part of her book. Griffith is central to her thesis because he promoted cinema—historically, of course, silent cinema. With its emphasis on visual communication rather than words—as a Universal Language that could break down barriers among peoples, promote harmony, unite the world in peace: goals Brown links to Theosophy’s ideal of universal human brotherhood. Many film historians would question the book’s upbeat treatment of this theme, or at least wish to see acknowledged what Miriam Hansen in her book *Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film* (Cambridge, MA 1991) describes as its “complicity with the most advanced forces of expansion and monopolization,” (186) that is, Hollywood’s successful drive to become, not part of universal brotherhood, but the overwhelmingly dominant power in world cinema that it is today. Justine Brown does not entirely ignore what she calls the “ugly and uninspired” (152) aspects of Hollywood, but her purpose is to remind readers that there are glimmers of utopian potential in its past, which may yet be made to shine again.

Robert Sklar
New York University


*ATODDS* is a groundbreaking study of the history of gambling regulation in Canada. Suzanne Morton sets out to explain changes in attitudes toward gambling between the end of World War I and the passage of the federal government’s Omnibus Bill in 1969, which permitted lotteries under certain conditions. During this period, gambling underwent a transformation from a moral vice to an acceptable activity regarded as necessary to fund the Canadian welfare state.

Morton explores the public debate about gambling in five provinces: Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia. While she is interested
in national history and tackling the "big picture," Morton is sensitive to provincial differences, particularly those of ethnicity and religion, and distinct provincial economies that affected attitudes towards gambling and hindered efforts by the federal government to amend the Criminal Code. She uses a wide variety of sources, mostly left by anti-gamblers, including those generated by governments, churches, public inquiries, and police commissions.

Part One examines the moral concerns about gambling expressed by its opponents during the first seventy years of the 20th century and considers the context of gambling activities between 1918 and 1945. Morton argues that there was a dissonance between law and behaviour and a widespread ambivalence towards gambling. A powerful segment of Anglo-Celtic Protestant middle-class policy-makers consistently opposed gambling, while at the same time private race tracks and gambling clubs for the rich and penny gambling among the working class were widespread. She suggests that uneven prosperity, the expansion of commercial leisure, the Depression, and World War II all fostered the development of environments that tolerated gambling. At times Morton's line of argument, that ambivalence rather than change characterized the Canadian view on gambling, limits the analysis. For instance, Morton notes briefly that Canada was static and ambivalent in its stance on gambling while other countries legalized gambling much earlier in the 20th century. This raises questions about the peculiarities of Canadians. Why were Canadians apparently conservative in their views on gambling, while other countries were more liberal and tolerant?

Part Two probes the ways in which gender, race, and religion structured the meaning of gambling in Canada. Morton probes the multiple constructions and responses to gambling and how competing social values were negotiated. A definition of masculine domestic respectability that emphasized a man's role as family breadwinner was enshrined in the Criminal Code of Canada and the masculine ideal espoused by the anti-gambling movement. Gambling, however, encouraged another competing form of masculinity, one associated with bachelor sporting culture and the qualities of courage, audacity, and risk-taking. Morton draws on the research of historians who have used urban space to illuminate how heterosexual women and gay men forged gender identities. She explains how semi-public male spaces associated with gambling were used to reinforce heterosexual male privilege in Montréal. The city was selected for an in-depth case study because of its association with the evolution of male sporting culture in Canadian historical writing. Privileged men traversed Montréal's urban space without boundaries, while gambling among the working class was closely policed and targeted in the rhetoric of the anti-gambling movement.

Bingo, with its largely female working-class clientele, was an exception to the male environments associated with most forms of gambling. The anti-gambling movement saw bingo as a threat to women's responsibilities as wives and mothers and consumers. Morton argues convincingly that for many married working-class women, bingo held out the potential of consumer durables such as vacuum cleaners, which for many were unaffordable. With the expansion of the welfare state in the 1960s the anti-bingo discourse shifted from working-class women who were married with children to welfare mothers and seniors.

Morton further explores the role of ethnicity and religion in shaping opponents' understanding of gambling through case studies of Americans, Jewish Montreal, Chinese Canadians, and the role of religion in Catholic and Protestant attitudes to gambling. Previous to the emergence of commercialized gambling and American organized crime in the
1940s, the gambling problem in Canada was associated with the Chinese community, composed largely of single men. In one of the case studies, she illustrates how the association of Montréal's Eastern European Jews with bookmaking could at times fuel French-Canadian anti-Semitism. Morton also contributes to the historical writing on the political tensions between Catholic Quebec and the rest of Canada. One of the strengths of the analysis is the attention Morton gives to differences among Catholics in their views on gambling. The Catholic Church, she argues, was not unanimously in favour of bingo and other games of chance. Nevertheless charitable gambling took place at the local level despite the disapproval of Church officials. After World War II attacks on charitable bingo became a way for Anglo-Protestants to express both anti-Catholic and anti-Quebec sentiments.

Part Three of the book focuses on the post-World War II period and the move to amend the Criminal Code by linking gambling with both the welfare state and charitable fundraising. Morton argues that during this period the definition of the problem of commercial gambling underwent a change. Critics were less likely to worry about the moral consequences of gambling and instead concentrated on its impact on civic society. Morton’s analysis of the gambling probes of the 1950s illustrates that by transforming the gambling problem to one associated with professional criminals, critics recast the public debate, and a distinction between criminal gambling and charitable gambling emerged. The connection between gambling and charitable fund-raising made possible the legalization of gambling in Canada in 1969. Morton is sensitive to the other issues that factored into post-war changes in views of gambling, although creation of the “compulsive gambler,” and the adoption of the rhetoric of gambling as a medical problem by the anti-gambling lobby is discussed only briefly. The ascendancy of the belief that
have fundamentally shaped both. In an account focused on the period 1870 to 1930, this book offers both theory and narrative, as well as a serious challenge to the East Coast, black/white bias in scholarship on US race relations. This is an important book that deserves widespread attention. *Unequal Freedom* balances a sociologist's attention to structure and theory with an historian's interest in thick description. In her opening chapter, Glenn proposes an “integrated framework” for analyzing gender and race. One cannot be understood without the other, she argues. Moreover, categories of race and gender — including blackness and whiteness, maleness and femaleness, Mexicanness and Angloness — are interdependent. One half of each pair cannot be understood without reference to the other. Moreover, the meanings of such terms are constantly being remade. An accurate study of power relations and difference in United States history therefore requires an approach that looks at real relationships among people, as they happened in particular places and times.

Glenn next provides a useful synthesis of recent scholarship on citizenship and labour in two narrative chapters. Her overall argument is that “the concepts of liberal citizenship and free labor developed and evolved in tandem and in response to political, economic, and social transformations over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”

(2) Her discussion of citizenship emphasizes the contradictory history of American universalism, implied in the idea that “all men are created equal,” and exclusion, as manifested in the decidedly unequal treatment of women, poor people, and people of non-European origin. A linked chapter on labour traces the intertwined histories of “freedom and coercion” in US history, emphasizing that the ideology of “free labour” often masked a reliance on the labour of people whose choices were so severely circumscribed as to make them only nominally free.

Having laid this conceptual groundwork, Glenn offers detailed case studies of the dynamics of citizenship and labour from 1870 to 1930 in three primarily agricultural regions: the South, the Southwest, and Hawaii. The South, where whites subjected African Americans to increasingly systematic regimes of sharecropping and racial segregation, was the most rigidly structured of these three societies. Mexicans in the Southwest, like African Americans, were technically recognized as citizens by the federal government. But Mexicans’ racial status was more ambiguous: in some contexts, some people of Mexican origin were understood to be “white” and therefore entitled to more rights and respect than were people of colour. Hawaii, with its minuscule middle class, was the most dramatically stratified of the three regions. In her analysis of Hawaii, Glenn focuses on relations between Japanese immigrants and white elites (haoles). She shows that the second generation of Japanese residents (Nisei) — born in the US and therefore citizens — were critical in claiming new rights that allowed many to escape an exploitative plantation labour system. The many differences among these regions notwithstanding, Glenn shows that in all three cases white elites used their power in political and economic life to build (often through coercion) large, non-white labour forces to do the grueling work of producing wealth.

To her credit, Glenn looks at racial ideologies as well as material circumstances. Across regions, she shows, elites mobilized ideas about racial difference to serve their own ends. They found ways of justifying the denial of basic rights by arguing that non-white men were — variously — uncivilized, lazy, dirty, or weak, while non-white women were exotic, loose, insensate, or incompetent. Such ideologies helped elites to reconcile the universalistic promises of American citizenship with the exclusionary practices of American capitalism.
Unequal Freedom is more than a story of raw exploitation, however. As Glenn demonstrates, Mexicans, African Americans, and the Japanese resisted oppression both directly and indirectly. They migrated away from repressive conditions, committed violence against employers or overseers, formed labour organizations, and went on strike. They also took steps to strengthen their own communities by, among other things, advocating for schooling, cultivating civic associations, and publishing community newspapers. Glenn shows that racialized communities were complex and often divided among themselves. Gender relations were contested and remade within these communities, for instance, and middle-class leaders argued over strategies for educating the population.

This work of synthesis makes important interventions in the existing literature. Glenn's analysis of gender provides a useful correction to studies that posit or imply that race is "genderless." Her insistence that labour relations shaped citizenship is a valuable antidote to a growing literature on citizenship that often disregards economic relations. And perhaps most important, Unequal Freedom demonstrates that racial formations in the US were far more than a drama in black and white. While Glenn is certainly not the first person to make this argument, her use of comparative analysis and the breadth of this work should prove beyond any doubt that, well before the policy changes that transformed immigration in the second half of the 20th century, people thought of Japanese and Mexicans, of haole and Anglos — as well as of blacks and whites — when they thought about "race" in the US.

Glenn treats all three regions as distinct entities, but there are intriguing hints of an interconnected history here as well. For instance, Carey McWilliams described the recruitment of Mexicans in Texas to grow sugar beets in Colorado as an "underground railroad" in which growers' agents spirited away labourers at night. (158) Ray Stannard Baker, famous for his study of the Jim Crow South, compared the haole elite in Hawaii to the white planter class of the "Old South." (205) Were the South and black/white relations a template for racial formations elsewhere in the US? Unequal Freedom suggests that we need to know more about how people imported and exported racial ideas and practices among US regions.

It is worth mentioning that some of Glenn's analytical and organizational decisions lead to telling omissions. Her choice to analyze a dyad of race relations in each of three regions precludes, for example, an examination of the role of Native Americans (whose status as a racialized group was enormously important in this period) or of the complex, multiethnic nature of society in Hawaii. Perhaps more problematic, however, is the almost complete absence of poor white people from Glenn's discussion of "whites" and "Anglos" in the South and Southwest. Historians have long been preoccupied with the role of poor whites in shaping citizenship and labour relations in the South in this period. Steven Hahn and J. Morgan Kousser, among others, have shown that elite whites used white supremacist ideology not just to oppress African Americans, but also to draw reluctant poor whites into their camp. In this critical struggle to forge a cross-class white identity, elites were forced to make significant compromises in their own agenda. And as historian Neil Foley has demonstrated, white elites in Texas were far from convinced that poor whites were "white" in the first place. Indeed, analyzing poor whites (as well as upwardly mobile people of color, whom Glenn does treat in more detail) forces a consideration of just how messy and intertwined the categories of gender, class, and race have been. Including poor whites would have complicated Glenn's already formidable task, but it would also have yielded a richer and somewhat less schematic study.
This dilemma should be instructive to those who call for fewer case studies and more synthesis: Is it possible to convey the complexity of history while, at the same time, covering large swaths of time and space and advancing new ideas? Overall, Glenn has met this challenge with great panache. *Unequal Freedom* is an exceptional work that not only cogently summarizes existing literature but also makes original contributions of its own.

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In *The Color of Work*, Timothy Minchin points out that the paper industry has received “very little attention” (2) from labour historians, even though it was a major industrial employer, especially in the South, for most of the 20th century and was almost 100 percent unionized. It thus offers the opportunity to analyze the role trade unions played in relation to questions of racial discrimination and civil rights, and to address the “class-race” debate that has animated labour historians in recent years. Minchin’s main focus is the experience of black workers in the southern paper industry. He documents the conditions they faced and the struggles they waged in rich detail. But he also pays close attention to the role of employers, unions, white workers, and the state in developing, and partially dismantling, the industry’s rigidly segregated regime.

Although Minchin challenges some of the class-essentialist premises that have characterized the “new southern labor history,” his engagement with the increasingly acrimonious literature engendered by the broader class-race debate is, for the most part, cautious and limited. Nonetheless, his book offers a formidable — often devastating — challenge to those historians who have praised the progressive role of (predominantly white) unions on issues of civil rights and who have perceived that alleged role as the logical outcome of what some have called “working-class interracialism.” Moreover, Minchin provides a ringing vindication of the black union activists who ultimately turned to the federal government to seek redress of their longstanding grievances. Bitter experience, over many years, had taught them that instances of “working-class interracialism” were few and far between. On the contrary, black workers’ demands for equality, in the workplace and the larger society, usually encountered massive resistance from management, white workers, and white unions. Thus, as a black worker from Moss Point, Mississippi, recalled, “We couldn’t do it by ourselves. We had tried everything. We had to go through the government.” (107)

Drawing on more than sixty oral history interviews he conducted in the late 1990s, and on the court documents providing the testimony of African American plaintiffs in the many lawsuits that threatened to overwhelm the paper industry and its unions after 1965, Minchin paints a vivid portrait of segregation in the workplace and of black workers’ growing determination to overturn the system that kept them subordinate. “When I first went there [in 1951],” Sidney Gibson recalled of his long experience at the International Paper Company (IP) plant in Natchez, Mississippi, “you didn’t do anything but whatever a white person didn’t want to do.” (33) Or as State Stallworth, from IP’s Moss Point plant, put it, “We got all the low-paying jobs and the hard jobs and the back-breaking jobs and the dirty jobs.” (34) Gibson and Stallworth were not exaggerating. Blacks were uniformly assigned to the “dirty” jobs in the “processing” segments of the industry, while whites worked at “clean” jobs in production and maintenance. In the “black” jobs
there were no significant opportunities for advancement; African Americans were assigned to “lines of progression” that led nowhere. But in the “white” jobs, there were complex lines of progression that offered opportunities for significant upgrades in pay and skill.

“National” corporations such as International Paper and Crown-Zellerbach were every bit as relentless as “local” firms such as the St. Joe Paper Company of Port St. Joe, Florida, in enforcing this discriminatory regime. But what about unions? During the upsurge of unionism in the 1930s and 1940s whites organized their own racially exclusive locals. When blacks also demanded the right to organize, they were shunted into separate and unequal locals of their own. Given the larger pattern of segregation in the region, and the fact that whites made up 80 to 85 per cent of the industry’s workforce, unions served to reinforce the status quo, or, in Minchin’s words, to “formalize and codify patterns of segregation that companies had initially established.” (26)

Does this mean that the black locals were powerless, or worse? Certainly not worse. Minchin points out that black unionists, many of them World War II and Korean War veterans, had begun to agitate for change long before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But their unions were, he acknowledges, “something of a paradox.” (73) They provided a forum in which black leadership could develop. Moreover, they became vehicles of effective protest when they joined forces with civil rights organizations and federal agencies. But within the framework of the industry and its international unions, they were ultimately powerless to effect change.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which outlawed racial (and gender) discrimination in employment, became the legal weapon black paper workers wielded against the companies and unions that kept them down; and the NAACP and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission became their greatest allies. To those who would lament this “race-based” strategy, Minchin offers a compelling rejoinder. Although a few whites did offer covert support for their black fellow workers’ demands, “working-class interracialism” was largely a fantasy in the southern paper industry; and the regulatory state, for all of its deficiencies, was an indispensable ally of the forces of change.

One of the most telling themes of The Color of Work is the character and scope of white resistance to black demands for justice. For white paper workers, as for so many southern whites, the civil rights revolution was “like Armageddon.” (171) When black workers and their allies began to develop affirmative action programs that threatened to dismantle segregation in employment, whites “thought it was the end of the world.” (172) But they fought, often viciously, to defend their turf against black encroachment. When new plantwide seniority agreements finally made it possible for veteran black workers to transfer to more skilled and better-paying jobs, they encountered so much harassment (and, sometimes, sabotage) that many returned to the departments and positions they had been eager to abandon. When employers finally opened up “white” cafeterias, shower rooms, and recreational facilities to black workers, whites often boycotted the integrated terrain. As a black worker at Crown-Zellerbach’s Bogalusa, Louisiana, plant recalled, “They stopped using the bathrooms, ... they quit taking a shower. We moved in, they moved out.” (136) All the while the companies and the unions hastened to inform their white constituents that they had acted to enforce new federal mandates only because they had to — because continued defiance of the law would mean the loss of valuable government contracts and, hence, white jobs.

If there is room for more than passing criticism of Minchin’s book, it comes at the points where he engages, or fails to engage, the existing literature on what he
calls the "interracial unionism debate." (2) In his relatively few references to this debate, Minchin sometimes seems to be reinventing the wheel — that is, he fails to acknowledge the extent to which his evidence reinforces, and his arguments coincide with, the work of other scholars. For example, he pays little attention to the scholarly work and historical role of Herbert Hill, who served as labour secretary of the NAACP for more than a quarter of a century and was a key figure in building the alliance among black workers, the NAACP, and the EEOC that Minchin discusses in such illuminating detail. Even before he left the NAACP in the early 1970s, Hill had developed a formidable scholarly reputation, and he has since become a major critic of the "new labour history." Minchin does make several brief references to Hill in his text and notes, but considering the fact that The Color of Work bears out — and validates — not only Hill’s scholarly perspective but the strategies he developed as a civil rights activist, the references are few and far between.

Moreover, several studies of the steel industry, including my own, have expressed a perspective that is remarkably similar to Minchin’s. In December 1986, Robert J. Norrell’s pioneering article on “Caste in Steel” appeared in the Journal of American History. Although there were differences between the paper and steel industries — there was only one union in steel and it was, formally at least, “integrated” — Norrell demonstrated that the contracts negotiated by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) served to ratify, and sometimes intensify, the patterns of racial inequality that had long prevailed in steel, and that black workers ultimately felt compelled to turn to federal agencies — and against the USWA — in their struggles for justice. My own book, Divided We Stand: American Workers and the Struggle for Black Equality (2001), was not available to Minchin when he was writing The Color of Work, but in the early and mid-1990s I published several articles and essays that served to reinforce his evidence and conclusions — so much so that reading The Color of Work and listening, especially, to black workers’ testimony therein, offered a vivid echo of familiar voices and parallel histories.

Ultimately, none of these criticisms are meant to deny that The Color of Work is an important book that merits a wide readership among labour historians and other scholars of class, race, and the American South. Timothy Minchin has already published one award-winning book, Hiring the Black Worker: The Racial Integration of the Southern Textile Industry (1999). The Color of Work is a worthy successor.

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THE FAILURE OF US unions to organize southern industry since the New Deal was one of several setbacks that later accounted for the diverging fortunes of unions on opposite sides of the US-Canada border. Having failed to establish a strong foothold in the south, private-sector American unions saw themselves isolated geographically and politically. While Canadian union density held steady or increased after the 1950s, US union density continuously declined to the point that by 2002 one half of American membership was confined to just six states. And no industry foretold the post-war travails of US unions in the south better than textiles.

Michelle Brattain argues in this well written, exhaustively researched, and judicious examination of textile workers in Floyd County, Georgia, that the politics of race are in fact crucial to explaining textile unionism’s failure. Brattain grounds her book in recent literature
which sees the construction of “whiteness” as crucial to US working-class consciousness and behaviour. She argues that the southern textile industry “began, and remained for much of its history, wholly captive to race” (5) and even “though southerners in the early twentieth century did not use the term,” whiteness “was deeply embedded in social relations, politics, and class formation.” Nor was whiteness instituted from above. Working-class whites participated in its construction: none more so than southern white textile workers, who “inscribed and gave meaning to working-class whiteness.” (7) By embracing whiteness, white workers made clear that they “did not in fact share identical interests with black workers” in the racialized south. (5)

Brattain uses the analytical tool of whiteness as well as any labour historian has used it to date. Her narrative opens with an account of the making of the southern textile mill workforce, as the process unfolded in northwest Georgia’s Floyd County. The arrival of the cotton mills in the early 20th century “seemingly reunited the interests of all classes of southern whites” who were “sorely divided” at the time, she writes. (35) The exclusion of black workers from the vast majority of textile mill jobs (other than as janitors) meant that just as “janitorial work was associated with blackness, textile work became associated with whiteness.” (47) Brattain argues that whiteness consequently helped define what it meant to be working class in the south. Indeed, she contends that “whiteness in the South became something that largely determined the ability to become part of the industrial working class.” (5)

Yet because Brattain is such an adept historian, some of the limitations of the whiteness paradigm become clear as her finely detailed narrative unfolds. To a greater extent than her title suggests, the politics of whiteness serves as a periodic referent or touchstone rather than the organizing principle of Brattain’s entire narrative. Wisely, Brattain rarely uses this now ubiquitous concept to explain what it cannot explain. Rather, she generally lets her narrative speak for itself. The inadvertent result may be that she teaches us less about the explanatory promise of whiteness analysis than its limited potential as an analytical tool.

