Ian McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Re-thinking Canada’s Left History (Toronto: Between the Lines 2005)

THE PRESENT POLITICAL conjuncture in Canada is not one of optimism and inspiration on the Left. The promising upsurge of activism that began after the “Battle of Seattle” subsided after 9/11 and the large anti-war protests of 2003 did not reignite it. Opposition to neoliberalism and war persists, but (except in Quebec) it is mostly diffused and inactive.

It is in this inauspicious moment that Ian McKay’s Rebels, Reds, Radicals appears. A compact paperback, its contents are anything but diminutive. This is a book brimming with big ideas about the history of the Canadian Left that raises issues about the nature of the Left itself. It is also an introduction to Realms of Freedom, McKay’s forthcoming multi-volume history of the Canadian Left, an ambitious work that, on the evidence provided by this book and other writings, will be a very important contribution. The series in which Rebels, Reds, Radicals is the first title, Provocations (“concise works advancing broad arguments, written by authors deeply immersed in their fields”), is a valuable project of Between the Lines.

Rebels, Reds, Radicals is not a history of the Canadian Left, although its final chapter, “Mapping the Canadian Movement,” offers a sketch of this history as McKay sees it. Rather, the bulk of the book presents an original theoretical perspective on the Left, the liberal order it has opposed (here McKay draws on his “The Liberal Order Framework” published in Canadian Historical Review in 2000), and how to conceptualize the Left historically.

The opening pages of Rebels, Reds, Radicals make it very clear that this is not a study of the history of the Left considered as something separate from the urgent concerns of many Canadian readers in the early 21st century: ecological crisis, social inequality, HIV/AIDS, the hollowness of life in a society of all-pervasive commodification. McKay makes the case that these and other affronts to humanity are interconnected social phenomena that, contrary to the neoliberal mantra that “There is No Alternative,” can be changed. “To be a leftist means thinking that human beings could organize themselves in such a way that these evils would be at least diminished if not ultimately eliminated.” (7) He sees leftists as involved in the struggles of their times and projecting what he calls, following Zygmunt Bauman, concrete utopias, “thought-experiments in living otherwise,” (7) and proposing how these possibilities could be achieved. He then turns to Marx, with a discussion of Marx’s idea of the “realm of freedom.” Marx, he suggests, has been important to every significant section of the Canadian Left since the 1890s, with the meaning of “Marx” shifting as leftists in different periods have engaged with his ideas, so that “Marx” is best thought of “as a dynamic and changing cultural code.” (15) From his reading of Marx, McKay derives a concept of realms of freedom as “a way of
understanding and extending the democratic spaces that we are able to experience in the daily world” (17) in capitalist society. These spaces are often small, but when they are larger they cause people to ask profound questions about society. Viewing the history of the Left as a history of people creating such spaces of freedom is part of McKay’s alternative to the dominant idea that the Left is “the dead, unalmented pipe dream of the twentieth century” (23) and to what he calls the sectarian and sentimental or scorecard approach to the history of the Left, in which writers defend the correctness of a particular political tendency. Instead of these two perspectives, McKay argues for a respectful, sympathetic, and critical treatment of all left-wing currents, with the Left understood as “those pushing for radical democracy.” (25) McKay writes that most but not all leftists have been socialists, and refuses to engage in disputes about which was “real” socialism or Marxism, writing that political “species” are not “fixed essences” (34) across time, so that, for example, Communist politics in 1921 were not identical to Communist politics in 1935. The history of the Left should be understood as “related to and informed by working-class history” (39) but always distinct from it, just as class is but one of many paths to the Left.

Central to the perspective presented in Rebels, Reds, Radicals is a conceptualization of “the peculiarities of Canada itself” (50) as a highly successful liberal order; the latter should not be confused with capitalism, since political rule in capitalist societies need not be liberal. A Gramscian notion of hegemony as a deep process is important for McKay, for whom liberal order provides a way of understanding the nature of hegemony in Canada.

Rebels, Reds, Radicals proposes writing the history of the Left not to produce syntheses but to carry out reconnaissances that will reveal “little-explored realities” and “help a re-emergent Canadian Left see its history more clearly and define its present more strategically.” (83) Key concepts for reconnaissance include matrix-events that rattle hegemony, moments of refusal, and superseder when realms of freedom open up, moments of systematization that follow them, and, emerging from these, Left formations. These formations are new mass collective subjects, each of which is composed of formal and informal organizations and a distinctive politics and cultural field. Reconnaissance entails the comprehension of “how each worked as a system of thought and structure of activism for the people involved in it.” (130) A formation’s degree of success can then be evaluated in terms of “the long-term structural changes” in liberal order “that can plausibly be traced back” (79) to it.

The book’s final chapter presents the formations of Canadian Left history — social evolutionaries (c. 1890-1919), mostly-Communist revolutionaries (c. 1917-1939), radical planners (c. 1935-1970), the New Left (c. 1965-1980) and socialist feminism (c. 1967-1990), with a sixth formation of global justice currently in emergence — followed by a few pages on the NDP. It concludes with a salutation to the Canadian Left as “one of the most impressive progressive forces in the world.” (216) Rebels, Reds, Radicals is one of the most thought-provoking works written about the Left in recent years and unquestionably the most challenging theorization of the Canadian Left to date. It is written in a lucid style, with verve. It has many highly commendable features that deserve emulation. These include the decision to write for a broad audience, an appreciation of the need for theoretical development, an undisguised and passionate commitment to Left politics and to intellectually rigorous, anti-dogmatic investigation that sheds new light on Left histories and yields “knowledge for a political purpose,” (83) a rejection of writing histories of political currents structured by assumptions of continuity, a recognition of the diversity (in the genuine sense, not the liberal multiculturalist
meaning) of who was and is the Left, and attention to the specificities of Canada and Quebec. Rebels, Reds, Radicals contains many suggestive insights about Left history, and will leave readers eager for the arrival of Realms of Freedom.

Yet this praise must also be tempered with major reservations, for Rebels, Reds, Radicals is also a problematic and frustrating work. I will register seven concerns. First, it is not essentialist to note that the concepts of the Left and socialism used are inadequate and not clearly distinguished. To include recognition of “capitalism’s injustice” and “the need for social transformation” (32) in the ideas that make one a leftist excludes moderate leftists who do not accept either. If we say that the Left is “those pushing for radical democracy,” (25) what of leftists who dreamed of creating a society along the lines of the USSR, China, or another Stalinist state? The problem is also visible in the identification of the fifth Canadian Left formation as socialist feminism; I would argue this was a Left feminism many of whose participants were socialists of one kind or another.

Second, the relationship between liberal order and capitalism is unclear and the strong emphasis on the former is questionable. McKay at one point (82) suggests that the liberal order is political and capitalism economic, but the very existence of separate political and economic spheres is a feature of capitalism and both need to be theorized as specifically capitalist. A related third point is that the book barely touches on who it is that exercises hegemony in Canada; pursuing this would lead to the issue of the dominant class and its many forms of rule.

The concept of Left formation has promise, despite its echo of Foucauldian archaeology. That said, my fourth concern is that it is not clear from Rebels, Reds, Radicals how the relationship between a Left formation and the class(es) and other social groups in which it is located or in which it seeks to root itself will be addressed. It is problematic to neglect the social-historical in favour of the political-cultural dimensions of the Left’s history, and to understand a Left formation we need to analyse its actual activities in the paid workplace, community, and household realms.

Fifth, I believe that evaluating the success of a Left formation only in terms of its effects on liberal order is a deeply flawed approach because it implicitly limits the Left’s horizons to altering this order. This has unfortunate implications for Left renewal today, at least for anyone who believes that it is absolutely crucial for humanity that we pose the question of whether capitalism and the forms of oppression interwoven with it can be overcome. This stance of Rebels, Reds, Radicals is connected to its social theory. All historical writing involves social theory (implicit or explicit conceptions about humans and their social contexts). In this case there seems to be an agnosticism about the sources of social power in liberal capitalist societies and, consequently, a refusal to draw theoretical conclusions from careful historical study about the possibility of progressive anti-capitalist change and about what kind of left-wing activity is most likely to win gains within such societies (I do not mean to suggest that Rebels, Reds, Radicals has no political orientation: it opts for a “war of position” perspective inspired by a reading of Gramsci). This agnosticism and refusal will greatly weaken the ability of histories informed by this perspective to contribute to Left renewal.

Although theorists can be read in many ways, what is written places limits on defensible interpretations, and my sixth concern is with how McKay reads Marx (and, to a lesser extent, Gramsci). One example is “realm of freedom.” In quoting the passage on this from Capital, McKay omits its concluding sentence, which makes it plain that Marx saw the realm of freedom as beginning outside the sphere of necessary work (even if revolutionized), and thus as something quite different from McKay’s term “realm of free-
dom.” Similarly, in the Communist Manifesto the gravediggers of capitalism are the working class, and not “radical activists and critics.” (96) The point is not that one must accept Marx’s (or anyone else’s) concepts, but that they deserve to be treated more carefully.

Finally, outside the central argument of Rebels, Reds, Radicals there are a host of interpretations and judgements that are highly debatable, ranging from the description of consumption choices as “small-scale acts of resistance” (20) to the concluding claim about the importance of the Canadian Left in global perspective. And “Nancy Ritchie” (209) is an amalgam of the names of two different union women.

It has been a long time since I read anything that made me think about the Left as a historical phenomenon in the way Rebels, Reds, Radicals did. The importance of what this book sets out to do demands that it be read in Canada and beyond, with careful attention to its accomplishments and weaknesses.

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Bill Waiser, All Hell Can’t Stop Us: The On-to-Ottawa Trek and the Regina Riot (Calgary: Fifth House 2003)

THE ON-TO-OTTAWA TREK and the Regina Riot symbolize the extreme ruthlessness of the Canadian state’s response to the unemployment crisis of the Great Depression. Government and police officials, taking their cue from Prime Minister R.B. Bennett and his bourgeois supporters, conveniently characterized the joblessness of the period as largely the fault of the victims and charged that those who organized the unemployed to demand a political solution to the problem were communists.

While the general story of the trek and its violent termination in Regina on Dominion Day, 1935, is well known, Bill Waiser provides the first substantial history of those events in this compelling and well-written narrative. Starting with the organizing among relief-camp workers in British Columbia, Waiser follows the trekkers through the Vancouver demonstrations that marked the beginning of the trek to events in Regina between their arrival in the city on 15 June and their departure in early July. He also provides a valuable discussion of the trekker trials and the Saskatchewan government commission of inquiry into the trek.

The main strength of All Hell Can’t Stop Us is the detailed discussion of events in Regina while the trekkers were in the city and of the legal aftermath of the police riot that broke up a peaceful meeting. Making extensive use of the Regina Riot Inquiry Commission files and RCMP papers, Waiser shows that the trekkers were disciplined and orderly while their leaders made reasonable proposals to leave Regina. Federal government and police authorities, however, were intent on a showdown to the point of engaging in an irresponsible and unnecessary provocation that resulted in the riot and the loss of two lives (trekker Paul Schaack, Waiser tells us, died of injuries sustained in the riot, in addition to Regina police detective Charles Millar).

While the federal government and the RCMP were unrestrained in their desire to violently repress the trekkers, Waiser does reveal how James Gardiner’s provincial Liberal government was relatively sympathetic to their plight and was negotiating with their leaders up to and including the evening of 1 July when the police riot began. In the aftermath of the riot, and largely to embarrass the federal Bennett government, Gardiner appointed the commission of inquiry that has provided so much of Waiser’s primary material. Alas, there were limits to the extent of legal liberalism in the 1930s when the rights of workers and the unemployed were involved. The commissioners, who were members of the Saskatchewan legal establishment, concluded that the RCMP
and the Regina city police were entirely justified in their actions.

Waiser also shows the degree to which the citizens of Regina supported the trekkers through donations of food and money, sympathetic statements, and attendance at supportive rallies. This did not happen spontaneously, however, and a further strength of the book is the story it tells of the broad coalition of citizens who formed the Citizens’ Emergency Committee to support the trekkers and the subsequent Citizens’ Defence Committee to aid in the legal defence of those charged as a result of the police riot.

Waiser’s rich and detailed narrative touches on a number of theoretical and conceptual issues including state responses to economic crisis, police repression of dissent, organizing the unemployed, coalitions to support workers and the unemployed, and crowd behaviour. While the book’s footnotes contain references to some Canadian and non-Canadian literature on these matters, the book would have been greatly enriched by situating the Canadian and Regina story in a broader context. How does this case study compare with similar stories in other countries during the thirties and in other time periods? How might those experiences help us to better understand the story that Waiser tells? All Hell Can’t Stop Us does not answer these questions, but it is nonetheless a valuable contribution to our understanding of unemployed organizing and police repression in Canada.

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WHAT HAPPENS at home when men go to war? Well, women sleep alone and children rest unfathered but women and children and dependent parents can also go unfed, unclothed, and unsheltered in an economic system that skews property control and definition of wage-worthiness along gender lines. Under a system of compulsory service and even under one relying on reservists, this is an egregious insult perpetrated by the government. Under a system of volunteer service, the men who would be soldiers share in the insult. Eleanor Roosevelt insisted that one could nullify an insult by refusing to take it. From a rich and powerful family, no matter her good will and good work, Mrs. Roosevelt could have little idea of how powerless the powerless can be.

This book has nothing to do with Eleanor Roosevelt. It has to do with the fight for, creation of, and seeing through of a system of relief for Canadians left to fend for themselves when their designated breadwinners went off to engage in that terrible lapse in human judgement, World War I. Even if one takes as gospel that the prevailing spirit was that it would all be over in a few weeks, there is an unseemliness about the haste with which men who had accepted the obligations that underlay their claims to economic favouritism let those obligations drop. The beginning of Morton’s book relates stories of Canadian, British, and foreign reservists answering the call of the fight in much the same spirit as Jack London’s men’s men answered the call of the wild. True, soldiering was paid work and, true, systems could be put in place to siphon off subsistence for dependents but the reality was that the money was never enough, did not flow smoothly and did not always get to those entitled to it.

This is a book about the establishment of a national bureaucracy that has morphed into our current systems of social welfare. In style, it inhabits the world of political history. Prominence of place is given to those who can be named. From the top, the names are those of politically and socially active men and of socially active women. From the bottom, the names are of those who show up in the records of the top group. Morton chooses the cast of
the former according to their performance within the power grid; he chooses the latter according to the didactic value or human interest of their situation. This is not a book of numbers and generalizations; it is a book based firmly in the theory that some individuals make history and others experience the making of it.

The Canadian Patriotic Fund had as its slogan the phrase, “Fight or Pay,” the idea being those who did the first deserved to have their systemic obligations shouldered by those who didn’t. It was a charity that wanted to avoid characterization as such, only partially because it wanted to inspire donors’ patriotism, not their pity. There were other compelling reasons to avoid the word “charity.” Necessity for charity is a sign that a society is not doing too well. At a time when spirits needed to be kept up, it was a stigma that seemed unaffordable. Charity was something that went to society’s failures, a designation at odds with the story the nation told itself about families doing their bit back home for their heroes. And then there was the idea that charity was naturally debilitating, that people got used to it and never got off it, and that this was not only unfair but dangerous. Bald social inequity spawns dissent and even revolution. Those who would remain in power needed to do something about it. The Patriotic Fund was launched in a world very aware that it must negotiate a solution that gave just enough to ward off change, not to be a change. The control mechanisms necessary to accomplishing this are still with us.

So is the split between the women who can find a crack in the façade of patriarchy to make individual gains and the women who cannot and perforce fall under the overarching control not only of men but increasingly, gallingly, of other women. Morton establishes clearly that the Patriotic Fund gave Helen Reid, one of the first women graduates from McGill, a wonderful opportunity to advance her own career. Seeing as part of her job was the offering of the “alms of good advice,” she must have been resented highly by women who found themselves stripped of help from government aid for insurrections so slight as taking in a male boarder to make ends meet. And of course women who could not prove legal marriage were left to lie in the beds they made. There is much work to be done on the quite justified resentment many women have for feminism, a movement in which I include myself. Historians have certainly laid the groundwork for this. What is needed is the political will to face the victimization of women by women, not by particular women like Reid but in the general abandonment of the feminine aspect undertaken by women who seek power within the patriarchal system, again myself included.

Morton’s work here is supported by extensive research. His work is always meticulous and I have no reason to think it anything but bad luck that, in leafing through, I found almost immediately an error in fact that I could only identify because I had just been sent a manuscript for
the series I edit that explores one long forgotten and undeservedly obscure woman’s life for the very first time. Morton would only have been able to identify her through sources that would hardly have cared to be precise. His work here exposes many women’s stories to public view and historical scrutiny. I would suggest it to students looking for ideas for a thesis topic. I also recommend it to historians of women, historians of social structures and, not least of all, to military historians who sometimes forget to factor into their calculations the role women and children play in war.

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Xiaobei Chen, Tending the Gardens of Citizenship: Child Saving in Toronto 1880s-1920s (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005)

XIAOBEI CHEN provides a “Foucauldian historical sociology of child protection” (7) during a 50-year period in Toronto ending with the Great Depression. But her concern is as much to compare child protection ideas as they emerged from that period with child protection ideas today as to trace the history of that earlier period. Following in Foucault’s footsteps, Chen provides a detailed discursive analysis of a relatively small number of issues and “texts” to construct a meta-narrative about a particular phenomenon. Such efforts often lead to claustrophobic conclusions, which the consideration of a broader set of documents and perspectives might suggest were simply ahistorical. Happily that is not the case here. Chen adds a great deal to our understanding of the evolution of child protection in Canada. Unfortunately, however, her commitment to a particular methodology blinds her to insights that other historians in this area, some of whom she cites, of some of whom she does not, have provided, somewhat diminishing the explanatory power of her book overall.

Chen’s focus is on the Toronto Children’s Aid Society [TCAS]. The story of the Children’s Aid Societies in Ontario has been much explored by scholars, sometimes with a positive spin on J.J. Kelso and other middle-class founders, as in works by Leonard Rutman and Neil Sutherland, and more critically in works by P.T. Rooke and R.L. Schnell, and Katherine Arnup. Chen is especially interested in the hegemonic ideas about children that governed the thinking of TCAS leaders and the ways in which these ideas differ from today’s notions of “children’s rights.” She also zeroes in on the concepts of cruelty and neglect that the TCAS embodied, and how their versions of these concepts diverged from earlier understandings as well as today’s consensus.

Chen’s evaluation of the rhetoric of the child-savers of the turn of the century leads her to conclude that their favourite metaphor about their work was the garden. Like gardeners, they were tending to finicky plants which, given too much of the right sort of attention or too little, would fail to thrive. Cruelty, which meant acts that were dangerous to children, or neglect, which was usually conflated with alcoholism or poverty, would result in a child growing up in society’s garden as a defective adult, a criminal, or a wastrel. Society, from this perspective, had a right and an obligation to interfere when its little flowers were not being given the right quantities of water and sunlight. Though this often meant removing children from their homes and placing them in foster care, it also encouraged “supportive measures, such as playground facilities and Mother’s Allowances.” (147) By contrast, in recent years, an exclusive emphasis on personal safety for children has resulted in notions of individual responsibility and a diminished emphasis on collective responsibility.
Yet, as Chen recognizes, the child-savers mostly relied on home visits by a growing cadre of self-styled social experts, who produced case records that in turn became the basis for overall social policies sanctioned by charities and the state for dealing with children whose parents’ child-raising styles did not seem to make them ideal “gardeners.” This socially constructed expertise reinforced emerging bourgeois notions of correct behaviour by parents and children, and specific gender norms, serving in short as an institutional form of moral regulation.

But the intended victims of Children’s Aid, parents of modest means and/or behaviours of which middle-class moralists disapproved, proved able in part to turn the TCAS to their own advantage. The TCAS operated a shelter for neglected children, meant to shield unfortunate children from abusive parents. But, in practice, ill parents, mothers with drunken husbands, among other instances of families needing temporary help with their children, came to use the shelter as a short-term respite facility. This enraged Kelso, who panicked that gender roles were being upset when a woman, rather than being submissive to her husband, could contrive to leave her husband temporarily in order to force him to change his behaviour, secure in the knowledge that she could temporarily place her children in the care of the TCAS. (85-6) The shelter became a political hot potato for the TCAS and a source of internal, gender-based divisions. Female board members, who composed all the members of the shelter committee, called for the building of a larger shelter that would offer more privacy for the children and offer training in domestic science for girls. But the all-male finance committee rejected their request as too costly. (98-9) In the 1930s the shelter was scaled back considerably and the move to community homes and foster homes began, threatening parents who faced short-term difficulties with the complete loss of their children. The antipathy to collective residential care, which is now so entrenched that no organized movement for child shelters exists, removed “for families who were not able to care for their children for various reasons ... a facility that could be made to work for them.” (100)

By contrast, the closing of the detention room at the TCAS in 1920 demonstrated the separation that was occurring between notions of deterring criminal behaviour and protecting children from cruelty and neglect. The idea of a child-raising garden in which the right quantities of reward and punishment had to be applied was giving way to notions of protecting innocent children from harm by adults. As Chen suggests, notions that the child was innocent, as opposed to potentially being a criminal, were modern ideas rather than eternal notions about childhood.

