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Découvrir la revue

Citer ce compte rendu

Even Canadians who know little of this country’s history of organized labour may recognize the name of Jean-Claude Parrot. Long-time leader of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers [CUPW], Parrot’s actions in the 1978 national strike led to his conviction and subsequent imprisonment for criminal conspiracy. Parrot was always something of an enigma. People often remarked that his public persona as union firebrand contrasted with his shy, rather awkward, private demeanour. This muted and understated tone is carried throughout the book. If braggadocio is called for, there are other union biographies available from Bob White to Jack Munro.

To some, Parrot embodied all that was wrong with the posties; they were militant, even dogmatic, and not about to back down from a fight. The frequency of national postal strikes made this point clear to all Canadians. For others, CUPW under Parrot’s direction took a principled stand on issues ranging from collective bargaining, technological change, and health/safety protections, to gender equality. If traditional industrial unions questioned their public sector counterparts’ lack of resilience, these prejudices were dispelled by CUPW’s willingness to take the fight to the employer. In the long run all Canadian workers were better off for it.

It’s clear that Jean-Claude Parrot lived in interesting times. Starting in 1954 as a sorting clerk, he later became a union steward and was a minor player in the 1965 wildcat that changed the face of public sector unionism. By 1968, Parrot was a full-time union official, becoming CUPW’s chief negotiator in 1975, and national president by 1977 — a position he retained until his retirement in 1992. Remembering the 1970s and 1980s were mean decades of wage cutbacks, high inflation, and the “permanent exceptionalism” of anti-labour legislation, it’s important to acknowledge the central role of Canadian postal workers in the campaigns to withstand these government incursions. Our labour history has duly celebrated the “good fight” of the 1930s-1940s but paid little critical attention to the 1960s-1970s. Parrot’s book goes some way to redress this imbalance.

One might expect an autobiography of one of Canada’s most celebrated labour leaders to offer juicy reading, with an insider’s account of the tumultuous years of CUPW’s formation and frequent tilts against the federal government, and it’s here in good measure, but first one must wade through the requisite union chronology. The tedious lists of names, conventions, inter-office memos, resolutions, and press conferences that typically bulk out these sorts of memoirs read like end credits to some feature-length film — it’s all there if you really must know. Thankfully this gives way to a two-chapter coda where Parrot reflects on the broader issues CUPW faced. Parrot is circumspect with his vitriol but when unleashed it’s a
telling indictment of Canadian organized labour in the 1970s and 1980s. In no uncertain terms the Canadian Labour Congress [CLC] comes in for much of this criticism. The CLC under the direction of Joe Morris and Dennis McDermott is depicted as a spineless entity more concerned with currying favour with politicians than supporting the aspirations of rank-and-file militants. Accused of creating a “bad image” for the labour movement, CUPW could expect little substantive support from the CLC. No surprise that the New Democratic Party shied away from malcontent posties lest some of this radical stuff prove contagious.

The book’s demolition of McDermott’s reputation is particularly efficient as CLC documents are cited at length to illustrate just how duplicitous was the Congress’s position on wage and price controls, automation, and back-to-work legislation. This was especially true of the 1978 confrontation with the Liberal government that so defined the future of both Parrot and his union. CUPW demanded class action while the CLC settled for class collaboration. Parrot doesn’t state explicitly whether this repugnant experience of the bad old Congress eventually pushed him to assume a CLC vice-presidency in 1992 but he informs us things did improve gradually. Nevertheless, visitors to CLC headquarters in Ottawa can still see framed portraits of Messieurs Morris and McDermott on the walls; history is so untidy that way.

Curiously for a Québécois labour activist who came of age during the 1960s, Parrot’s account downplays the struggles within the province. We learn little of the bitter rivalry between the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux and the Quebec Federation of Labour, although QFL leader Louis Laberge garners praise for his support of postal workers. Parrot describes his efforts to become fluent bilingual and ensure that francophone members were fairly represented in CUPW activities. Given that the 1965 wildcat had its impetus at Montreal’s downtown sorting facility, in no small part due to the insensitivity of the largely English-speaking post office management towards the francophone employees, it would be valuable to have a fuller description of this time. “Les gars de Lapalme,” who staged a notable 1970 strike against the postal system and gained further notoriety when cited as examples of injustice in the FLQ Manifesto, are entirely absent from Parrot’s story. Similarly, the events of the 1972 Common Front strikes that paralyzed Quebec pass by with only perfunctory mention. The book is thus tightly constrained to serve as the history of Jean-Claude Parrot and his years with the CUPW.

The life of a union executive has its benefits and liabilities. Parrot notes that his career, while satisfying, frequently demanded 60-hour weeks and that this took a predictable toll on his family life. While unstinting in his praise for wife Louisette and his two daughters, Parrot does recount how his 1971 election to national chief steward necessitated a summary move from Montreal to Ottawa, something his family only learned from a telephone call after the fact. Any resulting domestic friction was resolved and Parrot’s 1979-1980 incarceration for defying back-to-work legislation was made bearable by his family’s support.

The main focus of Parrot’s memoir is of course CUPW’s clashes with the federal government and in particular what became Canada Post. The initial concern was the ruthless top-down managerial style that pervaded mail sortation and distribution facilities. The post office was run like a quasi-military operation and, in Parrot’s words, subject to all forms of “paternalism, favouritism, nepotism, and discrimination.” But the worst was yet to come as the implementation of automated mail sorting came on stream by the early 1970s. CUPW’s 1974 “boycott the postal code” campaign was one response to wholesale technological change introduced without fair union consultation. The on-again, off-again rivalry with the
Letter Carriers Union of Canada [LCUC] representing the outside postal delivery workers complicated matters until the two unions were amalgamated in 1989 under CUPW.

The high-handed governmental approach continued straight through the 1970s and 1980s as CUPW entered repeated rounds of contract negotiations and the seemingly inevitable strike actions. Prior to the 1981 decision to make postal operations a crown corporation, employees did not fall under the terms of the Canada Labour Code. Parrot explains the ridiculously extended process by which his union was required to negotiate labour contracts. It wasn’t by any measure fair collective bargaining and all postal workers frequently suffered as a result. The ruthless actions of both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments to curtail union rights are amply detailed. Of particular note was the decision to privatize postal outlets in 1986. The Corporation eventually prevailed but at a high cost in both monetary and human terms. Talk about profligacy, the administration of Canada Post should long ago have been subjected to its own Gomery-style inquiry. In the end, Jean-Claude Parrot presided over the transformation of the postal workers from a weak group of workers into a powerful force for organized labour. CUPW certainly didn’t win all of its battles but it did ensure that a crucial government service took the needs of the workers, and the public, into account. It’s a story worth the telling.

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This book analyses the efforts of self-employed workers in four occupations — newspaper carriers, rural mail couriers, personal care workers, and freelance editors — to organize for collective representation and bargain to improve their pay and working conditions. The four case studies together with well-presented introductory and concluding chapters provide considerable insights into the limitations of labour law and the dominant model of industrial unionism for self-employed workers. Through this analysis, the authors also present important challenges to the routine classification of workers into dichotomous categories of the employed versus the self-employed. The book highlights the diversity of self-employed work experiences, and the degree to which many self-employed workers face a dependency and insecurity far more akin to that of employees than to the ideals of entrepreneurship with which they are more typically associated.

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the employment norm that is presumed by much of Canadian labour law since World War II. That norm is the “continuous, full-time employment relationship in which the worker has one employer and works at the employer’s premises or under his or her supervision.” (3) Most collective bargaining legislation is based upon such a model. The right of workers to associate is fundamental but also limited by legal concerns about conflict of interest (e.g., in cases of organizing managerial staff) and the stifling of competition (e.g., in cases of organizing professional and self-employed workers especially doctors and lawyers). Because self-employed workers have been viewed as entrepreneurs, their unionization has been cast as a threat to competition. Mem-
bers of the occupations featured in this book were initially regarded as entrepreneurs.

The authors draw on descriptions of the varied and often insecure work arrangements faced by self-employed workers to debunk the assumption that self-employment is analogous with entrepreneurship and all of its attributes — ownership, autonomy, control over production, and profitmaking. Many workers are actually disguised employees who are illegally recorded as self-employed so that their employers can avoid paying employee taxes and benefits. However, even legally defined self-employed workers (e.g., independent contractors, domestic service workers) experience many of the characteristics of part-time and temporary employees. The authors draw on data to demonstrate that increasing numbers of self-employed workers earn little more than subsistence-level income and have only minimal control over their working conditions. The concept of social location emphasizes the ways in which political and economic conditions interact with gender, class, ethnicity, culture, and sexual orientation to shape the experiences of self-employed workers. The four occupations presented in this book are populated by workers who are women, people of colour, and immigrants.

Even when the parallels between employees and some groups of self-employed workers are recognized, there are other features of these occupations that make collective organizing difficult and union recognition elusive. None of the four occupations in this book involved work at a single site. Such geographical dispersion made organizing extremely difficult. Each occupation also permitted some leeway for workers to set their work schedule and routines. Many of them worked only part-time and jobs were temporary. The personal care workers and freelance editors had multiple employers. Courts and labour boards often deemed one or more of these characteristics sufficient rationale to deny union representation. Employers were active in promoting definitions of workers that made them ineligible for collective representation.

Each case study illustrates, in a slightly different manner, the weaknesses of prevailing laws and dominant models of industrial labour relations. After much struggle, the newspaper carriers were able to organize, but then the newspaper quickly contracted out their jobs to another firm. Subcontracting is a constant threat to the organization of workers in the new economy. The rural route mail couriers were statutorily defined as non-employees. Nevertheless, they struggled to organize first as an independent association and later as a union. The struggle was complicated by rival unions vying for the right to represent the carriers in the prevailing model of winner-take-all unionization. Their ultimate success illustrates the high expenditures associated with organizing self-employed workers. This case also illustrates the importance of social and political context in shaping labour movement outcomes. The election of a Liberal government and public reports of postal corporation profits improved the climate for unionizing rural mail carriers. Personal care workers successfully organized by gaining recognition as employees, but now face further obstacles from new government policies that define the disabled client as the employer instead of the government or subcontracting agency. These changes may lead to a redefinition of personal care workers as either independent contractors or domestic workers, either of which could mean the loss of their collective bargaining rights.

In the final chapter, the authors draw on their case studies to identify changes necessary for improving the collective representation and working conditions of self-employed workers. They emphasize the need to shift away from employee and industrial-centred models of labour relations toward models that promote parity and plurality. Parity refers to giving all workers the right to freedom of association for collective bargaining. Within this
framework, self-employment would not be presumed equivalent to some entrepreneurial ideal. Plurality would entail the use of a variety of models for worker organization and representation, including organization by craft rather than by employer, geographical organization, and combining of bargaining units. Workers, not labour tribunals, would choose the organization that can best represent them. The authors also suggest that principles of majority support and exclusive representation be excised from labour law and policy.

The most compelling part of the final chapter is the discussion of community unionism: “Community unionism addresses the need to expand the narrow focus of business unionism beyond traditional topics of bargaining, such as terms and conditions of employment, to include matters relating to service and standards. As well it expands the group of those who have the right to participate in collective bargaining beyond employees and employers to include clients and consumers and other relevant constituencies.” (186) Community unionism is truly a model for labour organizing that is appropriate for the new economy. For example, in the case of personal care workers for disabled individuals, community unionism models would bring consideration of both worker and client needs into the decision-making mix.

This is a fine piece of social science research and should be read by anyone interested in the sociology of work and occupations, labour relations, employment law, or work in the new economy. Brief comparisons with US labour regimes clearly establish the relevance of this work for US as well as Canadian students, faculty, organizers, and policy-makers. The detail of the back-and-forth battles between organizing efforts and government regulators/corporate actors gets a bit tedious at times. Tighter thematic organization within those chapters, especially more strategic use of subheadings, might have remedied this problem. However, the introductory and concluding sections within each chapter were helpful reminders of where the reader has been and where the argument was going. The introductory and concluding chapters are both very strong and clearly establish the significance of this book.

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Leslie A. Robertson, Imagining Difference: Legend, Curse, and Spectacle in a Canadian Mining Town (Vancouver: UBC Press 2005)

This is a complex book. It is built on two foundations: eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Fernie, British Columbia, most of it between 1997 and 1999, and a strong emphasis on the importance of discourses (“imaginative resources”) in shaping the ways that people understand human differences. “What appears in this book,” writes Leslie Robertson, “is documentation of popular and official discourses now ‘traditionalized’ in European repertoires of human difference.” Her scholarly goal is “to contribute to the project of analyzing the European production of social knowledge about human difference.” Therefore, while the City of Fernie’s history and its residents of different generations provide much of the content for Imagining Difference, the book is not ultimately about Fernie. Rather, the city is simply a convenient site for the author’s exploration of “how essentialized ideas of difference are expressed through discourses of regionalism, nationalism, class, sexuality, and ethnicity.” (xxxviii) Indeed, although “Canadian Mining Town” appears in the subtitle of the book, a study with similar goals could have been undertaken in a town with a different economic base and/or located in another European settler country.

Part of the complexity of Imagining Difference comes from Robertson’s re-
lentless invocation of theoretical concepts and ideas. But a great deal of the complexity is due to the creative way the book is organized: each of the seven substantive chapters begins with a different version of a “popular local legend about a curse cast on Fernie by indigenous people.” (xvii) The curse legend is the “main thread” of the book, (xxx) “a doorway to different historical contexts” (xliv) “and a kind of barometer to trace the way that a story flows through a community.” (xxix) At the analytical level, cursing is treated as “an expression through which power is negotiated, contested, or claimed. It evokes the force of ideas cast into circulation, deeply affecting the ways that people imagine others and themselves.” (250)

The first version of the curse legend is taken from a book by an old-timer published by the Fernie and District Historical Society in 1973. The story is presented in four parts and interpreted in light of a postcolonial reading of the 19th-century relations between the Ktunaxa Band who lived in and near the Elk Valley and the European explorers/settlers. Leslie Robertson concludes that “cursing — the climax of the narrative — successfully incorporated the complex of colonial belief: normalized enmity between indigenous people and Europeans, erasure of indigenous economic interests, the essentialized mystical nature of the indigenous peoples, and the ever-present threat of rebellion.” (23) In the context of colonialism, the curse legend is far from benign: Robertson presents it as “a powerful political tool.”

The second chapter begins with a report on a conversation with a couple in their seventies; their grandparents had emigrated from Czechoslovakia to Fernie. The report shows how the couple tell the original “story of Fernie” in a way that encompasses tragic events (major fires and mine disasters) of the early 20th century. The curse legend disappears from the rest of the chapter wherein Robertson interpretively reads archival and interview materials to identify the “taken-for-granted assumptions of difference” (37) that result in non-Anglo Europeans being categorized as “foreign” in the period up to 1920.

Another Fernie resident’s version of the curse legend opens Chapter 3. The author then situates the legend in relation to a wide variety of popular knowledge such as the evil eye complex, superstition, and miners’ folklore. Leslie Robertson is true to her word of taking “seriously the idea of cursing.” (75) However the materials presented in this chapter are scattered and do not fit very tightly with the conclusions drawn in the first two chapters.

Part Two of the book encompasses the next four chapters and is given the same title as the book. Robertson states that her “intention is to highlight structures and discourses of power that take different shapes in different places, but operate in similar ways to assert a commonsense view of the world.” (103) This statement indicates that Robertson’s theoretical map of the causal efficacy of discourse is more structuralist than poststructuralist.

Chapter 4 begins with interview material from a woman in her sixties who knew nothing about the curse legend. It introduces for the first time how the curse legend is melded, in many people’s minds, with the “Ghostrider” shadow that appears and then disappears on the face of Hosmer Mountain as the sun goes down. The bulk of the chapter interprets how the experience of nationalism and war shaped the understanding of human difference of the eldest participants in the study, (114) even when that experience was their parents’. “I heard many people essentialize other nationalities,” writes Robertson, “based on parents’ accounts of transgression in their homelands.” (124) This is a long, rambling chapter that weakly concludes with Robertson’s “hope that I have shown the complex categories of difference employed by these people, and their connections to scholarly and political discourses.” (146)
Chapter 5 begins with a version of the curse legend that includes mention of the ceremony in 1964 meant to lift the curse. It analyses this event as a “cross-cultural spectacle” and asserts that the ceremony, like other ceremonies of reconciliation that have followed, was “symbolically staged to get rid of the story of colonialism.” (159) In Robertson’s view, the special rights discourse that has emerged on the Right of the political spectrum in recent years is merely “the latest incarnation of colonial discourse.” (180)

The next version of the curse legend was published in a free weekly newspaper in 1998. It sets the stage for an assessment of notions of human difference at the time when Fernie was changing from a coal mining town to a second-tier destination ski resort. In a section titled “Locals and Granolas,” Robertson reports two postings on an electronic chat line that humourously show disrespect for each group. For example, the posting on granolas starts off: “Just a message to granolas: 1) Soap is a good thing. 2) Shampoo and conditioner are your friends.” The author treats these postings with dead seriousness as new examples of “essentialized views” and denigrations. (201-202) I suspect she might offer the same formulaic reading of Trailer Park Boys. Robertson misses the point that certain types of trash talk and exaggerated depictions of an outgroup actually celebrate the humanity of the ‘other’ and therefore serve to undermine stereotypical understandings. The chapter also touches on a local controversy over Gay Pride Day and a weak attempt to use humour to make palatable an ultra-conservative column in the Fernie Free Press. Overall, the empirical materials are interesting but probably do not fit the author’s model of essentialized social divisions as neatly as she purports.

Chapter 7 begins with the responses of a group of three teenage women to Leslie Robertson’s question, “Do you know the story of the curse?,” during an interview in a fast-food restaurant. The chapter investigates the social worlds of young people in order to demonstrate the continuing force of essentialized ideas of human difference. It includes a report of a travelling hypnotist’s performance at a school gymnasium in Fernie, a short critique of the social content of the video game Pokémon, and analyses of three graffiti sites. The chapter has a potpourri sense to it, and is unduly reliant on the limited insights from the aforementioned group interview. Robertson’s conclusion — “ideas about human difference remain intact across generations” (246) — is overly general and not given much substance by the empirical materials in the chapter.

In the end I was intrigued by Imagining Difference but I was irritated by its faults. The fieldwork is surprisingly thin in places; citations from the literature are treated as authoritative rather than as a starting point for a dialogue between theory and findings; generalizations to subpopulations are sometimes offered when the research was not designed to make such generalizations; and the presentation is disjointed in many places, following what I suspect is a self-consciously non-linear, postmodern style. I was particularly disappointed that the book presented such a sketchy picture of the history of coal mining in Fernie and all but ignored how ideas of difference were articulated and transformed by the historic, counter-hegemonic workers’ movement in the Crowsnest Pass/Elk Valley.

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Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, University of Toronto Press 2005)

This biography is a new volume produced by the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History. Its productiveness and quality of publications is a tribute to the directors of the society presided over
by its president, R. Roy McMurtry, and particularly to the long-term editor-in-chief, Peter N. Oliver, whose recent death will be a great loss.

Philip Girard has completed a study, which is well written, balanced, and thorough. He faced an impediment because, unaccountably, Bora Laskin’s family did not cooperate with him and did not give him access to personal papers or correspondence. The result is an analytical account of various aspects of his career, but few details and only those on the public record about his personal life. Hence while a reader can be impressed with Laskin’s intellectual and juridical talents, the book is unable to convey, except in brief snatches, the force of his personality. What was it about Laskin that made him stand out, which contributed to his reputation as a talented individual with great authority, who attracted people’s admiration and attention?

Using vast legal and historical research, Girard has written an interesting and fair biography. The eldest son of Russian Jewish immigrants who arrived in Canada early in the 20th century and settled in the Lakehead and later Fort William, Bora Laskin rose to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. His father ran a small business; his mother oversaw the family; and both parents emphasized education, religious training, and involvement in the small Jewish community. At high school Laskin was exposed to the Anglo-Celtic middle classes for the first time and “he not only adapted socially, but excelled academically and athletically in this new environment.”

Laskin took his law degree at the University of Toronto. Several characteristics of this educational experience stand out. Jewish and Gentile students did not mix; education took place in an almost exclusively male environment, and it was a time of considerable discussion and debate about the law school curriculum, which Girard goes into in detail. The trend over many years was towards the professionalization of the law degree within universities and in this process Laskin was involved with W.P.M. Kennedy at the University of Toronto and Cecil Augustus Wright at Osgoode Hall, both of whom were mentors and sources of academic employment.

Laskin did well academically although he was not at the very top of his class. Through social contacts he had made in Jewish fraternities, he found an articling job with Samuel Gotfrid and was able to complete his LLB at Osgoode Hall. Though well aware of discrimination against Jews by the legal profession, he was always reticent about it. He graduated in 1936, by which time he had determined to become a legal academic rather than practitioner. He did graduate work at Harvard for a year, returned to Toronto, performed various jobs such as writing case notes for the Canadian Abridgement project to support himself and eventually, after some delay, he was hired initially to teach at the University of Toronto, later Osgoode Hall, then again at Toronto until 1965.

As a result of living through the social ferment during the Great Depression, and his work experiences, education, and temperament, Laskin, the public person, began to emerge. As a student of Jacob Finkelman, he studied labour law and wrote a paper on “The Law Relating to Collective Bargaining Agreements in Canada” in the mid-1930s. For the Workers Educational Association [WEA], he taught courses to workers, and did research and broadcasting as he strengthened his connections to the labour movement. As an educator, he believed that law
should be responsive and serve social ends, including the rights of labour and “human rights.” Girard makes a good case that Laskin’s “signal contribution” to Canadian society was that he “articulated, popularized, and symbolized a new rights-oriented discourse in post-war Canada” and persistently espoused a set of ideas about law and society which Girard calls “legal modernism.” (5) As an arbitrator and a judge he got to translate these ideas into law.

While he was a professor, Laskin also was associated with constitutional law, and later as a judge with a wide cross-section of issues, but the readers of Labour/LeTravail will probably find Chapters 10 to 12 most interesting. They deal with his work as an arbitrator, his activism in the post-war period in the area of human rights, and his support for academic freedom as a co-author of the report on the notorious Harry Crowe case at United College. On academic matters his views were conditioned by his service on university boards at several institutions and his active work in the early years of the Canadian Association of University Teachers [CAUT]. He believed quaintly in a “community of scholars,” and supported the enhanced role of the faculty in university governance shortly before the students of the late 1960s espoused a similar concept to increase the role of students. Thus he opposed the old, closed business-driven university boards, did not understand or approve of the unionization of professors, and probably would have been appalled by the current bureaucratization and corporatism in today’s institutions of higher learning.

