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EVEN A CASUAL OBSERVER of North American economic trends would recognize that workers today continue to experience significant anxiety and fear about impending job loss. Outsourcing, downsizing, restructuring, and rationalizing are now part of the common language of working- and middle-class decline under neoliberalism and global competitiveness. Steven High’s book illustrates that, while in the so-called “new economy” we may use new terms to describe massive layoffs, job site alienation, and unemployment, the underlying forces behind such dislocation are not new. High’s analysis, then, of the processes of industrial transformation in the 1970s and early 1980s in Canada and the US, which produced economic and cultural misery across the Great Lakes region, is not merely an historical text. It is also a useful and timely study that reminds us of the important countervailing force national politics and policies once played in challenging the contradictions of global capitalist restructuring.

High is centrally preoccupied throughout this book with assessing how well workers adapted to widespread plant closings when drawing upon either national or local solidarities, meanings, and purposes. What develops is an interesting cross-national perspective that demonstrates that in the midst of such upheaval, Canadian workers fared much better than their US counterparts. Specifically, US workers, who drew upon locally shared senses of solidarity, consistently failed to stop plant closings, and experienced considerably greater emotional and economic pain from such displacement. Canadian workers, in contrast, much more often drew upon nationalist claims and national policy to limit the extent of actual economic transformation as well as the searing emotional distress of workplace, community, and family upheaval. Thus, while the US heartland during this time period evolved into the depressed and aged “Rust Belt,” Canadian economic nationalism served “as a kind of ideological rustproofing that denied the Rust Belt imagery into the country.” (17)

Throughout the book’s various chapters, High draws upon oral histories and narratives, interviews, corporate records, and popular magazines and newspapers of the day to highlight how whether the locus of resistance for workers was national or local mattered a great deal to both their perceived and actual fates. High also makes liberal and welcome use of a variety of photographs, cartoons, and maps to illustrate the theme of industrial transformation that swept, albeit differently, across North America. Photos of padlocked factory gates, collapsed buildings, and of the many displaced workers protesting or on the assembly line, add to the pervasive sense of regional depression that affected parts of the Great Lakes.

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region. Select illustrations from labour cartoonist Fred Wright add significantly as well to the palpable sense of anger at the dislocation especially affecting US workers as plants closed or relocated to the Southern or Western US.

The theme of national variation in worker response to plant closings is returned to frequently in this book. In early chapters, High discusses the evolution of the Rust Belt imagery, and the building sense of hopelessness and disillusionment among US workers in the face of growing plant closings. As residents of the Great Lakes region watched plants relocate to geographically far-flung regions of the US, they failed to draw upon national imagery or were unable to call upon national political power in acts of resistance. As High notes, American nationalism had become soiled with McCarthyism and the Vietnam War, with divisions emerging between students and the New Left of the 1960s on the one hand, and workers less comfortable with opposing US involvement in Vietnam on the other. At the same time, American population shifts undercut Democratic Party strength in the US Congress and limited any legislative response to this industrial transformation.

The experience of Canadian workers in the face of plant closings, according to High, was strikingly different. First, geography played an important role, as the concentration of people along the Montreal-Windsor corridor limited company relocation to other parts of Canada. The relative economic health of Southern Ontario, including the fact that no integrated steel mills or auto assembly plants closed in Canada, prevented the Ontario “Golden Horseshoe” from taking on a rusted tint and becoming economically margin- alized. However, the presence of anti- American nationalism, national political power, and national legislation was clearly the deciding factor, for High, in influencing more favourable responses and outcomes to plant closings for Canadian workers.

The effectiveness of national political resources and the importance of national borders is a theme woven throughout the final three chapters of the book. In Canada, regional development initiatives and national legislation requiring companies to provide advance notice of plant closings proliferated. Nationalist, social-left legislators in the federal Liberal and New Democratic Parties were swayed by nationalist appeals against American multinationals, and responded with the use of increased legislative protection for Canadian workers. Meanwhile, in the US, the local community strategies of solidarity and collective response to plant closings had little impact on both businesspeople and legislators who lived apart from this economic turmoil.

High’s discussion of the different national political responses to the crisis affecting Chrysler in the late 1970s and early 1980s is an illustrative example of these national political differences. Democrats in Congress were too timid to take possible risks to regulate plant closings, and in fact in Chrysler’s case joined Republicans to demand worker concessions in exchange for public financing to help the automaker. In Canada, the importance of union political representation and NDP and left Liberal legislators was reflected in the Canadian government response to Chrysler: the 1980 bailout loan arrived with conditions that Chrysler maintain jobs in Canada, make new investments in its Canadian plants, and guarantee that no plants would close without the approval of the federal Ministry of Industry. (112)

High’s discussion of how Canadian national and provincial legislators, as well as the editors of major newspapers, collectively sought government regulations on how foreign — especially American — companies would close plants in Canada, is notable for its incongruence with today’s climate of neoliberalism.

In fact, it is striking to reflect, as High perhaps too briefly does in his conclusion, on how different the political envi-
environments are today under neoliberal continentalism compared to the heady days of Canadian economic nationalism. To be sure, workers in the US currently seem no more successful in drawing either upon local or national communities of identification as political strategies than in the period of economic dislocation and political impotence charted in High's study. Since 2000, the Rust Belt region of the US has once again become identified with massive job loss in the manufacturing sector, and has become the focus of the 2004 Presidential campaign as widely designated and politically valuable "swing states." Yet, American nationalism, having been strategically exploited by the Bush Administration in its war on terror and invasion of Iraq, again provides little comfort to workers in confronting these destabilizing economic trends.

In Canada the political and economic changes associated with deepening continentalism raise serious questions about the resilience of the economic nationalist position. High suggests that a pattern of economic nationalist resistance continues today, (191) and identifies the emergence and membership growth of the Council of Canadians as evidence of the survival of Canadian nationalism. Yet, the Council today has a much more internationalist orientation, and Canadian political and economic élites after North American free trade have all but abandoned economic nationalism. Even public opinion polls taken across Canada today show a public much more supportive of the trade deals that have so securely integrated Canada into a more North-South economic pattern. In short, it is much harder to argue, in the wake of renewed Québec nationalism and growing continentalism, that there remains a politically significant thread of economic nationalism that can continue to help Canadians overcome class or regional differences. This point aside, this is a well-written and soundly researched book that richly illustrates an early stage of the tremendous and ongoing economic transformations affecting labour in North America.

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IN THE CONTEXT of corporate-induced hysteria about the purported lack of skills among Canadians, Cohen’s latest edited book provides a useful and sober counterbalance. It is an important text, documenting skill training programmes and projects across Canada. As such it serves as a detailed and clear record of these initiatives. It also provides valuable insights into less asked, but pivotal questions such as what kinds of equity did these programmes advance and what was the impact on systematically marginalized populations such as women, recent immigrants, Aboriginal people, youth, and people with low incomes. The fourteen chapters review projects in the building trades, construction, mega projects, general job preparation, and life skills for systematically excluded populations.

The chapters are well-written and thoughtful, most providing conclusions that resonate soundly with demands advanced by the women’s movement, unions, and community activists for years, including: programmes are best when they are run for and by marginalized populations; longer programmes are better than shorter; long-term, consistent government funding with few strings attached sustains programmes while short-term, unreliable funding with numerous strings attached undermines programmes and places them in ongoing jeopardy; programmes need autonomy and flexibility in order to meet new and unanticipated needs; ancillary supports are required to address the specific barri-
ers to equity and participation encountered by specific populations; and on-site or easily accessible equity officers and outside groups provide accountability and integrity to equity programmes. The chapters also document ongoing problem areas in job training such as: the need for change in the closed and harassing culture of male-dominated trades and work sites; difficulties in finding and retaining employment once training is completed; lack of equitable access to advancement and on-the-job training opportunities; and unfair assignment of tasks and job assignments.

Cohen’s collection exposes the successes and failures of recent initiatives in job training. Successes include: a highway construction project on Vancouver Island aimed at providing training opportunities for women and Aboriginal people (Cohen and Braid); services aimed at and provided by immigrant women in Toronto (Manery and Cohen); and a project in Saskatchewan aimed at expanding women’s access to training and careers in carpentry (Little). Notable failures include: youth employment programmes in British Columbia (Wong and McBride); and women’s training on the Hibernia project (Hart and Shrimpton). Considerable attention is also provided to the impacts of government restructuring and offloading, including: the removal of supports for women’s job training (McFarland); the transfer of training from the federal to the provincial governments (Critoph); and the ways that private market training programmes undermine equality.

As Cohen notes in her introduction, job and skill training is intrinsically connected to employment policy. In the absence of policies that promote full employment and the availability of good jobs, job training can act as a holding tank, where groups of people are temporarily taken out of the labour market in order to learn skills that may never provide employment or provide only very temporary employment within tight and inequitable labour markets. Indeed, this was the situation in a number of the cases examined in this book: after completing training programs workers were laid off or employed temporarily and left with few options beyond ongoing unemployment, marginal employment, or relocation. In other cases, such as carpentry and the building trades, the harassing and bullying culture of workplaces and employers creates barriers that discourage many even where jobs are available.

This is an excellent book for undergraduates, policy analysts, and service providers. It carefully records policies and practices that promoted equality and those that, intentionally or unintentionally, undermined equity. The recommendations are positive and clear although few venture beyond a liberal model of equal opportunity and affirmative action. For the most part, the recommendations and descriptions extend equality but do not build liberatory practice or suggest ways to reorganize job training so that marginalized populations are emancipated rather than maintained as a more highly skilled, but still largely underemployed, underutilized pool of cheap labour.

The skills discourse, like the competencies and best practices discourses, pivot on ideological constructs that start to take on a life of their own when they become manifest in programmes and policies. Currently, skill debates are couched in terms of human capital wherein workers are responsible to acquire sufficient capital in the form of skills in order to be marketable and appealing to employers. Within this highly ideological understanding of skills, if the kinds of activities that workers perform are not deemed to be adding “value” they are removed from lists of “best practices” and thought to not be skills at all, though they may be the very actions that keep workers safe and ensure a reasonable quality of goods and services. Thus, the kinds of “skills” that workers are taught in training programmes and the impact of this training on the overall well-being of
trainees need to be carefully assessed, scrutinized, and understood within a broader ideological context.

Butterwick touches on many of these issues in her very interesting chapter on life skills training, a programme in which people are taught basic, everyday skills such as cooking, grooming, self-presentation, and parenting as part of job and life preparedness, the assumption being that those who are presumed to lack these commonplace capacities are unlikely to make good employees, even in the low-wage labour market. While some of Butterwick’s respondents find life skills courses to be supportive and normalizing, others find them to be punitive, humiliating attempts to homogenize marginalized workers and make them responsible for the problems that shape and limit their worlds. As one of Butterwick’s interviewees put it, “I didn’t need to sit and discuss how to do my life ... I’m not having problems with my life, I’m having a problem with my career.” (172)

Job training exists at the nexus of gender, race, ability, class, and power. It provides an outstanding opportunity to extend our analysis and theorization of the multiple factors that create and maintain the economic, social, and political marginalization of women, some immigrants, Aboriginal people, youth, and poor people. This collection would be enhanced by a deeper analysis of the political and ideological role played by job training in the context of neoliberal reorganization of labour markets, welfare states, and social relations, as well as by recommendations that went beyond building greater equity within the current, very limiting context in which those with power benefit from the ongoing marginalization of large portions of the labour force.

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Roger Stonebanks, Fighting for Dignity: The Ginger Goodwin Story (St. John’s: Canadian Committee on Labour History 2004)

EIGHTY-SEVEN YEARS after Albert “Ginger” Goodwin was shot dead by Dominion Police constable Dan Campbell in the wooded hills of Vancouver Island, the story of this coal miner, socialist, draft resister, and union leader remains shrouded in controversy. As a battle over political memory rages in British Columbia, with Goodwin at the centre, Stonebanks’ book appears at an opportune time. Fighting for Dignity is not perfect, but its publication represents a welcome contribution to the field.

The major strengths of the book — and its claims to originality — are new material surrounding Goodwin’s early life, and a counter-factual chapter exploring the legal evidence against Dan Campbell. Some of this new material is substantial, such as information on working and living conditions in Goodwin’s native Yorkshire, where a tradition of bitter industrial relations introduced the young miner to the conflict between labour and capital. Stonebanks enriches this material with valuable primary detail, illuminating Goodwin’s brief stint in Glace Bay, and providing a more comprehensive account of Goodwin’s life during the war and the events that culminated in his death. Fluid and clean in presentation, illustrated with photographs throughout, this book is well suited for the general reader. It provides a coherent narrative, grounded in fact and informed by the major themes of the period. Specialists in labour history will likely treat this work as a teaching tool, rather than as the definitive statement on Ginger Goodwin.

Two other books preceded Fighting for Dignity: Derek Hanebury’s short 1986 monograph Ginger Goodwin: Beyond the Forbidden Plateau, and Susan Mayse’s Ginger: The Life and Death of Albert Goodwin (1990). Mayse, with a background in creative writing and family roots in the Comox Valley, imbued her work with a wealth of oral history and a
creative flair that is lacking in Fighting for Dignity. Stonebanks, however, combines his skill as a journalist with years of meticulous archival research to provide the best historical account of the Goodwin story to date.

Stonebanks situates this contested chapter of Canadian history within the economics of coal and the politics of war, and temporizes Goodwin's life and death within the ongoing struggle for workers’ rights and economic justice. In his epilogue, Stonebanks offers an expansive narrative that follows the lives of his historical actors long after the tide of war and labour revolt had subsided. Details about Goodwin’s family history, the lives of his peers and adversaries, and the historical geography of Yorkshire, Vancouver Island, and mainland BC breathe life into this book. A sustained emphasis on industrial relations and environmental issues at the Cominco smelter in Trail is also effective.

More problematic is Stonebanks’ imprecise handling of theoretical questions. Issues of gender are entirely absent. Similarly, Stonebanks fails to address tensions between skilled and unskilled workers, and aspects of the work process itself, which is a major theme in Mayse’s work. Stonebanks points to existing studies in his footnotes, but fails to adequately engage these works and many of the issues they raise. This is particularly striking in terms of the earlier Goodwin books, but also applies to debates on the Socialist Party of Canada, tensions within organized labour, and international debates on labour and World War I. In order to remain accessible to the general reader, pages of theory are not required. However some acknowledgement by Stonebanks of how his work fits within the existing historiography would have been useful.

Another weakness is Stonebanks’ handling of theories surrounding Goodwin’s death. He dismisses suggestions of cold-blooded murder as conspiracy theory, and backs up this claim with an intriguing chapter by criminal lawyer Adrian Brooks. Legal issues surrounding the killing of Goodwin are explored through the frame of the imaginary trial of Dan Campbell. Though creative, this discussion fails to acknowledge the class basis of Canadian law, and the political bias against labour and radicalism within Canadian courts. Historical inquiry and the functioning of the law are related but distinct processes, and legal evidence is therefore not identical with historical evidence. Stonebanks fails to draw this distinction. One is left with the lingering suspicion that he and Brooks are too quick to acquit Dan Campbell, and discount the testimony of contemporary workers who questioned whether the police officer fired in self-defence.

While Stonebanks is wise to avoid the trap of either glorifying or vilifying his protagonist, elevating Goodwin to the status of sainthood and dehumanizing Campbell as an arch-villain, there is an inconsistency in tone and argumentation. The book drifts uneasily between liberal assumptions and values, and the dissident tradition with which Goodwin identified and to which he belongs. This ambiguity is well illustrated in Stonebanks’ uncritical treatment of Canadian Labour Congress president Ken Georgetti at the end of the book. Clearly, Goodwin and Georgetti occupy distinct locations within Canadian labour’s ranks; the former was a Marxian socialist and a militant, while the latter adheres to more moderate political alternatives and a more conciliatory industrial stance. Ignoring tensions internal to organized labour, Stonebanks identifies Georgetti as belonging to a seamless continuum, an unidimensional struggle, emanating from Goodwin.

This book, though focused on the past, has much to say to the present. Stonebanks, however, makes only brief mention of the contested nature of historical memory and the battle currently raging in BC over the symbol of Ginger Goodwin. The province’s class-polarized political culture, which traces its origins
to the coal economy and the days of Goodwin, finds contemporary expression in the unlikely battleground of a stretch of highway on Vancouver Island.

In 1996, the NDP government of Glen Clark named a section of the new Island Highway that passes by Cumberland Cemetery “Ginger Goodwin Way.” The electoral upheaval of May 2001 obliterated NDP representation in the BC legislature. Stan Hagan, Liberal (formerly Social Credit) MLA for the Comox Valley and a minister in Gordon Campbell’s cabinet, had the signs removed, preferring the less historically charged “Comox Valley Parkway.” The Campbell River and Courtenay District Labour Council responded by renting a billboard near the contested stretch of highway, and raised a photo of Goodwin with the words “Ginger Goodwin Way” — an action honoured at the Pacific North West Labour History Association’s 2002 meeting.

Every year, on the third weekend in June, labour activists converge on Goodwin’s gravesite for Miners’ Memorial Day, which coincides with the anniversary of Westray and serves as a reunion — a pilgrimage of sorts — for the British Columbia Left. Between pancake breakfasts, labour sing-a-longs, and pub hopping along Dunsmuir Street in Cumberland, Ginger Goodwin stands out as a potent symbol of working-class consciousness, anti-militarism, and militancy. While the Vancouver Sun described Goodwin in 1918 as “very poor material for martyrdom,” he was immortalized within days of his death when Vancouver workers downed tools in a general strike. In April 2004, BC workers brought the province to the brink of a general strike against the anti-labour agenda of the Campbell government. The battle over the memory of Albert Goodwin, therefore, has much significance beyond the history books. Threatened by the corrosive forces of élite history and hostile governments, Goodwin symbolizes resistance in both the past and the present; he is an icon from which contemporary dissidents draw strength in the current conflict against organized capital in BC.

Roger Stonebanks and the CCLH should be applauded for reviving this controversial and timely story. Fighting for Dignity represents a compact, detailed, and accessible contribution to the historiography of Albert Goodwin. For students, scholars, and general readers, this book offers a valuable window into important aspects of the labour and social history of Canada during World War I — and poignant fodder for contemporary social movements.

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John R. Hinde, When Coal Was King: Ladysmith and the Coal-Mining Industry on Vancouver Island (Vancouver: UBC Press 2003)

THE VANCOUVER ISLAND community of Ladysmith flourished in the early 20th century, its prosperity reflecting the exploitation of extensive coal deposits northwest of the town. Two events affected the community’s growth during this period: an underground explosion in 1909 that killed thirty-two men and the Great Strike of 1912-14, perhaps the most cataclysmic of British Columbia’s many strikes. Hinde’s book describes the community and those events with considerable skill: it is a welcome addition to the growing literature on BC’s coal miners and the province’s coal mining industry.

The book’s seven chapters describe the island’s coal mining industry, the nature of the community of Ladysmith, the 1909 disaster, and the genesis and course of the Great Strike. Hinde begins at the beginning, however: the opening chapter, “A Selfish Millionaire,” details James Dunsmuir’s role in establishing the town of Ladysmith as well as the manner in which he forced miners to relocate there. This chapter makes excellent use of the 1903 Royal Commission on Industrial
Disputes, which heard much testimony about the miners’ relocation, although Hinde overlooks a very good unpublished study of that royal commission (Allan Donald Orr, “The Western Federation of Miners and the Royal Commission on Industrial Disputes in 1903 with Special Reference to the Vancouver Island Coal Miners’ Strike,” MA thesis, University of British Columbia, 1968). Generally, however, one of the strengths of this monograph is its broad scholarly reach. Hinde engages not only BC’s labour historiography but also the rich historiography of the Maritimes as well as British and German studies. While he occasionally chastizes earlier writers (including this reviewer) for errors or questionable interpretations, his comments are thoughtful and his objections usually well supported by the evidence.

As Hinde’s own account suggests, two American “internationals,” the United Mine Workers of America and the Western Federation of Miners, played a considerable role on Vancouver Island in the decade leading up to the Great Strike. Not only did both unions attempt to organize the coal miners, their efforts also provoked a good deal of rhetorical hand-wringing in the press and elsewhere about the threat of foreign agitators, especially during the 1903 and the 1912-14 strikes. This being the case, Hinde might have gone to greater lengths to account for the unions’ interest in the Island miners. Similarly, he has surprisingly little to say about the mining industry of the western US, despite that region’s close links with British Columbia. As those familiar with the revisionist work of New Western scholars will know, there is also a rich literature to explore. For example, although Hinde’s chapter on the 1909 explosion is very good, his discussion of mine safety might have profited from James Whiteside’s fine study, Regulating Danger: The Struggle for Mine Safety in the Rocky Mountain Coal Industry (Lincoln, Nebraska 1990), a book that includes an excellent summary of the common-law concepts — assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and contributory negligence — which informed the attitudes of courts and employers to mine safety, prior to the passage of liability acts.

That said, there is much to admire in When Coal Was King, a book that provides the reader with a good deal more than an account of Ladysmith and its miners. The third chapter, for example, includes an excellent description of work practices in coal mining, while the fifth chapter, “From Pillar to Post,” offers a welcome revisionist analysis of the miners’ much-discussed industrial and political strategies. The book ends with two chapters on the Great Strike, a topic on which Hinde has written before (“‘Stout Ladies and Amazons’: Women in the British Columbia Coal-Mining Community of Ladysmith, 1912-14,” BC Studies, 114 (Summer 1997), 33-57). As with his earlier piece, the account here is insightful and challenging. He argues persuasively that the riots and accompanying violence of August 1913 were far from a “violent rebellion against the existing social order.” (174) Rather, they “are best characterized as a form of social protest designed to restore the perceived moral balance of society, the economy and the community.” (198) An analysis he substantiates with an excellent account drawn from a range of primary sources.

If the book suffers from any serious flaw, it is perhaps the tentativeness and brevity of Hinde’s concluding comments. After providing his readers with considerable detail about Ladysmith’s miners as well as a thoughtful analysis of their actions and the context in which those actions should be understood, Hinde has surprisingly little to say by way of conclusion. As in other parts of the book, he invokes the competing and complementary notions of community and defers to the trinity of gender, race, and class, but this hardly amounts to a conclusion. One is left wondering about the great silence that followed the strike. Hopefully Hinde will tackle that topic in a future book.

MARX HAS BEEN called many names, but “campy” is not usually one of them. Within queer studies, Marx is more often viewed as a dogmatic old fogey determined to rain on the rainbow parade. Not so for Matthew Tinkcom who, in Working Like a Homosexual, undertakes a campy reading of Marx and a queer Marxist reading of camp.

Given the ambiguity of Tinkcom’s clever title, we should begin by clarifying what he means by “working.” Within gay/lesbian studies, scholars have developed the interesting notion of “queer work”: the way particular types of jobs and/or places of employment come through popular cultural stereotyping to be viewed as “gay.” Think hairdresser or waiter. In these types of jobs, gay men forge mutually supportive work environments in which they can be openly gay among coworkers. But Tinkcom’s study of cinema is not about Hollywood or queer filmmaking as a refuge for homosexuals working as costume makers and set designers (although hairdressers do make an appearance in Tinkcom’s discussion of Warhol’s film Haircut (No.1)).

Another line of inquiry within gay/lesbian scholarship, the one perhaps most recognizable to specialists in labour studies and featured in anthologies such as Out at Work: Building a Gay-Labor Alliance (2001), centres on the experience of gay/lesbian workers and the labour movement. But, again, Tinkcom is not especially interested in homosexuals working in the film industry or in the labour process of queer filmmaking. What then does Tinkcom mean by work?

Tinkcom is concerned with camp and cinema as forms of intellectual and aesthetic work. And don’t be too quick to dismiss the value of campy labour, for Tinkcom argues that camp, like Marxism, is nothing less than a critical knowledge of capitalist modernity. In order to tease out camp’s critical take on capitalism, Tinkcom substitutes the customary emphasis on the consumption of camp with an appreciation for its production. From Susan Sontag’s 1964 “Notes on Camp” (and here Tinkcom usefully adds to D.A. Miller’s dead-on deflating of Sontag’s self-styled urbanity) to more recent collections, such as Camp Grounds: Style and Homosexuality (1993) and Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject (1999), the study of camp has focussed primarily on reception, on the pleasures differently-situated audiences derive from camp performances. The work involved here — the decoding of meaning — is something undertaken by the audience, by the consumers of camp. But Tinkcom calls for an analytical shift away from camp as consumption to camp as production, specifically, to camp as a form of queer intellectual labour.

The importance of being campy is usually derived from the sexual or gender dissidence of the camp act. But for Tinkcom, the political and philosophical significance of camp lies in the way it encodes a queer critique of capitalist notions of value. This can take different forms. For example, in his chapter on Vincente Minnelli’s early film musicals for MGM, Tinkcom shows how the lavish, campy visuals of Minnelli’s musical numbers destabilize the ostensible narrative of heterosexual romance. However, Minnelli’s films made more than sex/gender trouble; they also represented a distinctly queer commodity form. That The Pirate, for instance, was a box office flop may confirm that the film failed to meet normative narrative desires, but it also represented a beautiful failure that tempered with capital’s ability to extract a profit from the film’s queer labour. Sometimes camp critique rests on its status as trash within capitalist culture. Camp labour recycles and gives new queer mean-
ing and value to that which wasteful capitalism tosses aside as no longer profitable. This process of queer resignification can be easily traced in Tinkcom’s discussion of the films of John Waters, from *Pink Flamingos* to *Polyester*, and in what Tinkcom refers to as the filmmaker’s “trash aesthetic.”

Tinkcom’s revaluing of camp as labour may disconcert some queer readers/viewers, for it undercuts our cherished position as the chosen consumers of camp with privileged access to its hidden meanings. Camp’s function as a delicious secret to be savoured only by those audience members in the know may be less important than other knowledge concealed in the camp commodity, knowledge that can speak to all those who labour under the constraints of our current economic system. Take note: Tinkcom’s title is not working *as* but working *like* a homosexual, opening up the possibility that anyone, regardless of sexual preference, might tap into camp’s queer critique of capital should they choose, if only for the duration of a camp performance, to work like a homosexual. Tinkcom concludes that in the face of capitalism’s alienated drudgery, the campy, cinematic products of queer labour “give back to us the pleasures of work that the world of capital so insistently forecloses from us in large and small ways each day.” (194) When’s the last time you read something like that in a work of queer theory?

That I’m taken with many of Tinkcom’s cultural readings and theoretical musings is not to say I have no problems with the book. Much of camp is embedded in the broader history of gay male subcultures. Tinkcom is acutely aware of this; he reminds us often that we are looking at post-World War II, gay male, metropolitan subcultures. But Tinkcom makes very little use of the now extensive literature on the gay social/urban history of this period. One of the book’s most convincing chapters is on Kenneth Anger’s filmic treatment of the commodity and the fetish, from the highly-polished chrome of *Kustom Kar Kommandos* to the leather boots and chains of *Scorpio Rising*. But what precisely was Anger’s relationship to the car/bike and leather/Levis cultures emerging in Los Angeles and New York in the postwar period? Such missed opportunities are unfortunate because contextualizing camp production within the varied histories of gay subcultures would not only have underscored its historical specificity but would also have grounded Tinkcom’s homosexuals and their queer intellectual labour in material/spatial settings in ways that would have meshed nicely with Tinkcom’s Marxist affinities.

Still, it is my hope that Tinkcom’s elegantly-written book doesn’t share the fate of so many recent studies of popular culture: queer today and gone tomorrow. Future scholars may rediscover and revalue the many forgettable queer cultural studies that litter academic remainder tables today, but *Working Like a Homosexual* deserves a longer life, allowing us to linger over its surplus of value.
long-time activists in Winnipeg’s Jewish Left. Among this group were prominent Jewish educator, D.I. Victor, Fred Narvey, an activist in the Progressive Arts Club, and Evelyn Katz, who attended the Arbeiter Ring School and the Peretz Folk Shule. Also, there were many spontaneous reflections offered by the nearly 200 participants in the conference, all of which were recorded and are now archived in the Jewish Heritage Centre.

