I. THE MORAL RECTIFICATION OF THE SPECULATIVE LIFE

Perhaps the most enigmatic feature of man is the striking dichotomy of his make-up. His ponderous and mortally fragile body is adorned with and activated by a spiritual and incorruptible soul. The human soul itself is composed of two quite different strata: one belongs to the irrational and sensient order, the other to the supersensible, rational and intellectual order. "... One element in the soul is irrational and one has a rational principle." The irrational part of the soul has two parts, viz., the vegetative or nutritive part which is common to all living beings and therefore, is not human, nor the subject of human virtue; and the other part, which is capable of participating in reason and obeying its command. Most men are acquainted at least experimentally with the sensitive part of the soul, which is common to man and animal. Thus they have sensible joys, sensible sorrows, according as the weather is pleasant or unpleasant, as their "ponies" are winners or losers. They have desires or aversions in this same sensible order.

The dichotomy is continued in the superior part of the human soul: one part is termed rational. For one part of it is essentially rational, as having reason in itself; the other is called rational by participation, in as much as it participates in reason to the extent to which it obeys the dictate of reason. It is this division of the human soul that engenders the twofold division of human virtues: intellectual, which perfect the part of the soul which is essentially rational by making it apt to know truth; and moral, whose role is to perfect that part of the soul which only participates in or is obedient to reason.

Nor does the dualism in man cease here. It continues even throughout the essentially rational part of the soul. For the rational

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, chap.13, 1102 a 27; also Cf. De Anima, III, chap.10, 433 a 12-16; St. Thomas, In III de Anima, lect.14, n.797.
5. Cf. Ibid., n.243: "Cum enim virtus humana sit per quam bene perficitur opus hominis quod est secundum rationem, necesse est quod virtus humana sit in aliquo rationali. Unde, cum ratione sit duplex, scilicet per essentiam et per participationem, consequens est quod sit duplex humana virtus. Qvarum quaedam sit in eo quod est rationale per seipsum, quae vocatur intellectuales; quaedam vero est in eo quod est rationale per participationem, idest in appetitiva animae parte, et haec vocatur moralis. Et ideo dicit quod virtutum quaedam dicimus esse intellectuales, quaedam vero morales." Also cf. Sum. Theol., Ia Iae, q.56, aa. 3, c. and ad 2; 4, c. ; 6, c. ; q.58, aa.1-4.
soul itself comprises a scientific or speculative part by which it contemplates necessary and invariable things, and a ratiocinative or calculative part by which it deliberates and reasons about contingent things.

... And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle — one by which we contemplate the kind of thing whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind... Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle.1

The bipartite character of the human soul is consummated in the distinction of the speculative and practical intellects and the virtues by which each of these is perfected for its proper work. Now the knowledge of truth is the proper work of both the speculative and practical intellects, and the intellectual virtues are the habits by which each part is perfected in reference to truth.2

The explanation of this division is obvious. Even though truth is the good of the intellect, there is, nevertheless, a vast difference between the truths of the speculative and practical orders. The good and bad of the speculative intellect is the true or false absolutely considered. For the speculative intellect does not move to action, but simply contemplates and knows the truth of necessary things.3 But the good of the practical intellect is not absolute truth, but truth "confesse se habens," that is, truth in conformity with rectified appetite.4 For the practical intellect is a moving principle; and, if

1. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, chap.1, 1139 a 1-13; Cf. St. Thomas, In VI Ethic., lect.1, nn.1115, 1118: "Quia intendimus de virtutibus intellectualibus quae percipiant partem animae rationalem, ideo ad distinguendum virtutes intellectuales oportet dividere rationem habens eodem modo quo supra divisimur partes animae... Supponatur ergo quod pars rationalis dividitur in duas. Una quidem est per quam speculamur illa entia, scilicet necessaria, quorum principia non possunt altere se habere. Alia autem pars per quam speculamur contingentia."