As an arbitrator, Laskin gained a lasting reputation for integrity and impartiality. Beginning as a union nominee on 32 conciliation boards between 1944 and 1946, he became known and acceptable to both sides as an arbitrator in 137 cases between 1947 and 1965. Labour arbitration gave Laskin ample scope “to implement his vision of legal modernism,” as well as develop experience and contacts. (226) One insight of this book is that Laskin’s arbitration cases in the post-war period contributed to an emergent arbitral jurisprudence, to develop a “common law of the shop.” The new area of labour law was a break with the past, and with existing common law, and was thus in Girard’s mind ‘a revolution’. Laskin developed it on a case-by-case basis making fluid, socially aware interpretations, which treated workers with respect, balanced different interests, and stressed procedural fairness in decision-making. In his generation, gender was not much of a factor, and he ignored it when it was. He enhanced the role of arbitration boards and single arbitrators by insisting that they had remedial powers such as awarding compensation for breaches in collective agreements. He also consistently advocated a “hands-off” policy by the courts towards labour boards and labour arbitrators in all but exceptional circumstances. His work helped to train a new generation of arbitrators, contributed to the developing jurisprudence in labour law, and broadly educated the parties and the public about their industrial relations system. Thus he participated in an emerging, distinctive labour relations ‘culture’ in Canada.

Another important insight in this biography is that the post-war development of human rights legislation, codes, and commissions, was modeled on the administrative law approach to labour relations. Anti-discrimination policy was motivated by revelations about the Holocaust and resulted from activism by individuals such as Laskin in the Jewish community and Kalman Kaplansky in the labour movement. After several court cases failed to end discrimination, Laskin’s goal “was to supersede the courts and the common law entirely by creating statutory prohibitions on discrimination and confining the tasks of public education and enforcement to an expert tribunal based on the labour relations model.” (248) In 1961 the Ontario Human Rights Commission and in 1962 the Ontario Hu-
man Rights Code largely implemented this vision. The other interesting aspect of this activism was that Laskin chose to work behind the scenes as the Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B’nai Brith fought anti-Semitism and discrimination in general, through legal challenges and by pressing for human rights policy and legislation. Laskin served on committees, drafted and lobbied for anti-discrimination legislation, but he cautiously chose his battles and even censored himself on occasion to protect himself. His approach was to make friends and allies and to avoid making enemies, because as a Jew he remained vulnerable and knew that “one false step could prove fatal” to his ability to progress in his career or even make a living. (268)

In 1965 Laskin left teaching when he was appointed to the Ontario Court of Appeal and in 1970 to the Supreme Court of Canada. In 1973 Trudeau made him Chief Justice, which was seen as a bold innovative move at the time. Girard is very good at describing the male culture of the day which led to such appointments. Laskin was initially an outsider in the courts because he came from academe, but he used his talents to write important dissents in many cases, which often had a long-term impact on legislation or judicial interpretation. He sometimes was able to convince majorities to side with him on certain issues, such as the issue of courts respecting the decisions of expert administrative tribunals, which were proliferating. This was an important accomplishment. He was successful at gaining promotion to the highest judicial position in the country because he had a progressive image, became known internationally, and had an impact on the rituals of the courts to make them more open.

On constitutional issues his court ruled on Trudeau’s move to patriate the constitution unilaterally without the provinces. It supported the prime minister but drew the public’s attention to the ‘convention’ that Parliament would not request constitutional changes from the UK Parliament without provincial agreement. The decision stimulated further negotiations, which brought all of the provinces on side except Quebec, at that time governed by René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois.

As Laskin was a centralist on questions of federalism and headed the Supreme Court in pre-Charter days, many of his decisions on constitutional law are no longer important. His lasting legacy is in his modernism, his determination to create a more open legal culture, and his application of knowledge and experience in labour and administrative law fields to convince his peers in the judiciary to respect (in most cases) the decisions of other tribunals, which made judicial-like decisions. As Girard notes, Laskin’s education of his peers in this way was good preparation for the post-Charter days when the judiciary had a larger role to play but was measured in determining in which areas it would exercise its newfound powers.

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EVERY TIME I sit down to write this review, the same image comes to mind: it is of a bearded man, about five-foot-five, perhaps taller, though it is hard to tell because he walks slightly hunched over; he is walking down my street in Sydney, Cape Breton, pulling two shopping carts taken from a nearby parking lot; each cart is loaded down with pieces of corrugated tin and chain-link fence, wrought iron, and rusty rails and ingots. Nearly every day, he walks from Whitney Pier, a working-class, working poor, multicultural neighbourhood, across an overpass, and past my house with his load, which he has
teased from the rubble of the city’s former steel plant, which was shut down in 2000. In the winter, he uses a toboggan to carry the material, looping its rope around his forehead to pull it along the icy, slushy streets, the way a horse might pull a wagon. Whatever the season, he is headed to a scrap metal yard not far from Sydney’s downtown to exchange his load for cash. I don’t know who this person is, but, as I watch him go about his work, I can’t help think about the depth and breadth of capitalist restructuring here: the near evisceration of the city’s industrial working class; a century of steel-making reduced to so much detritus, sold for pennies a pound.

The de-industrialization of Sydney is truly astonishing — all the more so when the disappearance of the island’s coal mines is considered at the same time. Importantly, this long and torturous experience is but a local expression of a province- and region-wide process: the long-term decline of traditional industries such as steel-making, mining, forestry, fishing, and fish processing. In the 1970s and early 1980s, this dynamic — the “development of regional underdevelopment” — was the focus of much scholarly attention, much of it conceived within a Marxist centre-periphery framework and grounded in an appreciation of historical context and archival sources. Since that time, however, academic interest in Atlantic Canada’s political economy and the utility of class analysis has waned. James Sacouman and Henry Veltmeyer assert in the introduction to From the net to the Net: Atlantic Canada and the Global Economy, that this is lamentable for the region is currently being reconfigured by the forces of globalization and neo-liberalism, a set of forces that the older “Maritime Marxist school” is uniquely qualified to dissect and understand. (1, 24) This collection of nine essays, the editors suggest, is an attempt to “revisit” the question of regional political economy but in the “new” context of “the internationalization of capital and trade and a trend towards the integration of nation-states into a single global economy based on capitalist principles.” (3) The early 1970s, the moment when the long post-World War II economic boom ended and the neo-liberal “war against the working class and petty producers in this region” began, loom large in this volume: five of its nine essays recount this basic story. Contributors Thom Workman, Anthony Thomson, Colin Dodds, and Ronald Colman paint a particularly grim picture of life in the region over the past three decades: the disparity between rich and poor has widened; union density in the private sector has contracted sharply; the minimum wage purchases less today than it did in the past; and employment insurance is harder to get. “The line between eking out an existence from paycheque to paycheque and lapsing into desperate struggle to meet basic needs is growing thinner by the month,” Workman writes in “The Decaying Social Compact in Atlantic Canada,” capturing the flavour of the book as a whole. “[N]eo-liberal governments are deliberately creating such hardship.” (85, 98) And they are doing so, Tom Good and Joan McFarland argue in “Call Centres: A New Solution to An Old Problem?,” not simply by abandoning their commitment to the welfare state and social wage, but by embracing uncritically the chimera of economic development through the “knowledge-based service sector” — a trend evident throughout the region. (100) Operated by the likes of Air Canada, Xerox, and Sirius Satellite Radio, call centres thrive on a diet of low wages, anti-union legislation, and government subsidies and tax breaks: “[A]s New Brunswick has become more dependent on call centre jobs, the government has become more and more anxious to satisfy the industry,” they conclude. “The fear that these footloose enterprises might relocate once again creates an incentive for the government to perpetuate its repressive polices of the 1990s.” (113)

As this brief summary suggests, the accent in this collection is on the state and
state policies. It is a book about neo-liberalism more than it is a book about globalization, and that is a disappointment. The specific ways in which the “internationalization” of capital, labour, and trade have reconfigured the working lives of Atlantic Canadians who work on farms, in the woods, factories, or casinos, or on offshore drilling platforms do not emerge from the welter of theorizing deployed here; indeed, the voices of working people themselves are barely audible at all. James Sacouman’s “Capitalist Restructuring on Canada’s East Coast” is emblematic of this overall deficiency: an analysis of the “one-sided war of capital on the working class” being waged in the region, he dispenses with the “destruction of the industrial proletariat in Cape Breton” and the “persistence of a petty producer class in the inshore fisheries, on farms, and on woodlots” in a scant three pages, leaving the reader wanting additional historical context, more detail about the experiences of working people in each sector, and greater clarity on the link between globalization — the book’s overarching theme — and their lives.

Traces of a more “bottom-up” perspective can be found in two essays in this collection. In “State Employment and Trade Unionism: Signs of Renewal?,” Anthony Thomson provides a deft analysis of the evolution of collective bargaining law in Canada in the post-World War II period, including two short case studies of public sector union conflicts in Halifax in 2001. “Policy Issues in the Trade Union Movement” consists of two interviews with representatives of the Confederation of Canadian Unions and the Canadian Labour Congress that highlight competing approaches to unionization within the Canadian house of labour. Overall, however, the thrust of both articles, like the volume as a whole, is to foreground the importance of the state and state policy, not rank-and-file concerns or the perspectives of non-unionized or rural workers.

One of the defining features of the older “Maritime Marxist school” was a strong sense of the balance between “internal” (society, economy, culture, geography) and “external” (Confederation, transnational capital) explanations for regional crisis. On display in the skilful work of historians Ian McKay, David Alexander, and David Frank, that sense of balance, coupled with a reverence for the words and culture of working people themselves, conveyed what was specifically Atlantic Canadian about the question of underdevelopment, and highlighted what working people did for themselves in times of stress or crisis, not what was done to them or for them. Unfortunately, this collection, with its emphasis on neo-liberalism, does not strike the same sort of balance.

As I sit down to write the conclusion to this review, a second image comes to mind: it is of a Cape Breton Regional Municipality transit bus that picks up and drops off passengers a few blocks from the scrap yard mentioned above. In the narrow window above the driver’s head, where the route information is displayed, one reads “Ashby EDS.” Ashby is the name of a community that used to be home to many of the city’s steel workers. EDS is the name of a corporation which runs several call centres in the city; it is the largest, private sector employer on the island, a distinction that used to belong to Sydney Steel. Having read this book, I have a clear picture of the role that the state and state policies may have played in facilitating this wrenching transformation; my purchase on the precise role of globalization in this specific context, what makes this situation distinctly Atlantic Canadian, and how it felt to go through this economic shift is far less secure. Perhaps the older Maritime Marxist School would be of greater assistance.

Andrew Parnaby
Cape Breton University
NEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP is an important contribution to the theoretical and empirical literature on citizenship, globalization, migration, labour, identity politics, and intersectionality. The authors reconceptualize citizenship, not primarily as a legal or substantive entity but as a negotiated relationship. The book provides nuanced case studies on migrant women from the West Indies and Philippines, with a specific focus on two forms of care-giving labour in Canada, namely live-in domestic work and hospital-based nursing. As well as offering an analysis of racialized women largely ignored or under-theorized in citizenship studies, one of the strengths of the book is that it is based on primary research involving original survey data and interviews with stakeholders. The main argument is that whereas globalization expresses and exacerbates imperialist hierarchies, nation states are also major culprits in creating and perpetuating ‘non-citizens’ through ideological and institutionalized forms of sexism, patriarchy, Euro-centrism, Orientalism, racism, and class privilege.

Chapter two provides the substantive theoretical framework that shapes the rest of the text. It identifies the tension between universalistic claims of citizenship made by nation-states and the inequitable working conditions of migrant women imposed by the state; the contradiction between ideals of formal equality and inclusion and the actual material inequality and exclusion of poor women of colour; the privatization, individualization, and familialization of work that emerges as a consequence of economic globalization and neo-liberalism; the racialized nature of the public/private divide; the selective global circulation of human labour; and the racialized policing of state borders, which either governs the rights of women from the Third World or strips undocumented workers of rights. The authors usefully identify these as barriers that non-citizens negotiate in order to determine whether they are potential citizens, citizens on probation subject to technologies of policing, or ineligible as citizens.

The authors also challenge the assumption that migration is always an individual free choice by offering a contextual analysis of why women from the West Indies and the Philippines migrate (chapter three). They link social and economic factors within Third World countries with racialized/gendered labour practices and regulations in Canada and the global economy. These include financial internationalization and the legacies of colonialism. Specifically, these structural forces create poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, and unsupported urban growth in the Third World.

The argument is sharp, pointed, and historicized, especially in identifying that First World states are willing and able to exploit the increased supply of women workers from the Third World. This takes on dimensions of the gendered North/South divide where women in countries like Canada often spurn domestic work that is much coveted by women from the South.

The book also illuminates various stereotypes about Black and Asian women (rooted in histories of colonial sexism), and how these are instituted by Canadian ‘gatekeepers’ (chapter four). This analysis not only identifies the gatekeepers (i.e., legislation that imposes rules regarding recruitment and residence restrictions, and private placement agencies), but it also considers the contextual factors and impact of such gate-keeping. For instance, the authors note that the lack of accessible public childcare creates a demand for foreign workers. Later in the book (chapter seven), they address another source of gate-keeping, the legal system. The authors examine the lack of legal responsibility of employers and placement agencies; the regulation of en-
try of landed immigrants and temporary workers; the constraints in accessing legal channels of recourse; and the uneven and unmonitored discretion of immigration officers. This chapter usefully brings to light judicial cases to show that while courts have been willing to uphold some individual domestic worker rights, systemic problems facing the non-citizen tend to go unresolved.

The detailed analysis of foreign domestic workers (chapter five) and nurses (chapter six) takes on two kinds of comparisons that cut across each other. First, the authors point to the shared experience of non-citizenship that emerges from low wages, dependence on income to send to family members ‘back home’, exploitation in care-giving duties and household work, and the lack of privacy. At the same time, the authors do not universalize the experiences of differently racialized women. They note that domestic workers from the West Indies are more regularly undocumented, often leading to poorer wages and working conditions than for Filipino women; racialized stereotypes vary (e.g., the Black mammy and the obedient Asian women); there are differing chances in being offered employment (Filipino women tend to be preferred); and various ways of resisting oppression (e.g., Filipino women are explicitly transnational in organizing and Black women tend to mobilize local networks).

The second comparison is between live-in domestic workers and nurses. While both groups of migrant workers are in gendered ‘care’ occupations and vulnerable to workplace discrimination, the authors demonstrate that foreign nurses often enter with landed immigrant status and therefore have more access to formal rights such as social welfare entitlements and avenues for redress which are mostly deferred or denied to foreign domestic workers. (111) Nonetheless, the barriers to citizenship for nurses of colour continue to be related to discrimination and harassment at work. The significance of these comparisons is that they highlight hierarchies of Otherness and how these serve to operationalize non-citizenship.

The concluding chapter reiterates that far from being fixed or stable, citizenship is always in negotiation. To navigate citizenship, migrant women of colour face gatekeepers both before and after they migrate. This is also an important chapter as it picks up on the theme of oppositional consciousness that is touched upon throughout the book. Here, the authors speak to the ways in which West Indian and Filipino women adopt the face of ‘dissident citizenship’ by defying the status of victim and engaging in campaigns, alliance-building, legal challenges, and everyday resistance in the place of work.

There are some slippages in the book, including one which likens domestic worker placement to arranged marriage which is (falsely) assumed to be universally oppressive. Moreover, the theoretical and normative arguments would benefit from clarifying: how the idea of negotiated citizenship differs from other theories of citizenship (other than T.H. Marshall, to whom they refer); whether the interactions among gender, racialization, and capitalism are integral to each other or, alternatively, incidental; whether liberalism (and not just neo-liberalism) is inherently flawed and therefore a poor basis to re-conceptualize citizenship; and whether citizenship itself is essentially emancipatory or, alternatively, limited as an idea precisely because it relies on a tension between inclusion and exclusion.

In the end, these concerns do not undermine the contributions and insights of the book (some of which are only briefly examined, e.g., the rise of men seeking work as live-in domestics). Three stand out. First is the idea of the non-citizen, whose status is legalized within the nation-state and beyond. The non-citizen is one who lacks basic citizenship rights including the choice of employer and domicile, access to social entitlements, freedom of mobility, and the ability to grieve workplace discrimination. Central to
non-citizenship is gendered racialization and racism. Second, *Negotiating Citizenship* challenges the popular idea that we are living in an era of transnational citizenship. While the authors emphasize the transnational character of migrants — who aim to maintain citizenship status from their home countries, preserve household structures across borders, are part of a transnational labour force, and share exploited occupational status across the globe (39) — they demonstrate that global citizenship is a reality primarily for those with wealth. Third, the book debunks the myth that Canada is a welcoming multicultural society. While it is relatively less abusive to foreign domestic workers than other countries, its policies institute a permanent threat of deportation, unchecked working conditions, and forced living circumstances. As the authors note, Canada participates in creating and sustaining an “indentured or captive labour force.” (48)

Ultimately, this book provides a radical theory of citizenship that is empirically and theoretically rich and informative. *Negotiating Citizenship* transcends disciplinary boundaries and would appeal to those from such disciplines as sociology, politics and political theory, cultural studies, women’s studies, ethnic studies, and economics.

Rita Dhamoon
University of Alberta


In the post-9/11 world the issue of who gains access to a country, under what conditions they might enter, and for what causes they might be held and/or deported has risen in prominence. But in fact this issue has been an issue of concern to western states, Canada specifically, for a century. *Security Borders* briefly surveys the historical development of procedures for detention and deportation of non-Canadians who are deemed to be unwelcome, but pays special attention to the post-World War II era, and, more particularly, to the situation today.

The subtitle promises somewhat more than the book delivers. *Securing Borders* does not address any of the significant issues of detention of non-immigrants in Canada. But when it comes to the detention of potential immigrants and refugee claimants, or other visitors deemed to be “fraudulent claimants,” the book is a comprehensive examination of a system about which too few Canadians are aware.

Indeed, the book opens on and takes as its case study not a “prison” per se, but a motel in suburban Toronto, the spectacularly misnamed Celebrity Inn. In residence there are not celebrities in any popular sense; their names might not be known to more than a handful of Canadian officials in Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Only in rare cases do the people held there become “celebrities,” and often when they do their celebrity status is tragic. One such “celebrity” was Michael Akhimien, a refugee claimant from Nigeria who had been in Canada less than two months in 1995 when he died, unattended, of complications from diabetes. “Michael Akhimien,” Pratt concludes, “died in the zone of exclusion that is immigration detention,” a “kind of liminal space” (25-26) in which the usual laws, regulations, and norms about incarceration do not prevail.

Increasingly, Pratt points out, liberal standards of justice and rights are being excluded from the actual practice of dealing with refugee claimants who are considered to be criminal or security (or both) risks. Pratt argues that “[u]nder a liberal regime of government, the application of coercive powers against autonomous and free subjects, even noncitizens subjects, must be carefully justified and administered.” (221) But today, she contends, the reigning ideological outlook is neo-liberalism, which “has a distinctly punitive edge.” (216) Although it urges a smaller
role for formal institutions of government, neo-liberalism does still embrace the need for government to maintain law and order. Indeed, in the post-9/11 world, this coercive function has been stepped up. Hence she observes a “trend toward governing through crime,” (220) one aspect of which is the criminalization of those deemed to be fraudulent refugee claimants.

While Pratt’s book has its strengths in setting out the punitive handling of refugee claimants, its main argument, that neo-liberalism represents a qualitative new turn, might be questioned. In fact, Chapter 4, which is a useful survey of post-World War II Canadian immigration policy, lays out a trend toward seeing crime and security as intimately connected that began at least in 1945. In fact it is evident in internal policing practice and outlook beginning from World War I.

If this is the case, one might ask if Canada was ever “liberal” in the classic sense she suggests. Plenty of evidence exists to show that in both internal security policy and immigration policy, Canada has always had some elements of “racist, moral [and] ideological” bias that Pratt contends “are clearly antithetical to liberal ideals of natural justice and formal equality.” (221) One might ask whether Canada has ever been “liberal.”

Aside from this apparent philosophical contradiction, Security Borders contains important case studies of the contemporary demonization of “risky refugees” (for example, its brief but telling assessment of the media and state campaign against Somali immigrants and refugees) that make it an invaluable inquiry into an ongoing conflict within Canadian society.

Larry Hannant
University of Victoria and Camosun College


ON AN ALMOST DAILY BASIS, the public is engaged in debate around issues arising from drug use in our society and internationally: the possibilities and pleasures they offer; the relative dangers they present; consumer demands and marketing; who should administer drugs and under what conditions; the role of government in regulating quality and sources, and in determining the clientele; methods to disentangle drugs and organized crime; and on and on. Most of these debates somehow involve the difficult intersections of health, morality, and citizenship with drug use, the rights and responsibilities of drug users and those who eschew drugs, and the role of the state in maintaining a delicate balance among competing demands. Given the increasingly prominent role of mood-altering drugs, it is striking that so little Canadian academic literature has been produced about the drug trade and use. Catherine Carstairs’s new study aims to fill this huge gap in our literature.

Jailed for Possession situates the study of who used drugs in Canada between 1920 and 1960, the process of criminalization and its effects on users, and the various groups who worked with or against drug-users, usually on behalf of the state. Carstairs’s contribution to an expanding international literature concentrates on the social history of drug use in Canada, privileging the effect on users of the strict regulation in this “classic” period of narcotic control, a time when the regulatory framework was being constructed and when it was relatively simple, consistent, and rigid. From the panic regarding Chinese opium users in the early 1920s to the 1961 Narcotic Control Act which set new penalties for drug possession, Carstairs charts changing public perceptions about which drugs were thought to be most dangerous and why, the hardening profile of users, and the ra-
cial and class distinctions. Carstairs notes that in this period Canada had some of the strictest drug regulations in the world, more restrictive even than America.

With enforcement of these strictures went also careful documentation. The study benefits from extensive case files — notably from the John Howard Society of Vancouver and the Narcotic Division of what is now Health Canada — through which she seeks to show the impact of drug regulations on peoples’ lives. The profiles she constructs through the case records are both arresting and sad. She underlines that one of her goals was to give voice to the motivations, hardships, and drama of the addict’s life, and in this she succeeds admirably, providing a view of addiction from the inside. Many of the stories her characters tell are affecting and, of course, instructive about the particular conditions which give rise to drug use. At the same time, she manages to maintain a balance in her assessment of the addiction experience, wisely resisting the natural tendency to shade sympathy into sentimental acceptance of their stories at face value. Her conclusions about the characteristics of addicts most often caught in the regulatory net will surprise few, as we see the same profile today. The poor, unskilled users with few community or family supports were much more likely to be jailed than their wealthier, middle-class, and formally educated cousins.

Among the many strengths of the book is Carstairs’s sensitivity to the importance of race in the construction of the feared addict. Her discussion of the anti-Chinese opium panic of the early 1920s provides valuable insights into the way in which racial and drug panics overlapped and fed unreasonable terrors. The history of attitudes to drug use, she notes, is inextricably tied to Canada’s history of racism. (14) Opium, cocaine, and morphine were all freely available before the 1908 drug law, and many patent medicines relied heavily on such drugs. Furthermore, drugs had typically been used recreationally by all classes of both Caucasian and Chinese throughout the 19th century. Carstairs shows that the regulatory framework did not become toxic for Chinese labourers in Canada until the Asiatic Exclusion League and British Columbia politicians chose to use drug fears as a weapon in their campaign to end all Asian immigration. Hence, the imposition of jail sentences for possession was, she observes, a result of political agitation rather than pressures from the medical community. In fact, her analysis of the role played by doctors, long criticized in the literature for their intrusion into areas where they held no special knowledge and their construction of moral campaigns masked as medical crises, is measured and fair. She concludes that doctors were both the regulators and regulated when it came to the control of illicit drugs.