This is an important collection because it documents and analyzes in one volume many aspects of the history of the Jewish Left in Winnipeg and offers reflections on the experiences of the Canadian Jewish Left in general. Mildred Gutkin’s article focuses on the centrality of Yiddish to Jewish radical culture and explores its significance for Winnipeg’s early Jewish working-class movement. Several other articles in the collection deepen one’s appreciation of the strength of the cultural foundation of Winnipeg’s pre-World War II vibrant Jewish working-class culture. Women were central to this cultural experience. Roz Usiskin argues that Jewish working-class women began to transform their traditional gender roles as they became increasingly active in unions and the activities of the radical Left. Ruth Frager explores similar concerns in her study of labour and the Left in Winnipeg, and Michael Greenstein examines the ways in which Jewish Left culture provided the context for the fictional writings of Adele Wisemen, Jack Ludwig, and Miriam Waddington.

Other articles focus on radical politics. Henry Trachtenberg’s study of Jews and left-wing politics in Winnipeg’s North End from 1919 to the 1940s contributes to an impressive literature that Trachtenberg has published on this subject. He argues that it was Jews’ experience as immigrants in Winnipeg that radicalized them and led them to search out alliances with other North End working-class groups, in what Norman Penner once described as a “radical’s paradise.”

Henry Srebrnik provides a fascinating examination of Winnipeg Jews’ support for the Birobidzhan project in the Soviet Union. This plan, advanced by Soviet Jews and supported by Lenin, called for the creation of a Jewish socialist homeland within the Birobidzhan region of eastern Russia. Until the late 1940s, many radical Jews in Europe and North America promoted this plan. Winnipeg was a centre of concerted efforts, Srebrnik demonstrates, to advance this project. The subject of this article is a cautionary tale for historians who see the activism of this earlier era though the prism of the Cold War.

Leo Panitch’s keynote address to the conference, “Back to the Future: Contextualizing the Legacy,” is an analytical, scholarly, and personal examination of the radical Yiddish milieu of the North End and the “web of political, ideological, cultural, and social relations, symbols and institutions that composed it, and the meaning they had on the most formative people in my youth, including my parents and my teachers at the Peretz Shul.” The gradual disintegration of this Jewish radical culture in the 1950s is the subject of historian Alvin Finkel’s article. He argues that improving prosperity brought class mobility for North End Jews, which combined with Cold War ideology, and disillusionment with Stalin’s Russia, especially its growing anti-Semitism, explains the movement’s decline after World War II.

There are in Jewish Radicalism other interesting articles and reminiscences that space does not permit me to explore. Together with the articles noted above, they make this collection a useful introduction to Jews and the Left in Winnipeg.

Nolan Reilly
University of Winnipeg

WENDY MCKEEN’s book is a timely contribution to discussions of both feminism and social policy. There are two key underlying issues raised in the book: first, what model for social policy should feminists be putting forward? In other words, what constitutes a “women-friendly” social policy? Secondly, what strategies should feminists develop to advance such a model? In order to address these questions, McKeen examines Canadian feminists’ efforts to influence federal child and family benefits in the period from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s.

There are six core chapters in the book. The first chapter considers what might constitute a women-friendly social policy, the second develops a framework to highlight the role of feminist strategies and voices in shaping social policy, and the remaining chapters focus on feminists’ engagement with poverty debates in Canada, particularly as they relate to child and family benefits. This includes the emergence of a feminist perspective in the 1960s; the “writing women in” to poverty discourse in the 1970s; the place of feminism in the Tory child benefits debate of the 1980s; and finally the “writing women out” of the poverty discourse in the 1990s. The book thus provides a welcome opportunity to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of both the models put forward and the strategies advanced by feminists in this critical period.

In Chapter 1 McKeen asks “what should a woman-friendly, egalitarian form of citizenship and social policy look like?” Noting that much of social policy has been based on the assumption of women’s dependent status, McKeen identifies certain core principles of a woman-friendly policy. This includes recognizing the importance of care in society, facilitating access to paid employment, and enhancing the ability to achieve “personal autonomy and independence for women.” Drawing on Celia Winkler’s writing about Sweden, McKeen argues for a social individual model. This is one based on the notion of individual, rather than family-based, entitlements, but which also recognizes “the social context of individual lives.” Such an approach, she argues, would recognize both the importance of women’s individual autonomy and the social democratic ideals of collective provision of benefits and universal entitlements. In the second chapter McKeen develops a framework focusing on the meso-level of political activity: the activities of a range of intermediary organizations and individuals concerned with particular policy areas. McKeen modifies and broadens the concept of the “policy community” to emphasize the discursive construction of key social policy issues, as well as the role that marginal political actors can play in the policy-making process. This approach effectively allows McKeen to highlight the way that certain concepts such as “poverty” are ideologically and discursively constructed, the role that feminists have played in the social policy debate, and the importance of key strategic decisions made by feminist and other organizations.

A key focus in the empirical chapters is the interaction within the social policy community between feminist organizations and the left-liberal groups that have been key to framing debates on poverty over the last 40 years. As McKeen describes, in the 1960s a number of left-liberal organizations became established as “insiders” to the poverty policy debates and became recognized as the voice of progressives within the social policy community. Key in this respect were the Canadian Welfare Council (which changed its name to the Canadian Council on Social Development in 1970),
the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO), and the National Council of Welfare (NCW). By 1970 feminists began to have a voice in the social policy debate, but they did so by entering into this already established network. McKeen outlines two divergent feminist visions in this period: a liberal view which reflected an equal opportunity framework and a residual philosophy of targeting benefits to those who were needy, and a second perspective, calling for a more radical social policy transformation based on a “social individual” approach. The latter incorporated both the view that women should receive individual treatment and that universal benefits were important both for reasons of solidarity and because (in the area of family allowances) such benefits entailed a recognition that domestic work was not simply a private, but also a public and social concern.

A major argument that McKeen puts forward is that by the late 1970s the ability of feminists to advance this second option was constrained and ultimately diverted. The general shift in economic and political climate was a factor, but McKeen’s major focus is on the key role played by the left-liberal organizations operating at the meso-level of the policy community in closing the space for a feminist alternative. A major concern of these organizations was the elimination of tax exemptions (which gave greater benefits to the rich and high-income earners) and the adoption of a system of refundable tax credits for poor and low-income families with children. The selective Child Tax Credit introduced in 1978 was viewed by these players as an important advance and as the most progressive measure that could be achieved given the prevailing political-economic climate. McKeen argues that this period was particularly significant because the women’s movement, dominated by liberal-feminists, aligned with anti-poverty organizations and in the end supported the Child Tax Credit (CTC). This entailed support for a policy based on targeting rather than universal benefits, and on family income (something feminists had long opposed) rather than individual entitlements.

A similar scenario played out in the mid-1980s in response to Mulroney’s proposal to partially de-index family allowances and to introduce a new plan for child benefits. Again McKeen argues that the left-liberal anti-poverty organizations (organized at this time in the Social Policy Reform Group) effectively narrowed the debate and created barriers to feminists advancing the notion of individual rights. SPRG had a largely defensive response to the Conservatives, endorsing the direction of their child benefit proposal as the best that could be expected given the political and economic climate. Representatives of the women’s movement within SPRG (NAC and CACSW) chose to go along with this and to endorse the targeted family-income-based CTC as the primary mechanism for family income support.

By the mid-1990s the policy environment emphasized neo-liberalism, targeting, employability, adaptability, and self-reliance. In this context, child benefit programs were the one policy area left open for possible enhancement. Again, McKeen is sharply critical of the left-liberal organizations which took up the “child poverty” slogan and were willing to work closely with the federal Liberals in designing the new Child Tax Credit. As McKeen points out, the vision and language of child poverty created problems for feminists. The main focus is on families and children, while the role of gender as a structural variable contributing to poverty is ignored, providing little visibility to women as such. The reframing of the problem of poverty around this theme, McKeen argues, represented a further closure of a feminist politics of autonomy and contributed to writing women out of the poverty issue.

McKeen’s book makes an important contribution in a number of respects. First, the focus on meso-level actors and struggles within particular policy com-
munities significantly advances our understanding of the concrete processes through which policy is made. McKeen is able to effectively document how, over a twenty year period, there was a progressive shift away from a universal to a targeted approach, from individual to family income-based entitlement and from adults (women in the case of family allowances) to children as the beneficiaries of social policy. Particularly useful is her ability to demonstrate how progressive and feminist groups were drawn into such policy-making processes, and how, at times unwittingly, they became participants in a process that ultimately led in a neo-liberal direction.

Secondly, the book is useful because it opens up for debate again the question of what type of social policy feminists want to see and how it should be achieved. In terms of social policy models, the notion of individual autonomy and individual rights combined with notions of collective solidarity is important. This implies the importance for women, certainly, of having “money in their own name,” but also of going beyond that to consider how we advance notions of social solidarity and collective responsibility based on multiple networks and connections. The book, in many respects, raises as many questions as it answers. Is it better, for example, to disengage and organize autonomously, with the risk of remaining marginal, or to engage, but end up participating in debates and policy formulation in directions not of one’s own choosing? How should feminists negotiate the often difficult strategic choices facing them at particular conjunctures? To begin to consider those questions requires delving in greater depth into what alternative models there are, not only to the feminist vision put forward, but also to the organizing that took place. More consideration could be given, for example, to the agendas and strategies of groups that McKeen notes were not willing to engage with the terms set by the Tories (the labour movement and the popular sector as represented by the Action Canada Network). Similarly, it would be helpful to consider further the politics of the women’s movement itself, and how, here too, the development of significant alternatives might become possible. These are questions which, in the current era of defensive politics, are posed all too seldom, but which are critical to consider. In April 2004 two reports were released in Ontario: one pointed to the difficulties women leaving abusive relationships faced in accessing adequate welfare support and the other revealed that homeless women in Toronto were dying at ten times the rate of other women. In this context it is critical indeed to raise the question of what has happened to the feminist voice within the social policy debate and to reconsider the parameters of a “woman-friendly” social policy. McKeen’s book is most welcome because it challenges us to reflect on such questions and to re-open the debate on critical issues of both alternative models and strategies.

Ann Porter
York University


HUGH SHEWELL has provided the definitive historical account of government policy towards members of First Nations who were unable to survive without outside assistance. The thrust of his book is to focus not on the “dependence” of Native recipients of social welfare but on the government policies that created that dependence in the first place. As Shewell reminds us again and again, the government and the professional bureaucrats and social workers that it employed looked at poverty-stricken “Indians” as failed individuals who needed to be trained to be workers within an industrial capitalist system. By dealing with them
Ahistorically and as individuals, the system could cover up the fact that, in reality, they were dealing with dispossessed people whose destitution had been created by the same Canadian state that now tried to blame them individually for their lack of success within Canadian society writ large.

In the 1980s, Shewell was a bureaucrat in Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, in charge of the welfare program for British Columbia reserves. His recognition, through his work, that the program he was administering was ultimately a band-aid upon the gaping sores created by colonalist policies inspired his exhaustive historical research into social welfare policies with respect to First Nations. What he found in primary sources is mostly to be found elsewhere in bits and pieces in the burgeoning field of Native history. But Shewell accumulates so much material related to social welfare in one place that there is little doubt that his account will be the one scholars will turn to for many years to determine what government policies were in place regarding Native social welfare at different periods and why.

Shewell demonstrates that, while the underlying view that the Natives were responsible for their own misfortunes obtained in all periods, there were policy changes over time. In the early years after Confederation, social assistance was meted out when there were special requests from a First Nation, or a priest or Indian agent working with Natives, for government aid to avoid a bout of starvation. Such unsystematic aid, focusing on particular First Nations, gradually gave way, beginning just before World War I, to social work casework ideas that emphasized individual Natives or Native families rather than particular First Nations bands. Keeping down costs was a major driver in this approach, and, in the inter-war period, "led to a downward spiral in Indian welfare and neglect." (108)

Though a minority of Natives were successfully able to secure either subsistence on reserves or remunerative employment within the non-reserve economy, Indian Affairs continued to insist that it was the responsibility of Natives, not the government, to secure a living for themselves. The government consistently ignored the impact of its own policies of restricting Native fishing and hunting so as to create more opportunities for white settlers and tourists on opportunities available to Native people. Relief, when it was provided, was minimal and short-term since the philosophy of relief policy was "to control Indian behaviour and coerce the able bodied into the marketplace." (166)

Somewhat more sophisticated programs of integration of Natives into the mainstream as workers were put in place in the 1960s. The watchword became community development, and government policy now focused on involving the leadership of Native communities in social service provision and in policies affecting their community generally. But such involvement was always to be within a framework that rejected Natives' desire to return to their traditional Native culture, with its holistic linkage of spirituality and economic and social behaviours.

While Shewell provides an excellent historical account of the villainy and stupidity of federal government treatment of First Nations, he rarely discusses the reactions of First Nations in detail. For the most part, they are presented, de facto, as passive victims. They only suddenly emerge as active social agents during the post-war parliamentary hearings on the Indian Act. Shewell does give close attention to their briefs, and their proud understanding both of First Nations' moral right to their lands and the exploitation that they have experienced as a result of colonialism. Then the Natives largely disappear from the text again. They re-emerge however in the conclusion, "Shooting an Elephant in Canada." Shewell suggests that Native "dependency is a complex form of resistance to a socio-economic order that Indian nations neither chose nor fundamentally accept."
(324) Dependency as resistance? Nothing in Shewell’s nine previous chapters has prepared us for this idea. And unfortunately it exposes some weaknesses in Shewell’s historical account.

Shewell’s account is one that focuses heavily on original sin, in this case the government’s dispossession of Native people. That’s fine, but what results, perhaps because of the focus on government welfare policy, is a discussion of bureaucrats’ behaviour rather than a portrait of how the victims of that policy either coped or failed to cope. We are simply told that First Nations held on to their traditional values and waited for the day when they could regain control over their lands and return to their lives of old. But this conclusion, while it may reflect the viewpoints of some of Canada’s current Native leadership, requires critical analysis. As Ron Bourgeault suggested in a review of David Bedford and Danielle Irving’s *The Tragedy of Progress (Labour/Le Travail* 52, 267-71), discussions of Native people rarely manage to blend both class analysis and the specificity of Native oppression. Certainly, Shewell fails to discuss Natives in the labour force, though there is a rich literature on the subject.

While Shewell mentions Albert Memmi and Edward Said in his introduction, he is only concerned with their observations about how the colonizers view the colonized and their culture. For usurpers of others’ lands, the rationalization that the people being dispossessed are inferior peoples with inferior cultures is psychologically important. But Said and especially Memmi are equally concerned with the psychological impact on colonized peoples of colonizers’ constructions of both their pre-colonial past and their lives under colonial rule. It is here that Shewell’s reach proves too shallow. Though his account ends in 1965, at a time when the beginning of the movement of Natives off reserves and into cities was in its early stages, that provides little justification for conclusions about solutions to current Native issues that ignore changing demographics. Both on reserve and off reserve, in any case, it is clear that many Natives either want a blend of their traditional cultures and Canadian modernity or simply want the latter. Racism within the context of capitalist industrial relations limits the options that they have, but not all, and likely not a majority, want only the option of living in sovereign enclaves practicing traditional lifestyles. If only because the resource base for traditional lifestyles is simply unavailable in most Native communities in the south, even the leaders who appear to preach this solution are as likely to be advocates of Native casinos and cigarette marketing operations as of a return to lives based solely on hunting and fishing. And what of the long-term impact of the psychological scars of dispossession, forced stays in residential schools, exploitation of their labour, and poverty? Native communities are faced with the scourge of fetal alcohol, a consequence of colonialism that will not disappear simply by naming its ultimate source. More recently, HIV/AIDS has ripped through many First Nations communities, and Natives are at far greater risk of this disease than the general population.

The lives of Native women, as Native women’s organizations have been revealing for several years, are especially precarious. Within Canada generally, they face disproportionate risks of violence and death, their victimizers buoyed up by the racist indifference of police forces. Even within their own communities and homes, abuse of themselves and their children is commonplace. This is the case despite the fact that Native communities have a far greater degree of self-government than they did in 1965, the cut-off date of Shewell’s account. Colonialism was not unsuccessful in imposing patriarchy in most First Nations and, as Native women often argue, the interpretation of Native traditions that many male Native leaders espouse is a largely ahistorical one in which the present is read back-
wards to make current patriarchal forms part of the eternal history of First Nations.

Enough however of the shortcomings of Hugh Shewell's important work. This is not history from the bottom up, and it is rather shallow sociological commentary on present-day realities. But it is an excellent analysis of the thinking of social policy makers over a long period. It would be rather better if it analysed that thinking with more reference to the influence of the struggle among social forces in Canada at various times, and gave more attention to Native voices.

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Athabasca University


CE PETIT LIVRE trouve son origine dans une exposition au Musée de Pointe-à-Callière. L'institution a demandé à l'anthropologue Pierre Anctil, bien connu pour ses travaux sur la population juive de Montréal, d'agir comme conservateur invité et de rédiger ce court ouvrage. Le grand public sera reconnaissant envers le Musée d'avoir pris cette initiative et envers Anctil d'avoir relevé le défi.

En quatre chapitres abondamment illustrés, ce dernier retrace l'histoire de la Main en utilisant une approche qui marie le thématique et le chronologique. Dans « Le boulevard de la Révolution industrielle », Anctil esquisse à grands traits les transformations du paysage urbain dans la deuxième moitié du 19e siècle sous le leadership de promoteurs immobiliers dynamiques. Naissent alors sur le Plateau Mont-Royal des municipalités de banlieue à vocation industrielle et ouvrière; rapidement, l'industrie du vêtement y domine. Une culture de masse et des mouvements de revendication sociale voient le jour. C'est dans ce contexte qu'a lieu la « grève historique » des Canadiennes françaises de 1937.

Parallèlement, la rue Saint-Laurent se transforme en « boulevard des nouveaux citoyens », suite aux vagues migratoires qui déferlent sur la métropole, au premier rang celle des Juifs. Ceux-ci construisent une communauté vibrante qu'Anctil excellente à décrire. Les immigrants italiens et chinois font aussi leur apparition sur la Main, qui devient « un lieu porteur d'une mémoire historique » et « le reflet de la diversité ethnoculturelle québécoise ».

La rue Saint-Laurent, c'est également « le boulevard du bouillonnement culturel », une vocation qui se dessine pendant la décennie de 1890 avec la construction du Monument national, et qui se poursuit avec l'avènement du burlesque et du cinéma. En même temps, la Main est un lieu où les femmes jouent un rôle décisif, qu'elles soient suffraguettes, effeuilleuses ou prostituees. Mais, au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, de grands bouleversements éteignent « les derniers feux de la Lower Main » et en font le refuge des marginaux, des gangsters, une véritable « descente aux enfers », selon Anctil. Dans les années 50, de nombreuses bâtisses bordant le boulevard Saint-Laurent tombent sous le pic des démolisseurs, en même temps que la rue « sert pendant un temps de laboratoire à tous les courants dits de rénovation urbaine (p. 83) ».

Toutefois, à la fin du 20e siècle, une renaissance a cours lorsque la rue Saint-Laurent se transforme en « boulevard de la révolution technologique ». Des immigrants grecs, portugais, antillais, asiatiques, africains, s'approprient la rue, remplaçant ainsi les Juifs et les Italiens qui, eux, se déplacent vers les banlieues, au moment même où la Main est consacrée dans les romans de Mordecai Richler et de Michel Tremblay, ainsi que dans les chansons de Leonard Cohen. En fait, le boulevard devient « le rendez-vous des créateurs » aux horizons les plus variés, écrivains, peintres,
sculpteurs, cinéastes, ce qui redonne un tissu aux quartiers environnant la Main. Au tournant du 21e siècle, celles-ci renaissent également grâce aux entreprises du multimédia, qui ne sont pas moins de 159 en décembre 2000, et aux projets de rénovation urbaine, dont celui du faubourg Saint-Laurent.

Ces quatre chapitres sont précédés d'un « contexte historique » où Anctil décrit le chemin Saint-Laurent à l'époque pré-industrielle. Il est pour le moins curieux qu'il considère cette période plus « historique » que les périodes suivantes, qui constituent le cœur de l'ouvrage. Il est regrettable aussi que ce soit la seule partie du livre où il étudie la fonction de voie de communication de cette grande artère urbaine.

Anctil conçoit le boulevard Saint-Laurent comme le « reflet de la montréalité » et le « convoyeur de la modernité » québécoise. Il a sans doute raison dans le premier cas; toutefois, il ne faudrait pas penser que la Modernité n'atteint le Québec que par le boulevard Saint-Laurent. Elle a bien d'autres sources.

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THE BOOKS by Weaver and Clarke share a central thesis that is captured in one of the titles. It is that a key part of the making of the modern world is the transformation of the world's "commons" and communally held lands and waters into forms of private property. The authors, however, differ in their choice of historical focus. Weaver examines this conversion of property forms in five regions of British settlement colonies and their independent successors — the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in the period between 1650 and 1900; and Clarke explores the "struggle over land" in Upper Canada, and more specifically in Essex county in what is present-day southwestern Ontario, from 1788 to 1850. Geographically, the focus of the studies overlap in a small way, but one study is ambitious and sweeping in its scope, while the other is daunting in its detail and concentrates on a small area and a short period in the history of colonial British North America.

The dates that frame these studies are clearly very different — one covers a period of less than 100 years and the other spans 250 years — but they are similar in the seeming arbitrariness of these timeframes. That historical studies demand a chronological beginning and end is obvious, but there is no convincingly argued rationale by either author for their dates. If historical arguments and timeframes imply each other, in these books the reader will not find a clear connection.

The nature of their arguments is not quite so elusive: each rests his thesis on the concept of property. It is unusual to find the writing of historical treatises guided by concepts and even more so to find the concept of property creeping in (the spectre of Marx remains a problem in mainstream academia), but the use of this concept allows both authors to take the writing of history beyond the mere recitation of dates, events, individual actions, and policy initiatives to find a meaning that transcends the recording of the strictly empirical. For this reason alone, these studies are worth the read, and the authors stand out from those who try merely to record data in a chronological sequence.

Although Weaver spends the better part of a chapter defining property, and Clarke spends only a few pages in his Preface, neither quite provides an ade-
quate working definition or discussion of the concept for their lengthy studies. Both have implicitly made the distinction between property as a thing and as a relationship; and both have employed C.B. Macpherson to define property as a relation, that is as “an enforceable claim” or right or entitlement to the use or disposal of some good or service. Property, in this sense, is a generic definition, not a specific one, and as such embraces the entire range of property forms from communal and usufruct claims to exclusive, individual rights, i.e., private property. Both authors, however, frequently use the concept of property solely with the latter meaning. As if to avoid using the term private property, moreover, Weaver even coins the label “absolute property right” to refer to the same; but the notion of absolute does not convey the meaning of exclusive and individual that defines private property, that is, rights possessed by an individual (or the corporation as an “individual”). While Weaver is far more thorough in his discussion of property than Clarke, neither author develops the concept sufficiently well to do justice to the details of their historical knowledge or to the thesis they want to draw from their studies.

All social formations are characterized by a set of property relations — of rights, claims, and entitlements — that define their very nature. Conceived as changing property relations, the whole of history can be traced as the movement from communal or common forms of right, characterizing many pre-capitalist communities, to ever more narrowly defined exclusive rights in a world of private property. Here lies the strength of the concept of property as a tool of analysis. Both authors attempt to trace such changes, but their employment of the concept suggests that they do not see it as the essence of the system itself, and this prevents them from drawing conclusions that are more than statements of the obvious.

Both authors do, however, draw the relation between property forms and forms of political power — a point not always well appreciated. Clarke makes the point in his ninth chapter, entitled “Land and Power”; the existence of the oligarchy of Upper Canada, the “Family Compact,” rested on the underdeveloped nature of the land, due largely to the land-granting practices of the Imperial government that placed most of the available arable land in Crown or clergy reserves for the use and disposal by the ruling officers and established churches. Widespread patronage grants, corruption, and speculative use of the land conspired to frustrate development but maximize the returns to the oligarchy and church hierarchies. The unsuccessful rebellions of 1837 in Upper and Lower Canada merely tried to do what the American Revolution had done about 60 years earlier — to replace one form of government based on an Imperial and appointed monopoly of power and privilege with one that represented indigenous capital and privilege and implied widespread small holdings. Their failure reflected the degree of underdevelopment of indigenous capital in the province. Unfortunately, the Rebellions, long an embarrassment to historians who implicitly side with authority, are barely mentioned in this book.

For his part, Weaver employs the differences in official forms of land tenure as an important basis for a “comparative history.” That is, the position of government in relation to land holding provides a valuable tool in making cross-national comparisons and tracing historical movements. Using the concept in this way, we can see the foundations of different national characteristics grounded in different property relations, and in turn — to go beyond the confines of his study — understand the decline of these differences as the property forms become increasingly monolithic as private corporate property the world over.

Throughout history, wherever the state appears, so does religion, often in the form of an established church. In the transformation periods dealt with in these
books, not only did institutionalized religion provide the rationalization for the transformation of property forms, however violent it was, but also the churches strove to benefit materially, both in extending their constituencies and in apprehending for themselves a share of the spoils of imperial expansion. In this regard, no church was more rapacious than the Roman Catholic, although the Anglicans did rather well for themselves in Upper Canada, as Clarke points out. There the clergy reserves, established largely for the benefit of the established Anglican church, were not only a significant cause of underdevelopment (through the conscious use of small farmers to enhance the value of these holdings), but also their acquisition was of questionable origin; that is to say, much of the wealth of the Anglican Church, among others, cannot be said to have positive ethical roots.

For Weaver, it is almost as if the church played no role in the “great land rush” that underlay the making of the modern world. He briefly mentions the difference between the Catholic European colonizers and the Protestant British empire in religious attitudes towards land settlement and the indigenous peoples, but the role of religion was much more significant in determining the shape of colonization than his limited discussion suggests. This role included, in part, the very formation of the character of the government, settlers, and their attitude and approach to Natives and their rights.

The property transformations that both authors examine are central to the centuries of colonization by European powers; but any discussion of colonization requires some analysis of the rationale for expansion. In Weaver’s book, in particular — with the subtitle, “the Making of the Modern World” — one would expect to find considerable attention paid to this question. Some sort of presentation of the many theories of European and particularly British colonialism and imperialism and the rationale for claiming new territory would seem to be necessary to complement the detailed recording of dates, events, actions, and policies that comprise the book. But Weaver goes no further than to suggest that a “pre-occupation,” or an “appetite,” or an “urge” lay behind the demand for expansion in the mercantile period. And Clarke nowhere takes up the issue of the impetus in capital to expand.

This omission is unfortunate because it leaves the authors unable to explain the rapaciousness of the conquest of new land and the relentless pursuit of new territory in the periods that they cover, or to see the continuation of the object of their studies — the privatization of land holding — to this day. An exploration of the political economy of colonial expansion would have greatly enhanced their focus on the transformation of property forms. Without it, the question of the motive for changes in property forms is left unaddressed and the treatises necessarily become more descriptive than explanatory.

Both authors spend the better part of their work describing the various forms of appropriation of land from the native populations. Both discuss many examples of purchases, treaties, wars, squatting, state assumption of title for speculation or granting, and the use of the market. These discussions are thorough, to say the least, and yet both writers underplay the violence involved in most examples of alienation of indigenous land, not to mention the illegal, extra-legal, and fraudulent measures employed. It is not that these methods are not discussed, but that they are treated summarily, without the due importance that they possess.

It is most unlikely that the treaties signed were understood in the same way by both sides; the purchase of land as private property was almost certainly not fully grasped by indigenous peoples; the question of who possessed the right to sign or speak for whole tribes or bands in these regards would necessarily be unclear; the arbitrary assertion of rights by states or individuals could only be taken as a threat to pre-existing indigenous
rights; disease, the use of alcohol and deception, coercion, and the European failure to honour commitments complement the picture; and war and frequent policies of physical annihilation provided the ultimate sanction for the transference of their lands into the form of private property. Where First Nations persisted, they were often subjected to policies of cultural annihilation and/or assimilation. All of this is discussed only in the most circumspect of ways by our authors.

In other words, the transformation of pre-capitalist property forms into forms of private property, the making of the modern world, which is the topic of both books, was everywhere based on violence, deceit, corruption, and the sheer assertion of rights by states and individuals. It would be very difficult to point to any example of appropriation of land in the colonized territories that could be described as completely free of any ethical or legal doubts, that could be defended as completely legitimate, even within the legal framework of the colonizers. There was outright theft from the First Nations, corrupt practices among officials and corporations, and deceit and often violence throughout the whole process. The same legal and ethical reservations persist to this day in the continuing appropriation of commons and communally held lands and in the maintenance of private property. In short, both authors miss the point that everywhere the extinguishment of pre-capitalist rights was and remains questionable. Such an assessment of the "modern world" could have provided interesting conclusions for Clarke and Weaver.