While Chen’s comparisons of current notions about children and turn-of-the-last-century notions are interesting, they are not especially persuasive. This is particularly the case in terms of her argument that we have moved away from collective notions of responsibility towards more individualist notions. The children’s shelter and mother’s allowances aside, much of what her book reveals about the child-savers is that they focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of parents, especially mothers, who were not middle class. But she tends to downplay the issue of class. Both her bibliography and her account suggest an unawareness of Katherine Arnup’s work on child-saver advice to mothers. Arnup suggests that the well-off men and women who tried to re-educate working-class and poor mothers underestimated the knowledge of their targets. Lack of resources, rather than lack of knowledge, made them unable to fulfill the standards that the child-savers expected from all mothers. Veronica Strong-Boag’s work, cited in passing but not fully appreciated by Chen, makes a similar point, noting, for example, that women who ignored advice to have indoor plumbing, to take two week’s bed rest after giving birth, and to give each
child their own room were hardly motivated by ignorance of experts’ notions of best practices. Chen also pointedly ignores studies of the experiences of children in the courts in this period, particularly Joan Sangster’s work, which emphasizes the militant refusal of authorities to recognize any need to place more financial resources in the hands of parents as a way of deterring crime. Despite the gardening metaphors of the child-savers, they were as unwilling as more conservative elements of their social class to contemplate a real redistribution of wealth in favour of poor families.

If Chen is a touch too positive about the collectivist implications of child-saving work a century ago, she is also a touch too negative about the current state of collectivist impulses on behalf of children. Surely, the feminist campaigns for publicly subsidized childcare with the poor receiving the service free are more than a match for the earlier campaigns for mothers’ allowances. Women’s shelters, while as under-funded as children’s shelters were in their time, may not serve all the same needs as children’s shelters but do reflect a notion of collective residential care. If one limits oneself to discourse, there have been immense improvements in the position of both women and children, and Chen’s pessimism based on analysis of one thread of today’s discourse about children’s rights seems unjustified. Yet, on the whole, she is right to be pessimistic about how much has actually been achieved to give either parents or children equal chances. But such pessimism might be better grounded in a political economy than a discursive framework. Looked at in terms of discourse, for example, the 2005 federal election discussion of childcare reflected a real debate between supporters and opponents of women’s right to work. Looked at in political economy terms, it was a tokenistic debate between these two groups in which one group offered a negligible salary to mothers that might be a bonus to stay-at-home mothers while the other offered a token aid to parents requiring quality public daycare.

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IN PRO-FAMILY Politics and Fringe Parties in Canada, Chris MacKenzie draws on the experiences of the Family Coalition Party of British Columbia to explore the tensions created by the adoption of a political party form for the pursuit of social movement objectives. Although the book does consider some of the ideological dimensions of the “pro-family” movement, its primary focus is a more abstract consideration of the role of minor parties within Canada’s system of responsible government.

The book has three objectives: to recount the history of the Family Coalition Party of British Columbia; to trace the ideological roots and beliefs of the pro-family movement; and to understand the Family Coalition Party’s dual character as a party/movement. (8-9) The analysis mobilizes theoretical contributions from Inglehart’s “post-materialist” values perspective, theorizations of new social movements derived from the resource mobilization school, as well as radical democracy and political process models and mainstream analyses of Canadian political parties.

MacKenzie’s argument is multi-faceted. At his most abstract, Mackenzie asserts that the existence of minor parties with post-materialist values at their core (values such as the environment, feminism, identity, the traditional family, the non-traditional family, etc.) indicates the failure of Canada’s major parties to incorporate the growing array of voter concerns within their platforms and the inadequacy of Canada’s system of political
representation. Drawing more directly from the experiences of the Family Coalition Party, he further argues that the adoption of a political party form as a means to advance the objectives of a social movement necessarily creates tensions in the objectives and tactics of the organization. While a party must concern itself with gaining office, thus requiring a winnable platform, the ideals of the social movement are more ideologically pure, narrow, and necessarily antithetical to the aggregation of interests. Most concretely, MacKenzie asserts that the Family Coalition Party of British Columbia was doomed to languish in the political wilderness because its specific analysis of social reality (with its post-materialist, ‘lifestyle’ focus) was unpersuasive to sufficient numbers of voters, and voters operating within the context of a first past the post electoral system are unwilling to waste their ballots on protest parties. Nonetheless, the Family Coalition Party (and minor parties generally) offer “hope for democratic representation and participation in Canada.” That is, despite the fact that the major parties can no longer incorporate the range of Canadian interests, thus indicating the weakness of Canada’s electoral system, the existence of minor parties suggests that Canadians still believe that the political process does offer an opportunity to advance alternatives to current governing practices.

Perhaps the greatest strength of MacKenzie’s analysis is the even-handedness with which he treats the members of the Family Coalition Party of British Columbia. While observing their lack of political expertise and experience, he also notes the passionate commitment of the handful of people at the core of the party. MacKenzie’s capacity to reserve judgement on the policies of the pro-family movement, and the Family Coalition party more specifically, is enabled by his focus on the party/movement relationship. It is not the particularities or the implications of the pro-family movement that are under investigation in this study, but rather the obstacles and opportunities that arise for a social movement that chooses to adopt a party form in order to influence the political process. As other analyses of social movements have demonstrated, much of Canada’s democratic vibrancy is the product of a small group of passionate and committed individuals, labouring with few resources but with a (mostly) unwavering commitment to a set of principles. MacKenzie’s study provides further evidence of this observation.

For readers who are interested in political parties and in British Columbia politics, MacKenzie’s book should prove a stimulating read. Since the rise of the Family Coalition Party was intimately associated with the demise of the British Columbia Social Credit Party, MacKenzie’s analysis provides important insights into a profound alteration of British Columbia’s political landscape. His discussion of the politics surrounding the transition from Premier Vander Zalm’s leadership to that of Grace McCarthy provides an instructive demonstration of the impact a small party can have in shifting the political tide. MacKenzie observes that McCarthy’s declaration of the Social Credit Party as pro-choice immediately led to the formation of the Pro-Family Coalition around a strong pro-life position. In a subsequent by-election, the Pro-Family Coalition ran a candidate against McCarthy. As McCarthy only lost the by-election by 70 votes and the Pro-Family Coalition garnered 275 votes, McCarthy’s defeat, and ultimately the demise of Social Credit, was counted as a victory by the Family Coalition Party. Still, the capacity of the Family Coalition Party to garner electoral support was extremely limited. At its height, it only acquired 2.3 per cent of the popular vote. But again, MacKenzie finds cause for optimism. By agreeing to subsume the FCP under the banner of the Unity Party (a coalition of right-wing parties formed in 2000) while holding the new coalition to a pro-life stance, MacKenzie argues that
the Family Coalition Party was able to accommodate the competing demands of the organization's split party/movement personality and, potentially to find a broader constituency to support its political program.

The greatest portion of MacKenzie's analysis however is given over to rehearsals of the various theoretical texts with which he is engaged. If these are theories with which one is sympathetic, their elaboration in the context of the Family Coalition Party will undoubtedly prove illuminating. For this reader, however, the insistence on using the lens of post-materialist values to explain the context and shortcomings of the Family Coalition Party was singularly unpersuasive. MacKenzie asserts that the politics of the pro-family movement, whether in its American or Canadian variant, is primarily concerned with issues of lifestyle rather than basic issues of economic well-being and survival. This claim is asserted rather than proven and I would argue that it is unsustainable. Anxiety surrounding the future of the family is strongly linked to the collapse of the family wage system and to increasing economic tensions within families. Certainly pro-family advocates often insist that greed, feminist-inspired demands for women's autonomy, and rampant consumerism are to blame for this crisis, but even these explanations invoke materialist causes. Moreover, if the pro-family movement was to succeed in placing its policies on the political agenda, the results would undoubtedly have materialist consequences. How else would we describe a policy that would provide financial incentives for women to abandon paid work in the service of their children, wilfully embracing a state of economic dependency in the process? And given that most families rely on two incomes in order to sustain them, the assumption of a second job and the abandonment of all leisure for dad would certainly have material consequences for men, their families, and society generally. So, rather than explaining the lack of support for the Pro-Family movement as a result of the fact that Canadians reject these particular post-materialist values, or prefer to vote for parties that concern themselves with economic issues (note the contradiction — are we materialist or post-materialist?), it would make more sense to argue that the solutions offered by the Pro-Family Coalition to this particular set of social and economic circumstances are not viewed as credible.

Another concern I have with this analysis is the claim that this book is a study of pro-family politics in Canada. The primary location for the research is British Columbia, with some general discussion of Canadian parliamentary traditions and neoconservatism in Ontario. Alberta, a province that even has a statutory holiday in honour of the family, gets very little attention. But the most notable omission is the lack of any discussion of the province of Quebec. The fact that much of the legislation and social practices against which the pro-family movement is reacting have their origins in Quebec (the home of Henry Morgentaler, the province most proud of its progressive rights regimes surrounding same-sex couples, the highest rate of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock pregnancies in Canada) surely merits some consideration.

In the context of the terms it sets for itself, MacKenzie's study of pro-family politics has considerable merits. People with an interest in political parties, social movements, and British Columbia politics will be especially satisfied.

Lois Harder
University of Alberta


*ALMOST HOME* offers an in-depth account of the changes in long-term com-
Community care policy in Ontario proposed by three successive governments: Peterson’s Liberals, Rae’s New Democrats, and Harris’s Progressive Conservatives. Using a neo-institutional perspective the authors highlight how divergent stakeholder interests, differing societal ideas, and lack of institutional constraints allowed each government to exercise a “strong” role in shaping service delivery models for this sector. They contrast the proposed changes in service delivery for home-based care to the strikingly unchanged physician-dominated primary care system over the same time period.

Supported by stakeholder interviews and document analysis, the authors make a strong case that opportunities for system-wide changes were possible because of favourable policy circumstances. First, community-based services differ from physician and hospital services because they are not covered by the Canada Health Act (1984). Consequently it becomes possible for provincial governments to limit the availability of care without confronting the Act’s five principles: universality, comprehensiveness, reasonable access, portability of coverage, and public administration. Second, the stakeholders most impacted by service delivery in this sector struggled to mobilize because they had differing interests and they represented small organizations with limited financial resources and few paid administrative staff. Third, a “grey area” of service provision, the community long-term care system, encompasses the area of social care associated with the regular activities of daily living such as getting out of bed, taking a shower, getting dressed, eating food, going shopping, washing clothes, and maintaining a home. Ideas regarding the role and responsibility of government in these “softer services” are more ambiguous than those pertaining to medical care.

The authors also provide some important context which helps to illuminate why governments chose to focus on long-term community care. With the perceived rising demand in care due to an aging population, decreasing fiscal transfers from the federal government, rising provincial debts and deficits, each government was interested in cost containment. Community care appeared to offer a cost-effective alternative to more acute institutional care. Further this sector was considered a “patchwork quilt” of services consisting of small independent organizations in need of coordination.

Devoting each chapter to a newly elected provincial government, the authors offer a detailed account of the variation in proposed models. Peterson’s Liberals represented an attempt at incremental change. They proposed to establish Service Access Organizations [SAOs] which would oversee acute home care services, public nursing homes and community services, public nursing homes and community organizations (not-for-profit agencies which provided meals on wheels, transportation, adult day programs, and homemaking). This amalgamation of services would provide service users with one point of entry into the system. Existing organizations could become SAOs only if they were not current service providers, thereby separating the functions of assessment and provision of services. The authors emphasize that amalgamation meant placing the responsibility for service allocation under one ministry. Previously home care services were governed by the Ministry of Health and community services and placement services were governed under The Ministry of Community and Social Services. According to the authors, the SAO model would move home care services out of the OHIP envelope, effectively “mov[ing] [home care] out of the public realm into the private one of user fees and co-payments.” (91) Their argument regarding the funding impact of this decision is somewhat overstated given that home care was never a protected program like hospital-based and physician-led services. However, their analysis regarding the lack of stakeholder resistance to the proposed amalgamation provides well
substantiated support to their thesis. That the model was never realized was a product of a lost election not a mobilized community.

Rae’s NDP government envisioned a more drastic change to the system. They proposed the creation of quasi-governmental organizations which would replace existing service providers. These organizations would serve to assess, manage, and provide direct service to citizens. As a concession to existing service providers the Multi Service Agencies [MSAs] would be entitled to contract 20 per cent of services to outside agencies, preferably to not-for-profit service providers. Further, the government drafted and eventually passed the Long-Term Care Act (1994) which officially governed over community services, nursing home services, and home care services. Although the NDP did succeed in passing the legislation, they met more resistance than the Liberal government. One reason was that community organizations had formed a provincial association and had been given some funding from the government to consider alternate delivery models. Another was that for-profit and not-for-profit providers found themselves jointly opposed to these changes. The authors emphasize that divergent interests still existed among hospital-based workers and home-based workers. With pending hospital cuts, displaced hospital workers would be competing with community workers for employment in the new MSAs. They suggest that these competing interests interfered with lobbying efforts. In the end, the Long-Term Care Act was successfully passed but the MSAs were not established because the government lost the subsequent election. The authors highlight that this NDP term represents another example of a “loosely” organized policy environment. However, their analysis also provides evidence of a mobilization effort which delayed program implementation and required the government to offer concessions. More attention to the “exception” of this case may have provided useful insight into how communities can impact upon policy.

Harris’s Progressive Conservative government created and eventually implemented 43 Community Care Access Centers [CCACs]. Like the Liberal model, these organizations would broker services to service providers. However, influenced by market ideology, service contracts would be allocated based upon a system of managed competition. This would open the process to both for-profit and not-for-profit service providers who would be competing for contracts based upon a formula of best quality and best price. While labour was strongly opposed to these changes in long-term care they were occupied with other effects of Harris’s Common Sense Revolution and could not devote their full attention to the issue. Further, not-for-profit providers had little influence over this government and could not launch a successful lobby effort. Government ideology prevailed and the CCACs were eventually implemented. The retreat of the state was formalized further by government regulations which would legislate service caps on the provision of homemaking services and professional in-home services. This served to limit CCAC control over service delivery and downloaded more responsibility from the public domain into the private lives of service users and their families. The authors’ arguments are well substantiated in this case example. During the Conservative term a drastic change to the community-based system was both proposed and implemented and the authors do an excellent job of analysing how this “strong government” was enabled.

By offering this thorough analysis of the long-term community care system Particia Baranek, Raisa Deber, and Paul Williams illustrate how governments can successfully implement policy changes especially when they face “loosely” organized stakeholders and few legislative constraints. Unfortunately the authors pay much less attention to their third criteria for government-driven change: that
of divergent ideas. When they introduce their theory they highlight that Canadians are more divided on the importance of government support for “softer services” such as home meal delivery than on the right to access basic medical services. Quite possibly this divide explains the lack of institutional constraints in the area of community care. However their data analysis offers only a few sporadic comments highlighting this issue. A comprehensive analysis of this debate or lack thereof in government deliberations, the media, and at the community level may have offered more depth to their analysis.

As testament to Baranek et al.’s theory, a newly elected provincial government (Dalton McGuinty’s Liberals) has meant a revisiting of previous design decisions in community-based services. Most recently for example, Elinor Caplan was commissioned to review managed competition in Ontario. Although her report supported this system, she put forward a series of recommendations, one of which included the granting of extended contracts to organizations with “preferred status.” She also recommended a preference for not-for-profit service providers when bids are tied on all other levels. As predicted by the authors, community long-term care continues to offer governments the opportunity to follow their own ideologies and reverse decisions made by previous governments.

Overall, Almost Home is an exception ally well-researched and well-written account of the changes in community-based long-term care in Ontario over an eighteen-year period. Those interested in policy analysis or home care would benefit from reading this sophisticated book.

Tamara Sussman
University of Toronto


IT WAS IRONIC, I thought, that on the morning I sat down to read this book, news broke that the Service Employees International Union [SEIU] had decided to disaffiliate from the AFL-CIO. A “grievous insult” to the labour movement was how AFL-CIO president John Sweeney, himself a former leader of the SEIU, described the decision, adding that it “hurt the hopes of working families for a better life.” With 1.8 million members, the SEIU is America’s single largest union and had represented almost one-tenth of the AFL-CIO’s membership. Whatever else it might mean, the departure of the SEIU, along with the simultaneous departure of the Teamsters, is likely to redirect the foreseeable future of organized labour in America.

I say ironic, for Reorganizing the Rust Belt argues that the SEIU serves as a model for unions to follow as the American economy continues its shift from manufacturing to service-oriented employment. At a time when the national rate of unionization has dropped to 8 per cent, the SEIU has managed to double its own membership in a single decade. “If the labor movement is to rebound,” says author Steven Henry Lopez, “its resurgence must be built upon the conviction that organizing is always possible so long as people who work can’t afford decent health care, housing, transportation, and leisure. But whether US labor as a whole will manage to translate such a conviction into a series of innovative solutions is not a question that will be answered overnight.” (222)

How that question might be answered is the subject of this book. For two years in the late 1990s, sociologist Lopez served as an intern for a local of the SEIU that was trying to organize workers at a nursing home in Pittsburgh. This role as a “participant observer” provided him with
insights into both the problems that unions like the SEIU faced in securing members and combating employers, and also the possibilities for success. Central to the latter, and to the book itself, is the notion of “social movement unionism,” in which labour issues or grievances are recast as broader social concerns, thereby evoking support from the community in the union’s struggle against employers.

Lopez sets out his argument with admirable clarity. Why study a small group of service sector workers in the first place? Because, he argues, manufacturing jobs, the traditional base of American unionism, will continue to disappear in the face of technological substitution and global competition, whereas by their nature service sector jobs enjoy a greater fixity. “Not only do workers in nonmobile sectors have more potential leverage over employers than their counterparts in more footloose industries can muster,” argues Lopez, “but the struggles of place-specific service workers have important implications for workers in industries directly subject to capital mobility.... Until the labor movement solidifies and anchors its base in these sectors, it will not have the ability to radically change the context for organizing in manufacturing.” (xvii)

Why focus on nursing home workers in particular? Because “they are a prototypical example of the kind of low-wage, postindustrial service employment that is coming to typify Pittsburgh’s economy.” (xvii) Why Pittsburgh? Precisely because the old steel town affords the chance to view this transition from the old to the new, and to assess how unions are able to adapt to it.

Reorganizing the Rust Belt is divided into three parts. Part I analyses two union organizing campaigns at a Pittsburgh nursing home in 1997 and 1998. The first campaign failed, Lopez argues, largely because workers themselves had negative views of trade unions and because organizers failed to address this problem. “You can make your promises but they don’t mean shit to me,” one worker tells Lopez in his role as union intern. Just one year later, however, a second campaign succeeded once a change in tactics had been made. By involving rank-and-file volunteers in member-to-member campaigning — visiting the homes of workers, in many cases — organizers managed to overcome negative, stereotypical perceptions of trade unions.

Part II addresses the question of organizational legacies, the fact that union officials themselves are often reluctant to abandon established so-called “business union” ideas and practices in favour of newer, social movement unionism. Unions have to confront the limitations of their existing practices for themselves, if they are to change. Lopez looks at how two SEIU campaigns in 1996 and 1997 demonstrated to union leaders the value of building broader community alliances through social movement unionism. As a result, he concludes, “if unions can successfully deal with workers’ lived experience, they can build solidarity ... and if unions can also deal in various ways with the organizational legacies of business unionism, they can mobilize existing rank-and-file workers in struggles that link up workers across multiple work sites and with sympathetic community allies.” (154)

This leaves one final question: even if workers can be organized and unions can embrace new tactics, how can they challenge the overwhelming power of corporations in contemporary America? “For social movement unionism to be truly viable,” Lopez argues, “it must be able not only to establish but to defend and extend permanent beachheads in hitherto unorganized sectors” (154) With American labour law weighted overwhelmingly in favour of employers — for example, failing to award punitive damages in proven cases of unfair labour practices — Part III turns to the use that newly organized workers are able to make of an inherently unfriendly legal system. Reviewing a statewide fight by SEIU locals against the
private health company Megacorp Enterprises in 1995-96, Lopez once again shows that by recasting the conflict as a social, not a labour, issue, the union was able to mobilize public opposition. At the same time, the union encouraged workers to document and report as many health and safety problems as they could discover, with a view to tying up Megacorp in an endless parade of inspections. “We just tried to stay in their faces at all levels,” explains one union organizer. “We never wanted them to be able to forget about us.” (196) In the end, the union’s tactics succeeded, Megacorp agreeing to enter contract negotiations with the SEIU in May 1997. “The experience of the SEIU in the Megacorp struggle,” concludes Lopez, “suggests that by thinking about labor-management relations in a new way ... social movement unionism can deploy its forces and its efforts in a highly creative manner.” (209)

By any measure, this is an impressive and provocative book. Perhaps Lopez overstates the conceptual distinction between older business unionism and the new social movement unionism. After all, trade unions across North America engaged in community-based activism throughout the 20th century, often supporting and fighting for causes that had little directly to do with the workplace. At the same time, Lopez’s claim that any “resurgence” of labour will be fuelled by workers’ concerns about “decent health care, housing, transportation, and leisure” is to recast workers as consumers rather than producers, and thus misdirect attention from the root of their own distinct concerns.