Carstairs also explores the role of police officers and concludes that they were the most important element in the expanding drug regulatory framework. She argues that it was police (and social workers who sought to ‘cure’ the addict) who had the most to gain from constructing drug culture as a particular area of expertise, and as a relief from the daily grind of policing the city. As a case study of the implication of social workers in the users’ recovery, she offers a fascinating profile of the John Howard Society and the many ways in which users manipulated for their own purposes these well-meaning advocates.

The analysis is at its finest in charting the many ways in which gender ideologies and patriarchal power structures affected the lives of drug users. From the late 19th-century ‘white slavery’ panic in which pure young Canadian women were thought to have been entrapped by opium users, a panic which helped to fuel the first restrictive drug laws, through the gendered explanations for first experimenting with drugs and the penalties meted out to users, to the gendered experience of addiction and prostitution (both as a means for sustaining that lifestyle and as an explanation for becoming involved in
drug culture in the first place), Carstairs paints a vivid and believable portrait of the user as a gendered subject.

Of course, there are always ways in which an exploratory analysis of this type could be improved. In this case, the rich data base for Vancouver — unquestionably the drug capital of Canada — does mean that the argument’s centre of gravity is usually on the west coast. There is some considerable attempt to provide examples and comparative analysis for central Canada as well, although the Maritimes rarely enter the discussion. Carstairs convincingly argues that between 1920 and 1960, the drug culture was largely an urban phenomenon. But the factors which gave rise to illicit drug-using were certainly not confined to cities, and one wonders how the story would have been enriched with records that surveyed rural and small-town experiences as well as Vancouver and Montreal. Secondly, Carstairs provides a series of graphs to summarize important and interesting information relating to such issues as the racial origin, gender, and type of drugs used by those convicted under the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act from 1921 to 1945. The tables are all difficult to decode, partly because of the amount of information squeezed onto each one, and also because of how the information is presented. Distinguishing one category from another is difficult, reducing their value for even conscientious readers. Thirdly, fears raised by drug use have always had a strong visual element via images of the apparatus used for injection, or the compelling images of addicts in search of relief. The power of these images is suggested by a photograph on the book’s cover which is sexually ambiguous, oddly coloured (from early film footage) and compelling as an addict injects his fix. That this is the sole image in the book is disappointing.

Nevertheless, Carstairs’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on addictions generally, and drug use specifically. It takes up a subject which is both timely and complex, presenting a highly readable historical analysis from which we can learn much.

Sharon Anne Cook
University of Ottawa


THIS IS A TIMELY and very important book. For those of us old enough to remember the debate around free trade initiated by the Macdonald Commission, the role it played in legitimizing the decision by the Mulroney government to negotiate a free trade deal with the US was critical and, I would argue, transformative. Canada under free trade is a very different country than it was, or perhaps might have been, in the absence of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement [FTA] and North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA].

Inwood begins his analysis with an interesting discussion of the role of royal commissions in Canada’s history. He notes that there have been over 450 since Confederation. However, arguably, none has had a more profound impact on the future direction of the country than the Macdonald Commission. Unlike many others, the Macdonald Commission’s mandate was broad and general, permitting it to examine virtually all aspects of Canada’s economic and social life. As a result, it was able to initiate the most comprehensive program of economic and social policy research in Canada’s history. He notes that there have been over 450 since Confederation. However, arguably, none has had a more profound impact on the future direction of the country than the Macdonald Commission. Unlike many others, the Macdonald Commission’s mandate was broad and general, permitting it to examine virtually all aspects of Canada’s economic and social life. As a result, it was able to initiate the most comprehensive program of economic and social policy research in Canada’s history. Yet, ironically, despite the scope of its mandate, its recommendations reflected a much more narrow neo-conservative approach to addressing Canada’s social and economic policy challenges.

In researching the origins, composition, deliberations, and recommendations of the Commission, Inwood has done his homework well. He has examined, in
depth, the work of the commissioners, the consultative process they utilized, their extensive research program, and the very large number of submissions they received. He has also looked at the internal dynamics of the Commission itself, explaining how this process led, eventually, to Macdonald’s free-trade recommendations. Inwood interviewed virtually all the key players involved with the Commission, both inside and outside government. The book is an impressive model of good research and Inwood can lay claim to being author of what will probably be the standard text on this aspect of Canada’s recent history for many years to come.

Inwood sees the debate — and struggle — over free trade as being between adherents to social-democratic nationalism and neo-conservative continentalism. While shaped by these competing ideologies, it was also a reflection of conflicting state and societal interests with sharply divided factions within the (Liberal) federal government and profound disagreements between business on the one side and popular sector organizations and labour on the other.

Interestingly, when the Commission was appointed, the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau did not see free trade as a major issue. However, the deep recession of the early 1980s, the slow progress in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] negotiations, and the lack of progress in developing a ‘third way’ for Canada’s trade with countries outside the US provided the neo-conservatives with the argument that the post-war Keynesian nationalist (and social-democratic) economic strategy was failing and more radical, market-based alternatives were needed to address Canada’s economic problems.

Initially, the commissioners were not focused on the issue of free trade. Some were open to the idea, while others were skeptical. However, as their work progressed, many — but certainly not all — of the commissioners became more sympathetic to the arguments of the economists who dominated the Commission’s research agenda and who fervently believed in the benefits of free trade. Their analysis was supported by their use of sophisticated, if narrowly based, econometric models to assess the potential benefits of lowering trade barriers. The disproportionate influence of neo-conservative economists reflected the inclinations of its research coordinator whose outlook and priorities were given free rein by a group of commissioners too preoccupied with their other responsibilities — and particularly their brutal schedule of consultations with the public. Of course not all of the research was carried out by the core team of economists that dominated the research staff. Political scientists, sociologists, and other social scientists also did research for the Commission. But, subsequently, they found that their analyses were marginalized.

Similarly, the commissioners themselves were also marginalized to a significant degree. Despite the enormous amount of time they spent hearing submissions from the public, very little of this input ended up being included in the main recommendations. Rather than drafting the report themselves, they agreed to have a small team of researchers, overwhelmingly committed to free trade, do this work for them. Admittedly, drafts were run by the commissioners, but in a way that effectively channelled their reservations into footnotes and dissenting opinions, rather than the body of the recommendations.

One of the significant findings, statistically, of Inwood’s detailed review of the huge number of submissions presented to the Macdonald Commission during its lengthy deliberations is that the overwhelming number did not support free trade. The key — but critically important — exceptions were those from the business community, most notably the Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. While there had been divisions within the busi-
ness community about the advisability of free trade at the beginning of the process, by the end, the major business organizations had reached a consensus among themselves that they wanted such a deal.

As the preceding comments suggest, the author is not entirely sympathetic to the role of the economics profession in this process. He argues that the economists elbowed out the views of other disciplines — as well as labour and popular-sector organizations — dismissing as largely irrelevant any concerns about the impact of free trade on the future role of government in Canada and on the issue of sovereignty itself. He notes that the research agenda of the Commission privileged the economists and allowed their world view to predominate in the way the issues were framed. Thus the Commission’s recommendations largely ignored the political significance of greater integration with the US because it was outside the framework of the economic modeling that played such a key role in the Commission’s recommendations.

Inwood’s detailed research uncovers many interesting sidebars to the work of the Commission. Under Trudeau, the trade component of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was merged with the Department of External Affairs — almost by accident — as the government did not know where to put it. However, its pro-free-trade economists, under the leadership of Michael Hart, soon took over the policy direction of the reconfigured Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT]. And Hart exercised a critical role in shaping the research agenda and the ultimate recommendations of the Commission.

Inwood rightly notes that the actual Canada-US FTA was different in numerous ways from the model of free trade advocated by the Macdonald Commission. It failed to achieve market access in key areas important to Canada. It included a toothless disputes settlement mechanism. More importantly, it expanded the scope of the concept of free trade to include a wide range of government activities and public policies previously not considered to be within the realm of trade agreements. Nevertheless the Macdonald Commission laid the ideological and political groundwork for the subsequent conversion of the Mulroney government to free trade and bears at least some responsibility for the resulting outcomes.

The one representative of the trade union movement on the Commission was Gerrard Docquier, Canadian Director of the Steelworkers. Like other commissioners, Docquier found the workload of the Commission taxing. He also found his ability to influence its research agenda and final recommendations very limited. Although he, like several other commissioners, submitted written dissents, his views were overshadowed by the majority’s recommendations and his objections relegated to a supplementary item in the final document.

Inwood notes that concerns about the need for a comprehensive labour adjustment program to address the anticipated disruption to certain industries were largely ignored in the Commission’s final report. In sum, labour’s opposition to free trade as expressed in the numerous submissions by the CLC, various national unions, and independent locals was effectively ignored.

Docquier’s concerns about free trade, like those of some other commissioners, were also pre-empted by Donald Macdonald’s unilateral statement as chair, before the final report was released, that the Commission was going to recommend free trade. This action effectively defined the Commission’s position even though the actual recommendations were more nuanced and, as noted, accompanied by a variety of dissenting views.

If there are weaknesses in the book — and there are very few — the most important is Inwood’s tendency to downplay the role of the United States. The book’s impressive research focuses almost exclusively on developments within Canada. It sees the Commission — and its recom-
mendation in favour of free trade — as essentially a domestic matter. Arguably, the election of Ronald Reagan at the beginning of the 1980s signalled a much more aggressive approach by a US government determined to impose a neo-conservative economic model not just domestically, but throughout the world. US policy-makers recognized that trade agreements could be a vehicle for expanding US economic hegemony. They also understood that the US had a major stake in promoting free trade and economic integration with Canada — and within Canada. Free-trade agreements could be a powerful vehicle for restructuring the economies of their trading partners, both to provide new opportunities for US business and to curtail troublesome nationalist economic developments such as Trudeau’s National Energy Plan.

It would have been useful for Inwood to have included a more extensive analysis of the role of the US government and US business interests in Canada in the promotion of free trade, particularly as the Canada-US FTA was clearly part of a larger US agenda that was reflected in trade agreements being negotiated with Israel and several Caribbean countries at the same time. As subsequent developments quickly demonstrated, this agenda was soon expanded to include Mexico (through NAFTA), a drastically re-shaped GATT (in the form of the new WTO) and numerous other free-trade agreements with individual trading partners of the US around the globe.

Nevertheless, this is an impressive book. It provides well-researched analysis of the establishment, operation, and recommendations of the Commission, while commenting thoughtfully on the ensuing free-trade debate leading up to the 1988 election. Its author should be commended for this fine piece of scholarly research.

John Calvert
Simon Fraser University


For over 30 years, J.L. Granatstein’s Canada’s War has remained the standard account of the Canadian government’s handling of World War II. Granatstein’s hand is evident here, for he encouraged his former graduate student to explore “Canada’s Bad War.” The result is an impressive, wide-ranging synthesis that details the complexity of life in wartime Canada. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources to explore an exhaustive list of issues, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers sets a new standard.

Despite unprecedented government controls and media campaigns that failed to heal the divides over conscription, Keshen details how Canadians showed a remarkable patriotism during World War II. A country of eleven million people put over one million people in uniform, including over 50,000 women. Canadians paid for it with ever-increasing taxes and War Savings Certificates that were foisted on them in advertising campaigns, company payroll deductions, and by young Miss Canada volunteers. Even so, Keshen shows that Canadians across the country became wealthier than they had ever been before.

But, to quote journalist Charles Lynch, “not everyone was nice ... in Canada’s good war.” (5) Organized labour and farmers often had good reasons to complain, and they did. Despite efforts to control inflation through the Wartimes Prices and Trade Board, many landlords in bloated Canadian cities shamelessly gouged their overcrowded tenants. Black markets catered to unpatriotic appetites for beef, tobacco, rubber, gasoline, and alcohol. Social commentators fanned anxieties about wartime marriages, venereal diseases, the consequences of women in factories or in uniform, and juvenile delinquents. Although not always accurate, Keshen shows that these concerns
spawned an enduring legacy of both conservative and progressive social movements after the war.

Keshen also strips away any kind of romantic hue we may have about the Canadians who served overseas. Highly censored letters gave little measure of a soldier’s life to the folks back home. Until the Americans arrived, the British took a dim view of the Canadians’ drinking and carousing. So did the Italians and the Dutch. On the issue of venereal disease, the commentators at home were right: like their fathers a generation before, Canadian servicemen suffered high rates of infection. Their casualty rates in battle were not as high as their fathers’ but they were still substantial, including 42,042 dead. Keshen maintains that the Veterans Charter could not guarantee everyone a successful reintegration into civilian life at war’s end — for many the physical, social, and psychological impact of the war was too much. But government programs offering land, education, or housing were just some of the “progressive, bold, and often ground-breaking initiatives that provided millions with the means to achieve greater personal growth, social mobility, [and] financial security.” (286) With a certain reluctance, Keshen concludes that on the whole World War II was a ‘good war’ for Canadians.

This summary does little justice to the breadth of this work. Keshen has drawn upon a wide and impressive body of sources. Government reports offer a sound statistical overview, but also a good sense of the many regulations that became such a fact of life in wartime Canada. Even the voluntary contributions to the war effort, an area that is so often ignored in many discussions of wartime Canada, came under government edict. Public opinion polls help Keshen provide a glimpse into how Canadians felt, for example, about the level of butter rationing in 1943. Only 43 per cent of those polled thought it appropriate. (107) Newspaper accounts and scores of interviews further offer a more detailed sense of how individuals viewed the war and its effects. To Keshen’s credit, he does not lose the voices of Canadians in this wide discussion.

These voices are especially refreshing in two chapters that detail the role of women who worked in both civilian and military roles. Here Keshen takes gentle issue with Ruth Pierson’s “now-received version” that the “relatively minor breakthroughs” the war offered Canadian women were largely reversed after 1945. Keshen’s wide source base depicts a very complex experience for Canadian women. As he notes, inequities were apparent during the war and continued after. But the war also spawned a genuine appreciation for the capabilities of women that their children may not have fully appreciated in the decades to follow. Responding to the idea that married Canadian women simply returned to the home after the war, Keshen notes that the number of married women in the Canadian workforce increased fourfold between 1941 and 1951. (169) It took far less than a generation to entice married women back into the workforce.

Keshen was undoubtedly right to develop a set of thematic discussions, but reviewers are equally right to speculate about how this work may have revealed other things if organized differently. Certainly this national overview hints at a number of regional studies. Serge Durflinger has recently published a fine discussion of Verdun, Quebec, during World War II, but a similar study of wartime Montreal seems long overdue. Indeed, in a city that saw its mayor interned over his opposition to conscription, that by newspaper accounts saw an enduring black market and red-light district, a study of wartime Montreal may reveal a great deal that cannot be explained in a national study.

As impressive as it is Keshen’s wide research there are times when it seems divorced from a broader context. Consider the five paragraphs in which Keshen addresses the liberation of the Netherlands
by Canadian troops. In the first two, Keshen briefly summarizes the Germans’ harsh treatment of the Dutch in the war’s final months, as well as the “widely and deeply felt” gratitude the Dutch felt for their Canadian liberators. (253) Then in three much longer paragraphs, Keshen begins with how “Some Dutch accused the Canadians of exploiting their desperation as they would an enemy, using cigarettes, food, fuel ... to drive hard bargains to obtain items such as family jewellery.” (254) “Many Dutch men” resented the Canadians for seeing Dutch women, a situation that caused “near-riots” in two Dutch cities during the summer of 1945. Finally, Keshen cites three Canadian military memoranda to show that, among other things, a Dutch newspaper had charged Canadians with infecting nearly 2,000 Dutch prostitutes with VD, and that the infection rate of the 2nd Canadian Division had “reached 130 per 1,000” by May 1945. (255) Such memoranda are worth citing, but without context they offer a misleading impression. Nowhere, for example, does Keshen mention that the Canadians helped ease widespread starvation through the spring and summer of 1945 at a cost that would fill three Canadian war cemeteries on Dutch soil.

There are other noteworthy omissions. It is curious that a book examining Canada’s ‘bad war’ does not detail in some way the wartime treatment of either Italian or Japanese Canadians. It is also interesting that he does not expand upon a brief but intriguing discussion at the outset on the literary memory of the war. Of course the former topic has been covered elsewhere; perhaps Keshen plans to develop the latter — a Death So Noble for World War II — in another work.

Just as Jack Granatstein’s work has done, Jeffrey Keshen’s work will enliven Canadian war and society seminars for a long time to come.

Geoffrey Hayes
University of Waterloo

Mary Kinnear, Woman of the World: Mary McGeachy and International Coopera- tion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004)

FROM THE AGE of 27, Ontario-born Mary McGeachy was based in Geneva, as an officer of the Information Section of the League of Nations. One of the largest bodies of the League’s Secretariat, it gathered information from member states, and disseminated the League’s ideals of inter-state cooperation and making international relations more democratic. Single, she had broad friendships. These included compatible Christian acquaintances from her days of learning English and History at the University of Toronto, to teaching high school students and mill girls in Hamilton and later to becoming a participant in international conferences and newspapers that eventually brought her to her career in Switzerland. She also shared the life and ideas of women internationalists, such as Natalie and Laura Dreyfus Barney, of Canadian reformist intellectuals, like J.W. Dafoe of the Winnipeg Free Press, with whom she corresponded for ten years, and cosmopolitan bureaucrats, such as the colleague Konni Zilliacus, rumoured to be her lover.

Hired directly by the Secretariat, and thus free from the direction of her country, she collated national data for journalists and League staff. She also ensured relations between the League and international women’s organizations. Comprehensive inventories represent the main legacy of the League in many domains, from statistics on armaments to public accounts, as Martin Dubin and Yves Ghebali have long shown. More recently, Patricia Clavin and her colleagues, in a special issue of Contemporary European History, have shown to what extent, beyond the collection of data, the Secretariat could offer spaces for genuine exchange and innovation, away from state jealousies, which can be best analysed with the concept of “trans-nationalism.” As an unattached bureaucrat, McGeachy

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contributed to such phenomena, by suggesting accommodations and common standards, on topics as varied as nutrition and disarmament.

European influences had honed her practical skills and nurtured ideals of equality through education and international cooperation. As a student activist, she had worked for the relief of European students, and had come across the study of international trends under the guidance of historian George Wrong, himself inspired by the Round Table. An evangelical upbringing in a community of Scottish descent in the Sarnia area, often visited by British preachers and peopled by recent immigrants, and which was home to the future economist John Kenneth Galbraith, prepared her for decades of public speech and faith in work amongst the dispossessed. In return, McGeachy preached to her compatriots about the methods of the “new political world order” in four ‘mission’ visits to Canada she made from Geneva. She reported that “international indifference” prevailed in her country of birth, in detailed accounts of the Canadian public opinion she set out to change by education and persuasion. (44, 49, 33)

McGeachy also oversaw the logistics of key meetings and the implementation of League resolutions, while also lecturing abroad on the goals and possibilities of the “Great Experiment.” Her remarkable life has inspired the main work of fiction on the League, written by the Australian Frank Moorehouse, *Grand Days* and *Dark Palace*. Her practical skills found plenty of uses through the last days of the League, when she personally helped hundreds of League staff and their families escape Geneva, an epic of bureaucratic heroism with which Kinnear aptly chooses to open her book. Such thorough clerical work relied on sophisticated archival techniques, modelled after the British Public Records Office — as much of the Secretariat followed the lead of its first Secretary General, Eric Drummond of Britain. The historians of the League now meet in the very rooms the people they research inhabited. Kinnear also counts on public archives located on four continents, interviews, and private papers.

More than two decades ago, Donald Page, who interviewed McGeachy, and Richard Veatch gave a portrait of Canada in the League. But most of the story of the Canadians who participated in the history of the Secretariat remains to be told: from Larry Mackenzie, the member of the International Labour Organization, to the lawyer Walter Riddell, head of the Canadian delegation, to progressive businessman Herbert Ames, the first financial director, to social worker Charlotte Whitton, the Canadian member of the Child Welfare Committee (though Rook and Schell’s work does deal with Whitton’s contribution to the League).

In 1940, at 39, McGeachy was invited to Washington by the British Department of Economic Warfare. Never a pacifist, she was to use her expertise in public relations to steer the neutral Americans away from their enthusiasm for humanitarian aid to civilians in enemy territories, in favour of giving relief only after a territory’s liberation, a crucial aspect of Churchill’s “total war.” After the United States’ entry in the conflict, at the end of 1941, she often travelled to the United Kingdom, where she helped voluntary societies plan for post-war ‘social recovery’ in all parts of the world. (112) This work in the management of relief brought her close to Erwin Schuller, in the summer of 1942. A young Austrian banker of Jewish descent working in London, and an attractive bachelor, her future husband was eager to promote intellectual and social exchanges between Britain and central Europe. He was contributing to the war effort by lending his administrative abilities to the National Council of Social Services.

McGeachy’s proximity to such popular British endeavours went a long way to endear American audiences to the British war effort, her Canadian and Scottish
identities helping to enhance her credibility. The British government acknowledged her contribution by promoting her to the rank of first secretary at the embassy in Washington, a diplomatic precedent for British women who had long campaigned to increase their power in international affairs. This made her the first woman British diplomat. It is in this context of renewed interest for historians, the changing status of the international work of women, that Kinnear mostly places McGeachy. Though willing to use her charm and the protection of powerful men, she fought many sexual barriers for the recognition of her work. At the League, she benefited from a regime marked by equality of pay which had been hard fought from the start by women internationalists. The ceiling in promotions she had nevertheless met in Geneva was temporarily broken by the emergency of the war.

Two years later, at 43, McGeachy was in New York City, as one of the six deputy directors of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency [UNRRA]. In charge of welfare for the millions of persons displaced by the war, she spent her time between the direction of a staff of hundreds, travelling to gather information and do public relations, and the writing of recommendations to solve problems of an unprecedented scale. In the midst of national suspicions, of controversies about the role of experts and the accountability of UNRRA’s spending, she insisted on ideas that have a profound resonance to this day: treating stateless people as citizens, helping resistance movements in enemy-occupied areas, and showing how countries that provided help gained as much from these humanitarian relations as the communities who received it. This position was consistent with her criticism of the patronizing methods of the Student Christian Movement of the early 1920s. (49) In the eyes of this well-remunerated woman, the voluntary work of local communities was essential to international cooperation, a belief she had brought to the fields of central Europe from her work with the workers’ education movement in Ontario, and which had been reinforced by her witnessing the exceptional success of the voluntary movement on the British home front. (42)

The last 45 years of her life were spent in Johannesburg, New York City, the Adirondacks, and Princeton, as the wife of a wealthy international banker who remained committed to community work. When she was 50, the Schullers adopted two children, who have kept mainly unhappy memories of an uprooted childhood, and of a forceful mother, at times conceited, and often distant. Erwin died in 1967, from a suicide induced by chronic depression, and she survived him by 24 years. It is with his loving letters, which have survived, but in the absence of hers, and with testimonies from her children, that Kinnear attempts carefully to relate these difficult private stories.