Brattain’s modest approach is well advised, for references to the politics of whiteness in fact do not explain some of the central issues taken up in her narrative. Whiteness ultimately tells us little about how and why white mill hands resisted their white employers by unionizing and striking, what conditions favoured or undermined their actions, or why the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) in Floyd County was “initially at the forefront of changes in race relations...long before the passage of the Civil Rights Act.” (232) Nor do references to the whiteness of textile workers explain why they were less likely to support the rabidly racist politics of Eugene and Herman Talmadge than were their rural white neighbors.

Indeed, Brattain’s narrative suggests that if whiteness bounded the arena of Georgia politics, it did not determine what happened within that arena, where class and regional dynamics exerted enormous pull. The example of Georgia’s Depression-era governor, Eugene Talmadge, who exploited race politics as well as anyone in his time, provides a case in point. An anti-New Deal governor, Talmadge played the race card heavily to cover his betrayal of white workers during the 1934 national textile strike, when he used the National Guard to facilitate strike-breaking only days after seeking labour’s vote to win a decisive gubernatorial primary. Yet in the first campaign Talmadge ran after his 1934 treachery, there is little evidence that textile workers fell for his racist charade: they helped defeat him in a 1936 Senate race. Though Talmadge won an election again as governor in 1938, his victory had less to do with his appeal than the self-destruction of the incumbent administration. When he tried
to use demagoguery to get re-elected in 1942 by race-baiting President Roosevelt’s Fair Employment Practices Committee, he failed to win either Floyd County or Georgia. And when he mounted yet another campaign for governor in 1946, mingling red-baiting with his familiar racist conjurings, Floyd County voters helped thwart his bid. If anything, Brattain’s evidence suggests that “linthead” responded more tepidly than other Georgians to Talmadgeism’s appeals to whiteness during the 1930s and 1940s.

Similarly, Brattain explains the defeat of the CIO’s Operation Dixie after the war by referring to the dispersed structure of the south’s textile industry, the anti-unionism of local authorities, and employers’ red-baiting more than she refers to the politics of whiteness. And in explaining post-war strike defeats in Floyd County she cites “workers’ vulnerability to regional under-employment, hostile local officials, and the failure of federal labor policy” as decisive factors (194), not race politics. Yet because Brattain crafts her argument about the centrality of whiteness with a light touch, such facts tend to qualify — rather than contradict — her thesis.

To her credit, Brattain offers much evidence to undercut any exclusive claim for the centrality of the politics of whiteness to the textile labour history. And she is too faithful to the evidence to bend her entire narrative around constructions of race. Thus she relies on her final chapters, detailing the “Republicanization” of Floyd County whites in the wake of the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, to seal the argument that whiteness was ultimately a determining force in the history of textile workers. These chapters detail how warmly Floyd County’s “linheads” embraced “the most recent incarnation of whiteness,” the racist populism that George Wallace promoted in response to the civil rights movement. (267) As Brattain reports, Wallace easily out-polled Republican Richard Nixon in Floyd County in 1968, and drew twice as many votes as Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey.

These concluding chapters would be stronger, though, had they considered the textile industry’s larger market dynamics and the severe limitations the industry’s economic forces placed upon textile workers and unions in the post-World War II era. But the post-1948 portion of this book gives no attention to the economics of the industry, focusing instead on electoral politics, civil rights, and integration. Thus, one learns only in the book’s penultimate paragraph that between 1946 and 1960, 202 southern textile mills closed (including 5 unionized Floyd County mills), eliminating 54,290 jobs. (280) Had these facts been integrated into Brattain’s analysis, rather than inserted into her conclusion, she might have arrived at different conclusions regarding Wallace’s appeal to Floyd County whites. She might have considered the degree to which whites felt imperilled not only as a racial elite whose system of apartheid was threatened, but as workers whose economic futures were in doubt. In short, she might have looked beyond whiteness to more fully grasp Wallace-ism’s dynamics.

As it is, those not already won over to whiteness literature are not likely to be converted by this book. Thankfully, however, one does not have to embrace whiteness analysis to appreciate this as an outstanding historical narrative. Michelle Brattain’s wise and well informed account throws a bright new light on the failure of unionism in the US south, raising issues that scholars are likely to debate for years to come.

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As can be expected from a book that originated as a dissertation at Stanford in 1977 and then gestated over the next 25 years, Glenna Matthews’ *Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream* is both broad-ranging and challenging. Questioning “how it could be that the prosperity generated by Silicon Valley has been so maldistributed,” (11) Matthews argues that globalization, the decline of unionism, unplanned urban development, technological innovation, and the segmentation of the labour force into gendered, racial, and ethnic enclaves contributed to the contemporary situation in which “Silicon Valley’s rewards are ... disproportionately going to the haves at the expense of the have-nots.” (258)

Matthews begins her chronicle 100 years ago, when San Jose was neither urban nor high-tech but home to hundreds of orchards. A “great ethnic diversity” (36) characterized the area, with Irish Catholics, Italians, Chinese, Japanese, Latin Americans, and Mexicans labouring in fields and fruit factories. As in most other industries during this time, women were considered unskilled and were given low-paying and feminized jobs. Yet even though ethnic, racial, and gendered prejudices existed, families of varying ethnicities and races achieved stability, security, and prosperity. They did so by operating small businesses in their homes, buying real estate, and encouraging their children to attain high education levels. Unionization, however, was the chief method by which affluence was secured, and during the late 1930s most of the Valley’s cannery workers became members of the AFL.

During the Depression, San Jose’s fruit industry began to decline. Casting about for new opportunities, the city’s elites decided during World War II to capitalize on Stanford University’s technological resources and to cater to military spending. Several major defense contractors located in the area, providing high-paid, mostly unionized jobs for men and women of varying ethnic and racial affiliations. By 1967, “60 percent of all electronics orders nationally were placed by the Pentagon or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, with California’s aerospace industry being the single largest receiver of components.” (125)

Numerous technological inventions accompanied the rise of the military complex, the most important ones being the integrated circuit in 1959 and the microprocessor in 1971. These in turn revolutionized the electronics industry, paving the way for the development of personal computers and the turn of the high-tech industry away from the defense market and towards a consumer one. Seeking more scientific freedom than military spending offered, and wanting to escape the federal government’s slow bureaucracy and rigorous labour regulations, electronics companies began developing products to be sold to private buyers.

Quickly dividing their rapidly expanding workforces into two tiers, namely, small numbers of scientific employees versus large numbers of repetitive ones, major companies like IBM, HP, and Intel initiated a proletarianization and feminization of the high-tech industry. Around 1970, electronics firms started hiring predominantly immigrant women from Asia (especially the Philippines and Vietnam), Latin America, Mexico, and Portugal for low-paying manual jobs. These firms used — and still use — a number of strategies to keep their workforces cheap and loyal, including firing potential unionists and closing unionized plants. To keep their overhead low, they also operated factories in low-wage countries and outsourced much of their assembly work to “subcontractors,” who were often individual employees who bring components home to be assembled.
by family members. For low-wage workers, these exploitations were made worse through exposure to other undesirable conditions — both within the high-tech industry and throughout the Valley. These included health hazards caused by the toxins used in electronics production as well as exorbitantly high housing costs caused by a mixture of unplanned urban development and a recent population explosion.

Hence Santa Fe's transition from a rural, unionized region to an urban and largely non-unionized metropolis has detrimentally affected the distribution of prosperity in the area. Whereas 65 years ago workers could achieve stability and affluence, now working people's chances of attaining the "California Dream" are elusive. What is needed to redress this situation, according to Matthews, are organizing initiatives geared towards electronics workers. She also believes that unions should join forces with other groups in the area, including "progressive local politicians, social justice-oriented religious institutions, environmental groups, [and] grassroots community activists."

Also commendable is the author's explicit focus on the determinants of socio-economic inequality within capitalist formal democracies. Silicon Valley's methodology is especially helpful in this regard. By focusing on one region over a hundred-year period, Matthews is able to trace inequality's historical patterns: how and why inequality changes, but also how and why it stays the same. She shows us that first-generation immigrants in the 1920s were able to buy homes and thereby achieve upward mobility, but that first-generation immigrants in the 1990s find living quarters exceedingly difficult to purchase. She also reveals that while contemporary middle-class women have achieved some socio-economic success, particularly in mainstream politics and in some management positions, working-class women continue to face barriers to economic and political empowerment.

What would make Silicon Valley a stronger work, however, would be more theoretical attention paid to the themes of opportunity, wealth, and human fulfillment. When Matthews argues that Santa Fe's citizens must join together and fight for more equitable resource distribution, she implies that she wants to reform Santa Fe's political economy, but not to change it. Thus she is less interested in exploring the political and economic philosophies that support industrial market capitalism, and more interested in the introduction of small modifications to existing social institutions. For example, in her discussion of women assuming management positions within the high-tech industry, she says that Intel's 1988 appointment of a female vice president represents "genuine progress." Therefore, rather than critiquing the existence of high-tech industry, she suggests instead that it should be made more equitable. Since Matthews' purpose is to show why power and resources are distributed inequitably within Santa Fe, it is perhaps logical that she should focus on social inequality's short-term determinants. Yet Matthews'
avoidance of philosophical issues relating to contemporary liberal capitalism raises troubling questions about her book's underlying assumptions. In particular, Matthews does not question whether the social opportunities that she advocates are in fact desirable in themselves. To return to the previous example of women in high-tech management, she does not question whether women should want such positions in the first place; rather she assumes that it is positive when women attain them. Similarly, Matthews does not reflect upon the implications contained in her notions that people should want to own their own homes, should want to participate in mainstream politics, and should want to achieve upward social mobility. Instead, she assumes that all of these desires are inherently beneficial, and conducive to the fostering of human happiness.

Since Matthews makes these assumptions, it is apparent that she believes that the philosophical underpinnings of liberal industrial capitalism are positive. And it is here where her analyses become shortsighted. In supporting more opportunities for women in high-tech management, for immigrants' home ownership, for women and non-whites in mainstream politics, and for women's and non-whites' avenues of upward mobility, she is in fact suggesting that industrial development, acquisitive individualism, non-radical forms of democracy, and mainstream signifiers of social status are themselves desirable. Thus when one takes her arguments about equality to their logical conclusions, it becomes apparent that Matthews' understanding of an ideal society is based on a vision that includes some potentially negative aspects, including international industrial enterprise, large-scale production and consumption of commodities, conventional political machinations, and the pursuit of conventional social status. Though this book review is not the appropriate place to elaborate why these phenomena may not be conducive to human fulfillment, suffice it to say here that many of them are harmful to the environment, facilitate possessive individualism, and encourage political conservatism.

Hence Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream should be read for the valuable empirical content it contains, as well as for the innovative historical methodology it employs. It should not be viewed, however, as a guide to the formulation of critical perspectives on our contemporary political economy. Along with Matthews, we should urge that human life become more egalitarian, and we should especially advocate the elimination of discrimination based on understandings of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. But we should also be attentive to the broader philosophical assumptions that sustain North American social and material life. Most of all, we must question whether human fulfillment can really be attained by pursuing social equality within the contexts of liberal democracy, technological enterprise, and industrial development.

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STUDIES OF MIGRANT farm workers in the United States consistently place them on the bottom rungs of the economic ladder. Farm work is onerous and dangerous, pay hovers at the bottom of wage scales, living conditions are substandard, and access to such essentials as health care, education, and legal justice is severely limited. Many farm workers are illegal residents in the United States, compounding their exclusion from government programs and contributing to the discrimination they face as migrants and minorities. Nor has their situation improved
much since Cesar Chavez’s grape boycott and the farm workers’ union organizing drives brought their plight to the attention of consumers and activists.

The Human Cost of Food details the exploitation of migrant farm workers and their families, concentrating on the southeastern United States, but it takes the argument beyond the academic realm. Readers are urged to become educated consumers and social activists, to help end “farmworker exploitation and injustices that persist today.” (3) This book is a call to action and a practical guide for farm worker advocates.

Student Action with Farmworkers (SAF), one of the growing number of advocacy groups in the United States, commissioned this anthology from farm worker advocates and specialists. Emerging from a 1975 activist course at Duke University on social problems in the rural south, SAF today has a nation-wide reach linking university students and farm workers with community activists through internships, leadership training, social and legal supports, education and career counselling, and other programs to improve the lives of farm workers and their families. (http://www-cds.aas.duke.edu/saf/) SAF’s emphasis is upon working with, rather than for, farm workers.

Translating this worthy goal into a teaching tool is not without complications. The authors are to be commended for grappling with and, for the most part, achieving a balance between SAF’s philosophy of engagement with and respect for farm workers as activists, not victims, and practical advice for helping those defined by their need of guidance and assistance from non-farm-worker experts. As a text for increasing public awareness and for use in university courses on farm worker advocacy, The Human Cost of Food is designed to provoke concern and direct activism. It does both admirably.

Editors Charles D. Thompson Jr. and Melinda F. Wiggins catalogue the problems besetting farm workers and outline the necessary steps toward their solutions. The message is clear and strong: readers must become educated about working and living conditions in food production and they must become activist advocates for ethical treatment and justice for farm workers and their families. The message, supported by specific instruction, is underscored throughout the volume. Contributors include farm workers and SAF interns, academics, and specialist professionals in such fields as history, law, health, housing, education, and labour organizing. Always, the emphasis is upon listening to the needs of farm workers, working in tandem with them, and facilitating their empowerment.

Readers are first introduced to the cultural context of farm workers and their families. Although Latinos predominate, Alejandra Okie Holt and Sister Evelyn Mattern emphasize cultural diversity and the complex ways farm workers adapt to and influence other cultures. Religion, family, and cultural expressions sustain farm workers, but often marginalize them and target them for social and economic discrimination. Combined with migrancy and language barriers, cultural distinctiveness challenges advocates to work as translators between farm workers and employers, agencies, and local communities.

The historical context illustrates persisting farm worker exploitation. Charles D. Thompson Jr. compares the agricultural histories of the American south and Mexico, detailing how the growth of agribusiness resulted in a dramatic “loss of economic democracy” (56) for small farmers and growing streams of Mexican migrant labour to the United States. Cindy Hahamovitch’s more concentrated historical study examines interactions between south Florida growers and farm workers during the 1930s and World War II. In her persuasive and well-documented chapter, she reveals how a range of government programs sought, variously, to regulate and control or to protect and assist farm workers. Ultimately, though, the well-being of farm workers took second place to that of growers and, especially in the hothouse
wartime economy, agricultural production trumped farm worker gains.

Currently, farm workers face a host of legal disabilities, trapping them in a cycle of powerlessness and poverty. Garry Geffert examines the use of foreign-born migrants. The H-2A Guestworker Program was designed to regularize wages and working and living conditions to ensure temporary aliens would not displace American workers. The opposite has taken place. Poorly enforced, the program is used by employers and agribusiness lobbyists to increase the foreign migrant labour pool and to undercut wages and standards of the native-born. Greg Schell details the specific exclusion of farm workers from most labour legislation and workers' legal rights. He argues that farm workers and their advocates cannot match the resources of large agricultural employers and agribusiness lobbies in fights over specific conditions. Instead, they must work to eliminate the larger legal principle of farm worker exceptionalism.

Living conditions cannot be separated from farm work. Christopher Holden documents the substandard housing of most farm workers and their families, insisting that only systematic records can ensure effective allocation of scarce resources. Armed with up-to-date surveys of housing problems, advocates must pressure legislatures, government agencies, employers, and local communities to provide housing that is "safe, decent and affordable." (193) Health hazards facing farm workers and their families extend well beyond the dangers of substandard housing, as Colin Austin points out in his examination of a wide range of health issues. Heavy and stoop labour, unprotected equipment, and exposure to chemical pesticides and fertilizers pose direct dangers, compounded by chronic health problems due to inadequate health care, poor diets, and substandard housing. Advocates must ensure that cultural differences are incorporated into health care objectives and directed with the participation of farm workers and their families.

Farm workers are most actively involved in their own advocacy through education and labour unions, with sometimes contradictory goals. Education is the key to escape from farm work. Ramiro Arceo, Joy Kusserow, and Al Wright look primarily to the children and the youth, detailing the barriers of language, culture, poverty, and migrancy they face in school and the economic demands that keep them out. Activists must counter these problems and demonstrate the value of education to the children, their parents, and their communities. But for the great majority of farm workers, the road to improvement lies in union organizing. Paul Ortiz paints a dramatic picture of farm worker exploitation and resistance from slavery to the present, outlining the Herculean efforts of farm workers and organizers. Unionization is an elusive goal, but its greatest chance of success is through alliances between farm workers and their advocates.

_The Human Cost of Food_ is a promising guide for farm worker advocacy. The brief quotations, poems, and writings by farm workers and SAF interns invoke sympathy and concern. The tightly focused articles present a common analysis, with the activist message clear on every page. Additional tools reiterate the book's purposes, with appendices on advocacy training, a 14-week interdisciplinary syllabus with readings, films, speakers, activities, and assignments, a lengthy list of addresses and websites for farm worker related agencies and organizations, and a recommended reading and video list. The full bibliography and index, uncommon in essay collections, are very useful.

This is not a book to provoke debate. But its chilling documentation of the ways public policy buttresses and combines with private power to maintain inequities underscores the urgency of its message, and its practical strategies inspire confidence in the ef-
ficiency of advocacy with and for farm workers and their families.

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SOME 40 YEARS ago baseball columnist Furman Bisher expressed sentiments that, except for the dollar figure attached, remain commonplace today. Why, he asked, “should anyone have sympathy for men who are paid an average of twenty-two to twenty-three thousand dollars a year, get to live in fine hotels, and spend each spring in Florida?” (44) Even today, many people have difficulty thinking of major league baseball players as workers in the conventional sense. Seemingly exorbitant salaries, the seasonality of the game, the relatively short careers of professional athletes, and the difficulty in comprehending how the business of sport reconstitutes play as work, all contribute to the understanding of professional sport as a unique industry.

In this compelling history of the emergence of the Major League Baseball Players Association, Chuck Korr rejects the idea of sport’s exceptionalism. Instead he addresses how professional baseball players — like workers in other industries — organized themselves into a union, and used the collective bargaining process to overcome the exploitative practices of owners. Korr’s sympathies clearly lie with the players. Baseball’s owners, he argues, failed to comprehend the limits of their power and lacked the ability to work together to defend their own interests. Players on the other hand intuitively understood the importance of teamwork and of winning. Once convinced of the need to come together to defend their interests, the players proved too much for the owners to handle. Working collectively to reform the player-owner relationship, baseball players brought about “the end of baseball as we knew it,” and in the process helped transform the professional sport industry throughout the world.

Although the book focuses primarily on the period between 1960, when the Players Association opened a permanent office, and the 1981 players’ strike, the story begins earlier. At the end of World War II baseball owners exercised massive control over their players, supported by a sympathetic sporting press and public that romanticized the idyllic lives of those playing a boy’s game for money. Tied to their clubs by baseball’s reserve clause, players had little leverage in negotiating salaries, working conditions, or pension benefits. Owners dealt cavalierly with “trouble makers” and ignored player grievances. During the 1950s, a number of players’ representatives, among them Ralph Kiner, Allie Reynolds, Harvey Kuenn, Bob Friend, and Robin Roberts, worked hard on behalf of the players, able to do so only because of their stature as star players. Even then, however, owners treated them dismissively. When Kiner, a slugging outfielder on the last-place Pittsburgh Pirates, complained that his 1953 contract included a 25 per cent pay cut despite his having drawn many fans to the ballpark, Pirate owner Branch Rickey brushed off his complaints. Rickey’s response, “we can finish last without you,” delighted baseball writers, most of whom shared the widespread anti-union sentiments of the owners.

Players of the 1950s and early 1960s, Korr points out, had limited expectations. So did the first full-time executive director of the Players Association, Judge Robert Cannon, hired by the players in 1965. According to Korr, Cannon misinterpreted the owners’ willingness to lessen the control they exercised over the players. His belief that he could cultivate a harmonious relationship between the two parties was built upon a mixture of wish-
ful thinking, a romanticized vision of the owners as benevolent patriarchs with the best interests of the game in mind, and perhaps even a desire to become Commissioner of Baseball at some future date.

Cannon's collaborationist position stood in sharp contrast to the hard-headed pragmatism of his successor, Marvin Miller. Miller's willingness to confront the owners resulted in his vilification as "Comrade Miller" or Marvin Millerinski, and as an evil Svengali who supposedly mesmerized and brainwashed his players into believing that they were mistreated. According to Korr, Miller deserves to be considered one of the most effective labour leaders of the 20th century. His earlier experience in the steel industry, his familiarity with labour law, his negotiating expertise, his quiet demeanour, and democratic sensibilities gained the respect of the players, as he urged them to identify what issues were most important to them and the future they envisaged for themselves. Miller approached bargaining as would any other union official, asserting that both parties in the bargaining process were equal and that agreements had to be negotiated.