The fact that this transformation of rights was questionable reveals itself in the current demands for Aboriginal rights, now growing the world over. Along with these demands for restoration of rights to land and water, there are also claims for reparations for the wealth generated by the labour power taken by force or fraud from Native, slave, and indentured labour. General consciousness of this point is growing, in particular amongst those whose ancestors were defrauded, coerced, or enslaved. The entire edifice of a world of private property rests on dubious grounds; and while this important point is certainly deducible from these studies, the authors do not venture down this path of inquiry.

Both authors have written lengthy tomes that seem to embody a career's worth of learning and reflection. (Oddly, Clarke's book is the re-working of his doctoral thesis — at the end of his career.) The result of several decades of dedicated scholarship, however, would hopefully be revealed in the manner of the virtuosity of a mature musician — as the presentation of an interpretation that manifests itself as the effortless grasp of the essence, that highlights the themes and subordinates all that merely complements them. There are many historians who have written such pieces at the end of their careers. But with these authors their interesting theme of changing property is incompletely grasped and unfortunately obscured by the accompanying overwhelming detail. Both provide a daunting display of scholarship that continuously threatens to override the themes and cloud what otherwise could have pointed to novel ways of interpreting history. Elements of a good interpretation are all but lost in the excess of detail.

Gary Teeple
Simon Fraser University

David Quiring, CCF Colonialism in Northern Saskatchewan: Battling Parish Priests, Bootleggers and Fur Sharks (Vancouver: UBC Press 2004)

THE TITLE CONTAINS the central conundrum of this book. Who are the colonists? Apparently not the parish priests, bootleggers, and fur sharks. Indeed, Quiring concludes the book with the claim that churches and private businessmen (including the fur sharks) deliver up
more promise of progress, development, and employment than the Government of Saskatchewan.

From 1944 (when the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was first elected) to about 1964 (when the CCF was defeated by Ross Thatcher's right-wing Liberals), the provincial government made use of politically sympathetic existing public servants and appointees to try to transform the northern economy. Quiring's account is that of a historian at the University of Saskatchewan, trying to trace how well that plan worked.

This review rests in part on my living and working in the north starting in 1960 and earlier visits to the north as a somewhat politically aware teenager. I also participated intermittently in the La Ronge CCF club and provincial CCF conventions.

Quiring defines neither colonialism nor socialism. At least in this case, they go together for him. The book's introduction says he was alerted to the "socialism" of the CCF in his youth when the party called for co-op and government farms in his native southwest Saskatchewan, events which influenced his views of the CCF in the North.

CCF socialism seems to consist of ideologically motivated government intervention in the North at the behest of a couple of cabinet ministers and some partisan government employees, many (but not all) of whom were friends, activists, and CCF members. Leanings toward development of fur, timber, fish and other co-operatives, grants to local housing or employment projects, and evidence from archived government correspondence provide the basis for this view. Prior occupations in private business, subsistence activities, and bush piecework have no ideological content or importance for the author.

Colonialism seems to be founded on the fact that these partisans were there and took action, apparently as external forces sent to "colonize" the North. Though some southern CCF activists went to the north during that time, most mentioned in the book were long-time residents. Little is made of the fact that the number of so-called colonial activists was very small, and that the vast majority of northern government employees were not at all partisan, but merely did long-standing, non-political jobs.

Saskatchewan Archives Board material provides most of the citations. Though Quiring interviewed about two dozen northern and government individuals, archive documents override these voices. Quiring says he found memories faulty or selective. The documents apparently are seen as dependable. But Quiring's own documenting practices leave something to be desired. He makes claims, but the footnotes often show a group of sources, so it is impossible to tell which source made which point. In addition, some sources quoted do not show up in the bibliography. One interviewer, cited by last name only, is several times discovered in the middle of lists of archive sources, making it impossible to tell which source by that surname is being cited (though I know who it was, because I was a peripheral participant in the taping process).

The CCF as a party had very diffuse ideas about changing Saskatchewan's North. To transform an economy from mixed hunting and gathering and resource extraction into a periphery of an agricultural and industrializing provincial economy (which was, and is, a periphery itself) is a task that defeated more disciplined socialist forces elsewhere on the face of the globe.

The Saskatchewan CCF, having become the New Democratic Party in 1961, developed more conscious ideas and organizational forms to try again in the 1970s in the North. It would be more accurate in both earlier and later cases to call those efforts "social democratic management of a capitalist periphery economy."

"Colonialism" existed only in the sense that there is some evidence for overt moves to attach the North to the southern
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provincial economy. The global uranium market, new uses for timber previously viewed as low grade, fleeting hydro power and water export possibilities, greased with federal government funding until the mid 1970s, made the North economically attractive in a way it could not be during the time dealt with in Quiring’s book. Quiring cites other authors on colonialism in the North, but definitions and analytical rigour are somewhat stretched among them also. Socialism is normally construed as anti-colonial, so the reader has to do some mental gymnastics to adapt to Quiring’s assumptions.

The book is nonetheless a useful read. It marshals evidence that was formerly diffuse. Purposeful marches through archived government files uncovered much detail most ordinary citizens would never see. Quiring’s historical assemblage fills in much colour and shading previously rendered in the black and white arguments of the partisans. He has little to say about the reasons why CCF and other socialist and non-socialist activists battled abuses by the parish priests, bootleggers, and fur sharks.

The key role of the former Centre for Community Studies at the University of Saskatchewan is outlined too sparingly. Oddly, the CCF newspaper, Commonwealth, was not accessed for any official party views on the North. Perhaps it had little editorial or news content about this topic, but the very few mentions in Quiring’s book indicate there was something there. Quiring conflates the CCF and the Saskatchewan government. He refers to the party members and employees interchangeably, as if the party and the government virtually acted as one. In one case among several, he refers to a person I know well as the CCF Public Relations Director, though he in fact held that job in the provincial government.

Quiring’s conclusions seem liberally founded, pragmatically oriented to jobs and incomes within the narrow confines of the bush economy, without much focus on means for political and economic northern transformation. He thinks the aboriginal (his term) people were satisfied with the arrangements set up by the churches and fur trading stores. In the end, he thinks the CCF government activists did no better, and did worse in some instances.

When I showed this book to some of my northern Saskatchewan friends mentioned, they were bemused to see their words (from old government, party, and organization files) in print and analysed. They knew the people and places on the cover pictures, taken in the 1940s. They, like myself, do not share Quiring’s views, but took a certain amount of satisfaction seeing their work recognized and acknowledged, even if the results of their efforts were not as hoped.

Given the nature of the book, most potential readers will probably want to wait until it appears in paperback. The hardback version sells for over $80 Canadian.

Ken Collier
Athabasca University


I ADMIT that I began Eglin and Hester’s book with some uncertainty. My initial concern was whether it was appropriate to apply an ethnomethodological approach to something that in Canadian society is treated with such reverence (as evidenced by the National Day of Mourning that is observed on 6 December of every year). Countering this uncertainty was my own experience in researching violence and my firm belief that such topics are necessary areas of study, if we are ever to understand why violence of such magnitude occurs.

In fact, in reading the book, I found myself quite impressed with the sensitivity the authors showed in exploring the Montreal massacre, and I think they were
able to acknowledge the immense feeling associated with this event without compromising their analytical approach. In particular, I was pleased that they devoted an entire chapter to examining their own subjective responses to the events in question, noting that they were “not mere onlookers, nor just analysts,” (126) and describing their own uncertainties about the appropriateness of their analysis. That being said, however, I did find several things wanting.

My chief concern with this book is that it lacks a structure through which the analysis can be framed. By this, I do not mean that there is no discussion of the theory and method of the analysis; rather, I found that the approach to describing the method was a bit haphazard. While I am familiar with ethnomethodology, I am certainly no expert in the field, and I would have appreciated a more general overview of the approach before they began their analysis of newspaper articles reporting and commenting on the Montreal Massacre. Instead, this information seemed to come in little pieces as they moved through the different aspects of their research.

Throughout the book, the authors promise that ethnomethodology will provide new insights into classical sociological issues such as crime and deviance, “respecifying the functions of crime as members’ phenomena.” (109) I think they ultimately fail to deliver on that promise. This is not to say that the work did not contain insights into crime and deviance. However, these were not brought together in some kind of coherent explanation, and this omission diminished their effect. Without this kind of framework, it didn’t seem to me that membership categorization analysis can give us meaningful insight into violence.

A related problem I have with the book is my disagreement with their claims regarding social constructionism. At the beginning of the book they argue for ethnomethodology over social constructionism, but their description of social constructionism seems oversimplified. For example, at one point they state that “the social constructionist, on the premise that crime is a social construction, can argue that what are oriented to as ‘facts’… are in actual fact ideological fictions.” (7) While some social constructionist theories do take this as their premise, there are also a number of theories that take a much more moderate approach. In fact, I would argue that at times Eglin and Hester’s approach could be viewed as social constructionism, though they call it by a different name.

While I recognize that there is considerable debate regarding what, exactly, each paradigm entails, I don’t feel that they articulated their arguments well. Since I generally approach my research from a social constructionist viewpoint, I found their dismissal of it premature, and continue to believe that some exploration of discourse analysis would have enhanced, rather than inhibited, their analysis, as they later claim. For example, in their exploration of how media reports accounted for the events, they noted that stories about gun control arose. However, they chose not to explore these stories in much depth because, they claim, “we can find little of interest in relation to membership categorization analysis to say about the topic.” (40) Since the “political story about gun control” (40) did, in fact, frequently arise in the media accounts they analysed, incorporating aspects of discourse analysis may have allowed them to expand this area.

Their treatment of what they at different times term “professional,” “traditional,” and “conventional” sociology is even more reductionist. First of all, the authors do not indicate just what kind of
sociology they are talking about when they use these terms. Had this book been written in the early 1970s, I might easily conclude that they were arguing against functionalism. However, for me, writing in the 21st century, sociology certainly entails much more than this. While late in the book they do mention functionalism specifically, they continue to apparently equate this with “professional” sociology, barely acknowledging critical theories such as feminism at all — or the long history that qualitative sociology has had of engaging with the “micro” of social interaction. This lack of engagement is glaring given that they are exploring the way in which the Montreal massacre was accounted for as an issue of violence against women.

My final concern with the book had to do with their lack of strong conclusions regarding crime or violence. While each chapter contained a conclusion section, summarizing the angle of analysis for that section, I wasn’t clear on what their overall research questions were. Obviously, an important focus of the book was to demonstrate the utility of ethnomethodology, but this conclusion was weakened by the lack of precision in their arguments against other methods of analysis. As I read the book it became apparent to me that one possible conclusion might be an exploration of the ways in which violence is constructed or accounted for through the mundane and ordinary; there are hints in this direction, but the idea is never fully developed. I find this a shame, because there is such potential for the authors to suggest an alternative way of understanding deviance — i.e., not as “deviant,” but as something that is embedded in the “normal.”

This is not to say that I didn’t enjoy Eglin and Hester’s book. On the contrary, I found it illuminating. Had they spent less time making oversimplified arguments against other forms of sociological thought, and more time clearly explaining the scope (and limitations) of ethnomethodology, I think their purpose would have been easier to discern, and the worth of the analysis easier to identify. However, even despite these faults, the authors made some interesting observations, and I enjoyed the layered approach to the media accounts — first examining the characters and setting, then turning their attention to the stories put forth (and also those that were not put forth), and finally discussing the commentary from professionals, including academics, on those stories.

Kristin Atwood
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EUGENE FORSEY was extraordinary as a Canadian thinker in that he linked the welfare of the working class with the virtues of the British constitutional tradition. What made Forsey typical of his countrymen was his belief that religion was the essential foundation of society, that it pointed the way to reform. In tracing the roots and development of Forsey’s ideas, we are revisiting some of the political issues that confronted Canada in the 20th century. The fusion of the credo of national planning directed by Christian faith in the context of a parliamentary environment that provides for dialogue and guarantees freedom expired with Forsey’s passing.

A Frank Underhill or a Tim Buck and their beliefs could have fit in quite well in Massachusetts or Milwaukee. Pierre Trudeau’s principles could have been posited in Argentina or France. Forsey’s ideas, however, were distinctively Canadian. The descendant of Loyalists and pre-Loyalists, he was fluently bilingual and a serial partisan: going from the Conservatives in the 1920s to the CCF in the 1930s to a Liberal senatorship in the 1970s. In 1950, he described himself to a young Trudeau as an “Independent Continuing
Unprogressive Conservative CCF!” He was a force in the League for Social Reconstruction, the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order, the Canadian Civil Liberties Union, and the Canadian Congress of Labour. He was a failure (alas) in his one-time ambition to be elected to the House of Commons. He ran federally and provincially for the CCF three times in four years in the 1940s. His career and writings proved him the best parliamentarian Canada never had.

Frank Milligan’s intellectual biography is competent, workmanlike, satisfying, and most welcome. (Nevertheless, there are some disconcerting errors: the LSR’s *Democracy Needs Socialism* reappears, in the same paragraph (126) as *Canada Needs Socialism*.) By dissecting and ordering Forsey’s ideas chronologically — through his lecture notes, unpublished manuscripts, correspondence, and published works — Milligan’s book implicitly reminds us that Forsey’s Canada is no more. Influenced by Burke and by Fabianism, Forsey advocated gradual reform and evolutionary change, but the ideas and values that now drive Canada represent in their totality a revolutionary change from Forsey’s country of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. Religion is in decline as secularization proceeds unabated; even socialists have given up on central planning; and parliament’s foundation of responsible government has given way to courts, referenda, and the demeaning eclipse of parliament’s dignified apex, Forsey’s beloved Crown.

“Red tory” is a term that appears in the book a couple of times. Forsey uses it once and the author uses it to refer to George Grant, with whom Forsey corresponded. Both saw a central role for Christianity in public affairs and both were profoundly critical of capitalism and the dominant business élites, but they differed on human’s innate nature. Forsey was optimistic about people’s rational capacities; Grant was fearful of our irrationality. Thus Forsey became a CCFer and a socialist, while Grant remained a conservative and a Conservative until small-l liberals hijacked his party, something Forsey saw happening decades earlier. It is ironic that Milligan’s rather longish listing of secondary sources neglects Gad Horowitz’s seminal “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism: An Interpretation,” which appeared in his 1960s book *Canadian Labour in Politics*. It was there that the “red tory” debuted in the lexicon of Canadian politics and it is precisely there where Grant and Forsey are cited, cheek by jowl, as exemplars of the phenomenon which Forsey characterized as “a conscious socialist with some odd tory notions.”

As a red tory, Forsey was a critic of blue tories (the anglophone Montreal business class in the 1920s and the Bay Street Dalton Camps of the 1960s who vied to control the Conservative party). He was a champion of Tory democracy as articulated by Disraeli and Randolph Churchill. In this view, the material and spiritual needs of the masses could be addressed if, united with the Crown, they deployed their institutions as bulwarks against the plutocratic tycoons and rapacious bourgeois classes that would exploit them. Where Forsey differed with Disraeli and Churchill, a difference Milligan does not develop, is that Forsey never identified with or saw the old landowning classes, or other exponents of noblesse oblige, leading the people. Their doing so would only prevent the development and leadership of the working class.

Forsey prized his friendship with Arthur Meighen (they exchanged over 400 letters) and considered him a supporter of Tory democratic social security. They shared a low esteem for Mackenzie King and saw eye-to-eye on the King-Byng affair. For Forsey, like his British heroes, the Crown was a “popular throne,” which, along with parliament, represented the people. Tory democracy also went by the rubric “Tory social democracy.”

It is curious that Milligan provides dates and details of Forsey’s movements from McGill to Oxford and to a visit to
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Stalinist Russia, but we are not informed of the dates of his appointment to the Senate nor of his death. At McGill, Forsey was mentored by Stephen Leacock who later played a role in his dismissal from that institution. At Oxford, Forsey read the Webbs and Harold Laski, and was impressed with the lectures by G. D. H. Cole and A. D. Lindsay. However, the strongest influence on Forsey was a philosophy professor and a convert to Quakerism, John Macmurray. Forsey later adopted Quakerism as well. Macmurray, still quoted by Forsey in 1950, defined the heart of Christianity as action rather than doctrine. "Take away the spiritual," wrote Forsey, "and Labour's whole struggle becomes meaningless." That was a perspective he shared with social gospellers like J. S. Woodsworth and Tommy Douglas.

Forsey styled himself a citizen economist, one in favour of a planned economy. The press labelled him a communist. During the Depression, he was a critic of Canadian immigration policy because he believed four times as many immigrants were being admitted as could be absorbed. Forsey’s skills as a critical social scientist made him attractive to the CCL as its research director. According to the title of his own memoirs, Forsey lived a life on the fringe. This book, however, demonstrates the power, once upon a time, of both the democratic socialist and some tory notions of Canada. Mackenzie King liberalism trumped both decisively and marginalized what Forsey fought for.

Forsey eventually became a Liberal because of his position on the Quebec question. In the 1930s, he and fellow Montrealer Frank Scott feared an outbreak of racial fascism in Quebec. The NDP’s embrace of the two-nations idea of Canada in the 1960s led Forsey to leave its fold. He was a Pierre Trudeau Liberal, he told people, because he was a John A. Macdonald Conservative. Oddly then, there is nothing in the book on his views of Trudeau's Charter, although we are exposed to Forsey’s early efforts on behalf of civil liberties and told that he supported the Constitution Act, 1982 despite his deep suspicion of the courts weighing in on constitutional conventions.

There is a photo of Forsey on the cover of this easy-to-read paperback. It is split in two: one side is coloured salmon, the other mauve. Both are tinged with pink. Make of that what you will.

Nelson Wiseman
University of Toronto


For at least the past 50 years, the study of American workers’ compensation laws has been a crucible for testing new theories of the state and as such has also revealed much about dominant trends in the American academy. Liberal-pluralist accounts, such as Robert Asher’s, depicted the passage of workers’ compensation laws as the outcome of growing working-class political influence and its accommodation in a scheme that benefited both workers, by providing them with access to no-fault compensation through a simplified administrative mechanism, and employers, by immunizing them against civil liability for work injuries and deaths at a time when their common law defences were being eroded. Revisionist historians in the late 1960s, such as James Weinstein and Roy Lubove, retold the story through the lens of corporate-liberal theory, emphasizing the leading role played by big business in promoting workers’ compensation laws in order to further its objectives that included standardizing and making predictable the costs of industrial accidents, eliminating the role of troublesome private insurance companies, and reducing an important source of friction in employer-employee relations. State-centred
theorists, such as Theda Skocpol, subsequently explained the comparatively early emergence of workers’ compensation relative to other welfare-state programs on the basis that its passage did not require a greatly expanded bureaucracy or significant additional state spending. More recently, law and economics scholars, like Fishback and Kantor, and Epstein, have argued that workers’ compensation came about because it better approximated the outcomes that would have been produced consensually through markets and bargaining than the then existing common-law liability scheme and the transaction costs associated with it.

Entering this well-studied and deeply contested terrain poses a significant challenge to any scholar wishing to make her or his mark, but John Fabian Witt has succeeded admirably. His book, The Accidental Republic, is a meticulously researched, methodologically eclectic, deeply engaging and, at times, provocative study of America’s response to the problem of work injuries from the mid-19th century to the enactment of workers’ compensation laws in the first decades of the 20th century, and of their implications for the development of the welfare state. His central claim, suggested by the title of the book, is that the emergence of workers’ compensation as the principal policy response to the problem of work injuries, and the form that compensation laws took, was the contingent outcome of the encounter between a diverse set of ideological, political, and institutional influences. The strength of Witt’s book, however, does not lie in the proof of this claim but, rather, in his exploration of the deep ideological crisis triggered by work injuries in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and in his excavation of the less known responses of workers and employers to the work accident crisis.

In Chapter 1 Witt argues that industrial injuries and deaths posed a crisis to the American republic for both material and ideological reasons. On the one hand, their incidence was exceptionally high in the US for a variety of reasons, including ineffective health and safety laws and the lack of employer liability for those injuries (a matter to which Witt returns). Not only did these accidents cause great material suffering to workers and their families, but, Witt argues, they also precipitated a crisis of the free labour ideology enshrined in American politics and law after the Civil War. Like all ideologies, this one embraced a number of beliefs, including individual autonomy, manly independence, the family wage, and the efficacy of competitive labour markets.

In the next three chapters, Witt examines a variety of responses to the crisis. In Chapter 2 Witt looks at the common law, which in its classic 19th-century formulation embraced the principle that individual autonomy should be maximized by limiting legal liability to situations where individuals acted negligently or in violation of obligations voluntarily assumed by contract. Witt argues that the rising mountain of industrial accident claims challenged the doctrinal structure of American law because it left so many faultless victims uncompensated. While this is well-trodden ground, Witt offers some interesting observations on the reasons for the paucity of personal injury litigation in the first half of the 19th century, relating both to patterns of authority, deference, and power in employment relations, and to legal obstacles facing potential plaintiffs, including unfavourable evidentiary rules and the paucity of lawyers to take their cases. His treatment of the role of contract, especially in the earlier cases that established the legal presumption that workers assumed the risk of injury from hazards present in the workplace, is less satisfactory, as he underplays the importance of the idea that workers contractually consented to the risk of injury, including the risk of being injured by negligence of employers and co-workers. As well, Witt’s treatment of employer liability statutes is overly brief and leaves the mistaken impression that they aimed to make employers strictly lia-
ble for all injuries caused to workers, when they are more appropriately characterized as a limited reform that made negligence, rather than contract, the key legal principle for determining employer liability.

Labour historians will be particularly interested in Chapter 3 in which Witt illuminates the understudied phenomenon of workers’ mutual aid in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Specifically, he documents the explosive growth of workers’ cooperative insurance plans, identifying them as a response to the economic insecurity workers faced that was also consistent with the belief in manly independence and fraternity so strongly embedded in the consciousness of skilled workers. But just as the common law failed to provide a satisfactory resolution to the problem of work injury compensation, so too did mutual assistance. Reflective of Witt’s methodological eclecticism, he locates the movement’s limits through both a law-and-economics lens that focuses on the problems of “moral hazard” (fraudulent claims) and “adverse selection” (disproportionate participation of high risk workers) and through an assessment of the impact of the massive influx of immigrants on coverage and benefit levels for many of the most vulnerable injured workers. Witt does not, however, explore in greater depth the relationship between the ebb and flow of mutual aid and the political, ideological, and numerical trajectory of the American labour movement over the same period.

A third alternative, employer benefit plans, is examined in Chapter 4. Here Witt emphasizes the link between the growth of these plans and the spread of scientific management. While others, particularly Aldrich, have connected the rise of scientific management with the safety first movement in industry, Witt convincingly argues that firm-specific accident compensation funds came first and were viewed by management engineers as a way of making firms more efficient. As well, he demonstrates that scientific management was associated with a shift toward a more systemic view of causation, one that simultaneously emphasized management control over and responsibility for the creation of risk and the need to closely supervise workers to insure that they performed their work according to management’s dictates.

Is Witt correct, then, that workmen’s compensation was contingent in the sense that there were plausible alternatives that might have been selected? Here I think he overstates his case from both a functional and a political perspective. Functionally, as Witt himself shows, the alternatives failed to provide the mass of workers access to compensation for work injuries. Politically, as previous historians have demonstrated, workers’ compensation was enacted because it attracted support from a broad range of interests, including employers and insurance companies. None of the alternatives was politically viable. Moreover, there is a stronger argument to be made about contingency in the specific design of the workers’ compensation scheme. Fishback and Kantor’s quantitative and case-study analyses demonstrate how the differences in the balance of power among unions, employers, insurers, and political reformers determined how controversies over benefit levels and the role of public versus private insurance were resolved.

The weakness of Witt’s larger thesis, however, does not detract from his illuminating account of earlier responses to work injuries. As well, Witt makes at least two other distinctive contributions to the history of American workers’ compensation. First, he makes clear that the label “workmen’s” compensation was not an ‘innocent’ instance of the universalization of the masculine form, but rather reflected the deeply gendered discourse of the family wage, a key dimension of free labour ideology, that underpinned the scheme. Witt argues convincingly that public support for workers’ compensation was mobilized by emphasizing the nightmarish impact of industrial acci-
dents on the families of male workers — widows forced into low-paid positions in the labour market leaving behind unsupervised children. Moreover, the male breadwinner ideology was written into workers’ compensation statutes through provisions that made death benefits available to the widows of male workers killed in the course of employment but not to widowers of female workers.

Second, he locates workers’ compensation at the centre of a key shift in legal and social thinking about causation. Whereas in the 19th century inquiries into the problem of work injuries focused on whether an individual actor was responsible for a causing a specific outcome, workers’ compensation was premised on the view that work injuries were a predictable outcome of productive activity; indeed, they were not accidents at all. Thus, the proper inquiry was not whether a particular employer had negligently caused a particular work injury, but rather how to design a system that distributed losses appropriately. While this paradigm shift closed certain avenues of debate, it opened up others but, as mentioned earlier, Witt does not delve into the conflicts that emerged over these issues in the design of the scheme. Rather, his emphasis is on the role law played in shaping and limiting the further development of social insurance in the US. Specifically, Witt argues that judicial acceptance of the constitutionality of workmen’s compensation laws against claims that they violated employer property rights was conditional on the notion that there was a quid pro quo — in this case immunity from tort liability. Other social insurance programs could not offer employers similar trade-offs and, thus, both as a matter of law and of politics stood little chance of success.

In sum, Witt has made a valuable contribution to an already rich body of work on the history of American workers’ compensation by situating it within a complex array of legal, ideological, organizational, and institutional developments. For labour historians, however, the book will have two major shortcomings. First, workers’ voices are largely absent from the book, even though it was their lives and health that were at risk and the financial security of their families that was at stake. While in part this may reflect the limitation of the sources, it is also arguably the result of the second shortcoming, and that is the relegation of class and class conflict to a decidedly secondary place in the analysis. For example, neither the high level of labour militancy in the first decade of the 20th century, nor the repression of labour radicalism after World War I are part of the backdrop to the story of the rise of workers’ compensation in the pre-war era and the failure of other social insurance schemes to be enacted in the post-war period. Finally, Canadian readers will be amused to learn that when Americans now look for alternative accident-law regimes, they do not look to their own history “but to the far corners of the earth, places like Saskatchewan…” (209)

Eric Tucker
York University


WRITING IN the acknowledgments of Making Men, Making Class, Thomas Winter recounts a conversation he had with his PhD supervisor about the direction of his dissertation, the basis for this book. Originally conceptualized as a case study of philanthropy and labour relations in late 19th- and early 20th-century America, his thesis changed radically after taking up his supervisor’s advice to “look into” what the records of the YMCA’s Railroad and Industrial Department said “about being men”(ix) at the turn of the century. Evidently, they said a lot.
Drawing on the burgeoning literature on masculinity during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Winter takes aim at the notion that, in a time defined by “the rise of bureaucratic structures, new forms of work, and altering career paths,” middle-class men sought out a new sense of themselves which “sanctioned a more aggressive, physical type of manhood.” (4-5) This “hedonistic cult of masculinity” might have satisfied some middle-class men, he argues, but not all. Indeed, for the middle-class men who orchestrated and ran the YMCA’s programs amongst railroad and industrial workers, it was not the “strenuous life,” but a “sense of mission” and “social purpose” that defined their response to the “predicaments of their time.” (5) In seven short, tightly focused chapters, Winter explores this evolving sense of middle-class manhood.

Created with the support of corporate America, including heavyweights like John D. Rockefeller, the YMCA’s outreach initiatives were designed to dampen working-class militancy by recasting the relations between employer and worker “within a cultural framework of benevolent, manly paternalism.” (47) Situated in the “domestic” and more feminine setting of a YMCA building, and used to the “flabby-handed” routine of white-collar work, the organization’s officials and secretaries were faced with the daunting task of reforming “rugged workingmen.” To resolve this paradox, they deployed a new understanding of their gender that rested, increasingly, on updated notions of “character” and “personality.” By exhibiting these qualities, so the argument went, they stood a better chance of gaining the confidence of railroad and industrial employees, and, in the process, providing a living, breathing example of the sort of manhood the workers ought to emulate. Or at least that was the plan.