McGeachy served National Councils of Women wherever she resided, and became President of the International Council of Women, from 1963 to 1973. Paradoxically, the intense international activity of a woman of relatively modest origins was largely financed by her husband’s estate, and the rich friends she had kept from her days in Geneva and London helped to keep the ICW afloat. She attracted the criticism of the proponents of a more democratic and balanced budget, as well as the more aggressive advocates of women’s rights of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, through the heyday of decolonization, she was putting her voluntary ideals and her criticism of the sentimentalism of old-style charities into practice, an approach that places her among the early authors on the role of women in the development of communities.

This study of a life spent in the struggle to achieve international cooperation depicts shifting national, class, and sexual identities that trace unexpected lines
between the hopes and failures of 1919 and the experiments of today.

Dominique Marshall
Carleton University


Suburban Sweatshops is a most unusual book. Written by a lawyer possessed of both a keen sense of social justice and a well-developed writing style, it is both a first-rate analysis of a much understudied phenomenon — the plight of immigrant workers in suburban settings — and a well-reasoned critique of the methods used to reach out to these new “sweatshop” workers in the post-industrial era.

The author, Jennifer Gordon, is particularly well qualified to address these issues. As the founder of “The Workplace Project,” an organization designed to aid the immigrant workers who found themselves toiling in Long Island, New York, in the early 1990s, Gordon was privy both to the personal stories of these new “indentured” servants and to the successes and failures of the grassroots organization which sought to give them a collective voice and some legal protection in their workplaces.

Gordon carefully delineates the factors that have contributed to the creation of this new sweatshop economy: the decline in manufacturing employment, the dramatic rise in service-sector jobs, large-scale immigration from relatively impoverished or politically unstable Latin American countries, and a mounting willingness to exploit the labour of these immigrants in manners both illegal and unconscionable. She makes clear that traditional forms of organizing workers have had very limited success in the underground economy, both on Long Island and elsewhere in the US. Owing to the mobility of the various “workshops,” which include landscaping jobs, employment on various construction sites, janitorial work with mobile “maid” or cleaning services, etc., and the fact that many workers have to move from one “industry” to another on a seasonal basis, it can be extremely difficult to bring such workers together. Add to this the reluctance of government officials to enforce existing workplace legislation — and their misplaced uncertainty as to whether or not such legislation actually applies to “undocumented” workers (it does) — and the situation of these workers becomes even more untenable.

This is then compounded by the difficulties — and to be frank, sometimes the lack of union interest — associated with organizing highly mobile workers into unions. Factor in the growing wave of anti-foreign sentiment in the US (particularly pronounced after 11 September 2001, but already well established in the early 1990s) and the reality that many of these workers view themselves as mere “sojourners” in the country with no long-term stake in addressing the working conditions of themselves or their compatriots in the US, and one can begin to see how easily this group of workers can be exploited by employers.

This then, was the context in which the Workplace Project began its work. As Gordon put it so succinctly, if the project was to succeed, “it would have to figure out how to bring together a group of disparate newcomers, in competition with each other for jobs that operated below the radar of the government and unions alike, all urgently in need of whatever money they could earn and many desperately afraid of detection by the government.” (66)

Clearly, this was no simple task. But Gordon, who already had experience working with refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala, some basic knowledge of extant immigrant worker centres in different parts of the US, a newly completed law degree, and a small seed grant from the Echoing Green Foundation, had a
Her goal was to help create a self-sustaining organization that would eventually be run by the people it was meant to serve. Affiliating herself with an already established Central American community organization on Long Island, she spent the better part of a year making community contacts and studying the local situation. Realizing that information on workers’ rights was in short supply in this community, Gordon first began organizing and offering what she called the “Workers Course” to provide such basic information. Buoyed by the success of this, she then organized a “bare-bones” legal clinic for immigrant workers. The work that went on here and in the contacts made during the various sessions of the Workers Course revealed just how horrific the working conditions were for so many of these immigrants. Indeed, it soon became clear that even the limited victories won by the legal clinic on behalf of its clients, victories that all too often had no lasting impact on the larger community, only served to underline that “real change would come only when workers built the power to muster a systemic response to systemic abuse.” (80) So now the plan was updated: a new organizer, an immigrant from El Salvador, was brought in; graduates of the Workers Course were formed into a directing committee; and the Workplace Project was set up on its own as an independent worker centre; a centre where the bywords were outreach and flexibility.

It is interesting to note how far Gordon removes herself from the centre of this narrative. As the Workplace Project moved into the realm of action, sometimes successfully, sometimes not, the motivating ideas and strategies for organizing so disparate a group of peoples all seemed to be generated internally — as Gordon had originally intended. The word “I” is hardly ever seen, it is always what “they” did — or better yet, it is the story of a named individual, surrounded by her or his compatriots, coming up with the new ideas and strategies: in effect, it is grassroots democracy at its best.

But lest readers be swept away by the seeming success story that was the Workplace Project, the author devotes four full chapters to the very difficult and complicated component parts of organizing on this model (a word Gordon would actually reject as she claims that what was done on Long Island cannot be replicated, as virtually every tactic was situation specific, and that there was not really a “model”). In one chapter Gordon explains precisely how and why immigrants got involved with the project, and not just as clients, but as leaders. She also tackles the matter of “navigating the relationship between law and organizing,” (149) a relationship that Gordon sees as being particularly problematic when the workers’ centre is focused not only upon teaching people about their individual rights as workers but also on helping them come together to take collective actions. The two do not always meld easily. For this reason, in one way or another, two full chapters are devoted to this relationship: one on “rights talk and collective action,” the other on the role that can be played by a legal clinic in helping to “serve collective rights even as it vindicates individual rights.” (185) Perhaps most intriguing of all though, is Gordon’s chapter on “Non-Citizen Citizenship.” This details the tortuous path which some of the immigrant activists followed in order to have laws changed at the state level, most notably the campaign to have the “Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act” passed. It also explains — with suitable cynicism — the exact political factors which allowed such a victory to be won in the New York state legislature of the 1990s.

At the end of the day this book is not a how-to guide for social activists. But it is a reminder that positive change is possible. All that is required is commitment, hard work, flexibility, and a willingness to embrace real democracy. Gordon reminds her readers that, while victory is not inevitable, it is also the case that peo-
ple still have the power, if they chose to exercise that power, to make the world a better place via collective action. One can only hope that many, many people will read and embrace this book.

Jim Mochoruk
University of North Dakota


STRIKE ACTIVITY has declined in the United States since the immediate post-World War II years. However, the right to strike is one of the fundamental means used by workers to communicate their grievances to employers. Josiah Bartlett Lambert, a member of the political science department at St. Bonaventure University, goes a long way to explaining the emergence and transformation of the right to strike in this informative volume. Lambert utilizes an impressive review of the legal and ideological framework in which the right to strike has been shaped in order to support the view that this right has been transformed from a right of citizenship to a commercial right.

Lambert covers a lot of ground in a relatively short book, and he manages to include many references to various theories about the development of strike activity. He suggests that the right to strike was initially rooted in 19th-century republican ideology. Artisans of that period saw the right to withhold labour as an intrinsic part of their rights as American citizens. While not delving too broadly into republicanism, Lambert appears to believe that the right to strike was part of the ideology of Free Soil, Free Labour, Free Men that Eric Foner has examined. Artisans held allegiances to different institutions and some — like the Catholic Church — also supported the right to withhold labour.

The interplay between the American state and organized labour is prominent in this book. John R. Commons’s view that American society lacked the kind of class antagonisms found in Europe is noted, but so too is the repeated use of coercive force to break strike activity. The use of martial law was common in the late 19th century, and so too was the use of public and private armies to confront strikers. Capital and the state were, however, confronted with a dilemma as the 20th century dawned. America’s entry into World War I required the quelling of labour dissent, while also necessitating working-class support for the conflict in Europe. The state became more willing to placate labour by granting greater legal legitimacy in return for union leadership limiting rank-and-file militancy. This was not particularly problematic as the recognized leader of the American labour movement, Samuel Gompers, had already been a proponent of “pure and simple” unionism that itself limited dissent.

State interest in granting legal rights to American workers, such as the right to strike, ebbed and flowed in conjunction with America’s entry into the 20th-century’s two global wars. The extensive use of coercive measures against labour by capital and the state increased in the post-World War I years. Interest in developing a comprehensive legal framework for labour waned, and the primacy of the courts in circumscribing union activity continued. The creation of the National Labour Relations Act [NLRA] provided a comprehensive framework for union organizing and collective bargaining. However, Lambert correctly shows that the NLRA era was relatively brief. Worker militancy was not completely limited during World War II. Strike activity peaked in the United States in 1946 against the backdrop of dramatic strike activity in the country’s coalfields. A conservative post-war reaction to labour militancy manifested itself in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. Taft-Hartley does not usually receive the same attention as the Wagner Act, but Lambert properly shows that it was just as important as its 1935 prede-
cessor. He does not think that Taft-Hartley was a repudiation of collective bargaining or the right to strike, but it clearly placed severe limitations on both. Taft-Hartley would eventually be part of three major legislative defeats from which American unions suffered in the post-World War II decades, with the 1955 Landrum-Griffin Act and the failure of the 1978 Labour Law Reform Act being the other two. The 1980 election of the Reagan Administration accelerated the process of decline that had been in progress since 1947. Lambert concludes his analysis by strongly advocating a renewal of the right to strike as a citizenship, rather than commercial, right.

Lambert's narrative is strongest when he recounts the various events, individuals, and legislation that shaped the right to strike. He is on somewhat less firm ground when considering the ideology that has shaped the right to strike. He refers to diverse thinkers such as Friedrich von Hayek to illustrate how liberal economic arguments have been employed against organized labour, with von Hayek strongly opposing strikes. Leading management theorists like W. Edwards Deming have promoted worker autonomy, but not the right to strike. These various theories are presented as part of the wider view that the right to strike is a commercial right. However, the countervailing views of other theorists are not sufficiently considered.

Lambert is correct to note the importance of the right to strike, but he could have also contextualized it in relation to other aspects of unionism. For example, union membership is essentially viewed in commodity terms in the United States. Many workers feel that they are purchasing various services in return for their membership dues. Indeed, some may reside in right-to-work states and not pay any dues, yet still expect union representation from the unions in their workplaces. American unions have not substantially veered away from an emphasis on economic issues. Should it then be a surprise that striking is viewed as an economic right?

American workers live with many different identities, and being a union member may only be one aspect of their lives. However, being a consumer and participating in a consumer culture is also part of the reality of post-World War II America. Liz Cohen, in particular, has examined this phenomenon. Participating in consumer culture has increasingly become a part of citizenship for American workers. It should therefore not be a surprise that striking is viewed as an economic activity as so many other important aspects of workers' lives are also viewed in a similar manner.

Lambert advocates a return to republican values, and suggests that the right to strike should be part of a broader civil movement for workers' rights. This is an admirable suggestion, but there are problems with this idea that he identifies but does not fully pursue. He correctly notes that republican ideology did not have broad appeal among the working class, and a modern return to it could have the same limitation. However, republicanism was also inextricably linked to specific social, economic, and political conditions of the antebellum period. For example, David Roediger has notably discussed the impact of whiteness on republicanism. The artisan class also supported the Republican Party, and this party made a swift post-bellum transformation into the party of big business. The American Federation of Labor could be viewed as a product of republican thought as it did not essentially challenge Gilded Age capitalism, and instead operated within it. Lambert could have perhaps suggested that unions attempt to forge a new ideology that does not confine them within the bounds of capitalism.

Legislation, such as laws regulating strikes, is the product of political activity. Lambert touches upon the relationship between American unions and the Democratic Party, and it is evident from his narrative that this relationship has not always
yielded many returns for labour. However, he does not present a comprehensive political program for labour. Simply suggesting that unions create a modern movement for workers’ rights will not lead to better labour laws.

This is a useful book despite its shortcomings. It will provide readers with a detailed overview of the most effective means of opposing capital and the state that workers possess. However, readers may wish to refer to some other more comprehensive works on American labour history — such as Melvyn Dubofsky’s *The State and Labour in Modern America* or David Montgomery’s *The Rise and Fall of the House of Labour* — in order to place Lambert’s analysis within a broader perspective.

Jason Russell
York University


ELLEN REESE, a sociologist who studies social movements, offers a compelling narrative of the creation of the powerful conservative anti-welfare political movement in the United States. She argues that the earliest manifestations of the anti-welfare backlash began right after World War II when low-wage employers, with support from conservative racists who opposed the post-war civil rights gains of blacks, lobbied to severely restrict payments under the New Deal Aid to Dependent Children program introduced in 1935. The anti-welfare movement gradually gathered momentum and a broader base of support, peaking perhaps in 1996 with the adoption of the very restrictive federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act [PRWORA]. Reese argues that “as the social safety net shrank, the depth of poverty increased sharply between 1996 and 2002.”

The book is laid out in three parts, beginning with an overview of recent policy and debate, followed by extended discussions of what she calls the “first Welfare Backlash (1945-1979)” which reached the national level by the 1960s, and finally the “contemporary welfare backlash (1980-2004).” This structure works remarkably well to establish a strong and persuasive narrative. The history of welfare in the United States has broad parallels with the Canadian experience, but also striking differences created by the US federal government’s New Deal in the 1930s. The program at the heart of this study is Aid to Dependent Children [ADC], renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] in 1962. The fact that it did not initially include “agricultural, domestic, and casual workers” (24) meant that the program almost exclusively served white widows and allowed it to draw relatively little criticism in early years. In the post-war period, as more black women became entitled to benefits, opposition soon followed. In 1943 Louisiana adopted the first formal work requirement for ADC, but much stronger and widespread opposition developed following the war.

Part II of Reese’s book documents what she calls the first welfare backlash — from 1945 to 1979. Between 1945 and 1960, as ADC caseloads tripled, low-wage employers, especially in the agricultural
sector, stepped up the backlash, and in that period almost half the US states, mostly in the south and southwest, restricted entitlement. Although these restrictions were enacted at the state level, Reese is highly critical of the federal government’s complicity. Case studies of four states, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, and California, explore the roots of what would become a national backlash against welfare by the end of the 20th century. Reese locates the backlash in the labour crisis faced by large southern farmers who were facing a labour crisis after the war. Sharecropping was being replaced by wage workers and blacks were migrating in large numbers to the north and west. Neither mechanization nor foreign labour provided a quick fix, and these farmers saw ADC as a threat.

The four state-level case studies are an innovative element in the book. Georgia, where white racist large-scale farmers wielded considerable power in state politics, cut benefits and tightened eligibility to ADC in 1949 and made more severe cuts in 1952. A third of ADC recipients, almost all of them black, were cut from the rolls. Large-scale farmers in Georgia not only used their influence in the state legislature but also served on county welfare boards where they were direct participants in the welfare system. As a result welfare was routinely denied to black women during the harvest season. In Georgia critics of the cuts had little impact. In Kentucky, on the other hand, the welfare opposition was more contested despite the fact that welfare caseloads tripled between 1945 and 1950. The difference was the strength of pro-welfare groups, including the strong coal-mining unions, small-scale farmers, blacks, urban voters, and liberal Democrats. In 1950 only 7 per cent of Kentucky’s population was black, so racist bias was much less potent. Welfare politics in California and New York followed similar trajectories. In both cases racists and low-wage employers led the assault on ADC. Reese chose these two states because racism had different targets than in the south. In California it was Mexican Americans who were the target; in New York it was Puerto Rican immigrants. In both states liberal forces were able to hold back the cuts and restrictions for a few more decades.

In the chapters on the 1960s and 1970s Reese turns her attention to federal politics. Though these decades are often regarded as a period of liberal reform when the civil rights movement and the war on poverty made their mark on the national stage, business and low-wage employers were able to achieve tougher rules in 1967 and again in 1971. Reese attributes the 1960s welfare backlash at the national level to the white racist backlash against civil rights, which dovetailed conveniently with the needs of low-wage employers. Reese argues that opposition to welfare became more racialized. Her discussion of national welfare policy debates in this period includes a very useful analysis of the attempts by both Johnson and Nixon to enact a guaranteed annual income program. Their proposals faced opposition from the National Welfare Rights Organization as “anti-poor and antiblack,” from feminists who believed they did not address the gender gap, from unionists who wanted job creation, and from some elements of the business community which was split on the issue.

Part III of Reese’s book, “The Contemporary Welfare Backlash” (1980-2004), does an excellent job of addressing the development of a powerful coalition that opposed welfare. Low-wage employers and conservative racists continued to play leading roles in the 1980s and 1990s, but their numbers and their influence were augmented by the rise of right-wing think-tanks and the Christian right. As a feminist and welfare activist I found her discussion of the Christian right’s pro-family and charitable choice policies especially chilling. The think-tanks developed an emotionally charged rhetoric that “played a crucial role in shifting political debate about welfare rightward and undermining public support for welfare.”
Collectively the think-tanks and the Christian right were able to influence public opinion to the extent that opinion polls suggest that between 1984 and 1994 the number of Americans who believed that the government was spending too much on public welfare increased from 40 to 60 per cent. Reese also notes that both big business and the Christian right began to take a much more direct role in Republican party politics in this period. What Reese calls the “New Democrats” became virtually indistinguishable from the Republicans, and it was the Clinton administration that eliminated AFDC and replaced it with the much more restrictive Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act [PRWORA] in 1996.

The adoption of PRWORA reflected the culmination of the movement building efforts of the right. The coalition of racists dissatisfied with civil rights gains, low-wage employers, conservative Republicans, the right-wing think-tanks, and the Christian right was augmented by white working- and middle-class voters’ resentment of taxation and by a broader acceptance of maternal employment. However, and this is a striking observation, the punitive, miserly, and restrictive elements of PRWORA exceeded public opinion. The ironic conclusion is that sustained political organization and activism can change public welfare policy.

This book has much to offer scholars and activists concerned with welfare policy. While at times one felt trapped in acronym soup, and wished for more consideration of the international context, the book forcefully documents the building of the American right as a powerful social movement. Reese dedicated her book to “those forced to cope with the shortcomings of the current welfare system, and all those fighting for a better one.” While she demonstrates that welfare policy can be negatively affected by a powerful lobby that advocates a position not supported by public opinion, her example of the success of Kentucky unionists, blacks, and liberals in blocking tighter restrictions for Aid to Dependent Children in the state in the 1940s demonstrates that left-wing activism can also be effective.

Janet Guildford
Mount Saint Vincent University


A GLOBE AND MAIL opinion piece, entitled “Time for a Fair Deal for Low-Income Canadians” (1 June 2006) noted that the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights concluded that legislated minimum wages in Canada are set too low to keep people out of poverty. The article then reported uncritically a list of reforms proposed by the Ontario-based Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working Age Results. The task force produced a “road map for reform,” allegedly meant to “ensure that all working-age adults have the supports they require to participate fully in their communities and to contribute to keeping Canada’s economy healthy and growing.” Significantly, however, these supposed advocates for the poor, with their complex and sometimes rather technical proposals, said nothing whatsoever about pegging minimum wages above the poverty line.

According to William DiFazio, whose book focuses on the American poor, that is unfortunately exactly what one should expect from middle-class anti-poverty activists, both professional and volunteer, including operators of food banks. DiFazio is himself a long-time volunteer at a New York soup kitchen and his personal experiences cause him to reject the fashionable arguments from the Right, and sometimes the Left as well, that the non-poor who claim the right to speak on behalf of the poor are opportunistic individuals fattening on the poor while reducing the pot of potential government funds that could be handed directly to the poor.
Rather, they are well-meaning people who try to respond to the immediate needs of the poor and become trapped within the logic of an economic system that denies the responsibility of either capital or the state to eliminate poverty. Instead, the focus is on providing the short-term needs of individuals while working on altering their attitudes and behaviours so that they become employable.

But the approach of these good liberals is self-defeating, according to DiFazio. In the first place, the resources available to public and private social agencies to help those in misery are woefully inadequate. DiFazio mentions the poignant story of a black teenager who has lived a rough life on the streets for two years. “I don’t want to die in the streets. Hossein, don’t let me die in the streets,” the boy pleads with a supervisor in the soup kitchen. Hossein reassures the teenager, but “Hossein knows that I know that all the resources of the Bread and Life program, St. John the Baptist Church, and public assistance might not be enough. Hossein may not be able to prevent this youth’s death on the streets.” (66) Premature death is too often the fate of the soup kitchen’s clientele.

What’s missing from the anti-poverty equation, notes DiFazio, is the political activity of the poor. Marginalized and kept away from the table where their fate is discussed and determined, the poor can neither indict the system that impoverishes them nor demand the “above-poverty-wage jobs” that are the real solution to poverty. “To put it simply, only above-poverty-wage jobs can end poverty. There isn’t any evidence that these jobs are being produced. Low unemployment and a tight labor market have not resolved the problems of the inner city. The current boom has barely raised middle-class wages and has completely missed the urban poor. The job solutions of the conservatives and liberals have failed.” (20)

DiFazio documents the tragic consequences of Bill Clinton’s welfare ‘reforms’ of 1996 which severely restricted access to social assistance. The desperate poor are placed in workfare programs from which they draw a poverty wage and no chance of ever having a long-term job with above-poverty wages. This ruthless exploitation in the interests of capital is justified by reference to a series of overblown myths perpetuated by the capitalist media. The underclass, instead of being presented as the hard-working-but-getting-nowhere people whom they mainly are, are painted as criminals, baby machines, and drug addicts. In truth, all crimes against individuals and households in the US in 1992 accounted for $17.6 billion in lost money and goods, while white-collar crime was estimated at $250 billion. The birth rate for welfare mothers was below the average for the general population, the ‘welfare queen’ mythology, with its racist overtones, notwithstanding. The drug-addicted and the homeless represented a mere fraction of the poor. “Ordinary poverty” is not caused by shiftlessness and the search for a handout. It is the result of the needs of capital and the ordinary workings of the capitalist economic system.

DiFazio notes that the US in the 1970s had an anti-poverty movement led by the poor but that this gave way to a movement of middle-class anti-poverty activists. “The professionalization and bureaucratization of advocates prevents the development of social movements that could move social policy in the direction of the major changes required to end poverty.” (24-25) Unfortunately DiFazio provides little explanation as to why grassroots movements gave way to movements from above, limiting himself to an analysis of shifting discourses regarding poverty since the 1970s. While he is hopeful that a movement of the poor to challenge the system that keeps them poor will rise again, he provides only shreds of evidence that any such movement is emerging, all from his own experiences in New York City.