That said, Lopez is no doubt right in his closing observation that, “The struggle to reorient American labor ... in pursuit of economic and social justice will be played out over the first few decades of the 21st century.” (222) The SEIU’s decision to abandon the AFL-CIO has probably accelerated that struggle, and Lopez’s book should serve as a valuable reference point in the years ahead.

David Bright
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MARK REUTTER’s book explores the history of the American steel industry through the story of a single mill at Sparrows Point, New Jersey. From its beginnings in 1887 to its peak as the world’s largest steel works in 1956-57 when it employed 30,000 people, to its near ruin with the bankruptcy of the Bethlehem Steel Company in 2004, molten iron flowed at this vast industrial complex. Making Steel, however, is far more than a study of a single mill in isolation. It provides a narrative history of the steel barons who built, expanded, and let wither the Sparrows Point mill and of the steel workers who toiled on the shop floor. Oral history is the glue that holds this dual narrative together.

The tidewater location of the mill on the Chesapeake Bay was perfectly situated to exploit imported iron ore from Cuba and Pennsylvanian coal. Frederick Wood designed the mill and his brother, Rufus, engineered the adjoining company town. The two men sought to “develop a centralized management that would fuse business and social life in a way that was rational, orderly, and free of any dissenting voice.” (34) In the early years, employees sweated eleven to fourteen hours a day, alternating weekly between days and nights. When shifts changed on Sundays, many worked 24 hours straight as back-to-back shifts were the norm.

Needless to say, there was no union. This changed in 1941 when the Steel Workers Organizing Committee of the CIO, with the backing of Franklin Roosevelt, forced Bethlehem Steel (which took
over the mill in World War I) to agree to a free vote. Interestingly, the issue that swung a majority behind the union was job security in the face of technological change. Bethlehem Steel had unthinkingly shifted work from the old hot mill to the new automated mill (reducing the workforce from 2,200 to 350) without any regard for seniority. Senior men found themselves demoted to general labourer in the flash of a pen. As trade unionist Mike Howard recalled of the supervised election, “you could feel this mass of men going forward and voting their true mind.” (297)

Thanks to the state of Maryland, whose motto was “Deeds are manly, words womanly,” the town site was a company town in the traditional sense of the word. The company owned the land and buildings and operated a company store. The town’s physical layout thus reflected the social hierarchy of the mill itself. The streets were lettered “A” to “K” with company officials and town notables living closest to commercial “A” street. They were separated from skilled white workers by a school and several churches located on “D” street. As this was the Jim Crow South, Black workers and their families lived across a small bridge on “H” through “K” streets or in the shanties that lay beyond the town site. Their homes were designed to be the smallest.

World War I saw Charles Schwab, the high flying head of the Bethlehem Steel Company, purchase the plant. The Sparrows Point mill would be Bethlehem’s largest. For much of the century, company managers were the best paid in America. Schwab required that all company executives live in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Reutter draws the reader into this insular world: “the officers lunched daily in the corporate dining room, occupying leather chairs with their names affixed to gold-plated plaques, and on Saturdays they socialized at the Saucon Valley Country Club.” (388)

The negative portrayal of Schwab and his associates underpins Mark Reutter’s explanation of why the company went into decline. Despite the prosperity of the immediate World War II era, and the continued expansion of the Sparrows Point mill, Bethlehem Steel failed to innovate. Because the company had no research laboratories, Bethlehem lagged behind much of the world in the adoption of new steel-making technologies. Japan, Europe, and even Canada were building basic oxygen furnaces [BOFs] in the 1950s, but Bethlehem was building yet another open hearth, the world’s largest, at Sparrows Point. The company seemed oblivious to the fact that open hearths had been rendered obsolete.

The failure to innovate was only part of the problem. Reutter makes a strong case that government protection of the US steel industry allowed it to price itself out of business. Higher steel prices in the 1940s and 1950s opened the door to steel imports on the one hand and the rise of aluminum and plastics in packaging and manufactured products on the other. Bethlehem Steel executives failed to anticipate that many of their customers would stop using steel products altogether.

The steel industry has since undergone 30 years of upheaval. Household names like Republic, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Bethlehem have vanished. Dozens of steel mills have been closed and hundreds of thousands of steelworkers have lost their jobs. The list of former steel towns that no longer produce steel is a long one. Places like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Youngstown, Ohio, have had to reinvent themselves. Sparrows Point, luckier than most, continues to operate. But its once formidable work force has been whittled down to just 3,000 employees.

Originally published in 1988, Making Steel was the culmination of years of investigative journalism into workplace accidents and pollution at Sparrows Point for the Baltimore Sun. Mark Reutter’s hard-hitting articles forced the Maryland government to fine the company. A hand-
ful of other American journalists were doing the same elsewhere. *Making Steel* thus appeared on bookstore shelves the same year as journalist John P. Hoerr produced *And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the American Steel Industry* and a few years prior to William Serrin’s *Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town*. All three books evoked the hardship and hurt prevailing in steel town USA and sharply criticized corporate and government mismanagement. Reutter is less critical of the United Steelworkers union than the other two. These three books provide a comprehensive record of industrial decline in the American steel industry.

At this juncture, we might ask what is new about the 2004 University of Illinois edition of *Making Steel*. Readers of the earlier edition will find little new material here. The author has included a new four-page foreword, inserted a short photo essay, and added one thinly researched chapter entitled “The Discarded American Worker” that brings the story up to the present. None of the other 23 chapters were revised or updated. Sadly, the author also failed to cite virtually any of the secondary scholarship published in the intervening seventeen years.

Given these minimal changes, why did the Press print a new edition? Timing seems to have played an important part in this decision. The US steel industry was in disarray during the 1990s and early 2000s. LTV and Bethlehem Steel went bankrupt and many more steelworkers were left jobless. Because Bethlehem’s pension fund was grossly under-funded, the company stopped paying benefits to its 95,000 retirees in March 2003. As Reutter states, the demise of Bethlehem Steel “seemed an appropriate time to update the book.” (464) I would have to agree. While “turnaround specialist” Wilbur Ross picked up the profitable pieces, including the Sparrows Point mill, the retirees were cast adrift. In the most expensive rescue of a private pension plan in US history, the federal government picked up the $4.3 billion tab. Ross has since sold his interest in the US steel industry for a tidy profit and has shifted his money to a steel mill in China.

And yet, there is so much more that needs to be said about the post-1988 experience of Bethlehem Steel and its treatment of past and present employees. I wish the author had more deeply investigated these final days. One only has to look at Stelco to realize that what happened to the pensions of retired US steelworkers might happen to Canadian steelworkers as well. It was only a sharp upturn in steel prices and the determined resistance of the United Steelworkers that prevented Stelco from “doing a Bethlehem” this past year. More research on the pension issue is urgently needed. Until then, the new edition of Mark Reutter’s *Making Steel* is a useful reminder that a public debate about corporate obligations to past and present employees is long overdue.

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ILEEN DEVAULT’s latest book returns to the workplace and labour stoppages in the late 19th- and early 20th-century United States. Identifying herself with the “new institutionalists” who have tried to bring the insights of a more cultural approach into the workplace, DeVault focuses our attention on 40 cross-gender strikes in four industries where there is a clear gender division of labour but also an independent production process. She examines strikes from all over the United States in the clothing, textile, boot and shoe, and tobacco industries. As she notes in her conclusion, gender and class are her primary focus in trying to understand the role of gendered experiences in the cre-
nation of national labour movements by the
turn of the century.

In her introduction DeVault clearly
explains her approach and theoretical un-
derpinnings. In addition to identifying
with the “new institutionalists” she also
credits women’s labour history and femi-
nist post-structuralism as important influ-
ences. Acknowledging that her work
builds on previous studies of gendered oc-
cupations, DeVault aims to bring a more
comparative approach to the subject of
gendered work experiences. At the same
time she examines “the ways in which the
leaders of the labor movement utilized
those gendered experiences in their at-
ttempts at the turn of the twentieth century
to bring together the first long-lasting na-
tional union movement.” (7) Using Iris
Young’s adaptation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s
concept of the “series,” De Vault analyses
how “workers manifested their gender,
race, ethnic and class identities both si-
multaneously and serially, one after an-
other.” Thus the analysis focuses not only
on events and their serial occurrence but
also on the impact of external events both in “igniting” individual consciousness of
belonging to particular categories and
subsequent actions taken. (7) In other
words categories of identity can be multi-
ple rather than one dominating the others.

While Chapter 1 introduces us to the
four industries through four strikes,
Chapter 2 tackles the Knights of Labor
providing a somewhat revisionist but not
entirely new approach to the question of
the Knights’ views of women. Focusing
on the Knights’ declining years DeVault
finds fewer positive options for women
compared to the work of Mary Blewett
(shoe workers of Lynn, Massachusetts)
and Susan Levine (carpet weavers of Phil-
adelphia). Highlighting the domestic ide-
ology of the Knights and their preoccupa-
tion with fighting the American Federa-
tion of Labor [AFL] for members,
DeVault sees the glass as half empty
rather than half full, emphasizing male
dominance and the lack of women’s
voices in strikes such as the Cohoes, New
York strike of 1887, among others. In this
reviewer’s opinion, a critical view of the
Knights needs to be more balanced with
recognition of their more “progressive”
intentions, if not results.

Chapter 3 is a key chapter because it
makes the case for the masculine nature of
the AFL’s craft unionism. DeVault exam-
ines a number of strikes that exemplify
the connection of the social construction
of skill to manhood in all four industries,
particularly in cases where mechaniza-
tion, most often associated with female,
child, and immigrant labour, threatened
to undermine the position of skilled work-
ers. The Clark thread mill strike of 1890
and the 1902 Rhode Island strike of thread
mill workers, for example, readily fit the
idea of exclusive male craft unionism
while other disputes such as the 1892 Chi-
cago boot and shoe strike do not. In the
latter case the inclusion of women in
strike activities and the women’s
militance brought victory to the workers,
suggesting that the shoe industry might be
an exception. In the case of tailors, while
the rhetoric suggested the need for equal
pay for women workers and women’s un-
ion participation, the strikes, according to
DeVault, provide evidence that the Jour-
neyman Tailors Union [JTUA] actually
followed craft union principles and de-
efined membership in the trade so nar-
rowly that most women did not qualify.
(87) A key problem for the tailors was the
portability of their work and the ambigu-
ous status of women, often relatives, who
were classed as “helpers” in an industry
that could be home-based; many in the
JTUA wanted to eliminate home work in
favour of shop-based work. The Cigar
Makers International Union faced a simi-
lar problem though the employer had
more formal control over workers and
production than the tailors did in
home-based production. The close inte-
gration of men and women workers in the
tenements and the large proportion of
women workers sometimes produced
strong challenges to gender-based craft
unionism. Eventually, however, the un-
ion members voted to deny membership to tenement house workers, as well as the Chinese, and left the question of union membership for workers on moulding machines to the local level thus eliminating the less skilled women workers. Clearly craft unionism was a complex phenomenon; yet DeVault provides a nuanced portrait that supports her argument that craft unionism spelled exclusion for women in most cases.

The remaining chapters examine ethnicity and race, geography, the role of families, and attempts to broaden the AFL. Chapter 4 on ethnicity and race is perhaps one of the weakest. DeVault points out examples in different strikes of the permutations and combinations possible when ethnicity, for example, reinforced (or weakened) class and gender ties. Her use of “ethnicity” as referring to culture and “race” as a term “for situations in which ‘ethnicity’ is not strong enough” (106) leads to confusion as does her use of the term “racial ethnicity” (110) which is never defined. In describing a short strike of 300 African American tobacco workers in North Carolina in 1898, for example, DeVault describes their “total ethnic solidarity” as an explanation for success. In trying to avoid the essentialism of racial categories DeVault has made her analysis more difficult to follow. In addition, as she notes in the conclusion, gender and class have been privileged in this study, suggesting some awareness of the weaknesses in chapter 4.

Perhaps one of the more interesting findings comes in chapter 5 where her research indicates that women, immigrants, and workers not defined as skilled play a greater role in the “industrial periphery.” Lacking close contact (or any contact) with the AFL and craft unionism, these workers identified with their own factory or industry and eschewed divisions of gender and occupation. In more heavily industrialized areas closer to the AFL, attempts to broaden the national union movement through organizations such as the National Women’s Trade Union League were largely unsuccessful; thus, DeVault argues, the AFL provided the model for all further attempts to organize working women, a model which excluded them and other workers.

United and Apart challenges readers to think more broadly about gender and class in labour disputes. While the author acknowledges that she has chosen a sample of cross-gender strikes, it is not totally clear to the reader how the choices were made. Indeed, DeVault states that the strikes are skewed toward longer strikes where more information can be found and towards failures since successful strikes left less evidence. Readers may also differ with her views of the Knights of Labor and will find chapter 4 on race and ethnicity less successful than other chapters. Finally, readers will certainly be puzzled by the decision to include extremely blurry reproductions of newspaper photos of strike activities. Nevertheless DeVault’s book deserves a careful read by labour historians.

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POPULAR IMAGES of poverty in America are typically associated with black ghettos and white trailer parks. Mexican American barrios are rarely included in images and discussions of American poverty. Scholars have not done much better. Not since the early studies of Joan Moore, Ruth Horowitz, and Martin Sanchez-Jankowski, have social scientists concerned themselves with Mexican American experiences of poverty. Anthropologist Daniel Dohan seeks to fill this void in The Price of Poverty, an impressive ethnographic study of two urban barrios in California during a two-year period (1993-1995). He begins his field-
work in Guadalupe, located in San Jose, California, populated by Mexican immigrants who work multiple jobs in the shadows of high-tech Silicon Valley. He then moves to Chávez, located in East Los Angeles, populated by long-established Mexican American residents, many who live in housing projects and face joblessness in a region that has experienced a loss of manufacturing jobs and rise of low-wage service jobs.

The problem of relying on structural forces and individual motives to explain barrio poverty, according to Dohan, is that these overlook “the role of social institutions in the creation and recreation of urban poverty in contemporary America.” (4) He identifies three “institutions of poverty” that shape the ability to generate income in the barrios. In Parts II, III, and IV, the author closely examines each institution. The first is informal social networks used in finding and holding down jobs characterized by lack of union representation, low wages, inflexible working hours, poor working conditions, and lack of benefits. The second set of institutions are local organizations that help residents participate in the informal economy and illegal activities. For those shut out of the formal economy, street corner day labour, unlicensed street vending, and selling drugs and stolen goods have become sensible and routine illicit activities among barrio residents. The final institution is the public assistance programs. When residents have experienced tragedy, bad luck, or a severe loss of income, they have sought assistance from Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] and General Assistance [GA] while at the same time negotiating the negative stigma associated with welfare.

Even though these two communities shared similar experiences with poverty, they differed in their responses and expectations. To explain why Chávez residents view job opportunities as a glass half empty and Guadalupe residents view them as half full the author relies on theories of transnational immigration and social networks. US-born Mexican Americans of Chávez who faced limited options turned to “hustling,” combining low-wage work with crime and public assistance to make ends meet. Guadalupe’s Mexican immigrants worked multiple jobs or “overworked” to send remittances “back home” and save enough money to retire in their homeland. As Dohan suggests, “Social network connections to Mexico gave the dollar a value in Guadalupe that it did not have in Chávez, where dollars were earned and spent exclusively in the United States.” (91) The negative aspects of transnational networks were the enormous demands and expectations imposed on families that took an emotional and physical toll. Remittances could also impede economic mobility over time, especially if families decided to remain in the United States.

Dohan makes an important contribution in revealing how the exploitation of Mexican immigrants has become entrenched in American society and contributed to the impoverishment of Mexican Americans. Silicon Valley employers routinely turned a blind eye to false documents and sometimes encouraged law-breaking since the responsibility rested solely on the shoulders of undocumented workers. Even jobs typically associated with immigrants were rejected by Chávez residents because they were too demeaning and “as US Mexican Americas, they should not endure those conditions.” (68) The privileges of US citizenship and the expectations of upward mobility are evident in the testimonies of Chávez residents, even though they find themselves stuck at the bottom of the economic ladder.

The author pays less attention to the racialization experiences of barrio residents. This is surprising since the author describes a racial profiling incident in which he and several Chávez residents were detained by the police for simply hanging out on the sidewalk. A few testimonies of workplace discrimination combined with a long history of strained rela-
tions between the Los Angeles Police Department and Mexican Americans in East Los Angeles could also explain why Chávez residents developed an "oppositional culture and viewed job prospects as a glass half empty."

This shortcoming aside, *The Price of Poverty* advances our understanding of how poverty is experienced in the daily lives of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americas. This fine study should be required reading not only for scholars interested in urban poverty but also for labour unions, migrant rights groups, living-wage campaigners, and public policy officials dedicated toward improving the lives of the working poor in urban America.

José M. Alamillo
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LABOUR HISTORIANS, and North American labour historians in particular, have reason to celebrate this new edition of Hutchins Hapgood’s *The Spirit of Labor*, first published in 1907. The book is a fascinating piece of history — what Hapgood calls a nonfictional “human document” (9) of the life and thought of Anton Johannsen, a militant Chicago woodworker, unionist, and anarchist in the early 20th century — as well as a very enjoyable read. It will be fun and interesting in the advanced undergraduate or graduate classroom (as David Montgomery’s blurb on the back cover reminds us), and James Barrett’s insightful introduction and helpful annotations add a great deal to the text.

For precisely these reasons, it presents a somewhat tricky reviewing problem. First, discussing the book on its own merits, as one might a contemporary scholarly work, is not really the point of the exercise, for *The Spirit of Labor* has been reissued because of its import as a historical document. Reviewing it purely on those terms would be not entirely unlike reviewing a file folder in the archives. Second, Barrett’s well-researched introduction, which contextualizes the book in terms of Hapgood’s life, and the intellectual and social milieu of the time it was written, does an excellent job of placing *The Spirit of Labor*, and suggests a useful critique.

Hapgood was a widely read radical “bohemian” New York journalist. He counted among his friends many of the more prominent social reformers and politically progressive artists of his day: Jane Addams, Clarence Darrow, Eugene O’Neill, Upton Sinclair, Lincoln Steffens, Georgia O’Keeffe — the list goes on. Like many of these intellectuals, Hapgood was a member of the upper class whose commitment to social justice led him to confront class oppression, and whose relative affluence allowed him the leisure to investigate and write about it. After publishing other intimate (and very popular) nonfictional “human documents” of the urban poor — *The Spirit of the Ghetto* (1902) and *Autobiography of a Thief* (1903) sold well — Hapgood turned his attention to the labour movement, and to Chicago, “the place where labor [was] the most riotous” (12) in the early 20th-century US. He set out to meet a particular “kind of man,” one who embodied his (highly romantic) view of the American working man. Johannsen, a German “mechanic” raised in Iowa, active in the woodworkers’ union, met the requirements with “his intellectual vigor, his free, anarchistic habit of mind, and the rough, sweet health of his personality.” (16-17)

*The Spirit of Labor* tells the story of Johannsen’s youth and years as a “tramp,” but most of the book is a detailed description, often in Johannsen’s own words, of his intellectual and political life in Chicago’s radical circles and labour movement. Hapgood’s stories of the peo-
ple and ideas of Chicago’s “anarchist salons,” unions, and district councils, and of Johannsen’s stormy relationship with both his employers and union leadership make fascinating reading. As Barrett points out in his introduction, Johannsen was not typical of his coworkers or US workers in general (xxx); nor, I would add, was he typical of those outside his class. He was, by his own account and Hapgood’s, unswervingly honest, rigidly principled, uncompromising, dynamic, eloquent, and politically savvy. He was a committed anarchist, but he embraced what he saw as necessary institutional means toward change, i.e. the union and its leadership. (275) He was a very successful and popular leader in organized labour, although he rose highest in the hierarchy in the period after Hapgood’s book was published (at the end of his life, he spent a decade as the Vice-President of the Chicago Federation of Labor).

Hapgood’s account is greatly enhanced by his reflections on his “outsider” status among the working class, for he was a sensitive writer, and a honest self-critic. At no point does he try to “sell” himself as anything other than what he was: a wealthy man whose wealth was fortuitous and unearned. This critical reflection is usually suspended in his description of what he calls the “intellectual proletariat.” He is prone to statements like “it is this being the real thing, or based upon the proletariat ... which gives them their consistency, their meaning and their eloquence. It is they who get radical ideas, instincts and hopes first hand, and have consequently that freshness of mind and of expression which springs from having come actually in contact with the material of their emotion and thought.” (324) Still, the book is no less interesting or enjoyable for Hapgood’s romanticism; in fact, it resonated much of my own (often uncritical) optimism, a readerly response that was surely among his hopes for the book.