What is particularly impressive about this book is its presentation in a clear and coherent manner of the tangled legal and technical issues that owners and players fought over. Drawing upon interviews with most of the participants, exhaustive archival records, including correspondence between the principals, and press and magazine commentary, Korr constructs a marvelous overview of the emergence of the players' union in the troubled period leading down to the 1981 strike. The most important issues arising out of the collective bargaining process included the development of grievance and arbitration procedures, the reserve and option clause, and ultimately the principle of limited free agency. Korr takes us through the struggle that followed Curt Flood's unsuccessful court challenge of the reserve clause, and the importance of the option clause and of arbitration in ultimately ushering in the idea of free agency. Despite the ruling of arbitrator Kenneth Seitz that granted Jim "Catfish" Hunter free agent status (and subsequent cases of a similar sort), Korr argues that the owners refused to understand the implications of the decision, and attempted to proceed as though nothing had changed. As owners dug in their heels, eventually acquired strike insurance, and prepared for the defeat of the union, the players were driven reluctantly to consider the strike option. The result, according to Korr, was a defensive strike that the players won, but which turned public opinion against them. Of course, the struggles between players and owners have continued to the present, until many baseball fans have wished a pox on both their houses.

In sum, this is a fine book that makes a significant contribution to both sport and labour history. At the same time, it should be noted that the very strength of the book (i.e. its ability to address the baseball players' union as it operated within the conventional framework of collective bargaining) is also its weakness. Korr gives short shrift to some of the exceptional or atypical characteristics of the professional sport industry. For example, the very principle of free agency, even limited free agency as it is in this instance, suggests the uniqueness of a union which creates through the collective bargaining process the ability of individual workers to negotiate their own contracts. It would also have been helpful if Korr had more effectively addressed the complex emotional ties players have with a game that serves as rite of passage from childhood and adolescence to adulthood. In many ways, that same trajectory revealed itself in the development of the players' union itself.

Colin Howell
Saint Mary's University

THERE ARE OVER 3000 strip clubs in North America, sometimes generating revenues of over $5 million, and offering a wide range of “adult entertainments” for men: stage shows, table dances, lap dances (frottage), sex shows, and, rarely, prostitution. This insightful and lively book makes the rather counterintuitive and, I believe, wholly justifiable claim that these clubs are not fundamentally about sex at all. Rather they are about sexual and gender identity, specifically, how men’s fantasies are constructed more around conflicting goals such as intimacy and the distance of voyeurism than around sexual gratifications and conquests.

Frank, a professor of cultural anthropology and former exotic dancer, takes a close look at how and why men consume the eroticism of the strip club. Strip club “regulars,” whose repeat visits and attachments to particular dancers differentiate them from other patrons, Frank argues, are consuming two erotic forms: spectacle and intimate interaction. The consumption of eros in the strip club is thus made possible by an industry that is becoming simultaneously more spectacular and more individualized. The commodities clubs are “selling” include primarily bodies, as mass objects of the male gaze, and private identities. It is the category of identities that Frank does such a fine job of articulating. Basing her conclusions on conversations with hundreds of male customers and thirty primary interviewees, Frank states that she “can say with confidence that I do know what men were willing to pay for each night.” (7)

What these men are essentially paying for each night is a cluster of fantasies that serves to support their desires. These desires involve notions of self and other, male and female, and sex and its negation:

Men’s consumption practices in strip clubs are thus premised on a range of desires, such as a desire to publicly display a particular “mascu-

line” self free of obligation and commitments, a desire for “adventure” by mingling with Others who are seen as “wild” or visiting spaces believed to be “dangerous,” a desire to feel desirable (at least in fantasy), or a desire to have a sexualized relation with a woman that does not involve the vulnerability of actual sexual activity. (118)

The contradictions underpinning male desire in the strip club are profound. Here are men often choosing to pursue fantasies in defiance of reality — the reality of their own social status, attractiveness, and aggressive sexuality.

The question of what drives men to seek experiences and pleasures that are deeply contradictory is addressed by Frank on several fronts. There is, for example, what Frank calls “touristic practice,” an experience of the strip club where the very elements characteristic of geographical tourism are in play: the gaze becomes significant; experiences are sought through interactions; and “escape” fantasies are at work. Some men generated all sorts of fantasies pertaining to the transgressive nature of where they were. For some middle-class, or higher, men who enjoy visiting lower-end clubs, fantasies of vice and danger were in play, with all the obvious racial codings. Other men fantasized about what really happens in the infamous “champagne room,” a private or semi-private room where dancers and patrons interact. Such fantasies became marks of distinction, a form of “insider knowledge,” in the upscale clubs.

Another front along which Frank analyzes the regular’s experience of the strip club is the seemingly innocent, if not pedestrian, explanations typically produced by the men to explain their investments, emotional and financial. Perhaps the most commonly heard reason for visiting strip clubs is the main title of the book’s third chapter, “Just Trying to Relax.” What Frank shows so adroitly is how complex the seemingly straightforward “I’m just trying to relax” explanation really is. In this desire to “relax” are mixed the pleasures of escape from, say, emotional in-
volvement and the wish to make the habitual desirable again. It is as if “relaxing” is not actually repose at all but a process of securing one’s identity and desires in a changing world.

One of the biggest challenges facing men who visit strip clubs regularly is how to handle their own desire to be voyeurs. The strip club dramatizes the contradiction between the desire to look at women without being labeled a misogynist or “pervert” and the real wish to look, a wish some men define, Frank discovered, as natural, an inherent masculine drive. Men, in other words, are often quick to draw from pop psychology a justification of their voyeuristic behavior, perhaps precisely because of the feminism they have, however imperfectly, internalized. Part of the appeal of the strip club then is the escape it offers from confusions about contemporary masculinity and the expectations that govern it. Remarkable in Frank’s account is the repeated claim by men that strip clubs are therapeutic in nature: “It’s almost like therapy,” one patron remarks; while, as Frank notes, “many sex workers also frequently joke about really being ‘therapists.’” (119)

Men might appeal to the language of therapy and an essential biological nature, as Frank suggests, because they wish to be absolved of responsibility, to deflect any anxiety about being a customer in a commodified sexual service, and to express the idea that, for these men, sexual arousal is an emotionally meaningful experience.

The greatest contribution to the understanding of men’s investments in the strip club scene is, I believe, a critical engagement with the fantasies men have about their own identities and the women whose labour they enjoy. The vast majority of sociological and anthropological studies of strip clubs are focused on the dancers, their working conditions, and the attitudes they have toward their work. Relatively little critical understanding of the men who visit these clubs has been advanced. The real power of Frank’s extraordinary book is that she is able to give voice, through her many interviewees, to the complex fabric of masculine desire as it is staged in the strip club. Revealed in her study is a deeply conflicted masculine self, one that, for example, searches for some authentic experience of intimacy like friendship while maintaining at the same time a healthy cynicism rendering staged performances transparent. In the end, the strip club is not some marginal cultural phenomenon, even if it is consigned to the margins of the metropolis. It is one of the finest laboratories available for studying male privilege, pleasure, and fantasy.

It must be said that Frank is an especially gifted writer. Her critical prose is lucid, compelling, and accessible to non-specialists. But in this book Frank also displays her talents as a writer of fiction. Three fictional interludes serve to elaborate a few of the book’s central issues, such as bodily identity and intimacy, and are presented from the first-person perspective of the exotic dancer.

Michael Uebel
University of Kentucky


UNDERSTANDING THE CAREER and reputation of John Reed has long been a preoccupation of American historians and literary critics primarily because it is not readily apparent where to place him and his work. The subject of several biographies as well as shorter evaluations in works about Greenwich Village intellectuals and the forerunners of literary radicalism in the 1920s and 1930s, Reed continues to occupy a central if disputed place. As a writer, a romantic hero, a rebel, a journalist, as well as a participant in two of the great revolutions of the 20th century (Mexico and Russia), he remains
a figure of interest and controversy. On this last point Reed's allegiance was claimed by supporters and enemies of the Soviet Union. Because he died just as the Communists were consolidating their hold on Russia, Reed's future loyalties could not be known: all the more reason to speculate. Would he have joined his friend Max Eastman as a bitter critic, or would he have gulped back his objections and become a defender of Stalin?

Reed's writings have also been the source of varying evaluation. Some critics have found his production uneven and lightweight, sometimes careless. He also has his admirers, among them, Professor Lehman whose work is both an attempt to defend Reed against his critics as well as explain exactly in what ways Reed contributed to modern journalism and literature. His book thus takes up the argument around several important works: Insurgent Mexico and Ten Days That Shook The World, his war correspondence on the European Front in 1915, and shorter essays such as the sketch of Billy Sunday during his Philadelphia religious crusade. The book also reprints two samples of Reed's reporting: “In the German Trenches” and “Back of Billy Sunday,” both of which were published by Metropolitan Magazine in 1915.

While the outline of this reevaluation of Reed is more or less chronological, Lehman does not strictly adhere to a time-line, principally because he is more interested in defining Reed's style and working habits. This purpose encourages him, at numerous points in the book, to compare Reed's on-the-spot notes with his later journal manuscripts. In other words, he attempts to depict the way the author employs metaphors, opens up and generalizes from experience, and embellishes and invents dialogue. At the same time, Lehman carries on a running debate with other biographers of Reed such as Robert Rosenstone, Eric Homberger, and Christine Stansell - his purpose being to defend Reed’s stylistic and methodological choices. Quite clearly, Lehman's larger project is to restore Reed to a central place in the literature of American journalism.

Given the contemporary journalistic controversy over “imbedded” war correspondents and the rather longer existence of participatory journalism created by such novelists as Truman Capote and Norman Mailer several decades ago, it is instructive to see just where this tendency began. Quite clearly Reed as well as Stephen Crane were originators of this modern technique. Abandoning the pose of neutrality, Reed stitched his enthusiasms and political opinions into his sketches. Indeed, to get the story itself, he became an advocate and even a participant in the events he was sent to cover such as the Mexican and Russian Revolutions. This put him at odds with the prevailing biases of American journalism. In particular, this affected his view of World War I where his critical reports alienated his most important benefactors, publishers, and journalistic friends. Believing that the causes of the war were nationalistic expediency, international intrigue, and class antagonism that sacrificed millions of men to a cause they did not share, Reed lost most of his publishing outlets except in radical journals, themselves subject to censorship and repression. For Lehman, the question here is not bias or overt opinion. After all, being pro-war was a bias that shaped most of the journalistic reports. Rather, it is what Reed accomplished with his journalism that intrigues the author.

In explaining why Reed's writing should be considered pioneering and exemplary, Lehman spends considerable time evaluating style: for example, the metaphors chosen and the development of characters. In his ability to sketch exciting scenes and crisp dialogue, Reed seems to have matured and toward the end of his life had mastered ways to give vitality to elusive characters, even anonymous working men and women. As Lehman concludes, “Reed writes with lively, crafted diction; builds immediate de-
scription into larger truths; constructs effective scenes from skillful dialogue; manipulates point of view and structure effectively; establishes his personal presence to guide his readers toward self-discovery; and reveals the power of his stories to affect his subjects and readers." (63) There is little to question about this summary. In many respects it captures what Reed was up to in his journalistic style. But if Reed was the innovative reporter he seems to be, there is perhaps more to be said than this defensive list of prose attributes provides. Lehman does not, for example, consider the question of audience and Reed's relationship to it — except insofar as the journalist found outlets for his writing or suffered censorship. Yet this is a crucial question for Reed as well as other practitioners of participatory journalism. The participant, himself, in this genre, is both observer and audience. That is why he appears in the first place, to register reactions to the scenes he observes. Thus his response is intended to shape those of the audience. In many cases, Reed's pose was one of heightened innocence, shaped by a credulous belief in fair play, justice, and democracy. Confronting the terrible contradiction to such values in real life — in the random slaughter of World War I and the hypocrisy of Billy Sunday, or, more abstractly, the implicit assumptions of readers about revolution, Reed constantly invokes an ironic mode in his narrative. Sometimes this means that Reed subjects himself to satiric presentation, but far more often, he uses irony to strip away pretense and literary obfuscation to reveal — much in the manner of contemporary naturalist novelists — the bleak landscape of reality. In many respects, the point of much of Reed's journalism is the exploration of getting the story itself and the distance he traveled in this pursuit: from the elite classrooms and social high life of Harvard's ivy halls to the muck of trench warfare. It was a predisposition he shared with many writers and artists of Greenwich Village, even if he carried it much further.

In some respects, this makes Ten Days That Shook the World somewhat more difficult to understand and evaluate. Here Reed is an unabashed advocate of the revolution he described. Thus the tone of irony is repressed in favour of celebration, and the book becomes as much testament as journalism. There are many things that Lehman might have explored at this point, but one seems crucial since Reed's experience was a foretaste of the hundreds of travelers' accounts of positive experiences that surrounded the Soviet Union from its inception. Lehman does not explore how it was that Reed came to identify emotionally with the Revolution, why, in fact, he went so far and how this might help us understand what others would see. In fact, however, there are strong hints in Reed's account: his personification of the masses; his wide-eyed admiration for Russian culture; his delight in decisive action; his esteem for Lenin and Trotsky; his sense that the mundane world was being reshaped by high moral principle.

But how much of this did Reed actually see? How much existed in translation, through his enthusiasms, and from a language that he did not understand completely? (Lehman never confronts the language barriers Reed experienced in Russia and Mexico). Certainly, the author might have pursued some of these questions further, but he is too often trapped in a defensive posture. In the end, he succeeds in making a case that Reed was a self-conscious stylist and an innovator in journalistic techniques. But the harder case remains elusive: whether Reed ought to be remembered as a literary artist and not for the romantic and tragic story of his life.

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David W. Noble, *Death of a Nation: American Culture and the End of Exceptionalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2002)

IT IS NOT AN OVERSTATEMENT to say that this book is David W. Noble's magnum opus. Between the covers is a 301-page narrative filled with the provocative ideas, insightful and honest self-reflection, and breadth of knowledge that mark this historian's more than half-century career as a scholar and teacher of the cultural and intellectual history of the United States. *Death of a Nation* represents the intellectual life cycle of an influential scholar and teacher. For Noble both expands on ideas he has developed throughout his career and incorporates into this broad cultural history some of the research of former graduate students he has influenced at the University of Minnesota. Noble's scholarship, like his life, is rooted in connections.

The argument is familiar to those of us who know and have been influenced by Noble's work. The intellectual crisis of the 1940s that, in *The End of American History* (Minnesota 1985), Noble demonstrated had caused postwar "consensus" historians to separate themselves from their Progressive mentors, takes central stage again here. In *Death of a Nation*, however, Noble expands his analysis to include novelists and literary critics, painters, architects, and musicians, as well as his traditional subject, historians. These various artists and intellectuals participated in a cultural reorientation in the 1940s when their assumptions about an isolated national culture bounded by the geographic space of the United States were shattered. Artists, musicians, writers, and intellectuals had illustrated, composed, and written of an exceptional national landscape rooted in the provincialism of the New England Romantics of the 1830s and 1840s. This WASP nationalism was thought to keep at bay the destructive "Old World" and, therefore, un-American features of the trans-Atlantic capitalism out of which the United States developed. In the postwar years, 20th-century artists and intellectuals confronted the reality that the United States was and always had been an expanding capitalist country, one that contained many cultures, and one for which an exceptional and homogeneous national story could not be composed without a major dose of self-delusion. (The delusion persists, of course, in public discourse.) Hence the abstract expressionism of Jackson Pollack replaced the regionalism of his mentor, Thomas Hart Benton; the cultural pluralism of Richard Hofstadter replaced the cultural homogeneity of Charles Beard; and the universal internationalism of postwar architects replaced the universal nationalism of Louis Sullivan and the organic nationalism of Frank Lloyd Wright.

Strains of the postwar reorientation had appeared in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Noble does not try to claim otherwise. European styles and techniques had influenced photographers and the Ash Can School painters. Architects who had hated the architecture of capitalist cities in New England developed new and what they assumed to be democratic and American designs for the just-as-capitalist cities of the Mid-West. Novelists had created characters who lived unfulfilled lives of despair, characters for whom the American promise was, in Theodore Dreiser's words, an "American tragedy."

Noble therefore does not posit that everyone shared an uncontested set of assumptions before World War II and then embraced an equally uncontested and different set of assumptions after the war. Rather, he demonstrates that following the internationalism associated with World War I, American exceptionalists were elated when the United States failed to join the League of Nations. Then, at the onset of the Great Depression, they hoped for the final victory of the producers' democracy they had coveted for so long. They now awaited the death of international capitalism. Consequently, Thomas
Hart Benton’s paintings of the 1930s celebrate the productivity of a virtuous, industrious, and homogeneous national citizenry. Frank Lloyd Wright hoped that international capitalism would collapse and Americans would be virtuous producers rather than greedy profiteers. The proletarian fiction of the Depression decade pits virtuous workers against the agents of distant capitalist employers whom they never see. And literary critics openly defined themselves as Marxists. World War II, however, shattered these hopes and assumptions.

Consequently, the holy trinity (Henry Nash Smith, R.W.B. Lewis, and Leo Marx) of the postwar symbol-myth-image school of the 1950s and 1960s could write only about the 19th century. They could not write about a romantic national landscape rooted in New England provincialism if they studied 20th-century literature, for 20th-century literature does not represent that provincialism. Their books, then, were “Elegies for the National Landscape” (the title of chapter four). Smith, Lewis, and Marx mourned the cultural landscape’s demise. They also quit teaching graduate students, students who wanted to study authors commented on and increasingly represented the multicultural reality of the United States. Marx accepted positions at institutions where teaching undergraduates became his primary responsibility, Smith went to Berkeley to work with the Mark Twain papers, and Lewis remained at Yale but his new work represented traditional literary criticism rather than the type of broad cultural study he attempted in The American Adam.

For most intellectuals, writers, and artists, the idea of a universal national cultural landscape died on the altar of international capitalism. They now realized that a multicultural society had emerged from the conflicts between profit-seeking Euro-Americans and the ethnic and racial minorities who refused to melt in the national pot. The Cold War that pitted international capitalism against international communism, the bloody struggles for civil rights and Black Power, the women’s movement: the various aspects of the social and cultural crises of the 1950s and 1960s made it clear to all but the most diehard ideological advocates of a universal national cultural landscape that the nation had always been diverse and the economy had always been capitalist.

While the “death of a nation” (the death of the idea of a universal national landscape) has been accepted, for the most part, in the academy and in the arts, it is of course alive and well in public discourse. Those who defend narratives of the national landscape assume that such narratives are the only legitimate narratives, the only ones that have meaning. To them, the only true meaning is to be found in the universal national. That position, Noble proclaims, “has always been the position of bourgeois nationalists.” (285-286) George W. Bush, for example, would hate this book if he could read it. Those who want to claim the name “American” still want to own the term for a particular people in a specific national landscape.

Two central ironies pervade these pages. The first is that bourgeois nationalists evoke the metaphor of a universal national landscape while they simultaneously embrace an expansive capitalist economic system that transcends national boundaries. The second involves the international capitalist system that emerged with the growth of the colonial Atlantic economy, that ripped Africans from their homes to produce profitable New World crops for their Euro-American masters, and that tried its damnedest to destroy indigenous people. That system created, through blood and conquest, the multicultural societies despised by the advocates of homogeneous national landscapes and applauded by David W. Noble.

This is a highly readable and informative book that is a must read for students of the cultural history of the United States and for people interested in the intellec-
tual connections between historiography and other areas of cultural studies.

Robert T. Schultz
Illinois Wesleyan University

Henry Veltmeyer and Anthony O’Malley, eds., *Transcending Neoliberalism; Community-Based Development in Latin America* (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press 2001)

FOR SOME TWENTY YEARS, diverse voices have pronounced development studies to be at a theoretical impasse, if not completely superceded. Post-structuralists and those infused with post-modern and post-colonial critiques of social science generalizations insist that diversity, identity, and multiple-subject status of Third World peoples had been ignored or suppressed. The epithets “Euro-centric” and “modernizationist” frequently characterize these perspectives on the discourses and policy projects of the development era. Critical and Marxist political economy traditions charged that development had been driven by the imperatives of capital accumulation in the dominant capitalist economies, amounting to “the pillage of the Third World,” even to a new imperialism, a neo-colonial global order. At best, development was dependent and cynically oriented to the political prerogatives of global anti-communism, and it tended to reproduce the abuses and social disruptions of the early industrial revolution and commercialization of agriculture. The prescriptions from these traditions ranged from socialist central planning to combinations of statist, corporatist, and welfare-state models.

Differentiation among developing economies brought many observers to reject both the modernization and the political economy perspectives. The stagnation and collapse of socialist and central planning versions of development, the exhaustion of revolutionary energies in much of the global South, and the processes of democratization appeared definitively to displace the latter. Abject failures, stagnation, and de-industrialization eroded the former. Economic globalization, with its predominantly neoliberal foundational and policy principles, occluded statist and Keynesian versions of national development projects. But at the moment of neoliberalism’s doctrinal triumph, it could not rest easy. In Latin America, in particular, the 1980s, the first decade of full hegemony for structural adjustment and economic liberalization, was a “lost decade.” And when growth occurred, it was neither stable nor continuous, neither regional nor shared, neither equitable nor ecologically sustainable.