Nonetheless, Ordinary Poverty is an astute book that stands out from most of
the work that is published on poverty and anti-poverty activism. It is far better theoretically informed than most of that work and its dual emphasis on the shorter working day without a reduction in wages and benefits, on the one hand, and collective responsibility for creating full employment, on the other, provides the likely demands for a rejuvenated anti-poverty movement headed by the poor. DiFazio also makes mincemeat of Foucauldian analyses that neatly separate out discipline from control and press for local power. The poor, notes DiFazio, “are not part of the postmodern gaze.” (159) He finds hope in the expanding international struggles against globalization that envision “a new world with democracy and affluence for all.” (188)

Alvin Finkel
Athabasca University


GIVEN ORGANIZED labour’s political decline, the rise of conservative political economic visions, and the opening of major rifts in the house of labour itself, studies on labour and politics are timely. How do organized labour and capital use the electoral system to secure advances? How do significant political realignments impact the labour movement? In what ways are working people’s interests subsumed in larger political issues? These are the questions Samuel White brings to his study of Evansville between the close of World War I and the merger of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Throughout Fragile Alliances, White argues that the Evansville labour movement was “made and remade several times,” through “its intimate relationship with the political system and, most importantly, the manner in which labor’s demands [were] negotiated within this relationship.” (175) White examines how this dynamic functioned in five largely narrative chapters, reserving his analysis for the conclusion.

The first challenge to the Evansville labour movement emerging from World War I was the 1920’s Americanism campaigns, something White finds conveniently embodied in the Ku Klux Klan. In the 1920s, Evansville Americanized along the reactionary lines of the post-war climate. Anti-immigrant sentiment, patriotic school curricula, and the foreign-born population’s decline resulted in an increasingly homogeneous, largely native-born demography with a small black population. The period also witnessed significant shifts in the Evansville economy as traditional mainstays such as lumber, furniture, and stove manufacturing waned, making way for the new consumer durables economy characterized by the refrigerator manufacturing of Servel Incorporated and the Hercules Buggy Company. Anchoring these economic changes was the American Plan for business: employers would chart and lead social progress, watching out for labour, capital, and the consuming public.

In this milieu the Klan arrived in the early 1920s, building on anti-Catholic sentiment in Evansville. Prominent Klansmen D.C. Stephenson and Joe Huffington both helped organize the initial Klan movement. White notes that as Klan activity increased, independent labour activity declined, with Klan demonstrations vastly outnumbering Labor Day parades. However, the Klan’s success hinged less on its ethnic and racial ideology and more on its challenge to the established political authority of the Democratic machine. In 1924-1925, Klan-endorsed Republicans swept into office with workers’ support. Ultimately, though, the order’s rise would prove short-lived, as the independent labour movement revived under the direction of the Central Labor Union [CLU] while Klan-endorsed candidates succumbed to corruption scandals they
had pledged to eliminate. The legacy of the 1920s for labour and politics in Evansville was the appeal of Americanism based on optimism, patriotism, prosperity, and a docile labour movement.

The Great Depression and New Deal birthed two competing visions of economic progress. The first was a CIO-inspired vision of recovery upholding worker democracy. The second was Servel president Louis Ruthenberg’s paternalistic welfare capitalism. Strong Democratic victories in 1930 and 1932 showed voters’ support for the New Deal crystallizing in Washington. With passage of the NIRA and later the Wagner Act, however, labour in Evansville found itself embattled and divided. Ruthenberg led the employers’ counterattack by improving conditions while denouncing the New Deal. Nineteen thirty-seven proved a telling year, with the CLU and its AFL-affiliated unions expelling the CIO unions, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America [UE] winning an NLRB election, and Ruthenberg buying off workers engaging in a sit-down strike at Servel.

While 1938’s Democratic victories in Evansville signalled commitment to the New Deal, World War II would soon come to dominate national politics. Employers used wartime patriotism and defense contracts’ production politics to hold unionism at bay during the war while benefiting from the NLRB’s glacial pace. Despite nominal AFL and CIO cooperation, labour continued its internecine conflicts, including the UAW’s raiding of UE locals following the UE’s expulsion from the CIO, the CLU’s red-baiting, and an anti-communist movement (Committee for Democratic Action) within the UE itself. These divisions helped Ruthenberg continually postpone an NLRB election. The 1942 election registered workers’ frustration and ambivalence, as Republicans swept into office. Although that victory was reversed in 1944, the post-war climate was taking shape.

After the war, labour retreated from organizing, and workers’ interests were subsumed in the broader national political consensus forming around anti-communism. By May 1948, anti-communists in the press, industrial unions, and the city, combined with employers, united to crush UE 813 as it attempted to organize the Bucyrus-Erie plant. Bucyrus president Knox provoked illegal picketing in the wake of Taft-Hartley, prompting the NLRB to decertify the union while anti-communist union members agreed to cross the picket line. White’s portrayal of Evansville’s labour movement in the early 1950s is disheartening. In 1951 and 1952 elections, the working class turned Republican as anti-communism and economic progress became the framework for labour relations. In March 1955, UE 813 disbanded, sending its members to the International Association of Machinists.

In his concluding chapter, White turns an analytical eye to his topic, noting that the 1920s Americanism and post-war anti-communism both framed politics in a way detrimental to workers’ interests by burying them in a larger set of issues. The author also demonstrates consumerism’s importance in taming the labour movement, with business advertisements and cars becoming part of Labor Day parades. In the end, White argues that between 1919 and 1955, class was lost as a viable political issue because first Americanism and later anti-communism restrained labour’s rhetoric and action, while the fragile New Deal coalition, labour divisions, and recalcitrant employers blocked advances.

Fragile Alliances provides a clear and detailed analysis of voting patterns in Evansville, and White’s ward-by-ward scrutiny yields important data. Convenient tables illustrate individual elections, with complete narrative description of how various classes, ethnicities, and races voted and why. The final chapter and conclusion bring the major themes of the work into clear focus. Lastly, an unintended consequence of the book is its de-
tailed description of the AFL-CIO split on a local level. The CLU’s actions and the CIO unions’ responses provide a unique case study of national labour divisions as lived by a specific urban working class.

Despite the strengths, however, the book suffers from some key weaknesses. First, White often brings a condescending tone to labour activity he deems somehow mistaken. For instance, there is a persistent chiding of factionalism that assumes some “correct” path for the labour movement. White accuses the anti-communist UE faction of holding “dual union” meetings (142) and calls the working-class electorate “fickle.” (186)

The second problem is ambivalence about political culture. White argues that while both Klan Americanism and 1950’s anti-communism failed to translate neatly into electoral politics, anti-communism threatened labour more because it had distinct implications for structuring labour relations. But this fails to recognize that both ideologies were employer-friendly. The American Plan equaled anti-communism in its threat to labour’s interests more because it had distinct implications for structuring labour relations. But this fails to recognize that both ideologies were employer-friendly.

Finally, Fragile Alliances provides little new material to labour historians. After reading the book, precisely why a case study of Evansville was necessary remains unclear. Given recent work on labour and politics, few of White’s conclusions are new or surprising. While Fragile Alliances is an admirable analysis of an industrial city, it offers little in rethinking predominant interpretations of labour and politics.

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Georgetown University


DON MITCHELL’s The Right to the City makes an original contribution to an expanding literature on contested access to urban public space by employing the concept of locational conflict. A human geographer at Syracuse University, Mitchell argues that “space, place, and location are not just the stage upon which rights are contested, but are actively produced by — and in turn serve to structure — struggles over rights... In a class-based society, locational conflict can be understood to be conflict over the legitimacy of various uses of space, and thus of various strategies for asserting rights, by those who have been disenfranchised by the workings of property or other ‘objective’ social processes by which specific activities are assigned a location.” (81)

Mitchell’s book is influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s writings, particularly the 1974 groundbreaking study La production de l’espace, and Le droit à la ville (1968), the inspiration for Mitchell’s title. In the first of the six chapters, Mitchell draws from Lefebvre’s insistence on the right of all citizens to inhabit the city. He argues that the problem with the bourgeois city is that it is “not so much a site of participation as one of expropriation by a dominant class (and a set of economic interests) that is not really interested in making the city a site for the cohabitation of differences.” (18) Because property rights imply the power to exclude, groups without property become alienated from political power. This leads to violence because disempowered groups are denied access to public space. (17-21) Laws are enacted to counteract violence and to protect citizens, but they also limit their rights. Limiting rights is geographical, and especially so for homeless people who are denied the right to housing, as well as access to public space. With the explicit aim of establishing urban order,
current neo-liberal practices reduce the democratization of public space.

Locational conflict is a very useful concept. With clear thinking, its generality extends to present-day protests over globalization and democracy. Mitchell gives concrete examples of disparate struggles for spatial empowerment and establishment responses, particularly in stringent control and policing of public spaces. Chapter 1 opens with references to three very different events: “wilding” or young men attacking joggers in New York City’s Central Park in the 1980s; explosions in Atlanta’s Olympic Park in 1996; and the terrorist bombings in New York City on 11 September 2001. (13) Perhaps Mitchell could explore the meaning of security and orderliness and consider significant differences in these violent incidents. Mitchell makes much of the history of Hyde Park, where working people forced their way in 1866 to hold an assembly for the right to vote. Mitchell sees in the anti-democratic reaction to Hyde Park the idea that public space is associated with unruly behaviour or uncontrolled space. He uses various secondary sources, newspapers, and court decisions as evidence, but his failure to justify the selection of these particular examples of locational conflict is a methodological weakness.

Chapter 2 considers specific groups who have taken to the streets to secure their rights, including a discussion of the 1994 Madsen and Hill court decisions that upheld certain provisions in the injunction against anti-abortion protesters in Melbourne, Florida, as well as of various US labour disputes. I find his treatment of women and the working class problematic and lacking clarity. Mitchell could reassert his observation that “anti-abortion activists did not lose much — and certainly not as much as Justice Scalia claims — in these decisions” (75) in light of the current backlash restricting women’s access to abortion. His disparate selection of restrictive speech and assembly ordinances in response to Industrial Workers of the World [IWW] street protests and anti-picketing ordinances in California could be linked to issues of contemporary labour struggles in the context of increased corporate concentration.

Mitchell’s treatment of locational conflict in the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement in Chapter 3 is the most successful. Here he argues that the university administration validated the dominant values of the political community by deploying specific politics of regulation to nonconformists, anarchists, and communists, movements that militated against “the dictates of a class- and race-based society that refuses to grant blacks, workers, and students those rights that were supposedly the very foundation of its existence.” (85) In this chapter he shows how the space itself structures the struggle and how the struggle for space itself is negotiated. His inspiration may be Lefebvre, but he could more rigorously apply Lefebvre’s class analysis and spatial theory. People’s relations to the means of production and to state intervention are causal factors in locational conflict. The stark class, gender, ethnic, and racial divide of US cities is played out in public space in complex ways worthy of more careful examination.

The absence of a clear and consistent socio-political analysis renders this book increasingly frustrating and scattered, especially after Chapter 4, with the central issue of the homeless in Berkeley’s People’s Park. Here Mitchell draws from Richard Sennett’s The Fall of Public Man and the distinction between the public and private realms. (132-133) He acknowledges the blurring of distinctions, yet falsely creates a contradiction between a desire for security and people’s interaction, entertainment, and unconstrained social differences.

Chapter 5 refers to Peter Goheen’s investigation of the negotiation of public space, but Mitchell does not provide a detailed analysis of the negotiation. Who are the powerbrokers involved in the laws designed to get the homeless and other
disempowered groups out of the park? Are retailers and other business leaders motivated, as Mitchell suggests, by a desire for “superficially pleasing landscapes”? (184-190) In his treatment of public space “zoning” in Chapter 6, Mitchell once again employs a cultural explanation, but he does not adequately ground his analysis in specific material and class relations. He does not actually demonstrate how the structuring of public space is or could be important to achieving better social housing. Are not the most liveable and enjoyable cities those that coalesce differences and celebrate culture and entertainment in the streets and in other public spaces, as well as provide the homeless with amenable shelter and support services? Even among capitalist cities, there are some that tolerate dissident political groups and the homeless more than others.

The lack of cohesion in the book suggests the need for a deeper political analysis and a broader historical framework. Few would disagree that people should have the right to redress their grievances and debate political positions in public space, but Mitchell does not answer how and why the homeless and others are most threatened. For instance, he does not delve into the roots of the homelessness crisis: the increasing impoverishment of North American cities, including state cutbacks in public health care that have forced psychiatric institutions to exclude or discharge patients in need of care onto the streets and other urban public spaces.

Mitchell’s passionate defence of rights of access to urban public space is admirable, but the book’s effect is limited by theoretical weakness. Overall, Mitchell does not finish what he sets out to do and does not position himself very clearly. He does not examine the real or imagined threat of democracy to capitalist accumulation, and why social exclusion and the destruction of public space are winning. The contemporary vision of the rational and technical city conflicting with everyday practice and political programme is firmly grounded in historical research. For instance, Christine Stansell and Mary Ryan have examined the regulation of working women’s and children’s social life in the streets and in other public and semi-public spaces of 19th- and 20th-century US cities. In Taking Back the Streets and in Red City, Blue Period, Temma Kaplan has analysed contested class, gender, and national struggles for access to public space. Mitchell pursues a limited investigation of the zoning of urban public space and the laws established to protect state and corporate power. The monograph does not sufficiently investigate the causes, consequences, and remedies of this anti-democratic thrust in our public spaces.

Kathleen Lord
Mount Allison University


JAMES GREGORY’s new book is ambitious. From a scholarly perspective, its unwieldy subject matter might even approach the “are you crazy?” end of things. Gregory’s main goal is to demonstrate the centrality of what he calls the “southern diaspora” — the millions of black and white southerners who left the South for the North and West between the turn of the 20th century and the 1970s — to the broader cultural and political economic currents of American history. This is not a book about the significance of “The South” in US history so much as a book about the importance of “southerners” in the history of the non-southern US. This means he must account for both the distinctive features of the separate “migrations,” and their links and complementary elements. Along the way, then, he must also suggest a way to understand the enormous complexity of an era in which do-
Domestic issues in the US have taken on global significance. To put it in the terms of part of his subject matter, this is an academic stepping up to the plate. The risk of a-swing-and-a-miss is quite high.

I will refrain from a bad “home run” metaphor, and say rather that I am glad Gregory has this kind of ambition, and is willing to take on a big, messy subject, because this is a really good book that works very well. Part of the reason it is good, certainly, is that Gregory can write: in a conversational tone that somehow manages to be both confident and modest at the same time, he not only gets his main scholarly points across, but he also manages to make the book very enjoyable, sometimes even fun. There are interesting but brief digressions here and there, and he offers more lengthy discussions of southerners’ place in the history of popular culture arenas like baseball, boxing, jazz, and country music. He also personalizes some of the history by narrating it through the experience of “case studies” like Lily Tomlin and Aretha Franklin (among others less well known), whose southern-migrant families, it turns out, lived not too far from each other in Detroit. For these reasons alone it will be an excellent book to use in the classroom, either undergraduate or graduate.

But it is not only the writing that is good here. The book also contains innovative scholarship, both methodologically and in its historical argument, and it speaks to our current political condition in a direct and interesting way. Gregory opens the book with a discussion of internal migration data gleaned from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series [IPUMS], a massive census-derived database developed at the University of Minnesota. (Gregory has made his data available online, and has added 24 of the most relevant tables as an appendix to the book.) The IPUMS data shows clearly some dimensions of the migration out of the South that have either been misread or attracted less historical attention than he argues they deserve. To take only a sample of these dimensions, Gregory finds that the southern migration was much more massive than usually thought — close to 30 million people left the region in the period in question. He also finds, complicating the focus on the African American “Great Migration” (which was of course very great, especially proportionally), that twice as many white southerners migrated as blacks. Moreover, he discovers how crucial relatively short-term “turnover” or return migration was to whites, a factor that is missed by less fine-grained data. This leads him to conclude that “the white diaspora is best understood as a circulation, not as a one-way population transfer,” in contrast to the black migration. (16) For those of us who work on the politics of race and class in the West, the book is also very welcome for refocusing some attention on the fact that the migrants, both black and white, did not just head north to cities like Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, something that most histories, especially those of the African American population movement, seem to forget.

This is not to say that the book is not about cities, but it is not just about the big cities of the east — it has Los Angeles as well as Philadelphia, Oakland as well as Chicago. In fact, this is in many ways primarily a book about cities, a history of the impact of southerners on the culture and politics of urban America. He even makes a compelling case for the resurrection of the idea of the “Black Metropolis.” The running analytical metaphor Gregory uses to study this is the stereoscope, which is a lens that gives two-dimensional images a third dimension (it is often used to allow one to see relief in aerial photographs). Gregory certainly follows the histories of black and white southern migrants in their new urban homes as two racially specific phenomena (the two dimensions of the conventional image). But he also argues that by examining them “stereoscopically” — i.e., thinking about them simultaneously, in their interaction — a “third dimension” becomes visible.
This third dimension constitutes a richer, and more accurate account of the diversity of meaning of southern-ness in the US.

Some of the best parts of the book cover the realm of “cultural production,” which Gregory convincingly argues is the social site at which this third dimension is most apparent. Perhaps best laid out in vivid discussions of white country music, black blues and jazz, and the evangelicalism of black and white churches, he shows how although the strands of the diaspora were often opposed, they were at the same time “never out of touch.” (193) Together, they “generated models, images, and ideas that contributed to important reformulations of racial identities and southern identities” during the 20th century. (194)

Gregory also uses this same approach to think about the increasing power of white “working-class” conservatism in the US (while acknowledging that it is not necessarily just working class), and its southern roots. This is the focus of the penultimate chapter, “Re-figuring Conservatism,” and here he makes some interesting claims as to the extent to which the US has been “southernized,” and conversely to which Dixie has been Americanized. His point is not that either shift has been dominant, but that it is the movements of the participants in the massive southern diaspora that have been one of the principal vectors through which these dynamics have worked.

This chapter, as good as it is, also points to my only real reservation about the book, and that lies in the danger of homogenizing the South. Gregory recognizes, as he says, that “there were, of course, many Souths,” (22) but by the end of the book this point is somewhat lost, as “the South” is more frequently mobilized as a definitive regional marker. There is certainly evidence in the book that this homogenization made sense to the migrants, at least within the bounds of the “racial” categories through which the region is normally characterized. But I am not sure that analytically it might not be more useful to decompose these movements into some of the finer threads that Gregory weaves together. His justification for doing so — that the book is about the southerners outside the South, not so much about why they left — is well presented. Nonetheless, it seems to me the historical lessons that are obscured by the compression, such as some consideration of the sources of the wide range of white southern attitudes toward race (and how these mattered outside the South), are sometimes of crucial importance.

Gregory’s conclusions — that race, class, institutions, and geography matter — will not surprise anyone. What is enormously important here is his emphasis on the fact that all of these things matter not abstractly or categorically, but rather because they are alive in the movement of real people, across real spaces, and in the ways they changed the real places to which they moved.

Geoff Mann
Simon Fraser University


As the title suggests, this is an ambitious work which narrates a national story of the history of interracial marriage in the United States from the colonial era until the early 21st century, the heart of the analysis focusing on the era “between the 1860s and the 1960s, from the Civil War to the Civil Rights movement.” (5) Wallenstein’s book is a study of race, sex, and the law in the United States over a century through the prism of laws which forbade marriage across colour lines. His central argument is that the story of race, law, and marriage is one of how state power, exercised through its imposition of a restrictive definition of race and marriage, was both imposed upon and re-
sisted by those who attempted to marry across the colour line. Wallenstein has coined the rather creative term, the “anti-miscegenation regime,” to explain this history. (7, 9)

Beginning his analysis in the colonial Chesapeake, in the first two chapters Wallenstein fleshes out the laws governing race, sex, and marriage during this period. The author provides a nuanced portrait of the prevalent definitions of “race” and how they in turn affected who was lawfully entitled to marry whom. Here we learn that this story was not a case of a simple black/white binary but something far more complex, a triangulated racial context where “whites,” both male and female, produced children with Native Americans and people of African descent. (14) These dalliances across the colour line created a society where African blood did not automatically consign one to a condition of servitude despite the best efforts of colonial assemblies. After 1662 Virginia and Maryland decreed that children would inherit the status of their mothers, irrespective of paternity, in order to ensure the enslavement of the product of unions between slave owners and their female slaves. Thirty years later these colonies seized upon the racial regulation of the institution of marriage for the “prevention of that abominable mixture and spurious issue … as well by Negroes, mulattoes, and Indians intermarrying with English, or other white women, as by their unlawful accompanying with one another.” (15) By the early 1660s, laws targeted white women who married across the colour line; those who did faced the wrath of the law in the form of banishment, or worse, the terms of their servitude could be adjusted from seven years to between 30 years and lifetime servitude — in effect slavery — along with legal denigration from whiteness to blackness. To further complicate this picture these laws were repealed some seventeen years later. (23) In the midst of this shifting landscape of race, slavery, and freedom, the bonded children of such unions turned to the courts to decide their legal status, some of whom were consigned to long-term servitude while others secured their freedom depending upon when they were born and the letter of the law at that exact time. Virginians who were born into slavery during this era also staked claims for freedom based on their matrilineal Indian ancestry. (28)

Wallenstein then traces the history of the anti-miscegenation regime over several watershed periods: the Early Republican until the Civil War, Reconstruction, the inter-war period, the post-World War II era and the Civil Rights age. Throughout the North and the South, the colonial tradition of the legal prohibition of interracial marriage endured in the newly constituted nation emanating westward from the eastern seaboard. Over the course of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 38 states enacted laws against interracial marriage. (49) Incendiary debates about interracial marriage also figured prominently within the larger racial questions of the era. The very term miscegenation was coined in the North during the Civil War and members of the fledgling Republican Party and the Democrats were united in their mutual disgust for the idea of racial amalgamation. After the Civil War, the 13th and 14th amendments called the legality of legal prohibitions of interracial marriage into question. The Reconstruction era witnessed challenges to states’ (mostly Southern) laws against interracial marriage based on the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause, (71) setting the pattern that would endure until the 1960s. Fascinatingly, we learn that during the Reconstruction era seven out of eleven former Confederate States did not ban interracial marriage. This interlude was reversed by the 1880s when a series of landmark cases determined that the equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment did not include the right to marry across the colour line. (108) As long as the penalties for violating racial marriage laws were applied equally to both (typically but not exclusively)
whites and blacks alike, this, it was argued, upheld the legal principle of equal protection under the laws. The US Supreme Court also ruled that the regulation of marriage fell under the jurisdiction of the states. These legal principles were reinforced by the fateful *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896.