By the early decades of the 20th century, however, as the YMCA’s role in labour relations contracted, the language of personality and character, and the social practices within which it was enmeshed coalesced around new issues of expertise, professionalism, and leadership. According to Winter, this shift in focus “helped create an ideal of the service-oriented ‘corporate man’ and ‘team player’ when the standard of upward social mobility as a primary means of affirmation of the male self became an increasingly elusive quest and salaried, white-collar work became the major occupational domain for middle-class men.” (146) The irony, here, is striking: by trying to “submerge[ ] the realities of class difference in an ideal of manliness,” the YMCA actually helped to create “new cultural codes and boundaries” around gender that, over the long term, made the gap between labour and capital more obvious. (64, 147) “As YMCA officials set out to make men,” Winter argues, “they ended up making class as well.” (1)

Readers of this journal will not be surprised to learn that the YMCA played an influential role in the cultural history of the US at the turn of the century; over the past decade or so, scholars have explored the YMCA’s role in policing men “adrift in the city” and in making “the age of the bachelor” — to cite but two examples. What is important about this book, however, is its principal assertion that definitions of class difference were critical to the formation of a new sense of masculinity amongst middle-class men. While that, too, might not sound novel, it is worth noting that in the context of the American literature on this topic, considerations of class often take a back seat to considerations of race (Gail Bederman’s important Manliness and Civilization comes to mind here).

What’s more, Winter’s emphasis on class, both as a lived experience and a socio-economic force, does not come at the expense of an attentiveness to the changing language of manhood and its connection to wider structures of determination. Not only did the new language of character and personality shore up the YMCA secretaries’ sense of self, and ease
their transition into a new corporate and professional world, but, he argues, it became a powerful resource for the maintenance of class differences, the sine qua non of a capitalist society. Blending the techniques of post-structuralism and historical materialism, and keen to resist the urge to substitute one determinism (language) for another (economics), Winter has produced a study that deserves a wide and appreciative scholarly audience. His decision to follow his supervisor’s advice was certainly the right one.

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FOR HISTORIANS who have studied labour relations on the New York and London waterfronts, this book tells a familiar tale, albeit one enlivened by a wealth of new material from union sources and primary interviews. For historians unfamiliar with previous studies of conflict on the waterfront, this book is as good as any that you will find.

In *Waterfront Revolts*, Colin Davis offers a more refined analysis of time (1946-61) and place (the great city ports of New York and London) than many earlier accounts, using the comparative method to identify the structural and cultural forces that lay behind the emergence of rank-and-file dockworker movements. Instead of “US exceptionalism” and “British peculiarity,” it is the joined experience of New York longshoremen and London dockers that informs the comparative study. As Davis points out, “Sharply delineating connections and differences provides a clear sense of both historical congruence and specificity. This is how both comparative and new institutionalist histories can merge.” (4)

Historical congruence is very much to the fore in the early chapters on “The Men” (Chapter 1), “The Work” (Chapter 2), and their “ Estrangement” (Chapter 3) from the trade union leadership of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and Transport & General Workers’ Union (TGWU). The complex interactions between race and ethnicity, class and religion, are systematically analyzed to construct a detailed profile of the men in both ports. Segmentation by race and ethnicity was far more important in New York, and Davis returns to the issue of racist hiring in Chapter 8. Black and Hispanic longshoremen were typically forced to “shape” as extras, rather than gangs, which severely limited their work opportunities, as did the inability of the Jim Crow Local 968 to secure its own pier.

Hiring practices dominated the daily lives of both New York longshoremen and London dockers, and in different ways proved to be the root cause of estrangement. Many jobs on the waterfront were highly skilled, or at least “required an intricate interplay of abilities that were learned by doing. It took months and even years to acquire the rhythmic motion needed to handle a huge variety of goods efficiently and quickly.” (36) These jobs, which were far better paid than the ‘bull work’ also found on the waterfront, were allocated to the “favored” gangs.

In New York, the shape-up system was not simply a source of insecurity and subservience, but a mechanism of ILA control over its membership. As Davis clearly demonstrates, “The murderous image of the mobster and union officials was based on a violent reality ... longshoremen both obtained employment and worked in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.” (63, 65) In London, unlike many other British ports, casual hiring practices (the daily “free call”) persisted in the early post World War II period, despite the introduction of a statutory employment scheme. Through a combination of skill, collective organization, and familial control, many gangs enjoyed the
“freedom” to work when, for whom, and on whatever cargoes they chose, but such freedom jarred with the regulations of the National Dock Labour Scheme (1947) which imposed regular attendance on the dockers and obliged them to accept whatever work was on offer. More importantly, strict disciplinary sanctions were meted out in any cases of non-compliance by the London and National Dock Labour Boards. Union officials shared joint representation with employers on these Boards and regularly approved harsh disciplinary sanctions against their own members. In the eyes of rank-and-file dock workers, their union leaders were in the employers’ camp. “Paradoxically, what some New York dockworkers yearned for — stable, institutionalized union-employer relations — was resented by their London counterparts.” (79)

The shared but distinct experience of these transatlantic workers informs the core chapters of Waterfront Revolts, which focus on major strikes in both ports in 1949 and 1951. What emerges from Chapters 4-7 is the intense resentment of New York longshoremen and London dockers towards their trade union leaders, albeit for different reasons. Estrangement led to confrontation in both ports, not only with the respective union hierarchy but also employers and the state. It is here that the narrative succeeds where many other accounts fail short. Throughout these chapters, Davis weaves together the complex interaction of human agents — rank- and-file dockworkers, union officials, port employers, state representatives, and “outside” groups such as the church, communists, and lawyers — with the underlying forces of structural impulsion. The end result is a compelling account of how dignity became the watchword of both New York longshoremen and London dockers. “Whether they wanted to reform or dismiss these union leaders was not the critical point. Rather, the goal was to be heard and recognized as workers and above all as union members.” (240) To be sure, the struggle was more organized and self-directed in London than New York, where longshoremen turned to outside allies for succour. But the elements that united the two groups were more important: “The job, and its attendant group identification, nurtured and encouraged resistance.” (239) In both ports, dock workers “believed they could only rely on one another.... It was only the work gang, and by extension the port-wide labor force, that could be trusted.” (240)

With any study of such international comparative ambition there are bound to be questions that demand further scrutiny (e.g. the influence of an industry-specific as opposed to a general union structure on democracy, decision-making, and rank-and-file action) as well as calls to extend the comparative historical method to other ports and other periods. For example, London was Britain’s most strike-prone port during the early post-World War II period but conflict subsequently abated and the metropolis was usurped by Liverpool as the nation’s most strike-prone port. Dockers in London resolutely defied the obligations of the National Dock Labour Scheme from 1946 to 1961, but dockers elsewhere (cautiously) welcomed state regulation. The replication of cases from both countries over the same or subsequent periods would add immeasurably to our understanding of industrial conflict on the waterfront, especially if such research could match the standards set by Colin Davis.

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Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War against Iraq (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004)

Paul Rutherford’s new book examines how the recent war in Iraq was sold to various publics. Throughout, it also tells an eerie, if all too familiar, tale about the
power of marketing in our culture. The language of marketing dominates other modes of communication in affluent societies, to the extent that spin is now like the Stars and Stripes at a John Ashcroft news conference; it’s everywhere. Marketing generates publicity about new products and services but it also clutters our lives with ever more slogans and pitches. Spin spreads, taking over aspects of our culture previously thought to be part of that vaunted liberal democratic domain: the public sphere. In politics, public relations creates what Rutherford (drawing on the work of Daniel Robinson) calls a “marketing polity,” one in which a new kind of democracy is practiced. Here politicians are retailers and voters are consumers in a political supermarket intent on turning even the most brutal events into easy-to-consume homilies. It is such a context that fashioned the second war in Iraq as a commodity throughout the winter and spring of 2003. Such a production is dangerous, Rutherford warns, because it is only made possible through the provisions of a propaganda state, a “regime where a constant flow of illusion enables an elite to rule over the citizenry.” (192)

For the record, Rutherford did not support the war because it lacked UN sanction. But it is not “the justice ... of what happened in the spring of 2003” that interests him. (3) Rather, Rutherford is concerned with the experience of war, the spectacles and narratives produced by the mainstream media, and the ways in which these were received by audiences. “The intervention became a branded war,” Rutherford argues, “a co-production of the Pentagon and of newsrooms, processed and cleansed so that it could appeal to the well-established tastes of people who were veteran consumers of popular culture.” (4) This was war as a commodity, clean and compelling. And while most might find the notion of selling war like any other product repugnant, our pop culture of violence easily lends itself to the marketing of real war through spectacles of adventure, conquest, and victory. Gulf War II was expected to be the first Internet war. In fact, Rutherford tells us, this was not the case. Again television remained the only medium that “could deliver the experience, the images and the sounds, that made of war a live spectacle.” (80) Newspapers, radio, and the Internet would prove important, but TV stayed at the centre of our media landscape. As compared to the first Gulf War, what was new this time though were the satellite TV services of Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, etc., which offered alternative, if sometimes equally suspect, perspectives on the conflict.

A sense of belligerence across American public opinion following 11 September 2001 certainly created fertile ground in the media for Bush’s war. However, with polls throughout 2003 indicating that most Americans wanted UN sanction before moving into Iraq, the Administration and the Pentagon worked tirelessly to ensure their message and the commodity they offered (i.e., victory) were front and centre. This meant dominating and controlling the media through what the Pentagon calls the discipline of “information operations.” (61) Executed through both White House and Pentagon officials, information operations works through the constant production of narrative. The infamous “shock and awe” campaign was one such storyline meant to brand the invasion as a “good war” executed with technological sophistication via smart bombs, decapitation strikes, and stealth machinery, etc. These efforts were supported by three-a-day news briefings from White House spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, news reports by US commanders from Central Command headquarters in Doha, Qatar, and daily Administration faxes sent out to major networks and US embassies laying out the theme for the day. And when these efforts were still not enough to manage news headlines, information operations also included the production of dramatic storylines, including the so-called rescue of Private Jessica Lynch on 1 April 2003. We now know
that this story was over-hyped and wrongly reported, but its fit with the intentions of the Pentagon’s publicity machine made it impossible to resist. It also didn’t hurt that the story came out just as polls were suggesting that the American populace was beginning to worry that Iraq would become a quagmire like Vietnam.

Besides heroic tales of rescue, Rutherford also notes how a new form of marketing came to influence media coverage of the war. Viral marketing propagates one message by infecting other more legitimate messages, much like viruses spread through an unsuspecting population. A version of this was implemented in Gulf War II; only audiences came to know these people by a different name: embedded journalists. In Canada, CBC refused to embed any of its journalists for fear they would become “instruments of the marketing apparatus,” but more than 600 mostly British and American correspondents did take up this option. (70) And once in, as was to be expected, “[m]any of the reporters became family; they lost that sense of distance necessary to ‘objective’ journalism because they developed instead a sense of camaraderie, an admiration, for the people in the unit.” (76) In this way, Rutherford argues, embedded journalists became servants of the war effort. More importantly, by providing a seemingly unending flow of images, they also helped usher in the experience of real-time war, which can be viewed as it is happening. “The conceit of the real-time war was its capacity to create an illusion of being there, right when something is happening.” (85) The problem, however, is that this kind of coverage becomes a more sinister version of reality TV. By bombarding the viewer with wave upon wave of new, low-res, fragmented images, real-time war overwhelms our sense of history. It promises a kind of “thereness” that negates the past and absolves one from thinking about the future as a framework for making sense of what is happening now. How can Rutherford draw these conclusions?

Certainly, one of the most interesting methodological components of the book is the “citizen’s panel” Rutherford turns to as a bounce-board to evaluate how audiences received the messages sent out by the Pentagon and TV networks. Not surprisingly, he was selective with regards to the members of the panel: these were “women and men who belonged to the articulate public, people inside and outside the university community, who paid a lot of attention to public affairs.” (4) To Rutherford’s credit, the panel offers divergent opinions and includes the voices of peace activists, those who supported the coalition, and some who were simply what Rutherford calls “alienated consumers.” (5) Polls, letters to newspapers, and newspaper editorials were also consulted and, in general, what results from this is a book that helpfully tracks “how the weapons of mass persuasion were deployed, what their effect was, and why the experiment was significant.” (7)

The major weakness in the text has to do with the way Rutherford treats those who opposed the war. Throughout the text, there are occasions where critics of the Bush war plan are dismissed all too easily. Protests lacked intellectual substance and in fact were “naïve, ideological and … so very anti-American” (48), we are told. Rutherford’s own disdain for left-of-centre social movements seems to inform this conclusion, rather than a clear analysis of how opposition to the war developed in the West. This is a shame in what is otherwise a fine contribution and assessment of the future of war in Western cultures.

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APRIL AND MAY were cruel months in 2004. Falluja, Rafah, Abu Ghraib prison. I thought of Edward Said’s legacy when the prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq erupted in the media bringing with it photos of an American woman soldier leading a naked Iraqi man on a leash, and grinning American men and women soldiers posing for the camera before a pyramid of naked Iraqi men forced to simulate sodomy with each other. The orientalist defense offered by the US military, that the photos were staged to deliberately culturally offend Arab prisoners during interrogations (the idea being that Arabs are people for whom homosexuality and women in powerful positions are especially degrading), went completely unquestioned by most Western journalists. After all, the Arab mind is a special thing. That the West too would have found such torture degrading and humiliating could go unremarked only because it is so deeply ingrained that the Orient is not the Occident. We have Said to thank for showing more clearly and unrelentingly than others how these ideas consolidate the power of the West.

When one sees photos of this kind, the challenge is to stay human, to avoid being eaten up by the anger and to think how to respond. Here too Said was a kind of spirit guide for many of us. When Rafah refugee camp was once again the scene of slaughter and house demolitions by the Israeli military in May 2004, I thought of one of Said’s last pieces on dignity and solidarity in which he mentions the death of Rachel Cory, a Jewish American woman who one year earlier had tried to stop the bulldozers in Rafah with her body. Said took the time to offer condolences to her parents. He praised Rachel for her individual act of courage, believing until the end that such actions matter and will ultimately win the day. Condemning Arab leaders for having no dignity, Said offered Rachel Cory as the counter example, someone who saw and was willing to defend the dignity of Palestinians. There are many days when I don’t share Said’s humanism, days when dignity seems an odd word to use in the circumstances. This spring, however, I needed to think about dignity and what it might mean to stop the bulldozers, the massacres, and the torture, and to live a committed life that recognizes the dignity of all peoples.

Dignity is one of Said’s parting gifts in Culture and Resistance. A series of interviews conducted by David Barsamian, this is a little book and one that can actually be read on a beach, so eminently readable is the prose. It is vintage Said with all the passion, generosity, and insight packaged as a primer of those themes for which he has long been known. Strangely, it is an appropriate last book covering his views on Palestine, Iraq, 9/11, teaching, culture, and most of all, commitment. I can just make out what a dignified path might entail for me, a teacher and a writer.

The book opens with Said’s views on Arafat and, as he does throughout, he gives one or two pithy facts that seem to say it all. Arafat’s security apparatus consists of 40,000 people, enough to make him the single largest employer in the Palestinian territories. An enormously unproductive part of the economy, laments Said, who sees Arafat as a micro-manager of the worst kind, unwilling to brook any challenges to his authority. Lest we are tempted to spend too long on Palestinian failings, Culture and Resistance gets to the heart of the matter very quickly. In 1948, 800,000 Palestinians were driven out of Palestine by design, an occupation, Said reminds us, that is transformed into a story about modernization in the Israeli settler narrative. In the Israeli story, Palestine was little else but a desert with a few Nomads until the Jews came. It is in order to dismantle what North Americans should recognize as the classic settler mythology of terra nullius (the land was empty and awaiting European improvement, occupied by people too primitive to really lay claim to it) that Said has always wanted the publication of maps. He once commented that one of the hardest things
to do was to publish maps of Israel/Palestine in North America, something this volume finally addresses. There are no less than thirteen maps in an appendix to the book and they tell the story of conquest more eloquently than words can.

Aware as he was of Israel as a settler colonial project, Said was nevertheless always clear that the answer could never be the end of Jewish settlement on Palestinian land. A proponent of a binational state solution, Said insists in these interviews that we must refuse to think of Jews as crusaders or imperialists who must simply go back home. “The Israelis are Israelis,” he says simply and forcefully, and Palestinian existence is inextricably linked to Jewish existence in Palestine/Israel. By the year 2010 there will be demographic parity between Palestinians and Israelis. Apartheid does not work well under these circumstances, and most especially not in a territory this small. There must be a vision that “will allow people to live and not exterminate each other.” (7)

What gets in the way of that vision? $135 billion in US aid to Israel is one of those facts strewn across these interviews that stands as an entry point for discussing why the United States cannot be seen as an even handed, honest broker of peace. Commenting on the Israeli lobby in Washington, Said traces the story we are told in the media, the story of Palestinian violence and Israel’s need to protect itself, and puts this against the counter views (his own included) that often fail to get published. We understand as we read just how little we have been allowed to know. Said, ever the literature professor, uses his skills to raise our awareness of language games among politicians and in the media. For example the word “occupation” is one under dispute and officially rejected by the US administration.

I looked for insights in this book that I had not heard before and found one in Said’s comments on 9/11. Rejecting Eqbal Ahmad’s argument that terrorism is the poor man’s B-52, Said points out that the terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Centre and killed so many people were not poor men. Educated and middle-class, they were people uninterested in dialogue or in making a point. There was no political message and there were no demands attached to the bombings, only silent terror. The terrorists were not part of anything, Said stresses, and we cannot reduce their actions to those of the powerless against a superpower. For this, and for his unwavering sense of humanity, I will miss Edward Said. This book offers to fill a part of the gap, providing quick vignettes of Said’s views to be pulled out and reflected upon whenever the seasons prove to be as cruel as this spring’s.

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A SENSE OF CRISIS has been palpable in nursing in North America since the 1990s. Cost containment, restructuring, and institutional mergers have all contributed to an unstable environment with considerable costs for nursing, including job losses, intensified work loads, and the loss of professional autonomy and power. This engaging study describes the “dismantling” of a prized nursing professional model known as primary care nursing, during restructuring at Beth Israel Hospital in Boston in the late 1990s. This was not just any hospital, Beth Israel was a renowned Harvard teaching facility, the first in the country to establish a patient’s bill of rights, and “one of the best hospitals in the world to be a nurse.” (2) It set the gold standard in terms of the respect and power it gave nursing, and was known as a so-called “magnet hospital” because of its record in attracting and retaining nurses. It had adopted primary
nursing care in 1974, a model which privileged the role of nurses in organizing and providing care for patients.

In 1996, under enormous competitive and financial pressures (intensified by cuts to health spending in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act), Beth Israel became another participant in the “merger mania” then sweeping American healthcare institutions. It joined with nearby New England Deaconess Hospital to form Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Centre (BIDMC), part of the even larger CareGroup health care corporation. The merger was fraught with power struggles and culture clashes between personnel at the two hospitals. In the case of nursing, the reasons for the clash were plain. Beth Israel’s management style had been consensus-based, relying upon debate and experience to make decisions. By contrast, Deaconess had adopted Total Quality Management (TQM) during a restructuring exercise in the early 1990s, and had a data-driven decision-making style. At that time, Deaconess had also introduced patient care technicians to perform some nursing tasks, in order to decrease their nursing budget. This had generated enough discontent to spur a unionizing drive by the Massachusetts Nurses’ Association in 1993, which was defeated by a two-thirds margin. Weinberg argues that the introduction of patient assistants was not a new concept, but essentially a return to the “team nursing” concept of the 1940s and 1950s — a way to divide up nursing labour, and delegate those tasks requiring the least skill to cheaper nursing assistants. Primary nursing care, the model employed at Beth Israel, had developed as an explicit rejection of team nursing as detrimental to both nursing professionalism and patient care.

The institutional merger was meant to eliminate redundancies, increase efficiency, and allow the two hospitals to claw their way out of their financial im­broglios. Yet after a year, BIDMC was haemorrhaging money, losing a million dollars a week. Its response was to launch a restructuring initiative, known as “Gen­esis” (or, “Genocide” as staff called it). Primary nursing at BIDMC was fundamentally undermined by Genesis, which introduced an expanded role for nursing assistants, the majority of whom were nursing students. This too was reminiscent of the 1940s, when student labour was essential to the expansion of hospital care.

Beth Israel nurses were understandably unhappy about this. The primary nursing model held significant benefits for nurses, including opportunities for career advancement and a role in the power structure. Nurses throughout the hospital reported only to nurses, and the head of the nursing department was a hospital vice-president. Nursing was recognized as a clinical discipline in its own right, that determined its own practice. This was particularly important in relationships nurses had with physicians. Nursing leadership was committed to equality with doctors. Beth Israel had clearly created an environment in which academically-oriented and ambitious women in nursing could make use of their skills and abilities, and gain both status and power. Restructuring decimated this power base.

What primary nursing meant for bedside nurses is more ambiguous, and Weinberg might have looked more directly at the downsides of the model. Primary nursing put pressure on bedside nurses to sacrifice self-interest to the goals of nursing professionalism. For example, primary care stressed the continuity of patient care, which was to be achieved by a nurse taking full responsibility for each patient’s needs over a 24 hour period. Few tasks were delegated, nurses routinely stayed past the end of their shifts to finish their work, and they rarely took breaks. When they did, they were discouraged from leaving the unit, in case they were needed. Weinberg points out that nursing management at Beth Israel preferred to view themselves as “men­tors” rather than managers, and to down­play their power over bedside nurses.
What happened when conflicts occurred between management and frontline nurses? In Weinberg’s account, there apparently were none.

In this context, it is disturbing but not surprising to learn that the response of bedside nurses to increased workload and decreased autonomy at the restructured BIDMC was further self-sacrifice, rather than collective action. As Weinberg herself notes, “nurses have been socialized by nursing schools, hospitals, and professional organizations to feel personally responsible for the care and comfort of their patients.” (152) Nurses told Weinberg in surveys, focus groups, and interviews conducted in 1999 that they felt stressed, unsafe, overworked, and unhappy about the inferior quality of patient care they had time to deliver. One nurse testified that “I don’t like the feeling of walking into a patient’s room and saying, ‘Here are your medications for the morning.’ And I’m thinking in my head, ‘Don’t talk. Just take the pills. I’ve got five people today.’” (145) Yet their form of resistance to unwelcome changes in the workplace was highly individualized: fantasies of quitting nursing, refusing to give up high standards for their patient care (often at their own expense), and opting to work part-time rather than full-time. Although a significant proportion of nurses (one in four) reported to Weinberg that they were contemplating leaving their jobs, she presents no data on employee turnover that would suggest that nurses were in fact doing so. One reason must be the relatively high compensation nurses enjoy relative to other female-dominated occupations. Salaries, which were not rolled back as a result of budget cuts, were not a source of complaint.

The greatest difficulty facing Weinberg, and other critics of hospital restructuring, is to establish that what has happened to nursing practice threatens the safety and recovery of patients. Code Green doesn’t provide any data on measures such as medication errors, complications, falls, and so on. Administrators at BIDMC argue that standards of care remain high, and that patients are satisfied. An inpatient survey, they argue, found 85% patient satisfaction. If you ask nurses, however, as Weinberg did, quality is deteriorating, and the emotional and psychological aspect of healing ignored. Do patients in North American hospitals even expect emotional care from over-stretched staff in hospitals anymore? Certainly, their experience of illness cannot be more pleasant for its lack. Unfortunately, health care providers and patients seem to have lowered their expectations of institutional care. In the process, nursing has become a less appealing career for women, and the seeds of a nursing shortage are sown.

This is not a book about solutions, as much as it is a very convincing cautionary tale. It offers little hope that nurses themselves will organize to demand changes to their work environment, and does not explicitly argue that they should. Weinberg does not comment on the failure of unionism among nurses in the US, or the barriers to organization, including the opposition of nursing leadership. Sadly, bedside nurses at BIDMC have had a hard time getting support from the nursing elite, some of whom argue, with administration, that nursing has changed and the old-style nurses must simply adapt. Although there is plenty of blame to go around here, Weinberg clearly reveals the gap between bedside and elite nurses, and shows how dangerous this has become for the future of nursing.

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Arbeiter Ring Publishing


IN THE HISTORY of democratic governments, children have often served as symbols for hopes that had little to do with
them directly, or, as this important study demonstrates, as cloaks for realignments of political forces.

In this remarkable study of one century of child policy in the US, Judith Sealander asks why programs for the young have failed to fulfill the high ambitions that successive governments have characteristically attached to them. She addresses all domains of young people’s lives in an integrated fashion, from welfare to health, work to education. Well-studied programs, such as compulsory secondary education, vaccination, or state aid to poor families, are studied together with lesser known measures, such as preschool education, physical fitness, youth labour camps, and recent laws governing child abuse, whose meaning she finds to be surprisingly wide. Of reforms affecting disabled children, for instance, she writes that “No other group of policies illustrates the high aspirations and serious failures of the ‘Century of the Child.’” (260) Her search for explanations is open and the period of her survey long.

Unexpected realms of public life have determined the evolution of programs for children and, chief amongst them, is the legal process. Until the 1960s, for instance, the idealist notion that young people could commit no crime relegated the realm of “juvenile delinquency” to the sidelines of lawyers’ discussions. Then, changes in the due process of law, and an unprecedented increase of practitioners in the legal profession, brought the rights of children to the fore. The number of court cases grew, and an increasing similarity between adult and youth trials ensued. However, legislation failed to alter the perennial problem of low status and heavy workload for probation officers. Overall, strained circumstances aggravated existing “(p)erceptions that the rehabilitative ideal had failed...” (31) In the same period, the augmentation of litigation cases jeopardized the commercial production of vaccines, and, however unintentionally, pitted rich parents’ efforts on behalf of disabled children against the struggles of the poor.

An important focus of The Failed Century of the Child is the history of knowledge about the young. Sealander reconstructs the “chain of convection between social theory and social policy” (222) to catalogue instances of “pervasive misunderstanding of social science theory” (114) among politicians, academics, and the public alike. She shows how, in the mid-century campaign against polio, the pressure of philanthropic foundations via “massive publicity campaigns” led researchers to work too rapidly. She also proposes that the recent disclosure of the extent of child abuse is the rediscovery of a phenomenon underlined by romantic child philanthropists and municipal politicians at the turn of the last century. These Progressives’ concerns, linked too closely with a focus on immigrant families, faded from public life when immigration quotas lessened the anxiety about the social impact of newcomers, only to be revived in the late 1960s by social activists equipped with better medical tools of investigation.