Long a laboratory for diverse official and societal development projects, Latin America has manifested an array of popular and community-based “alternative” development experiences in the interstices of that neoliberal hegemony. Born as much from local struggles to survive as from the creativity and imagination expended in Latin Americans’ search for social justice and popular democracy, these experiences constitute the practices Henry Veltmeyer’s and Anthony O’Malley’s edited book terms “another development.” *Transcending Neoliberalism* offers closely informed, sympathetic but critical coverage of specific community-based experiences (in Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, and Bolivia) in four of the nine chapters. In the other five chapters (three by Veltmeyer, one by David Barkin, and a concluding one from O’Malley), the book provides rich contextual and theoretical discussion of the concepts, principles, and performance associated with those experiences. The resulting counterpoint is effective in conveying what is shared among (and beyond) the very diverse cases and the caution needed in advancing any generalizations about them.

Readers with the broad premise that neoliberal economic models do not serve the majority of Latin Americans at re-
Regional, national, and local levels will find easy and immediate confirmation in Transcending Neoliberalism. But those wanting to "just say no to neoliberalism" and to have a democratic, local, empowering, and ecologically-sustainable alternative clearly and programmatically laid out will be disappointed. But they should persevere. The authors are well aware that development historically has been contested terrain, discursively constructed and deconstructed, often a project embedded in another, for example, development as Cold War anti-communist strategy or privatizing the public sector in order to provide new arenas for private capital's expansion in a sustained crisis of accumulation. Henry Veltmeyer, in particular, has been for decades a trenchant critic of all forms of development subjected to the primacy of capitalist accumulation, and his several chapters are no less critical of neoliberalism. All the contributors articulate the need for "alternative" development and express solidarity with those subjects, especially the local community, trying to advance it. At the same time, they have all absorbed the post-modern obvious: avoid simple dualisms and polarities in the social sciences; acknowledge plural and shifting identities of actors; expect diversity of intention, practice, and outcomes; embrace complexity and contradiction.

In such a spirit, the editors and authors in Transcending Neoliberalism show themselves historically and conceptually informed. In chapters worthy of close attention from students of development thought and practice, Veltmeyer, O'Malley, and Barkin provide the contexts for both the emergence of neoliberalism's supremacy and its inchoate contestations in community-based development. The case study chapters—from Laura Macdonald on NGOs and participatory development discourse in Costa Rica, from Veltmeyer and Tellez on state-promoted participatory development in Bolivia, from Eduardo Aquevedo Soto on state-fostered local development ostensibly focused on poverty in Chile, and from Aquiles Montoya on community economic development—bring complementary contributions. Varied in style and case-specificity, they convey the breadth of community development in Latin America in conception, social composition of actors, and performance. Each brings into focus a slice of relatively unknown but relevant "alternative development" literature. Macdonald considers the activity of international and national NGOs involved in participatory development, particularly through the lens of discourse analysis. Veltmeyer and Tellez examine Bolivia's state-propelled popular participation infrastructures through their familiarity with 30 years of generally market-serving reforms and with specifically Latin American social movement literature. Aquevedo Soto highlights the heterogeneity of poverty in the Bio-Bio region of Chile as "a product of quite diverse socioeconomic and cultural processes," placing that poverty and the government strategies for local development in the region within the narrative of Chile's last thirty years. State decentralization and devolution to municipalities by dictatorship decree provide the backdrop for considering poverty, community development, and the economics of the region within a liberalized and transnationalized Chilean economy. Montoya summarizes the findings of a survey of community economic development, also called the 'new popular economy,' in 100 Salvadorean communities of "repatriated, demobilized or relocated persons." He concludes that varied social, political, and economic factors make the "new popular economy" both necessary and viable, though often conflicted and fragile. Together the case studies lend social concreteness to the broad conceptual matters of critical concern to the editors and the other contributors.

Politically and paradigmatically, Transcending Neoliberalism is committed to alternative, democratic, socially equitable, and ecologically sustainable community development; all the contri-
Butors would certainly want neoliberalism and strictly market-driven economic activity at the community level to be transcended. Their collective experience and knowledge result in critical scrutiny of the discourses and inter-conceptual linkages of modernizationist, political economy, and neoliberal thought and practice. They place squarely before the reader, and before the literatures they engage, the alternative development glossary. Notions of how varied actors define and use development, community, decision-making, decentralization, sustainability, civil society, the “subject,” even “the social” are subjected to informed intellectual historical contextualization, deconstruction, and reconstruction. Community-based economies and their development are considered in their articulation with globalizing capital accumulation; along the way readers may find themselves groping towards a renewed “social market” vision, one with significantly more local, ecological, gender, and popular content. And Transcending Neoliberalism keeps in the foreground the old and deceptively simple question: what is an economy for, after all?

Fred Judson
University of Alberta


This book fills a gap in North American studies on Brazil’s cinematography. It is especially relevant because it is the first one published in English on this famous Brazilian film director. The book is a volume in the series, “Contemporary Film Directors,” edited by James Naremore.

The major section of the book, “A Cinema of the People,” is divided into nine smaller sections that are organized chronologically and concerned with different periods of his life and his films. The book also presents two interviews which were done with Dos Santos in 1995 and in 2001.

Sadlier notes that Dos Santos has been a prolific director for about 50 years. For instance, Dos Santos’ first feature film, “Rio, 40 graus” (Rio 100 Degrees), was a 1956 production and his last film, “Cinema de Lágrimas” (Cinema of Tears) was finished in 1995. Dos Santos has also directed a series of short films and documentaries, has been involved in television, and is considered one of the fathers of the “Cinema Novo” movement in Brazil. This was an artistic movement in Brazilian cinematography to produce films that were socially conscious and “eager to raise the consciousness” of the people. (30)

Sadlier attempts to give the reader an overview of Dos Santos’s work and the impact of history and political ideologies on this work. As Sadlier states in her preface, “I have attempted to give a full-scale chronological overview of Nelson Pereira dos Santos’s films and a sense of how his work has evolved and been determined by various historical political, and cultural influences.” (XI)

Sadlier does well in showing the devotion of Dos Santos to making films about the people, especially those from Brazil’s northeast, the poorest region of the country. Sadlier also points out how dos Santos was highly influenced by Marxism in his work and how he has portrayed social inequality and racial problems within Brazilian society. Indeed, as another important film director in Brazil, Glauber Rocha, stated in 1981, “Rio, 40 graus” “might be regarded as the developing world’s first revolutionary film, since it exploded onto the scene even before the Cuban Revolution.” (18) In fact, social issues related to poverty and race have been a constant in Dos Santos’s work. In a 1995 interview he stated that, “As I have said race is a theme that because of my upbringing is incorporated into my existence.” (159) He added that,
"The other great issue, poverty, which is very linked to race, is a permanent theme in all my films; it's not possible to think about national identity without including the very serious problem of absolute poverty in some parts of Brazil." (159) He also considers that "the essential point in the struggle of anyone who wants to participate in the social movement of Brazil is the elimination of poverty." (140)

Yet, even though dos Santos's approach to his work was strictly Marxist, Sadlier noted that in his later films he had changed his approach in order to acknowledge the impact of popular culture and of religion in the lives of the poor, especially the Afro-Brazilian religions, such as Umbanda and Candomblé. In this fashion, as Sadlier pointed out, Dos Santos changed his political approach from an orthodox Marxist to a left-wing populist. Indeed, Dos Santos became critical of orthodox Marxists who ignore the aspects of the people that do not interest them. When commenting on a character, "a university professor," in one of his most recent films, "Tenda dos Milagres," made in 1977, Dos Santos stated: "[The professor] represents the orthodox Marxist who throughout the years has been just as colonizing as the non-Marxist colonizer because he has not been able to transfer the mode of thought but has instead merely transferred the observations achieved through that method... I am criticizing myself as well, because I have fallen into the same trap... An intellectual like the professor... envisions the transformation of society... [However] His background, his class, and position prevent him from including truly popular manifestations — specifically religion — in his cultural universe." (96)

The major weakness of this book is that the description of films and of Dos Santos's early life can be a bit tedious and confusing to read due to the large quantities of detailed information. For instance, in the section devoted to the analysis of one of his most important films, "Vidas Secas" (Barren Lives, 1963), too much reference is made to the book by Graciliano Ramos from which the film was based on. Sadlier should have focused more on the film since this comparison is relevant only if the reader is familiar with the novel as well as with the film. Another weakness in the book is the mentioning of too many names of people, which breaks the flow of the book, especially for people who are not familiar with the Portuguese language.

However, the unique value of this book is the information on and analysis of a very important Brazilian film director and the acknowledgement of the influence of his work on the social and political issues of Brazil. Moreover, Sadlier provides an excellent analysis of "Como Era Gostoso o meu Francês" (How Tasty Was My Little French Man, 1972). She shows how the film extrapolated from the re-telling of a historical event in early colonial Brazil to a more critical analysis of Brazil's society in the 20th century. The film is based on the German explorer, Hans Staden's chronicle *Brazil: The True History of the Wild, Naked, Fierce, Man-Eating People* written in 1557 which describes his capture by the cannibalistic native group, the Tupinambá, when he was living among the Portuguese in the region encompassing today's Rio de Janeiro. Sadlier clearly shows Dos Santos's objective of linking cannibalism with worker and Native resistance in the capitalist world of the 20th century. As she states, "Although the major historical trauma it exposes is a familiar one of European domination and genocide, it suggests that this irreducible violence keeps returning and repeating itself in the here and now; meanwhile, it converts the traumatic event described in Staden's text — the cannibalistic act — into a provocative metaphor for the resistance to a modern society of global capital and foreign consumption." (59)

My overall impression of the book is that it is an important contribution to the better understanding of Brazilian issues
in North America and it is also an important source for anyone interested in world cinematography. In this way, the book fulfills the objective of the series, "Contemporary Film Directors," which is to "broaden our awareness of important artists, to give serious critical attention to their work, and to illustrate the variety and vitality of contemporary cinema." (II)

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*Students of labour* and working-class history occasionally encounter the police in accounts of industrial disputes, political dissent and plebeian culture. The "new" police emerged during the transition from commercial to industrial capitalism and there is growing literature on its role in class relations. One of the first modern constabularies in England for example, the Thames River Police, was organized to seize control of traditional labour practices surrounding the valuable West Indies trade. In labour studies, the police often are depicted as agents of control. Studies of the police as workers, and police organizations as work forces controlled by management, are rare. Thanks to Shpayer-Makov, we now know much about police workers in one of the world's most famous constabularies, the London Metropolitan Police (LMP). The LMP, founded in 1829, was not only a model for other jurisdictions in the Anglo-American world; it was also a large, complex and conflicted body of workers, governed by intricate formal and informal control mechanisms. Unlike other urban and rural police in England who were under the authority of local officials, the LMP reported to the Home Secretary.

The author argues that despite the working-class origins of recruits, and an initially authoritarian management style, by the time the LMP had grown to 22,000 men in 1914 occupational culture had created a distinct *esprit de corps*. In the 1830s and 1840s, the police had encountered considerable working-class resentment and resistance. By 1914, deployed in 22 divisions, the force policed a population of 7 million, most of which, according to Shpayer-Makov, accepted the police as a necessary service. As the public image of the force improved, so did its morale and personnel turnover rates.

Recruitment patterns changed somewhat over the decades, but they were distinct and fairly deliberate. The early commissioners favoured young, unskilled farmers and farm workers, who were thought to have the proper physical capabilities and temperament, as well as lack of urban experience, to be transformed into reliable constables. Semi-skilled workers and clerks were also valued. Unlike large North American police departments, sons rarely followed their fathers into the service. Veterans of the Royal Navy and Marines were prized recruits; ex-Army types were less valued because of their associations with drink and fast living. Candidates were expected to be literate and "respectable." Although native Irish and Scots were hired, most recruits hailed from southern England. By the early 20th century, regulations narrowed recruitment age to 21 to 27 and single men were preferred. And despite the intentions of the 1830s architects of the LMP, the force increasingly hired Londoners. Because of strict recruiting standards, most applicants were turned away.

In addition to initial recruitment and successful completion of a probationary training period, advancement depended upon written examinations. Compared to continental European constabularies, a distinct officer class was almost non-existent. According to the author, the
LMP was a pioneer of the merit system, which was a tool for building worker loyalty and workforce stability. Despite the lure of a supervisory position (a patrol sergeant was responsible for roughly two dozen sergeants and constables), 80 percent of the men who remained never advanced beyond the lowest rank. Few policemen reached the ranks of the middle class.

In order to attract and retain first-class police workers, administrators resorted to carrot-and-stick methods. Although a largely unarmed force under civilian control, the LMP was governed by a militaristic discipline and chain of command. Single constables, for example, had to live in section houses and opportunities to air grievances in a formal fashion were rare. Despite strikes in 1872, 1890, 1918, and 1919, affiliation with trade unions was illegal. The Police Federation, established in the wake of World War I unrest, was not a union and was not permitted to delve into promotion or discipline. As servants of the Crown, constables were expected to be neutral in terms of class relations and politics, which is why they were unable to vote.

Shpayer-Makov identifies vestiges of aristocratic paternalism, combined with the "middle class individualism" of the merit system, as the basis of management style. A contributory pension scheme began as early as 1839 but its scope was limited and decisions were made by management in a discretionary manner. Drunkenness continued to be the most common reason for dismissal and there is evidence that punishments became less severe over time. Nevertheless, even with the institutionalization of internal mobility, hostility toward the higher ranks flared up from time to time.

Despite official rules against protest, labour actions, contact with sympathetic Members of Parliament, and evidence heard by Parliamentary committees revealed worker dissatisfaction. The most common act of resistance was departure. Of the 100,000 men who joined between 1829 and 1860, roughly half resigned and nearly a third were dismissed. Although pay was steady, the rate (below that of artisans and skilled workers) was a long-standing grievance, particularly as married policemen aspired to live in respectable working-class areas. They also resented having to live in close proximity to station houses. In addition, their spouses, in the interest of respectability, were forbidden from working outside the home. Given that most constables by the late 1800s were married, this meant hardship for police families. The 1890 strike resulted in legislated pension reform, which based eligibility not on age but total years of service. Patrol work with exposure to the elements and the risk of assaults and injuries, and 60-70 hour work weeks, were physically demanding. Health problems often led to early retirement, particularly in the 19th century when only a small minority of recruits succeeded in completing 25 years of service. Until 1910, the police had only one day off every two weeks.

But policemen received free medical services and financial assistance for time lost due to sickness, a rarity in most workplaces. Paid vacation leave also was available. The author explains that humanitarian reforms such as pensions, free medical care, and sick pay enhanced the public reputation of the LMP as an "employer" and helped to build institutional loyalty. The end result of the "making" of policemen was that police workers increasingly identified with their occupation and their organization.

Surveillance and regulation of working-class culture had been one of the chief aims of the LMP when founded in 1829. Policemen were discouraged from frequenting the basic working-class social institution, the pub. To instill discipline and camaraderie, and insulate the rank-and-file from the community, the police authorities attempted to create a distinct police culture through recreation and leisure activities. These included the Police Christian Association, reading and
recognition rooms, sporting activities, dances, banquets, music, amateur theatricals, and family activities such as picnics. Top administrators and social elites attended police events as spectators, but not participants, reflecting the British class system.

This reviewer has few quibbles with such a thorough study. One possible addition would have been greater discussion of the residential neighbourhoods of police families within the social geography of metropolitan London. Hopefully this work will encourage other historians of labour and the working class to take a second look at the police.

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Konni Zilliacus was an important international socialist of the 20th century, the Labour MP, Sydney Silverman, venturing to suggest, on his death in 1967, that he was "the greatest international socialist of my time." (193) Archie Potts' biography of this partially forgotten figure is a timely reminder of the international developments of the turbulent years between 1918 and the 1960s the years of the League of Nations, World War II, and the Cold War — which convulsed world politics. Bravely attempting to offer international solutions to immediate difficulties, Zilliacus earned the distinction, in 1949, of being refused a visa to both the United States and the Soviet Union, and of being expelled from the Labour Party. In many respects this was because whilst he was influenced by Marxist ideas he was committed to international peace through the collective security of the United Nations. Zilliacus was certainly an unconventional socialist and, that rare thing in British mainstream politics, an international socialist. But then he was an unusual British socialist.

Zilliacus was born in Japan in 1894, of a Swedo-Finnish father and an American mother of Scottish descent, as a result of the exile of his father who was a prominent figure in the Finnish independence movement. Konni's early years were spent living in Japan, Finland, and Sweden before his mother, who left his father in 1908, took him to live in England. On her re-marriage in 1912 he went to live in the United States where he attended Yale, finishing with a first in his class with a PhD in 1915. Having concentrated in science for his first two years, he spent his third year studying social sciences and history. Truly international in his experience, a master of eight or more languages, it is natural that he should have become involved in international affairs. By the end of World War I, however, he was once again domiciled in Britain and Europe.

Zilliacus was involved in a range of international posts for more than twenty years. He was active with the Supreme Allied Council which, in 1918, had the mission of establishing whether or not Britain and the Allies should invade Russia on the side of the White Russians. From 1919 onwards he was on the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Geneva and at the hub of international developments. Not always happy with the various actions of the League, or British statesmen, he wrote numerous books, pamphlets, and articles for The Guardian, under a variety of pseudonyms. In particular, he was alarmed at the way in which Britain, and other countries, veered away from taking collective action against Japan after she invaded Manchuria and created the puppet state of Manchuko, was alarmed at the actions of the British government over the Abysinnian crisis, and was particularly critical of the appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain's National Government.

Zilliacus's own solution to fascism was to organize a Popular Front against the National Government to remove it
from office and replace it with a People’s Government which would form an alliance with France, the Soviet Union, and the USA in a Peace Bloc which would be forced to defeat fascism in the war he expected. However, this never occurred and during World War II he was employed in Britain’s Censorship Division, particularly briefing Swedish journalists at the beginning of the war.

In the post-war world Zilliacus was largely concerned with British domestic politics, his opportunities within the international community being restricted in the Cold War climate. To begin with, having been returned as Labour MP for Gateshead in Labour’s landslide general election victory of 1945, Zilliacus found that the new Labour government was more interested in domestic than foreign policy, which was left to a few Labour leaders and presided over by Ernest Bevin, the famous trade union leader who branded him a Communist. Inevitably, Zilliacus was drawn into condemning “Labour’s policy as a dead end” (95) and as being too closely allied to that of the United States. He was thus involved in attacking Bevin’s foreign policy in the House of Commons and in the unsuccessful amendment debate led by Richard Crossman in December 1946. It was at this stage that he visited Stalin, attempted to justify the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in early 1948, and was deeply impressed by Tito and the elections in Yugoslavia. With the estrangement of Tito from Stalin, Zilliacus was increasingly viewed with suspicion by the Soviet Union.

In Britain, however, his criticism of Ernest Bevin’s foreign policy, involvement in the Nenni Telegram affair, opposition to moves to create NATO, and other similar events led to his expulsion from the Labour Party in 1949, along with several others of Morgan Philip’s “Lost Sheep,” losing his Gateshead seat in the 1950 general election. He was readmitted to the Labour Party in February 1952, and became Labour MP for Manchester Gorton in 1955. He continued to focus upon foreign policy, to oppose the existence of NATO, and to support the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Although he was briefly suspended as a Labour MP in 1961, he remained Labour MP for Gorton until his death in the summer of 1967, vehemently attacking the Labour government’s policy of support for the United States’ policies in Vietnam and advocating peace to the bitter end. His ashes were returned to Finland, where they rest near the remains of his father and brother in the Sandudd cemetery in Helsinki.

In relating the life of Zilliacus, Archie Potts has certainly written a readable book of a complex and, hitherto, neglected socialist political figure. It is a good book but I wonder about the balance of it and its reluctance to assess Zilliacus. Many of the 28 chapters begin with a detailed study of international or domestic politics and then Zilliacus’s role and attitude is discussed. I feel certain that much of this introductory material could be reduced and that more focus could be placed on Zilliacus’s views, with his ideas and career being the driving force of the biography. In addition, there is too much of a tendency to let Zilliacus speak for himself and too little desire to evaluate and assess his role and influence in politics. If he was such an important international socialist, why was he so important and what was his impact? Most certainly, the concluding chapter needs to be more than simply a relating of the valedictories offered by leading Labour figures at the memorial meeting held at Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, London on 27 July 1967. It does need to assess his contribution rather than repeat the homage paid to him. Nevertheless, this is a good read on one of the ubiquitous figures of British and international politics in the 20th century and, as Tony Benn writes in his Foreword, this biography “deserves a very wide readership, not least in the ranks of New Labour, which seems to lack any knowledge of, or interest in, the

RAY HEMMINGS was a senior lecturer in Mathematical Education at Leicester University and in retirement has turned to the writing of history. In this short, readable book, he traces the struggle for parliamentary democracy in England in the late 18th century. He does so by developing two parallel narratives of leading radicals: John Cartwright, the founder of the Society for Constitutional Information, and Thomas Hardy, the founder of the London Constitutional Society.