By the early 20th century, the anti-miscegenation regime further tightened its hold. One congressman was so enraged by the sexual exploits of a black boxer named Jack Johnson, who was admired by and an admirer of white women, that he attempted to pass a national law prohibiting interracial marriage. In concert with efforts to craft national laws against interracial marriage, individual states began to tighten up the legal definition of whiteness, a development which had implications for the legality of many marriages and the laws of inheritance which only recognized the inheritance rights of the progeny of those who were legally married. (161) After World War II, the legal prohibitions against interracial marriage began to decline due to several main factors: the active involvement of Church organizations, hitherto reluctant civil rights organizations, and the US Supreme Court’s decision to apply the logic of the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas* decision’s interpretation of the equal protection clause as a guarantee of freedom from racial discrimination. The 1967 ruling in the *Loving v. Virginia* case included the right to marry a person of another race. (233) The struggle to define marriage in the US endures to this day around issues of sexuality. (259-260)

Even a book this impressive has flaws. First we are left to guess about important methodological questions. This book is based on numerous legal cases but we don’t know, exactly, how Wallenstein generated his sample. Second, the “anti-miscegenation regime” is far too dynamic a term to be contained within the institution of marriage; this regime necessarily encompassed a much wider terrain of race and sex. Surely the law was only one front where the opposition to race and sex in the US was mobilized. Curiously, Wallenstein gives lynching only a passing mention in this book. Only beyond the formal reach of the law, but nonetheless buttressed by it, could white Americans effectively police the full range of interracial sexual encounters — with intimidation, threats, menacing glances, and, ultimately, the rope. Perhaps in the future Wallenstein might consider the critical and symbiotic link between the legal and extra-legal governance of race and sex. These quibbles aside, this book is a tour de force. This is a very important book from a seasoned scholar at the height of his powers.

Barrington Walker
Queen’s University


According to the authors of this book, punk rock is about estrangement from, and opposition to, capitalist society, although it is also recognized that it has accommodative tendencies as well. Despite its title, the book has nothing to say, beyond personal reminiscences, about the audience(s) for punk rock, the meaning(s) that might be attached to the music by listeners, or their revolutionary proclivities (or lack thereof). Instead, the conclusion is arrived at after a content analysis of the lyrics and themes of punk recordings released by three companies in the United States throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It is a conclusion that will surprise nobody who has had any exposure to punk rock over this time period. What is more surprising, perhaps, is that this can be presented as a finding that is original and insightful nearly 30 years after the birth of punk.
It is, nonetheless, the centre piece of a book that is generally poorly written, repetitious, and couched throughout in the irritatingly tendentious language of ‘critical’ (as opposed to uncritical?) social science. It will not repay many people’s effort to read it.

Preceding the content analysis are chapters on the authors’ social backgrounds and brief and alarmingly superficial overviews of the literature on popular culture and resistance, and other, pre-punk, subversive musical genres. After the content analysis comes a concluding chapter called the “Inevitable Revolution,” though nowhere in its scant 2½ pages is the chapter title explained. Much of the argument is then reviewed in an afterward by Peter McLaren and Jonathan McLaren, who entertain the possibility, seriously I think, that between them punks and skateboarders could become gravediggers of capitalism.

Julian Tanner
University of Toronto


In recent decades, swelling capital flows and trade have rendered advanced capitalist countries increasingly interdependent. But does globalization mean convergence of previously diverse national systems of corporate governance and employment relations? This book offers a nuanced answer, based on a well-executed comparative case study of corporate business in Japan and the United States. Along the way, we get an historical narrative on the changing shape and form of capitalism in the most recent three decades of neo-liberalization and financialization. Although Jacoby accepts that there has been a net shift from plan (or organization) to market in corporate employment and governance arrangements, the case analyses reveal a great deal of diversity within each country at the level of specific firms, and a temporal unevenness grounded in the fact that no one business system is inherently superior to another. As part of the competitive process, businesses continually scan across changing national contexts for the most profitable organizational forms.

Confirming the principle that “when a nation enjoys macroeconomic success, it will be regarded as a model for its slower-growing peers,” (14) the fabulous success of Japanese stakeholder capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s, years of visible American decline, led (some) US corporations to adopt (some) Japanese approaches. With the collapse of Japan’s “bubble economy” in the 1990s and the resurgence of corporate America under the sign of deregulation, the flow of emulation reversed. Most recently, as scandals and crises have beset American shareholder capitalism, the flow may be reversing yet again. Yet in each period the process of transnational emulation has been only partial — this because of the obdurate reality flagged by the book’s title. Corporations, and corporate management, are socially embedded, not only in distinctive national contexts but in specific industries, and their trajectories are therefore path dependent.

Jacoby tells these comparative stories from a specific place — the Human Relations [HR] departments that in Japan have been integral to business structure and strategy but in the US have tended to occupy the lower tier of corporate organization. The traditionally centralized and paternalistic mode of organization in Japan has given HR departments broad mandates in labour relations, employee-welfare services, and the grooming of potential managers. The senior HR executive has typically sat on a company’s board of directors, exercising some power in setting overall corporate strategy and even representing workers, after a fashion (indeed, many HR executives have been re-
cruited from the upper ranks of enterprise unions). In the US, this sort of corporatism, and the accompanying stakeholder corporate governance, has been extremely rare. The employment system has been market-oriented rather than organization-oriented, with higher turnover, shorter job durations, low training expenditures, and a managerial antipathy toward unions. The corresponding regime of American corporate governance, particularly in the late 20th century, gave priority to shareholders over stakeholders and brought the market into the interior of the firm itself, as corporate divisions were granted autonomy but appraised and regulated via financial criteria. In such a system, HR departments and personnel managers occupy a subaltern status. They have little in the way of an organizational function compared to chief financial officers, whose quantitative strategic judgements inform the buying and selling of units and the comparative assessment of divisional performance. In a business culture dominated by quantitative norms, HR departments deal with qualitative problems, and they attend to employees — a “factor of production” that in the American system lacks stakeholder status.

As one might gather from this very brief synopsis of an empirically rich text, Jacoby’s interpretation relies substantially on a version of structural-functional social theory, which is never made explicit. National business systems cohere around deeply seated norms and values, and functional interdependencies among institutions create organizational inertia. Change comes slowly, through selective adaptation, muting any global tendency toward convergence. In the same way that Toyotism, although widely mooted in the 1980s as the face of corporate America’s future, did not become the general norm for US corporations, today “those who think that the large Japanese corporation will gradually morph into its American counterpart are mistaken.” (166) Each system is stabilized by embedded societal norms, such as the Japanese obligation of employers to employees and the conception of the corporation as a community of stakeholders. While norms stabilize the system, one vector of change issues from the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to create an impression of normative change strong enough to induce a self-fulfilling prophecy — a bandwagon effect that overcomes the reluctance of actors to switch norms unless they believe others are also switching. In contemporary Japan, candidates for such a role include American-based institutional shareholders in Japanese firms, now pushing US-style corporate governance reform, the local business press, which has advocated the same reform, and the Liberal Democratic Party, which has enacted a raft of business law legislation in the past decade that privileges shareholders over stakeholders. However, the culturally embedded character of the Japanese corporation makes normative change very difficult, and the fact that Japanese firms reap international competitive advantages from being distinctive in their organizational form ensures a good measure of continuity. In the US, the Enron scandal and the more general collapse of the equity bubble may have weakened the position of shareholders. Yet actual reforms to corporate governance have been minimal, and other collective actors such as the labour movement (which has aligned itself with reform-oriented institutional investors) are at this point more “straws in the wind” than entrepreneurs as the term is normally understood. Still, in the bastion of investor capitalism, crises and falling share prices do undermine the hegemony of finance in corporate governance while they open opportunities for others with alternative approaches to “the creation of corporate value,” (163) including those urging the adoption of a Japanese style of managing internal resources. Ultimately, Jacoby concludes, neither convergence nor the reproduction of divergent capitalisms furnishes a satisfactory grand narrative for the trajectories of cor-
porate governance and employment relations in Japan and the United States. Corporations adapt to changing conditions in ways that fit preexisting institutions and social values: there is no overarching convergence process but an inertial, piecemeal hybridization — a continuity in change.

My only criticism is paradigmatic. Jacoby’s study is informative and, on its own terms, reasonably persuasive. The structural-functional framework and the top-down view of corporate organization serve well for the cases and purposes at hand. However, a labour-centred standpoint, and a greater range of cases (including instances where labour movements have mobilized more effectively and/or autonomously than in the US and Japan) might yield a rather different picture of employment relations, corporate governance, and the agents and structures that bring about the creation of value. The corporation is embedded not only in culture but in class relations that run deeper than the level at which this study has been undertaken.

William K. Carroll
University of Victoria


STEVEN KETTELL, like many other people, is puzzled by Tony Blair’s decision to participate in the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. But unlike many others who have written about this puzzle, he would have us shift our attention away from the main players and their immediate motivations. What he argues instead is “that the development of the Iraq policy was fundamentally conditioned by the underlying structural architecture of the British political system ... by a series of deeply entrenched norms and values pertaining to a centralized, hierarchical and elitist style of government.” (4) The UK state has a democratic deficit, too few checks and balances, too limited a notion of representation, too great an enthusiasm for strong leadership. So too does New Labour. That, he tells us, is the key to the tragedy of Blair and Iraq.

In arguing in this fashion, Kettell positions himself in an ongoing debate about why Tony Blair went to war. In the broadest sense there are only four kinds of explanation in play in that debate: explanations privileging history, psychology, the accidental, and the structural. Kettell’s explanation is a structural one. Within its own terms of reference, it is very persuasive: but so too are the others, and in key ways they help us to understand the substance of Blair’s policy rather better than does Kettell’s standing alone. A structural explanation definitely helps to clarify why the Iraq policy was Blair’s to make, and why, once made, it was so difficult to stop. But for the full story we need more than that. We need to know too why the policy Blair chose was the one it was; and to get to that, we need a lot of history, a little psychology, and even a dash of tragedy.

After all, the tendency of UK governments to align themselves with the requirements of US foreign policy, in the manner of Blair’s alignment with Bush, is not new. It has a long history, though not an unbroken history. Most famously, Harold Wilson resisted US pressure for UK troops to fight in Vietnam; but Wilson was the exception, not the rule. Post-war Labour governments, no less than Conservative ones, have regularly chosen — in Peter Riddell’s telling phrase — to “hug them close,” out of a desire to maintain a special relationship with US global power — a desire rooted in the reluctant recognition in UK governing circles that the UK alone is no longer strong enough these days, either economically or militarily, to play an independent global role. On this argument, Blair ended up as George Bush’s point man on Iraq because he, in common with the rest of the New
Labour leadership, had never broken entirely free of a mindset that requires the UK to punch above its weight on the international stage. Blair ended up sending British troops into Iraq because that’s what UK governments habitually do. They help rearrange other people’s political furniture because they have the military capacity and imperial arrogance to do so.

The fact that Blair participated so easily in this particular piece of furniture moving, and was then so resilient in the face of criticism from other European leaders, has also been explained psychologically by people like David Runciman, as a by-product of “the politics of good intentions.” Blair the man — firm in his own convictions and well schooled in taking and winning political gambles — simply took another high-risk initiative. As a passionate advocate of globalization and an independent architect of the strategy of pre-emptive action, he inadvertently laid the ground for the invasion in his 1999 Chicago Address, and gained the necessary experience in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. On this argument, Blair actively wanted a leadership role post-9/11, imposed himself on the Bush people to get one, and was geared to regime change in Iraq well before March 2003. When New Labour stalwarts looked on in horror as he aligned UK policy with that of neo-Conservative Republicans, the prime minister’s hubris then kicked in, reinforcing his commitment to the alliance and the invasion. A different prime minister, drawing on the same history and enjoying the same structural advantages, would have played it differently. The differences are psychological here, not structural. It was “Blair the man,” so the argument goes, that holds the ultimate explanatory key.

Or maybe there’s a role for accident. Certainly James Naughtie thinks so; and so in a different way (in Blair’s War) do Joel Krieger and I. By chance, Blair inherited a military relationship with the United States in relation to Iraq — the no-fly zones left over from the first Gulf War. He was — as he remains — close to Clinton, and supported his military moves in the Middle East. Nine/eleven killed UK citizens in significant numbers, not just Americans; and once Blair had accepted the Bush framing of the issue (“terrorism” and “axes of evil”) he was trapped by the power of his own involvement in the demonizing of Hussein. To back down in the face of Iraqi defiance would strengthen the Iraqi dictator. To leave him in power alongside al-Qaeda would push the Baathists and the fundamentalists together. To take a principled stand alongside the French and the Germans would hurt the special relationship he so valued, and weaken the voices of moderation — mainly Colin Powell’s — within the Bush Administration with whom Blair identified. In the end the UK went to war because Blair had to. His credibility was on the line, put there by a year of his own rhetoric. It wasn’t the political architecture of the UK state that took us to war so much as the ideational architecture of Blair’s public utterances.

All four arguments bring important insights to the puzzle of why Blair participated in the invasion of Iraq. In struggling to understand that puzzle, Steven Kettell’s book provides a great service by emphasizing the impact of the structure of the UK state on the developing storyline. The service is a great one because it points to a vital area of reform; but it is also a limited service to the degree that it pulls us away from the other area of reform suggested by explanations more rooted in history, psychology, and accident. For it is the mindset of imperialism, still deeply engrained on the British Left, which also needs to go — not just the elitist structure of the UK state. We need democratization and mental cleansing at one and the same time. Labour leaders have to stop all this “punching above their weight” on the world stage. They need genuinely to repopulate the UK at the centre of a social democratic Europe, and drop all their nonsense about bridging the Atlantic on Eu-
rope’s behalf. That bridging simply allows them to strut their stuff before the world’s media — to feel good by claiming to do good — when in places like Iraq, what they do, and what they support, is not good at all. It’s not just the UK’s political architecture that needs reform. That of the international community also needs reform. The Kettell argument points to that need in the UK. Let’s hope it also triggers thinking about the equivalent need at the European and global level.

David Coates
Wake Forest University


This book refocuses the academic discussion of land reform to its due status as central to ending imperialism and promoting social justice throughout the globe. Because the majority of recent academic discussions on agrarian reform have either focused on the mechanism of land reform (i.e., the market vs. expropriation), or placed land reform in the context of the field of development and combating rural poverty, its significance for global social change — and as a challenge to imperialism — has been diminished. The editors correctly assert that “the importance of land reform, beyond the short-term reprieve that it offers the rural poor, is its potential to break the political structures that foster underdevelopment.” (52) By framing land reform in this context, the editors bring land reform into the spotlight as a central component to social, economic, and political change, and take the agrarian question beyond simply its role in ‘development’.

Additionally, by focusing on the primary tactic employed by contemporary rural social movements, land occupation, the book legitimizes this strategy in the discussion of land reform — another effort that is overdue in academic discussions on the topic. However, the book’s analysis could have gone further in looking at how the nature and purpose of some land occupations are shifting. For example, in Brazil, where multinational corporations’ holdings and operations are increasingly being targeted for occupations, often the primary purpose of these occupations is not to pressure the government to expropriate and redistribute the land, but to expose the illegal activities of these companies through media attention. This changing character of some occupations may represent an increased militancy on the part of social movements in their resistance to corporate power.

In their introduction, the editors contextualize rural social movements in the present global political, social, and economic order. They focus on neoliberalism (especially structural adjustment) and the globalization of the agro-food system during the post-war period. The various chapters in the book, focusing on the three central geographic areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, discuss shared tactics of organization, as well as the political, economic, and social exclusion shared by different movements, helping the reader to understand how neoliberalism has had similar effects in rural areas throughout the world. The book also highlights the differences and nuances (i.e., indigenous, separatist, armed, etc.) of different movements, as outcomes of country-specific circumstances.

While the editors do point out the importance of the World Social Forum as a place and space for rural social movements to share information and form transnational alliances, again the book could have gone further in its discussion of how contemporary rural social movements are globalizing, particularly through the recent emergence, organization, and growth of the Via Campesina. The Via Campesina serves an important function for information-sharing and solidarity amongst rural social movements across the globe. Yet it appears that its
role as an umbrella organization for rural movements is also changing. Indeed, related to the changing nature of occupations discussed above, the Via Campesina is beginning to organize occupations that target multinational corporations, and participants in these occupations are members of social movements throughout the world. An example is the Via Campesina’s recent action at Aracruz Corporation in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, in which 2,000 people united to uproot over one million eucalyptus seedlings, and destroyed the company’s tree-cloning laboratory. Such actions demonstrate how social movements themselves are globalizing and unifying their different struggles, and their growing militancy, in the face of economic globalization and growing corporate power. These developments also highlight how the Internet has been a major tool for the Via Campesina to spread and share information.

This book is a good read for anyone interested in understanding how rural social movements are organizing, evolving, and changing in the current global neo-liberal context. It provides good evidence for how contemporary rural social movements that are organizing for land reform offer perhaps the most tangible and real effort at global social change today.

Isabella Kenfield
University of California

Deborah Eade and Alan Leather, eds., *Development NGOs and Labor Unions: Terms of Engagement* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press 2005)

MOST OF the authors of this fascinating collection of essays have worked on both sides of two divides: the one between unions and other types of NGOs, and the one between NGOs based in the global North and those based in the global South. That cooperation across this “double divide,” the term used by Evans and Anner in their chapter of the book, is both possible and desirable is one premise shared by the contributors to this volume. Another shared premise is that such cooperation is difficult, and that efforts to cooperate often fail, or, at best, do not realize their full potential. Together, these shared assumptions explain the need for, and the purpose of, this book. The editors and contributors aim to draw on their experience to help others better understand the problems and opportunities involved in cooperation across the two divides, and by this means, to more effectively mitigate the problems and more fully realize the opportunities.

The volume is empirically rich. Most of its essays are case studies — detailed pieces of the vast mosaic of social movement mobilization around worker and human rights in the global economy that has emerged over the last quarter-century. Among the most important pieces of that mosaic examined in this book are struggles to advance worker and human rights in countries with very repressive political regimes (Anner & Evans, Eade, Ayede, Povey); to curtail sweatshop production in the apparel sector and in export processing zones more broadly (Conner, Braun & Gearhart, Prieto & Quinteros, Lipschutz, Compa, Kearney & Gearhart); to empower informal sector workers (Pearson, Spooner, Johnston); to modify or stop neo-liberal trade agreements such as the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Huyer, Anner & Evans); and to develop global networks of worker rights advocates and a global policy and regulatory infrastructure sympathetic to worker rights (Anner & Evans, Roman, Simpkins).

Some of the cases considered here, particularly the use of codes of conduct in challenges to sweatshop production in export processing zones, have already received considerable attention, though these essays shed light on such efforts from a number of useful angles. Other cases get less sustained treatment than their importance warrants. For example,
three essays in this collection have important things to say about organizing in the informal sector that were new to this reader. However, only one (Pearson) is focused primarily on this subject (and mainly on one aspect of it, homework). I wish there had been more. After all, this sector probably accounts for a majority of the global South’s workers; it is also growing rapidly in the global North, as Southern workers flee untenable economic conditions in their home countries. Anner and Evans identify organizing this sector as “perhaps the biggest single challenge” facing unions and NGOs alike, and note that neither of the campaigns that they discuss in their chapter — the anti-sweatshop movement and the Hemispheric Social Alliance process — seriously addresses this pressing question.

What lessons for future practice should we draw from the cases considered in this book? The editors offer no concise answer to this question. A final chapter setting out such a synthesis, instead of, or in addition to, the annotated bibliography that ends this book, would be very helpful. After so many detailed cases, there is a need to step back from the individual pieces of the mosaic to see more clearly the larger picture. A short review such as this does not permit a sustained or nuanced response to this challenge. However, I will identify some of the most important insights that I got from these essays.

With respect to the sources of tension across the two divides, at least three seem widespread. The first is the disparity in material resources between relatively rich unions and poor NGOs, and between relatively rich Northern organizations and poor Southern organizations. When richer organizations, often in the name of accountability to their members and/or funders, demand disproportionate influence over the processes that determine how their money is spent, poorer partners are bound to resent and resist.

The second widespread source of tension is overlapping turf: unions often assume that they are the primary if not exclusive actors articulating and defending the interests of workers, organized and unorganized. But other NGOs often define their mandate and constituents in ways that include workers and workplaces. Many such NGOs understandably reject unions’ claims to exclusive or primary representation, particularly in areas (e.g., the informal sector) and issues (e.g., women’s issues in the view of many organizations organized around gender identities) where unions have been inactive, indifferent, or ineffective.

The third source of tension is differences in goals and strategy: when is community organizing better than, or an essential supplement to, workplace-focused organizing? Should the informal sector be recognized as a reality that will not go away, for which special organizing strategies must be devised, or is that conceding too much to the deregulatory agenda responsible for the expansion of this sector? Should efforts to organize workers focus on economic needs, or is it (sometimes) better to organize workers around ethnoracial, gender, and/or national identities? Or is it better to organize women qua women, with some of what these women’s organizations do focusing on the labour market? These strategic differences may be rooted in different organizational cultures that make different assumptions about what motivates people to make the sacrifices necessary for successful organizing. Or they may derive from differences in the people to whom organization leaders are accountable (e.g., workers who are members with voting rights vs. non-profit boards of directors or foundation funders).

While almost all the case studies in this book report such tensions, quite a few also tell stories of relatively successful efforts to cooperate, particularly where those efforts were sustained beyond a single campaign. None of the three basic sources of tension just outlined is likely to disappear any time soon, but each can be managed more or less successfully. If this
analysis of the underlying causes of tension is accurate, then relatively successful cases of cooperation across the two divides should be found where mitigation efforts have been effective. A thorough synthetic chapter might look to see whether more successful cooperation is indeed strongly connected to such mitigation, and if it is, look at how this was achieved. Here we can look very briefly at these questions for two of the cases examined in this book.

The first case, reported by Paul Johnston, involves organizing among recent immigrant workers in California’s Salinas River Valley. In 1985, reform candidates with ties to the United Farm Workers won the election for the leadership of the biggest union in the area, Teamsters Local 890. A decade later, in the wake of California’s anti-immigrant Proposition 187, the union launched the Citizenship Project to help its members, most of whom were eligible, to secure citizenship. The Project was created as a separate organization from the outset, but initially it depended very heavily on union funding, and major policy decisions were made by a board comprised mainly of union members. Today, representatives of the grassroots groups sponsored by the Project constitute a majority of the board members, and only 5-10 per cent of the Project’s funding comes from Local 890. Nonetheless, the union’s organizing staff and the Citizenship Project are co-located, and the project’s staff and volunteers are integrated into union organizing campaigns. While not quite seamless, a very powerful organizing network has been created.

This case is unusual because the NGO in question was created by the union that subsequently worked with it. These origins no doubt make cooperation easier, though hardly inevitable. The disparity of resources was turned into an advantage, with the union financing the Project’s launch but then pulling back, both in funding and in control, as it developed. The two organizations work on the same turf — organizing, educating, and mobilizing immigrant workers in the region — but have developed an effective division of labour, and a willingness to devote organizational resources to the other’s campaigns. While the Project is in some ways unique, many of the things that it does, and the organizing praxis that informs its efforts, are characteristic of the new low-wage and immigrant Workers’ Centres that are springing up throughout the United States. Ten years ago, there were fewer than ten such centres in the USA; today, according to recent research by Janice Fine, there are at least 130. A few were founded by unions. Many more work with unions in various degrees of proximity. Johnston’s chapter suggests that unions and Central Labor Councils would be well advised to follow Local 890’s example of how to work with existing Workers’ Centres and to help launch them where they do not yet exist. Of course, many unions do not draw a majority of their membership from the same ethnic group as the people organized by the Workers’ Centres. But many unions based in the private service sector, where most employment and most growth of employment is found, do increasingly have such members. Others that lack many such members might nonetheless undertake to persuade their members that making common cause with these workers is the best way to build overall labour movement power, from which all will benefit. The prospect of many more Workers’ Centres, working more closely with unions, is perhaps the most hopeful scenario we have for organizing low-wage workers, many of whom are in the informal sector.