Given the documentary force and meaning of the text, the most appropriate read a review can offer is, I think, less critical, and more suggestive. Barrett’s introduction is very helpful in this regard, for he points out not only what is notably missing from Hapgood’s story — for example, the significant role women played in Chicago’s radical circles (xlii), and the increasingly influential IWW (xliv) — but he brings up a plethora of questions that would be useful in any critical discussion about *The Spirit of Labor*: Why was the working class exceptionally radical in Chicago, and why at this moment in history (xli)? What does Hapgood’s work and life tell us about the cultural significance, and (im)permeability of class stratification in early 20th-century US (xlvi)? Alongside the original text, the questions Barrett raises make the book an exciting teaching opportunity.

Moreover, these questions, and the critical reflection they might inspire, are invaluable in today’s academy, and not merely because of the windows it might open on events past. Reading *The Spirit of Labor* is meaningful today because it exposes us not only to Hapgood’s humanity, hope, and the inevitable limits of his moral vision, but to our own as well. It forces critical and radical scholars to think through what it means to be a politicized academic or intellectual today, to be in a position of relative privilege, sharing Hapgood’s sympathy and hope, but often sharing also his self-consciously “outsider” status. Indeed, I think *The Spirit of Labor* could be paired in a seminar very profitably with Thomas Geoghegan’s *Which Side Are You On?* (New Press 2004), a much less sanguine, but equally reflective “insider/outsider” look at the labour movement in Chicago in the 1970s and 1980s. Geoghegan’s brutal honesty reasserts part of Hapgood’s legacy, nearly a century later: the undiminished importance of an intellectual openness to difficult personal and political questions — questions about the privileges accorded by class, race, citizenship (we would add gender of course; maybe more) — and to the ways in which their funda-
mental contradictions shape not only the social worlds we study, but the classroom, the archive, and the written word.

Geoff Mann
Simon Fraser University


WITH THE EXCEPTION of the pretentious word “saga” this book delivers every single thing its title promises, and is therefore highly recommended not only to historians, but to students of true crime, the law, courtroom drama, and fictional murder mysteries. Members of the first and the last of these categories are usually, for very different reasons, not much interested in true crime studies, but this is a first-rate one.

In Detroit in summer 1925 one man was killed and another wounded when a group of whites surrounded a home newly purchased by a black family. The whites threw stones and yelled what the media currently likes to describe as “racial epithets.” Anticipating trouble, a small number of Detroit policemen were on the scene and working to keep this group from attacking the house. The word “group” is used here though, as Kevin Boyle makes clear, to the blacks in the house, blacks in Detroit, blacks in America, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP], this was a white mob, prepared to act as white mobs had acted in many other American cities during the period between the two world wars. They were going to attack and kill — lynching was the preferred method, but other means were acceptable — the blacks inside. The house had been purchased by Ossian Sweet, a medical doctor who sought a home for his wife, Gladys, and his infant daughter, Iva, outside the blighted ghetto to which Detroit’s African American community was confined. As Boyle reveals him, Florida-born Sweet was both naïve in his belief that working hard would entitle him to move his small family into a decent neighbourhood, and sophisticated because he expected white resistance. The group, or mob, — Boyle has written the kind of balanced book that forces the reader to decide — was then fired upon by one or more of a group of black men Sweet had assembled inside the house to protect his home. All these men were arrested and charged with murder. Much of the book examines how they came to be charged, social, legal, and political maneuverings by both sides, and the trials — there was more than one — in which the defence was led by none other than Clarence Darrow. Darrow was then the best-known attorney in the United States, a staunch liberal and aggressive public advocate of the Negro in the United States.

Though it runs to over 300 pages, Boyle’s narrative is fast moving. Publishers’ blurbs on the back of murder mysteries often warn readers not to begin if they have to get up early the next day as they will sleep beyond the alarm clock. Much the same claim can be made for *Arc of Justice*, as Boyle literally yanks readers out of one chapter and compels them to read the next. Despite its fast pace, the book includes many informative insights and asides.

In addition to the account of the events leading to the shootings, the trials, and their aftermath, Boyle also provides a number of interesting narratives. The early history of the NAACP, the role of the local chapter in Detroit, and the role of the national organization are explained and placed in context. The NAACP had before the Supreme Court of the United States a case that if decided in the organization’s favour would have prevented racial covenants in the selling of homes. A homeowner would not have been able to place a restriction on his property to prevent it being sold to an African American. The NAACP feared that if the High Court failed to invalidate such restrictions, America’s cities would become racially
segregated. In the ideal NAACP world the Sweet case and the restrictive covenant issue would have been publicly resolved at the same time, with those charged found innocent and the Court eliminating the legal restrictions, each decision reinforcing the other. Boyle’s intermittent accounts of events at the civil rights’ organization’s headquarters are therefore understandable. So are his accounts of the rise and fall of the Ku Klux Klan in Detroit.

Historians perhaps know more of the spread of the political power and racist actions of the Klan in Indiana than in any other northern state. So Arc of Justice makes a valuable contribution by tracing the development of the KKK in the Motor City. Boyle carefully laces the actions of the Invisible Empire in the commercial, ethnic, labour, and political context of the 1920s. He also provides an understanding of the press, pointing out, for example, that it was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to handle more than one African American major story at a time. So when a New Yorker from a prominent family sued his wife for divorce on the grounds that when he married her he had not known she was a Negress, the Sweet case got little attention. As the press saw it, the white public could handle only so much reading about blacks.

There are also mini-biographies scattered about the book. Some are told in one place and their subjects never re-appear, while others have their stories interrupted, only to be resumed pages later. These biographies include, but are not limited to, the judge in the case, the lawyers on both sides, significant NAACP personnel (whether or not they held formal office), politicians (honest and crooked), policemen (ditto), Klansmen, liberals (mostly white, but not exclusively so), ministers, and artists (mostly activists, but not always so). This is not an exhaustive list. Put together it offers a clear picture of social class, among both whites and blacks in the 1920s. And it reveals, as sociologists have long argued, that while knowledge of occupation, education, and income can tell a great deal about social class, they cannot tell all.

In addition to the main narrative, other narratives, and brief biographies, Arc of Justice also includes tidbits. For example, Wilberforce University, a private black college located in Ohio began its institutional life as a grand resort hotel, Tawawa Springs, used by southern planters and the female slaves whom they made their mistresses. When the resort went broke, the planters transformed it into a school for their mulatto children, but in the 1850s it was purchased by Ohio’s (white) Methodists and established as a college for free blacks. Boyle segues into this history of Wilberforce by way of giving background on Ossian Sweet, who earned his undergraduate degree there, and there is usually a good reason for introducing the tidbits in the book.

Tidbits, biographies, sub-narratives, and central narrative all rest on solid scholarship. The notes provide proof. They demonstrate Arc of Justice uses virtually every conceivable way of getting at the early 20th century and uses the ways well. Missing only are maps. A native of Detroit, Boyle knows his city and describes it well but a few maps of Motown, especially of the neighbourhood into which Sweet moved, would have been very useful. For the paperback edition, dump the photos and replace them with maps. History and geography remain married despite the attempts of sundry historians to push the divorce. Finally, and in the best murder mystery tradition, to uncover the ultimate fate of Ossian Sweet the last sentence on the last page of Arc of Justice must be read.

Rhett S. Jones
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The New Labour history has been built around the conviction that workers have a hand in making the world around them by articulating and acting upon a collective sense of their class experiences. In *Race, Class, and Power in the Alabama Coalfields*, Brian Kelly de-emphasizes the power and possibility of workers’ agency as he argues for the necessity of, what he phrases, “bringing the employer back in.” (9) In making this argument, Kelly uses W.E.B. DuBois’s point that racism was “carefully planned” to underscore his own contention that Alabama operators were the architects of southern race hatred in the coalfields. In *Race, Class, and Power*, we learn much about the power dynamics between workers and employers and, more significant in its originality, between working-class and middle-class Blacks. Kelly has a keen ability to pen a forceful and provocative argument regarding the materialist top-down side of racism. But Kelly vacillates between ascribing to the employers of Alabama’s coal miners a monolithic power and, in turn, showing them to be a divided force (between large employers like TCI and smaller employers that were part of the Alabama Coal Operators Association). The author’s wavering leaves the reader unsure, therefore, about how much and what exactly is gained by an emphasis on “the employer.”

*Race, Class, and Power* focuses on the period between 1908 and 1920, the nadir of mining unionism in Alabama, to illustrate the operators’ hegemony in the coalfields. Crushing the interracial United Mine Workers [UMW] was both a blessing and a curse for management. Although their victory allowed them to reign supreme, the defeat forced operators to come to terms with the root cause of the industry’s weakness. Before 1908, coal mine owners blamed the union for their own inability to compete with coal companies in the North. The industry’s real problem, however, had little to do with the UMW and much more to do with operators’ failure to successfully recruit and retain a viable labour force. Operators were unwilling to pay competitive wages to southern skilled miners, many of whom left the region after the UMW’s 1908 defeat. Racist attitudes prevented them, initially, from hiring and training African American men to do skilled work. The solution, for a brief period, was immigrant labour. Immigration did not solve the labour supply problem. Kelly argues that there were two reasons for this: an inflexible bi-racial “caste system” in which operators alternated between hinting at ethnic whiteness while treating immigrants like Blacks, and the unwillingness of immigrants to remain in Alabama when better opportunities appeared elsewhere. Though his analysis could be richer and its historiographical context clearer, Kelly’s findings on the racialization of immigrant workers in the South is an important addition to labour and immigration history which has tended to focus on the in-between identity of immigrants in the urban North. Kelly suggests that because operators were unwilling to alter working conditions to keep immigrant labour in the South, and because employers understood that Jim Crow laws written for plantation exploitation would benefit them, they turned to African American workers. The cause and effect trajectory that Kelly assumes regarding the use of Blacks to mine coal is interesting. Kelly’s assumption on this point seems rather speculative as the author provides no chronological markers and only paltry evidence to prove his suggestion that employers were not simultaneously trying to exploit immigrant and African American labour.

Regardless, once Blacks made up a significant portion of the mining labour force in the state, their presence in the coalfields reshaped relations between working-class and middle-class Blacks. It is in this analysis which includes the
intra-racial conflict within Alabama’s African American community and the interracial connections between Birmingham’s Black and white elites that Race, Class, and Power makes its most significant contribution to the field. Kelly argues that employers cultivated ties with middle-class Blacks in hopes of pacifying African American miners who increasingly rejected the accommodationist notion of individual “racial uplift.” These interracial elite ties included locals, whom coal companies hired in their welfare capitalist ventures designed to deter miners from union organizing, and extended outward to count Booker T. Washington and other Tuskegee graduates among their connections. Kelly shows that Birmingham’s middle and working classes had competing interests. The former was not only anti-union — many argued that “strikebreaking was ... a legitimate activity for blacks” (100) — but, because they benefited from segregation, they also vehemently opposed interracial working-class organization which the UMW epitomized at the turn of the century. Through churches and fraternal organizations which touted accommodation and bourgeois ideology, race leaders hoped that African American miners would identify their racial interests above those of class. But despite their efforts, which were bolstered with coal mine companies’ support, Blacks in the coalfields developed a working-class sense of race. As the racial and class identities of coal miners emerged, Kelly proves just how important Black workers’ ideas were in the moulding of the UMW’s interracial unionism. In drawing out the complexity of race and class relations, Kelly’s book succeeds in complementing Daniel Letwin’s seminal monograph on Alabama coal miners. (12)

As adept as Kelly is at bluntly reiterating his argument regarding the central role that Alabama coal operators played in causing race hatred among workers — in the conclusion he does not waver in this assertion, noting that “white workers absorbed — racial chauvinism” and that “the principal force in maintaining black oppression ... were its ... employers” (205) — he falters in his reiteration of the arguments of those historians he is so bent upon challenging. His failure to fully articulate the complexity of their arguments, which are based on DuBois’s notion of “the wages of whiteness” (the foundational concept upon which labour scholars of whiteness have based their work and the very historiography which Kelly is attempting to amend), make his contention about materialism seem incomplete and rather thin.

Caroline Waldron Merithew
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BLACK STRUGGLE, Red Scare is a useful addition to the growing scholarship on the southern Red Scare. The monograph’s main argument is that white segregationists rallied against the post-World War II Civil Rights Movement because they believed that it was part of a foreign, Communist-inspired conspiracy that threatened the (white) “southern way of life.” (2) Southern anti-Communism was a key component of what Woods calls “southern nationalism,” a “defensive regional ideology” and “set of values and traditions” rooted in the historical memories of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, suspicion of centralized government power and modernity, fundamentalist Protestantism, and, above all, white supremacy. (2) It was this ideology that made the southern Red Scare distinct from anti-Communist hysteria nationwide. Indeed, as McCarthyism lost traction nationally, anti-Communism, Woods asserts, gained ground in the South, especially at the height of the Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960s.
The book is arranged chronologically. The opening chapter argues that post-war, anti-black, Communist hysteria “had deep roots in the region’s past.” (12) Immediately before and after World War II, Southern nationalists took the lead in institutionalizing anti-Communism at the national level. Convinced that post-war black militancy was a Soviet plot to destroy the southern way of life, Senator James Eastland and other Dixiecrats virulently opposed civil rights reforms and became some of Joseph McCarthy’s staunchest allies during the peak of the Cold War.

The southern Red Scare grew in tandem with massive resistance against the Civil Rights Movement immediately after the Brown v. Board decision (1954). White southerners not only held the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] responsible for the Supreme Court’s decision but believed the organization was part of a Soviet-directed conspiracy. The Eisenhower administration’s decision to send federal troops to desegregate Central High School in Little Rock coupled with the Soviets’ launching of Sputnik in the fall of 1957 galvanized white mass popular opposition to desegregation and convinced them that the South was under siege by subversive outsiders.

Woods’s discussion of the “little HUACs” and “little FBI s” established across the South in the late 1950s is the most interesting, original part of the monograph. Like works by John Dittmer, James Dickerson, and Yasuhiro Katagiri, Woods concludes that Mississippi’s State Sovereignty Commission [SSC], an investigative body formed in 1957 in response to growing black militancy, became the state’s “secret police, wiretapping, bugging, and infiltrating civil rights organizations.” (69) But he breaks new ground in showing how southern investigative agencies such as the SSC, Louisiana’s Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, the Georgia Commission on Education, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, and the General Investigative Committee (Texas) helped to fuel the southern Red Scare and emboldened segregationists. Drawing heavily from these investigative commissions’ papers, Woods paints a chilling picture of how southern “little HUACs” targeted, harassed, and kept extensive files on civil rights groups and alleged subversives. These agencies also frequently exchanged information about civil rights activists with FBI head, J. Edgar Hoover. Like House Unamerican Activities Committee [HUAC], southern “little FBIs” held investigative hearings into the alleged Communist infiltration of civil rights groups. These hearings did not lead to convictions of individuals, but they did force civil rights organizations to divert valuable resources and attention from campaigns against segregation to legal defence. Finally, southern “little HUACs” and “little FBIs” provided Hoover with an “institutional example” for local investigative campaigns at the very moment the FBI launched the infamous Counterintelligence Program [COINTELPRO].

The monograph’s final chapters illustrate how red- and black-baiters found some success in putting the Civil Rights Movement on the defensive during the early 1960s. Citizens’ Councils effectively built mass support against the Civil Rights Movement by linking it to Communism. In the end, though, segregationists failed in using the specter of Communism to prevent the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

In the conclusion, Woods asserts that by the early 1970s, southern nationalists’ efforts to maintain segregation had failed. Congress abolished HUAC in 1975. And racial equality had been become accepted by the political mainstream. Curiously, Woods does not discuss how the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 marked the coming of age of the “silent majority.” By the 1980s, most former
segregationists and southern conservatives became Republicans, and they spearheaded efforts to roll back civil rights legislation, dismantle welfare programs, abolish affirmative action, and promote “law and order” by expanding the prison-industrial complex. Recently, some critics have charged that the Patriot Act has rekindled McCarthyism. In light of these developments, Woods’s sanguine conclusions may be somewhat premature—and perhaps even naïve.

It is impossible to discuss Black Struggle, Red Scare without placing it within the larger context of the contentious historiography of American Communism. Woods’s view of the American Communist Party closely resembles the neo-Cold War interpretations of Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, who view the Party as a conspiratorial, Soviet-controlled organization. Sweeping statements charging that the Southern Negro Youth Congress and the National Negro Congress promoted the “undisguised civil rights wing of the Communist Party” suggest that these two Popular Front-era organizations were little more than Communist fronts. (32) These conclusions contrast starkly from those of Robin Kelley, Gerald Horne, Mark Solomon, and Mark Naison, who stress black agency and recognize that the Communist Party represented a complex, dynamic, inter-racial social movement with unique connections to the global political stage. Moreover, Woods’s assertions that one former Party member became a government informant because he “became disenchanted with Communist plotting” and that the right-wing John Birch Society often “adopted some of Communism’s own clandestine and ruthless tactics” beg for clarification. (116, 112)

While Woods provides fresh, probing insight into white southerners’ reactions to the Cold War, in many respects his argument that southern segregationists were the most ardent Red-baiters reiterates conclusions drawn by scholars such as Gerald Horne and Manning Marable. Moreover, black Americans, especially those on the Left, wrote and spoke out frequently about the connections between white supremacy and anti-Communism during the Cold War. In addition, most of the discussion on black responses to the southern Red Scare focuses on Martin Luther King’s and Stokely Charmichael’s relationship to the Left. Woods’s monolithic view of the Black Freedom Movement does not sufficiently differentiate between the politics of national civil rights leadership and the grassroots membership and local leadership. As historian Barbara Ransby has pointed out, local leaders and grassroots participants were often less fearful of charges of “Communism” than national civil rights leaders who had to answer to the media and to white lawmakers. Curiously, Ransby and several recent, groundbreaking works on the Black Freedom Movement by Charles Payne and Diane McWhorter are neither cited nor included in the bibliography. Nor does Woods use African American newspapers or draw heavily from oral histories of civil rights activists. These primary and secondary sources would have provided valuable insight into how everyday black people experienced and responded to the southern Red Scare.

The text lacks a gender analysis of southern nationalism. How did anxieties of inter-racial sex between black men and white women that Communism allegedly promoted fuel red- and black-baiters’ anxieties about the Civil Rights Movement? To what degree did anti-Communism help deflect gender and class tensions within the white South? Catherine Fosl’s recent biography on Anne Braden, which is not cited, highlights the intersections of racism, sexism, and anti-Communism in the South. Similarly, utilizing scholarship on “whiteness” would have provided useful insight into the making of white supremacist, southern nationalist subjectivities.

While those interested in how African Americans responded to the southern Red Scare will be left hanging, scholars inter-
ested in how anti-Communist, racist politics played out among white southerners will find *Black Struggle, Red Scare* useful.

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This technical legal study will be closely studied in the US but may hold limited interest for Canadian readers. The decline of the unionization rate in the US (now 7.9 per cent in the private sector) has focused attention on the rights, privileges, and powers of unions that represent less than a majority in a given workplace. Such nonmajority organizations include some of the most vital, movement-like organizations in US work life, and protecting their existence and privileges could play an important role in keeping the union movement alive. Examples include such projects of the Communication Workers of America as WashTech and Alliance@IBM; Restaurant Opportunities Center [ROC-NY], a project of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees; and advocacy groups for immigrant workers, some with union support.

Most of the legal questions concerning nonmajority unions are uncontroversial. Employees who seek to organize or maintain a nonmajority union are engaged in concerted activity protected by the (US) National Labor Relations Act. As such, they may not be discharged or disciplined in any way for such activity. Employers are privileged to recognize nonmajority groups as the representatives solely of their members, and to conclude binding agreements with them. Nonmajority groups may engage in just about any kind of economic pressure that a majority union can. They may strike, call for a boycott of the employer’s products, or pursue any other kind of lawful consumer pressure. Indeed, a number of US unions in the past decade or so have attempted to maintain such a workplace presence through groups like those mentioned in the last paragraph, despite representing less than a majority. They sometimes seek to have employers deal with them and sometimes succeed. We have no systematic study of such groups.

Morris addresses the only significant legal uncertainty in the US about nonmajority groups. If the employer refuses to meet with a labor union or other group representing some of its employees, purely as the representative of its own members, will the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB] order it to do so? When I wrote about this question in the *Rutgers Law Review* in 1993, I could find only one such order, *Lundy Mfg. Co.* 136 NLRB 1230 (1962), enforced 316 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 US 895 (1963). Morris doesn’t have any others, so we may be pretty confident that this case is unique. On the other side are a series of cases, going back to the earliest volumes of Labor Board decisions, in which the Board has stated, sometimes in dicta, sometimes as holding, that the employer’s duty to recognize and bargain with a union applies only to unions that have demonstrated support from a majority of the workforce in an appropriate unit. Morris characterizes all these statements as *dicta*, but he himself shows that, in at least one, General Counsel had claimed that the employer’s refusal to meet was an unfair labour practice, and the Board was removing that issue from the case. I concluded that, under US administrative law, the Board’s lengthy and mainly consistent practice meant that it was probably no longer free to order recognition of nonmajority unions, even as representative only of their own members, absent some action by Congress.