Sealander underlines the role of a “politics of emotion” (138) in matters of childhood. Her examination of the failure of the late 19th-century German-inspired kindergarten movement is an example of her subtle handling of the variety of public attitudes: images of innocent children being saved from their parents coexisted with images of children educated at home which, in the end, prevailed. Elsewhere, she shows that the same idealized notion of an innocence of youth that underlay early juvenile delinquency laws, fostered an inability, at times an unwillingness, to discuss the brutality of children which, in turn, paved the way for the exaggerated idea of male teenage violence of current years. Armed teenage boys, she argues, have become the symbols of adults’ fears in the face of a general recrudescence of murders. (51) The story of the Progressive reformers’ disregard for the material vulnerability of working-class families fol-
lows the same pattern: projects of “effective work training” suffered from their concentration on laws prohibiting child labour. Craft apprenticeships were not, as in Europe, made available to the young. Instead, secondary education became compulsory. After World War I, burdened with the problem of keeping teenagers in school, policy makers welcomed proposals of intelligence testing already rejected by the army for their unreliability, “condemning millions of American teenagers to several years of meaningless schooling.” (207) The rhetoric of training for citizenship of the early part of the century, and the drives for “excellence” and for “life adjustment” that have followed more recently often helped to delay acknowledgments of these failures. The integration of the schooling of disabled children provides another instance of “good intentions gone awry.” (290)

Similarly, at the turn of the 1960s, social scientists who suggested that poverty itself could encourage habits of passivity provided the intellectual justification for a considerable extension of the scope of the rehabilitative features in the federal program for dependent children enacted during the Depression. In the meantime, the proportion of eligible families was also increasing thanks to lawyers defending the equitable treatment of the large number of black families moving from southern farms to northern cities. The result was the “welfare explosion” of the 1970s. Together with conceptions of cultures and cycles of poverty, the behavioural theory of “cultural deprivation” of children, and the social propositions of “community action” and “opportunity theory” of deprived citizens were at the intellectual origins of the Head Start initiatives of the 1960s directed at the young children of the poor. The popularity of quantitative research to evaluate programs may have served to mask the possibility that Head Start “helped control minorities socially and politically” (250) to the extent that it became “politically invulnerable.” (237)

To go back to transformation of the Aid to Dependent Children program in the 1960s, the campaign of civil servants already attached to the program to increase the scope of federal authority had a profound influence. Debate about this sort of centralism represents the third most important feature of American child policy of the last century. By requiring that married women work to benefit from the program, President Reagan wished to put an end to the “welfare explosion.” The budget of the program shrank, Sealander shows, not because “workfare” made mothers more independent, but largely as the effect of the President’s ambition to restrain the social and economic responsibility of the central administration. The same had been true of the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Protection Act of 1921, which was abandoned after five years, and of the unsuccessful campaign of the same period for a Child Labour Amendment to the Constitution. The fate of both seems to be best understood as a conflict between those who “wanted a dramatically increased federal role in social policy” and those who saw it as a threat “to put public officials in control of American child rearing.” (231)

In the 1980s, demanding that beneficiaries of welfare work, says Sealander, constituted an answer to “simmering public anger.” (122) “Most people never thought a poor woman had a ‘right’ to demand the state subsidize her decision to stay home with young children.” (125) In her quest for what she calls “deep movements,” the author alludes to a “public opinion” of “ordinary Americans.” But her examination of the nature of the “popular groundswells” is uneven, and that may be the weakest point of the study. For example, it is not clear how beneficiaries of Aid to Dependent Children themselves came to think of the programs that recognized their rights, and how their conceptions clashed with those of “most people,” who “venerated work.” (129) Too often, changes in family structures, such
as the rise in the number of two-income families, are taken for granted, whereas features uncovered by historians of families may help to place the role of parents in various circumstances within context of other pressures on the state. Why, for instance, did the support of newly enfranchised women that had scared opponents of the Sheppard-Towner Bill in 1921 into supporting the measure not materialize? Only Sealander’s analysis of middle-class activism and success in the campaigns on behalf of disabled children addresses in depth the nature of “the power of parents.”(273)

In a systematic effort to point to lessons from the past, the author scrutinizes the unusual cases in the prevalent history of failures. Chief among them is the Civilian Conservation Corps’ success in training young people. Her review of enthusiastic testimonies of young recruits, and of the thorough regulations, and the comparison with the Job Corps of the turn of the 1960s, all point at the clarity of purpose, the concrete nature of the work accomplished by the young, and to the “discipline” and “psychology” of the army (the intellectual assumptions and references of military planners, however, are not analysed with the same scrutiny as those of bureaucrats and politicians). In contrast, the logic of “profit statements” of later programs, and the wish to “avoid the potentially explosive issue of race” (171) led to wasteful budgets and corruption.

Thanks to a thorough reading of primary documents, in national, state, philanthropic, and professional archives, and to extensive summaries of secondary sources in numerous fields, this exceptional book offers a remedy to what Sealander deplores as one of the recurring features of child policy: the absence of awareness of past experiences.

Dominique Marshall
Carleton University


SHERRY ORTNER is a respected anthropologist who has turned her attention away from Sherpas in Nepal to the Class of ’58 Weequahic high school in Newark, New Jersey, the high school from which she herself graduated that year. This change of focus may not appear self-evident but the impressive quality and sophistication of this study only serves to confirm that high academic achievement has as much to do with familiarity with the subject as with innovative research skills, a capacity to apply rigorous analytical frameworks, and to draw thought-provoking conclusions that can address wider questions. Ortner has clearly demonstrated she has all of these abilities. In New Jersey Dreaming she makes the case for the centrality of class as it combines with race, ethnic background, gender, and with the influence of “social movements that seek the advancement of particular groups” to account for social mobility. However commonsensical this overarching premise might strike historians, her findings and analysis provide an invaluable wealth of material and thought-provoking analysis for anyone interested in following the concrete impact of these variables on people’s chances of upward mobility. This she does by following the life trajectory of 304 high school graduates of the late 1950s and interviewing about 100 of them over a 40 year period. While Ortner’s findings are for the most part not fundamentally surprising, they are at times unexpected and all made plausible by her perceptive insights and persuasive interpretations.

At the root of her inquiry is an attempt to account for the fact that the majority of the class of ’58 which was of working and middle-class origins ended up moving into an upper-middle or professional-managerial class. This, in turn, allows her to confront head on and contradict what
she considers the “invisibility of class” — the fact that class is “under-recognized as a factor in American social and cultural life” by many scholars and indeed by individuals themselves such as the graduates being interviewed. In this study, she brings out the dominant impact of class in determining the fate of the graduates of ’58 while confirming that they were more likely to ascribe their circumstances to psychological factors. In addition, the fact that 83 per cent of the graduates of ’58 were Jewish gives Ortner the opportunity to address many stereotypes and assumptions associated with this particular ethnic group.

It must be said that at times some of her conclusions are drawn from relatively small samples. This is particularly true when it comes to drawing conclusions on the experience of non-Jewish ethnic groups or working-class graduates. While she is systematically diligent in reminding the reader when the size of the sampling warrants caution, one could argue that she might have foregone drawing conclusions in these cases altogether. In the same vein, although this occurs on very rare occasions, she can go beyond what her evidence will support. This is true, for instance, when she deals with the “hoods and sluts” at the school. She did not interview members of these groups as she defined them. Yet this does not stop her from commenting on their secret wishes.

At the end of every chapter, the author included a “field journal” in which she aimed to recount some of the difficulties she encountered as a “native ethnographer.” These often proved revealing, but for reasons that remain unclear, the author placed particular emphasis on the frustrations she had driving to the residences of the graduates. While not unsympathetic to the stresses of finding one’s way in new surroundings by car, the reader may be excused for wondering how this information furthers our understanding of the “reactions of a working ethnographer.” One can easily imagine that other challenges came her way that might have been more worthwhile recounting to enlighten colleagues and the novice ethnographer.

More importantly, Ortner does not always avoid the pitfalls awaiting those who set their study in a relatively short time period and identify it as distinctive if not exceptional. In this case, she labels the 1950s with the familiar epithet of conformist. The risk, of course, in doing so, as historians know all too well, is to overstate the case by underestimating the continuities with the past. In New Jersey Dreaming, historians of women’s higher education and professional life, for instance, will be particularly sensitive to this. A more extended knowledge of trends and developments in these areas before the 1950s would have certainly made the author less likely to present the barriers her female graduates experienced as women as evidence of the distinctive conformity of the 1950s. Here, then, is where historians will find Ortner’s conclusions less convincing.

Nonetheless, all of the above are essentially minor shortcomings in what is overall a fascinating study. And as a reviewer it is worth pointing out that Ortner has made it easy for readers to critically assess and appreciate her work since she is exceptionally explicit about her objectives, approach, assumptions, and concerns as a researcher. Furthermore she systematically keeps the reader informed of her on-going thoughts as she conducted her interviews and the analytical reactions they inspired. She also has the intellectual honesty to alert the reader when her findings pushed her to revisit her initial assumptions. She thus succeeds in involving the reader in her journey of discovery. Finally, by giving pride of place to the voice of her interviewees she does indeed successfully “bring class back in” to the Class of ’58.

Nicole Neatby
Saint Mary’s University

IN THIS UNCOMPROMISING book — which started life as *The American Scheme*, published in India in 2001 — Vijay Prashad develops a trenchant and wide-ranging critique of what might be characterized as the neoliberal settlement in the US. It is very much a big-picture book, focused on the fateful conjunction of economic restructuring, conservative politics, and what Prashad depicts as a form of first-world structural adjustment. This amounts to a systemic analysis of the domesticated form of neoliberalism — an assessment of the impact of the Washington consensus “at home,” if you like. As the author modestly observes in the book’s introduction, “Here I am, an Indian historian with a tendency to write about racism, and a scribbler on matters political, trying to write a book on so vast a topic.” (vii) Seemingly undaunted, he delivers a punchy analysis of the logics that connect rising inequality, wealth concentration, and the punitive management of the poor. Although Prashad now teaches in the US, his ability to see the American political economy at something of a distance is a distinctive feature of this book. Its achievement is to tie together a series of political-economic tendencies and moments, portraying these as necessarily connected components of a neoliberal political conjuncture, together with its own, historically distinctive, process of class formation, and then to imagine alternative political futures.

Prashad describes a hypertrophied neoliberal state, bifurcating between a CEO class and a contingent class. Analytically, the book’s task is to connect together the various axes of oppression that produce the variegated contingent class, along with its typical conditions of impoverishment and exclusion. “Prisons are not far from welfare offices,” Prashad writes, (xv) “but do we have a theory of our world to make sense of the links between them, to find the connections at a structural level?” Politically, the parallel challenge is to explore those emergent social struggles and movements — labour-community alliances, anti-sweatshop campaigns, immigrant organizing efforts, feminist and antiracist mobilizations, human-rights movements, and so forth — that might act as carriers for new kinds of politics with the potential to transcend this destructive neoliberal conjuncture. As a “movement book,” (ix) *Keeping Up with the Dow Joneses* both grows out of, and seeks to feed into, this political firmament.

The foundation for Prashad’s critique is a broad-brush interpretation of US-style neoliberalism, portrayed as an hegemonic political-economic ideology with roots in the economic slowdown of the 1970s and the rise of Reaganomics. Crucially, the proactively regressive response to these deteriorating economic conditions involved offloading costs and risks to the poor, while insulating both the wealthy and corporate profitability. The accompanying state strategy, pioneered by Reagan and normalized since, “was not to shrink government in total, [but] to refocus ... away from the creation of equity and toward the maintenance of law and order.” (xvi) So defined, the American path to neoliberalism would subsequently comprise four components. The first has involved the defunding and dismantling of the social state, as autocritiques of “big government” and Darwinian moralizing accompanied a sustained attack against the practices of the welfare state, against the principles of social equity, and, by implication, against the poor themselves. Second, the punitive arms of the state have been significantly augmented, as a culture of control and containment have taken root. Prashad vividly characterizes this expansion of policing, penal, and military functions as a domestic application of the Powell Doctrine of “overwhelming force.” Third, this disciplining of the poor has found an hypocritical reflection in the creation
of a New Deal for the rich, as euphemistically-named corporate welfare programs have proliferated and as a dynamic of accelerating tax cuts has been entrenched. For the architects of America’s neoliberal settlement, this policy delivers the triple benefit of rewarding conservative electoral constituencies, locking in income gains for the wealthy, and choking off the supply of tax dollars to the social state. Finally, political consent under this regime of systemic inequality is “bred through cruel forms of cultural nationalism,” (xx) xenophobia, consumerism, individualism, and the restoration of racialized and gendered notions of self-reliance.

The bulk of the book is given over to three essays — on debt, prisons, and workfare — each of which explores a constitutive strand of this wider process of neoliberal class restructuring, and each culminating in a (selective, but suggestive) discussion of the ascendancy of potentially transformative political countermovements. The chapter on debt conjoins the rise of Greenspan-era trickle up political economy, during which time the Dow Jones rose to inordinate prominence as the very “index of human reason,” (5) with the proliferation of sweatshop economies and the structural expansion of contingent work. In a society in which half of all stocks are held by the wealthiest 1 per cent of the population, while the bottom four-fifths of Americans account for a measly 4 per cent, the (dubious but at the same time daunting) achievement of the neoliberal regime has been to transmit the costs of economic distress and instability with ruthless efficiency to the swelling ranks of the contingent workforce. Adding insult to injury, lousy wages and Dickensian working conditions constitute a downward pull on employment standards more generally, as the neoliberal regulatory regime works to “extract the maximum labor for the minimum expenditure,” (23) while effectively evading and externalizing the costs of social reproduction. In the context of falling real wages, insecure employment, and a withering social state, Prashad asks, “Who will pay for the upkeep of this reserve army, this unemployed and shiftless population? ... Who is to feed, clothe, and shelter the contingent class?” (28) The answer, within a neoliberalized environment, is that the contingent class is on its own, immiseration and indebtedness being the grimly predictable outcomes.

Prashad’s indictments of the prison and workfare systems are no less searing. While the perverse politics of mass incarceration and “welfare reform” are clearly racialized and gendered, there is also an underlying political-economic logic. In the final analysis, these are seen here as institutions of social control: “the only way the state has to keep the reserve army of labor in check is by [creating] lockdown conditions in urban areas.” (166) Poor women of colour are propelled by workfare programs into deadend McJobs in the service economy, or by the Bush Administration’s “marriage incentives” into economic dependency on poor men. Meanwhile, for those in poor communities that cross the line into the drugs, vice, or crime economies, prison awaits. The jail, in this context, “becomes the storehouse of the redundant working population as well as its soup kitchen,” (88) a mechanism for managing the undeserving indigent under conditions of total surveillance.

The most significant questions raised by Prashad’s roiling critique of the bleak neoliberal conjuncture in the US are political ones. Keeping Up with the Dow Joneses documents a systemic regime of inequality and oppression, and confers on this a certain antisocial logic. At the same time, Prashad sees transformative potential in a plethora of grassroots political movements that have been surfacing across the country in the past decade, many of which — like living-wage campaigns and movements for affordable housing and healthcare — can be seen to stem directly from the inequalities and dysfunctions of the neoliberal regime it-
self. There are no guarantees, of course, that these local struggles will ultimately coalesce into some antisystemic countermovement. Prashad concedes that at the time of the 1996 welfare repeal, “the unions did little, the welfare rights movement was in disarray, and the feminist movement let down the side.” (165) Of course, these progressive forces were not asleep at the wheel. Their failure adequately to defend even the limited welfare settlement of the past lies partly with neoliberalism’s facility for dividing and disorganizing social collectivities and other sources of potential opposition. This, in turn, underlines the challenges of progressive mobilizing in such a climate. Prashad’s counterpoint, though, is that the structural and institutional conditions of this neoliberalized polity may also be (inadvertently, of course) seeding new forms of politics, generating new stakes and sites of struggle, and creating new class alliances.

Ultimately, Prashad’s conclusions are optimistic in that he sees in these oppressive macropolitical conditions the bases for an incipient process of “social revolution from the bottom up,” (193) waged by a radicalized contingent class, the disparate unity of which is forged out of conditions of shared exclusion, overlapping needs and demands, and an intensified sense of class antagonism against the Dow Joneses. Local struggles against the injustices of mass incarceration or the exploitation of contingent workers are seen here as the opening salvos in a process of contingent class formation and consciousness, the first stirrings of a political process that will develop its own dynamics. There is no Master Plan, but this is a road that will have to be made by walking. The continuing challenge, in this respect, is to connect politics of critique and resistance to the daily realities of contingent work and the long-term interests of contingent workers. As Prashad bluntly puts it, “there is no point in being ideologically right if you cannot at the same time translate those positions into the everyday struggles of the contingent.” (192) This is the purpose of the book, which deserves a wide readership across the progressive movement. Those with specialist knowledge of particular fields like welfare reform, contingent work, or prisons policy will find little that is new in the specific parts of the book that deal with the issues closest to home, but the achievement here is to thread these strands together into a larger story about the neoliberal moment and its incipient contradictions. Whether Prashad’s macropolitical aspirations will prove true must remain to be seen. But even if he is only half right, the first steps along this path have already been taken.

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JACQUES PAUWELS set out to synthesize the disparate monographs and scholarly articles that strip away the layers of the American mystique surrounding that country’s participation in World War II. The US remained neutral during the first two and a half years of war, and only entered the fray after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Its armed forces then spent most of the next two years focusing on maintaining America’s Pacific empire and beating back Japan’s challenge for domination of Asia. Yet its government and tame scholars would quickly construct a mythology in which America was at war to defend democracy and civil liberties in Europe and defeat the fascist regimes that were the enemies of such values. After the war, American involvement in the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremburg and in the reconstruction of Germany were also presented as proof of the country’s commitment to the destruction of fascism and the re-establishment of democracy in Europe.
Pauwels is mostly successful in his effort to construct a counter-narrative. His is a lively book, originally written in Flemish, and later translated into German, Spanish, and French. Lorimer published an English version, translated by Pauwels himself (his PhD and university teaching experience are Canadian), in 2002. Pauwels marshals the considerable evidence of the moral and financial support of leading American corporate officials in the 1930s for the Hitler regime, and their involvement in strengthening the German war machine once war broke out, an involvement that did not abate when the US itself joined the Allies as an enemy of Nazi Germany. As Pauwels notes, American corporations with subsidiaries in Germany benefited from Hitler’s economic policies. “Their German subsidiaries and/or partner firms, such as Coca-Cola’s bottling plant in Essen, General Motors’ Opel automobile factory in Rüsselsheim near Mainz, Ford’s Fordwerke in Cologne, IBM’s facility in Berlin, or Standard Oil’s infamous German partner, IG Farben, flourished under a Hitler regime that had swept away the unions, whose rearmament program caused a flood of orders, and with whom all sorts of highly profitable deals could be concluded thanks to the services of corrupt Nazi big wigs such as Herman Göring, unscrupulous bankers such as the notorious Hjalmar Schacht, and financial institutions in Germany itself or in Switzerland.” (30)

American capitalists, like their British counterparts, hoped that Hitler would aim his guns at the Soviet Union, destroy Bolshevism, and open up the Communist giant to foreign capital, while destroying workers’ illusions everywhere that they would ever get away with trying to end capital’s reign. When Britain, finally fearful that Hitler in fact intended to dominate western Europe and threaten their empire, went to war with Hitler, the US remained on the sidelines. Its capitalists were happy to arm both sides, and continued to hope that the two belligerents would unite in a war against the hated Soviets.

But, according to Pauwels, American capitalists, while supportive of Hitler’s pro-capital and anti-labour policies, soured on him because of his promotion of autarchy. Britain offered more lucrative economic prospects, particularly after Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the Lend-Lease program that provided American government guarantees for American manufacturers selling war materials to Britain. Nonetheless, American industrialists who were active in fuelling the German war machine, were happy to celebrate Nazi successes across Europe. Among guests at functions in New York in June and July in 1940, celebrating the Wehrmacht’s victories were the leading officials of General Motors, Ford, and Texaco.

Of course, corporate America, which did not want to let markets in the Pacific disappear, supported Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of war on Japan after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. When Hitler then joined his Japanese allies in declaring war on the US, there was no way to extract the country officially from the war in Europe. But for several years the government’s focus was on the war in the Pacific, and the Roosevelt administration, while it may not have approved of US corporations continuing to help the Nazis, pretended that there was no ongoing relationship between American subsidiaries in Germany and American headquarters.

Once the war was over, the American occupation zone and eventually the zones occupied by Britain and France, whose debts to the Americans left them with little option but to defer to the emerging Cold War leader of the West, became havens for former Nazi officials and corporate leaders who had collaborated with the Nazis. The Americans proved as determined to weaken labour organizations as they were to strengthen the hand of the Nazi collaborators who assumed control of “democratic” Germany’s government.
and corporations in the postwar period. After formal liberation from Nazi rule, German workers recreated their unions and established democratically elected works councils in factories. They expected managers to receive input from these councils and to regard them as co-managers of the firm. When the owners of the firms were Nazis or Nazi collaborators, as they generally were, the workers also called for the state to assume ownership. The Americans suppressed the works councils and defended the right of Nazi owners and managers to remain in place. Confounding democracy with the rights of capital, the Americans insured that Germans only enjoyed democracy at the ballot box, a limited right that they nonetheless denied to citizens in many other countries who proved less willing than the Germans to give parliamentary majorities to pro-American, pro-capitalist politicians.

There are lacunae in this narrative. Pauwels weaves back and forth between the state and the corporations, only at times being clear about the relationship between the two. The result is a book with rather little nuance. This is particularly true with regards to the figure of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration more broadly. The Left, both in Roosevelt’s time and ever since, have had some difficulties determining where to fit this scion of a ruling-class family within a class-based account of American history. Though he was never anti-capitalist, his convictions about how to fix the capitalist system made him seem a class traitor to a large section of the capitalist class. By most accounts, Roosevelt and at least a section of his administration were neither pro-Nazi nor “isolationist.” They behaved gingerly with regards to Hitler because the so-called “isolationists” in Congress, who were, in fact, despite that neutral-sounding term, mainly pro-Nazi, were believed to have public opinion on their side. Indeed most accounts of American political opinion in this period stress the weakness of anti-fascist organizations in the country before and during the war, with both the Socialists and Communists opposing the country’s entry into war when Britain and France finally declared war on Hitler. Roosevelt, though more focused on the Japanese threat than the Nazis, had made overtures to Britain in late 1937 about using naval blockades to “quarantine” aggressor nations. They were swiftly rejected by Neville Chamberlain, whose Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, then resigned because he had not been consulted by Chamberlain and because he recognized that his modest efforts to end Chamberlain’s appeasement policies could not bear fruit. Without internal or external allies for a bellicose policy regarding the dictators, and obviously unwilling to make common cause with Stalin, the major world leader opposed to Hitler, Roosevelt retreated. But his enthusiasm for Lend-Lease and his eventual willingness to open a Western front in Europe resulted at least in part from anti-fascist sympathies, though certainly, as Pauwels suggests, the Soviet victories in Europe against Germany probably played a bigger role. The Americans were not prepared to entertain the idea of a socialist Europe, whether of the dictatorial Soviet-controlled variety, or workers’ republics run by workers’ councils along the models of the original soviets at the time of the Russian Revolution.

It is clear that the American state was unwilling at any time, whether before the war, during the war, or in the aftermath of the war, to penalize in any way American corporate leaders who actively supported Nazi rearmament. Government leaders were happy to maintain Nazis in position of authority throughout both industry and government if only as an alternative to the popular demands among urban workers for democratic socialism.

American politicians of the post-war period, particularly both George Bushes, love to dredge up the Munich Agreement of 1938 to rationalize their invasions of various sovereign nations. They imply that Munich represented the craven sur-
render of jaded leaders of European democracies to Hitler’s tyranny, and illustrated the need for America’s leaders never to allow a similar surrender to tyranny. Pauwels’ work complements the growing body of literature that demonstrates the shallowness of interpretations of relations between Hitler and the leaders of Britain and France in terms of “appeasement” as opposed to the common interests of pro-capitalist politicians. It also complements the extensive literature on American imperialism which underlines the profoundly anti-democratic outlook of the people who run American corporations and governments, even as they fool their own population with slogans that suggest American politics is guided by a commitment to democracy and Christian values. Indeed Pauwels ties together these two sets of scholarly literature to explain, in popular language, the real goals of the American ruling class from the time of the Nazis’ rise to power to the beginnings of the Cold War.

Alvin Finkel
Athabasca University


OVER THE LAST several years, historians have shown continued interest in the campaign for women’s suffrage in early 20th-century Britain. Recent work by June Hannam, Karen Hunt, Laura E. Nym Mayhall, and Nicoletta Gullace has revisited in innovative ways the most important questions around the struggle for the women’s vote, such as the involvement of working-class women, the meaning of militancy, and the impact of World War I. The Pankhurs — mother Emmeline and her warring daughters Christabel (the apple of her mother’s eye who moved on to religious mysticism), Sylvia (whose commitment to the working classes, socialism, and sex reform made her a viper in the family nest), and Adela (the least-notchorous Pankhurst, more of a Sylvia than a Christabel, who pursued a life of pacifist socialism in Australia) — remain at the heart of this narrative. In 2002, there appeared no less than three new biographical studies, one of the entire clan by Martin Pugh and two of the materfamilias, Emmeline, by Paula Bartley and June Purvis.

The attraction of the Pankhurs as a subject is understandable. At least within the parameters of 20th-century British history, their story has it all: the seething cauldron of late Victorian and Edwardian life; a domestic political campaign unmatched in its militancy and ferocity until the late 20th century, and, not least, an ongoing family opera, replete with love, betrayal, sibling rivalry, and hatred. Most importantly, the Pankhurs’ story is entwined with the question of women’s political and social equality, an issue that runs through the public life of 20th-century Britain. The questions brought up by the suffrage campaign — the meaning of gender equality, the relationship between class and gender, and the place of sexuality in politics — animated future generations of British feminists.

Above all of this stands the figure of Emmeline Pankhurst. After marrying a radical doctor, Emmeline became involved in socialist politics, rubbing shoulders with the likes of Keir Hardie and Ben Tillett. Women’s suffrage was an early passion. Initially, she approached the question through socialism and gradualist suffrage organizations such as the Women’s Franchise League. But, in 1903, frustrated with what she perceived as the indifference of socialist societies to the question of women’s rights, Emmeline and her daughters, Sylvia and Christabel, founded the Women’s Social and Political Union. The WSPU was a single-sex organization, aiming at obtaining the vote for women on the same basis as men without compromise. In 1905, in a strategy Christabel adopted from the history of working-class protest in Britain,
the WSPU took the route of militant political action. From that point until the outbreak of World War I, suffragettes waged a war against successive Liberal governments. The intensity of that struggle is still remarkable. Tens of thousands of women gathered for suffragette rallies throughout Britain. WSPU activists were arrested, went on hunger strikes, and were violently force-fed in prison. Empty houses and public buildings were bombed. Purvis recounts some of the more minor acts of a single month in 1912: “an orchid house at Kew Gardens was burned, the refreshment house at Regent’s Park was destroyed, pillar boxes set on fire, and a railways carriage set ablaze; in addition, telegraph and telephone wires were cut, a jewel case at the Tower of London smashed, and windows at London clubs broken.” (209) Pankhurst herself was jailed several times. And, then, with the outbreak of war in August 1914, she made an abrupt volte-face. From waging war against the government of the day, Pankhurst and the WSPU became the fiercest advocates of waging war against Germany. Patriotism, nationalism, and later anti-Bolshevism became ideological cousins to women’s equality in Pankhurst’s mind. After both suffrage and the war were won in 1918, she endured a varied life. For a time, she promoted a single-sex party, the Women’s Party. When this failed, Pankhurst became a campaigner for social purity in Canada. She ended her life far from where she had started politically, as a parliamentary candidate for the Conservative party in London.

Purvis’s biography of Pankhurst is a major achievement, capturing the scale and immensity of her subject’s life with wide-ranging research and scholarship. As with other new work on the suffrage question, we are lucky to have this book. There is much valuable new material and discussion. Purvis’s contextualization of Pankhurst’s “patriotic feminism” during World War I is very striking for example, as is the exploration of the links made between sexuality and suffrage before 1914.

But, even with Purvis’s achievement, there remain unanswered questions about Pankhurst, which concern her political ideology, the effectiveness of the militant campaign, and her personality in private and public life. Purvis’s sympathy for her subject sometimes clouds her assessment of Pankhurst in these respects.

Purvis wishes, first of all, to defend Pankhurst’s valorization of sex over class in the suffragette campaign. While others (her daughter Sylvia especially) wished to explore the intersections between the plight of women and the disadvantage of class through the framework of socialist feminism, Emmeline focused strictly on the question of sex equality. Early in her biography, Purvis insists upon the legitimacy of Emmeline’s position, which she said recognized “the power of men over women in a male-defined world ... and the primacy of putting women rather than the consideration of say, social class, political affiliation or socialism, first.” (6-7) Purvis also argues for a socialist continuity in Pankhurst’s outlook, at least until the Russian Revolution of 1917 after which she became a rabid anti-Bolshevik. Pankhurst’s position on class and socialism comes across, however, less as a considered acknowledgement that class and gender might compete than an unthinking dismissal of, for example, the complexity of the position of working-class women, disadvantaged by both class and gender. Pankhurst’s intellectual rigidity on this question made her blind to the varied meanings of equality. In this way, it is not that surprising that Pankhurst found herself isolated after 1918, when many other feminists tried to think through the relationship between gender and class. Similarly, Purvis provides excellent background on Pankhurst’s socialist lineage, but it is hard to see much of this left by 1914. Pankhurst may have been socialist in her own mind, but this had little reference to rigorous considerations of class position or state action on social issues.
Questions also dog the effectiveness of Emmeline’s uncompromising and militant strategy on suffrage. Purvis has done an admirable job in conveying the passion and commitment of WSPU activists before 1914. Quite rightly, she argues that without the militant campaign it is possible that male politicians might have postponed dealing with women’s franchise. But she also suggests that the WSPU had reached an impasse by 1914, with no clear way forward. In simple terms, the vote for women was not being won by Emmeline and Christabel’s refusal to give up the militant campaign and their dismissal of alliances with other groups. In many ways, Emmeline was an extraordinary political figure, able to inspire a great mass of women around the world, but a poor politician, whose very passion and intensity blunted the acumen necessary to achieve her goals through timely compromise and the building of alliances. The bad feeling Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst left in their wake did little to sustain the feminist movement in Britain during the 1920s.