John Cartwright was the third son of a minor country gentleman from Nottinghamshire who went to sea as a midshipman and saw plenty of service in the Seven Years' War, rising to the rank of lieutenant. After the war he served on the Newfoundland station for four years and mobilized for war against the Spanish during the Falkland Islands crisis of 1770-1771. He then returned home, greatly emaciated by his naval endeavours, and during his convalescence threw himself into the looming crisis in domestic and imperial politics over America. He was a major in the Nottinghamshire militia, a territorial army that was organized both as a counterpoint to a government-dominated standing army and as a defence against a possible invasion by the French after their alliance with America in 1778. Like some other naval officers, he declined to fight against the Americans, whom he regarded as freedom fighters engaged in a just war against an oppressive government. Indeed, he openly advocated a form of American home rule as early as 1774, hoping that this major concession would facilitate an ongoing union between Britain and America. It was the American experience that radicalized Cartwright, leading him to advocate universal manhood suffrage in 1776 and four years later, to found the Society for Constitutional Information, an organization dedicated to broadening the frontiers of political literacy and to disseminating radical tracts at subsidized prices.

Cartwright's narrative is interwoven with that of Thomas Hardy, the Scottish shoemaker who nearly left for America to set up a shoe factory in New York but ventured instead to London where he helped found the London Constitution Society in 1792. Hardy's story is, of course, better known, having been central to the first section of Edward Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*. Hemmings does not add a lot to an already well-trodden story save that he stresses how the writings of Major Cartwright and the Duke of Richmond, who routinely moved the adoption of annual parliaments and universal manhood suffrage in the Lords during the 1780s, were central to Hardy's radicalism. His major contribution is his concise and intelligible account of Hardy's trial for treason in 1794, noting not only the legal intricacies of what treason meant in that era — whether it had to involve an actual conspiracy to kill the king or not — but also the drama of the event and its subsequent significance in radical memory.

Unfortunately for Hemmings, the year of his book also saw the publication of John Barrell's *Imagining the King's Death*, a brilliant investigation of the treason trials and their meaning. Working from the original statute of 1351 which made it treason to "compass or imagine [intend] the death of our lord the king," Barrell showed how the Crown prosecution, in its desire to suppress the radical movement, stretched the meaning of treason to cover "overt acts" which might lead to the deposing or imprisonment of the king. They invited juries to imagine the sequence of events and circumstances
that made such an attack upon the king's authority likely if not inevitable. "Imagining the king's death" thus took on new, sinister, and capacious overtones, with topical analogies to the "imprisonment" (and subsequent execution) of Louis XVI in France and by extension to the debate over political representation that was foregrounded by Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, where reason and representative transparency are counterposed to tradition, law, and the spectacle of majesty. Barrell's elaborate contextualizing of the treason trials and his play on the fluid signification of "imagine" at an acute crisis in British politics make Hemmings' account look parched. What it underscores is Hemming's very insular approach to the radical movement, his failure to see how central the American and French revolutions were to the aspirations of British radical endeavour.

Hemmings' insular approach means that other opportunities are missed. His account of Cartwright's first democratic statement, *Take Your Choice*, fails to examine how the militia major reworked the Country Whig tradition in the context of the American Revolution and looked forward to dramatic changes in the British political landscape with an almost millenarian intensity, describing the British polity as a system of corruption heading for a "Niagrian fall." Hemmings spends too much of his time criticizing Cartwright for proposing a property qualification for MPs in a new democratically-elected parliament and not recognizing the novelty of his pamphlet, which, with its demand for equal electoral districts, payment of MPs, a secret ballot, and annual parliaments, anticipated much of the Chartist program of reform in the next century. Equally important, Hemmings does not seem to understand the dilemma that radicals faced in this age of revolutions and prescient change, that of how to put radical "reformations" into effect. This is why issues of mass petitioning, remonstrances, conventions, or "grand national associations" to use Cartwright's phrase, assumed as much importance as electoral franchises and strategies to get men of integrity into parliament. To focus so exclusively on the potentially inclusive nature of parliament — in Hemmings' frame of reference whether working men were eligible or not to vote and be elected — runs the risk of anachronism. The late 18th century was the age of radical enlightenment, high political expectation in the wake of new liberated nations, and also one which had to grapple with a moving frontier of political literacy in which crowds were sometimes politically volatile and credulous. Hemmings' inclination is to adopt a Whiggish perspective, to see the changes and challenges of this era as part of the long road to political democracy. This filters out millenarian expectation, revolution, and radical revolt, and privileges parliamentary probity. It highjacks complex debates about the nature of citizenship, public space and debate, the appropriation and reworking of old political languages or narratives, and the fate of universalist. Enlightenment assumptions in an age of militant nationalisms.

Also disconcerting is Hemmings' tendency to contrast Cartwright and Hardy and their respective institutions in class terms without appreciating the extent to which these men and their fellow travellers were part of the same emancipatory project. Hemmings is hard on Cartwright for agreeing with other landowners to regulate the wages of itinerant workers on their farms. Fair enough. He does not mention that Cartwright also saw the militia as a training ground for mass citizenship and believed that military service — often imposed upon poor people — strengthened their entitlements to full participation within the British polity. Nor does he stress the degree to which Cartwright's Society of Constitutional Information encouraged the formation of democratic clubs across the country in 1792-3, circulated radical literature to them, and assumed the leadership of the
radical movement in May 1792, when the fledgling plebeian societies became increasingly vulnerable to government prosecution.

True enough, some leaders of the SCI like John Horne Tooke abandoned the radical wagon when things got hot. But that was certainly not the case of all, least of all Cartwright himself, who soldiered on during the bleak years of radical blight to help pioneer the Hampden clubs in the post-war era. Cartwright may have been a bit of a patrician, but he was a populist patrician all the same who believed that the “poor peasant,” specifically the poorest male peasant, was entitled to full political rights. How those rights might have been exercised in the economic sphere was not something that Cartwright, or any other radical of his era, addressed very systematically, with the possible exception of the agrarian utopian Thomas Spence.

Whether those rights could encompass women or people of colour, an issue that emerged with the confluence of abolitionism with radicalism, were also unresolved issues in this era of dramatic international transformations. Historians have begun to unpack those issues in the wake of feminist and multicultural agendas, but they will not find much to work with in Hemmings’ study. Although Hemmings briefly alludes to Hardy’s friendship with Olaudah Equiano and has two fleeting references to Mary Wollstonecraft, he has no interest in these new perspectives, or in anything remotely connected to the cultural turn. This is a staid, pre-Thompsonian treatment of two radical figures of the late 18th century, nicely written, but dated.

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THIS WORK, which originally appeared in French in 1998, is a product of a renowned historian’s quest to study ordinary people instead of elites, members of the great majority whose obscure condition and illiteracy meant they conveyed nothing to future history, except inadvertently in administrative archives. Arguing that the current social history of ordinary people is based on the traces left by very unusual people who are wrongly taken to be spokesmen for the rest, Corbin seeks to rectify this by studying someone so obscure, unimportant, and anonymous as to be totally unremembered. He chose his native department, the Orne, picked out in it at random a tiny and obscure commune, Origny-le-Butin, and from its municipal archives chose, again at random, two late 18th-century names, from which he selected the one with a longer life. Thus the focus of the book is one Louis-François Pinagot (1798-1876), the son of a carter, who worked mostly at making wooden shoes (sabots, a trade translated in this book as clog-maker), but sometimes as a labourer. Pinagot married the daughter of a farmer at the age of twenty, she bore him eight children before her death in 1846.

Illiterate, leaving no written traces beyond scrawled crosses on voting registers, and often officially indigent, he vanished totally without trace when he died. Corbin, however, sets out to collect and collate all traces of him, so as to organize them into a picture of the outlines of his life, to reconstruct his times, family environment (Pinagot’s relatives are all also investigated), circle of friends, community, probable values and beliefs, and to imagine the feelings, emotional relationships, and forms of sociability that might have affected him. In this way Corbin hopes to understand this period in a
wretched part of one of the poorest departments in France. The book provides fully researched accounts of the area, countryside, agriculture, places, housing, transport, sounds, forms of exchange (with an apparent assumption that dealings for money actually meant money changing hands), produce, diet, animals, population, occupations, family structures, education, literacy, conversations, the social division between farmers and woodsmen, the particular trades in which Pinagot and his relatives worked (sabot-making, spinning, and glove-making), local quarrels (with a long catalogue of disputes over such matters as land boundaries and rights of way), standard of living, periods of famine, memory, celebrations, National Guard, and elections.

Corbin wishes to make Pinagot part of the memory of the 19th century, which can sound like a folie de grandeur. No doubt Pinagot will henceforth be referred to in historical works, so that, in the terminology of E.H. Carr, he has become a historical fact. In truth, not surprisingly, little is discovered about Pinagot beyond the bare outlines of his life, and the probable greater comfort of his later years. After the last bad time of 1853-4, as sabot-making became more remunerative, spinning was replaced by the better-paid glove-making in the employment of female members of the family, agriculture was modernized, the forest better exploited, the economy more national and fluid, and all his children of working age. In 1856 he bought a little cottage with a small plot attached to it and thus became a landowner, and in the 1870s his eldest son became a municipal councillor. As Corbin recognizes, a biography of Pinagot is impossible, and we can only hope to create an evocation of his life. Because of the lack of information, Corbin proceeds to speculate on such matters as networks of solidarity, what Pinagot could have seen and felt, and his views of the past. This leads him to pick out events Pinagot was likely to have heard or known about, including the cahiers for the Estates-General, chouannerie, periods of dearth and popular protest (of which an account is given), conflicts over the local church, the impingement of the outside world in the invasions of 1815 and 1870-1, but not Napoleon. Corbin's defence of this "re-creation" through speculation is that all historians speculate anyway, which will make some readers uneasy.

The main lesson of this book would seem to be the impossibility of knowing the thoughts of most of the people of the past. While it is of some interest to know about Pinagot and his relatives, and this little impoverished area and the overriding concerns of its inhabitants, it is not clear that a new perspective on history has been gained. The aim seems to be to get at ordinary people usually missed out in historical research, by going behind the misleading partial pictures of them that arise from the usual sources and such exceptional testimonies as those of Menetra and Menocchio. This is to be done by looking at someone so obscure that we are freed from any intermediary opinions, preconceptions, or interpretations of him. No such distorting and obscuring pictures get in the way, even from the man himself through such exceptional actions as giving us a written statement on anything. But because so little can, consequently, be discovered about him, the reconstruction has to be filled out with information on people like him in this small area, culled from the usual (suspect) documents created by outsiders. Because these have no direct connection with Pinagot himself, they are used to speculate about him. Perhaps, instead, we should be content to recognize the subjectivity of our sources instead of trying to circumvent them, and agree, with Collingwood and Bloch, that we seek to extract from the sources things they were not intended to tell us. What is really gained by the focus on this one man remains unclear, as it does not even lead, as biography does, to any understanding or recognition of individuality. Pinagot fig-
ures not as an individual but as a sort of vessel for some very generalized statements and assertions that often obscure the multiplicity of the past.

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**IN THE INTRODUCTION to** *Childhood in the Promised Land*, Laura-Lee Downs offers to “deepen our understanding of the meanings of childhood in contemporary urban culture.” (12) The book fulfills this initial promise by exploring the rich history of the *colonies de vacances* in France from the end of the 19th century through the 1950s. This first, in-depth, historical study of the *colonies* explores the summertime worlds, “rural collectives,” and “toy republics” that adults across the political spectrum in France have created for children for over a century. According to Downs, a network of diverse *colonies* developed out of a broad range of movements in France: Protestant charity and republican school programs, “Catholic defense” against state and societal secularization, as well as Socialist and Communist initiatives inspired by “leftist ruralism” and the desire to build a utopian future by encouraging the healthy political and social development of working-class children.

*Childhood in the Promised Land* traces the emergence of the *colonies* from their earliest incarnations as charitable and public-health initiatives designed to “repair the bodies” and “restore the souls” of working-class children. Beginning in the 1880s, first Protestant charitable organizations, then republican projects to extend children’s educational experience into the summer months (*colonies scolaires*), shared the conviction that the future health of the French nation depended on the well-being of its working-class children. Encouraged by anxieties about depopulation and living conditions in an increasingly urban and industrial France, early *colonies* stressed hygiene as their central project. Transplanting poor, urban children to the French countryside for several weeks of fresh air and healthy activity, the *colony* experience could effect both individual and national rejuvenation by saving society’s most fragile members from various forms of physical and moral “pollution.” According to Downs, while the hygienic emphasis would never disappear altogether, the pedagogic possibilities of the *colonies* became more of a focus for organizers into the 20th century. Regardless of the confessional and/or political motivations behind each distinct *colony*, the twin concerns of hygiene and pedagogy formed a kind of double helix at the core of these urban-rural experiments throughout their history.

Towards the end of the 19th century, Catholic *colonies* developed out of an existing system of apprenticeships for working-class youth known as *patronages*. The Catholic *colony* functioned as “one key to maintaining a positive Catholic presence in the lives of children and their families” (90) who were otherwise “vulnerable” to the increasingly secular distractions of the republican school and working-class culture. Articulating their mission in deliberate “opposition to the narrowly intellectual and overly materialist mass education of the public schools,” (86) Catholic *colonies* helped with the gradual spread of child-centered, “active” methods and practices to later *colonies* and extra-curricular activities for children in France, including the growth of the scout-
Emphasizing the progressiveness of Catholic colonie pedagogy, Downs disrupts assumptions made all too often by historians of the "modern" period: that secularization happened all at once, and that the Church’s role in "modern" societies in the west has been, always and necessarily, "reactionary."

Having traced the history of pre-World War I colonies in France, Downs focuses on examples of colonies developed by two working-class municipalities on the outskirts of Paris during the interwar years: the Socialist “garden city” of Suresnes and Communist Ivry-sur-Seine. One of the strengths of this book is to show how political difference did not obstruct the sharing and borrowing of pedagogic models and strategies between different groups, “even as they competed for the same children.” (5) Another is the way in which Downs’ comparative study traces strategic and practical differences within the Left, differences between Socialist and Communist versions of the colonie. In Suresnes, an entire network of social assistance and public education linked the colonie to municipal plans to improve housing, education, and medical treatment. The colonie was an important part of an overall project of social engineering managed by a growing group of “experts”: social workers, doctors and educators. In the case of Communist Ivry-sur-Seine, the colonie functioned itself as a model of a future utopian society. The Communist colonie created an imagined political community of children in which games and exercises prepared participants for a political future they would bring about. Involving children in the colonie also functioned as an important way of connecting working-class families to the mission of the municipality’s Communist political leadership.

Throughout the book, Downs raises important questions about how historians analyze vectors of power in discussions of class and politics. Decrying “the well-fed...vantage point of the late-twentieth century” that might easily reduce the public health projects of earlier generations to the machinations of bourgeois and state authorities, Downs defends these efforts as responses to a “genuine crisis” (37) in industrializing France. Downs’ discussion of the “participatory urbanism” developed in Suresnes also takes on the perception of the working-class family as the pure “victim” of state interference and bourgeois intervention. In both Suresnes and Ivry-sur-Seine, colonies developed as part of municipal, working-class political and social agendas. Later in the 20th century, Downs argues, the development of colonies for middle-class children was part of a “trickle-up” movement from working-class and local strategies to practices adopted more generally by the growing welfare state in France. Finally, Downs rejects what she refers to as “the jaundiced eye of Foucauldian suspicion” (7) that might read the colonies as expressions of state, Church, or other forms of “discipline.” Downs insists that the colonies’ history cannot be read in terms of “indoctrination” because of the fundamental complexity of the play-centered pedagogic models that came to dominate them. In their emphasis on freedom and children’s natural “capacity for moral reasoning,” colonies “across the political spectrum” functioned as crucial testing and training grounds for a “modern,” Western citizenship predicated on “the development of an autonomous moral and political agency in adult life.” (236)

Indeed, the “Foucauldian” functions in Downs’ analysis as a kind of short form for a number of possible critiques of the colonies. While I think Downs suggests a viable alternative to any cynical judgment of the colonies’ “dark purposes,” (37) I wonder if a more developed Foucauldian reading of the phenomena treated in the book would necessarily take the simplistic analytic form she anticipates and rejects in defense of complexity. It would also be interesting to explore further how children participated in and responded to the models and practices used to organize their own childhoods. Downs includes ex-
cerpts from children’s journals and adult recollections of colonie participants that invite more discussion of how children may have imagined, experienced and helped to create the varied social and political “promised lands” intended to encourage their growth and development. In the interpretive questions it raises, and in its insistence on the possibilities of working-class agency and social change, Children in the Promised Land is a provocative and hopeful book.

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THIS BOOK is an “updated” version of a work first published in 1999 and is based on research conducted in the 1990s. It identifies trends that encourage successful worker co-ops like those at Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain to imitate the behaviour of transnational corporations, thereby undermining their democratic roots. The original volume won the International Communication Association’s Best Book Award for 1999-2001. The author is Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah. The publisher is well-known for its series in labour studies, in particular, research into employee participation.

A worker co-op is a business enterprise owned by its employees on an equal basis. It differs from other employee ownership models because of its one person/one vote principle. As a non-capitalist enterprise, a worker co-op offers an alternative business model. This book tries to answer the question of how alternative social values, such as the participatory democracy inherent in worker co-ops, can be sustained in a complex business organization, which seeks to compete globally. The question implies that there is an inherent tension between market growth and employee democracy in which market demands result in a diminution of employee control. The author believes that the demands of productivity and the requirements of democracy result in a struggle over corporate identity.

The Mondragon co-operative system that the author studied in the 1990s was started in the 1950s (with roots in the 1940s) as a small manufacturing business that has grown into a variety of worker co-ops, educational institutions, a large bank, and assorted consumer co-ops, including a large grocery chain. The 150 co-ops in the system have 42,000 employees, sales of $7 billion US, and constitute the tenth largest non-state enterprise in Spain. This spectacular growth has been both a source of pride for the worker co-operative movement and a challenge to democratic principles. It has also resulted in the Mondragon co-ops being the most studied (next to the kibbutzim) model of co-operative enterprise in the world.

The author’s argument begins with an outline of the ethos of multinational corporate capitalism in the 1990s, which he sees as being centered on the mantra of market demands. He contends that this ethos is a challenge to the principles of democracy, equality, and solidarity that Mondragon represents. The author’s American universe is the world’s most hyped-up management culture with endless concern with new approaches to increasing profit. This “how-to” culture jumps from one management technique or buzzword to another.

While living in the ethos created by this hyper-capitalism, the author also brings with him the values of a smaller, alternative American movement that promotes democracy in business — everything from employee profit-sharing to communal enterprise. The roots of this approach are populist, an emphasis on the voice of the people being heard in the workplace. This movement fits with the
wider American view that the US represents a radical sense of democracy that does not exist in Europe and that it is a place where change, innovation, and experimentation are a priority.

The author finds the new Mondragon deviating from its founding values as it pursues a policy of aggressive growth. He claims, as other researchers have, that Mondragon's ideology has compromised its co-operative values. The structure of the enterprises remains co-operative but the reality of operations limits employee participation. Earlier research into worker-owned firms by Jaroslav Vanek pointed out that small worker-owned businesses tended to develop an anti-growth ethic once the needs of the members for income and security were satisfied. As workers, they lacked an entrepreneurial capitalist ethic of expansionism and personal wealth accumulation. Cheney suggests that a corporate growth model as embraced by the Mondragon co-ops is closer to capitalist values than co-op ones.

The anti-growth ethos associated with the worker co-operative model can be overcome by an elite with a wider interest than just satisfying the members' basic needs. At Mondragon these goals came originally from the social ideology of progressive Catholicism, Basque nationalism, and resistance to Franco's centralizing fascism. These wider factors play only a peripheral role in Cheney's discussion. Because of his preoccupation with workplace democracy, his focus is the fate of employee participation.

One very important aspect signaling a pro-market ethic at Mondragon was an increase in the pay scales from the original 1 to 3 ratio (lowest to highest paid) to the current 70 per cent of market pay for its upper management. The author considers this an important departure from Mondragon's original principles. This may be a departure from original principles at Mondragon but the payment of market-competitive salaries to managers in co-operative enterprises of various kinds anywhere in the world is commonplace. Liberal democratic co-ops based on the Rochdale model, the most common co-op structure in the world, need to be competitive with the capitalist environment in which they operate. Paying market salaries does not undermine Rochdale principles. The radically democratic wage ratios in the early years of Mondragon reflected the communitarian values and Christian egalitarianism of reform Catholicism and not co-op principles.