Morris argues that this is wrong, and that an employer who refuses to meet and bargain with a union representing a subset
of the workforce indeed commits an unfair labour practice. The originality of his study is his focus on the decisions of the early New Deal labour relations boards (1933-35) that preceded passage of the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] in 1935. Morris shows convincingly that these early boards routinely ordered employers to meet with nonmajority unions if no union had a majority. The boards applied general language, later transferred to the NLRA, guaranteeing employees the “right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” (Some of these predecessor boards functioned as part of an early New Deal program, later declared unconstitutional, whose symbol was the blue eagle; hence Morris’s title, which will be incomprehensible to anyone under the age of eighty unless he or she is well versed in the administrative history of the early New Deal, cutting Morris off from most of his potential readership.)

Morris argues that since the pre-NLRA boards ordered employers to bargain with nonmajority unions, and since the NLRA used the same statutory language protecting employees’ “right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,” the NLRA is now, and always has been, obligated to order employers to recognize nonmajority unions. To reach this conclusion, Morris must reject an alternative reading, under which the scope of the employer’s duty to bargain was merely delegated by Congress to the new NLRA. Since the NLRA has, with but one exception noted, never issued such bargaining orders, Morris needs to show that this refusal violates Congress’s delegation. If Congress merely delegated the scope of the employer’s duty to the Board, then the Board’s limitation of its powers to majority unions, while unfortunate, would be within the scope of its authority and not something that a reviewing federal court of appeals might properly correct.

Morris’s argument involves close reading of the pre-NLRA administrative cases, and then the successive drafts of the NLRA. It is too fine-grained for reproduction here, but will be read very carefully by US labour lawyers. I was not convinced. While I agree that the NLRB should have required employers to meet with organizations representing only a fraction of their workforce, I do not find a clear Congressional command that requires the Board to do so. Morris shows that, at several stages in the drafting process, such clear language was briefly part of the bill, but was later deleted as part of a general process of simplifying language and delegating detail to the new NLRB. Drafters similarly rejected a proposal that would clearly have restricted the duty to bargain to majority representatives. I read this history to mean that Congress delegated this issue, along with many others, to the new NLRB.

Morris also shows why the Act’s proponents, and Congress, might have preferred to leave open the issue of nonmajority unions. Union leaders were themselves reevaluating their attitudes during the period of his study. At the beginning of the decade, with no history of US law that addressed union recognition, unions outside the railroads normally understood their claim to representation to rest on their designation by their members. In a 1934 case that Morris makes much of, the union, after defeating the company union in a government-run election, still sought recognition as the representative solely of its members. The pre-NLRA board held that any agreement would apply to all employees. Morris notes that the two most influential US labour leaders, Presidents William Green of the AFL and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers, disagreed, believing that a union’s representational powers extended only to its own members. The necessary implication was that in a workplace with no majority union, and even in one that had one, there might be multiple competing representatives, each speaking only for its members. However, this attitude among union leaders began to
change as US employers became more aggressive and sophisticated in sponsoring rival unions loyal to the employer. Legislators and witnesses sympathetic to unions (such as Harry Millis, whom Morris quotes), and union leaders themselves, no longer regarded with equanimity the vision of a workplace with multiple competing unions, only some of which were loyal to the labour movement. This may explain why the NLRA as adopted does not address the status of nonmajority unions and might be said to have left the matter to the NLRB’s administrative interpretation. A desire to keep matters fluid, depending on the Act’s efficacy in ending company unions, is at least as consistent with the legislative history as is Morris’s argument that the Act contains a secret command that the Board must order employers to meet with nonmajority groups.

Whether or not Morris is correct, the issue of nonmajority bargaining will not go away. If US unions represent new groups at all, those groups will increasingly fall short of a majority. Unions will increasingly demand recognition for these groups, which employers will resist, and unions will attempt to force such recognition through economic pressure. The study of existing nonmajority bargaining, and the design of new workable institutions for it, remain open questions not discussed in Morris’s book. Out of that study may come important innovations in US union practice, and further successes will come only out of those successes, irrespective of the intentions of Senator Wagner’s associates over 70 years ago.

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STEPHEN RICE’s book takes the reader on a whirlwind tour of strange and wondrous sights in antebellum America. Manual labour schools, health reform schemes, steam boiler explosions, and even a chess-playing automaton fill the pages of his monograph. Just when you might ask yourself what all these disparate people and things could have in common, Rice offers an intriguing and provocative explanation. In these unusual cultural and technological byways, the emerging middle class began to establish social and intellectual control of the nation’s new industrial order. By deliberately discussing work, mechanization, and class relations in places often far removed from the centre of industrial change, new middle-class Americans could stake their claims to authority and power in less contested arenas.

Rice begins his study with a thoughtful chapter on the popular discourse about mechanization in antebellum America. He traces two competing visions of the mechanical future — one where inventors are almost godlike, machines are almost human, and factory “hands” are almost slaves, the other where workers retain the power to manage the machines and where the human brain controls mere mechanical devices. Needless to say, many Americans in the growing ranks of factory managers and other middle-class occupations tried to avoid conflict by arguing that the social relations of industrial production were indeed cooperative and not oppositional. Head and hand, mind and body, human and machine could all work together in harmony.

Mechanics’ institutes and technical education could serve as one way to improve skilled workers’ knowledge and status, heal the growing rift between manual and mental labour, and still secure managers’ prerogatives to direct operatives on the shopfloor. Another educational innovation — manual labour schools which strived to merge physical work with classical studies — formed at the same time as the institutes (starting in the 1820s). Just as strong hands had to be linked with knowledgeable heads, so the
thinking man had to have a healthy body. In a world of divided labour, Rice traces the struggle to build and sustain whole people through education, training, and healthful living.

What exactly constituted these healthful habits for the new American middle class? Rice pursues that question in a chapter on popular physiology and health reform. Here again, debates about digestion and dyspepsia that seemed far removed from the industrial workplace revealed a series of arguments about individuals and society withstanding the pressures of mechanical labour. In fact, health reformers often used the metaphor of the human body as a machine to encourage people to take better care of their own biological factories. Critics of the industrial system also embraced this image to talk about humans being turned into mere machines, and those machines breaking down under long hours of labour at a breakneck pace.

Rice’s final chapter shifts gears (pardon the pun) and looks at steam boiler explosions and the engineers who tended those boilers. The problem of steam engines blowing up on ships and in factories was both a technical and a human challenge. Here was the danger of unbounded technology staring down at people: raw mechanical power without control, a hand of iron without any reliable head to guide it, physical explosions leading to social dislocation and death. Political leaders eventually responded to the growing carnage with some of the first federal regulations for worker training, workplace safety, and public transportation. In particular, a 1852 law required that steamboat engineers be examined and licenced based on their technical training and moral character. In effect, these men had to be expert hands and heads, they had to display high skill and status, and they had to bring themselves and the machines they tended under control. Thus, once again, Rice argues that questions of power and authority were inscribed onto seemingly technical or scientific issues where the middle class could solidify its social standing without appearing to do so.

Rice thereby returns to his core thesis that middle-class formation in antebellum America took place through this broad popular discourse about mechanization, and that these discussions usually occurred on the periphery of industrial change rather than in the mechanized workplace itself. But it was the very elliptical and metaphorical nature of this debate, and this process of a class forming and articulating its own identity, that allowed the new middle class to consolidate its power without constantly provoking violent opposition. Educational and health reformers, and crusaders for steamboat safety defused class conflict over industrialization by transferring the debate to seemingly more neutral territory. Rice posits that American workers did not always see the middle-class hands at work in these seemingly disparate discussions, movements, campaigns, and regulations — just as American audiences did not see the hidden man in the chess-playing automaton.

Rice’s presentation is often rich, complex, subtle, and nuanced; but it also raises rather basic methodological questions. Start with the most fundamental matter of chronology: when exactly is “early industrial America”? Rice implies that he is following the traditional antebellum periodization of 1820 to 1860, but the temporal parameters of this study remain uncertain at times. Moreover, Rice often ranges back and forth across the decades in search of revealing sources and quotes, but then loses any sense of whether the discourse on mechanization (especially in the first chapter) changed over time. He also pays little attention to regional differences, or the impact of gender on men and women’s perceptions of industrial change. One would think that, in antebellum America, Northerners and Southerners might have different attitudes toward the coming of the machine in their midst.
This study is clearly focused on middle-class formation; but that process did not take place in a vacuum, even when some Americans tried to move the arena for debate far away from the actual sites of technological and socio-economic change. How readily did workers acquiesce to this change of venue, or to the model of cooperative social relations between hand and head, mind and body, and men and machine? Were working men and women somehow oblivious to what the middle class was doing away from the factory floor? Or were workers insisting that questions of power, control, and authority in the new industrial order had to be confronted directly at the point of production? Open class conflict may well have been avoided because, to put the matter crudely, labour could not get management into the same ring to settle the score man to man. And all this metaphorical bobbing and weaving was exactly what the middle class wanted. But steering away from a fight may not be the same as consolidating your power, or fooling the other side so they do not know how strong you are becoming. Workers were probably often well aware that the middle class was trying to avoid confronting many of the problems associated with rapid industrial development; but labour did not have the leverage to insist that these thinkers and schemers consider the reality of workplace dangers — except when a steam boiler exploded.

Finally, there is also the question of intentionality. That is, how aware were all these middle-class folks about what they were supposedly doing? Did they have a clear sense that they were building their own power though mechanics’ institutes, manual labour schools, and health reform campaigns? Rice is under no obligation to produce historical “smoking guns” proving conclusively that every American who enrolled in one of these efforts was trying to promote his own class identity. In fact, Rice continually explains that he is talking about an often indirect and uncertain process. But he also asserts that mapping class relations onto these less contested terrains was not mere happenstance. Middle-class Americans gained a safe haven to work out many of their own conflicted emotions and consolidate their claims to social authority. Yet Rice can never quite say how much these particular citizens were cognizant of their growing power, how deliberatively they built mechanisms for increasing their control over society, or how consciously they concealed their class identity even as they strengthened it.

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HOW BEST to preserve the memory of the country’s recent, painful past has been a main preoccupation of Argentines. In a speech delivered on 24 March 2004 on the occasion of the government’s return to the city of Buenos Aires of one of the most infamous detention sites, the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada [ESMA], President Néstor Kirchner stated, “Vengo a a pedir perdón en nombre del Estado” (I come to ask for forgiveness in the name of the state). An estimated 5,000 people were detained in ESMA during the brutal dictatorship that lasted from 1976 to 1983 and the place has now been enshrined as a space of remembrance and of the promotion of human rights. What to remember and how in this symbolic site is a different matter altogether. Memory in Argentina turns out to be a highly contentious issue. Lindsay DuBois’s book complicates the issue further by addressing memory from a rather neglected dimension, that of working-class people and their experiences. Relying on an ethnographic study with people in a working-class neighbourhood in Buenos Aires, DuBois’s study reveals that memory, when engaged...
from the bottom up, is characterized by a sense of timing which differs markedly from the periodizations proposed by officials and academics.

Argentina’s military dictatorship which ruled from 1976 to 1983 used unprecedented levels of brutality to introduce radical political and socio-economic changes in the country. The regime, which called itself the Process of National Reorganization, did succeed in transforming Argentine society, as DuBois notes, by “ripping apart the social fabric, forcing people to turn inward, to abandon social ties, and seek personal and economic survival in a game with a new set of rules.” (85) The presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999), the populist Peronist who replaced Raúl Alfonsín elected in 1983 — whose economic strategy failed to stem the legacy of severe economic crisis the country had been saddled with by the outgoing regime — entrenched a costly neoliberal restructuring. What Menem styled as the “popular market economy” intensified processes of de-industrialization and rising unemployment, and shrank the social state. The outcome has been dramatic changes in the country’s social structure and distribution of wealth, with increasing numbers of people sliding precipitously into the ranks of the “new” poor or into indigence. DuBois sets out to explore the lasting impact of the long-standing transformation of Argentina for people who have lived through it in a working-class housing project called José Ingenieros, located in a suburb of Buenos Aires. In the course of doing so, she offers some fascinating insights into the conundrum that has puzzled many: why have so many who have lost so much in these traumatic decades acquiesced so willingly? In her words, “how did a militant Peronist working class become a Peronist working class without work, supporting a neoliberal Peronist presidency”? José Ingenieros, built in the early 1970s as part of a massive project of housing improvement, has, in fact, a complicated history. Some residents were legally assigned their homes, while others invaded the unfinished buildings in 1973 and eventually gained legal status to their apartments. Dubois, who lived in the neighbourhood from July 1991 to December 1992, relies on a rich ethnographic study and in-depth interviews with a number of key people to tell a fascinating story of remembering and forgetting. Her study illustrates the everyday and intimate aspects, experiences, and implications of processes which are global in scope. Its most creative dimension are two talleres de la memoria, or history/memory workshops, DuBois helped organize, and from which she draws important insights about identity, politics, and memory in the second half of the book. She uses the approach of popular memory to untangle the complex ways in which people in the neighbourhood relate to the past. The story she unfolds for us illustrates how the past of the dictatorship, as seen from the bottom up by working-class people in Argentina, needs to be anchored in both an older past linked to the organization of the neighbourhood in which so many of them played active parts, and also in the period after 1983. However, her findings also refine the conventional understanding of popular memory as “shared” common-sense history, for what is shared among neighbours is not an agreed-upon memory of the past but one that is disputed in some key dimensions. In her words, “In a rush to give voice to the voiceless, we sometimes imply a kind of coherence which may not be present, and which potentially misrepresents and silences the complexity and contradictions inherent in social memories.” (209) Lindsay Dubois’s study, then, offers a caution about popular memories taken to be about giving voice to the voiceless, where the subaltern voices have tended to be seen as coherent and consensual.

Not everyone in José Ingenieros, it turns out, remembers the dictatorship as a period of fear of brutality; some even...
deny that state violence and disappearances marked the lives of their neighbours. Working-class memory, then, is not one seamless, homogeneous whole, but is criss-crossed by tensions and conflict, manifested in what is remembered and what is forgotten. By this, Dubois does not suggest “that there is a group of forgetters and another of rememberers.” As she puts it, “for one thing, to remember some things is to forget others.” (176) Not only does what neighbours remember, or not, matter, but also how they remember. For many, for example, there is no clear break, no before and after the dictatorship, as there is for government officials and academics. Police abuses continue in Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, but now with a new target: the figure of the delinquent has taken the place of that of subversives. José Ingenieros, it turns out, has been targeted by the police as a place of crime and drugs and neighbours are divided on the issue. The dominant discourse has decontextualized crime so that making a connection between crime and the economic crisis is not possible, and what is emphasized instead is crime as an individual moral defect, and this justifies state intervention through police force. Another, very material, institutional continuity with the past is the exercise of state force. The police forces and prisons, Dubois points out, “continued to be staffed by personnel who were present during the dictatorship, and their treatment of prisoners has been similarly brutal.” (181) Furthermore, fear, that critical dimension of life under the dictatorship, continues to be present in the lives of the neighbours but it means different things to different people: some neighbours are fearful of crime and criminals while fear of police brutality is what others, especially young people, experience and articulate. Efforts to organize the neighbours in José Ingenieros to deal with crime locally have run aground. Similarly, efforts to find solutions to the severe problems of sanitation and health facing the neighbourhood have proved to be difficult. Conflicting experiences and interpretations of the past, politically motivated suspicions and divisions, and generalized distrust of others, are at the root of these difficulties, and lead Dubois to argue: “In addition to a culture of fear … the recent history of Argentina has engendered a culture of cynicism. Perhaps a cause, but also a result, of such cynicism is the continued adherence to the patronage game — in this case, a Peronist patronage game. If you cannot trust anyone, go with someone who can give you something you need.” (201) Here, then, is a powerful answer to the conundrum about why a beaten Peronist working class supported, or at least acquiesced to, the ruthless neoliberal agenda of Peronist Carlos Menem. Dominant discourses about the past which present the organizing of the early 1970s as an unmitigated disaster, and about the present which is meant to have delivered rights and responsibilities to individuals as part and parcel of democratization, have made it nearly impossible for people in José Ingenieros to make positive, collective use of their past. What this study makes painfully visible is that from the vantage point of people who have lived through the powerful transformative project of the past nearly 30 years, to call Argentina a democracy because the right institutions are in place is far from accurate.

One unanswered question that looms large for Dubois is the role of gender in local responses to the reorganization of the nation. In fact, it is only in the last chapter that Dubois reflects on the implications of this very gendered story she has told us, and only in a small paragraph at that. In all fairness, the author herself warns us at the start about this shortcoming of the book. Women, however, made up a good number of the author’s informants, and they were the overwhelming majority of both history/memory workshops she organized in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, what is fascinating in her account is that today’s dogged attempts to revive older forms of solidarity
and organization in José Ingenieros are being spearheaded by women for the most part. Given this, one would want to know, for example, what specific forms women’s relations to the Peronist past take, and what are the cultural-political legacies of those memories and experiences of political activism. In addition to the general observations the author makes about why women organize in greater numbers at the level of the community, there are surely more specific claims to be made about women’s experience of Peronism, and about the practical-political forms it took. Finally, even the discussion of the ways in which popular memories differ from official accounts would benefit from a gendered lens. After all, the way in which women organize events and dates through what the author calls “family times” is central for her claim about how the sequence of events is organized differently from below. We are left to wonder about the kind of organizing of everyday/experiential time used by men to order events, for example, and about the complexities this adds to the issues of periodization and time as experienced/represented from below. A gender-sensitive lens would have allowed us to see further layers of complexity in the process of popular remembering and forgetting, and would enrich the author’s concern with capturing the past-present continuum in people’s experiences and representations of long-lasting transformations in Argentina. It is a pity, then, that the looming presence of women merits so little analytical attention in the pages of this otherwise fine book. These observations notwithstanding, the book tells a fascinating story that will be of interest to Latin Americanists, and makes an important and necessary contribution both to the study of contemporary working-class politics, and to the expanding field of memory studies.

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Oscar Oliverera in collaboration with Tom Lewis, ¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia (Cambridge, MA: South End Press 2005)

THE BOLIVIA “Water War” of 2000 has become an iconic example of the power of social movements to resist corporate globalization. In April 2000, a widespread coalition of small farmers, coca growers, factory workers, the unemployed, and small business people shut down the city of Cochabamba, protesting the privatization of public water resources. After a dramatic standoff between protestors and the military that left one young man dead, the government finally backed down, amending the national water legislation, rescinding the contract it had signed with the private consortium, and granting control of the local water utility to the network of social organizations that emerged to coordinate the protests, the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life, known as “the Coordinadora.”

The Cochabamba Water War is widely regarded as the first major victory won by social movements after fifteen years of neoliberal structural adjustment programs in Bolivia, and as the authors claim in the introduction to this book, “the first great victory against corporate globalization in Latin America.” (xiii) This inspiring book documents the triumphant struggle that kicked American transnational corporation, Bechtel, from Bolivia. Divided into four sections, the first, third, and fourth sections are primarily based on interviews with Oscar Olivera, the main spokesperson of the Coordinadora, that have been compiled and translated by collaborator Tom Lewis. The second section consists of chapters written by other activists and intellectuals about what happened after the Water War that place the new forms of struggle that have emerged in Bolivia in their political-economic context. Raquel Gutiérrez and Luis Sánchez-Gómez contribute chapters that describe the challenges of operating the
city’s water service in the interests of local residents rather than for profit. In the latter section, Tom Lewis contributes a chapter that chronicles the activities of the Coordinadora from the Water War in 2000 to the Gas War in 2003.

¡Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia is about much more than the struggle against water privatization. It is also about the dilemmas faced by all social movement organizers fighting for social transformation in the new era of neoliberal capitalism. Oscar Olivera, a former shoe-factory worker and trade-union leader, provides an astute political analysis of how the changes to the economy have affected the forms of working-class organization in Bolivia. In the “New World of Labour,” he documents how privatization and economic restructuring throughout the 1990s have led to a dramatic reduction in the number of workers organized in unions and concentrated in large workplaces. He argues that this process of restructuring has been accompanied by “an inverse process of ‘reproletarianization’” marked by the growth of smaller, decentralized workplaces that employ between one and four employees who confront precarious conditions of employment. Contrary to the “historical delirium” that the decline of large factories has rendered the working class irrelevant, Olivera suggests that “the number of wage workers who sell their labor power is much higher than it was ten years ago.” (106) Given the atomization and insecurity that characterize these new forms of work, however, he argues that “the basis for formation of class identity has changed.” (106) Olivera observes that the new working class has thus far “found it extremely difficult to project itself as an active social subject with sufficient personality to launch convincing mobilizations, to generate demands that motivate large numbers, or with even less success, to put forward practical proposals that incorporate the demands of other social sectors.” (107) In “A Political Thesis” and “Towards a National and Continental Rebellion,” he argues that new forms of doing politics are needed in Bolivia, proposing that political struggles organized around “the basic necessities of life” such as water and sewers can provide a way to overcome the working-class fragmentation described above. The Coordinadora that emerged in the Water War, for example, pulled together a “multiform torrent of workers, independent peasants, and communal peasants” (126-7) in an alliance that managed to expel a large transnational corporation.