1118: "... Et dicit quod praedictarum partium animae rationalis, una quidem quae speculatam necessaria potest dici scientificum genus animae, quia de necessariis est scientia. Alia autem pars potest dici ratiocinativa secundum quod ratiocinari et consiliari pro eodem sumitur. Nominat enim consilium quamdam inquisitionem nondum determinatam... quae... maxime accidit circa contingentia..."

2. Cf. St. Thomas, In VI Ethic., lect.1, nn.1118-23; lect.2, nn.1120-33; and esp. 1140-1141: "Cognitio veritatis est proprium opus utriusque particularis intellectus, scilicet practici et speculativi, vel scientifici et ratiocinativi."

1141: "... Illi habitus sunt virtutes ambobus partibus intellectus per quas contingit verum dicere quod est bonum intellectivae partis."


it knows the truth, it is not for the sake of the truth but for the sake of something other to which that truth is directed or related, be that other an action such as willing, in view of which it is perfected by prudence; or a product such as a table or a chair, for which it is perfected by art, these being the two virtues of the practical intellect.\(^1\) Aristotle makes all this very clear in summary fashion when he states in the second chapter of Book VI of his *Nicomachean Ethics*:

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.

... Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect as well, since everyone who makes, makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation) — only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this.\(^2\)

1. *The Speculative Life — A Thing Apart?*

The common division of the essentially rational part of the human soul into the speculative and practical intellects, with the characteristic contemplative or speculative attitude of the former and the active and moving tendency of the latter, has led to something of a paradox. For, whereas men have some information about the active life proper to the practical intellect, they are abysmally ignorant of the speculative life. Too many seem to deny, at least interpretatively, that it is, in fact human. They seem to think it is beyond the pale of morality and coolly shrug off any responsibility for it. It seems to be a common opinion of men that their speculative life is not subject to the demands of ordinary living. They seem to fail to realize that they are morally accountable for their thoughts and thinking. Liberals, especially, disregard, even deny, and that in the name of science, any restraint on their purely intellectual activity. To us, however, the tenet that man is entirely responsible for the intellectual choices he has made in an exercise of his free will is axiomatic.

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2. Reasons for This Opinion

The human anomaly of ignorance and disdain of the speculative life and knowledge and esteem of the active life is \( (\text{proh dolor!}) \), characteristic of our assembly-line age, that, oblivious of the primacy of contemplation, bestows its \( \text{"Euge, serve bone et fidelis"} \) upon the robot-minded man of action. Lamentable though this reversal of reality is, it is not without adequate explanation.

First of all, Aristotle and St. Thomas consider that the speculative life has something divine about it and, as such, is not a human possession. When discussing the nature of happiness, Aristotle has this to say about the speculative and contemplative life:

But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is a man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.\(^1\)

St. Thomas’s commentary on this passage points out that the speculative life is “better than the life which is according to man,” and that to give oneself to the purely intellectual life is proper to a more elevated being than man. For a man to live in this manner is to live, “not according as he is man, but according as something divine exists in him,” for the speculative life is compared to and towers above the strictly human life much as the divine and human differ.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Cf. St. Thomas, In X Ethic., lect.11, nn.2105-2110, esp. 2105, 2106: “... Talis vita, quae vacat contemplationi veritatis, est melior quam vita quae est secundum hominem. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex anima et corpore, habens sensitivam naturam et intellectivam, vita homini commensurata videtur consistere in hoc, quod homo secundum rationem ordinet affectiones et operationes sensitivas et corporales. Sed vacare soli operationi intellectus videtur esse proprium superiorum substantiarum, in quibus inventur sola natura intellectiva, quam participat secundum intellectum. 2106: “Et ideo manifestans quod dictum est, subdit quod homo sic vivens, scilicet vacando contemplationi, non vivit secundum quod homo, qui est compositus ex diversis, sed secundum quod aliquid divinum in ipso existit, prout scilicet secundum intellectum divinam similitudinem participat. Et ideo quantum intellectus in sua puritate consideratur differit a composito ex anima et corpore, tantum distat operatio speculativa ab operatione quae fit secundum virtutem moralem, quae proprie est circa humana. Sicut ergo intellectus per comparationem ad homines est quoddam divinum, ita et vita speculativa, quae est secundum intellectum, comparatur ad vitam moralem, sicut divina ad humanam... 2110: “Nec hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secundum hominem, sed suprain hominem: non est enim secundum hominem quantum ad naturam compositionem, est autem propriissime secundum hominem quantum ad id quod est principalissi-
Elsewhere St. Thomas says that by the contemplative life man is assimilated to God and the angels, for in contemplation man becomes conversant with superior beings, that is, with God and the angels, being made similar to them by happiness. He states quite categorically that the contemplative life is not properly human, since the speculative intellect is not found to be as perfect in man as it is in the angel.

