The Nature of Man and his Historical Being

Charles De Koninck

Volume 5, numéro 2, 1949

URI : id.erudit.org/iderudit/1019827ar
DOI : 10.7202/1019827ar

Citer cet article

If man had no nature, he could have no history. Nevertheless, supposing one interpretation of the term "true being," it may well be said that the true being of man is his historical being. In fact, we distinguish in a man what he is by virtue of being a man from what he is in view of what he should be: for one may be truly man without being a good man. If, then, by "true being" we mean what a man is in view of what he should be, we have to admit that this being is a strictly historical one — seeing that it cannot be inferred either from the nature of man or from the nature of this particular man.

By the term "history" we mean here, primarily, narratio. Historical personages, actions or events are, first of all, things that can be "reported" or "narrated." It is true that these things may also reveal more or less rational connexions that exist among them, and that the term "history" also serves to designate the kind of knowledge ordained to the discovery of such connexions. Taken in this sense, History tends towards a certain universality and thus towards the estate of a "science." And, in this sense, only significant facts enter into the realm of History: the kind of facts credited with "historical importance." It is not with this second meaning of "history" that we are now concerned. Rather, taking the term in its more primitive sense, we call "historical" even such things — nay, such above all — as cannot form the object of any rationalization: the things that can at best be "told," "reported," "narrated"; in a word, things obscure, ineffable, incommunicable as to their essential meaning. In this sense, to be sure, the true being of man is an eminently historical one; so much so that our narratio of the events that manifest it cannot attain its inmost core.

For, indeed, it is in his contingent behaviour that a man proves to be, or not to be, what he should be. By contingency we do not mean here simply the fact that his action is free, and might not have taken place; we call it contingent, more specifically, by reason of the circumstances comprising the agent himself. Socrates, Sophroniscus' son, is waiting for the street-car; the children in the street are exploding crackers; he is thirsty (it is the day after the banquet); Xanthippe was in a good temper this morning (owing to a new hat, but Socrates does not know this); the sky is clear; the street-car arrives, crowded; Socrates, only just in time, slips past a motor truck rushing God knows why; and so forth. The circumstances of our action are inexhaustible in wealth and complexity. Those, in particular, of which a given person in a given situation must take account so as to act well are, in a sense, inalienably "his," and incapable of any complete rendering or communication. Alighting from the
street-car, Socrates bumps into a woman loaded with parcels: eggs and cabbages are lying scattered about in the street. Ought he not to have watched his step better? — the more so as the lady possessed very visible bulk. But Socrates, at the critical moment, was asking himself why Bergson saw in real movement an object of his “intuition of becoming.”

Which, now, were the relevant circumstances for Socrates: the ones he had to think of before all else?

Practical truth, as referred to action in a given situation, is not a matter of knowledge alone. If, in order to act in a reasonable manner, we had to know all the objective circumstances of our action, we should never be able either to move or to refrain from moving; nor even be able either to think or not to think. And accordingly, the truth of human behaviour consists, not in the mind’s conformity to what is, but in its conformity with the rectified appetite.¹ We cannot infer what a man ought to do hic et nunc either from our speculative knowledge of the facts or even from moral science as such, however elaborate. The truth of an action resides in a type of judgment formed according to a mode of inclination, and not merely according to a mode of cognition. That is why this truth is inaccessible both to mere speculative knowledge as such and to mere moral science as such.² Neither a just evaluation of the circumstances of an action nor even one’s certitude as to what one ought to do hic et nunc suffice to constitute prudential truth. Over and above these, it is requisite for the judgment to be true that the agent should love the good as it is proper for him to love it and determine himself to do what he ought.

In this respect, even moral science is of little usefulness for virtue: it cannot provide the proximate and ultimate measure of conduct. Indeed, as St. Thomas says,³ “…prudence implies more than practical science, for practical science only embraces moral judgments of a universal character: for example, that fornication is evil, that theft should be shunned, and other similar judgments. Even where this science is present, it may happen that reason, in regard to a particular act, is prevented from judging rightly; and thus has it been said that practical science is of scant usefulness for virtue: even though he happens to possess this science, man may sin

¹ “...Verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam verum intellectus specu­lativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per con­formitatem intellectus ad rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter con­formari rebus in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est circa necessaria.—Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fuit: sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive facitibia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici: circa facitibia quidem, ares; circa agibilis vero, prudentia.”—St. Thomas, Ia 11ae, q.57, a.5, ad 3.—In VI Ethic., lect.2.