A recurring charge against Emmeline Pankhurst in this regard is that she was an autocrat. Despite its sympathetic stance, Purvis’s biography bears out this indictment. It is ironic that the commitment to women’s involvement in democracy and a proclivity for autocracy were the constant poles of Emmeline’s life. She was an autocrat within the WSPU, the Women’s Party, and most other organizations in which she was involved. She was no less an autocrat with those close to her. Emmeline’s ruthless dismissal of longtime friends such as the Pethick-Lawrences, Ethel Smyth, and her own daughters, Sylvia and Adela, when they dared to disagree with her politically, is quite breathtaking, to say nothing of the sheer nastiness of Christabel, the favoured scion.

These comments should not detract from Purvis’s achievement with this biography. She has provided us with an invigorating study of a major figure of early 20th-century Britain, whose legacy continues to be debated. This biography makes a critical intervention in those debates.

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When Gladstone called, unannounced, on Florence Nightingale (1820-1910) in December 1884, she declined to see him. Such was still the stature of “the Lady with the Lamp” that she could decline to receive the Prime Minister without worrying that she had given offense or burned bridges to future access. As a member of a well connected family and a woman who had come to be internationally revered for her leadership in nursing and many other aspects of health care, Nightingale could safely assume that she would continue to have the ear of powerful figures just as she had had since the 1850s. As the title of her book indicates, Gourlay focuses exclusively on Nightingale’s involvement with health issues in India. She probably overstates the degree of ignorance that exists about this aspect of Nightingale’s career and previous authors’ neglect of it. Most scholars with even a peripheral interest in Nightingale or in Victorian measures to “modernize” health care in India will probably be aware of her involvement there even if they are unfamiliar with the specific issues that engaged her. Lynn McDonald’s well-known project, The Collected Works of Florence Nightingale, includes plans for two of the eventual sixteen volumes to be devoted to Nightingale’s work for public health in India, the only topic, in addi-
tion to nursing, to merit two separate volumes. That said, neither specialized scholarly studies like Antoinette Burton’s *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* nor popular works like Gillian Gill’s lengthy new biography give more than passing reference to Nightingale’s work for India. Gourlay, then, can rightly lay claim to having written a pioneering work.

The phrase “for India” rather than “in India” requires emphasis: like James Mill before her and Marie Stopes later, Nightingale sought to influence events on the Indian sub-continent without ever having been there. Indeed, in the case of Nightingale, it was work conducted from the confines of her bedroom, since, for most of her post-Crimea years, she was, in her own words, “an incurable invalid.” (227) Nightingale’s work was also conducted “for India” in another sense, Gourlay maintains. Though it began in the wake of the 1857 “Mutiny” with the imperialist goal of improving the health of British troops so that they could more effectively “hold” India, her purview gradually widened to include the well-being of all of India, and especially its peasant majority. The idea of an English gentlewoman who had never once visited India offering detailed blueprints for numerous reforms there must initially strike almost any modern reader as the height of imperial arrogance. Yet Gourlay argues that Nightingale *did* have well-informed and increasingly compassionate advice to offer in regard to public health matters. And the number of those who wrote or visited her to seek information and advice—they included middle-class Indian social reformers as well as private and public British figures from Gladstone on down—provides compelling evidence that her views were seen to matter. A succession of viceroys sought her out, among them two former governors-general of Canada, Lord Dufferin and Lord Lansdowne. Not that Nightingale necessarily waited to be sought out. Having requested and pored over government documents on India and digested endless statistics, she provided summaries and reports to those in a position to initiate action and lobbied élite members of the political and health reform communities in an effort to have them exert influence. Leaking advance information to sympathetic journalist/reformers such as Harriet Martineau and Edwin Chadwick, as she did to facilitate action on the 1863 report of the Royal Commission on the sanitary state of the British army in India, was but one of her tactics. Moreover, she had contrived to have the commission appointed and to determine its membership, and her *Observations* formed an important part of its report.

Gourlay deals with this first of Nightingale’s India initiatives following an introductory chapter that provides a preview of her successive projects as well as her modes of work. Though the focus of the Royal Commission Report was on British troops in India, her *Observations* also dealt with the deplorable sanitary conditions of the sepoys and brooked no excuses for past inaction: “Talk about ‘caste prejudices’ was to her ‘an excuse for European laziness.’” (37) Her work would increasingly widen out and increasingly focus on Indians, beginning with matters of rural sanitation. Though she initially attributed the unhealthy conditions in which Indian villagers lived to their “filthy and injurious habits,” (102) she came to see the problem as one of government inaction and imperial officials’ tendency to justify a lack of improvements on grounds of costs and Indians’ “apathy.” With this broader understanding, Gourlay maintains, Nightingale began to reach out to Indian reformers and to perceive the degree to which poverty was at the root of sanitary and social problems. This, in turn, led her to advocate such agricultural improvements as irrigation projects and reforms to the land tenancy system. The latter she regarded as having worsened for peasants under British rule as a result of changes introduced
in the role and power of the *zemindars* (landholders) to facilitate production for export. Nightingale supported Lord Ripon, the most liberal of “her” viceroys, in his 1880s efforts to obtain a Bengal land tenancy bill that would improve the situation of the peasants. Likewise, she backed his ill-fated efforts to secure passage of the Ilbert Bill, whose initial version would have allowed Indian as well as European magistrates to try Europeans in criminal courts. It was as part of a strategy to support Ripon, Gourlay believes, that Nightingale declined to receive Gladstone, calculating that a carefully worded letter would accomplish more than an unanticipated meeting. In the last decade of her India work she returned to a focus on village sanitation, this time with an emphasis on self-help, especially through the agency of middle-class and village women. She also supported a new initiative, the Lady Dufferin Fund (formally known as the Association for Supplying Female Medical Aid to the Women of India), to provide professionally trained Western and Indian medical practitioners for *zenana* women. Having described the evolution of Nightingale’s India interests, Gourlay in a final chapter assesses the practical outcomes of her subject’s prodigious efforts. Cited as “tangible contributions ... that no one could quibble about” (254) are improvements in army sanitation and living standards, the keeping of systematic mortality statistics, and the introduction of modern nursing. Much more could have been accomplished, Gourlay believes, if imperial officials had followed up on Nightingale’s recommendations.

Without wishing to demean this remarkable woman’s commitment to a land she had never seen, one could wish that Gourlay had put Nightingale’s work for India into a larger context and acknowledged more fully that many other actors, Western and Indian, played an equal, or larger, role in many of “her” causes. In regard, for instance, to the introduction of modern nursing and female doctors in India and the training there of indigenous practitioners, Gourlay both gives too much credit to Nightingale and exaggerates the impact of what was accomplished. Outside the Indian Christian community, nursing remained a despised occupation well into the 20th century. It is thus difficult to accept Gourlay’s claim that its introduction “was a step forward in the fight for equal rights and opportunities for Indian women.” (257) Nor did the Dufferin Fund owe as much to Nightingale or play as pioneering or successful a role in providing British and indigenous women doctors for India as Gourlay implies. (She appears unaware of the pioneering role of US women.) Indeed, the number of Indian women doctors was still small and their status still generally inferior in both Dufferin-Fund and mission-run facilities until late in the colonial era. Meanwhile, in regard to the wider, preventive aspects of public health work to which Gourlay devotes a substantial portion of her book, there were layers of complexity beyond “administrative incompetence and indifference” (260) to inhibit successful modernization in colonial India, as recent works by historians like David Arnold and Mark Harrison have shown. While works by these and other scholars are cited in support of her emphasis on this particular causal factor, there is scant evidence that she has been influenced by their recognition of the broader cultural limits on, and indeed the inherent limitations in, medical modernization for colonial India.

Gourlay’s tendency to generalize, and to construct dichotomies while eschewing complexity, is also evident in regard to matters of gender. The assertion, for instance, that in Victorian England “Men were considered superior in every respect and women, rich or poor, had no scope for a proper education, professional opportunity or vocational training” (4) ignores the fact that many middle-class and élite women used informal channels for educating themselves and exercising influence, especially in mat-
ters of social reform. Nightingale herself is only the best-known example. Likewise, Nightingale’s deployment of a discourse of self-effacement in writing to political élites (what she herself delightfully styled “importunate widowing” [30]) was, presumably, a disarming strategy, an effort to soften and disguise the exercise of her own power. Furthermore, it was a discourse that contrasted sharply with that used in 1860 to reject the new phenomenon of women doctors (“they have only succeeded in being third rate men” [226]) and that used in 1896 to voice reservations about suffrage (“I am afraid I have been too enraged by vociferous ladies lecturing upon things they knew nothing at all about” [227]). To be sure, Gourlay makes no claims for Nightingale as a feminist. But neither does she take advantage of her rich knowledge of Nightingale and her vast literary output to analyse her discursive strategies or consider the reasons for her lingering reservations about larger roles for Western women.

There is, finally, the matter of Nightingale’s spirituality. Gourlay writes that her subject was “profoundly religious,” (6) but she does not explore the ways that Nightingale’s religious convictions might have inspired her work for India. Florence Nightingale and the Health of the Raj, is, in sum, a narrowly focused, somewhat reverential, work, one that would have been enriched by more attention to matters of context and more openness to recent scholarship on gender and colonialism. Nonetheless, there is much to be gained from Gourlay’s close and respectful account of Nightingale’s long-lasting commitment to India, including an awed appreciation for the dedication that kept her locked in her bedroom reading those government reports.

Chris Wrigley, British Trade Unions since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002)

THIS BOOK is part of the “New Studies in Economic and Social History” series, sponsored by the Economic History Society, and now published through Cambridge University Press. As such, it has a fairly clear brief: to provide a short and digestible overview of its subject, primarily for the student market. What do its readers need to know about the history of British trade unionism in the 20th century and the debates surrounding it?

Chris Wrigley’s credentials as a guide can scarcely be doubted; he has published very extensively on the subject of industrial relations. For this book, he divides his topic into four main themes: the structure and organization of trade unions, strikes, incomes policy, and trade union legislation. Each of these four chapters sets out to cover the period from 1945 to 2000, while the first part of the book’s chronological reach is, oddly, hived off to a separate chapter of its own.

This highlights one of the peculiar aspects of the project. Why “since 1933?” There is no justification given for the chosen period, and it doesn’t even seem to follow from anything so contingent as there being a previous volume in the series with 1933 as an arbitrary cut-off date. One of the positive features of writing across the common historical caesura of World War II might be to examine continuities and inheritances across the period, but this is never really attempted. The separation of the 1930s and the war years from the thematic chapters which follow only serves to marginalize them within the study. There is a photograph of the 1986 Jarrow marchers on the front cover; in the text there is no reference either to them or to the Jarrow Crusade of 1936.

The book is really concerned with the period after 1945. Wrigley presents useful material on trade union membership and density during the second half of the 20th century, and discusses the ways in

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which the face of trade unionism has altered, as a reflection of changes in the workplace. By the end of the century, he notes, the most likely person to be a trade unionist was “a female black in paid employment.” (31)

Wrigley sets the history of trade unions firmly in the context of the history of employment and a general survey of economic policy. This is difficult to avoid, but does present a challenge within the parameters of a short book which is also trying to engage with the detail of some specific debates about the study of trade unionism, for example about the use of available statistics and the applicability of models of union activity in explaining varying propensities to strike. There are a few notable casualties in the struggle for space in the text. There is little on the TUC as a political player, and scarcely anything on the trade unions’ party political affiliations, influence, and ambitions. Here the effects of European directives and employment standards might have been given more prominence than they are at the end of the book, as trade unions began to direct their lobbying efforts away from Westminster. On the other hand, there is welcome attention given to comparative material in discussing what might or might not be significant about the place of trade unionism in British life, with tables to compare different countries’ experiences.

Perhaps textbooks should diverge from our expectations. There are certainly some interesting details brought to prominence in this account: the cultural experiment of Centre 42 in the 1960s dominates the introductory chapter (taking up two of the five and a half pages of text). But I was struck by what was missing. There is no “beer and sandwiches at Number 10,” surprisingly little on the “Winter of Discontent,” or on the practical impact of major disputes in public utilities and in schools in the 1970s and 1980s, and the effects of this on public perceptions of trade unions. The visceral struggle of the 1984 miners’ strike merits only a short paragraph, devoted to the issue of how injunctions operated against secondary picketing (but never mentioning the “flying picket” phenomenon). By any measure, the miners’ strike was surely the major episode in British post-war trade union history, and it hardly seems to aid understanding to discuss the Conservative government’s approach to labour relations in the 1980s without reference to it. Instead, we are told that trade union legislation under Thatcher was influenced by the ideas of Hayek — though the book does not enlighten students about what those ideas were.

The problems of omissions and the treatment of subjects by allusion rather than detailed explanation are in part a feature of the kind of book this is. The series in which it appears is intended to “survey the current state of scholarship.” It aims to introduce students to “the significant debates,” though the references to, and isolated quotations from the secondary literature sometimes serve to distract the reader from grasping the main lines of interpretation within a chapter. In fact, there is no concerted attempt to provide a straightforward overview of the historiography in the area, though the final chapter does present some critics’ verdicts on the overall impact of trade unionism.

This approach in a textbook risks achieving neither one thing nor the other: it disdains a chronologically-organized account (which, for example, could introduce students to the Donovan report and In place of strife as points of interest in their own right), but does not fully commit itself to offering a synthesis of the secondary literature and a commentary on writing about the subject. The result is disappointing, and a bit half-hearted. In the accumulation of information about trade union membership, trade union law, employment patterns, economic trends, and economic policy, it is often difficult to discern a clear line of argument, or a definite sense of what the book is setting
out to achieve. The division into sections adds to this impression.

To take the chapter on incomes policy as one example: while this offers a valid topic in its own right, its interest within a study of trade unionism should have more to do with how unions had to respond to those policies and the degrees of influence which they might have in that context. The volume runs to only 86 pages of text, including tables, which does not offer much scope to stray beyond a defined brief. British Trade Unions since 1933 might have been more useful for its target market if it had been content to focus its discussion on what its title describes. In fact, Wrigley’s main interest here is in the frameworks within which trade unionism developed, and this, rather than the history of the trade unions themselves, becomes the main theme of the book.

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The issue of the economic performance of the Soviet Union is hardly any less controversial today than it was at the height of the Cold War. While specialists continue to debate the precise figures, the consensus today is that under Stalin the Soviet economy grew rapidly, though at enormous human cost, and that economic growth was not translated into commensurately rising living standards. Moreover, revisionists have argued that the Russian Revolution aborted what would have been a capitalist economic take-off which would have allowed Russia to join the ranks of the leading capitalist powers. Those who find anything positive in the Soviet experience risk demonization as apologists for Stalin.

Bob Allen is a distinguished economic historian who has only recently ventured into the minefield of Soviet economic history and in this book he seeks systematically to clear a path through it, arguing that Russian capitalism before the revolution was not poised for take-off. He recognizes that collectivization and terror imposed economic, as well as human, costs but argues that the economic gains of Stalinist industrialization had neutralized those costs by the end of the 1930s. Finally, he argues that the slowdown of the Soviet economy after 1970 was not, as today’s consensus has it, inherent in the Soviet system of economic planning, but was primarily the result of major planning mistakes. Robert Allen does not reach his conclusions as an apologia for Stalinism, but on the basis of computer simulations based on traditional, though now unfashionable, models from development economics.

Allen argues that pre-revolutionary Russia lacked what are generally considered to be the institutional prerequisites for capitalist development so that its development prospects were not good. Although economic growth in the 50 years before the Revolution was relatively rapid, by the Revolution the sources of growth had been exhausted. Agriculture had reached North American levels of productivity before wheat prices collapsed after 1914. The expansion of the railroads had run its course and there was no prospect of protected light industry becoming internationally competitive. Moreover, Russian capitalist development had brought little if any benefit to the urban and rural working class, intensifying the class conflicts that erupted in Revolution. The appropriate comparators for the prospects for Russian capitalism in the 20th century are not Japan but Argentina or even India.

Following War Communism, the New Economic Policy (NEP) sought to develop the Russian economy within a quasi-capitalist framework. However, the institutional and structural barriers to Russian economic development were now compounded by the unfavourable
circumstances of the world economy, so that there was no prospect of export-led development, while low domestic incomes provided only a limited market for domestic industry. Without a state-coordinated investment programme, the Soviet economy would be caught in the low-income trap typical of the underdeveloped world.

The Soviet Union had a massive rural surplus population with little scope for increasing agricultural productivity, other than through the consolidation of excessively fragmented holdings. The obvious development strategy, as Soviet economists were well aware, was to transfer the surplus rural population to industrial employment in the cities. The key issue was how to achieve this. Stalin achieved it by a brutal policy of collectivization, forced migration, compulsory requisitions, and heavy rural taxation. Allen believes that the continuation of the NEP policy of encouraging market forces in agriculture, alongside state-sponsored industrialization, could have achieved almost the same result at much less human cost as the surplus population was attracted to industrial employment in the city and those who remained increased their sales of produce. Allen argues that a capitalist economy would not have created the industrial jobs required to employ the surplus labour, since capitalists would only employ labour so long as the marginal product of labour exceeded the wage. State-sponsored industrialization faced no such constraints, since enterprises were encouraged to expand employment in line with the demands of the plan.

Allen’s simulations of alternative strategies in the 1930s suggest that a capitalist development strategy would have provided very slow growth and high unemployment, but that the Stalinist collectivization strategy soon overcame the disasters of collectivization to outperform a hypothetical continuation of the NEP policy alongside rapid industrialization by the end of the 1930s, although not by very much. The other positive feature of the Stalinist strategy was that the rapid expansion of education and growth of employment reduced the fertility rate and saved the Soviet Union from the population explosion that has plagued much of the Third World.

The strong performance of the NEP strategy might seem surprising, since the turn to forced collectivization was made at the end of the 1920s precisely because the NEP was not working: the peasants were not increasing their sales sufficiently to feed the urban population. However, Allen’s finding is primarily due to his assumption that without collectivization farm output would have grown steadily, so that under his NEP simulation farm output is 51 per cent greater than under collectivization and it is still 16 per cent higher in 1939 (234): the food supply to the cities comprises a much lower proportion of total agricultural production than under collectivization.

Soviet industrialization was not only based on forced collectivization, but also on the massive allocation of resources to heavy industry and the military at the expense, Stalin’s critics have argued, of the living standards of the population. Allen uses simulations of Feldman’s classic Soviet growth model to show that an investment strategy focused on heavy industry is quite compatible with rising consumption and re-analyses the best available data to show that, after the catastrophe of collectivization, living standards indeed rose rapidly.

Bob Allen shows that the Stalinist strategy worked, in strictly economic terms, until around 1970, when growth slowed dramatically. He explains the downturn in terms of the failure of the system to adapt to the ending of the labour surplus, but the failure was not so much that of the system as of the decision-making at the top. A growing proportion of investment resources was wasted by diversion to the military; by expanding energy production instead of economizing on consumption; by investing heavily in Siberia; and by retooling
old plants rather than closing them down and building new facilities. However, we might ask whether these faulty decisions were just subjective errors or whether they did not perhaps have deeper systemic roots. The decisions may have been economically irrational, but there were good reasons for them, as for so many other economically irrational decisions, in the rationality of the Soviet system.

Bob Allen’s book convincingly establishes the superiority of a planned over a capitalist economy in conditions of labour surplus (which is the condition of most of the world most of the time). However, his findings should not divert attention from the well-documented deficiencies of the Soviet economic system that provided perverse incentives at every level and led to grotesque levels of inefficiency and waste. His book is testimony to the astonishing achievements of Soviet workers, whose efforts produced such impressive results despite their bad management and often appalling living and working conditions.

The big question raised by Bob Allen’s book is whether it is possible to reconcile the benefits of central planning with democracy and microeconomic efficiency. Gorbachev believed that it was, but his attempts at democratization and economic liberalization led to the collapse of central planning, so that the Russian people merely exchanged the irrationality of the Soviet system for the irrationality of global capitalism. The failure of the Soviet Union to achieve its proclaimed socialist aims surely does not mean that it is impossible for humanity to make a better world.

Bob Allen has written a thought-provoking book, packed with stimulating insights and supported by rigorous analysis, that merits reading and re-reading.

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*CAETANA SAYS NO: Women’s Stories from a Brazilian Slave Society* is a well-written and compelling study that makes extensive use of civil and ecclesiastical sources. The most important contribution of Sandra Lauderdale Graham’s work is its exemplification of the complexities of the personal interactions between masters and slaves. In addition the book also shows that in a 19th-century patriarchal society, women could contest the authority of powerful males, as they were not merely powerless victims of oppression.

The book consists of the narratives of two women in the coffee plantation zone of the Parayba Valley in Southeastern Brazil. One, Caetana, was a house slave who was forced by her master, Luis Mariano de Tolosa, to marry another slave but who refused to consummate the marriage and who pressured her master to try to annul the marriage.

Caetana’s story survived because of the annulment petition that documented her request. However, this document lacked detailed information about some of the issues surrounding her case. For instance, it is unclear why Tolosa forced her to marry. As Graham points out, perhaps it was a consequence of the fact that she was his house slave and he, being a widower, was concerned by what people would say about him having a young woman living in his house. It is also possible that he was trying to protect Caetana from his three sons who could be tempted to have their first sexual experiments with a single slave girl. Another possible reason could be that Tolosa was concerned that a single slave woman would become a bad influence on his daughters. Needless to say, female choice in the matter of sexuality was denied, since the role of most women was to marry and to raise a family.
It is also unclear why Caetana refused to consummate the marriage. As Graham states, Tolosa gave her “ample liberty to choose one of the other unmarried slaves who served the house ... She discounted the offer, understanding it was all the same. She would have to marry one man or another.” (57) She was fighting for her right to be single. She did not fight against slavery, but she refused to accept an imposed marriage. Even though Tolosa was a man of immense power, he eventually agreed.

It is undeniable that Caetana had a special position in his plantation. She had been his wife’s personal slave and, after she died, Caetana was the woman in charge of his house and children. Still, in a simplistic view of slavery, we would see a dominant master and submissive slaves who do not dare to confront their master’s decisions. What Graham shows us is that this was not always the situation. As she states, “It would be easy to dismiss Tolosa as the powerful master and Caetana as the helpless slave, but that gloss does not work. He did order her to marry, and she knew she had to obey; but she struggled, and he relented.” (4)

Another myth that Graham dismisses is that of slaves being denied a family life and the right to marry. Caetana’s marriage was a religious ceremony with the blessings of the Catholic Church. It is true that she and her husband were part of the elite group of slaves in Tolosa’s plantation, and that they could have enjoyed special rights. Still, there were significant numbers of married slaves in that region of Brazil.

In the second story, Graham presents a woman, Inácia Delfina Werneck, from a powerful plantation family who never married, never had access to literacy, and because of that was dependent on literate males to run the property she inherited from her father. This story reinforces but also challenges assumptions of a patriarchal society. It reinforces the view of a society that denied women the right to an education. Yet, it also shows a woman who did not get married and who owned land and slaves. We do not know why Inácia remained single. But in doing so, she did not fulfill the role of a woman of the elite to procreate and to bring up male heirs. Her sister went even further. Not only did she never marry but she also raised her illegitimate son at her home. “Her sister provides an unexpected contrast as the unmarried mother to a natural son ... Just as surprising, no lasting scandal impaired her son’s public success in local politics or as a landowner.” (157)

Another unusual aspect of Inácia’s life was that she took the decision to nominate five of her house slaves as her heirs. They were granted their freedom, the ownership of eight other slaves, and Inácia’s coffee estate. The literate males around her accepted her demand. Unfortunately, due to the coffee crisis of the late 19th century, her estate was in deep financial trouble and the slaves ended up inheriting a long legal battle in the Brazilian courts, as they were considered responsible for the debts of their former master.

Inácia’s story also portrays the ambiguous relationship of masters and slaves who bond without affecting the continuing power of the former over the latter. The two may have been as close to each other as family members but they were still bonded by force, and the friendship co-existed with that relationship.

The major weakness of the book is the lack of a clear argument linking the two stories. Also, the book could have been improved if a theoretical analysis of gender and slavery had been added to the introduction. In this way, it would have made it easier for readers to compare and contrast these experiences of 19th-century-Brazil with those of other slave societies. Because of the way that the stories are presented, readers may perceive them to be two narrow cases that contribute little to a better understanding of slavery and gender relations in the Americas.

Yet, overall the book is a relevant contribution to the study of 19th-century
Brazilian society, highlighting how complex slave and patriarchal societies were. As Graham states, narratives are worth "telling because they make of slavery and of patriarchy not abstract systems of labor or power ... Their stories reveal how personal, enduring, and complex the ties could be, and how unfamiliar, unexpected outcomes have the power to shift perceptions, if only slightly." (158)

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MICHAEL SNODGASS's book treads on a widely covered, highly controversial, and still hotly debated area in the history of Mexico's pattern of industrial relations. That the author deftly addresses old and revisionist versions of an important aspect of contemporary Mexican history, and does this with a warm and humane touch, is indicative of a rigorous methodology, keen inquisitive mind, and classic history writing. The book is indeed a worthy contribution to the analysis and further understanding of the unraveling forces that struggled to take control of the spoils of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917).

While focusing on capital-labour relations in the city of Monterrey, in the northern State of Nuevo León, the author dissects in detail the attempts on the part of the capitalist forces to retain control over the labour force, through a *carrot and stick* approach, all the while willing to meet head-on the challenges posed by an emergent and independent proletariat, influenced to no small degree by the socialistic principles enshrined in the 1917 constitution. This primary contradiction is thoroughly examined, especially during the critical period between 1920 and 1940 when the old and the new Mexico continued to oppose each other. This is done in order to illuminate the contradictory role of the Plutarco Elas Calles administration (1928-1934) via-à-vis the Lázaro Cárdenas government (1934-1940). While Calles tried to undo some of the important, although symbolic, gains of the revolution, the Cárdenas government, on the other hand, brought about the realization of several of the promises associated with the first social revolution of the 20th century, including a stronger enforcement of Articles 27 and 123 of the constitution. The former gave land to some peasants, while the latter, the longest article in the constitution, praised the role of workers in the building of a new Mexico, and recognized and guaranteed the social, economic, cultural, and political rights to which Mexican workers are entitled (at least, nominally).

While these ideological battles were fought in the corridors of the presidential palace and parliament in Mexico City, in the battlefield the war between capitalists and workers took on a completely different meaning. Owners of steel, smelter, glassworks, and beer factories in the city of Monterey resorted to every means at their disposal to counter the growing ascendancy of an industrial proletariat influenced not only by revolutionary sloganeering but also by a growing class consciousness, resulting mainly from Communist activists’ proselytizing. When they could be afforded, the governor, the media, the courts, the labour boards, and docile workers and their families were used to deny the more militant workers the right to form truly class-based trade unions. The distinct paternalistic discourse that owners of industry and workers have the same interests was used and abused incessantly by the proprietary class and their organic intellectuals. Coupled with regional idiosyncracy and common sense con-
tempt for the rest of the country, many workers bought into the alleged “unique qualities” of the people of Monterrey. Those who saw through the phony aspects of paternalism and struggled to get their right to form independent unions, to negotiate in good faith, and to improve the lives of the rank-and-file were met not with paternalism but outright repression, as police forces, fascist organizations, and the ruling party’s charros harassed, beat, and killed some of them, while facilitating the firing of many others.