The active life, on the other hand, is regarded by the Angelic Doctor as being most proper to man. In actual fact, this is not surprising. Man the "doer" and man the "producer" are quite familiar figures. The so-called "Existential" philosophers of our day have seized on this point and pushed it even beyond its logical conclusions. Aquinas states in no uncertain terms that the life which is most proper to man is the active life, which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues.

It is thus somewhat comprehensible that the vast majority of men remain unacquainted with this divine, speculative life and its demands on the person who exercises such activity. And perhaps these Aristotelian and Thomistic comments on the two genera of activity proper to man explain the popular misconception that the speculative life is separate and apart from human endeavour.

3. Orders of Specification and Exercise

The apparent antinomy that results from associating contemplation with the active life finds its complete solution only in a mum in homine: quod quidem perfectissime inventur in substantiis superioribus, in homine autem imperfecte et quasi participative."

1. Cf. Ia Iae, q.3, a.5, c.: "In vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, sollicitum cum Deo et angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur."

2. Cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. de Virt. Card., q. unie., a.1, c.: "In hoc homine inventur... intellectus speculativus, qui non perfecte in homine inventur sicut inventur in angelis, sed secundum quandam participacionem animae. Ideo vita contemplativa non est proprie humana, sed suprahumana;..."

3. Cf. Ibid.: "Unde virtutes cardinales dicuntur in quibus fundatur vita humana, per quam in ostium introit; vita autem humana est quae est homini proportionata..."

4. St. Thomas, Ia Iae, q.51, a.1, c.: "Inter caeteros autem actus hominis proprium est ei consiliari: quia hoc importat quandam rationis inquisitionem circa agenda, in quibus consistit vita humana; nam vita speculativa est supra hominem..."
thorough study of the vast and intricate question of the relations between will and intellect in man.

The Doctor of the Schools begins his treatise on this subject in the *Summa Theologica* by asking which of the two spiritual faculties of man is the higher and nobler. "Is the will a higher faculty than the intellect?" he asks. And in reply he says that the intellect, in itself, is, absolutely speaking, a higher faculty than the will because its object, being simpler and more absolute, is nobler than the object of the will. Relatively, however, the will may sometimes be nobler than the intellect as when its object is found in a higher or nobler thing; and this is the case when the desired object is superior to the soul itself. Thus it is more noble to love God than to know Him.1

Though the intellect is nobler than the will, these two faculties, nevertheless, mutually influence each other. For they are both immaterial faculties and can reflect upon themselves and upon each other, as well as upon the soul and its powers. The intellect can know itself and the will; the will can move itself to act. The intellect can know the will and the acts of the will; the will can move the intellect to act.2

The intellect both moves the will and in turn is moved by it. A faculty is moved by another inasmuch as it is in potency; for when

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1. Cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.3, c.: "Eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem alicuius talis simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale; secundum quid autem, prout dictitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum.

   "Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior inventur. Et hoc apparebat ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis: nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cujus ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem alicuius est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum: sequitur quod, secundum se et simpliciter, intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate.

   "Secundum quid autem et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas inventitur interdum altior intellectu: ex eo secilicer quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re inventitur quam objectum intellectus... Ut... dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente: actus vero voluntatis perficitur ex eo quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem, prout in se est... Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta: per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam: tunc, etiam in comparatione ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cogitatio; et contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalis quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas."