Another departure that Cheney analyzes is the establishment of new plants in joint ventures outside of Spain and Mondragon ownership of enterprises that are not co-operatives. Promotion of co-operatives is a co-operative principle so one may conclude from this that the sanctity of the co-op model is not the essence of Mondragon. In fact, Mondragon has never exported its co-operative ideology outside of Spain. What the Mondragon system has learned is that their co-operative form, like the kibbutzim in Israel, is sui generis. These models have grown out of a particular historical situation and are grounded in a geographic locale that does not make them exportable in a universal way. They belong to the culture and society in which they were born and to which they are committed.

What the author has missed that is so crucial about Mondragon's success is the importance of non-co-operative values rooted in Basque identity. In fact, Doug Lionais of the University of Durham argued in a paper given at the 2002 Canadian Association for Studies in Co-operation that it is the non-cooperative features of community-based business that are the key to success and longevity. Mondragon is successful because it has made pragmatic adaptations in defense of its regional development and not because of its co-operative principles.

Cheney has an essentialist view of social values rather than viewing them as in-
He conceives of co-op principles as the central goal of Mondragon and in this he is wrong. Co-operative principles and values were basic tools for achieving valued employment, social cohesion, regional regeneration, and other wider community values that were to maintain the Basque way of life so important to its Catholic founder and visionary. Co-ops were approved by reformist Catholicism as a form of Catholic communitarianism expressing Christian principles against models of communist state ownership and capitalist exploitation. Worker ownership and participation may be defining aspects of Mondragon but not its raison d'etre. In Canada the New Dawn Community enterprises in Nova Scotia, also founded by a Catholic priest, use co-operative structures to achieve broader goals of community survival and integrity. There is a similar social vision at New Dawn and Mondragon that is deeper than the horizon of workplace democracy.

Cheney does a good job of documenting the threat to democracy at Mondragon forced by the ethic of growth. But growth is not just a corporate value. It exists for individuals, communities, and states. Mondragon has become the equivalent of a General Motors in the Basque region through intense work, technical leadership, loyalty to the people of the region, and the desire to be world-class in a globalized economy. To protect its co-operative base Mondragon has had to expand internationally to remain price-competitive in a region where costs keep increasing as the standard of living goes up. Criticism that this has led to potentially exploitative relations outside the co-op structure is no different from criticism that co-ops in the Western world do not treat their employees fairly. It may be a valid criticism but it is not necessarily anti-cooperative in that the interests of a co-op's members are paramount.

Mondragon's longtime dependence on a managerial class is a bedrock of the system. Managerial classes, technocracies, and bureaucracies are hindrances to democracy, but they do not destroy it. The strategic thinking required of the management cadre does not mesh easily with the tactical interests of workers. Entrepreneurial risk, capital investment, market forces etc. are the concerns of the former group while pay, pensions, and hours of work are the concerns of the latter. Only in small-scale enterprises can the two be brought together in a formal way. Thus one can achieve a utopian ideal of the worker-owner-entrepreneur but at a cost. What is crucial is that the management elite and Mondragon's worker-owners have never sold their enterprises to capitalist competitors the way various successful American worker co-ops have. The system has maintained employment in the region, has created new co-operative jobs, and has secured the future of the co-op worker-ownership model like no other worker co-op in history. Enforcing stricter democratic practices at Mondragon to preserve founding values could very well undermine this achievement and even lead to its demise.

Workplace democracy is a narrow definition of a human being. In large systems like that of Mondragon, individual power is limited even on the job. Working in large corporate structures means that people often seek personal satisfaction and control in areas outside of work — in what entertains them, in the sports they play or watch, in the hobbies they have, the voluntary groups they belong to, where they worship, and in those they love. It would do well for investigators to think about this and not be so restrictive in their definition of life and work at Mondragon.

Cheney's research provides a valuable synopsis of the broad issues facing the Mondragon model, issues that Mondragonians have been debating for several decades. The quotes from interviews he conducted with key players are useful and insightful. His in-depth discussion of workplace democracy is recent and his knowledge of the extensive literature on Mondragon and general work-
place democracy issues is excellent. In many ways he tries to be balanced in his assessment of the trends at Mondragon, pointing out both benefits and drawbacks. But his conclusion that management’s emulation of trends in corporate capitalism is undermining Mondragon’s democratic cooperative achievements is over-stated. He has an American-rooted evangelical interest in workplace democracy that is not translatable to Mondragon. His criticism that Mondragon currently lacks someone to provide a counterbalance to the culture of globalizing capitalism is correct but, again, that earlier commitment came from a founding visionary, working in a different business environment. The managerial elite that drive Mondragon today cannot be expected to be anything more than disciples, keepers of the grail. That they have remained true to the original vision to the flawed degree they have is to their credit. I believe that Mondragon workers would rather have a flawed system of workplace democracy and remain economically viable, than have a radical democratic structure that leads to collapse.

What would be interesting and revolutionary is having Mondragon’s elite develop a radical corporate model that the great majority of the world’s co-ops could use for growth in a capitalist environment. If the impressive mixed-ownership model of second-tier co-ops at Mondragon (workers, consumers, and the community) were adopted by the thousands of co-ops in the world, Mondragon would have caused a revolution in co-operative principles. Likewise, the maintenance of first-tier worker co-ops as the focal point of the co-operative experiment remains radically innovative. The worker co-op element in the world co-operative movement is a small and unimportant element compared to consumer, agricultural, and credit union co-ops. There is nothing else like Mondragon in the world and it remains a radical model for co-operation, even after 50 years. In the last analysis Mondragon, even in its present form, is more democratic, more co-operative, and more egalitarian than anything else in the co-op universe. Cheney’s concern that Mondragon may be turning into a capitalist wolf in co-operative clothing is unjustified. Only when Mondragon stops being a co-operative system, can we cry wolf. I doubt that will happen soon.

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Michael Melancon & Alice K. Pate eds.,
New Labor History: Worker Identity and Experience in Russia, 1840-1918
(Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica 2002)

THIS TIMELY COLLECTION of essays makes an important contribution to our understanding of Russian workers in late Imperial and revolutionary Russia, and signposts the direction for Russian labour history in this post-Soviet era. The contributors, drawn together by the “Allan K. Wildman Group for the study of Russian workers and society,” include eminent figures from the field, as well as up-and-coming scholars. Though the essays, organized in a loosely chronological format, encompass a broad scope of different approaches, overall they chime a harmonious accord.

Boris Gorshkov’s study on children working in factories is an important contribution to our understanding of Russia’s working class, not least because it plugs an important gap in the historiography. Setting his study firmly in the context of developing civil society, Gorshkov discusses attitudes towards child labour, and state responses to popular concerns, which gradually set restrictions on child labour through the 1880s and 1890s. I was disappointed that the author did not explore the question of notions of childhood, and at what age youths were considered adults, particularly as one of the later essays (Steinberg 131) refers to this specifically.
Page Herrlinger's illuminating piece on factory workers and religion, specifically Russian Orthodoxy, places religious worship in the factory context, and in doing so offers a fascinating perspective on the challenges of factory life, and on religion in the continuity of social change. Herrlinger openly challenges the oft-expressed dichotomy between workers and peasants, and uses religion to expose the ways in which workers and their families breached this dichotomy. The practical problems of maintaining a religious lifestyle are clearly spelled out, thus offering an alternative explanation for the well-documented "loss of faith" of the urban lower class. Herrlinger also addresses the ways in which the church itself adapted and compromised to reach its flock. She makes a number of useful and underexplored connections, which it is to be hoped will be pursued in future work: the positive connections between Christianity and socialism, for example, the connection of interest in religion with a broader trend of interest in education, and most interesting of all, the ways in which Orthodoxy was sometimes channelled into secular, radical, or political directions.

The next chapter, by Sergei Firsov, also deals with workers and the Orthodox Church. I found this chapter the least satisfying of the collection, and one that was in some respects discordant with the collection overall. A number of Firsov's conclusions seemed to contradict those of Herrlinger in the previous chapter; he suggests an absolute conflict between church and socialism, and argues that the church "struggled against urban influences," (68) in contrast to Herrlinger's more nuanced position. Firsov does not link into some key Western historiography, notably the work of Joan Neuberger on hooliganism in late Imperial Russia. Mikhailov's chapter on self-organization in the workplace begins, rather ambitiously, by suggesting a direct link between the collective mentality in the peasant commune, and forms of self-organization that developed in the factories. While his first examples, which refer to organizations such as zemliachestva and artels, which sprang directly from peasant ways of life, are fine, the link between peasant collective mentality and the elected elders' system and trade unions is less easy to support.

Alice Pate tackles the numerous failed attempts to unify the Social Democrat party, and argues, significantly, that the party's activists and party workers broadly supported a united party, and were less conscious of the significance of ideological differences, while the party's divisions into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions were retained only by the machinations of the party's émigrés, Lenin foremost among them. Pate suggests that the domination of the discourse by factionalist Social Democrat language was what determined the eventual continuation of factionalism, despite the non-partisan realities for grassroots activists. Pate makes her case convincingly, if somewhat laboriously, and comes to the important conclusion that younger workers were not in fact moving towards Bolshevism as was claimed by the seminal social historians, but that they were moving more generally towards Social Democracy, in a more broadly conceived form.

Mark Steinberg's contribution takes a very different approach. Using as his sources worker literature of the late Imperial period, Steinberg discusses the importance of conceptions of individualism, suffering, and self in the development of working-class identity. Rejecting notions of fatalistic Russian "masochism of suffering," Steinberg nonetheless notes that the "moral poetics of suffering preoccupied Russian workers." (127) This is a sensitive and thought-provoking piece, which points up a number of ambiguities and problems. Worker literature often railed against the drunkenness, apathy, and loutishness of the "working masses," and in doing so the worker-writer identified himself as a "stranger": both a worker...
and yet outside the worker milieu. This 'outsider' mantle is highlighted by the language used by worker-writers, which echoed Russia's high literary traditions, rather than popular speech and folklore. Steinberg's concluding point brings us back to political realities, pointing out that in a profoundly unequal society, recognition of self-worth was very dangerous. The importance of this 'recognition of self' is reflected in the numerous worker appeals for respect of their human dignity.

I found it slightly puzzling that the editors chose to place William Rosenberg's important essay towards the end of this collection. Rosenberg's paper essentially sets out a theoretical position which most of the essays here seem in some respects to emulate. This much is acknowledged by the editors in the afterword. Rosenberg challenges the processes through which we operate as historians, and suggests that we reconsider and challenge the direction of historical study. Essentially a defence of social history against the encroachments of post-modernism, and post everything else, Rosenberg's essay addresses the problem of the discrediting of class as a category, and points out that the collapse of the Soviet Union does not in itself necessitate a redrawing of the past. Rather, new evidence and new theoretical paradigms, such as have been produced by cultural and gender history, can do that.

Michael Melancon's piece on the Petrograd factory committees between March and June 1917 debunks the myth of Bolshevik dominance of the factory committee movement. Through a typically detailed study of the archival evidence, the conclusion drawn is that the committees were consistently radical, but that they were not Bolshevik. He furthers a position he has presented before very convincingly that party political affiliations were of very limited importance to the operation of shop-floor politics. He points out that the factory committees' pursuit of "full-blooded workers' control," (183) often assumed to be an indicator of Bolshevik affiliations, was in fact nothing more than a pragmatic response to the loss of factory administrators in the first days after revolution. Melancon convincingly suggests that pragmatism, rather than political dogmatism, provides a far more convincing explanation for the ebb and flow of party political support in 1917 and 1918.

The final chapter, by Michael C. Hickey, presents a detailed account of a month-long strike that occurred in Smolensk during 1917. Hickey's extensive work on revolutionary Smolensk enables him to present a detailed and nuanced picture here. He emphasizes the importance of placing the Smolensk strike, which broadly followed national contours of labour unrest, in a specific regional context. He makes a number of important conclusions, notably the importance of the strike's failure as reflecting a broader rejection of the moderate socialists, and the rising heat of class rhetoric.

This collection will be of great value to undergraduate and postgraduate students, as well as to specialists of Russian late Imperial and revolutionary history.

Sarah Badcock
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STEPHEN CROWLEY and David Ost have edited a valuable collection of studies of labour and the Eastern European transition that has much to offer a wider audience. The country chapters and the editors' introduction and conclusion attempt to explain why, in the face of the horrific economic crisis, there has not only been little sustained labour protest but labour as an institutional force remains weak.
Although the editors did not impose a common framework, the authors elaborate similar themes which give the book considerable coherence. One theme is implicit in all, namely that the “elites” that consolidated their power did so at the expense of the mass of the population and the transition was therefore about class issues. The question is why, in the face of this, did class formation not occur at the bottom?

One way of measuring class formation is in terms of social protest. Strikes have taken place but they have tended to be what Crowley and Ost term “strikes of despair.” These defensive actions have been most evident amongst miners, transport workers (especially rail), health and education workers but they have often had a lightning character. Workers as a whole have not been able to turn justifiable grievances into a means of mobilization. A second aspect of class formation is more organizational. Why have trade unions proved so weak? Crowley and Ost summarize the situation by noting that union density has dropped to about one third of the workforce in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, two fifths in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, half in Serbia, and two thirds in Russia and the Ukraine. In comparative terms these figures are not unrespectable and, paradoxically, the reformed Communist trade unions remain, in most countries, the largest civic organizations. But real strength relies on the ability to persuade government, to have some national political representation, and to win collective bargaining in the workplace. Here the record, as each author shows, is poor in every country examined. At the bottom workplace representation is weak and at the top unions have, at best, secured an “illusory corporatism.”

To explain this the authors discuss how material factors — real wage cuts, wage arrears, unemployment, and mass poverty — have undercut the capacity of workers to resist a deterioration in their conditions. Organizational-resource factors have also affected the capacity of unions to reform, adjust and sustain activity at appropriate levels though the editors suggest that official unions did quite well in the formal transfer of physical resources. The biggest problem, Crowley and Ost suggest, is that of ideas and identities. They are led to this conclusion by the fact that despite the variation in economic conditions, state institutions, and organizational resources, labour organizations remain weak, suggesting that there may be a common third factor at work. This is a crisis in socialist ideology that has served to delegitimize class cleavages in favour of identity-based cleavages.

As a group the authors share the view that this labour weakness has vitiated the possibly of a more democratic transition. Indeed several authors allude to the possibility that labour’s weakness has helped to create a space for xenophobic nationalism and far right politics to develop. But it might also be argued (with the possible exception of the former Yugoslavia and even there organization on a nationalist basis has been intermittent) that the factors that have weakened labour’s capacity to mobilize have also made it difficult for the far right to capitalize on the unfocused anger that the authors show exists. What is interesting in this sense is the comparative freedom of manoeuvre that those running these societies have had to manipulate the transition in their wider interest.

But a bigger issue surfaces at a number of points and this is reflected in the title of the book. Crowley and Ost begin by pointing out that many expected labour to be more prominent in the transition since labour appeared to be central to the old system. Yet at various points the editors and different authors also point to the way that labour suffered in the old societies and how misleading were the propaganda claims, even about Yugoslav self-management. What then was the nature of this system of “workers’ states” in which real workers played so limited a role? This is not just an abstract question. If workers had been sold a lie, if they were
exploited, if they were denied the capacity for independent organization, then there was no reason to expect that they would have so strong a presence in the transition. That could only come with sustained struggles at the base. Some spectacular explosions did occur in 1989-1991 but labour did not experience a sustained mobilization that could be translated into a strong and independent base.

But one possible implication of this argument is that a top-down transformation or restructuring of both society at large, and "trade unions" within this, was bound to be alienating since what was really needed was a bottom-up change. In these terms labour has not fallen from grace (as a real indication of the position of workers in a "workers' state," [sic] consider the fact that nearly 200,000 workers were killed at work in the last two decades of the old USSR when things were improving). If this is right, although it is difficult to disagree with the pessimism of the book in terms of the problems of the mass of the population in the transition, perhaps a more positive view could have been taken both analytically and politically of the struggles that have occurred and continue to occur. It is out of these that we are likely to see a stronger labour movement eventually emerge.

How these struggles in the future might relate to the existing labour organizations is an important problem. In the first days of the transition it seemed as if new unofficial unions might displace the discredited state ones. But this has not occurred. Each of the national chapters shows that they remain as weak, indeed often weaker, than reformed old organizations. To this extent any rebuilding of unions that does occur may have to start with the material at hand even if it is of doubtful quality.

Perhaps the most effective help that can come from outside is in showing the value of basic trade union principles and methods. But whether in the form of the International Labour Organization, the European Union, Western trade unions, and many Western academics, much of the advice and help that did come in the 1990s focused more on illusions of creating top-down tripartite structures. That these could not work without a real base is evident from the discussions here.

But readers should be encouraged to explore such themes for themselves and they will be better able to do so on the basis of the rich material in Crowley and Ost's collection.

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Crises et renouveau du capitalisme. Le 20e siècle en perspective (Laval: Presses de l’Université Laval 2002)

L'OUVRAGE se divise en deux parties. La première partie examine quatre crises : celle des années trente (I. Joshua), celle des années 1970 (M. Husson), les crises financières contemporaines (M. Zerbato), et la crise de la dette (É. Toussaint). La seconde partie porte sur la nouvelle économie et le renouveau actuel du capitalisme. S'agit-il là d'un changement de cours du capitalisme comme ce fut le cas après la Longue dépression (G. Duménil et D. Lévy), d'un nouveau régime d'accumulation, « à domination financière » (F. Chesnais), ou encore d'un nouveau cycle long dans une dynamique de longue durée qui arrive à son terme (I. Wallerstein) ? Le débat est ouvert. Les deux parties sont précédées d'une introduction et suivies d'une discussion entre les participants.

Renouveau du capitalisme ou ....

De la première partie, je retiendrai le texte de Joshua, qui se démarque nettement des trois autres, somme toute très « classiques ». L'auteur, en effet, propose une explication originale de la crise de 1929, développée plus en détail dans son livre, La crise de 1929 et l'émergence américaine (Paris, PUF,
« La crise débute aux États-Unis, franchit l'Atlantique, frappe l'Europe, et fait retour, amplifiée, en Amérique » (p.11). Le schéma est fondu, dit l'auteur, mais cache l'essentiel : il n'y a pas eu une mais deux crises, l'une aux États-Unis et l'autre en Europe, « dont l'addition des effets donnera la grande dépression ». L'origine de la crise américaine doit être recherchée dans l'essor rapide d'un capitalisme moderne qui s'est fait au détriment de l'agriculture et de la production artisanale et dans la chute brutale de la consommation, amplifiée par la généralisation du salariat. La crise européenne est avant tout celle de l'Angleterre, déclassée par les États-Unis et incapable de soutenir le symbole de sa puissance passée, l'étalon-or. En clair, pour l'auteur, les faits démentent l'hypothèse selon laquelle la crise de 1929 serait une crise de suraccumulation.

De la seconde partie, je retiendrai le texte de Wallerstein. Ses dièses sont bien connues et on les retrouve dans son texte. D'une certaine façon, Wallerstein prend à contre-pied la thèse de Fukuyama sur la fin de l'histoire pour essayer de nous convaincre que l'économie-monde capitalistique est entrée dans une phase critique, ultime. L'argument central de l'auteur est que les niveaux de profit subissent la puissante pression d'un triple processus : de déruralisation, d'épuisement écologique et de démocratisation. Il y aura évidemment réaction de la part des capitalistes, et relance de l'expansion, mais le système est entré « dans une ère de turbulences chaotiques — sur les plans économiques, politiques et culturels » (p. 138), prélude transitoire d'un passage à un nouveau système-monde dont, pour le moment encore, les contours restent à dessiner.

L'auteur travaille avec deux cadres temporels. Le premier est celui de la longue durée, celui de l'histoire du capitalisme qui s'étend « d'environ 1450 à aujourd'hui », et le second est celui du cycle Kondratieff « qui va de 1945 à aujourd'hui ». Avec Ernest Mandel, Wallerstein est l'un des rares auteurs marxistes à avoir adopté la théorie des ondes longues, avec ses deux phases, d'expansion et de stagnation, d'une durée de 25-30 ans chacune. Il fait trois constats : (1) « L'économie-monde capitaliste s'est longtemps perpétuée, comme le fait n'importe quel système, grâce à des mécanismes stabilisateurs, rétablissant l'équilibre chaque fois que les processus propres à ce système l'en éloignaient » (p. 134). (2) « L'équilibre n'est, pourtant, jamais restauré immédiatement mais seulement à l'issue d'une déviation suffisante vis-à-vis de la norme. De plus, la correction n'est, bien entendu, jamais parfaite ». Et, (3) « l'équilibre n'est jamais rétabli à l'identique, car les corrections impliquent certains changements dans les paramètres fondamentaux du système. Aussi, l'équilibre se déplace-t-il toujours, et le système manifeste des tendances séculaires » (p. 134). On est très proche ici des thèses et de la méthode de Schumpeter, à la différence près cependant que, pour Wallerstein, si la combinaison de cycles et de tendances séculaires est « inhérente au fonctionnement d'un système, les tendances séculaires ne peuvent se prolonger à l'infini, et viennent buter sur des asymptotes ... Dans de telles situations, les cycles ne parviennent plus à assurer le retour à l'équilibre, et le système est alors en difficulté ». (p. 134). Le système entre « dans sa crise ultime et se trouve confronté à une bifurcation », à plusieurs routes possibles conduisant chacune à un nouveau système.