In his thought-provoking essay entitled “The ‘Multitude’,” Álvaro García Linera presents an academic analysis of changes to the forms of working-class organization and identity that have accompanied the restructuring of the Bolivian political economy over the past fifteen years. He argues that the decline of the “union-form” along with large-scale factories has “inaugurated a slow and multiform reconstitution of working class identities” and a strengthening of “local forms of unification with a traditional character and a regional base.” (70-1) In this context, García Linera argues that the organization that emerged in the Water War of Cochabamba — the Coordinadora — represents a new kind of popular movement in Bolivia. Unlike the hierarchical union structures that dominated Left politics in Bolivian history, the Coordinadora was a horizontal organization without formal elected leaders. It also introduced a new repertoire of resistance strategies in their fight against the government and transnational capital, holding a popular referendum and public assemblies attended by 50,000. Linera dubs this new form of collective action “the multitude,” defined rather obtusely as “a block of collective action through which the subaltern classes give rise to autonomous, organized structures in relation to hegemonic discursive and symbolic structures.” (n. 10, 85) While this murky concept attempts to describe the diverse social energies that can be harnessed in the struggle against neoliberal capitalism, the text is
about as clear as to what precisely “the multitude” means as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s infamous text on Empire.

If the book has one minor flaw, it is the tendency of the authors to overstate the extent of the political transformation achieved by the movement that emerged in Cochabamba. García Linera writes, for example, that the “new social movement of the multitude” embodied by the Coordinadora “has contributed to the formation of mobilizing strategies and symbolic struggles embodying a breadth and impact never before seen in the history of social movements in Bolivia.” (79, emphasis mine) Such a statement repeats the tendency towards uncritical celebration of the novelty of such “non-class” forms of organizing typical of some of the early literature on “new” social movements, particularly in Latin America. Was the Coordinadora really more effective than any previous social movement in Bolivian history? The events of April 2000 in Cochabamba certainly opened a new cycle of contention in Bolivia, but to suggest that the new strategies employed by the Coordinadora have achieved a greater transformation of state-society relations than that attained by the national-popular Revolution of 1952 is a flight of exaggeration. After all, neoliberalism drags on and even the question of social control over the local water utility has been left unresolved. A more sober analysis of the limits and possibilities of the movement that emerged in Cochabambu would be better served by a perspective that recognizes the inherent tensions that emerge in cross-class, “issue-based” forms of organizing, such as presented by the work by Heather Williams on coalitions formed between labour unions and social justice organizations in the Mexican maquiladoras.

What the authors do correctly highlight, however, is the need for activists to employ organizing strategies that differ from those that dominated the ‘old’ labour movement, such as organizing unorganized workers beyond the formal place of work. Others such as Kim Moody have termed this type of organizing “social movement unionism,” strategies that are eloquently described by Olivera’s chapter, “Organization,” on the outreach work of his trade union, which laid the basis for the Coordinadora.

Overall, this is a compelling book that will appeal to readers interested in social movements and recent events in Bolivian history, including geographers, Latin Americanists, labour historians, and political economists alike.

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SLUMMING is a provocative, insightful study of one set of contradictions embedded in the ideology underlying Victorian middle- and upper-class relationships with the poor. Koven has already revealed his talents as a cultural interpreter, for example in his superb essay “How the Victorians Read Sesame and Lilies,” in Deborah Nord’s edition of Ruskin’s Sesame and Lilies (Yale 2002). Here he brings his reader to the heart of his subject through his definition of slumming: “activities undertaken by people of wealth, social standing, or education in urban spaces inhabited by the poor.” (9) The term, Koven points out, was almost always used in a pejorative sense, to condemn the motives of other people, not oneself. Victorians identified themselves as Christian rescuers, investigative journalists, or philanthropists. But inevitably, though usually unconsciously, they were also “slumming.” Slumming, as Koven defines it, involves “some sort of ‘descent’, across urban spatial and class, gender and sexual boundaries.” (9) In consequence, the middle- and upper middle-class individuals and organizations whose mixed
motives are the subject of Koven’s study all too often positioned “the poor as erotic objects of elite spectatorship.” (283) It is the objectification and the eroticization, the frisson aroused by verbal and visual depictions of dirt and misery that constitute Koven’s subject: “Slumming.”

This is a book about the themes of eroticized horror and homoerotic voyeurism that Koven believes connect the historical examples on which he focuses, beginning with James Greenwood’s series *Night in the Workhouse* (1866) and continuing with child rescuer Dr. T.J. Barnardo, Joseph Merrick (the “Elephant Man”), the Anglo-American journalist Elizabeth Banks, and male and female settlement house workers.

Like Judith Walkowitz’s *City of Dreadful Delight* (1992), Carolyn Steedman’s *Strange Dislocations* (1994), or Lynda Nead’s *Myths of Sexuality* (1988), to all of which Koven refers, *Slumming* is a work of what is now defined as “cultural history.” As with all such studies, the success of *Slumming* rests on how convinced we are as readers that the author is at home with his historical material, on the extent to which the textual analysis expands our understanding, and finally on its persuasiveness. On the first two counts, *Slumming* is a resounding success. The depth of Koven’s research and his knowledge of the historical context are impressive and his insights are vivid and thought-provoking. I am less convinced of the persuasiveness of Koven’s overriding hypothesis.

For instance, take his discussion of Dr. Barnardo. Dr. Barnardo has been presented — for example in George Behlmer’s excellent *Child Abuse and Moral Reform in England 1870-1908* (1982), a book Koven draws on and cites enthusiastically as responsible for “the largest and best known” of the late Victorian ‘child rescue’ agencies. (58) Koven does not dispute this interpretation of Barnardo’s importance. For Koven he remains “one of the Victorian age’s most luminous do-gooders.” But “at the same time,” Koven says, his “appreciation for Barnado’s achievement is tempered by a keen sense of their costs.” (94) Through an extended discussion of the clash between Barnardo and the Charity Organization Society [COS] in 1877, Koven demonstrates that the evangelical Barnardo used the new technology of photography to become an entrepreneur of philanthropy. Thus, the dispute between the COS and Barnardo was not simply a clash between secular modernity and religious conservatism.” (103) Through an analysis of the “before and after” photographs of children that the Barnardo organization employed, Koven sheds light on the contradictions inherent in slumming. At times Koven overplays his hand, as when he tells us that raggedness, specifically “ripped and torn clothing” was not only an effective visual marker of poverty but could also be a disturbingly erotic sign and offers as corroborating evidence C.L. Dodgson’s putatively erotic photos of Alice Liddell. (118) The problem with this approach is that Dodgson’s erotic interest in Alice became obvious only to a post-Freudian sensibility. Koven is on safer ground when he asserts that the part “sexuality played in the sympathy Barnardo excited was neither explicit nor intentional.” (130) Such caution takes nothing away from his illuminating insight that whether it was Greenwood’s sensational journalism or Barnardo’s verbal and visual narratives, modernist slumming involved arousing the sympathy of the public by depicting the poor as members of an exotic, outcast group, and these strategies did contain an element of the erotic.

One of the few instances where Koven offers Victorian evidence for his sub-textual analyses involves Greenwood’s 1866 *Night*, first serialized in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Greenwood, he maintains, cannot simply see the men and boys huddled together in the shed at the Lambeth Workhouse, where they sleep on this January night, as cold and hungry. In his brilliant extended reading of this text
Koven emphasizes quite convincingly the “masquerade” in which Greenwood engaged. But he also emphasizes homoeroticism. We are, says Koven, introduced to “many homoerotic themes” though he acknowledges that it is “easy to miss them if we so choose.” (46) Like Koven, I have on my shelves Peter Keating’s Into Unknown England 1866-1913, Selections from the Social Explorers (1976), which begins with Night. When I read Koven, I am intrigued, and almost convinced. But when I read Greenwood himself, I fail to find evidence that Greenwood was evoking a “male brothel.” (47) On the other hand, here’s one place where Koven has evidence from the Victorians themselves. It appears that Night had a “volcanic impact” on no less a Victorian than John Addington Symonds. Greenwood’s “erotic subtext,” Koven convincingly demonstrates, caused Symonds to recognize his own same-sex desires.

I have merely touched on some of the issues Koven considers. One impressive feature of this book is the extent of its range. For example his treatment of the now-almost-forgotten American Elizabeth Banks, who made her living as an investigative journalist in England and in the United States, illuminates an important aspect of the journalistic trade. Koven points out that Banks was frank about the fact that she engaged in slumming, a word she actually used about her activities, because it paid. Her crass commodification of poverty, he suggests, is one reason that social and cultural historians have ignored her and remembered instead such undoubtedly more worthy investigators as Clementina Black.

Koven is explicit about the fact that his insights have relevance to the present. Poverty, in the southern hemisphere but also in developed countries like Britain, the United States, and Canada, remains a pressing problem: in fact, a scandal. As Koven points out, the Victorians didn’t solve it, but Victorian approaches are still with us. Readers of Koven’s book will all be familiar with the appeals that come through the mail. Whether it’s OXFAM, Doctors Without Borders, or Save the Children, all worthy causes, the photographs are there to tug on our heartstrings, just as the Barnardo photographs of more than a century ago were designed to do.

In conclusion, then, Koven has written more than a fine contribution to the historiography on Victorian poverty: this is a book that makes one think, about the present as well as the past.

Deborah Gorham
Carleton University


Labour After Communism distills more than a decade of engagement by its author in the struggles of autoworkers and their unions in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. David Mandel, who teaches political science at the University of Quebec, previously has written on the workers of Petrograd during the 1917 revolution and elsewhere in the Soviet Union during Perestroika. He also is co-founder of the School for Worker Democracy which, according to the blurb on the back of this book, “conducts rank-and-file labour education in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.” In the often depressing, occasionally surprising, but generally fascinating story this book tells, the School figures as a site for interactions among shop-floor activists, and as an actor itself.

The book, then, is the fruit of Mandel’s involvement with the School and his reflections on the strategies and practices of leaders of the autoworkers’ unions in the three countries. It amply demonstrates the advantages and occasionally the disadvantages of the author’s personal involvement with his subject.

The book opens with a chapter on “The Legacy of the Soviet Period” that is one of the most insightful summaries I have read of labour under Communism. Weaving
the emergence of insurgent movements of autoworkers into its account of the Perestroika period, it easily can stand on its own for class assignment and discussion. Among the other eleven chapters, five deal with Russian autoworkers’ unions, and three each are devoted to those in Ukraine and Belarus. The “socio-political context” in each country is presented in chapters under that title. They too could be used in labour education and global studies classes as supplements to, or a foil against, the literature that considers “democratization,” “civil society,” and investment opportunities in isolation from workers and their institutions. The conclusion assesses unions’ failures and victories ("exceptional and limited though the latter were") in the light of the interplay of “objective” and “subjective” factors, the desirability but difficulty of pursuing class independence as a strategy, and the importance of promoting dignity among rank-and-file workers.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, unions in the predominantly Slavic successor states have pursued two basic strategies: “social partnership” and “class independence.” The former, identified most closely with the labour federations that are the lineal descendants of the old Soviet trade union structures (and in some cases, personnel), asserts the necessity of maintaining good relations with enterprise management (indeed, retaining the membership and active participation of managers in the union), taking into account the “objective circumstances” of the economy and individual enterprises, and maintaining the union’s control over the distribution of social benefits in order to protect workers from the vagaries of the market and retain their loyalty. Unions pursuing the “class independence” strategy of turning up the heat on management instead of the state have been few and far between. They included most famously the break-away Independent Miners Union [NPG], but also other “alternative” trade unions affiliated with Sotsprof [Association of Socialists] Trade Unions and the VKT [General Confederation of Workers].

Mandel is an informative, if hardly unbiased, guide to the ins and outs and fluctuating fortunes of both the main autoworkers’ unions of the three countries and the only non-ephemeral alternative union in the industry, Edintsvo (Unity), which represents roughly 3,000 workers (or some 3 per cent of the entire workforce) at Togliatti’s giant automobile company, VAZ. He scrupulously acknowledges — indeed, he emphasizes — that the situation has been less clear-cut than the simple division between “traditional” and “alternative” unions would suggest. Some affiliates within the “traditional” Russian autoworkers’ union (ASMR) engaged in sustained militant action largely to protest against wage arrears, and under the dynamic leadership of its first president, Vladimir Zlenko, the Ukrainian union (ASMU) consistently pursued a policy of opposing layoffs and promoting rank-and-file activism. In Belarus, Zlenko’s counterpart, Aleksandr Bukhvostov, was also committed to independent trade-union activism and educating the rank-and-file. As for Edintsvo, it gets high marks for distinguishing itself from ASMR’s conciliationist/capitulationist relationship with management, but Mandel admits that only in 1998 did it break from its policy of supporting the Yeltsin regime, that the strike it organized at VAZ in Fall 2000 “failed,” and that the union needs to “rekindle the dynamism of earlier years.” (148)

Inevitably though, the imbalance of informants and the author’s own ideological proclivities colour his analysis. The voices of the “social partnership” majority — to say nothing of management — generally are muted, and such individuals invariably come off as cynical, resigned, or just nasty. Communists are labeled “Stalinists” and assumed to be motivated mainly by opportunism. Those with whom the author shares the same outlook (and especially the activists who participated in the School for Worker Democ-
racy) get to tell their stories in their own words, and often are given the benefit of the doubt. The already mentioned Zlenko is a case in point. He “is a committed socialist without nostalgia or illusions about the old system” (175); “never stopped pushing, but had few illusions about the capacity of willingness of most regional and local leaders to change”; (177) “had few illusions about the impact of amendments to the union’s constitution (179); and “had had few illusions about his support,” (183) which is a good thing because no sooner had he retired than his successor shifted the orientation of the union’s Central Council towards cooperation with management. The book, which Mandel describes as “an honest analysis of the available facts and the determination of their interconnections,” (vii) sometimes has the character of a primer for trade union organizers.

And yet, the close contacts he has with “hundreds of activists, some of them union officers but many with no elected position” (viii) also constitute a strength of the book. It is through them that the reader is privy to information about the most local and quotidian of affronts to these auto and farm-machine workers’ dignity: physical searches at the plant gates, foremen’s use of foul language, management’s manipulation of the bonus system and housing situation, its failure to replace a lightbulb in a stairwell without the intervention of the president of the firm, and so forth. Thanks to such contacts — the “interviews, reports at seminars, personal communications, and personal observation” (212) that comprise a great deal of the source-base — we learn of the local triumphs too: the liquidation of wage arrears, the saving of a factory from closure, the simple assertion of personal worth derived from participation in collective action.

On a larger scale, Labour After Communism is persuasive about where the main thrust of unions’ activities should go in these countries — not so much in opposition to respective governments as against the sway of private enterprise and its invocation of “objective constraints.” It also, incidentally, provides a useful corrective to the incredibly one-sided coverage of the regime of Aleksandr Lukachenko in Belarus. For, notwithstanding its undeniable political repressiveness, Belarusian workers by most criteria have fared better than their brothers and sisters in Russia and (notwithstanding the Orange Revolution) Ukraine. For all these reasons, the book deserves a wide readership. Indeed, a Russian-language edition would be highly appropriate. Let us hope that it avoids the perverse transposition of dates and other typographical errors with which this edition is afflicted.

Lewis Siegelbaum
Michigan State University


DAGMAR HERZOG begins her study by using the rich scholarship of the last decade to examine the conflicting sexual practices, attitudes, policies, and ideologies of Nazi Germany. She challenges older conclusions about these subjects, and insists that questions about sexuality rarely produce definitive or unambiguous answers. As she notes, the Nazis did not have a “master-plan [or] coherent policy” (17) for sexuality, and simultaneously acted or legislated in ways that were emancipatory for some, repressive, dangerous, and punitive for others. In her words, “legitimation of terror and the invitation to pleasure operated in tandem.” (18) But for Herzog, understanding the co-existence and permeable boundaries between sexual freedom and sexual repression, and the many popular sexual responses to the workings of the Nazi state is not an end in itself. Instead, as the title of her work indicates, she is concerned
with sex after fascism. Her purpose is to discuss how a variety of social and political groups reimagined the Nazi sexual past in different ways as they grappled with the reconstruction of political and moral truths in the post-1945 world. These same sexual imaginings enabled a variety of post-war actors — from Christian churches to political parties to professionals and intellectuals — to explain the rise of Nazism or to deal with their own complicity in the most brutal dimensions of the regime.

The first chapter of the book covers the period from the 1920s into the World War II era. Here Herzog addresses questions of continuity or rupture in sexual behaviours, attitudes, and policies between the Weimar and Nazi eras, and then focuses on Nazi policies and controls. The topics of youthful promiscuity, reproductive policies, the sexual demonization of Jews, adultery, and homosexuality are included in her discussion. Herzog depends on an impressive array of secondary literature, best represented in English in the works of scholars who contributed to a special issue of the *Journal of the History of Sexuality* which she edited in 2001/2002. Chapter 2 covers a “post-war moment” spanning the seven or eight years immediately after 1945. In her analyses of this period Herzog joins other scholars who have shown that instead of silence about Nazism, those years saw “incessant, insistent chatter,” (97) especially about sex, as society sought to manage memory and normalize Nazism. She refers to this period as a “window of sexual liberalism” (72) which was shut down after 1953 with “an abrupt shift toward sexual conservatism.” (101) This change is the subject of Chapter 3 which covers the years from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s during which the search for normality was evident in law, advice books, and the media, and debates about desirable sexual behaviors and policies were often described in terms of the Nazi past, with conservatives insisting Nazism was degenerate, and liberals viewing it as repressive. Chapter 4 moves away from the usual story of the sexual revolution of the mid-1960s, by analysing these events in the light of their connections to evolving views of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. Chapter 5 is a bit of a detour as Herzog shifts from West Germany to discuss the “alternate modernity” (184) of the German Democratic Republic, and to describe what she sees as its “remarkable sexual culture” in the post-war era. With Chapter 6 the author returns to the West and focuses on the post-1968 debates about sexuality in the New Left, and the eventual collapse of the sexual revolution in the 1980s. The chapter ends with a brief glance at the post-reunification decades during which the focus of sexual politics was “1968” and not the Nazi years.

In this panoramic sweep of German history, Herzog brings to non-German readers an impressive array of the most recent German scholarship on the history of sexuality, politics, and memory, along with exhaustive references to similar materials in English. She expands on these materials through her own investigations of advice literature, the writings of sexologists, medical professionals, philosophers, and sociologists, sexual surveys, published policies and law, and numerous newspapers. In some cases, material is repetitive, and often the reader has a hard time judging the impact or importance of a particular publication or survey. Do these works indeed represent “most” Germans as she sometimes claims? Nuggets of useful historiography and intellectual history are scattered through the volume including an introductory summary of strands of scholarly interpretations of sexuality under Nazism; a discussion of Theodor Adorno’s invocations of Nazism to argue for sexual freedom in the early 1960s, and an analysis of New Left cultural critic Klaus Theweleit’s two-volume *Male Fantasies*, which sought to define the essence of the relationship between fascism and sexuality.