Snodgrass’s painstaking use of primary sources, including newspapers, archives, and diplomatic correspondence, allows him to provide a comprehensive picture of how the owners of the Cuahatemoc brewery successfully won the hearts and minds of their workers. Such a feat can, certainly, be seen as the harbinger of the corporatist model to be later institutionalized by successive Mexican governments to the present day. In effect, beginning with Cárdenas, labour autonomy throughout the country would gradually be lost as most unions, federations, and confederations became an appendage of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). From 1940 onwards, it was not only private capitalists who fought militant unionists toe-and-nail, but the official Mexican Confederation of Labour did its best to erase any semblance of class consciousness among workers. It did so by joining industrialists in blaming international Communism and their supporters in Mexico; more important though, its resort to corruption to co-opt militant leaders paralleled the paternalistic approaches of the private bosses who bought workers’ acquiescence with material benefits. In either case, workers believed that their material improvement was due to the goodness of their company and union bosses, rather than to the fact that those material benefits were recognized by law. Of course, as Snodgrass reminds those knowledgeable of Mexican affairs, it is not the lack of law that explains the poor state of industrial relations in that country but the concerted efforts on the part of the government and the private sector to not enforce the numerous pieces of legislation already in place.

One of the shortcomings of the book is its lack of a clear theoretical framework. Important concepts, such as class consciousness, class in itself, class for itself, corporatism, and co-optation are either not acknowledged or are not defined with the precision that is required. Rather, the author presumes that the reader is familiar with them. This presumption may not apply to those not intimate with the Mexican political economy of the post-revolutionary period. As well, most primary sources seem to have been taken at face value, which is odd given the almost total lack of objectivity to be found in newspapers, diplomatic correspondence, and records from labour tribunals, a situation that the author only insinuates at times.

In sum, Deference and Defiance in Monterrey: Workers, Paternalism, and Revolution in Mexico, 1890-1950 is a refreshing contribution to the study of labour relations at an important period of Mexican history. It will be extremely useful not only to all those already engaged in the analysis of Mexican history, but also to students and young scholars thinking of doing work in paradoxical Mexico.

Nibaldo H. Galleguillos
McMaster University


THIS IS an excellent book that helps to explain why any isolated North Korea continues against all odds to survive in its corner of Northeast Asia. It does so by revealing in detail the origins and foundations of the North Korean revolution — its aims, its programs, and its basis of popular support — thus challenging some of
the Cold War stereotypes promoted in the West.

According to many Western analysts, the government headed by Kim Jong II lacks any substantial popular support or political legitimacy and clings to power by virtue of strong-arm policing and the bare-faced propaganda bluster of a pathetic dictator. According to this view North Korea was a Soviet-type regime imposed by Stalin that lacked any national roots, was not really Korean, and, like the Soviet-sponsored governments of Eastern European countries, it should have disappeared after the USSR collapsed in 1991. Instead it has somehow lingered on as a kind of communist freak show waiting to be blown away.

Charles Armstrong argues that the “source of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) strength and resiliency, as well as many of its serious flaws and shortcoming” (1) lie in the poorly understood origins of the North Korean system. He probes these origins mainly by relying on a large body of documents captured by the American army when it occupied North Korea for 52 days during the Korean War (1950-1953). These documents were stored for many years in a Federal Records Center in Virginia, and then transferred to the US National Archives where they are available for scholarly study. Since the documents were not prepared for external propaganda purposes they provide a unique window into the process of “building socialism” from the ground up: minutes of official meetings and speeches of Kim II Sung, soldiers’ diaries, photograph albums, employment records, women’s magazines, sheet music, trial proceedings, lists of people under surveillance and their alleged crimes, “and a host of other items left behind in the flight from invading UN forces.” (249) In all there are 1,600,000 pages, “often fragmentary, diffuse, and unsystematic” (249) but enough to glimpse a “real society composed of real people going through a period of tremendous change.” (249)

According to Armstrong’s reading, the economic system in North Korea was not simply imposed by the Soviet occupation forces after the defeat of Japan in 1945. Nor was Kim II Sung a puppet leader appointed by Stalin. Rather, the new system was the result of a combination of forces that included the Soviet army of occupation as well as various Korean communist forces that emerged from underground after the liberation from Japan’s colonial rule, or that returned from China where they had been in exile and had provided part of the guerilla forces taking part in the Chinese revolution. The North Korean army, for example, eventually included 200,000 Korean veterans of the struggle in China; they had participated with the large Korean ethnic minority population of Manchuria in the land reforms, united front politics, and social reforms that later would be replicated in North Korea. Kim II Sung was one of those who returned from such experience in anti-Japanese guerilla bases in China and the Soviet Union and then had to compete with others before emerging with his faction as supreme leader in 1946. Armstrong demonstrates in convincing fashion that post-1945 North Korea was more a product of anticolonial struggle, national feeling, and demands for economic and social justice “than Soviet manipulation.” (33) When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, North Korea did not follow suit because it had its own legs to stand on. Armstrong’s analysis includes second-hand reference to the new archival materials released in the former Soviet Union as analysed by other scholars such as Kathryn Weathersby in “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8 (Washington, DC, November 1993), and Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim II Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1950 (London 2002).

After the North Korean land reform of 1946, “which was one of the most rapid
and thoroughgoing land redistribution efforts in history,” (77) and with very little violence, even official observers of the American government noted its popularity and the legitimacy it conferred on the North Korean government. “By this one stroke,” they commented, “half the population of north Korea was given a tangible stake in the regime and at the same time the north ... gained an important propaganda weapon in its campaign against the south.” (75)

Armstrong comments that the North Korea system does not rank high by any measure of liberal democratic freedoms and that it created many internal critics and opponents as it emerged after 1945. But in at least one respect it delivered what it promised by giving the poor majority at the bottom of the social ladder a privileged position at the top. Ironically this bedrock of popular support for the ruling Korean Workers’ Party has led to a new inflexible social hierarchy where the offspring of the workers and poor peasants lord it over the descendants of the landlords, Japanese collaborators, and capitalists. This new social hierarchy, Armstrong says, is one of the most distinctive and long-lasting elements of what he describes as “North Korea’s ‘conservative’ communism.” (106)

Armstrong argues that North Korean communism was greatly influenced by conservative Korean Confucian traditions including the emperor system. This helps to account for the widespread acceptance of the cult of leadership that developed around Kim Il Sung and continues under his successor Kim Jong Il. Another influence was the long and difficult struggle that the guerrillas waged against Japanese colonialism with its intrusive system of secret police control. This helped to shape the mass mobilization campaigns so characteristic of North Korean politics as well as the nation-wide system of political surveillance and repression of dissidence. The style and example of Stalin’s autocratic rule is demonstrated as another influential factor in the political evolution of North Korea.

For some reason Armstrong wants to emphasize that the North Korean communists disobeyed Marx. This is a recurring theme in his book. Perhaps it is to make them more acceptable. Their emphasis on ideology over material circumstances, he argues, “was a complete reversal of Marxist orthodoxy.” (242) Korean communists, he says, always tended to “stand Marx on his feet” (91) with “correct thought” leading to political and economic changes rather than the other way around. This attempted foray into Marxist dialectics is one of a very few examples of superficiality in a book that deserves to be widely read for the insights it provides into one of the most isolated, misunderstood, and vilified corners of the world. It is a handsome, well-written volume, including archival photographs and an informed discussion on sources, which will likely become a classic work in the field. The bibliography would have been more helpful if it had included a listing of the secondary sources consulted.

Stephen Endicott
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Bill Taylor, Chang Kai and Li Qi, Industrial Relations in China (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 2003)

OVER THE LAST 25 years, behind the rhetoric of the “socialist market economy” and the “modern enterprise system,” China has restored capitalism. With the restoration of capitalism, can one begin to talk about the emergence of a system of industrial relations in China? The Chinese government has introduced the core institutional components of such a system by legislating for individual and collective labour contracts and a disputes resolution system and revising the trade union law to define the rights and obligations of the trade unions (although there is
still no equivalent definition of the rights and obligations of employers). What are we to make of all this?

Most Chinese commentators take the laws, regulations, and decrees at face value and proclaim the existence of a unitary system of industrial relations based on the common interests of employers and employees. Many researchers have conducted case studies in Chinese enterprises over the past few years which have tended to confirm this view of the industrial relations system as unitary, though based on the exclusion of workers from the system rather than on their active incorporation into it. However, the limitation of such studies is that they have tended to treat Chinese employers and trade unions like their developed capitalist equivalents, looking for elements of industrial relations systems familiar from developed capitalist countries.

One great merit of the book under review is that it rejects such attempts to incorporate China into a traditional industrial relations framework, instead locating industrial relations in China within a wider political and economic perspective. In particular, industrial relations in China are much too important to be left to trade unions and employers. The government, mindful of the fate that befall the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and of its own experience of revolt in 1989, sees the industrial relations system not primarily as the means of regulating the employment relation, but more fundamentally as a means of maintaining social stability in a period of rapid social and economic change.

The government plays a central role not simply by intervening in industrial relations processes, but also in moulding the industrial relations actors and dictating the outcomes. The first part of the book deals with the actors, before considering the industrial relations processes in which they engage in the second half of the book. This approach is effective in explicitly problematizing the identity of the industrial relations actors and in facilitating a consideration of their diversity, which underlies the diversity of industrial relations processes, rather than trying to locate Chinese industrial relations in relation to a common pattern or a single continuum.

The Chinese Party-state does not play the role of a third party in the regulation of industrial relations but strongly influences the character and activity of the first two parties. While the Chinese trade unions continue to be kept firmly under the wing of the Party, the government has ample means of influencing employers, including those in the private and foreign-invested sectors, so that the Party-state strongly influences all aspects of industrial relations. One aspect of this influence that the authors emphasize is the way in which the Party-state is able to maintain and exploit the fragmentation of employers and workers as a means of reinforcing its economic and political control.

The review of industrial relations processes, which makes up the second half of the book, considers in turn “participation”; labour conflict and settlement; and the negotiation of collective contracts. These have all been means by which the government has sought to contain the potential conflicts to which rapid economic change gives rise. However, as the authors show, all three processes have been imposed and are systematically controlled from above so that they have failed to provide workers with any channels through which to articulate their aspirations or express their grievances. Managers are still kept in check not from below, through forms of democratic participation in management or the negotiation of collective contracts, but from above, through Party-state structures. The majority of workers, moreover, fall outside these systems, confronting private employers as powerless and isolated individuals. The formal dispute resolution procedures are heavily weighted against workers and only a small proportion of disputes are pursued through such proce-
dures. Moreover, the majority of workers continue to see the government as being ultimately responsible for their situation, so most industrial conflicts rapidly assume a political character and are directed not against employers but against local government bodies.

This book is an invaluable resource in providing a detailed, nuanced and well-documented account of industrial relations in China, which draws on a wide range of Western and Chinese research to grasp the complexity of the current situation. The overall impression given by the book is that there is no system of industrial relations in China. On the one hand, there is no clear demarcation of the parties involved in industrial relations. The influence of the state is pervasive, while the trade union in the workplace is a part of the management apparatus that remains under close Party control. On the other hand, there is no uniform system of regulation of the employment relation, with marked differences between state and former state enterprises, on the one hand, and private enterprises, on the other, as well as between large and small enterprises and between one region and another. A semblance of uniformity is provided only by the uniformity of laws and regulatory procedures, which the government is trying, with limited success, to extend from the state to the private sector. Finally, none of the industrial relations processes introduced by the government function effectively as such because they do not more than articulate power relations in which the employers, backed by the Party-state, enjoy absolute authority over their fragmented employees.

In conclusion the authors suggest that this is not a stable situation, that the interests of both workers and employers have become more homogeneous, particularly as capital penetrates the countryside, but the inability of workers to organize independently impedes the development of class consciousness on the basis of collective action. Seeing little prospect of trade union development, they anticipate that the key conflict in determining the future course of Chinese development will not be that between workers and employers, but that between workers and the state.

Central to this prognosis is their pessimism about the possibility of independent trade union development. There is no doubt that the current leadership of ACFTU is committed to the top-down approach to industrial relations and implicitly or explicitly supports the state repression of industrial conflict and social protest, which has prevented the emergence of independent trade unionism. However, as the authors note, there are many younger and more progressive cadres who would like to see ACFTU playing a more active role as representative of workers in relation to their employers and it is not inconceivable that over time the CCP could sanction such developments, if the incorporation of workers into an industrial relations system holds out better prospects of social stability (and international acceptance) than the overt repression of protest. This would not be a revolutionary development, but it would be a great step forward in the making of a Chinese working class.

Simon Clarke
University of Warwick


THIS COLLECTION of case studies is another useful contribution to our understanding of workers’ knowledge. It bears witness to the persistence and continuation of know-how and learning and tilts at the contemporary mantra that workers everywhere need to “re-skill” and continuously learn if they are to participate in the “learning society.”

An introductory chapter is followed by an introductory section titled “Researching Learning and Work,” that is
followed by Part II, "Case Studies," the "meat" of the book. The case studies range from the auto industry, small parts, and chemicals to a community college and garment manufacturer. Part III, "Comparative Perspectives Across Case Studies," is a bit misleading as it sets out to draw comparisons across the case studies in relation to home and community first and then come to some general conclusions on work and learning drawn from the case studies.

The introductory chapter provides the authors' perspective on work and learning and those familiar with their other work will find no surprises. Their observations that the literature on issues of social class and education is scant as are work-based case studies may ring true for North America and for adult education respectively. But they will surprise readers from societies with more transparent social structures and Canadian scholars from labour relations and labour history backgrounds where case studies are more common.

The first chapter following the introduction is co-authored with D'Arcy Martin; it explores the problematic nature of work-based research undertaken with and for working people. This provides a useful guide for student researchers but could have been strengthened by reference to other adult education (and labour relations) research undertaken with working-class adults rather than a misleading aside (31-2) on adult educators researching university students. The second chapter reviews adult learning theories and provides a justification for the cultural historical activity theory (CHAT) approach adopted. No surprises here for readers of Labour/Le Travail except perhaps that more acknowledgment wasn’t given to the role of labour historians and British cultural studies in developing these approaches.

The first case study of the auto industry (GM site in Oshawa), co-authored with Ruben Roth, is a corker. It gives a good feel as to what is happening in the plant and why. It describes the impact of union education programs (particularly CAW’s paid educational leave [PEL] program). These can be considered as modern-day equivalents of traditional adult education (non-formal), and informal learning that occurs at work, in the union, and socially. The authors identify the role of PEL as critical to the continuance of collective education and worker solidarity.

The second case study looks at the chemical industry and discusses the role of formal schooling, company training, and the workers’ own ways of learning to manage the plant. It reviews the tensions between knowing and being credited and paid for it. The struggles over control of on-the-job training and rewards flowing from it highlight an important and over-looked aspect of the “learning organization.” The next case study of the community college introduces dimensions of race and gender into the restructuring of public service and learning rhetoric. It also notes that training/education opportunities go to those who have most. These divisive themes are revisited in a different context, small parts manufacture, in the following case study.

The final case study, co-authored with Clara Morgan, of garment workers is the most painful to read. It discusses the position of immigrant (mainly women) workers, the need for ESL and ABE, and the vanishing jobs and dreams of secure employment of these marginalized workers. The unions’ attempts to stem the tide and prepare their members are documented and the workers’ own knowledge and resilience is acknowledged. Concluding paragraphs beginning “CHAT can help to make visible ....” and “from a CHAT perspective ....” seemed forced; having read the chapter, the observations are clear and obvious, CHAT or no CHAT. This chapter should be compulsory reading for all management gurus extolling the virtues of the new “knowledge economy.”

The first concluding chapter, “Household and Community-based Learning:
Learning Cultures and Class Differences Beyond Paid Work,” is a useful discussion of the work/home/community dimension and may remind older readers of Richard Hoggart’s “The Uses of Literacy.” The final chapter draws together observations from the case studies about schooling, training, and learning and also looks at gender, race, and age dimensions of working-class learning. A final section compares the study’s findings with comparable studies and makes a number of recommendations.

The comparison with the Leeds University research team’s study of workplace learning led by Keith Forrester does demonstrate Livingstone and Sawchuk have but a limited conception of the way progressive Employee Development Schemes (EDS) have evolved in the UK. The argument for progressive EDS is an argument for funding and in some cases paid time off for workers to undertake adult education courses of their own choosing. Examples include the union-negotiated Ford Employee Development Assistance Program (EDAP) and UNISON’s (Britain’s largest public sector union) return-to-learn courses and open-college concept. While CAW/CUPW PEL is superior to EDAP in terms of union control and “oppositional” potential, the extent of EDS at the time (perhaps covering 20 per cent of the workforce) Forrester and colleagues were writing and the opportunity for public policy support help explain their enthusiasm. Forrester’s subsequent conclusions presented at a conference in 1999, which both Livingstone and Sawchuk attended, spoke to earlier shortcomings in the Leeds research, and in the opinion of this reviewer, should have been acknowledged in a book appearing some four years later.

The authors’ discussion of their recommendations becomes a little confusing because the CAW/CUPW version of PEL is very different from what is generally understood as PEL and it is not clear to what the authors are referring. Similarly, prior learning assessment and recognition (PLAR) is problematic and needs to be teased out. PLAR may help workers advance at work and gain advanced standing in further and higher education programs; EDS may provide the “general educational tuition support” (291) to allow workers the opportunity to study outside of the workplace; and PEL rights may give them the time off needed for sustained study. However, the CAW/CUPW PEL and other union education programs can support union activism and resistance at work and in society and can, as suggested by the authors, meld with informal learner networks at work, in the union, community, and at home to bolster worker opposition to global capitalism. The different impacts of the various recommendations need to be sorted more clearly. The major struggles around work and learning will continue at work.

This book is a valuable addition to any graduate course reading list examining work and learning. The case studies provide current insights into the world of workplace learning defined from a worker perspective. The commentary could have been more carefully contextualized in places and the book’s title may lead the reader to expect more than there is about the future of organized labour in the information age. This is the third book on work and learning to appear in 2004 with Peter Sawchuk’s name on the cover, an encouraging sign that the future of the study of adult education is in good hands.

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This IS the best Canadian text available on workplace learning but it’s not without its frustrations including the omission of a number of references from the biblog-
The book is intended as an introduction for students to the growing field of work and learning, theory and practice, and it achieves that purpose tolerably well. It also is intended as a critical introduction, one that takes account of power, authority, and control at work and it is more successful in doing so than comparable texts. D'Arcy Martin provides a forward and he highlights the tensions between a Human Resource Management (HRM) approach and a worker-centred perspective to understanding the issues at stake. The discomfort he hints at will be experienced by readers as they move through the various chapters.

The book is divided into seven chapters. A brief introduction is followed by a longer chapter on management strategies which in turn paves the way for a chapter discussion of groups and teams. Chapter 4 looks at the growth of the learning organization idea but the predictable pattern of chapters is then broken with an examination of unions and workplace learning and, in Chapter 6, a discussion of adult education’s contribution to the field. The concluding chapter attempts to draw the strands together and project workplace learning forward.

The strengths of the book include a sense of history and an understanding of the importance of the critical eye. Its weaknesses are that at times these strengths give way to minuta and description and some chapters overlook key issues. The introductory chapter illustrates the first point very well and is a splendid introduction to the field. My only quibble would be with the depiction of management attitudes that leads to the assertion “that work-based learning is not always promoted solely to increase profitability or management hegemony.” (8)

Chapter 2 discusses management strategies and workplace learning. It does so at length, explaining the development of management theory. This is a well-structured chapter but there is more information here than many readers will need, particularly given the chapter conclusions that “it appears that much of the ‘progressive’ learning-orientated HR strategy has been put back on the shelf.” (38) Companies are adopting low-cost, market-driven strategies, the chapter author notes, with minimal investment in people. Readers are also warned to stay away from the ready acceptance that “knowledge work” is typical of new jobs and that companies are primarily in the “knowledge” business. These are useful caveats particularly in view of the dominant views expressed in management and mainstream adult education texts.

Chapter 3, “Groups, Work Teams and Learning,” is useful enough although it meanders a little and includes unhelpful diagrams that are the subject of an errata sheet. At times the critical gets lost in the detail and readers may be better served by reading the critical CAMI study’s treatise on teams. The fourth chapter on organizational learning is too reverential and readers could be forgiven for thinking that “learning organizations” are real and have replaced self-interested corporations. A number of critical studies are discussed and referenced but the chapter would benefit from differentiation among types of organizations (public, small private, corporations, not-for-profit, and worker cooperatives) and from a frontal assault on the idea that organizations learn!

Chapter 5 on “Unions and Workplace Learning” is excellent. It’s so refreshing to find a well-informed and referenced discussion of what workers gain from union workplace learning and what they learn from union activity itself. It undoubtedly reflects Bratton and Sawchuk’s interest in organized labour and the workplace. The section on paid educational leave (PEL) and prior learning assessment and recognition (PLAR) needs to be more nuanced. For example the distinction between the jointly con-
trolled UAW PEL program and the union-controlled Canadian union PEL versions could have been made clearer. But this is a minor issue.

The adult education chapter serves as an important reminder that adult education has always been interested in issues of work and learning, sometimes intimately as in the Antigonish movement and sometimes more obtusely in the recognition that adult students were also workers. This chapter is expansive, covering unpaid and paid work; it has an essentially Canadian perspective and is loaded with Canadian examples and references. The chapter links concerns about learning at work to workplace democracy and active citizenship, recalling the liberatory traditions of adult education.

In the final chapter the authors do a good job of stitching the chapters together and make sense of the differing foci. Their enthusiastic embrace of the “great potential” of workplace learning (175) may be misplaced but it is understandable in the authors’ own terms. At the very least, workplace learning has to be seen as contested terrain and the authors have illustrated with numerous examples why that must be so.

Although I see the book as being most useful for students of adult education, particularly those interested in work and learning, it should also be of interest to those considering working in the HRM/HRD field. As the authors point out, some organizations may well believe that the company’s “competitive advantage” depends on a happy and committed workforce and may work towards that end (full-time employees, higher skills, job flexibility, workplace learning), but others may equally believe that tight control of labour costs combined with close supervision over employees is the road to success (low-paid, part-time employees, routine jobs). According to the authors, both approaches can work “equally well.” (71) Being an HR professional in the first organization may well be more satisfying than in the second.

This book will be core reading for my students in work and learning courses.

Bruce Spencer
Athabasca University


THE SUBJECT of The Politics of Prostitution is not really prostitution politics. Instead, the research collected here seeks to answer the questions “Do women’s policy agencies matter?” and “Is there such a thing as state feminism?” The Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS) has been studying these questions since 1995 in “Western political democracies;” prostitution is only one of five issues which members have used to measure the impact of women’s movements for equality. By the term “women’s movements,” the researchers mean a range of organizations and groups, both grassroots and formal, which may or may not self-identify as feminist. By “women’s policy agencies,” they refer to government institutions which exist to advance women’s status in society. These definitions are key to appreciating the book.

Researchers in twelve countries (six in Europe plus Israel, Australia, Canada, and the US) each chose three prostitution-related debates to be analysed according to the network’s method for measuring the impact of women’s movements since the early 1970s. To qualify for inclusion, the debates had to end in an “output” — a report, legislation, or judicial decision. Although all chapters follow the same outline, they are not all equally strong. Some of the authors, like Barbara Sullivan of Australia, are long-time analysts of prostitution issues, while others are relatively new to them or familiar with them in other contexts than their home states. In the latter case, this sometimes means that they underestimated the im-
portance of certain social actors while overestimating others. The chapter on Spain is an example, overly centred on Madrid and reading like a compendium of the opinions of current local actors in the field without a deeper knowledge of the context. The Dutch and Italian chapters, written by specialists in their own countries, are far more nuanced. Apart from these differences and the imposition of a rigorous writing format, all authors did not handle the material exactly the same way, either quantitatively or qualitatively.

Because of the repeated, fixed order of points and paragraphs and the masses of dates and agency names, the book cannot be a pleasurable read, but it may serve as a reference work for comparing periods and debates across national boundaries. The imposed methodology also marginalizes numerous points mentioned in passing that one would like to know more about: feminism came late to Austria; a small grassroots prostitutes’ group was more important than the “women’s movement” in Italy; there was no policy debate on prostitution per se in the US; racial issues were important and the activist voices of individual prostitutes influenced “femocrats” in the Netherlands; the AIDS issue was influential in France and Austria. Much is unexplained, and we cannot draw the conclusion that racial issues were not important outside Holland or that AIDS was only influential in France and Austria, since these appear as individual authors’ comments made outside the project’s specific research questions. It is a shame that Germany was not a participant, since this country’s debates and solutions to sex-industry issues are among the most interesting in Europe.

The editor warns that the processing of the data risks “eliminating important cultural aspects” of individual country politics. But nation-states provide the frame, rather than cultures, and there is no engagement with possible cultural meanings. It is fascinating to compare the efforts of different national parliamentarians to define which commercial-sex activities should be permissible, which words should be used for which acts, and which kind of paid sex, provided by whom to whom, offends. Neighbouring countries in Europe, after all, have reached contrasting solutions to these questions during the same general period, so that, for example, indoor prostitution is currently forbidden in Italy and France while it is allowed in Spain. But, given the framework for the research, such material is neither explored by individual authors nor by the editor, since this did not form part of the research project. Yet for those interested in the subject itself — prostitution — such questions cannot help but be more compelling than the technical research question, and these readers cannot help wishing for an account of these differences. So, although outside the remit of the project, the lack of engagement may be felt as a frustration here.

The methodological framework requires the use of very general (and ultimately hegemonic) terms. By asking whether state feminism or women’s policy agencies matter, by definition the research concentrates on formal, governmental actors and entities and downplays other elements and influences. The issue that repeatedly demonstrates this concerns the role of individual activists or subaltern groups, particularly vocal sex workers. For example, the UK chapter makes the common outsider error of imagining the English Collective of Prostitutes to be an important player in British prostitution politics and neglects other groups that advocated from the sex workers’ perspective (PROS, SCOT-PEP, POW), also underestimating the weight behind the Europap-UK/UKNSWP alliance, which has been vocal on behalf of 60-70 different agencies in the past 5 years. The Canadian chapter mentions the participation of CORP in one early debate but fails to mention other groups that played a role in other debates (SWAV, Maggie’s, RYPL). Herein lies the pitfall of this kind of research, for no matter how
many definitions are agreed upon at the beginning, individual researchers and their informants will inevitably have differing opinions as to the importance of the contributions of one or another social actor. Other kinds of errors mar some of the chapters.

The researchers were required to judge if and how the debates they analyse became “gendered” as a requirement for deciding the significance of women’s movements. These sections are interesting, but the constructs “woman” and “women’s movement” inevitably mute or erase the diversity of opinions among women themselves. Thus a debate may be classified as “gendered,” but it is arguable that conflicts within women’s movements were sometimes more important than this gendering. Since these conflicts — about women’s agency and the meaning of prostitution — have been particularly nettlesome in these debates, this merger is odd. Moreover, while activist sex workers’ voices are sometimes noted, the book overlooks the fact they have rarely been consulted about policy issues by those attempting to legislate on their behalf, and thus have often been pitted against women’s movements that treat them as distant objects in debates. By focussing on the role of women’s policy agencies and the extent to which their views were heard, the book elides the fundamental issue of representation — that many speaking in these debates presume to speak on behalf of women who do not become protagonists themselves.

The concluding chapter quantifies the evidence provided in the chapters and concludes that the hypothesis is proved: women’s policy agencies have had a significant impact on prostitution debates and thus the case is made that governments can effectively promote women’s status. Those interested in the quantification of this kind of material may judge for themselves from the charts provided. Given the polemical quality of so many of the debates discussed, with individual women and groups arguing for different solutions, the project conclusion troublingly evades the question of whether gender is indeed the most important aspect of these debates or not.

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IN THIS FASCINATING and compelling book, Temma Kaplan continues her ongoing project — undertaken most recently in Crazy for Democracy — of reclaiming the stories of those who, against extraordinary odds, attempt to call their governments to account and to make democracy a reality. Crazy for Democracy focused especially on individuals and groups in the US and South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s; Taking Back the Streets recounts the struggles of (mostly) women and young people against authoritarian regimes in Chile, Argentina, and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s. While the accounts are often chilling in their presentation of the details of repression and torture, they are also especially timely and inspirational.