² “Contingit enim aliquem iudicarem, uno modo per modum inclinationis: siue qui habet habitud virtutis, recte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur: unde et in X Ethic. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum humanorum. Alio modo, per modum cognitionis: siue aliquid instructum in scientia morali, posset iudicare de actibus virtutis, etiam si virtutem non habet.”—St. Thomas, Ia, q.1, a.6, ad 3.

³ Quaestio disputata de Virtutibus in communi, a.6, ad 1.—Ia 11ae, q.77, a.2; In VII Ethic., lect.3.
against virtue. It is the office of prudence to judge rightly concerning
the particular actions as they have to be performed in the present, and
any sin but falsify this judgment." When either speculative or
moral science are alleged to be the proximate norm of conduct, they
degenerate into a "system."

The prudential act, then, is inalienable and incommunicable. Ulti-
mately, every man has to judge on his own count. Suppose he is following
an advice: very well, even then he must judge it proper for him to follow
that advice, and actually conform his conduct to his judgment; otherwise,
he would not be performing a human act. Seen from this point of view,
every man is alone in the midst of his fellow men. Here is the very centre,
the innermost core of our neighbour's behaviour — which it is strictly
beyond our power to judge in any absolute fashion. A man may be plainly
criminal, fairly tried, rightly judged and condemned to death. Yet, this
judgment can never claim finality, or identity with that of the Supreme
Judge. God alone sounds the hearts; God alone plumbs the depths of the
mind. The gulf between the Day of the Lord and the Day of man
cannot be bridged from this side. *Neque meipsum judico* — says the
Apostle. Correspondingly, the human *narratio* of a person's actions can
never transcend the field of appearances, no matter how much or how little
foundation these may seem to have in reality. As for the personal or auto-

---

1 Here now it is required among the dispensers, that a man be found faithful. 
But to me it is a very small thing to be judged by you, or by man's day; but neither do
I judge my own self. For I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby
justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Therefore judge not before the time; until
the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make
manifest the counsels of the hearts; and then shall every man have praise from God.—
I ad Cor., iv, 2. "Aut ab humano die, id est, St. Thomas explains in his Commentary
on this passage, ab intellectu in hoc tempore judicandibus, quasi dicit: vestrum, vel
quorumcunque hominum judicium parum eurari. Uno modo, quantum ad alios, qui ex eorum bono,
vel sedificantur, vel scandalizantur, et sic sancti non pro minimo, sed pro magno habent ab hominibus judicari,
evum Dominus dicit: Videant opera vestra bona, et glorificent Patrem vestrum, qui in
cœlis est.—Alio modo quantum ad seipsum, et sic non curant multum, quia nee gloriam
humanam concepiscent, secundum illud I. Thess. ii: *Neces gloriam ab hominibus
querentes, neque aliquid a sobis, neque ab alitis.* Neque approbrium hominis timent,
secundum illud Is. ii: *Notite timere opprobrium hominum, et blasphemin eorum ne
timeatis.* Unde Apostolus signanter dicit: *Meth audem, etc., id est, quantum ad me
pertinet, non autem id pro nullo est, sed pro minimis, quia bona temporalis, inter
quae bona fama computatur, non sunt nulla bona, sed minima, ut Aug. dicit [in
De Libero arbitrio]."—Ibid. That the "judicium hominum bene de hominibus opinan-
tium" is the most fragile of goods, St. Thomas shows in the following lines from the
*De Regimine principum:* "Nihil enim videtur in rebus humanis fragilis gloria et
honore favoris hominum, cum dependant ex opinionibus hominum, quibus nihil muta-
bilius in vita hominum, et inde est quod Isaías propheta, xx, huiusmodi gloriam nomi-
nat *florem foent.* Deinde humanæ gloriae cupido animi magnitudinem affert. Qui
enim favorum hominum quaerit, necesse est ut in omni eo, quod dicit aut facit, eorum
voluntati deserviat, et sic dum placere hominibus studet, fit servus singularum.
Propret quod et idem Tullius in lib. De officiis, cavendam dicit gloriae cupidinem.
Eripit enim animi libertatem, pro qua magnanimitis viris omnis debet esse contentio."
— I, c.7. "Fama non habet stabilitatem: immo falsa rumore de facili perditur. Et si
stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens."—Ia Iae, q.2, a.3, ad 3. In
other words, the man whose conduct is governed by the Day of man (i.e., the "free
man") of the *City of man,* or free man in the now usual sense) and who could appeal
to no more than the *Judgment of history,* is, in reality, the most abject kind of slave,
catering as he must to the most whimsical of masters.
biographical diary, it is subject to the same limitation, and is so, for the most part, to an even higher degree. The aspect of "inaccessibility" of which we are speaking is not, therefore, a characteristic of the secrets of the heart as such; for anybody who is keeping a thing secret could as well communicate it if he chose to.\(^1\)