... renouveau théorique ?

Pourtant avoir retenu ces deux textes ? Évidemment, les thèses développées par les auteurs sont contestables, mais elles ont le mérite, dans le premier cas, de replacer les faits à l'avant-scène de la recherche et, dans le second, de poser la question de la méthode.

Comme le dit Joshua, « guidés par une approche marxiste, nous devons tenter
d'élaborer une théorie qui rende compte des données disponibles, et les citations de Marx ne peuvent remplacer une analyse concrète » (p. 69). Revenir sur les faits est en effet la raison d'être même de la recherche. Il ne s'agit pas d'aller à la pêche pour conforter des conclusions déjà faites, mais de mettre de l'ordre dans les faits, de dégager les faits stylisés, pour ainsi comprendre comment le système fonctionne. Mais encore faut-il avoir une grille de lecture. Les concepts, certes, découlent toujours de notre perception du monde, et les modèles que nous construisons sont davantage une « représentation métaphorique » plutôt qu'une « description littérale de la réalité » mais ceux-ci ont le mérite de rendre le monde intelligible. À condition toutefois de les mettre continuellement à l'épreuve des faits, non pas pour les tester, ce qui n'aboutit qu'à des certitudes, mais pour les faire évoluer, voire leur substituer d'autres modèles si les faits font émerger de nouvelles intuitions. Aussi, tant et aussi longtemps que les économistes marxistes continueront à se référer uniquement à Marx plutôt que d'engager la recherche sur le terrain des faits, le débat ne peut être que stérile. Un peu comme si, pour prouver qu'ils ont raison, les libéraux devaient toujours en appeler à Adam Smith et les keynésiens à Keynes !

Pour Marx comme pour Schumpeter, ce sont les facteurs endogènes qui doivent expliquer les évolutions du système économique. Mais parler de système, c'est déjà avancer une hypothèse de travail. Reconnaître qu'il existe des lois propres à ce système, en est une seconde. En reprenant à son compte les concepts d'équilibre, de cycle ou encore de trend séculaire, Wallerstein prend un risque, c'est certain. Mais comment rendre compte de la nature particulière d'un système qui combine stabilité et changement, croissance et crises, cycles et transformations ? Marx fut le premier à poser le problème sous cet angle. Et de manière très novatrice. Mais, sans lui apporter une réponse satisfaisante. Avec le résultat que l'on peut voir en lui aussi bien un théoricien de la croissance, un pionnier de la croissance dira Schumpeter, qu'un théoricien des crises. Les marxistes auraient tout intérêt à s'en souvenir, parce que leur grande erreur a toujours été de n'étudier que l'une de ces deux facettes du système capitaliste, les crises. Au point de faire de ces dernières une sorte d'état permanent de ce système et de la croissance un sujet d'étonnement toujours renouvelé.

Wallerstein, que l'on soit d'accord ou non avec ses thèses, a le mérite de ne pas tomber dans ce piège. Par contre, on peut lui reprocher ne pas prêter suffisamment d'attention aux institutions, sinon pour leur donner un rôle purement fonctionnel et justifier leur émergence pour des raisons qui relèvent de la survie fonctionnelle, ce qui n'est guère très différent de la théorie conventionnelle. Pourtant, l'histoire n'est ni totalement déterminée ni totalement anarchique. Elle est un construit, et ce qui lui donne un sens, ce sont les institutions. C'est la grande leçon de l'institutionnalisme. Entre les acteurs et leurs comportements et les institutions il y a interactions, et ce sont ces interactions qui font qu'il y a un système, ou du moins que l'on peut en avancer l'hypothèse. Chesnay le montre fort bien d'ailleurs à propos de la corporate governance. Alors, pourquoi, dans ce cas, ne pas prendre les institutions au sérieux et les étudier en détail, au plan des faits comme au plan théorique ?

À défaut de poser les problèmes de manière nouvelle et surtout de se pencher plus rigoureusement sur les questions de méthode, ce n'est pas dans ce livre que le lecteur trouvera des analyses convaincantes des ratés du capitalisme contemporain, encore moins des transformations en cours. Accordons lui cependant ceci : il pose le débat. Souhaitons que celui-ci se poursuive, avec plus d'audace et hors
LES PHILOSOPHES ont effectué un virage important dans la compréhension de la technologie. Autrefois, ils cherchaient à découvrir les conditions historiques et transcendantes de la technologie ; et c'est pourquoi ils en parlaient théoriquement comme d'une force capable d'assujettir la nature aux désirs humains. En revanche, ils maintenaient qu'en plus de transformer foncièrement la société, la technologie agissait selon ses propres déterminants. La thèse du désenchantement du monde, qui dénonçait l'effet réducteur de l'objectivité scientifique sur les valeurs humaines, coiffait alors l'édifice de cette position philosophique classique.

Désormais, les philosophes s'intéressent aux impacts des technologies sur la société, dans leurs pluralités et leurs spécificités. L'objet de leur étude empirique porte sur la manière dont les pratiques sociales d'une technologie donnée génèrent de la culture, de l'identité, des normes, etc. Quant aux questions éthiques, elles sont formulées dans les termes d'un raisonnement pragmatique à partir duquel l'interaction humaine produit des valeurs. On sera déçu d'apprendre que le livre La révolution technique ne contribue pas à l'avancement de cette réflexion actuelle, car il se situe naïvement dans les lieux communs de la position classique.

À en croire l'auteur Daniel Jacques — qui se décharge de prophétiser quoi que ce soit — une révolution technique serait en train de se dérouler sous nos yeux, tant et si bien que nous assisterons prochainement à la première révolution véritablement universelle ! C'est dire que la réalisation des aspirations démocratiques à l'échelle mondiale dépendrait de plus en plus d'une maîtrise accrue de la technique ; car, après en avoir constaté les progrès au cours des siècles derniers, l'on se tournerait, fascinés, vers les promesses utopiques de la technique, qui réduiraient les souffrances les plus terribles, qui comblerait les désirs les moins assouvis, et qui, enfin, réaliserait le bonheur à l'échelle individuelle. Domaine de réalisation des modernes, la politique se trouverait dès lors entièrement asservie à la technique au terme de cette révolution ... et c'est le libéralisme triomphant qui en serait la cause première : sous l'action des entreprises privées, l'utilité s'imposerait comme une valeur centrale de l'activité politique. Il devient impératif, face à une révolution technique à la fois inexorable et nécessaire, de repenser l'humanité, d'autant plus que les progrès des sciences auraient détruit l'humanisme dans sa version classique. Pour s'y prendre, rien de tel que « l'humanisme noir », c'est-à-dire que les dérives inhumaines pourraient servir de repousoirs vers des valeurs fondamentales. À ce propos, la mémoire collective de l'Holocauste devrait faire naître en chacun de nous la compassion, le contre-poids de l'utilité.

On se doit de reconnaître que l'étude des rapports entre la technologie et la politique demeure l'une des plus stimulantes de la philosophie. Si l'auteur observe justement que les nouvelles technologies générèrent des utopies sociales, il se méprend toutefois sur la nouveauté radicale de ce phénomène. On sait maintenant, par les études historiques et sociologiques, que les utopies sociales sont des invariants des nouvelles technologies, quelque soit le temps et le lieu d'où elles émergent. De plus, l'auteur minimise le fait que les usagers ne demeurent pas très longtemps dupes des projets utopiques, puisqu'ils s'approprient, adaptent et modifient la technologie en fonction de l'usage réel qu'ils en font. Il
est en outre un peu exagéré de réduire l'imaginaire de la technologie à la littérature de science-fiction, dont certaines des œuvres ont été adaptées par le cinéma, et, surtout, d'insister à localiser la source de leur création dans les laboratoires scientifiques.

Un autre aspect des rapports entre la technologie et la politique est la manière dont les sociétés génèrent des règles. Alors que les gouvernements adoptent des lois et édictent des règlements, Daniel Jacques semble persuadé que nous sommes dépourvus de valeurs communes face aux progrès engendrés par les technologies. C'est comme si l'on faisait abstraction la plus complète des valeurs proposées par les groupes d'intérêts pour solutionner les problèmes causés par la technologie dans les domaines de l'environnement, de la santé humaine et de la consommation. De plus, l'auteur n'en pense pas moins non plus qu'à l'heure actuelle, la science s'affranchirait de toutes contraintes morales, d'autant plus que la religion et l'humanisme ne seraient plus là pour la maintenir à l'intérieur de gardes-fous. Et pourtant, plus que jamais auparavant, les scientifiques sont soumis à des procédures de contrôle éthique dans l'attribution des subventions, dans la publication des résultats et dans l'administration d'enquêtes portant sur des sujets humains. Enfin, l'auteur s'en prend avec raison aux promoteurs de la sociobiologie, de la robotisation humaine et de la vie cybernétique, car leurs idées matérialistes assèchent le sens de la vie humaine. Il ne faudrait toutefois par exagérer la portée de ces projets utopiques, qui sont des positions marginales loin de faire consensus au sein des communautés de scientifiques et d'ingénieurs.

Quant à la solution de l'humanisme noir, il n'est pas dit par l'auteur comment la mémoire de l'Holocauste, essentiellement limitée à l'Europe et à l'Amérique du Nord, gagne les autres continents. Et même en Occident, où il y a des journées de commémoration, des désignations de lieux de mémoire et des musées de l'Holocauste, il y a très peu, voire pas du tout de rapprochement entre les technologies (hormis les chambres à gaz et la crémation) et l'extermination des juifs, des tziganes, des homosexuels et des malades mentaux par le régime national-socialiste. La plupart des gens qui ne sont pas des spécialistes retiennent qu'il s'était agi de crimes graves au nom d'une idéologie prônant la supériorité raciale. Ce n'est pas tant de technologie qu'ils entendent à parler que de politique. Tout bien considéré, on voit mal comment l'humanisme noir viendrait à leur dicter une conduite morale dans l'utilisation des nouvelles technologies.

Dans l'éventualité — d'ailleurs peu probable — où l'humanisme noir aurait une efficace quelconque, il serait essentiellement limité au cas des biotechnologies, en ce sens qu'elles peuvent servir de fondement à une idéologie raciste. L'auteur a certes martelé sur son clavier des mots tels que génétique, neurosciences, biotechnologie, mais l'exposé dans lesquels ils s'inscrivent se limite à une évocation anecdotique et superficielle des faits. Entre autres exemples, quand le propos porte sur les techniques de contrôle du vivant, l'auteur évacue cavalièrement les problèmes que pose l'eugénisme depuis son apparition à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle. Il occulte ainsi le fait pourtant bien connu que l'hygiène raciale s'est le mieux épanouie dans les régimes démocratiques du monde anglo-saxon tels la Grande-Bretagne, les États-Unis, l'Australie et le Canada jusque dans les années 1970. À tout prendre, il ne faut pas s'attendre à trouver dans ce livre une contribution originale de la manière dont les biotechnologies posent des problèmes éthiques.

Quoiqu'il n'y ait pas d'exemples approfondis de problèmes posés actuellement par la technologie, il se trouve en revanche des commentaires pénétrants d'œuvres de grands auteurs de
la philosophie politique qui composent l’essentiel des références du livre. Cela explique sans doute pourquoi plusieurs questions que posent les philosophes de la technologie à l’heure actuelle ne sont pas abordées dans cet essai. Dans les faits, le propos s’étend longuement dans les mots de la philosophie depuis Platon d’ Athènes jusqu’à Alexis de Tocqueville (dont l’auteur est incontestablement l’un des spécialistes), en passant par Michel de Montaigne, Thomas Hobbes et Nicolas Machiavel. On s’étonne toutefois qu’à cette réunion d’imminents personnages, l’auteur n’ait pas convoqué Francesco Petrarqua. Dans le De sui ipsius e multorum ignorantia (1347-1348), l’humaniste italien est pourtant à l’origine de l’affirmation selon laquelle, dans l’établissement d’une vie heureuse, les questions sur les animaux, les végétaux et les minéraux sont beaucoup moins significatives que celles qui touchent aux origines, à la nature et à la destinée de l’homme.

Une chose est certaine : à l’image de Pétrarque, l’auteur de La révolution technique a préféré démontrer de la bonté par ses vertus morales, et, par là même, son imperfection, plutôt que de manifester de l’intérêt pour les sciences et les technologies. S’il est fort difficile de lui reprocher son humanisme, puisque, face aux dérives de la technologie, se mettre en devoir d’humanité demeure pertinent, il en va tout autrement de la démarche qui l’a conduite à penser la manière d’accomplir ce devoir.

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WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENTS in many countries have experienced serious setbacks and defeats since the mid-1970s.

Most remain on the defensive, though the international wave of resistance to neo-liberalism has led to significant mass strikes and protests in Western Europe and Latin America. For some, labour’s retreat and the real and alleged changes in global capitalism subsumed under the term “globalization” justify bidding farewell to workers’ movements as a force for social change or even farewell to class itself. Although few readers of this journal are likely to agree, important questions remain about the future of labour movements.

Beverly Silver’s Forces of Labor aims to engage with current debates in labour studies by examining labour unrest internationally since the late 1800s. Silver, a proponent of the world systems theory approach associated with the Fernand Braudel Centre and its Review, uses a world-historical theoretical perspective and empirical data to move beyond the focus on the late 20th century of most writing about labour and globalization. Forces of Labor clearly lays out a theoretical framework that distinguishes different sources of workers’ power and characterizes labour power as a fictitious commodity. Drawing on Marx, Silver highlights the contradictory character of capitalist development as creating both human suffering and working-class power as it passes through phases in which periodic processes of restructuring reorganize capital and labour. Through Polanyi, she observes “a pendulum-like motion” (17) between eras during which the commodification of labour is heightened and those in which people mobilize to reduce it. On this basis, she argues that working classes are always being remade. She notes two kinds of labour unrest: “Marx-type” — “the struggles of newly emerging working classes that are successively made and strengthened” (20) by capitalism — and “Polanyi-type” reactions to the extension of market relations (Marx’s analysis of which she does not discuss). Silver also observes that groups of workers as well as employers and states
are involved in creating exclusionary boundaries within working classes.

Methodologically, *Forces of Labor* takes as a premise that workers in different places are linked by the global division of labour and the international state system. Consequently, it emphasizes the interrelatedness of “cases” around the globe and through time, and the structural pressures of the world system. Silver argues that the main research strategies for dealing with this kind of complex analysis, encompassing comparison (which traces similarities and differences between cases to an overarching totality, such as Immanuel Wallerstein’s modern world-system) and cross-national comparison, are both inadequate. Instead, she limits complexity by working on only two levels of analysis, capitalist structures and collective action, and by studying only episodes of intense labour unrest.

The World Labour Group database is a key source for this book. As explained in the introductory chapter and a useful appendix, it has been compiled by combing *The Times* (London) and the *New York Times* from 1870 to 1996 for reports of labour unrest around the world. Its purpose is limited and specific: to register changing levels of struggle and identify waves of unrest. The data for Argentina, China, Egypt, Germany, Italy, South Africa, and the US was checked against statistics and working-class history literature to test its reliability, with favourable results.

*Forces of Labor*’s three central chapters examine labour movements and, respectively, capital mobility, product cycles, and world politics. The chapter on capital mobility is a study of the 20th century’s leading industry, automobile production. It demonstrates how capitalists have responded to worker militancy by reorganizing production and shifting to new regions in search of higher profits and labour control. The result has been the relocation of unrest, not its elimination. The following chapter examines how capital accumulation moves between industries. Here Silver recasts the concept of product cycles to include the role of worker resistance as well as capitalist profitability. The auto industry is compared with the earlier global lead industry, textiles, and reasons for the greater workplace and market bargaining power of auto workers are proposed. The transportation sector is also introduced for purposes of comparison. The chapter concludes by surveying four contenders for the title of leading industry of the 21st century to predict where future waves of labour unrest may erupt, noting the importance of the Chinese working class. The book shifts into a different vein in the next chapter, whose scope is broader than the others: the relationship between international politics and workers’ movements from the late 1800s to recent years. The narrative follows the swing of a Polyanian pendulum: from increased commodification of labour through resistance, revolt, and revolution after World War I and World War II to the global capitalist offensive in response to challenges to US hegemony and the end of the post-World War II boom.

The book closes with a brief chapter, “Contemporary Dynamics in World-Historical Perspectives.” Silver argues that the preceding analysis shows that neither a “race to the bottom” nor changing labour processes are the roots of crisis in global workers’ movements. It is wrong to see this crisis as permanent, as new workers’ movements will likely transcend it. The picture is not exactly rosy, though: global capitalism will continue to reproduce North-South inequalities, many service-sector workers have weak structural bargaining power, and it is uncertain if the Polyanian pendulum will swing back.

The great merit of *Forces of Labour* is its attempt to analyze workers’ movements and high points of struggle on a world scale across over a century, within the totality of global capitalism. This sets it above much of what has been written about labour and globalization. The ambitious project reveals a number of patterns, yields some insights, and touches on other issues in suggestive ways (some, such as
the subordination of national states to the Gold Standard in the 1920s, cry out for a more profound analysis that would strengthen the treatment of contemporary capitalism, which is disappointingly thin).

Any such study must necessarily be made at a high level of abstraction, and the most striking limits of the book arise from problems in the way its abstractions are constructed. A stark example is the claim that “more controlled and limited warfare as well as a more labor-friendly [sic] international environment” (174) explains the decline of labour unrest and radicalism in the second half of the 20th century. What of the impact of fascism, Stalinism, World War II, the Cold War, and the Long Boom on working classes, the Stalinization of the Communist International, and the strategic impasse of social democracy, Communism, and “Third World” national liberation movements after the mid-1970s? Politics and its social roots get short shrift. The book also suffers from questionable theoretical notions. These include “partial decommodification” of labour power (in fact, a specific form of its social regulation), the exclusion of struggles against capitalists in the sphere of consumption from the definition of labour unrest, and a weak concept of boundary-drawing between workers (rather than forms of oppression and privilege) that at one point leads to the implication that immigration controls and protectionism are in the interests of workers in the North. (178) As a result, Forces of Labor is an interesting but limited contribution to labour studies.

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GLOBALIZATION sometimes conjures an image of footloose “vagabond” capitalism. Turning this image inside out, Ronaldo Munck suggests that rapid proletarianization is a fateful aspect of globalization. The world’s total workforce has doubled in numbers in only three decades and Munck demonstrates that this massive expansion of the working class is geographically uneven and highly concentrated in the global South. Furthermore, this explosion is marked by profound changes in the nature of work and workers, particularly the “feminization” and “informalization” of work (highly correlated yet distinct trends). Meanwhile, labour unions, international confederations, and worker actions are honing creative strategies to face up to the new global realities of work. Drawing inspiration from Karl Polanyi and Antonio Gramsci among others, Munck explores this recent trajectory of labour internationalism and finds that effective transnational and international strategies are emerging. His central concern is to assess the positive potential of workers, worker institutions, and organizing efforts.

Munck’s volume contributes to debates on globalization as well as labor studies and strategic (and counter-hegemonic) thought more generally. I found it to be highly readable, well organized, and original. Any serious scholar of labour studies or globalization will want to engage Munck’s work. At the same time, the volume could provide a supplementary text in such courses as labour history, economic geography, globalization and society, or social movements. I believe undergraduates will enjoy the crisp writing style and I intend to assign the book in my course on globalization and geography. The book is organized in eight short chapters with the most
provocative being two pairs of chapters: "Workers North" (Chapter 4)/"Workers South" (Chapter 5) and "The Old Internationalism" (Chapter 6)/"The New Internationalism" (Chapter 7). In these paired discussions, Munck outlines the key differences between a global "South" and global "North" perspective on labour. These contradictory viewpoints have come to a head recently over the idea of social regulation, specifically the incorporation of a "social clause" in international trade arrangements such as the World Trade Organization. Another contentious issue is the way in which trade-union corporatism during the Cold War metastasized into trade-union imperialism and undermined principles of worker democracy and solidarity, especially within the AFL-CIO.

There are a number of intriguing elements in Munck's argument that could be highlighted. I found the discussion of gender and women workers to be particularly insightful. Recognizing that women's rapid proletarianization may signal some new opportunities (and challenges) for labour activism, Munck does not simply "add women and stir." Instead he makes a concerted effort to think through how the feminization of global labour changes the dynamics and prospects of the contemporary situation. He develops the related issue of social movement unionism to signal the importance of wider creative worker strategies that seek to bridge community concerns, household and gender networks, and local and/or regional economic (and social) arrangements. These sorts of careful linkages to community — encouraging the "embeddedness" of trade-union institutions and social regulatory mechanisms at various geographical scales — will certainly be one effective way forward for labour activism. The "living wage" initiatives in a number of US cities are one example of a response to this sort of prescription.