The chapters examine five different movements, most of them movements of the Left, that “chose to make their arguments for democracy and justice by spectacular acts in front of an audience.” These include opponents of the Chilean regime of Pinochet, including Mujeres Por La Vida [Women for Life] and Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos [Association of Family Members of Disappeared Detainees]; the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the group that led the resistance to the Argentinian Junta; women’s and youth movements in both Chile and Argentina that struggled to keep alive the memory of repression and human rights violations
even after formal democracy was restored; and groups that struggled for democracy in Spain, both during and after the rule of Francisco Franco. Significantly, however, she also includes the role of right-wing women’s activism in bringing down the government of Salvador Allende in Chile. The book (which reads as a group of more-or-less independent, though interconnected, essays, rather than as a monograph with a single, sustained argument), explores a variety of related themes, including the relationships among solidarity, resistance, and recovery, the strategic uses of gender in public mobilizations, the dynamics of shaming and publicity in sustaining (and overcoming) repression, and the complicated ways in which activist women do or do not define themselves as “political.”

In some ways, this book is an extended exploration and application of the notion of “female consciousness” that Kaplan introduced in a 1982 article, and which has been taken up by feminist historians of social movements in the years since. As Kaplan notes, “Frequently, groups of women speak out ‘as women’ about public issues, legitimating their activities by denying that they want to promote any overtly political goals … they say they are only doing what they were raised to do as ‘good women.’” (45-46) Particularly in situations of repression, the claim that one is only taking care of one’s family or children can possibly provide a small zone of safety. Although it is clear that such claims did not always protect either Mujeres por la Vida in Chile, or members of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (members of both groups were “disappeared,” killed, and/or tortured by those regimes), their claiming an identity as women or mothers did help them carve out some space for action in contexts where public spaces were largely shut down.

Indeed, the place of the “public” is a key feature of this analysis. Kaplan’s detailed discussion of the nature and effects of torture makes clear that one of its central purposes/consequences is to shame, humiliate, and isolate its victims. (Recent photographs from Abu Ghraib, and the discussions that have followed from their release, highlight similar forms of sexual humiliation and shaming). The survivors whose stories she tells have “gone public” with their experiences — not only to expose the horrors perpetrated by the various military-led regimes, but also to exercise their own shame and isolation, and to reclaim their place as fully-human citizens. In fact, her argument is that it is only through solidarity, and the overcoming of isolation and humiliation, that the survivors were able to survive. Her analysis of the relationship among repression, solidarity, and resistance is strong and compelling. Indeed, Kaplan’s descriptions of the tortures they endured is, to my mind, unusually graphic, and painful to read. But it seems clear that the presentation of the details is, for Kaplan, too, a political act: if the women (and men) who experienced these horrors could live through them and tell them to others, then the least we can do is to read about them and express our solidarity by not closing our eyes.

But the book focuses on the strategic role of “the public” in two other senses, as well. First, in most Western societies, the public arena has traditionally been denoted as “political” and a male domain, while women were relegated to the “private” or domestic arena, supposedly protected from the corrupt and violent world of politics. In recent years, feminist scholars and activists have challenged that dichotomization, noting the ways that the supposed separation of public and private spheres has limited the reach of democracy for everyone, and particularly constrained women’s roles. Kaplan highlights the ways virtually all the activists she studied deliberately played with the public/private divide. They often explicitly denied that their activism was “political” in nature, while using the cover of the claim to non-political status to protect them from repression. She explores the
uses of this strategy not only among women on the Left, in Chile, Argentina, and Spain but also among right-wing women in Chile. Nevertheless, in the Chilean case, Kaplan portrays the right-wing women as the foils, if not the dupes, of right-wing, male-led organizations, rather than as having developed this strategy on their own, to forward their own purposes.

Kaplan also explores the uses of the “public” as a space for spectacle. Many of these chapters explain, in considerable detail, the ways these women and young people took to the streets almost as a form of guerrilla theater. In a world where formal political action was not only forbidden, but often violently and viciously punished, resisters proved extraordinarily creative in presenting their positions. The weekly walks around the plaza of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo are, perhaps, among the best-known example: those women carried pictures of their disappeared loved ones on strings hanging from their necks, and wore baby diapers, embroidered with the names of the disappeared children, as kerchiefs on their heads. Even without saying a word, they communicated a great deal about the loss of their (and others’) children, and the goal of discovering their whereabouts. As the political context changed in each country, demonstrators could take slightly greater risks. Thus, Kaplan notes that, in the case of Chile, women’s protests “amounted to civic rituals in which they reclaimed the city of Santiago and then the entire country from Pinochet and the military.... Mujeres por la Vida presumed that playing the part of citizens living in a democratic society might help develop people’s capacity for living a democratic life.” (82-3) For those women, claiming public space — and using it in their own ways — was an important dimension of the politics of creating a more democratic society. Similarly, she recounts the ways that, in the closing years of the Franco regime, women in Spain used creative strategies to protect themselves against repression while, at the same time, demonstrating against the unfairness of laws governing adultery and rape.

At a time when millions of people demonstrating in cities around the world have been unable to stop US military intervention in Iraq, and when citizens in the US are finding their civil liberties steadily eroded, it is especially valuable to learn about the efforts of those who ultimately succeeded in their struggles against seemingly implacable governmental foes. Kaplan’s book stands as a fine example of engaged, and informed, scholarship, that attempts not only to clarify historical events but also, in so doing, to change the range of possibilities for the future.

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AS THE TITLE suggests, this book tells the story of women working in occupations that have traditionally been performed by men. Bagilhole draws on data from four occupational case studies to identify common barriers faced by and strategies used by women working in these traditionally male fields. The case studies are comprised of samples of women working in civil service management, academia, and the priesthood in the Church of England. Matched samples of men and women are included in the fourth case study of construction engineers. These studies were carried out over a period of seven years, and each occupation contained a different percentage of women.

Bagilhole categorizes her four occupations by drawing on Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s typology of proportionate diversity (Men and Women of the Corporation, New York 1977). Kanter’s taxonomy ranged from skewed organizations wherein one social type predominates, to more balanced organizations in which the minority social type in question consti-
tutes at least 40 per cent of the work group. The priesthood of the Church of England recently (in the early 1990s) moved from an all-male or “uniform” occupation to include women; it represents the most extremely skewed field of Bagilhole’s cases. Male priests predominate numerically, and as a consequence, define the norms of the occupational culture often to the detriment of female priests. Although the construction engineering field has included women for a longer time period than has the priesthood, it is also an extremely skewed occupational field. Academia includes more women than either the priesthood or engineering fields and thus constitutes a less skewed occupation. The Civil Service is balanced as an occupation, but its management positions are still quite skewed.

Kanter predicts that as work groups become more proportionately balanced, minority social types (in this case, women) will face fewer barriers and exert more influence on the workplace culture. However, in contrast to Kanter, and consistent with more recent research, Bagilhole finds that women face considerable barriers in all four occupational groups, and perhaps most importantly, that once an occupation integrates to include women, gender segregation is re-instituted by assigning women to gender-specific specializations and job tasks. Of course, each occupation in the study exhibits its own distinctive version of this re-segregation process, but these gendered specializations and duties commonly prevent women from attaining the pay, status, and advancement associated with the duties assigned to their male coworkers. For example, female engineers are encouraged by senior male managers to enter supporting office-based roles rather than the site-based work locations that are most highly valued in promotional decisions. Women in the priesthood are much more often placed in half- or non-stipend positions than are their male counterparts.

Bagilhole promises to utilize her data to address the persistent question raised in studies of women in traditionally male occupations: will women change the fields that they enter? This question is nicely framed by Bagilhole’s overview of international workplace gender segregation patterns (Chapter 1), and her extensive review of the theoretical explanations of occupational segregation and the emergence of gendered job categories (Chapters 2 and 3). Her analysis reveals the myriad ways in which women’s “choices” about work hours, assignments, and careers are shaped by societal arrangements such as the gendered division of labour in the home, and by organizational conditions that value men’s work over women’s, and assume that the “best” workers are those unencumbered by geographical constraints or routine childcare and housework responsibilities. These same structural and organizational dynamics make it difficult for women to significantly transform work practices in the male-dominated occupations that they enter. Bagilhole’s case studies consistently reveal the many barriers and pressures faced by women in non-traditional fields, and lead to the conclusion that these male-dominated work experiences change women more than women can change the jobs in their field. Importantly, however, Bagilhole’s data do reveal pockets of women who think that their job performances have significantly altered their occupational field for the better. This finding was most evident among female priests who were working to develop a priesthood that was both more responsive to parishioners and supportive of increased gender equality in their society at large. Several female academics believed that their presence improved the quality of teaching and mentoring for university students. Yet, female academics recognized that the link between research and university career advancement led to the devaluing of those who cared for teaching over scholarly publication. The progressive female
priests also perceived less commitment to occupational change among the new, younger women recruits to their field.

Given the strength and longevity of the male-dominated work cultures in all four of her case studies, Bagilhole concludes that increasing the numbers of women alone is unlikely to produce occupational change. She argues that individualistic solutions will not change sexist organizational cultures, and ends the book with a call for centralized, and state-driven interventions to promote gender equity. She briefly describes one such program in Sweden as having produced a number of successes.

Bagilhole’s analysis presents an excellent overview of the societal and organizational barriers confronting women in non-traditional occupations. Given the time frame of the study, the book is important because it shows, sadly, that many of the barriers described by researchers during the 1980s and early 1990s continue into the present day. However, the book does not offer much in the way of new insights into the study of women in male-dominated fields. Most of the data seem to confirm existing theory rather than to forge new ground. The last chapter on challenging gender boundaries emphasizes state-initiated remedies as a solution, but this focus contradicts discussions in earlier chapters about the subversion of such initiatives at the organizational level. Moreover, while such strategies may be gaining ground in the UK and EU, US trends seem to be running in an almost opposite direction with the dismantling of many affirmative action programs nation-wide.

Most of the book focuses more on organizational dynamics than on the larger structural context of contemporary work organizations. Although structural levers for change that might improve or worsen women’s position are briefly discussed in Chapter 2 and occasionally referenced in other chapters, the likely effects of major structural trends like globalization, downsizing, and outsourcing are not fully considered in this study. The discussion of “international” workplace gender segregation only addresses First World countries such as the US and the member countries of the EU. It does not deal with the effects of international divisions of labour on gendered job segregation in First and Third World countries. The structural dynamics of the global economy are shaping and reshaping workplace organizational dynamics in ways that may both replicate past gendered organizational barriers, but also create new opportunities and new dilemmas for women in traditionally men’s jobs. Future research should attend to these matters.

Despite these concerns, Women in Non-Traditional Occupations is a solid piece of research. It is well written and provides many rich quotations from interviews with women in four very interesting fields. The book would be a fine addition to courses focused on work and occupations, organizations, gender and work, or social inequality.

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Harry Glasbeek, Wealth by Stealth — Corporate Crime, Corporate Law and the Perversion of Democracy (Toronto: Between the Lines 2002)

THESE TWO BOOKS are good companions. Glasbeek’s book, while very rich in Canadian content and examples, is a much more academic and difficult read for the neophyte to corporate law and crime. Bakan’s book reads more like a popularized version of Glasbeek’s book, with predominantly American examples. He builds upon a series of interviews with leading economists and business people who explain the history, workings, and problems of corporations. Both authors discuss corporate influence, the corporate
push to soften and avoid regulations, corporate deviance and crime, and challenging corporate rule.

Bakan and Glasbeek explain how corporations gained the right to be treated as legal “persons,” giving them the same rights as any other citizen to free speech. Protected by law under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in Canada, and the First Amendment in the US, corporations use this right to influence the government and the public. As persons, they have more say than unions which can be silenced by the government in various ways (i.e. denial of the right to strike). Corporations use various strategies (i.e. think-tanks, lobbying) to create a business-friendly climate. This climate includes the softening or removal of regulations.

Glasbeek points out how corporations promote the “myth” that small businesses are the backbone of the Canadian economy. He debunks this myth, pointing out that the term “small business” can be applied to quite large businesses, with as many as 99 employees and “annual incomes of less than $25 million.” (28) He explains that the Canadian economy is really dominated by giant firms — oligopolies and monopolies. “(A) few major economic actors in any one sector are close to being in full control of that sector.” (36) These corporations lobby for the “small business” to create an empathetic political climate as a means of advancing an agenda that favours business over the interests of most Canadians. Governments rush to help “small business” through cheap financing, and “cutting red tape,” but Glasbeek reminds us that this means “cutting of safety and quality controls” that would protect workers, consumers, and the environment. (35) With the Westray mine, politicians keen to create jobs scrambled to secure risk-free financing for the mine owner. Even though government authorities documented occupational health and safety infractions, they turned a blind eye and did not enforce the regulations.

Glasbeek is critical of how corporations use public relations firms and “intellectual gatekeepers” to manipulate information, skew research findings in a particular way that favours corporations, and massage the truth. He lumps intellectuals into a group that he calls “corporate cheerleaders.” This group includes Fortune 500 corporations, lobbyists, media, law firms, and universities who serve corporations. Intellectuals, Glasbeek argues, play a key role in influencing the government and public by either speaking on behalf of corporations, or doing research for them. Intellectuals too are complacent about the effects of corporate power, because they do not really feel its effects — they can say what they want because they have so little to say. Glasbeek, however, points to key academics and researchers who are blowing the whistle on the undue influence of corporations on scientific research and government policy-making (e.g. Nancy Olivieri, David Healey, and Health Canada scientists). Healey lost his position at the University of Toronto for speaking out, and as I write this book review, three Health Canada whistle-blowers have just been fired.

Corporations try to avoid regulations by promoting two key ideas: self-regulation and “corporate social responsibility.” Both authors illustrate why these concepts are problematic. Milton Friedman, Nobel laureate and eminent economist, explains to Bakan that because of corporations’ mandate to make profit, corporate social responsibility can only be tolerated “when it is insincere” — that is when it is treated as a means to make more money for shareholders. (32-34) Bakan uses the Enron fiasco to illustrate the wide gap between Enron’s public commitment to “social responsibility” and its actual operations. Enron “collapsed under the weight of its executives’ greed, hubris, and criminality.” (58)

Bakan scoffs at the idea of corporate self-regulation. “No one would seriously suggest that individuals should regulate themselves, that laws against murder, as-
sault and theft are unnecessary because people are socially responsible. Yet oddly, we are asked to believe that corporate persons — institutional psychopaths who lack any sense of moral conviction and who have the power and motivation to cause harm and devastation ... should be left free to govern themselves.” (110)

Bakan reminds us that “regulations are designed to force corporations to internalize — i.e., pay for — costs that they would otherwise externalize onto society and the environment.... Deregulation is a form of dedemocratization ...”(149-150) Yet both Bakan and Glasbeek illustrate how governments trip over each other in a “race to the bottom,” wooing corporations by removing or softening regulations, and censoring themselves from introducing new regulations to protect the public interest.

Both Glasbeek and Bakan concentrate on the harm that corporations do. Robert Monks, a businessman who helped reform and run many Fortune 500 companies, explains to Bakan that “the corporation ... is an externalizing machine, in the same way that a shark is a killing machine” and that this makes it “potentially very, very damaging to society.” (20) In externalizing their costs, corporations harm others and the environment, with little regard for the effect of doing so. They are accountable only to their shareholders. Yet, as we’ve seen with recent scandals, even shareholders get hurt.

Both authors review the reasons for the tendency of corporations to habitually commit deviant acts. Glasbeek argues that large publicly traded corporations are prone to deviance because of their intricate organizational structure, which can lead to a lack of oversight especially in higher management. Corporations also commit deviant acts because they know that they will not suffer very serious consequences for their misdeeds. Corporate deviance is rarely criminalized, instead being redefined in ways that avoid stigma. The attitude in North American society is that corporations are risk-takers and their harmful acts, even when they cause injury and death, are morally neutral. Bakan and Glasbeek’s review of the number of cases where no criminal charges were laid (even though the employers knew the harm that they were causing) is sobering. This sends a message that corporations will not be held accountable for the harm that they do — that they are beyond the law.

But the authors also trace the history of opposition to undemocratic corporate rule. Bakan provides historical accounts of constraints on corporate power such as full liability for shareholders, the outlawing of corporations, the revoking of corporate charters, and Roosevelt’s New Deal during the 1930s, which introduced regulatory laws and more government control of large corporations and banks.

Glasbeek and Bakan discuss the growing backlash against globalization, neoliberal politics, deregulation, and privatization. As corporate scandals grow, so too does the anger towards corporations. Both authors evaluate suggestions for curbing corporations’ powers and disciplining their wrongdoings. These suggestions include improving the regulatory system, strengthening political democracy (inside corporations as well), creating a robust public sphere, and challenging international neoliberalism.

Both Glasbeek and Bakan feel that there is a struggle in present-day society between two visions of the political economy that influence policy making: one that views economic development as a tool to provide for human needs, and the other that sees economic growth as an end in itself. This is a struggle between democracy and neoliberalism. Both authors feel an urgency to bring corporations under democratic control and to ensure that they serve the public interest. Glasbeek wants Canadians to realize that there are two governments: the permanent one made up of corporations and their “cheer-leaders” and the provisional government that controls very little. He urges readers to expose corporations and to remove the
structures that hide them from the financial and moral duties that ordinary Canadians have, and to humanize society.

Glasbeek’s heart lies with the workers, and he promotes the idea of giving workers more say in corporate decision-making, as in Western European countries. He points to the German model of “industrial democracy” as an alternative model of corporate governance that places more emphasis on protecting and respecting workers.

For anyone interested in corporate influence, deviance, and crime, I highly recommend both books. For the neophyte, it is best to begin with Bakan, who provides a basic understanding of the corporation and legal jargon. Glasbeek provides a lot more breadth on these topics. While he focuses on Canada, he also weaves in a rich array of examples from Britain, Western Europe, and Australia. Glasbeek wears his heart on his sleeve. It is evident that he is truly concerned about occupational health and safety and that he has dealt with too many cases of injured and sick workers over the years. Both authors seek solutions to the current situation where there is too much harm to workers, consumers, and the environment.

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MICHAEL YATES was an economist teaching at the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown. He advocated a socialist view of economics both to critique mainstream economics and to advance an alternative analysis to his discipline in an effort to query what could be done to make this a better world. From my understanding he pursued these aims in ways that go well beyond the career courses of Economics professors. He advocated a radical alter-native to the discipline, travelled miles every week to bring his alternative to students who were literally distant from main urban centres, and brought his alternative to groups of traditional working-class organizations. He has deep personal roots in this class both in terms of his own family and the family he married into. It is also my understanding that he retired early as the frustrations of a somewhat changed academia became just too annoying. The author of a number of previous books (and many articles) including the important work Why Unions Matter, he has since become an Associate Editor of the independent socialist journal Monthly Review, which has published his latest effort.

In 1964 Monthly Review Press published Capitalism As A System by the prominent African-American sociologist Oliver C. Cox. It can be reasonably argued that Cox has never received enough credit for his contribution to the emergence of world systems theory. That aside, Cox wrote then: “In this book, I want to show that capitalism, as a system of societies, is characterized by a definable order and structure which not only differentiates it from other social systems, but also determines and limits interactions of persons within its reach. It is an illusion that capitalism gives businessmen unlimited freedom to plan and dispose of resources at will.... I use ‘system’ mainly to denote the international order, and ‘society’ to refer to the internal organization of the national units. It should be clear that there can be no capitalist nation outside the capitalist system. And the sequence of motivation has been predominantly from system to society: the internal societal organization seems to depend upon demands and imperatives arising chiefly from a play of circumstances peculiar to the system.” (ix-x)

Cox’s “entry point” is more “global” in nature than that of Yates but both emphasize the interrelations of society’s institutions and the crucial importance of a truly inter-disciplinary approach. In 1972
economists Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas Weisskopf published an edited book titled *The Capitalist System* which contained a collection of readings identified as (the new) political economy drawing on radical (socialist) economics in many areas but integrating material from the other social sciences into the analysis. It was an attempt by economists to draw on all sorts of “leftist” social scientific research in order to comprehend the current state of capitalism as a system and at the international, national, regional, political, social, cultural, and psychological levels. Two updated editions were subsequently published in 1978 and 1986, and while all three were important contributions to providing people access to modern political economy and to how capitalism as a system works, their emphasis was still more economic than social and more political than cultural. Nonetheless, they did not get bogged down in terms of debates about “mode-of-production” rather than “system” and “social formation” rather than system. The point is that Yates carries on with this “systems” approach and the making of an attempt to reach an audience beyond Marxist intellectuals.

The “system” that Yates is “naming” is this very capitalist system alluded to. Yates takes a socialist political economy approach to his presentation and, to some degree, an interdisciplinary approach. His emphasis, however, is on the discipline of economics and to a lesser degree on the disciplines of political science and history. The other social science disciplines and the humanities receive lesser attention. A large part of his objective is to: criticize capitalism as a system and in whatever era; criticize economic theory which has celebrated capitalism both in the past (neo-classical economic theory) and currently (neo-classical/neo-liberal economic theory); and address the record of capitalism in the past and currently at the levels of the global economy, the national economy, and the local economy—and all in less than 300 pages. Yates mobilizes both theoretically and empirically-based critiques and evidence in carrying out his objective; and in large measure he succeeds. His book is well-written and, thus, readily accessible to virtually anyone reading it with many key concepts defined, explained, and exemplified. There are times when the analysis is oversimplified and not obvious to a reader somewhat not well-versed in the issues and topics he raises and deals with. The book seems to be a “primer” in the area of contemporary socialist political economy. Nonetheless, as I will suggest later, I remain unclear what audience this book was directed at and what role the author and publishers saw it playing at the present time.

Among the many tasks Yates has undertaken is one which could be described as a “primer” in the political-economic theory of Karl Marx. The basics of Marx are clearly laid out although there are other works which have already done this (Pierre Jalee, Ben Fine, Ernest Mandel to identify a few), and others who have done this at a higher level (Paul Sweezy and Ernest Mandel). His connections of Marx’s classic theory to more contemporary Marxist political-economic theory are laudable but wouldn’t necessarily be clear to those unfamiliar with these works (Baran and Sweezy, Magdoff, and Foster among others). Yates’ presentations and examples in this area are useful and his deeper criticism of neo-classical economic theory is clear and worthy. His identification of capitalism’s generation of various (inter-related) inequalities is important and he provides empirical evidence of those connections. His identification of the consequences of those inequalities is limited given the available research, and this is where the research from other social sciences would have been useful. Yates also extends Marx’s discussion of the capital-labour, employer-employee relationship which entails both exploitation and alienation. The extension moves into the area discussed by Braverman and provides good exam-
ples of the daily issues experienced by labour in this day and age. Yates also provides a thorough discussion of labour production at the global level with some important emphasis on the position of women. Based on this he also identifies some of the important oppositional forces at work in the anti-globalization movement. On the other hand, such analyses and criticisms are many and some have been done by those closely associated with *Monthly Review*, i.e. William K. Tabb. Such a comment does not negate some of the useful material Yates identifies but it does raise further questions as to what the purpose of this book is.

There are, it seems to me, two major flaws to this work and they are interconnected. I have alluded to the first several times and that is what audience this text is attempting to reach, i.e. undergraduates in academia and/or the more general public. The identified problems so far have to do with what knowledge the reader already brings to a reading of this work and what discussions and debates it would raise which, in turn, depends on whether the reader is simply an individual or has involvement in a group which is prepared to engage in "exchanges." Such an exchange is undermined by the second flaw and that is Yates’s identification throughout of the Soviet Union and its "satellites" as "socialist." All too often Yates is rather defensive in his identification of the Soviet Union as a place of "actually existing socialism" (there is the odd qualification to this in the book), and such an identification places socialists in the untenable position of trying to explain something that wasn’t actually true. Yates’s argument becomes even more mysterious given the fact that for decades the editors of *Monthly Review* have been highly critical of the former Soviet Union and have presented a cogent analysis as to why Eastern Europe wasn’t close to being socialist in any Marxian sense of that term. Beyond the falsity of Yates’s position here is the very practical politics of socialists being forced into the Soviet box, especially in this era. It is hard to recommend (or assign) such a book whose credibility will probably fall on this score alone.

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ACADEMIC INTEREST in the role of third-sector economic development has been growing since the 1980s. This book is an up-to-date survey of the sector in the US and a critical analysis of the issues facing its future development. The book is a broad study of American social entrepreneurship carried on by community groups, labour unions, co-operatives, and religious organizations as they seek to create economic activity to meet needs that neither the private nor public sectors are willing or able to do. Currently 65 per cent of the US economy is under the private or first sector, 25 per cent is in the second or public sector, and only 10 per cent is in the social/nonprofit or third sector. (31)

The author, Christopher Gunn, is a professor of economics at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and the author of *Workers’ Self-Management in the United States*. Gunn acknowledges that the third sector is relatively unknown to the American public because of the promotion and glorification of the private sector and capitalist globalization that has dominated that country’s media since the Reagan era. While various beneficial theories of capitalist development are mouthed constantly in public discourse, the role of the third sector in economic development is not discussed. But Gunn points out that “many a community is not being served well by the global economy.” (8) In fact individual Americans and their communities are victims of globalization. While
the loss of manufacturing plants and jobs to developing countries is well-known, the new arena for outsourcing jobs offshore is the white-collar service sector. A recent estimate is that 3 million American white-collar positions will move overseas between 2005 and 2015. This scenario would indicate that the demand for third sector intervention would only increase.

The sector has grown substantially because of the loss of manufacturing jobs and the offloading of social services by the public sector. Health, education, and culture are the three main areas of non-profit activity. Even with only 10 per cent of the American economy, the sector is substantial. Private foundations, which are a source of funding, have over $300 billion in assets. (28) “The sector’s historic mission,” Gunn writes, “has been to fill the cracks and repair the damage.” (44) It looks like there is a lot more damage to come as large numbers of white collar jobs are moved offshore.

Gunn describes the American economy as one of “uneven development” in which income distribution is becoming increasingly unequal and class divisions have grown. (47) While the third sector tries to address these imbalances, it does so sporadically. The 25 case studies which he provides reflect the extraordinary diversity of the sector — all sorts of enterprises from the highly successful Dakota Growers Pasta Company to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. He measures each case against five criteria: creation and retention of surpluses, provision of jobs with living wages, environmental sustainability, linkages and spin-offs, and the meeting of basic needs. As “alternative institutions of accumulation” he views third-sector enterprises as engines of economic growth that could do more to democratize and revitalize beleaguered parts of the economy and disadvantaged regions and cities. What he regrets most is that the sector has not developed “larger-scale applications,” which would allow development at “a meaningful level.” (183)

The obstacles to a more prominent role for the sector are numerous. First, most of these projects are locally-based. There is little driving them to create national solutions. He considers co-operatives as having the most potential for growth, but he is right to say that only a change in American political discourse can create a climate for third sector development on a scale that would matter. The American emphasis on the private sector, the limited nature of the American public sector (primarily civil service and military-oriented), and the lack of internal linkages within the social sector itself indicate that moving to a new level of influence would probably require a major economic crisis.

This book is a valuable survey filled with useful information and informed analysis with critical insights. But it speaks almost completely to a national American audience. It is written for Americans and deals specifically with their situation. Because of Gunn’s belief in the third sector as an important economic engine, non-American readers need access to comparative material so they can understand the importance of the third sector in their countries and how that environment relates to Gunn’s America. In Canada, for example, the social sector is also a distant third in terms of economic impact, though Canada’s co-operative sector is well-developed in certain regions of the country. Canada’s public sector plays a greater role in health and education than the public sector does in the US, where military spending and private health care give it a different profile. Canadian community economic development also has strong links to the Canadian state, as do the First Nations territories, whose economic needs are significant. If the third sector is to play a fundamental rather than a marginal role nationally in Canada or even the US, then it must be part of a global economic movement that creates a change of consciousness about economic development. Only a crisis in global capitalism could
put something so different on the historical agenda and then only with significant government and public input.

At the end of his book Gunn suggests that the power of the anti-globalization, anti-capitalist movements of the past decade may be the seedbed of a renewed interest in the third sector and its role. But there is a debate between those who support a strengthening of the public sector as an answer to privatization and those, like Gunn, who prefer the social sector. What we need to realize is that the social sector has been part of developed economies for some time. Like the other two sectors, it competes for resources and status, but it operates at its best when the two large sectors leave it more or less to its own devices. Whenever the private or the public sector want to move in on the social sector there is little to stop them. Ideologically, financially, and politically they have much deeper pockets than does the social sector. As long as the sector remains marginalized in the economy it will be allowed to continue its role. Should it ever rise to challenge the other sectors, we will be witnessing a social, economic, and political revolution. Gunn’s study of the sector in the US describes a situation that is non-revolutionary.

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