In this book, Herzog has tackled extremely difficult and complex historical
questions. The story of the connections among sexual behaviours, attitudes, and ideologies and their political meanings is never simple and transparent. Attempting to bring these issues into considerations of memory and the uses (or abuses) of the past is a daunting enterprise and sometimes conclusions boldly go beyond the evidence presented. While Herzog might hope to startle us with sweeping generalities that “no one argued,” or “everyone thought,” and “all agreed,” in reality her chapters are always filled with diverse actors, and contested views and values. A particularly good example of this is the author’s assertion in Chapter 2 that the post-1945 period was a “time of libertarianism and open possibilities.” (100) In fact, the evidence in the chapter documents the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, shattered marriages, a push for restoration of “heterosexual domesticity,” and heightened homophobia. The author would have done better to stay with an argument for “ruptures and continuities, retrieval and reconstruction and [sic] new departures.” (107)

As we read the book, we must follow the contradictory tactics developed for “responding to social and political changes as West Germany moved from fascism to democracy,” and how these related heavily on debates over sexual behaviours and values. At the same time, we must consider how these tactics are also the tools for managing the memory of Nazism. Overlaps or porosity in chronology, which are understandable given the subject matter and material, nevertheless frequently make it difficult to follow the author’s arguments. Raising these cautions should not deter anyone from reading Herzog’s book; it is an always provocative and fascinating account of 20th-century German social, political, and cultural history. Some of the weaknesses I have pointed to result from the complexity of the undertaking. In the end, Herzog provides valuable insights for an understanding of the historical contretemps and conundrums of 20th-century Europe. In so doing she convinces us that history is an amalgam of “interpretations and conditions, representations and reality.” (260)

Jane Slaughter
University of New Mexico


IN UNSOCIAL EUROPE, Anne Gray investigates recent European trends towards labour market flexibility and work-for-welfare programs. The study critically analyses the interaction of benefits systems and changing forms of work and labour regulation in the context of globalization and European integration. Drawing on evidence from a number of cases, Gray argues that the EU and its member states have compromised the project of “Social Europe,” as well as workers’ rights and benefits more generally, by relying on neo-liberal policies that seek to mobilize low-cost labour and reduce wage pressure. The EU and OECD encourage member states to implement “active labour market policies” as a means of combating unemployment and labour market stagnation. These policies, however, contribute to the “flexploitation” of the labour force by driving down labour costs and reducing employment stability. Gray relies on a seven-country comparative study to question whether active labour market policies can reduce unemployment, and if so, what the effect of these policies is on the unemployed. The book builds on evidence derived from the Minima Sociaux project, a Commission-sponsored initiative examining the experiences of unemployed workers and benefit recipients in the UK, Germany, France, and Belgium. Gray augments this research through secondary material from Denmark, Sweden, and Spain. This approach successfully broadens the scope of analysis and allows Gray to examine trends in and across traditional categories
of European welfare regimes. Her research highlights that recent developments in welfare-to-work programs and labour market policies introduce new dimensions to Esping-Andersen’s classification of European welfare states. While a degree of convergence towards workfare across the various regimes is evident, differences in approaches continue to distinguish the various states within a single welfare state regime.

*Unsocial Europe* begins with a discussion of globalization and European integration as potential challenges to Keynesian traditions in the European welfare state. The author highlights that recent developments in European labour market policies are generally more concerned with the needs of business and capital than with the continuation of a Keynesian welfare system. In their attempt to combat rising unemployment, member state governments are increasingly relying on ‘supply side’ economics and a commitment to the mobilization of a flexible, skilled, and affordable workforce to promote employment growth, but fail to recognize the negative impact of these policies on job quality and employment conditions. This prompts active labour market policies and a quest for “social inclusion” through labour market participation. Yet social inclusion through labour market participation does not address the quality of jobs available. It is consequently becoming increasingly important that the European labour market policies address the quality as well as quantity of jobs.

Gray’s analysis differs from many other studies of labour market flexibility through her reliance on “front line evidence.” Gray introduces compelling evidence from unemployed workers and benefit recipients to show active labour market policies disempower the job seeker and frequently perpetuate poverty and the benefits trap. The book thus adds a human face to the bureaucratic language of labour market flexibility. By granting a voice to unemployed workers, Gray introduces a fundamentally new perspective to the debate on welfare, workfare, and social benefits.

Chapters 5 through 8 draw attention to the negative aspects of capital-oriented labour flexibility from the perspective of the unemployed. Following the European recession in the early 1980s, workfarist policies and a reduction in the rights of the unemployed challenged the ideal of “decommodification.” Job seekers consequently saw a reduction in their autonomy and rights, including their right to reject unsuitable positions. Sanctions and an increase in compulsory programs and measures have re-commodified labour and reduced the bargaining power of the unemployed. The country-by-country analysis in Chapter 5 questions which benefits system can, in the current capitalist system, best empower the unemployed and offer them a degree of bargaining power against bad employers, highlighting similarities and differences in the gradual shift towards greater conditionality of benefits in the various systems. While a return to the decommodified ideals of earlier years would make the unemployed less vulnerable to bad employers, Gray maintains that these systems could not supply individuals with decent jobs. We must, she suggests, fix the jobs rather than the benefits system.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 offer a more detailed discussion of specific factors in the relationship among labour market deregulation, “bad jobs,” and active labour market measures. All three chapters draw extensively on interview material to highlight the manner in which temporary and low-quality jobs can perpetuate the problems of unemployment and create a divide between “good” and “bad” jobs. The primary problem, Gray suggests, is not a shortage of jobs *per se*, but a shortage of high quality jobs. In general, available jobs are low-paid, low-skilled temporary positions with little appeal for job seekers concerned with safety, working hours, job security and training possibilities. This problem can be perpetuated by tem-
porary work agencies which argue that any job is better than no job.

In contrast to much of the conventional literature, Gray finds that low wages have only a minimal effect on unemployment levels. Active labour market policies make it easier for employers to hire and fire. Job creation incentives directed at the employer may encourage companies to replace full-time workers with several part-time or flexible positions, dramatically compromising job security and increasing the number of under-employed workers. Thus, labour market flexibility may in fact have a neutral effect on job creation. Moreover, the across-the-board drop in job security contributes to a series of other problems, including the reduction of the bargaining power of labour unions, increased reliance on benefits and social services for low-paid and part-time workers, and an increased polarization of incomes. Certainly, the European Union has attempted to avoid a “race to the bottom” which could result through the deregulation of the labour market. EU re-regulation however has been largely insufficient and ineffective.

The neo-liberal economic policies favoured by the EU and the OECD have led to policies to increase flexibility to the benefit of capital and at the expense of “Social Europe.” Gray concludes that while the project of “Social Europe” could be revived it would require substantial changes to labour market policies. She describes the necessary re-thinking as “layers of change” or building blocks in which a re-organization of some aspects of labour market policy could gradually be expanding to include a more radical re-structuring and thus move beyond neo-liberal policy solutions. Gray recognizes that these changes, particularly the second and third stages, will be met with strong resistance from the agents of capitalism, yet maintains that it is essential to use the EU institutions and possibilities for social dialogue to overcome the dominance of the neo-liberal project and secure an upward harmonization of workers’ rights and benefits.

Gray’s analysis of benefits systems and rules from the perspective of the unemployed is a valuable addition to the debates on globalization, shifting welfare policies, and the nature of work. The focus on the experiences of the unemployed takes the comparative analysis into new territory and “humanizes” the discussion of employment policy. The book is of value to those interested in the evolution of social and labour policy at both national and European levels, as well as those studying the interplay between national and European level social policy. Overall, this is an interesting and well-written study.

Heather MacRae
Carleton University


IN THE REVISED and updated edition of her 1996 book on women’s employment issues, Hakim has triggered a controversy worthy of the much earlier debates among scholars about why the labour market experiences of women are as they are. Women at the turn of this century continue to exhibit markedly different labour market circumstances than men. They are far more likely to work in nonstandard employment, employment that is less than fulltime, paid below the rate of men, and often does not make full use of their qualifications. As explanation, Hakim puts forward a new theory, developed and tested by her, called preference theory. She puts forward this theory as more in tune with the data, which she presents in great detail over six chapters loaded with statistics, than other theories such as Goldberg’s theory of male dominance or Becker’s theory of comparative advan-
Hakim claims that preference theory is: historically informed; empirically based; multi-disciplinary; prospective; and applicable in all rich modern societies. By presenting pages and pages of European data, much of it outdated, to support her theory, she contends that it is historically specific, reflective of the diversity of women’s lifestyle preferences, and based on new surveys which put it to the test. From this she concludes that women’s weaker attachment to the labour market, lower pay, and predominance in the nonstandard workforce is not a result of discriminatory or less than women-friendly policies and attitudes in the labour market, but a consequence of the choices women freely make. The issue of choice is a difficult one.

Can we be regarded as having made a choice because we find the barriers and daily struggles of juggling work, childcare, and the myriads of demands on our time and energy beyond what we can endure? We cannot opt out of our families, once our children have been born. So we compromise in the areas we can — we take part-time work because we need to work but cannot make the economics or practicalities of working full-time work for us, at least not without public affordable childcare and supportive partners. Does this imply a less serious commitment to our work as Hakim would suggest or does it simply recognize the limitations of the current structure and organization of society which forces women to make choices we do not ask men to make?

Hakim’s conclusions are hard to agree with. The reasoning is flawed; great leaps of presumption are made about women. If anything, she is guiltier than most current researchers in this field in presuming to know what women want. It is hard to tell how Hakim would respond to labour market data based on race or class. If one followed her own logic, these individuals, like women, would be exhibiting a choice to work in less desirable employment than white, middle and professional class men. This stretches credibility. The reality is far more sinister than that. Discrimination continues and women who are also members of another minority by virtue of ethnic origin, race, or disability are doubly disadvantaged. Further, neoliberal economic and labour market policies have resulted in the erosion of employment security and conditions for a large portion of workers. Increasingly, two breadwinners, not one, are required to survive. This is not a matter of choice, but one of necessity. And just because one of those individuals may earn less than the other, it does not make that employment secondary, and most certainly, not optional or discretionary for that family, as Hakim claims. In the seven years between 1995 and 2002, lone mothers in Canada increased their labour force participation by 17 per cent. Have preferences changed that much over that period? In 2002, 67 per cent of female sole parents worked compared to 72 per cent of women in two-parent families. Are the women in sole parent families that different from those in two-parent families? Also in 2002, 26 per cent of women working part-time wanted full-time work, while 30 per cent of men did. Is this enough of a difference to assert that all women working part-time are choosing to do so? (Statistics from Women in Canada: Work Chapter Updates 2003) Labour markets in industrialized countries are increasingly polarized, with increasing numbers of workers working multiple jobs to make ends meet and earning less. Simultaneously, the portion of low-income men is increasing while the percentage of women is decreasing marginally. With more women in the workforce by necessity and by choice, women’s education levels reaching or exceeding those of men, jobs becoming less stable, and wages stagnating, the sex difference among the lower paid in Canada has dropped from a 15 per cent gap to a 7.8 per cent gap from 1981 to 1998. The gender wage gap has similarly narrowed substan-
tially from 41.6 to 27.5 per cent between 1967 and 1997. Is this a result of changing preferences or other phenomena? (Statistics from *Winners and Losers in the Labour Market of the 1990s*).

For those interested in exploring the contemporary issues of women’s employment in the Canadian context, there are many useful sources. Leading the pack is the work of the Alliance on Contingent Employment [ACE] headed by Leah Vosko. In this comprehensive look at precarious employment, Vosko and her fellow researchers are unpacking the difficult questions of what dimensions of our labour market and social policy and regulatory framework play a role in facilitating the precarious nature of increasingly large numbers of employment alternatives. Unlike Hakim who argues that seasonal jobs, temporary work, and term jobs offer an opportunity for a better work-life balance, ACE recognizes the involuntary nature of much of this work and sees a societal responsibility to ensure that workers in these forms of employment are not vulnerable. Other interesting sources to consult include the work of Heisz, Jackson, and Picot in the above-mentioned *Winners and Losers in the Labour Market of the 1990s*, Zeytinoglu in “Gender, Race and Class Dimensions of Nonstandard Work,” *Industrial Relations* (Vol. 55), the special issue of *Just Labour* (Vol. 3, Fall 2003) on ACE’s work, and Hughes, Lowe, and Schellenberg in *Men’s and Women’s Quality of Work in the New Canadian Economy*. Basic data on women’s employment circumstances are available in the *Women in Canada: Work Chapter Updates* released periodically by Statistics Canada, most recently in 2003.

Reading this book, one is left wondering if Hakim sees herself as the latter day conscience of overzealous feminists whose work on women’s employment left little room for women who might prefer to remain out of the paid workforce for any number of reasons. To move from providing room for such diversity of choice to suggesting as Hakim does in this book that all but a small margin of women’s continued disadvantage in the labour market is the result of women’s preferences is to deny the evidence and the reality of the very difficult experience of the many women who struggle every day to earn respect for all the roles they may either choose or find themselves in. In so doing, Hakim provides fodder to those who would continue to subjugate women and create structures and rules that punish them for their circumstances. This we do not need.

Ursule Critoph
Athabasca University


DESPITE SLIGHT increases in enrollment in nursing education programs over the past few years, nurses continue to leave the profession in record numbers and there are many more nursing positions across North America than there are nurses available to fill them. In this book, Gordon discusses three key factors — the relationship between nursing and medicine, the portrayal of nursing in the media, and the organization of nursing work within the health care system — that, from her perspective, are associated with this problem.

In Part One, Gordon intersperses a historical analysis of the development of the relationship between nursing and medicine with accounts from nurses and doctors to show how professional education, formal and informal, has created a power differential and influenced these relationships. She notes that both medicine and nursing education have perpetuated the “doctor knows best” perspective. Although nurses’ knowledge and observational expertise are clearly necessary, they seem somehow to be less important...
contributions than those of the doctor and sometimes drop off the radar screen altogether. Gordon notes that this distinction is also evident in the ways nurses and doctors dress and in the ways they address each other. While nurses wear pastel uniforms and comfy, printed smocks, doctors wear business attire and white coats. Nurses, regardless of their level of education, are addressed by their first name, while doctors are always addressed as Dr. ———.

The power differential also surfaces in verbal (and sometimes physical) abuse of nurses by doctors. This abuse has historically been accepted as an exercise in stress release — something doctors are entitled to do given their many long years of sleep-deprived training. Researchers who have studied the health professions thought these disparities were rooted in gender issues and hoped that as more men became nurses and more women became doctors, the characteristics of the relationships between nursing and medicine would change. Gordon notes that with a few notable exceptions, this does not appear to be happening. Rather, there is a general perception that bright young people interested in health become doctors and those not “smart enough” to do so become nurses. In this context, abusive behaviour is almost considered a “right,” something one is allowed to do given his or her superior intellectual position. Nurses don’t like the abuse but they expect it, are grateful when it doesn’t happen, and are reluctant to complain about it.

The relationship between nursing and medicine is further complicated by ways in which the roles of physicians and nurses are portrayed in the media and prescribed within health care organizations. These points are discussed in Chapters 6 to 14. Gordon cites many examples of ways in which nurses must constantly be on the alert to catch errors in medical orders and interpretation of lab tests but are seldom given credit for this work. When patients write notes to hospitals following discharge, they describe the excellent medical care they received but seldom comment on the care provided by nurses. The invisibility of nursing extends beyond hospital walls. For example, Gordon notes that while many individuals know that the popular group Doctors without Borders won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for their wonderful international work, they don’t realize that the group includes many nurses.

The portrayal of nurses in the media further supports their inferior position in relation to doctors. Gordon notes that regardless of whether one examines portrayals of nurses in books, television, or movies, all give the same message — while nurses may be trustworthy and honest, they are “kind but dumb.”

The historical relationship between nurses and doctors and the way nurses are represented in the media are mirrored in the way nursing services were reorganized during the period of health care reform in the 1990s. Whole departments of nursing, previously recognized internationally for their excellence, disappeared. Directors of nursing became directors of patient care services, responsible for rehabilitation, laundry, pharmacy, and other support services, in addition to nursing. Nursing positions were cut and many settings witnessed an increase in the use of less expensive staff, despite the fact that patient acuity levels and the complexity of patient care were increasing. During this period, Gordon notes that compulsory overtime became common. After working an eight- or twelve-hour shift, nurses were increasingly being asked to remain on duty for an additional shift. Those who refused were told they had “abandoned” their patients, were not a “team player,” and were frequently fired. In other industries, these conditions might facilitate the development of strong unions and while some excellent bargaining units have developed in a few places, this is generally not the case. Rooted deeply in the way nurses are socialized, opponents to unionization have stressed
the professional, selfless nature of nursing and tried to distinguish it from blue-collar work.

Not surprisingly, the above changes to the health care system have given rise to a tremendous shortage of nurses. Nurses with other options have left the profession and young people, seeing the position of nurses in society, have chosen other professions. This development has sent recruiters on trips around the world to hunt for nurses for the North American health care system. They offer wonderful incentives not available to existing staff, further fracturing the nursing workforce. This approach to solving the nursing shortage has added additional stresses related to language proficiency and educational equivalence.

Gordon’s writing about the experience of nurses is evocative. As a nurse, I found my mind wondering back to additional examples of the points she raised from my own practice over the past 30 years. I have never personally witnessed the abuse she described but I certainly know individuals among my Canadian nursing colleagues who have. Her writing is overwhelming at times and I found I could only read a few pages at a time. She does an excellent job of capturing the sense of helplessness we have all experienced, not just in the last fifteen years, but also from the earliest days of our professional work. Although Gordon’s examples are drawn mainly from the US, she provides some analysis of health care restructuring in Canada and other countries in the 1990s.

Several things bothered me about this book. First, it is a little too “black and white.” Physicians as a group are portrayed negatively. I work with many doctors who are not at all like the ones she describes. Indeed, there are some who would have made excellent nurses! They are kind, caring, and respectful. I have been particularly impressed by the collegial and collaborative interpersonal style of recent medical graduates. This variation within the medical profession has heightened the uncertainty surrounding interactions between nurse and doctors. We (nurses) never quite know what to expect.

Second, the book left me wanting a deeper explanation of how such a dysfunctional set of professional relationships could have developed. These things don’t just happen. More importantly, why are they being perpetuated? What are the driving forces within society that require the sharp power differential between nursing and medicine? What (and whose) interests do they serve?

Nevertheless, Gordon has “seen” nursing and presents it in clear and vivid detail, even though she is not a nurse. She has raised new questions in my mind about my profession and the way we think about who we are and what we do. Her book still sits on my desk. I won’t be ready to put it away for quite a while.

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This book supports the privatization of the oceans, accepting the neo-liberal economic argument that marine common-property rights have led globally to the problem of open-access depletion of fish stocks. (1) Hannesson favours individual transferable quotas (ITQs): fish quotas assigned by the state to economic entities, which may be transferred for specified periods or permanently by lease, sale, or other forms of property transaction such as inheritance. Such private property rights would ensure that fishers use resources for long-term productivity rather than squandering them in the short term. The author cites New Zealand and the Pacific coast of Canada as examples of the successful application of ITQs, while Chile and Norway are cases where the potential success of ITQs succumbed to the problems of democracy.
Hannesson sees Iceland and the United States as places in which ITQs have proved economically efficient, but politically controversial because of the manner in which such efficiency has concentrated wealth and capital.

Hannesson argues that ruthless self-interest defines humanity. Such self-interest has had grave consequences internationally, according to the author: “most of human history is a history of ethnic cleansing and the rule by the club, the sword, the cannon, the machine gun, and the bomb. Gradually, and with setbacks, we seem to be entering the phase of the rule of law.” (39) However, our Hobbesian struggle of all against all proved its worth by being at the heart of the American victory over the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Hannesson feels that “private property is a manifestation of self-interest and greed; if we were happy to share everything, there would be no reason for private property. It is indeed paradoxical that a system based on self-interest and greed has proven itself superior to socialism, which is based on shared interests and common ownership.” (9) Hannesson argues that the self-interest of private property drives us to be as economically efficient as possible, but we need a strong state to set the rules for the pursuit of our interests. These rules should not protect the weak, but rather ensure that the sanctity of private property is not harmed by our competition. Hannesson lauds the Pinochet regime in Chile for having the power to force ITQs on the fishing industry in the late 1980s. Unfortunately, industrial and labour interests took advantage of the democratic reforms of the 1990s to limit the extent of fisheries reform. States should be strong enough to impose ITQs on initially unwilling publics, Hannesson argues, but they should not want to retain any control over the quota rights that would “detract from their instrumentality.” (78)

Hannesson concedes that ITQs may trouble people who worry about the unequal distribution to private entities of what should be public rents generated by fisheries. He concedes that governments might use taxation to ensure that society benefits from rents, but concludes his discussion of this issue with arguments against such taxes. These arguments suggest that governments would only waste the money on public services, and that rents would “reduce the value of the quotas,” reducing the ability of holders to reinvest extra profits as capital in their enterprises, and providing incentives for them to push for higher quotas. (60) Particularly foolhardy, he argues, are the objections of coastal community groups, the organized labour movement, and social democratic parties and governments which, as in the case of Norway, opposed the development of ITQs on the grounds that they would encourage the consolidation of wealth and capacity in fewer communities and among fewer people. To Hannesson, such objections are manifestations of a misguided ideological commitment to the imposition of “Soviet-type” planning in fisheries management. (107)

While happy with the development of ITQs in the Canadian Pacific rockfish fishery, Hannesson sees similar misconceptions at work on Canada’s east coast as well as in Iceland. In the latter cases, he argues, governments have been too concerned with managing fisheries for social as well as economic purposes. Hannesson feels that governments should reject political pressure from coastal communities, which fear that ITQs would result in the loss of their local share in the fishing industry. Hannesson argues that communities which might face plant closures and job losses under an ITQ regime likely had little comparative advantage in the fishing industry anyway. It would be inefficient and wasteful to prop them up, or to prevent labour from finding some more productive use elsewhere. Hannesson clearly feels that workers in fisheries are primarily factors of production that must be free to find their best use. Social and economic policies designed to support
fishing communities are misguided because they inhibit the free circulation of such labour. Hannesson acknowledges that people’s anxieties about losing their jobs and communities underlie much of the international opposition to ITQs. He further claims that in areas such as the eastern seaboard of the United States, where ITQs have been introduced into surf clam and quahog fisheries, workers and fishing communities have worried less about them because there are other industrial sectors close by to absorb their labour. However, the clear message in this book is that fisheries managers must not worry about the social consequences of property rights policies. The only cases in which Hannesson accepts that fishers might have a positive role to play in fisheries management are when producers’ cooperatives, as in the case of the Alaskan pollock fishery, are willing to accept ownership of ITQs.