It seems to me that it will be crucial to link Munck's insights on embeddedness to an analysis of the dismantling and de-volution of many social programs (for example health and education programs associated with the welfare state) that have been propelled by globalization. In one sense, labour activists are trying to restore the linkages to community that existed — albeit unevenly — at the national scale during the "Golden Age" of various Fordist arrangements. The geography of globalization has shifted production logics to supranational geographical scales, while these parallel processes (of devolution and dismantling) have shifted social reproduction logics to subnational geographical scales and to the micro-spaces of households, individuals, and neighborhoods.

In the final chapter, Munck's findings again touch on the potential importance of theorizing social reproduction in relation to globalization. Here he discusses benchmarking as a potential strategy for worker internationalism and globalism. Benchmarking was developed by global management consultants to compare a particular enterprise with best practice anywhere in the world. As Munck shows, the Canadian Automobile Workers adapted this business-oriented technique by doing intensive research among their members to monitor and measure the quality of life. International labour standards could expand this method by setting workers' benchmarks "on key issues of wages and conditions to health and safety but also including an equality agenda and issues of social responsibility.” (183)

This would be a means of tracking production and social reproduction issues in a way that ensures overall improvement in worker conditions while avoiding the North/South controversies over protectionism. If quality of life information is shared widely, benchmarking might lead to techniques that could harmonize global inequities over time instead of exacerbating them.

This volume charts the rapidly shifting terrain of labour internationalism in pursuit of social justice goals. Munck chronicles and analyzes emerging international-
ist strategies and suggests that these could give way to global strategies that agitate for global citizenship and global rights. Massive proletarianization is the force behind such a “great transformation.” Munck honours Karl Polanyi in the subtitle to this volume and suggests that Polanyi’s concern with the counter-hegemonic potential of workers to transform society during the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century is highly relevant to contemporary society. Polanyi’s idea of a “double movement” in which the expansion of free-market principles is met with a counter-movement of self-regulation to protect society informs Munck’s hopeful view of the future and his realistic assessment of the potential power of ordinary people. Let us prove him right.

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David McNally, Another World is Possible: Globalization and Anti-Capitalism (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing 2002)

ANOTHER WORLD IS POSSIBLE is a compact volume by activist and academic David McNally who states from the outset his solidarity with the new global justice movements which have arisen since the mid-1990s. While most widely known here for their opposition to the World Economic Forums, these movements include uprisings of indigenous peoples over land expropriation and redevelopment (Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador), popular protests against utility privatizations (Puerto Rico, Bolivia, Colombia), and rallies against the debt collection of the World Bank (Thailand, India, New Guinea) in the Southern nations. These popular mobilizations have been joined by urban movements of unemployed workers (Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela) and mass strikes of workers, unemployed, and students protesting attacks on public services and pensions (France), as well as blockades against meetings of the world’s elites (Melbourne, Porto Alegre, Quebec City, Seattle). The title for this volume then was inspired by the banner at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre and is written as a guide to a new generation of activists.

While the book is divided into seven chapters, it can be more usefully described as falling into three sections. The first section (chapters one and two) is a handbook of the new social movements listing places, dates of events, and a few lines about the type of action (chapter one) followed by an introduction to the movements’ aims (chapter two). The second section (chapters three to five) tries to provide a background to capitalist oppression and responses to it. And the third section (chapters six and seven) is McNally’s political analysis of the global justice movements.

McNally’s principal argument is that the global justice movements should develop a language of anti-capitalist organizing and elaborate common goals and objectives which fit the specific historical situation. He outlines a list of “modest proposals” (266) for things that need to be done at this stage: building common fronts; bringing together all anti-capitalist activists around a “common emancipatory project;” creating conferences, forums etc. for debate and decision-making; holding large political, educational, and cultural events; producing literature, videos, and CDs; and promoting revolutionary pluralism. His method then is named “socialism from below” by which he means that the emancipation of the working class will be the action of the class itself, citing Rosa Luxemburg. In drawing together socialist and anarchist activities, he says that for him “socialism from below” might also be called “libertarian socialism” and uses the words interchangeably with “revolutionary.” (251) His aim is to address the new anti-capitalist activists avoiding characterizations and while there is some strength to this approach, he
also avoids some political questions which I will discuss later.

McNally draws on many examples of anti-capitalist organizing from both the past and the present. One movement that he calls on to exemplify this approach is the Unemployed Workers’ Movement in Argentina. (244) He characterizes it as a “grassroots movement that is independent of the unions and political parties,” (239) and describes a movement which imaginatively embraces a wide range of organization and notions of democracy. Drawing on McNally’s source, James Petras, one learns that in August 2001, highly organized unemployed workers numbering over 100,000 (30-80 per cent of Argentines are unemployed) shut down over 300 highways, paralyzing the economy, and went on to lead a successful general strike in Buenos Aires in conjunction with sectors of the trades unions against privatizations, job losses, pension cuts, and cuts to social services due to IMF requirements. These workers were armed only with a transitional program of demands and won modest concessions from the government. Petras points out that large numbers of unemployed industrial workers had union experience and were familiar with collective struggle. Thus these actions were not spontaneous, but the product of decades of experience. In footnote 38 to chapter 7 McNally explains that self-activity from below “does not mean that such movements cannot elect organizers and delegates for special purposes. It is to insist, however, that there should be complete democratic control over any elected officers who ought to be accountable to mass assemblies or conventions...” (270)

The second major preoccupation of this volume concerns the political direction of the workers’ and unemployed movement. The tactics of revolt (rallies, pickets, demonstrations, strikes, and occupations), according to McNally, should bring people together around a program of common demands and political vision. While McNally’s volume tends to describe the actions more than the organizational linkages between activists, he says, in several places, that the point is to spread the struggle from the local to the international. What distinguishes these movements from elitist politics are the methods they employ, those which build the self-confidence of workers through self-organization from below. Quoting Rosa Luxemburg, McNally says “the struggle for reforms is the means; the social revolution its goal.” (250)

McNally advocates the mass strike as a means to bring together the workplace, community, and street protests. (253) He does not refer to the sort of strike organized from the top by the bureaucratic caste of business unionism, but one in which workplace committees take control in a system of workers’ councils. Here he cites the mass struggles in Chile (1970-73) and Portugal (1974-5) but indicates the weak link in the chain of radical opposition to capitalism are the working-class organizations in the north. He suggests that workers in the north have not been sufficiently radicalized through direct struggles on the streets as they have in the south so that rank-and-file opposition movements in union locals have yet to be built.

My principal criticism of Another World is Possible is the vacuum that exists around the role of the political party in the workers’ movement. In this volume McNally avoids discussion of any kind of party building, whether it be the vanguard party, a party formed from the trades unions, or a left-wing electoral party with a mass base. The independence of the working class could be interpreted as independence from the party. Nonetheless it seems a shame not to consider the role of a genuinely left party in the building of a workers’ movement. Surely there are countless lessons to be learned globally from the successes and failures of such party building. While McNally is not opposed to building socialist organizations (he is the editor of New Socialist), he
does not see it as his central question in this work. He de-emphasizes the question here in favour of other issues about the new radicalization.

I would have wished also for more analysis of the role of organized labour in building the movements. According to Lennist theory, workers need mass organizations, and while the trades unions can never replace the party, it is paramount that these mass movements in the unions. Ultimately the goal is to build radical strike committees, workplace committees, and, finally, workers' councils elected by all the workers. McNally's analysis of the militant Korean Confederation of Trade Unions emphasizes the role a million-strong general strike (1996) can play in radicalizing workers. But he is silent on the problem of why these mass movements in our period so often fail to advance socialist programs. Also, more work is called for on what McNally sees as the weak link with the unions in the northern countries. While McNally praises the Bus Riders' Union and OCAP in Canada as examples of independent working-class action which involve a relationship with the unions, he does not discuss other possibilities. He supports the call for a decisive break from social democratic and Stalinist parties, but he avoids major theories of Leninist party-building. A study of the strengths and ultimate betrayals of the Solidarity Movement in B.C. (1983) and the Days of Action in Ontario (1995-6) would have clarified his call for a break from the bureaucracy of the unions and their social-democratic politics.

My smaller criticism of the book is that it tries to achieve too much in a compact volume. The middle section of the volume on the nature of capitalist oppression is probably the strongest, most interesting, and the most central to understanding the situation today. The first and last sections of the book then are guides to activism and left this reader wishing for fewer examples and more detailed accounts of struggles in different parts of the world. Another disappointment is that many of the endnotes refer me to secondary sources.

In conclusion, Another World is Possible starts an important debate on the political direction of the social justice movements around the world. Its format makes it an easy reference for a brief survey of recent events and while it may not have been exhaustive enough for this reader, it provokes questions on important developments.

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Barbara Hobson, Jane Lewis, and Birte Siim, eds., Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2002)

CONTESTED CONCEPTS in Gender and Social Politics is an international dialogue among twelve influential scholars of gender, social policy, and the welfare state. It is a comparative and interdisciplinary examination of current theoretical and political debates about social policy and the impact of shifts in policies of European welfare states on women. The authors are members of the European Network on Theory and Research on Women, founded in 1991. In the past decade, the network has been engaged in scholarship about gender, citizenship, and the European welfare states. This collection is one of the network's many publications. Their goal in this book is to explore seven key concepts of social policy in the context of the emerging European Union. They are: citizenship, care, social exclusion, contractualization, commodification and de-commodification, representation, and social capital. Each chapter provides an overview of the feminist debates about one of the seven concepts and its application to the current social policies of the European Union and its member states. The essays are written collaboratively by
scholars from different national and disciplinary backgrounds. The authors examine social welfare policy from different methodological and cultural frameworks, but share the position that "gender matters, context matters, and politics matters." (17) The importance of feminist scholarship in gendering analysis of inequality and of women's activism in improving women's civil, political, and social rights are unifying themes of the volume.

Raymond Williams' *Keywords* is the inspiration for the organization of the book. The authors share Williams' argument that societies produce unique interpretations of concepts that are based on different histories and social politics. Following Williams, the editors believed that it was important to take stock of the various meanings of key concepts in gender and social politics. Departing from Williams, the contributors focus on the evolution of social concepts instead of keywords in order to analyze how social and political processes have influenced the genealogies of these concepts rather than how these processes occur within language. The central questions of the book are the extent to which gender has destabilized conceptual vocabularies and the impact of these debates on women's lives. The renegotiation of relationships among the family, market, and the social welfare state in the context of the European Union informs the analysis of the essays. Each chapter provides a critical overview of the development of the literature about one concept and recommends directions for future research that the authors believe will provide a theoretical grounding for the advancement of women's rights. Examinations of the debates on the restructuring of welfare states in their own countries and in the development of social policy in the European Union support the theoretical discussion.

Social citizenship has been a cornerstone of discussions about the development of social welfare states. However, existing frameworks based on Marshall's concept of social citizenship no longer capture the complexities of the rights and obligations of citizenship because their authors did not anticipate the development of supranational policy-making institutions. In the opening essay about citizenship, Barbara Hobson and Ruth Lister submit that the next step for citizenship theorizing is to envision how rights and claims will be made in global and supranational arenas. The feminist project of gendering citizenship by exposing the androcentric bias of social policy remains important, but feminists must consider how global restructuring and the prospect of Eurocitizenship will affect women's citizenship claims. Advancing women's rights in the European Union has produced contradictory results. Women in member states have invoked the European Union's intolerance of gender discrimination to lobby successfully for legislative reform to advance women's political rights. Regardless, social policy has not addressed the structural features of the labour market, such as the sexual division of labour and women's lower wages that hinder women's ability to participate in economic and political life.

Analyzing how women are excluded from social and symbolic domains has been central to feminist theory and political strategies for change. Feminist analysis arguing that women's exclusion was embedded in power relationships was never integrated into mainstream policy discourses about exclusion. Instead policy discourses about groups who are marginalized in society concentrate on individual rather than systemic change. Social exclusion is the current "buzzword" in social policy that aims to integrate marginalized groups into social and economic processes. It entered public discourse in 1974 through French social policy and gained precedence through European Union policy discussions about poverty. While the concept is most closely associated with policies about poverty, it also includes all social in-
equalities and deprivations. Mary Daly and Chiara Saraceno argue that social exclusion has become a politically strategic discourse that serves political needs better than social needs because it has not been developed adequately as an analytical concept. The most serious implication for advancing women’s rights is that social exclusion as it is currently articulated in policy discussions does not consider women’s inequality as a central form of exclusion.

Care work is a recurring issue in these essays because social policy will not rectify the structural barriers to women’s economic and political participation unless it strikes a balance between care and paid work. Current trends in social policy are moving in the opposite direction. The reconceptualization of the family relationship that posits two equal and independent breadwinners counters feminist solutions integrating care and paid work. Rights are increasingly tied to paid work in discussions about the restructuring of the social welfare states, a trend that has serious implications for women who still assume most of the responsibility for unpaid care work. Ute Gerhard, Trudie Knijn, and Jane Lewis argue that developing policies that recognize the importance of unpaid work requires a conceptual shift in theories on contractualization from independent, competitive individuals to an analysis of the interdependent relationships among individuals. Social policy that assumes that women and men are equally able to enter into the new contractual relationships between the state and citizen do not work for women because the care work is unequally shared and women still earn less than men.

The theorization of an ethics of care based on interpersonal relationships rather than rights is a significant development in feminist analysis of care. Despite the proliferation of care discourses in the past 30 years, Arnlaug Leira and Chiara Saraceno argue, there are important ambiguities in the literature that may thwart feminist efforts to promote women’s equality through social policies that accommodate care work. Discussions of the ethics of care that do not consider the rights of care-givers and those who are dependent on care do not address the power relations in caring relationships, and how those relationships differ in familial and public contexts. They caution that the emphasis on the ethics of care that does not adequately address the labour dimensions of care work may make women’s unpaid care work invisible. Releasing women from these obligations with public services has been one feminist strategy to facilitate women’s continuous participation in paid work. In the chapter about commodification and de-commodification, Trudie Knijn and Ilona Ostner raise important questions about the impact of policies that stress women’s paid work over unpaid caring responsibilities and argue that improving women’s opportunities in the workforce has not adequately addressed men’s responsibility for care work. Subsidizing paid care work has helped women pursue careers and has created jobs for women, but it has also produced inequalities among women. The recruitment of domestic workers from poorer nations, who are excluded from welfare benefits, best illustrates how the emphasis on the adult worker model in social policy depends on global inequalities. Knijn and Oster recognize that policies that promote men’s caring responsibilities are problematic because they rely on “nice fathers,” but conclude that they provide a more equitable solution than basing caring strategies on exploited women.

The last two essays examine how women contribute to political life in government and in civil society. Berengere Marques-Pereira and Birte Siim examine how feminist scholarship has emphasized “the connection between representation and empowerment with women’s agency as the link.”(170) They explore different strategies to improve women’s political representation in European states to demonstrate the link between national politi-
cal traditions and how feminists frame their strategies to improve women's participation. Greater representation for women in governments has empowered women politicians, but has not significantly changed women's collective power within states. Hence, much of the feminist scholarship about representation, agency, and empowerment has concentrated on civil society. The book closes with a discussion by Dietland Stolle and Jane Lewis of the potential of the increasingly important concept of social capital to assess women's roles in civil society. They believe that social capital is an important concept because it helps us assess how citizens take care of each other. However, the literature's focus on voluntary organizations fails to assess how women accumulate social capital because women no longer have the time to participate in organized politics and volunteer work. They recommend more research about women's informal support networks to understand how women build cooperative and trusting relationships in their communities. This research program entails moving the theoretical discussions of social capital beyond civil society to analysis of the relationship between the state, the family, and civil society.

The essays in Contested Concepts confirm that gender, context, and politics matter. The influence of feminist scholarship on the development of social policy has been contradictory and uneven, but it has had an impact on how women articulate their politics at local, national, and international levels. The discussion of trends in social policy in the various member states of the European Union demonstrates that although policy-making is increasingly bound to international agreements, the nation-state still matters. Comparative research enriches the exploration of how social, historical, and political processes shape the vocabularies used in theory and social policy, and to what degree gender analysis has influenced these vocabularies. The questions raised in these essays will no doubt inspire future thinking about the gendered implications of the current restructuring of social welfare policy.

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DIALECTICAL URBANISM contains a number of previously published (and rewritten) articles, together with some new materials, which Andy Merrifield has melded together to tell a particular story about the contemporary urban experience within the advanced capitalist city. The central theme of the book is that this contemporary urban experience is one riven by a number of contradictions. Specifically, as suggested by its title, Merrifield seeks to explore what he calls the dialectic of urbanism and urbanization, by which he means the dialectic between the experiences of living in the contemporary, post-industrial metropolis and the ways in which the urban built environment is physically constructed as part of the accumulation process under capitalism. Three tenets run through the book, as outlined by Merrifield in its introduction: first, "truth claims about cities must be conceived from the bottom upward, must be located and grounded in the street, in urban public space, in everyday life"; second, the built environment is an inherently political social product and different sorts of organizing and localized action are necessary to construct more socially just cities; and third, there is an ambiguous metaphysical condition to the urban experience in which both optimistic and dysfunctional aspects of modern life are expressed — cities can be simultaneously liberatory and oppressive, utopian and dystopian, full of pessimism or full of hopeful potential.
After laying out the conceptual structure for the book, there are then five chapters which examine a number of contemporary conflicts within several US and British cities. In Chapter 2 Merrifield explores conflicts over the creation of the bourgeois playground of Baltimore's Inner Harbor, particularly as it has impacted the area around the old American Can Company plant. The chapter recounts how federal government urban policy has been hijacked during the past twenty years or so by large financial interests and how speculative investments in the spaces of the built environment have encouraged the gentrification of old industrial facilities. Merrifield examines how a local community group sought to intervene in the built environment to save the American Can plant from being demolished so that it would retain both its corporeal and psychic position within the local community's lifeworld. For Merrifield, part of the paradox of this conflict between developers and local community activists is that whilst the community activists took on the power of speculative capital (and so might be seen by some on the left as heroic proletarians) they were also, in many ways, quite racist, bigoted, and nationalistic in their politics — many supported the first Gulf War and were quite explicit that they did not want “Jewish parasite developers” destroying their neighborhood. Merrifield calls this situation (racist and nationalistic proletarians fighting the forces of capital) a “political dilemma” for the left, for it complicates some representations which see working-class community activists as flawed heroic figures — though ultimately the dilemma may stem more from the left’s idealized notion of how proletarians should act and its failure to understand the power of patriotism for many working-class people than from the actual practices of community activists and workers themselves.

In Chapter 3 Merrifield looks at the conflicts that have divided neighbors within the poorer parts of Liverpool, England. In particular, whereas the majority of residents within the poorest of Liverpool’s inner-city neighborhoods are white, struggles for social justice have usually been portrayed as an issue particularly for mobilizing black Britons and non-white immigrants, and questions of class have tended to disappear from local political organizing agendas which have been articulated by many non-white community activists. One of the questions for Merrifield, then, is how to celebrate ethnic difference amongst urban subjects whilst simultaneously trying to maintain some sense of commonality and cohesion amongst workers who share similar class positions. As a way of exploring this question further, perhaps, in Chapter 4 Merrifield recounts the living-wage activism in Los Angeles in which janitors and other low-wage workers — who are mostly non-Anglo — have managed to organize around issues both of class and ethnicity. For Merrifield, continuing the theme of urban dialectics, the living-wage campaigns which have arisen in over one hundred US cities represent American workers’ antithesis to capital’s assault on their standards of living. They are the working-class response as many jobs and services have been sub-contracted out by a downsizing corporate America and by local governments during the past twenty years.

Having spent some time in the book investigating conflicts within the contemporary city, Merrifield then ponders in Chapter 5 the issue of order and disorder in the city, contrasting the writings of 19th-century writers such as Marx and Dostoevsky with 20th-century writers such as Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford. In particular, Merrifield argues that both a certain amount of order and disorder are essential for a vibrant urban culture, an argument that he delves into through an analysis of the transformation of 42nd Street/Times Square in New York City. Continuing the focus on NYC, Chapter 6 scrutinizes what has been happening to Single-Room-Occupancy (SRO) tenants
as many neighbourhoods in the city become gentrified as the city reinvents itself as a post-industrial, financial services, and tourist-destination metropolitan centre. Finally, Chapter 7 serves as a conclusion to probe what Merrifield calls the “negative dialectic of the city” and the conflicts under capitalism between use-values and exchange-values in the built environment.

In summing up, although Merrifield is not the first to make the argument that there are deep contradictions within cities, he writes about the topics covered in the book with great passion and aplomb. The book is easy to read — Merrifield is an evocative writer — and the prose flows in such a manner that you want to turn the page to find out what happens next. The book would be appropriate for students of all levels, from first-year undergraduates to graduate students, who are dealing with urban issues across a wide range of social science or humanities disciplines, particularly for those interested in reading about case studies of contemporary urban struggles. One criticism of the book, however, relates to the copy-editing. Although most books have some typographical errors (in this one the reader might be left wondering whether the “ballet boxes” of page 72 relate to voting or to dancing), there is a significant problem with the footnoting in Chapter 2 — 48 footnotes appear in the prose but there are only 47 footnotes for the chapter at the end of the book (it appears that the inconsistency begins around footnote 36). If a second edition of the book is planned, this inconsistency should be corrected.

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