   "Intelllectus enim intelligit se, et voluntatem, et essentiam animae, et omnes animae vires; et similiter voluntas vult se velle et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis."

Also cf. *Ia Pars*, q.82, a.4, ad 1.
we say that one faculty acts upon another we mean that it moves the other, reducing it from potency to act. A power of the soul is in potency in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. My eyes sometimes see actually and sometimes do not see. This is the order of exercise or use. And when they are actually seeing, they sometimes see a white object and sometimes a black one. This is the order of specification or determination. Thus a faculty of the soul may be moved in two ways, namely, as to exercise and use, and this is on the part of the subject; or as to determination and specification. This latter motion comes from the object which specifies the act.1

The object moves the faculty by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle. And the first formal principle is universal being and truth, which is the object of the intellect. In the order of specification, therefore, the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. The will is the appetite of the intellect. And the intellect moves the will after the manner of a final cause by presenting to the will its object, the known good, which moves the will as an end desired. And so in the order of specification and determination the intellect is quite independent of any influence of the will, and rather than being moved by the will does itself move the will.2

To say that the intellect plays an important role in the movement of the will is an understatement. The rational appetite must turn to it for a knowledge of the goods which it embraces or rejects. On a hot summer day when a tired executive decides to drive into the country in search of mental relaxation from the fatiguing round of daily duties, it is his intellect which proposes to him this suitable and desirable object of the will. And in this consists the moving power of the intellect — a sort of salesman’s role — a presentation of objects which the will may accept or reject.

From this short excursion into the domain of specification and determination it is evident that, if this order alone is considered, the speculative life is indeed a thing apart from any humanizing and moralizing influence. It is simply a case of the intellect’s being

1. Cf. Ia Iae, q.9, a.1, c.: “... Dupliciter autem aliqua vis animae inventur esse in potentia ad diversa: uno modo, quantum ad agere vel non agere; alio modo, quantum ad agere hoc vel illud: sicut visus quandoque videt actu, et quandoque non videt; et quandoque videt album, et quandoque videt nigrum. Indiget igitur movente quantum ad duo; sicut quantum ad exercitium vel usum actus; et quantum ad determinationem actus. Quorum primum est ex parte subjecti; quod quandoque inventur agens, quandoque non agens; et ideo igitur moventi quantum autem autem est ex parte objecti, secundum quod specifi­ tur actus.”

2. Cf. Ibid.: “Sed objectum movet, determinando actum, ad modum principii formalis, a quo, in rebus naturalibus, actio specifi­ catur, sicut calefactio a calore. Primum autem principium formale est ens et verum universale, quod est objectum intellectus. Et ideo, igitur moventi, intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut prae­ sentans ei objectum suum.”
determined by its proper object—a phenomenon which remains outside of and separated from the moral and active life. To see only this aspect of the intellectual activity of man, however, is to see the life of the intellect "through a glass in a dark manner".

When the order of use or exercise is considered, however, we find that it is the will which moves the intellect and all the other powers of the soul, for we make use of the other powers when we will. I think because I will to do so, just as I write because my will commands me to do so. The reason for the ascendancy of the will in the order of exercise is found in the comparison of its object to the objects of the other particular powers. In the order of use and exercise the motion is from the subject as contrasted with the object, which specifies and determines. And the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. Every agent acts for an end and every end is a good. The object of the will is good and end in general, whereas each particular power is directed to some particular good suitable to it, as sight to the perception of colour and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Thus, the will, as an efficient cause, moves all the powers of the soul, except the natural powers of the vegetative soul, which are not subject to the human will. For the end and perfection of every other power is included under the object of the will as some particular good. And so the will, as an efficient cause, moves the intellect in the order of exercise to its acts of understanding and reason.

... Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul... The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. ... Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.1

1. St. Thomas, In Pars, q.82, a.4, c.: "Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis: sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum et omnes animae vires... Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentissimis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respiciit finem universalem movet potentias quae respicient fines particulares... Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens: sicut visus, ad perceptionem coloris; et intellectus, ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas, per modum agentis, movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetatiae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur." Also cf. In Ilae, q.9, a.1, c.; Contra Gentiles, III, cap.26, ad 5; De Verit., q.22, a.12, c.; Q. D. de Mulo, q.6, a. unius.: "Si autem consideremus motus potentiarum animae ex parte exercitii actus, sic principium motionis est ex voluntate. Nam semper potentia ad quam pertinet finis principalis, movet ad actum potentiam ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem; sicut militaris movet frenorum factricem ad operandum, et hoc modo voluntas..."
If the order of specification alone is considered, the speculative life is thought of without reference to the will and morality. But this is only one, and the less important, aspect of man's speculation and contemplation, for, as St. Thomas so well points out, when we are discussing knowledge, and therefore the life of speculation, there is a twofold good which must be assured. One of these has reference to the order of specification, and consists in man's attaining the truth of things, "ut homo circa singula aestimet verum." And, since this regards the very act of knowledge, it falls to the intellectual virtues to assure this good. There is a second good which may not be neglected nor overlooked in man's intellectual pursuits, namely, that his appetite be rectified to apply his apprehensive forces in a virtuous manner. Being a question of the use and exercise of one of the faculties of the soul, this comes under the sway of the appetitive power.1

A brief discussion of the virtues of the speculative intellect will provide a clearer understanding of the realms of specification and exercise and of the two goods of knowledge.

The speculative intellect may be perfected by habits which are prior to the will or by others which follow the will. These habits perfecting the speculative intellect as preceding the will may be called virtues, but not so properly as the habits which follow the will. Understanding (intellectus), science and wisdom are the virtues of the speculative intellect which are prior to the will.2

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1. Cf. Ila Ilae, q.166, a.2, ad 2.
2. Cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. de Virt. in Comm., q. unie., a.7: "Intellectus tam speculativus quam practicus potest perfectissim ab aliquo habitu. Uno modo absolute et secundum se, prout preceedit voluntatem, quasi eam movens; alio modo prout sequitur voluntatem, quasi ad imperium actum suum eligiens: quia, ut dictum est, istae duas potentiae, scilicet intellectus et voluntas se invicem circumeunt.

"III igitur habitus qui sunt intellectu practico vel speculativo, primo modo, possunt dici aliquo modo virtutes, licet non its secundum perfectam rationem; et hoc modo intellectus, scientia et sapientia sunt in intellectu speculativo; ars vero in intellectu practico. Dicitur enim aliquis intelligens vel sciens secundum quod eius intellectus perfectus est ad cognoscendum verum; quod quidem est bonum intellectus. Et licet istud verum possit esse volitum, prout homo vult intelligere verum; non tamen quantum ad hoc perficiumur habitus praedici. Non enim ex hoc quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur volens considerare verum, sed solummodo potens; unde et ipsa veri consideratio non est scientia in quantum est volita, sed secundum quod directe tendit in objectum . . ."

"Habitus vero qui sunt in intellectu speculativo vel practico secundum quod intellectus sequitur voluntatem, habent verius rationem virtutis; in quantum per eos homo efficitur non solum potens vel sciens recte agere, sed volens . . ."

"Sic igitur patet quod habitus in intellectu existentes, diversimode se habent ad voluntatem.

"Nam quidam in nullo a voluntate dependent, nisi quantum ad eorum usum; et hoc quidem per accidens, cum huiusmodi usus habitum alter a voluntate dependeat, et alter ab habitibus praedictis, sicut sunt scientia, sapientia et ars. Non enim per hos
Some preliminary explanation is necessary on this point. When St. Thomas treats of the subject of virtues, he gives a very fine answer to the question, “Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?” A virtue, he says, is a good operative habit. But a habit may be referred to a good act in two ways: first, by the habit a man acquires an aptitude for a good work; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptitude to speak correctly, though his habit of grammar does not make him always speak as he has been taught. Secondly, the habit may confer not only aptitude to act but also the right use of that aptitude or capacity; for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. These latter habits are called and are virtuous simply because they render the work good as well as the one who performs that work. But the first kind of habit is not called virtue simply and absolutely because it does not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptitude, nor does it make its possessor good without qualification but only good in that respect. For, being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good not simply but relatively; a good grammarian, for example, but not a good man. Hence the intellect—even the speculative intellect, without any reference to the will—may be the subject of virtue in this first sense, that is, as a habit giving only the aptitude for a good work. It is in this sense that Aristotle designates understanding, science and wisdom as virtues of the speculative intellect, and art, of the practical intellect.1