The second case I would like to highlight briefly is the evolution of the anti-sweatshop movement, documented by Evans and Anner, Eade, Compa, Braun and Gearhart, and others. Initially, there was much tension between Northern NGOs and Southern unions because the codes of conduct that the NGOs developed were imposed with little or no consulta-
tion with Southern unions. Over time, however, communication has increased, and more importantly, some of these NGOs have recognized the desirability of placing workers’ rights to organize at the heart of codes of conduct. Since the essays in this volume were written, this strategic basis for cooperation has been strengthened by the “designated supplier list” [DSL] campaign developed by the Worker Rights Consortium [WRC] and United Students Against Sweatshops.

The DSL campaign aims to get major US universities to commit to purchasing a steadily increasing share of clothing bearing their logos from companies that agree to source from subcontractors on the list. To get on this list, suppliers must have a democratic union and pay a living wage, as determined by the WRC. Since January 2006, the entire University of California system has signed onto this approach, as have several other major US universities. SweatFree Communities, a coalition of anti-sweat NGOs that push school boards and state and local governments to adopt sweat-free purchasing policies, is also moving in this direction. In this way, the power that NGOs wield through their capacity to influence institutional purchasers in the global North is being harnessed to create powerful new incentives to recognize and bargain with unions in the global South. It is a strategy with much more potential for synergies between unions and NGOs, and between workers in the global North and South, than the earlier iteration of the anti-sweatshop movement. Let’s hope that the essays in this book help to stimulate new examples of such symbiotic interaction across neo-liberal globalization’s two divides.

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THIS BOOK is an important addition to the now voluminous literature on global economic development. It draws upon economic, political, and organizational theory in an effort to identify and analyse those fundamental elements and structures which typify developing countries and which impair their developmental progress.

The somewhat surprising and unusual point of departure for Root’s analysis is the distinction between risk and uncertainty. Throughout the 20th century, various economists, including Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes, endeavoured to place considerable analytical weight on this distinction. Risk is deemed to be a tractable feature of world economies insofar as it is measurable and allows for the calculation of probability. This enables various social actors to weigh the costs and benefits of alternate courses of action with a view to selecting that which will prove the most rewarding. In such an environment, self-motivated agents can formulate and implement forward-looking plans, including investment and other risk-taking schemes, resulting in the mobilization of society’s productive resources and the subsequent realization of a growing dynamic economy.

Root argues that what differentiates low-income developing countries from their developed counterparts is the absence of institutions that effectively manage to transform uncertainty into risk. Faced with uncertainty, social actors adopt insular, conservative strategies, such as over-insuring; hoarding resources, information, and capital; and over-relying on a nexus of close family ties instead of the wider impersonal relations associated with larger institutions such as the market. The result is a lack of dynamism, an absence of risk-taking, poor and inefficient dissemination of in-
formation (much of which remains privately held), and a poor and incomplete mobilization of productive resources. Economic development therefore requires a sustained and ambitious program of institution-building and institutional change.

This is where the state and economic policy comes in, but Root argues that the formulation and implementation of the necessary policies in developing countries is problematic at best. Existing political and institutional arrangements tend to induce behaviour by governmental decision-makers and public sector workers that acts to preserve and protect the status quo. In particular, existing arrangements operate to the immediate material advantage of those in power and their relatively narrow clique of supporters. These favoured parties may in fact be increasing their wealth while the rest of the country confronts perennial economic hardship. Root notes that poor national economic performance may bind the ruling party and their support base ever more closely together. Developmental aid, in the form of material, financial, and/or intellectual support, can be accepted and appreciated by governments in developing countries, but, given the institutional arrangements and the existing incentive structures, this assistance cannot be expected to bring about much improvement in the economic conditions facing the majority of the population.

Much of the book is given to specific analysis of selected developing countries and regions, and Root uses his robust theoretical framework to illuminate the ways in which the logic of global development has manifested itself in various environments. Part of the strength of his approach is that it permits explicit recognition of the distinct cultural and institutional circumstances among developing countries. This produces a number of interesting insights. For example, Root claims that countries characterized by a highly polarized population will find it very difficult to create a broad social consensus around any set of transformative developmental policies. Without the requisite consensus, policy-makers will find that their best strategy for remaining in power will be to continue to deliver material benefits to their narrow coterie of supporters, thereby impeding any substantial developmental progress.

More generally, Root’s approach can be viewed as indicative of recent work in the social sciences. Institutions and culture, as noted above, are not treated as an afterthought but are of prime importance in the analysis of existing material conditions and in the evaluation of policy options. The methodological precepts of mainstream social science, and of economics in particular, are consciously adhered to. In particular, a choice-theoretic framework is extensively used in which self-interested agents contemplate alternative courses of actions. The institutional framework operates to favour some choices over others. The prospects for and consequences of institutional reform or transformation are considered in light of the incentives and options that agents encounter. Actual policy choices are consequently conceptualized as endogenous outcomes of the decisions of self-interested public officials and policy-makers. Root’s work is an exemplary product of mainstream political economy. The mainstream approach, however, is not without its limitations, and these are also evident in the volume under review. The methodological individualism that marks mainstream economics and which is now increasingly evident in the other social sciences displaces structuralist alternatives. As a result, the challenge of economic development is analysed in a framework that offers no room for consideration of such phenomena as imperialism, or of any manifestation of the power of capital, whether domestic or international. For political economists with a more radical or Marxist orientation, these structural manifestations of power are an essential component of the social reality.
of developing economies. They do not, however, receive any consideration here.

Root is not unaware of alternative Marxist and radical approaches. He explicitly asserts that the old dichotomy between capital and labour is anachronistic, that is, it is no longer applicable in a world replete with advanced global communication and information technology. In this context, Root argues that access to information is the road to wealth. The potential gains that accrue from this access are available to all agents, independent of class, although he acknowledges that there is no reason to expect such gains to be equally distributed. Consistent with mainstream methodology, the agents making economic decisions are assumed to be generic, representative individuals (or individual households). Implied here is a model where these representative agents have stocks of investable wealth and enjoy the ownership of various productive resources. In this context, it is their savings and investment decisions that come to the fore. The stark scenario confronting agents who have virtually nothing to sell but their capacity to work slips off the analytical screen. As a result, wealth creation is identified with the exploitation of market opportunities rather than the exploitation of a workforce.

Readers seeking analysis and insight on issues directly involving labour, including labour organizations and the labour process, will find virtually nothing on those topics in the contents of this volume.

Root’s critique of the institutional failings of developing countries carries a parallel albeit less explicit endorsement of the institutions of developed capitalist economies. In these countries, the institutions are understood to work well, transforming uncertainty into risk and allowing agents to assume the degree of risk that they are consciously willing and able to bear. A broad consensus holds with respect to the goals of economic policy. The incentives facing policy-makers and public servants facilitate the formulation and implementation of policy designed to enhance general economic well-being.

This somewhat sanguine view of advanced contemporary capitalist economies is an unsurprising outcome of mainstream analysis because that framework excludes the critical stance associated with alternative radical perspectives. However, many of the institutional and incentive problems that Root sees as plaguing developing countries are not necessarily unique to them. For example, a lack of transparency in the corporate structures of companies, and the significant misrepresentation of the financial positions of firms, both of which he considers to be important factors contributing to the poor economic performance of developing countries, also characterize much of the corporate sector in developed countries, as the events of the Enron era attest. A similar case can be made regarding the degree to which corporate money influences public policy and industry regulation and/or deregulation. This raises the question of whether or not these phenomena are systemic features (or tendencies) of capitalism, and thus not specific to developing economies. Extensive similarities between developed and developing countries with respect to both corporate managerial and financial opacity, and the political influence of vested corporate interests, will undermine some of the explanatory power of Root’s take on the challenge of global development.

These reservations should not detract from the importance of the issues raised by Root, nor of the insights provided. The book is a timely and welcome addition to the development literature, and is sure to be of interest to analysts, policy-makers, and students of economic development.

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“NEOLIBERALISM is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” (2) What we learn in David Harvey’s impressive, condensed history of neo-liberalism, however, is that we need to delve much more deeply into the recesses of neo-liberal practice than the first instance, if we are to get a grip on its origins, trajectory, and implications across the globe since the 1970s.

Among the many insights offered up in Harvey’s analysis, two principal and related arguments stand out. First, there exists a tense relationship between the theory and practice of neo-liberalism. In choosing to interpret the last three decades of neo-liberalization “either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites,” (19) we are well advised by the evidence to conclude that “the second of these objectives has in practice dominated.” (19) A cursory glance at aggregate growth rates before and during the neo-liberal period — approximately 3.5 per cent in the 1960s, 2.4 per cent in the 1970s, 1.4 per cent in the 1980s, 1.1 per cent in the 1990s, and 1 per cent since 2000 (154) — illustrates that in terms of spurring capital accumulation internationally neo-liberalism has been an abject failure. The predicted results of the utopian neo-liberal theory, of a rising economic tide that would lift all boats, were not realized. At the same time, the neo-liberal project has had roaring-to-moderate success in the restoration of class power to ruling elites in many advanced capitalist countries such as the United States and, to a lesser degree, Britain, while fostering capitalist class formation in countries as diverse as China, India, and Russia. (156) Not since the 1920s has global capitalism facilitated such grotesque concentrations of wealth and power.

If this was the intent of capitalist classes beginning in the mid-1970s, then their successes were bigger and better than most would have dared to imagine at the time. Harvey shows convincingly “that when neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognizable.” (19) In this view, then, the “theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument” — as developed over time by Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, the Mont Pelerin Society, endless American think-tanks, the business press, and the business schools and economics departments of ivy league universities such as the University of Chicago, Stanford, and Harvard, and innumerable other institutional channels — “primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve” (19) the goals of the economic elite.

This leads us to the second and closely related contention advanced by Harvey: that neo-liberalization has acted essentially as a vehicle for the restoration or formation of capitalist class power at the expense of the working classes throughout the bulk of the world, “a naked class power, locally as well as transnationally, but most particularly in the main financial centres of global capitalism.” (119) This argument is persuasively theorized and substantiated with empirical data throughout the book.

Harvey recites the now familiar chronology of the transition from the embedded liberalism of the post-World War II global economy to the neo-liberalism of the last quarter of the 20th century, and the opening years of the 21st century. Key
junctures include the following: in Chile in 1973, the military coup orchestrated by Pinochet with the support of the American imperial state which overthrew Allende’s social democratic government and ushered in the first neo-liberal experiment in economics and state restructuring by 1975; in July 1979 in the United States under Carter’s administration, Paul Volker’s assumption of the command of the US Federal Reserve and the concomitant radical change in monetary policy; in May 1979 in Britain, Margaret Thatcher’s electoral victory as prime minister; in 1980, Ronald Reagan’s election to the presidency of the US; and, subsequently, a whole host of ideological, economic, and political processes which produced, by the 1990s, the solidification of the hegemony of the “Washington Consensus.”

Moreover, in what Harvey describes as “a conjunctural accident of world-historical significance” (120) — an accident, incidentally, that many accounts of neo-liberalism miss — tremendous political uncertainties in China after the death of Mao in 1976, as well as an extended period of economic stagnation in the country, ushered in a period of Chinese market reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping just as neo-liberalism was setting sail in Britain and the US. For Harvey, “The spectacular emergence of China as a global economic power after 1980 was in part an unintended consequence of the neo-liberal turn in the advanced capitalist world.” (121) Finally, Harvey’s chronological account of the transition to neo-liberalism prominently features class conflict, a critical component left out of much of the mainstream social science literature. As the global phase of embedded liberalism entered meltdown in the late 1960s — manifested most emblematically by the stagflation and unemployment of the 1970s — “labour and urban social movements through much of the advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post-war period.” (15) This was the political threat to the ruling classes which, when combined with the economic threat of negative interest rates and “paltry dividends and profits,” led the upper classes “to move decisively if they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation.” (15) The basis was laid for a political project to restore capitalist class power.

The many strengths of A Brief History of Neoliberalism cannot be adequately conveyed in this short space, but include powerful analyses of the devastating impact of neo-liberalism on the environment and labouring conditions (especially for women), a nuanced perspective on the external and internal forces compelling states to turn towards neo-liberalism, and the ways in which Marx’s concept of “primitive accumulation” is highly pertinent to the neo-liberal era of capitalism if we see primitive accumulation as an ongoing component of capitalism, and as Harvey therefore prefers to call it, “accumulation by dispossession.”

In his discussion of the meaning of class power Harvey highlights how there was “unquestionably a power shift away from production to the world of finance” during the neo-liberal period, which means that a “substantial core of rising class power under neoliberalism lies ... with the CEOs, the key operators on corporate boards, and the leaders in the financial, legal, and technical apparatuses that surround this inner sanctum of capitalist activity.” (33) In addition, however, new processes of class formation, marked by the vast fortunes of a few individuals, have taken place in the new sectors of biotechnology and informational technologies. (34) On the controversial question of whether or not an emergent transnational capitalist class can be detected, Harvey charts a middle path. He argues that there have long been international links across capitalist classes and that these ties have deepened during the neo-liberal era, but that this does not
mean “that the leading individuals within this class do not attach themselves to specific state apparatuses for the advantages and the protections that this affords them.” (35) At the same time, massively rich capitalists also often “exert class power in more than one state simultaneously,” and exchange ideas and influence politics through powerful arenas such as the annual World Economic Forum at Davos. (36)

Much of the literature in development economics points to successful “models” of development — most recently South Korea, Taiwan, and China — which ought to be emulated by other “developing” countries. Harvey’s consideration of the global dynamics of capitalism, and in particular his discussion of the uneven geographical development of neo-liberalism, exposes the weakness of such a search for model countries. Harvey argues that successful growth states and regions put competitive pressure on other states and regions to mirror their developmental policies, but that the competitive advantages of successful states are generally ephemeral, “introducing extraordinary volatility into global capitalism.” (88) Within this context, “certain territories ... advance spectacularly (at least for a time) at the expense of others.” (156) The “fact that ‘success’ was to be had somewhere obscured the fact that neoliberalization was generally failing to stimulate growth or improve well-being.” (156)

Perhaps the most frightening and enlightening observation the book makes concerns the ways in which the internal contradictions of neo-liberalism, as well as signs of declining US hegemony on the world stage outside of the military realm, are opening up space for an end to neo-liberalism. What is potentially catastrophic about a future transition from neo-liberalism is that the emerging answer to neo-liberalism’s contradictions in the United States, and increasingly in China, is the embrace of a neo-conservatism characterized by militarism, authoritarianism, and nationalism. The fact that China and the US may be converging from very different points to a neo-conservative tide does not, as Harvey puts it mildly, “bode well for the future.” (151)

Having said all this, I highly recommend A Brief History of Neoliberalism, but not without some reservation. The deepest flaw in Harvey’s account emerges in his arguments around resistance. While Harvey rightfully asserts the necessity of renewed working-class struggle from below to counter the project of restoring capitalist class power from above, he also calls, much less compellingly, for the building of social democracy as an alternative. This stops well short of a resistance seeking to overcome capitalism, which I see as necessary if we hope to end imperialist wars, class exploitation, inequality, poverty, hunger, and, finally, if we are to avoid the possible extinction of our species through environmental crises.

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AN INTEREST in Marx’s work flourished among Western scholars between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the study of Marx and the use of approaches drawing upon his legacy have declined precipitously, as if by some absurd logic that what might be of value in his work depended on the viability of totalitarian state socialism. This dismissal of Marx’s project is a mistake. Arguably more than any other major figure in the history of social thought, Marx struggled to grasp the full scope of humanity’s history and potential.

Although Marx is generally thought of first and foremost as a political econo-
mist, his focus was far broader than the concern with the problem of scarcity. He insisted that we must address how our struggle with the economic problem of scarcity is causally and dynamically connected to our social organization and to our social consciousness. Relatedly, and far more alien to the tradition of Anglo-American social science, he studied our self-creation — the manner in which phenomena of our own creation act back upon us to help determine how we live and think. To the extent that we lose awareness of our authorship of our creations, we are unfree. Because we are in part produced and controlled by our own creations, in potentially harmful manners, our freedom, and therefore welfare, requires that we recover recognition of our authorship.

Labour is at the core of his model of humanity’s struggle with the material problem. Labour is a universal condition of humankind, a nature-given necessity: “it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and nature; it is the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase” (Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. I [New York 1906], 204-205).

However, labour for Marx was more than merely a means to an end. This is the point that Gulli wishes to clarify and develop in this book. Critical to the argument is the distinction between productive labour and non-productive labour, a distinction “blurred by analytical difficulties” that, according to Gulli, Marx himself failed to resolve. Productive labour is labour that has an end outside itself. It is a means to another end. Non-productive labour, or more precisely, labour that is neither productive nor unproductive, is living labour, a real creative power. Living labour is “the fire that gives form to all beings that come out of the relationship between humans and nature or humans and technology.” (82)

Under capitalism, labour becomes, and comes to be understood as, merely a means to an end. It is productive labour in subservience to its own product, capital. Much of *Labor of Fire* addresses the manner in which labour is alienated from itself under capitalism. However, while capital cannot exist without labour, labour exists independently of capital. In other terms, living labour cannot be extinguished by capital, and herein lies its revolutionary power.

There is another way of putting this. Marx viewed labour as fundamental to all modes of production, which form the substructures of societies wherein the dynamics of change are generated. Culture is superstructural. This is the basis of Marx’s materialist conception of history. Through labour, “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will” (Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in David Fernbach, ed., *Karl Marx: Surveys From Exile* [New York 1974], 146). Marx’s optimism was grounded in his belief that with abundance and the transition beyond capitalism, culture becomes freed from this materialist determination. At this historical juncture, real human freedom begins. Through living creative labour, humans make their future with free conscious will. As Gulli puts it, “the concept of communism... cannot be reduced to economic categories.” (42) It is where creative labour “is not subsumed or subsumable under the imperatives of the economy.” (143)

But what is the nature of post-capitalist society? Gulli’s book has virtually nothing to say about what would constitute post-capitalist institutions. Indeed, it is not clear that there would be any. Nevertheless, he believes utopia possible. What he concentrates on is the question of what labour would be. There will be “production without productivism, labour without capital — a production that spans the range of human activity from economy to culture; a poetic praxis, a practical poiesis.” (11) Much of the book is an at-
tempt to unpack just what this charged claim means, and it is often tough sledding. Needless to say, this review cannot begin to deliver the fullness of his argument. A few hints will have to suffice.

Gulli sees labour ontologically as “human sensuous activity.” This “nonestranged form of labor is the essence of man.” (25) “Production [becomes] artistic production, ... the result of creative labor.” (173) And art “is this world’s constitutive power..... [It] is not a social phenomenon, but the grounding of all social phenomena....the functions of art and labor become identical.” (174-175) The “revolutionary task of the present [is for] labor and art [to] speak with one voice.” (183) Gulli embraces Nietzsche’s view that art must become “the real task of life.” To give meaning to such assertions, Gulli draws from the works not only of Nietzsche, but also such major 20th-century thinkers as Heidegger, Adorno, Bloch, and Foucault.

But could such a world exist? This poses a critical question on which Gulli is silent. What would be the social coordinating mechanisms in his post-capitalist ideal or utopian world? Historically, humans have been coordinated by traditions, political authority, and markets. Following Marx, Gulli envisions an ideal future society, but like Marx, fails to address and clarify just how it would be organized. He credits Marx with a concept of human nature “as becoming and always in the making” (29); “man’s true nature ... is making itself.” (38) But even if humans are as plastic as such assertions suggest, what guarantees that the future will be one in which humans will be free to fully express their creativity though labour?

This book suffers other flaws. Gulli continues to discuss contemporary workers’ conditions in the terms used by Marx to describe 19th-century factories, for example, routinization of the work process, workers as mere appendages of machines, etc. He thereby ignores the substantial changes in the workplace that have been occurring in the rich economies that provide workers, individually and collectively, with greater control over the work process.

And for whom is he writing? A small hermetic band of Marxist philosophers? It would seem so. He takes up his differences with other Marxists who are somewhat obscure outside a small intellectual community, and readers not familiar with their works will find his exposition difficult to follow. Indeed, it often seems more an explication of “how they got it wrong” than a strategy that helps develop and make clear his own argument. At times his prose is impenetrable. This is all a pity. His treatise deserves a broader audience.

Yet in spite of its shortcomings, this is an important book for three interrelated reasons: It reminds us of why Marx still matters. It probes for what might be the promise for humanity when it is no longer controlled by a materialist vision of happiness, wherein labour exists rather exclusively for the endless accumulation of material goods and services. And it highlights the centrality of labour to human freedom, creativity, and happiness.

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ONE OF THE MORE arduous yet intellectual challenges of teaching at a small liberal arts university in a conservative region is convincing students (and, at times, colleagues) that women’s and gender history have an authoritative genealogy. In an era of economic tumult, students seek degree programs that clearly promise financially profitable career prospects. The fact that women’s and gender history command an underwhelming sum of institutional recognition, in Canada at least, undermines the
field’s credibility. Thus for many, women’s and gender history appear an unlikely guarantee of professional advancement.

However, women’s and gender history are extraordinarily vital as this three-volume set edited by renowned Rutgers University scholar Bonnie Smith, and published with the support of the Women’s Committee of the American Historical Association, affirms. Both seasoned readers and neophytes will be impressed with the remarkable theoretical, methodological, and historical achievements of women’s history since the 1970s as reflected in nineteen essays enhanced with rich appendices and footnotes. Undergraduates, graduates, and teachers across women’s history, global history, regional history, labour history, gender, feminist, and women’s studies will benefit from this collection featuring the following scholars many of whom have played leading roles in the development of women’s history. Volume one has essays by Margaret Strobel and Majorie Bingham, Ann B. Waltner and Mary Jo Maynes, Julia Clancy-Smith, Alice Kessler-Harris, Pamela Scully, Mrinalini Sinha, and Susan Kent. Volume two has essays by Sarah Shaver Hughes and Brady Hughes, Susan Mann, Barbara N. Rumusack, Judith M. Bennett, Ann Twinam, and Kathleen Brown. Volume three includes Cheryl Johnson-Odim, Nikki R. Keddie, Judith P. Zinsser and Bonnie S. Anderson, Barbara Engel, Asuncion Lavrin, and Ellen DuBois.