History, argues Hannesson, is “a victory march of property rights,” especially as demonstrated by his understanding of the English enclosures and the Scottish Highlands. (14) Relying solely on the late 19th-century work of T.E. Scrutton, E.C.K. Gonner’s Common Land and Enclosure (1966), and E. Richards’s work on the Highlands and Patrick Sellar (who was acquitted by a jury of landowners of charges of murder and brutality as he served as the agent for landowners demanding tenant evictions), Hannesson accepts without question every contemporary observation that the right of the commons led only to rural poverty. Common rights to the land, like common property in contemporary fisheries, created “a poverty trap.” (18) Those who could not appreciate the progress of the clearances were simply “rural romantics and defenders of the old ways and culture of the Highlands.” (21) The concentration of capital in fewer, but larger and more efficient units of production, whether 19th-century farms, or 21st-century fishing enterprises, leads to a knee-jerk reaction: “Everyone loves the family farm but curses the large corporation, even if our material well being is due in no small measure to the fact that the former is largely gone out of business while the latter provides us with energy, communications and even food.” (77)

Hannesson’s “history” of the enclosure of the commons in Britain is appallingly outdated and ideologically loaded. This is not surprising; Hannesson does not take seriously ideas other than his own. He dismisses as “Panglossian” the voluminous research that questions the assumptions underlying Hardin’s tragedy of the commons thesis, assumptions which form the basis for his book. (82) Environmentalists, he claims, have a “charming naiveté” that frustrates sound economic management of the fisheries. (67) His penchant for disregard suggests that Hannesson would not have treated seriously the more recent, extensive literature on the nature of the commons and enclosure in Britain, or anywhere else for that matter. In the New Zealand case, for example, Hannesson discounts Maori opposition to the potential dispossession of their traditional fishing rights by ITQs as having “many of the hallmarks of rent seeking with vicarious arguments.” (90) Further, Hannesson has no time for democratic institutions if they countenance anything besides a commitment to his market-based ideology. Hannesson condemns the structure of fisheries management councils in the United States because they listen to and act upon popular and industrial opposition to ITQs. It would be “better,” according to Hannesson, “to get politics out of fisheries management” by replacing democratic institutions “with market-driven incentive structures that will ensure maximization of economic benefit in the long term.” (161)

This book is a fine illustration of the problems that arise from the neo-liberal economist’s obsession with market models and market ideology. The least harmful effect of Hannesson’s book is a truncated and erroneous perspective on the
history of the popular use of the commons in many of the countries of the North Atlantic rim. More alarming is the implication throughout the book that the world will be a better place when we all accept that our resources and activity must only be used for the pursuit of self-interest. Governments should not concern themselves with social priorities when attempting to implement ITQs. Instead, governments should demonstrate the strength of will to rule in the interests of private property, regardless of the democratically expressed priorities of any particular society.

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IN THIS SHORT BOOK sociological theorist John O’Neill returns once more to the theme of his earlier work, The Missing Child in Liberal Theory (1994), indicting the failure of liberalism, over the past quarter-century, to protect the rights of children. Civic Capitalism represents an impassioned and at times eloquent plea for a return to the principles of universal social citizenship, articulated most powerfully by T.H. Marshall in his well-known 1949 essay on “Citizenship and Social Class.” The difference is that in Civic Capitalism the injuries and inequalities of childhood rather than social class constitute the dominant narrative. “Rather than give the critical voice to the parties or the classes ... I have given it to children, for whom the issues of equity, security, and well-being must be addressed if we are to retain any claim to civility,” O’Neill writes. (1) In this respect, his work joins a long tradition of child advocates stretching from Charles Dickens and J.J. Kelso in the 19th century to sponsors of mothers’ and family allowances in the 20th by invoking the rights and needs of the child as the fulcrum required to “save capitalism from itself.” (7)

What is “civic capitalism”? In one of many formulas sprinkled throughout the book, O’Neill defines it as “Civic capitalism = Human Capital + Social Capital + Private Capital.” (14) Essentially, O’Neill argues from a human capital perspective that a society’s investment in children is as or more important for its future health and well-being than investment in physical capital and that a secure “civic childhood” can only be sustained through generous support of families, of the public health, educational, and social services which determine whether children thrive or fail, and through the cooperation of a private sector which recognizes the costs and obligations of this interdependency. None of the above sounds controversial. Indeed, it describes much of the Keynesian welfare state consensus of the first three decades after World War II. The fact that O’Neill is compelled to make this argument in 2004, in defence of children’s rights, is a measure of how far that consensus has in fact unraveled.

The blame, according to O’Neill, can be laid at the feet of the three dominant intellectual currents of the past three decades: neo-liberalism, identity politics, and the Foucauldian turn. The “anti-governance” tendencies and possessive individualism of neo-liberalism (56), the fragmenting preoccupation of identity politics with “lifestyle issues,” (55) and the Foucauldian stigmatization of the welfare state as a “demon of control,” (83) O’Neill argues, have all worked in tandem to erode support for the idea of “something like a standard childhood.” (80) The end result, intentionally or unintentionally, has been to undermine the rights of children, the one group which “cuts across the exclusions of race, class, and gender,” and yet lacks political voice. (23) Only a renewed dedication to their rights, O’Neill argues, can overcome the current “wilding of capitalism.” (5) A focus on children can also “bring the generations together and perhaps thereby
to take the edge off class, race, and
genderism.” (11)

In the book’s five chapters on “civic capitalism,” “civic education,” “the civic state,” “civic childhood,” and the “civic gift,” O’Neill sketches in broad strokes the types of family friendly social policies, educational ideals, welfare state reforms, children’s benefits, and re-imagined altruism that are required to rehabilitate a liberal state in which children’s social citizenship can flourish. High on the list are universal day-care programs, generous children’s allowances, affordable and attractive social housing, schools aimed at the pursuit of “learning to learn” rather than applied skills training, income and wage policies which reduce rather than enhance market inequalities, the expansion of public goods in health, recreation, and social services, a guaranteed annual income sufficient for the basic standards of life, and the end of a male breadwinner ideology. At the broadest level, O’Neill also calls for the “institutionalization of an international standard of childhood.” (86) These are by now familiar parts of a social democratic agenda and O’Neill makes the case for them forcefully. In the chapters on civic education and civic childhood, by far the strongest in the book, he is particularly eloquent in his defence of some of the normalizing tendencies of the welfare state so criticized by Foucault and his followers. “The standardization of life chances,” O’Neill reminds us, “is essential to the covenant we enter into with the children we make.” (79)

Even the sympathetic reader, however, is left puzzled as to how O’Neill’s agenda in defence of civic childhood is to be realized, given the forces arrayed against it. His book is far clearer on what needs to be done than on who will do it, which is another way of saying that Civic Capitalism is primarily an exercise in moral suasion, not political strategy. “We must restate what we can reasonably expect from the market and what we can reasonably ask of government,” (39) O’Neill writes without saying what those limits might look like or who should define them. Later on he urges a shift from what he describes as a welfare regime based on a “Gendered Market Contract” [GMC] to one based upon an “Intergenerational Civic Covenant” [ICC], noting that for such a transition to occur “national states must realign income measures around a non-productivist civic covenant.” (71) But which groups or forces in society will bring this about? O’Neill does not say.

Indeed, the lack of agency in Civic Capitalism is its greatest weakness. Absent from his discussion is a sense of the coalitions, alliances, contradictions, or windows of opportunity which went into creating the welfare state along with the rights of children which he is anxious to defend and enhance. At one point O’Neill notes in passing that “the welfare state as we have known it ... was the product of a social compact between the state, business, church, and labour.” (63) But that is about all we get by way of historical analysis. The implicit assumption is that recognition of the plight of children in itself should be the motive force for entrenching their rights, a trope familiar to most child-saving literature. If this were true there would be no need for the book O’Neill has written, since the quest for a “civic childhood” would have long since been resolved. Not all children have been disadvantaged. Nor do all the disadvantaged come from the ranks of children. A strategy designed to rehabilitate social citizenship for the 21st century must clearly include but not be limited to campaigns for children’s rights.

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BEINER’S BOOK retells an old sad tale: the actions of a small privileged elite frustrate the intentions of legislation designed by the larger community to address a social problem, legislation that relies on the legal system to provide redress to victims and to encourage social reorganization to eliminate the social problem.

In this case, the social problem is the sexual harassment of women in the workplace; the legislation is Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act that defines workplace sexual harassment as an illegal form of discrimination for which victims can seek damages in the courts. The small elite that frustrates this enterprise is, no surprise, the male (mostly) judiciary of the lower and higher courts of the USA, and corporations and their lawyers.

Beiner’s goal is to reform US jurisprudence on Title VII as a means of reforming the US workplace from one that tolerates sexual harassment to one that discourages it. A reformed jurisprudence should provide fair and equitable decisions in workplace sexual harassment cases. The unfair and inequitable decisions produced now are seen by Beiner to be the product of the disjunction between the views of US courts and the social reality of workplace sexual harassment. Out of touch with workplace social reality, the court’s views are structured out of presumption and stereotypes which lead to a focus on the behaviour of the female victims of workplace sexual harassment instead of the behaviour of the harasser. The outcome is that victims win too few cases, and harassers and their employers win too many. Even those cases lost by harassers and their employers result in small damages awards and this allows workplace sexual harassment to flourish in the USA.

Beiner believes that the corrective for presumptions and stereotypes held by the US court system is social science research that provides a factual basis for addressing questions from how victims respond to sexual harassment, through how effective are workplace sexual harassment policies and practices, to what are usual outcomes for women who do report sexual harassment and take their complaints to court.

Can social science research correct all of these presumptions and stereotypes? Does the research exist? If so, is there enough of it and is it relevant? Is the quality of the research adequate to the task? Are samples appropriate, large enough to be convincing and accurately measured? The answers, according to Beiner, are yes to all of the above.

This is not to say that she is unaware of difficulties here. She points to the problem of social science relying on “correlational studies” that do not “prove anything” but does not discuss the practical impossibility of experimental studies (which supposedly “prove things”) of these phenomena. Nevertheless, Beiner sees that a lot of correlational studies can add up to something useful. Another problem is studies that rely upon college student populations who differ in substantial ways from working populations. Beiner’s solution: use only studies based on samples of working people except where no alternatives exist and alert the reader where she has to use results from studies based entirely on student samples. She comments on problems with terminology, diversity of disciplines, too much variety in social science theories, and the short amount of time social science has been researching sexual harassment. Forewarning the reader, Beiner proceeds to use the research to show the mistaken conceptions and stereotypes that dominate the thinking and the actions of the US courts with regard to sexual harassment.

In Chapter 1, Beiner uses social science research to show that “the perceptions of judges on what constitutes harassment to the reasonable person do not always square with what reasonable peo-
ple perceive as harassment.” (16) The result is judges refusing to hear cases or permit them to go to trial on the grounds that the incidents complained of are not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to constitute actionable sexual harassment. Beiner suggests that social science surveys of community opinions on what constitutes sexual harassment would set a more appropriate standard and allow more cases to go to trial. On the other hand, she also suggests that refocusing courts’ attentions toward whether the harasser’s actions affect the victim’s conditions of employment would serve as a better criterion for “actionable” sexual harassment.

In her second chapter, Beiner suggests that the same refocus would put a good end to the “reasonable woman” debate currently used as part of the standard for determining if a harasser’s activities constitute actionable sexual harassment.

Beiner’s third chapter takes up the issue of how the “unwelcomeness” of sexual harassment has led to an inappropriate focus on the victim’s response to harassment, and to her having to “prove” the harasser’s attention was unwelcome, much as rape victims have to. Social science research results are used to show how the great majority of victims respond to sexual harassment by ignoring/avoiding it as long as possible. Harasser defendants can easily argue that they were misled by this response into thinking their actions were welcomed by the victim. Even after the failure of the ignoring/avoiding strategy, most victims do not report sexual harassment because of the risks associated with reporting. Beiner’s solution is to put the burden of proof onto the harasser who would have to explain why he thought the behavior complained about was welcomed by the victim/plaintiff.

Is harassment of an employee “because of sex” or not? If it’s not, then a sexual harassment suit cannot be brought under Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act. How do fact finders (judges and juries) make decisions not based on stereotypes? Beiner looks first at some social science research that suggests stereotypes play a smaller role in simple decisions than in complex, and when the criteria for decision making are unambiguous. She then suggests that “fact finders” assess five simple factors which social science has shown consistently show up when sexual harassment occurs: “(1) whether the workplace is gender homogeneous; (2) whether the target is isolated from others of the same gender; (3) whether the occupation is traditionally gendered male or female; (4) whether the environment is sexualized, ...; (5) what is management’s (including the immediate supervisor’s) attitude toward harassment.” (141) This discussion takes up Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 deals with what Beiner sees as the most troublesome practice of the courts in sexual harassment cases. She looks at US Supreme Court decisions which provide a defence for employers, and require the sexual harassment victim to report the sexual harassment as “early as possible.” The first permits employers to avoid liability for their employee’s sexual harassment by pointing to their policy and training without having to show evidence that these are effective in preventing sexual harassment. Social science research shows that most policies and training programs are, in fact, ineffective. The second requires victims to act in ways that social science research shows most do not and will not, and hence impairs the likelihood that their suit will succeed. Beiner’s solution here is to require employers to show that their practices actually work to diminish sexual harassment, have fact finders accept that harassed employees usually take a lot of time to report sexual harassment, and encourage courts to use compensatory and punitive damages assessments to discipline the most offending employers.

In Chapter 6, Beiner examines how to compensate victims and how to deter defendants. Her solution for both goals is to abandon the upper limits (caps) placed on sexual harassment damage awards in the US federal legislation and to use compen-
sation and punitive damage awards “crea-
tively.” She uses social science research on
the damage award behaviour of juries
to show that without the caps, juries will
not go crazy with large awards that ruin
businesses found liable for workplace
sexual harassment. In fact, they are likely
to come up with awards that adequately
compensate victims as well as encourage
employers to take sexual harassment seri-
ously.

In the final chapter, Beiner summa-
rizes her approach to making Title VII of
the US Civil Rights Act work to achieve
its stated purposes: eliminate discrimina-
tion in the workplace and compensate vic-
tims. I found her arguments theoretically
convincing, by and large, but as she ad-
mits, it is difficult to assess how effective
all the changes would be without seeing
them in action. And if they were imple-
mented, it would not be surprising to see
Beiner’s plan dismantled bit by bit by the
same forces that undermined and defeated
the stated purposes of Title VII of the US
Civil Rights Act described in this book.

Beiner’s book is a striking example of
the thoughtful and clever use of social sci-
ence research findings to point to changes
that will improve the operation of an im-
portant US social institution. But what is
its relevance to Canadian reformers?
Lawyers I consulted here suggested Cana-
dian law has gone in more liberal direc-
tions than the US and that American cases
are rarely, if ever, cited in Canadian sex-
ual harassment cases today. Arjun
Aggarwal, senior author of *Sexual Ha-
arrassment in the Workplace*, in a personal
communication, points out that “the U.S.
procedures for resolving sexual harass-
ment disputes and the criteria for deter-
mining the amount of compensation has
had little or no effect on the Canadian sys-
tem.” So Beiner’s book would not serve as
a guide for what is needed in Canada.
However, Aggarwal also argues that “de-
velopments in the U.S. and the functioning
of the EEOC in resolving disputes is
closely watched by Canadian employers
and administrative agencies” and that “an
understanding of the developments and
trends in the U.S. is imperative for an ap-
preciation of this rapidly-growing area of
law.” If this is what you need, read
Beiner’s book. Readers unfamiliar with
the US setup for sexual harassment as a
form of sexual discrimination should be-
gin with Chapter 6.

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Gary Teeple, *The Riddle of Human Rights*
(Aurora: Garamond Press 2004)

The idea of human rights has had an un-
deniably profound impact on Western so-
ciety in the 20th century. Surprisingly,
however, the study of human rights by Ca-
nadian academics, with the exception of
scholars in law and political science, re-
mains relatively unexplored. Gary
Teeple’s most recent book, alongside sev-
eral other recent publications by Cana-
dian historians, represents the emergence
of a new field of study among Canadian
scholars.

In *The Riddle of Human Rights*, Gary
Teeple forwards a scathing critique of the
human rights paradigm. He argues that
the concept of human rights is a contra-
diction that reflects similar contradic-
tions in the capitalist system. According
to Teeple, human rights are not truly uni-
versal or inherent. Political rights serve
the interests of the upper class whereas
social rights are nothing more than con-
cessions designed to placate the working
class. Social (including economic) rights
were not realized until after World War II;
these rights are the result of work-
ing-class struggles and are continually
under attack by hegemonic forces, partic-
ularly in the wake neo-liberalism. One ex-
ample of the contradictions inherent in
the idea of human rights is the entrench-
ment of civil rights and social rights in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Civil rights are exclusive by nature (lim-
ited access to social products) while so-
cial rights are inclusive (generalized rights to social products). Civil rights legitimate the state and require the state to protect private property in a system dominated by market mechanisms. But the market is unable to effectively reproduce this system on its own since access to basic goods and services may be denied by the inevitable inequities of the system. Concessions, in the form of social rights, are required to protect people from the vagaries of a system in which price mechanisms, not need, determine access to essential goods such as food and clothing.

Although both civil and social rights may co-exist, the contradiction is that the complete realization of one would, by necessity, preclude the existence of the other. As a result, in socialist states human rights are only partially valid (or totally alien) because state ownership of the means of production precludes the need for civil rights, and political rights exist only within the governing party. In contrast, political rights in capitalist societies set the stage for competing factions among capital to determine which will dominate state policy.

Drawing on the history of truth and reconciliation commissions, the international criminal court and other international agencies for human rights enforcement, the author draws out the underlying problem with human rights claims today: inequality and rights violations are blamed on individual human error. Human rights agencies, by their very nature, are blind to systemic inequalities and, thus, systemic solutions. His section on NGOs, using Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International as case studies, is particularly engaging, and he raises interesting questions about the repercussions of their activism. The work ends with a discussion of the future of human rights in the face of global capitalism and the implications of 9/11. The book is organized thematically and is highly accessible, with several sections dedicated to explaining difficult concepts. It would be an ideal textbook for a course on human rights.

Teeple’s work is a welcome addition to stimulating debates on the implications of the human rights paradigm. But skeptics will question many of his assumptions. For instance, Teeple is not prepared to abandon the idea of human rights, but calls for a reconceptualization of human rights as a social imperative rather than a legal one designed for a market-oriented society. He recognizes that it is the link between human rights and the capitalist state or, more specifically, that it is the liberal conception of human rights that defines human rights solely as legal rights derived from the state, which limits human rights to being a tool for maintaining inequalities of wealth and power. A new conception of human rights would privilege social rights above civil rights; social rights would no longer be concessions designed to maintain the dominance of economic elites. In this new guise, human rights are presented in a broader, cultural framework in which a market-oriented society is replaced by a community focused on the fullest realization of human rights.

Is such a conception of human rights possible? Human rights are essentially a product of the state. A right does not exist until it is recognized by some kind of legal instrument enforced by a state. Even the international human rights system is statist. The United Nations’ human rights agencies may seek to shame states with reports on human rights violations, but in the end it is up to individual states to interpret and apply human rights principles as they see fit. Granted, activists may make human rights claims, and such claims have a powerful moral force, but a claim does not become a right until it is recognized by the state. Those who have argued that moral suasion and social pressure are a way of enforcing human rights standards fail to appreciate the historical evolution of the human rights paradigm. A voluntary agreement by a private agency to serve blacks at a lunch counter is not a
recognition of a right. Historically, human rights activists in countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia have always sought legal recognition of human rights claims. It is thus questionable whether human rights could be reconceptualized in such a manner. Moreover, to divorce human rights from their capitalist/legal foundation would seem to apply the term so broadly as to make it an unwieldy and ineffective concept. The term ‘human rights’ is already so expansively conceived that it has become a debased form of rhetoric.

At a major conference organized at the University of British Columbia on Food and Human Rights in October 2005, a keynote speaker (a leading figure in the United Nations and the international human rights community) argued that the solution to food poverty around the world was to entrench access to nutrition as a right so that judges could step in and guarantee the poor access to food. Surely there is no greater evidence of an excessively litigious civil society than one in which judges, a cadre of elite individuals lacking democratic accountability, are assigned responsibility for the distribution of food. Teeple’s most recent work forces us to consider the ramifications of a narrow, legal conception of human rights in a world where the division between the state and civil society is becoming increasingly blurred. It is an innovative argument and an essential contribution to a literature blind to the limitations of this elusive concept.

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