1. Cf. St. THOMAS, Ia IIae, q.56, a.3, c.: “...Virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini facultas ad bonum actum: sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo semper recte loquatur: potest enim grammaticus barbarizare, aut soloeismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem bene agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur: sicut iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur.

   “Et quia bonum, sicut et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus: puta quia est iustus vel temperatus... Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddi, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes: quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes: quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est scienis vel artifex; sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber.

   “Subjectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus absque omni ordine ad voluntatem: sic enim Philosophus..., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes.”
Since the subject of a habit which is truly a virtue can be only the will or some power moved by the will,1 it is obvious that any virtues which may perfect the speculative intellect as preceding the will are called virtues only in that first and limited sense. And because these virtues of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part, they may indeed be called virtues but only in the sense that they equip man with an aptitude and facility for that good work which is the consideration of truth; and this is the good work of the intellect. For even though a man possesses a habit of speculative science, he is not thereby more inclined to use this capacity. He is merely made capable of considering the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge.2

Once the Doctor of the Schools has made it amply clear that the virtues of the speculative intellect have nothing to do with their good use or exercise by the one who possesses them, he goes on to distinguish the virtues proper to the speculative intellect. His own analysis of the question is so acute and penetrating as to render unwarranted any sluggish commentary of ours. We shall, in consequence, quote it in its entirety.

As already stated, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration,—as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a principle, and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called understanding, which is the habit of principles.

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a term. This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature; hence that which is

1. Cf. Ibid.: "Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas; vel aliqua potentia, secundum quod est mota a voluntate. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias, quae aliquotiens sunt rationes, ad suos actus... Et ideo, quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus, quae facit bene agere in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate, vel in aliqua potentia secundum quod est voluntate mota."

2. Cf. Ibid., q.57, a.1, c.: "Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non permissat partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respicient, sed solam intellectivam: possunt quidem dici virtutes, in quantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis quae est consideratio veri, hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus: non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum: sed fit potens speculandi verum in his quorum habet scientiam."
last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is wisdom, which considers the highest causes, as stated in Meta., I, 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. — But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is science that perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge: whereas there is but one wisdom.¹

In consequence of the foregoing consideration of the virtues of the speculative intellect, we are again driven to the fact of the independence of the speculative life from the humanizing control of the will. And only when one is very insistent on the distinction between the orders of specification and exercise can he correctly argue that the speculative life is in very truth a most noble human pursuit. For though the virtues of the speculative intellect are free from all interference of the will on the plane of specification, determination and definition, on the lower and human plane of use and exercise they are quite dependent upon and influenced by the will.

When there is question of man’s using or exercising the virtues of understanding, science and wisdom, — that is, the whole question of man’s exercising the speculative life, — then there is just no doubt about such a use and activity being a thing apart from man. For like everything else which enters the domain of use and exercise, the use and exercise of the virtues of the speculative intellect, too, come under the sway and dominion of the will. For the will moves to their acts all the other powers which are in any way rational; and if man actually considers truth, — and the good of this consideration is assured by the intellectual virtue itself — it is because he wills to do

¹. *Ibid.*, a.2, c.: “... Sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perfectur ad considerandum verum: hoc enim est bonum opus eis. Verum autem est duplicita considerable: uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per alium notum. — Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut principium, et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus perfectum intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur *intellectus*, qui est habitus principiorum. "Verum autem quod est per alium notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu; sed per inquisitionem rationis. Et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse duplicita: uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. — Et quia ex quae sunt posterius nota quod nos, sunt priora et magis nota secundum naturam, ut dicitur in I Phys.: ideo id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et etsi huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaph. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus: quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberis non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. — Ad id vero quod est ultimum in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perfect intellectum scientia. Et ideo, secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum; cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.”
so. For though a man has the habit of Geometry, he is not thereby inclined to make use of it. That he makes use of the knowledge he has is due to the motion of his will.¹