This is the point we must bear in mind if we are to understand in what sense a man's true being is radically historical — and, in the same time, inaccessible to the *Day of man*. None except the Maker of history could "narrate" to us the life of Peter. The "sufficient reason" of what happens in this world is not itself of this world; it is not "subjectified" in the things. As seen in the particular things and the actions of which it is composed, the world reveals itself full of irrationality and absurdity. And, from this point of view, the "system" can be described as an attempt (or, worse, a determination) to find the sufficient reason of the world in the world. That is why the "system" is bent on eliminating all objective irrationality as at least irrelevant, and tends to impose itself as a "sufficient reason." How superficial and how perverse, at the same time, such an outlook on the world — together with the type of action it inspires — must be we shall best understand in considering that the absolutely universal causality of God, as well as His properly divine wisdom, appear most strikingly in the intrinsic contingency and the inherent absurdity of the world; for only God is the determinate, per se cause of that, too, which in itself is contingent. No creature can be the per se cause of what is either casual or fortuitous.

*Ecclesiastes* tells us what the world looks like when viewed in its own light. *Under the sun, the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favour to the skilful: but time and chance in all.* [...] *There are just men to whom evils happen, as though they had done the works of the wicked: and there are wicked men who are as secure as though they had done the deeds of the just.*\(^2\) — It is Prof. Bummelklotz, of all people, who strikes oil in his back yard while digging for water. And it was Hegel — the way had been prepared by Spinoza and Leibniz — who discovered in the nineteenth century, that the light of the Sixth Day\(^3\) is actually *under* the sun: "What irks and infuriates us is not what is, but the fact that it is not as it should be; once we know that it is as it must be — that is to say, not arbitrary or contingent —, we also

\(^1\) The "secretum cordis" must not be confused with the secret "intentio cordia."

\(^2\) *IX*, 11; *VIII*, 4.

\(^3\) *Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat: et erant valde bona. Et factum est vesperae et mane, dies sextus.—Genesis, I, 31.*
recognize that it should be as it is.” And Karl Marx is even more concrete in applying the “sufficient reason” — the “system”: Socrates believes in immortality and Xanthippe drenches him with a pail of water “because the production relations are lagging behind the forces of production.”

The philosophical doctrine that properly concerns the opinions advanced by Existentialism is not the doctrine of being; rather, it is the doctrine of the good. Nor do we mean, by “good,” the transcendental property which is convertible with being; we are referring, more particularly, to the good that divides being. That division has been indicated already at the beginning of this paper. The good man is “good, absolutely” (bonus simpliciter), not by reason of his “absolute being” (esse simpliciter) — this, in fact, is not good except in a certain respect (bonum secundum quid), — but by reason of a superadditive or ultimate perfection, which derives from an accidental being (esse secundum quid), and in itself is separable from his “absolute being.”

1 Briefly, it is by reason of his virtue and proper ordination to his end that a man is a good man. It is only in God that what is being in the absolute sense is also good in the absolute sense; the esse simpliciter which encloses all perfection of being is the proper of God, Whose essence is His being. (It may be well to remember here that there can be found in God no basis for a distinction, even of reason, between His essence and His esse.)

1 “...Aliquid potest diei bonum et ex suo esse, et ex sua proprietate, vel habitudine superaddita; sic et dicuntur alii quis homo bonus et in quantum est justus et castus, vel ordinatus ad beatitudinem. Ratione igitur primae bonitatis ens convertitur cum bono, et e converso; sed ratione secundae bonum dividit ens.”—St. Thomas, Quaesitiones disputatae de Veritate, q.21, a.2, ad 6.