Each author synthesizes the thematic and theoretical trajectories of the literature to date and subsequently tenders constructive suggestions for future exploration. Most explicitly fulfill the pedagogical agenda promised in Smith’s introduction. For example, those studying the history of Japan, Korea, and China will be aided by Susan Mann’s essay on women in East Asia with a practical appendix gauging the “gender-friendliness” of current textbooks in East Asian history generally. (2:47-100) Strobel and Bingham summarize how world and global history have neglected, or situated women providing basic definitions of women’s and gender history and offering a ‘women’s history chronology’ and thematic guide to assist teachers of world history curriculum to integrate women into a survey narrative. (1:9-34) Kent’s global summary of organized feminist activism, “Worlds of Feminism,” will fill a gap in many women’s studies course readers. (1:275-312) Zinsser and Anderson highlight sources on European women’s engagement in imperialism, conquest, and exploration (1:111-144) that complement the theoretical overview on gender and nationalism by Sinha. (1:229-274) Some chart new territory beyond the region with which they are identified, as exemplified by Alice Kessler-Harris in “Gender and Work: Possibilities for a Global Historical Overview.” (1:145-194) Whereas the seven articles of the first volume are topic-driven, volumes two and three are organized by region or geography as in Johnson-Odim’s “Women and Gender in the History of Sub-Saharan Africa” (3:9-67) and “Russia and The Soviet Union” by Barbara Engel. (3:145-179) Some address specific national movements or periods within regions such as Asuncion Lavrin’s “Latin American Women’s History: The National Period,” (3:180-221) Kathleen Brown’s “The History of Women in the United States to 1865,” (2:238-280) and “Women in the Middle East since the Rise of Islam” by Nikki R. Keddie. (3:68-110)

Smith’s brief introduction, repeated in each volume, tracks the theoretical and transnational reorientation from women’s history’s founding ambition of recovery and revision to theories of femininity and the notion of gender as a central category of analysis. Early precedents of a global perspective on women were exemplified, for instance, in 1835 by Lydia Maria Child’s History of the Condition of Women. International activism for human and women’s rights as represented by
Child’s campaign for abolition of the Atlantic slave trade or Ida Wells Barnett’s anti-lynching campaign widened women’s solidarity across the globe. Campaigns organized around imperialism, abolition, and feminism increased intercontinental exchange among women. Yet, by World War I, notes Smith, the growth in solidarity across continents largely ended. With an eye to reviving the international solidarity evident in earlier campaigns and by linking knowledge to activism, the series moves women’s and gender history beyond national and regional preoccupations. Global systems of oppression, the writers imply, animate a pressing need for the renewal of political and cultural commitment among women. Smith invites students and researchers to participate in this current stage of historical and theoretical enquiry by marshaling effective links between the local and global in women’s and gender history. The goal is to ground gender as a global concern.

The shift from women’s history to gender history ignited an analytic opening for historians who illuminated the ways women reproduced the binaries of femininity and masculinity and were complicit not only in their own oppression but the subordination and oppression of others. The initiative of scholarship from the ‘margins’ and ‘third world’ inspired historians to strive towards inclusion to integrate “insights and information from recent scholarship from all geographic regions ... inclusive topical chapters ... bring into play women’s experience of such large scale institutions and movements as nation-state, feminism, and religion from around the world ... written by specialists in a variety of geographic fields.” (1:4) Motivated by a desire to rectify the exclusionary tendencies of the first generations of North American and European scholarship, myopia is declared obsolete. (1:5) Another notable theoretical shift that is effectively adopted by authors in this collection is expansion beyond the well-exercised triumvirate of race, class, and gender. Medieval women’s lives and circumstances, Bennett determines, were not only contingent on conventionally employed categories of differences but by other categories of identity such as marital status, religious status, legal status, sexual status, ethnicity, and regional differences. (2:143-144)

This collection is timely. As contemporary politicians, economists, and corporate CEOs harmonize over the virtue of globalization, and national leaders claim impotency in pulling us back from the precipice of multinational war, it is urgent for women historians to insert a gendered perspective on our global circumstances. As Sinha observes, political chatter readily exploits women as identifiable icons of their nation with concepts of femininity and masculinity bound up with state needs and cultural expression. (1:229) Women, these historians illustrate, have been both victims and agents of the global traffic in ideas (colonization, nationhood, imperialism, modernity, virtue, femininity, charity, maternalism, feminism) and their bodies, by will or coercion, have been mobilized across nations, continents, and among men in kin and family systems. Nonetheless women actively created “national and international political systems,” with “activism that flowed across nation-states, and economic structures,” as noted by Zinsser and Anderson. (1:131)

Grassroots anti-globalization campaigners, including feminist and rights activists, have exposed questionable labour practices of GAP, Starbucks, and other corporations who now operate in tax-advantaged zones of ‘free’ trade. Armed with a firmer understanding of the ways women’s labour and agency within poorer circumstances and settings advance the prosperity of women residing particularly in North America or Europe, it is no longer plausible to plead innocence regarding women’s plight. Many women in almost all nations work double or three shifted days and are, as a rule, mired at the bottom of the labour hierar-
Smith’s declaration of “the centrality of gender to the organization, remuneration, and conditions of work globally” re-affirms the political awareness of the worldwide impoverishment for women that arises from neo-liberalism. But knowledge potentially stimulates action. As public intellectual and peace activist Charlotte Bunch wisely advised in _Passionate Politics_, to strategize for change feminists initially engage in description and analysis of past and present experience. These writers concur.

_Women’s History in Global Perspective_ is an impressive and financially accessible series indispensable for teaching or as a core reference for private or public collections. Suitable for upper level and especially graduate students the series convinces readers that women will profit from the end of historical and continental isolationism.

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_IN HIS LATEST BOOK, Written in the Flesh: A History of Desire, Edward Shorter, the current Jason A. Hannah Chair in the History of Medicine at the University of Toronto, argues that human brains are hard-wired to experience the desire to give and to receive what he labels “total body sex.” The term refers to sensual pleasure involving every part of the body rather than just the face and the genitals. According to Shorter, the brain drives the individual toward total body sex. The mind assesses how that drive can or cannot be exercised based on external constraints. In sum, says Shorter, human desire can be understood as “the history of the almost biological liberation of the brain to free up the mind in the direction of total body sex.”

To bolster his thesis, Shorter puts into place three caveats. First, he asserts that he is speaking only of the history of Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world because he is unfamiliar with non-Western cultures. Second, he claims that his work is based on the sexual practices of the more “innovative” segments of society. Third, he contends that research illustrating the existence of pleasure pathways in the brain indicates that desire can be brain driven.

The bulk of the book charts chronologically the tug-of-war between the brain’s drive toward total body sex and the external constraints under which the mind must labour. Shorter periodizes this battle, insisting that Roman and Greek antiquity constituted a hedonist smorgasbord of sexual activities. But from the Middle Ages onward, the sexual “baseline” changed. Apart from the elites, most men adopted “the vaginal focus, missionary position, and ram-it-home approach.” Women’s baseline was similar to that of men’s. However, because of the fear of an unwanted pregnancy they had few opportunities to exercise their sexual desires. Gay men engaged mainly in “buggery,” meaning anal sex. Lesbians were limited to “tribadism,” or the rubbing of pelvises together to produce an orgasm. Often, this activity was undertaken while one played butch and the other, femme.

Shorter explains that the sexual baseline narrowed over time not only because of the anti-hedonist teachings of the Church but also because of the obstacles presented by everyday life. These ranged from the serious — chronic pain, disability, and death — to the vexatious — poor hygiene, infestations of lice, disfiguring infections, lack of privacy, and community mores. However, as educational, economic, medical, and technological improvements accelerated in the late 19th century, a sexual breakout occurred, culminating in the sexual revolution of the 1960s and onward. Straights and gays increasingly engaged in oral and anal sex,
nipple play, fetish displays, sex toys, and sado-masochism.

Shorter’s book is fast-paced, entertaining, and, at times, amusingly salacious. However, as a work of serious scholarship the book frustrates. Shorter’s thesis is not bold, as the dust jacket praise would hold, but old. It smacks of the kind of essential biological determinism that reigned among academics more than 30 years ago. Since then, historians of sexuality have proposed that sexual desire is not merely the product of essential biological drives. Rather, it is the socially constructed outcome of complex interactions between the individual and time, place, and culture. Shorter is not a fan of social constructionism. He relegates poor Michel Foucault, pioneer of the social constructionist approach to the history of sexuality, to a brief textual appearance in which Shorter has Foucault experiencing total body sex in a Toronto gay bath house. Shorter does allow that although the brain’s drive predominates, sexual desire is the combined result of both nature and nurture. Reconciliation between the essentialist and social constructionist viewpoints is sorely needed. However, this book is too flaccid an instrument for the job.

By his own admission, Shorter is dealing with a putative shift toward total body sex in a very select group. This group consists of literate individuals of European and Anglo-Saxon origin living in the Western world. Shorter introduces diversity and complexity into this group by including straights and gays. Yet Shorter does not question the polymorphous sexual experiences of many of these individuals, the origins of classifications of heterosexual and homosexual, or the rigid division he invokes between these classifications. Rather, he insists only that homosexuality has a biological predisposition and leaves the situation at that. Moreover, Shorter has chosen to explore exclusively the sexual behaviour of the supposedly more innovative segments of this group. When Shorter refers to the sexual revolution of the 1960s, his reference point narrows even further, to the United States. His dubious and rather imperialistic claim that other parts of the world now also display a similar “massive convergence” toward total body sex does not distract from the fact that any extrapolation about human sexual desire from such a limited population sample is suspect.

Suspect as well is the cursory information Shorter provides about the science of the brain and its relationship to total body sex. How exactly are studies on trained rats, hormones, and the biological basis of homosexuality related to frolics in black leather and matching fur handcuffs? Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Shorter’s evidence for the brain’s drive is not based on medical mappings of that organ but on a jumble of cultural fragments left behind by the limited population sample he studies. The drawings on Greek vases, diary entries, autobiographies, popular magazines, poems, letters, sex surveys, pornography, paintings, films, postcards, novels, photographs, and television shows are the highlight of the book. Unfortunately, Shorter makes no value distinction between say, Franz Kallman’s twin studies and a note by D.H. Lawrence, a comment by a pornographic filmmaker and an episode from Sex and the City. He lumps together academic and popular culture sources to point relentlessly in the direction of total body sex.

Much of what Shorter observes, particularly in the 20th century, has less to do with the brain’s drive toward total body sex and far more to do with capitalism’s drive toward total body commodification. Sex sells, and has sold, literally and figuratively. Nowhere is this commodification more apparent than when Shorter discusses women’s sexual history. For example, Shorter declares that once oral contraceptives released women from the fear of an unwanted pregnancy, they assumed control of their own sexual desires. However, one of the best-known criticisms second-wave feminists levelled
against the birth control pill was that the drug had turned women’s bodies into profitable sexual commodities for men and for pharmaceutical companies. Instead of tracing how birth control technologies may have cemented a lucrative penetrative imperative for many heterosexual women, thereby working against total body sex, Shorter dismisses this criticism of the pill and remarks upon feminism’s “deadening hand.” Instead, he waxes contentedly about what amounts to the ongoing sexual commodification of the bodies of straight and gay women — the development of muscular female physiques, lesbians’ participation in pornography, and the mainstreaming of sadomasochism in heterosexual couples — solely as proof of the movement toward total body sex.

It is difficult to believe that a book that deals with total body sex does not tackle the topic of HIV/AIDS. Even in his Epilogue, Shorter shies away from the subject, preferring to caution that while the brain’s drive toward total body sex cannot be ignored, individuals’ hedonist behaviour has resulted in disaffection from community life. Herein Shorter misses a golden opportunity to converse more profoundly about total body sex in regard to the complexities of sexual desire and the fallout of that desire. In some quarters, the advent of HIV/AIDS has renewed calls for sexual abstinence. In others, it has sparked strategies for safe sex, meaning not only condom use but also non-penetrative sexual activities. Has the threat of HIV/AIDS moved individuals to practise more or less total body sex?

Shorter’s most valuable contribution may be to set the stage for finer-grained analyses of sexual desire, nature, and nurture. Such analyses might chart the impact of larger social justice movements such as civil rights, feminism, and gay rights on the biology of sexual desire. They may illuminate the workings of the heart — a cultural symbol for love — on the brain and the body. Perhaps such analyses may ultimately discover why sexual desire, even under optimal conditions of both nature and nurture, does not occur, or appears and then disappears, or remains unspoken, unreciprocated, and unrequited.

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**PAOLA MONZINI**’s *Sex Traffic* is a clear, mainstream overview of the “traffic in women.” Monzini sets out to explain to a non-specialist audience the phenomenon of the traffic in women, a system of exploitation that can ensnare those seeking a better life in the global labour market, particularly the global sex market. The author provides a broad analysis of trafficking by laying out the framework that she sees as sustaining the traffic: the coming together of “international migration, organized crime, gender issues and the ‘global’ sex-market.” (3) That is, Monzini explains the traffic in women as a product of the male demand for sexual services, the “supply” of young women seeking work in the global labour market, the growth of organized criminal networks who take advantage of those seeking to work abroad, and the gendered nature of all of these processes. In this discussion Monzini treads fairly carefully between the polarized schools of thought over trafficking — the radical feminist contention that trafficking and prostitution are two sides of the same coin of sexual exploitation and sex-workers’ rights proponents’ argument that the problem is neither sex work per se nor migration for sex work but the structures that limit sex-workers’ independence in that work.

To her credit, Monzini is careful not to over-simplify in a debate that often becomes abstract and rhetorical. For example, she avoids painting a simplistic picture of evil men and innocent women as is sometimes the case in radical feminist
discussions of trafficking. Indeed, she recognizes that many women are in fact aware that they will be working in the sex trade, or are already working in the trade, when they set out to migrate — although they may not be aware of the extent to which they are at risk of exploitation. And while she points to male demand for sexual services as part of the problem, she recognizes that not all clients are the same and not all are necessarily looking to sexually dominate women.

Nonetheless, because the study focuses on the structures and system of exploitation rather than the experiences of women or the meaning of those experiences to the women involved — that is, a top-down rather than a bottom-up study — the need to aggregate and generalize can sometimes lend itself to feeding pre-given notions on a topic on which there are strongly and deeply held beliefs and assumptions. Thus, there is sometimes slippage into a tone that could lead one to assume that prostitution itself is problematic by definition rather than the particular ways in which sex work is sometimes controlled and exploited by others. For example, discussions of a “global boom” in prostitution beg for further clarification as to what, precisely, the problem with such a boom is (i.e., is a “boom” a bad thing because prostitution is bad, or because the boom has been accompanied by increasing structural limitations over sex-workers’ ability to work freely and control their own conditions of work?). While Monzini also recognizes, again refreshingly, that “trafficking” or the exploitation of migrant labour is hardly unique to the sex trade, one sometimes wishes that that point was reiterated when, for example, she points to the “intensive exploitation of women” that is packaged and sold in the promotion of sex-tourism — but which, one could point out, is also packaged and sold in the promotion of all tourism (i.e., the expectation of sunny and servile hotel staff and “colourful locals” both male and female). Nevertheless, Monzini is to be commended for the careful distinctions she does draw and her recognition that the process is far from singular or universal. There is, as she points out, a wide range of experiences in women’s entry into and work in the global sex trade and the migration experiences of women are similarly complex and not all necessarily exploitative or exploitative to the same degree or duration.

The book is strongest in describing the operation of criminal networks in various locations around the world and the precise mechanisms they use to try to control and exploit women’s migration and labour. She does this well and in some detail, since at base Monzini does view the problem as a criminal rather than a labour issue. The information provided here is very useful for those trying to understand exactly how the criminal process — which is certainly a part of the problem — works. However, the discussion does raise the question of how, if we are not to see this as a singular and monolithic force, these networks differ from smaller operators who enable the (potentially illegal) migration process and who may or may not be unscrupulous and how some women manage to evade or limit their exposure to or exploitation by such networks. The answer to this question might shed interesting light on potential solutions to the problems faced by migrant working women.

Monzini does provide an interesting and balanced discussion of potential solutions. The debate over the solutions to trafficking is also a contentious one, particularly in the wake of recent US support for “rescue” operations that pose non-Western sex workers as helpless victims to be rescued by good (Western) men despite protestations by the women themselves and the US government’s attempt to cut off support to outreach organizations that fail to pledge themselves to an anti-prostitution approach. Again Monzini is careful not to endorse the quick and easy answers of abolishing the prostitution trade through legal sanctions
or directly controlling it through legalization and she does point out that “greater scope for prostitutes to organize their own activity on a commercial basis, and greater recognition of it as a possible form of independent work, might help to bring about a change in social perceptions, and a reduction in the social stigma attached to the activity.” (141) But she also calls for a closer study of the linkages between the way prostitution is organized in the receiving country and the incidence of trafficking. This is a call that both sides in the debate are no doubt open to. She also points to the problematic tendency of “solving” trafficking by deporting the presumed victims and draws attention to the need to address underlying socio-economic conditions and gender discrimination.

Overall, Monzini provides a fairly careful overview of the mainstream understanding of the problem of the “traffic in women” as a problem of criminal exploitation of migrant women in the sex trade. But in order to understand the wider political issues here the book is best read in conjunction with those studies that point out that criminal exploitation of migrant women in sex work is but one small part of a larger issue of migrant women’s rights as sex workers — a problem that requires addressing the conditions of both sex work and migration for women. These same studies point out that focusing only on the criminal exploitation of migrant sex workers creates a moral panic that leads to repressive anti-immigrant, anti-sex-work measures which disempower women in the name of “saving” them.

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Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House 2005)

TREMENDOUS CHANGES have taken place in the publishing industry and especially in academic publishing over the past decades with the “publish or perish” mentality causing the production of half-researched pot boilers, and publishers swinging books into print with barely an editorial glance. It was with interest, but disappointment, that I read Professor Robert Pape’s book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism published by Random House (2005). The topic seemed timely, but, as it turns out, Pape only spent two years on the research and publication of this book with a team of graduate students at the University of Chicago in the “Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism” which he established. Despite the rather rapid transition to print, Pape grandly claims this book is the first “universal” study of the topic. (3) Prior to this project Pape was teaching air strategy at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. So say no more.

Pape is an advocate of “offshore balancing,” which is a strategy of securing US oil interests by building alliances with pro-western allies in the Middle East. In order to prevent further attacks on US interests, he argues for the withdrawal of land troops from the Arabian Peninsula but the retention of a US Navy presence and strategic air attacks in the region coupled with a homeland security policy of completing the 1,951-mile Border Fence across Mexico, and bolstering immigration controls and background checks. (240) Pape seems to have peddled his book to both the American right and left presumably with each side hearing what they want to hear. The “offshore balancing” strategy is nicely contained in the final chapter, and so possibly the peace activists who have spoken with him have forgotten to read Chapter twelve entitled “A New Strategy for Victory.” (237-250)
Pape says he has studied 315 international suicide missions between 1980 and 2003. He classifies them into thirteen major campaigns, including those of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE], the PKK, independence fighters in Chechnya, Kashmir, the Punjab, as well as al-Qaeda and the current war in Iraq. In this book, however, he appears to be primarily focusing on the campaigns in the Middle East in order to address current American military priorities in that region. For historical background, Pape opens with a short history of suicide missions as part of war strategy from the time of the Zealots and Sicarii in the 1st century, to the Ismaili Assassins in the 11th and 12th centuries, and the Kamikaze fighters in World War II. (33-37) The most useful information I learned in this brief history is that the word “terrorism” is derived from the “Reign of Terror” in France (1793-1794). Pape claims that between 1948 and 1980 there were no further suicide attacks; rather, a series of self-immolations and hunger strikes by assorted Buddhist monks and nuns. It is worth mentioning that there are large swaths of the world that Pape doesn’t mention, such as the international suffragette campaign, Ireland, the revolution in Russia, and independence movements in India, Africa, and Asia where suicide missions, hunger strikes, and assorted other techniques were also employed over a long period of time. Pape’s analysis of suicide missions begins with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1983 because, for political reasons, he is more intent on focusing on the Middle East. He firmly states his book is placed in the context of 9/11. (7)

Pape has two underlying enquiries: the first is to understand the motivations of suicide missions; the second is to suggest a political strategy to prevent further attacks and to protect US strategic interests. He begins by saying that there is a myth being perpetuated that all modern-day suicide bombers are Islamic fundamentalists. Of the 384 attackers on which Pape says he has data, he says only 43 per cent were religious and the remaining 57 per cent were secular. (210) In Hezbollah, he says he found that of the 41 attackers, 30 were affiliated with groups opposed to Islamic fundamentalism. (129) He states the obvious, that attacks are occurring wherever there is an American troop presence or the presence of their allies. Ninety-five per cent of attacks are associated with organized campaigns of national liberation movements. (50,104) He says the idea that Islamic fundamentalism is on the verge of world domination is a fantasy. Pape doesn’t deny that religion plays a role in half the cases, but he says that it is largely used as rhetoric to mobilize people. He points out that within Islam there is a major debate about the morality of suicide attacks. (195)

Pape argues that the purpose of suicide attacks is to get American troops out of a region. He argues that suicide bombing has emerged in places where traditional standing armies and guerrilla warfare have failed and that in seven of the thirteen major world campaigns since 1980, they have achieved either limited or significant concessions. That is roughly a 50 per cent success rate compared to the less than 30 per cent success rate of traditional military campaigns. (64-65)

Pape argues that suicide bombers are not lone, isolated, or psychologically deranged individuals but fit the profile of traditional fighters. They work in joint teams, often crossing national boundaries and have a high level of community support. The reason they are often not detected is at least partly because of language differences, but mostly because they are protected by the community. The organizations they belong to actually require a relatively high profile in order to get walk-in recruits and so they have embedded themselves in social institutions. (81) They run schools, charities, orphanages, medical clinics, vocational centres, libraries, banks, sports clubs, religious congregations, and sometimes police and judicial systems. He gives the examples of the LTTE and Hamas (191-192) and
says that Hamas has been running 40 per cent of social welfare institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. He points out that Osama bin Laden founded groups named “Human Concern International,” “Third World Relief Agency,” “Mercy International,” and the “Islamic International Relief Organization. (195-196)

Pape’s concluding chapter and argument for a strategy to defend American oil interests is for the US to withdraw its land troops from the Arabian Peninsula. He recommends depriving al-Qaeda of its Afghan bases, making quick concessions to cut off popular support, and bolstering homeland security, partly through border and immigration controls and the erection of a wall across Mexico. He supports the idea of regime change, but says that the current strategy is faulty and that the US should engage in “offshore balancing” by using foreign assistance to build alliances with local states so that US combat forces can be deployed quickly should a crisis emerge. The purpose for Pape is to preserve US oil interests. (247) He warns that should the US invade Iran, there will be a massive retaliation in the region. As most a light digression at the end of the book he suggests that the US might wish to pursue “energy independence.” (250)

This is an appalling book, full of fatuous argument and contradictory statements. Pape’s arguments are hardly rocket science and I didn’t feel he actually needed to do any research to write this book. He does not mention the real, live workers of the Third World and how American foreign policy is affecting them. Nor does he analyse solutions for these workers through mass action and solidarity campaigns. One presumes he accepts the logic that their only option is to be slaughtered in suicide missions or by American troops. Neither is there a political dimension to the book beyond that of defending US interests and there is certainly no moral condemnation of what is happening to the workers of the world, including those in the US who are being used as economic and military cannon fodder for the current US regime.

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CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL POLICY
REVUE CANADIENNE DE POLITIQUE SOCIALE

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