Since every virtue is ordained to some good ..., a habit ... may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition ... belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.²

The reason for this is not far to seek. For the will is the first efficient cause, "impellens impulsum," and, because of that, the will moves the intellect and all the other powers, since its end is universal in comparison with the ends of the particular powers. The object of the will is good and end in common; whereas the object of the other powers is some particular good. Use or exercise is from the subject as contrasted with the object, which specifies and determines. And the motion of the subject is from some agent. Every agent acts for an end. And since good in all its community is the object of the will, it is thus the role of the will to move all other powers and faculties to their respective ends.³

It is but a short and easy step to conclude that since the use and exercise of the speculative life depend on the will, the efficient cause which moves all powers, save the powers of the vegetative soul, then the good and virtuous use, application and exercise of the speculative life and virtues must depend on moral virtue, which rectifies man's will.

The Doctor of the Schools is very clear on this matter when he states unequivocally: "Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a

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¹ Cf. Ia IIae, q.56, a.3, c.: "Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias, quae alqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus ... Et ideo, quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem."

² Ibd., q.57, a.1, c.: "... Alio modo, quia, cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum; et hoc pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiquit partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiiis et habitibus."

³ Cf. Ia Pars, q.82, a.4, c.; Ia IIae, q.9, a.1, c.: "Motio autem ipsius subjecti est ex agente aliquo. Et cum omne agens agat propter finem ... principium huius motionis est ex fine. Et inde est quod ars ad quam pertinet finis, movet, suo imperio, artem ad quam pertinet id quod est ad finem: sicut gubernatoria ars imperat navifinicae ... Bonum autem in communi, quod habet rationem finis, est obiectum voluntatis. Et ideo, ex hae parte, voluntas movet alias potentias animae ad suos actus: utimur enim aliis potentiiis, cum volumus. Nam fines et perfectiones omnium aliarum potentiarum comprehenduntur sub obiecto voluntatis, sicut quaedam particularia bona. Semper autem ars vel potentia ad quam pertinet finis universalis, movet ad agendum artem vel potentiam ad quam pertinet finis particularis sub illo universali comprehensus."
habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.”¹

St. Thomas’s statement is valid. If man is to lead a good speculative life, not only must his speculative intellect be perfected for the consideration of truth by the virtues of understanding, science and wisdom, but his will must also be perfected by moral virtue so that he may use those perfections of his intellectual faculty in a good and human way. These are the two goods of knowledge to which St. Thomas referred when he stated that in reference to knowledge a double good is to be assured — one which assures a good act of knowledge — the science of Geometry, for example, for the consideration of mathematical truths relating to continuous quantity; another which assures a good use of the act of knowledge, namely, that man’s will be perfected in view of applying his apprehensive powers in a good and virtuous manner.²

In summary, it is evident that, though man’s speculative life is often considered as amoral and thus quite apart from any humanizing influence, this is not the case. Despite the arguments which might seem to favor such an opinion — the “divine” aspect of contemplation; the active life’s being termed the truly human life; the whole plan of specification, whereby the intellect and its determining object face one another without the foreign influence of the will; and the very nature of the virtues of the speculative intellect, which do not necessarily guarantee their good use — despite these arguments, the speculative life must submit to the rule of the will, by means of which alone a good use of speculation is assured. And as a good use can come only from an appetite which is perfected by moral virtue, it follows that moral virtue has its role to play in assuring a good use and exercise of the intellective powers, whose good — the consideration of truth — is procured by the habits of understanding, science and wisdom. Not to leave the question only partly answered, we shall now go on to consider the nature and office of docility and studiousness; two of the particular moral virtues which are necessary that the second — and perhaps the more important — of the goods of knowledge may not be lacking.