2 St. Thomas, Ia, q.5, a.1, ad 1.

3 “...Sicut ens multiplicatur per substantialem et accidentalem, sic bonitas multiplicatur; sed tamen inter utrumque differt. Qua aliquid dicetur ens esse absolute propter suum esse substantiale, sed propter esse accidentalum non dicetur esse absolute; unde cum generatio sit motus ad esse; cum aliquis acceptit esse substantiale, dicetur generari simpliciter; cum vero acceptit esse accidentalum, dicetur generari secundum quid; et similliter est de corruptione, per quam esse amittitur. De bono autem est e converso. Nam secundum substantialemen bonitatem dicetur aliquid bonum secundum quid, secundum vero accidentalen dicetur aliquid bonum simpliciter; unde hominem injustum non dicimus bonum simpliciter, sed bonum quid, in quantum est homo; hominem vero justum dicimus simpliciter bonum. Cujus diversitatis ista est ratio. Nam unumquodque dicitur ens in quantum absolute consideretur; bonum vero, ut ex dictis, art.1, ad 6 argum., patet, secundum quid, in quantum est, in se ipsum perfectum; unde cum perfectione superaddita est e converso.

In seipso autem aliquid perfectitut ut subsistat per essentialia principia; sed ut debito modo se habeat ad omnia quae sunt ex ipsa, non perfectitut nisi mediante bus accidentibus superadditis essentiae; quia operationes quibus unum alteri conjungitur, ab essentia mediante bus virtutibus essentiae superadditis prograduntur; unde absolute bonitatem non obtinet nisi secundum quid completum est secundum substantialem et secundum accidentalam principia. Quidquid autem creatura perfectionis habet ex essentialibus et accidentalibus principiis simul conjunctis, hoc totum Deus habet per unum suum esse simplex; simplex enim ejus essentia est ejus sanctitati et justitiae, et fortitudine, et omnium hujusmodi, quae in nobis sunt superaddita. Et ideo ipsa absoluta bonitas in Deo idem est quod ejus essentia; in nobis autem consideratur secundum ea quae superadduntur esse tae. Et pro tanto bonitas completa vel absoluta in nobis vel et antequam et totaliter superaddita, non autem in Deo; quamvis substantialis bonitas in nobis semper maneat.”—St. Thomas, De Ver., q.21, a.5, c._—” Esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeminent vitae et omnibus subsequentibus: sic enim ipsum esse praehabent in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur.—Sed et consideretur ipsum esse prout participatur in haec et vel in illa, quae non capiunt tam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut est esse cuilibet creatureae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est emi-
It follows from the preceding that the substantial or absolute being of the creature is formless, as it were, by comparison with the accidental being which renders it good in the absolute sense. "In God the absolute goodness itself is identical with His essence; in us, however, it is to be considered according to the things which are superimposed on the essence." If, then, by "existence" were meant that actuality which is due to the things "superimposed on essence" — which determine whether or no a man is "good absolutely" — we should be willing to say that, simply speaking, essence is prior to existence; for it is not merely by reason of his esse simpliciter that man possesses existence thus understood. Again, it is by reason of this "true being" of his, dependent upon an esse secundum quid, that the good man grows into a truer likeness of Him "Who Is." On the other hand, if, by "existence" we mean esse simpliciter, and by "essence" that which a man is in view of what he should be — i.e., that which he becomes, or is, in his actions — , we would say that existence is prior to essence: Socrates can be without being a good man.

Indeed the answer to the question "To be or not to be" gives rise to a far more pertinent query. That we shall inescapably be, is not the final solution. The certainty of life beyond death leaves in our historical being — it is truly a being towards the death in which our lot shall be established once and for all — a supreme concern about the one thing necessary: to be good in the absolute sense. The choice is not, forthwith, between "to be or not to be": it is between goodness absolute and the kind of absolute being which, in itself, may as well as not be superfluous, expendible, and destined for the refuse-heap — de trop, as one writer puts it. For the "absolute being" of a rational creature confirmed in evil is a being de trop, seeing that for him, at any rate, it would be better not to exist. What may be de trop for man is, indeed, his esse simpliciter.
In the final analysis, this problem of existence — of true being, of historical being — is a moral and personal one: its solution lies, not in any science as such but in our conduct.¹ No amount of speculative, nor even of practical doctrine, whether natural or supernatural, can make a man to be as he should be. Yet that is what many critics demand as an essential condition of true doctrine. It has been said that the demonstrations of God’s existence and of the immortality of our soul — some have included Faith as well — could hardly be certain unless they irresistibly compel one to pursue the good and to be a saint, as if such knowledge had to be practical truth and thus constitute prudential judgments. Whoever seeks a doctrine that is to be “existential” in this sense is on the road to despair.

CHARLES DE KONINCK.

¹  Charles de Koninck.