II. DOCILITY

Any study on the moral virtues which regulate man’s appetite for knowledge must needs treat of docility. Man has two methods of

¹. *Ibid.*, q.58, a.2, c.: “Sic igitur, ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis morals.”
². Cf. *Ila Ilae*, q.166, a.2, ad 2.
coming to know truth; for he may acquire knowledge by way of invention or by way of discipline and teaching.¹

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns [by instruction]. For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. I, 1): All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.²

And just as happy conjecture (eustochia) and shrewdness (solertia) facilitate the acquisition of knowledge by way of invention,³ so docility is a necessary part of the disciple’s equipment in view of his learning by instruction from a teacher. For discipline is the reception of knowledge from another, as St. Thomas understands it in his exposition of the Posterior Analytics.⁴ Docility, in turn, assures that the doctrine given by the teacher is properly accepted by the disciple. "Now it is

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¹ Cf. De Verit., q.11, a.1, c.: “Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur: uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae; ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam: unus, quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignorantum; et hic modus dicitur inventio; alius, quando rationi naturali aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur disciplina.”

² In Pars., q.117, 1, c.: “Scientia autem acquiritur, in homine, et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui, per inventionem propriam, scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori, ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicum homini quoddam principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis; per quod cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi universalia principia applicat ad aliquam particulariam, quorum memoriam et experimentum per sensum recipit: per inventionem propriae acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad ignota procedens. Unde et quaelibet docens, ex his quae discipulus novit, ducet eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat, secundum quod dicitur in I Poster., quod omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex praecessenti fit cognitione.”

³ Cf. IIIa Ilae, q.48, a. un.: “Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio: quae fit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet eustochia, quae est bona coniecturatio. Huius autem pars... est solertia, quae est velox coniecturatio medi...”

⁴ Cf. In I Poster. Anal., lect.1, n.9: “Nomen autem doctrinae et disciplinae ad cognitionis acquisitionem pertinet. Nam doctrina est actio eius, qui aliquid cognoscere facit; disciplina autem est receptione cognitionis ab alio. Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum, sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque.”
a mark of docility to be ready to be taught:...”

Now... docility consists in man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man...”

And when one realizes the greater utility and facility which characterize teaching as a means of coming to knowledge when compared with the intrinsic and extrinsic difficulties concomitant to the method of discovery, one has no hesitation in signalling the first-ranking importance of docility in the life of the student.

The Angelic Doctor has no lengthy exposé of docility; as a matter of fact, his mentions of it are but few and brief. And when he does treat of it both in the Summa Theologica and in his commentary on the Sentences, it is always in connection with prudence that he envisages it. However, as St. Thomas himself states, though docility is in a special way related to prudence, it does have a great utility for all the intellectual virtues.

A reason for St. Thomas’s so saying is not difficult to ascertain for, as we know, all the intellectual virtues, with the exception of understanding, are acquired through learning; and so for these others, too, docility will have its function to discharge. We think that we may say without fear of erring that what St. Thomas says of docility in reference to prudence is valid, mutatis mutandis, in reference to the other intellectual virtues, and may be considered as common teaching about the acquisition of knowledge in general and not only of the acquisition of the knowledge prerequisite to prudence. After all, docility pertains to prudence inasmuch as this latter proceeds by way of knowledge.

In fact, St. Isidore, in his famous lexicon, seems to conceive of docility as extending to the whole field of learning from another, for he says that “one is docile not because he is learned, but because he can be taught; for he is capable and apt for learning.”

1. Docility and Prudence

St. Thomas’s first mention of docility in the Summa Theologica is but a passing reference in a reply to an objection wherein he states that docility is not a virtue really distinct from prudence but rather is to be related to it as one of its integral parts, that is, as one of the several elements prerequisite for the perfection of prudence.

1. I Ha IIae, q.49, a.3, c.: “Hoc autem pertinet ad docilitatem, ut aliquis sit bene disciplinae susceptivus.”

2. Ibid., a.4, c.: “Sicut autem docilitas ad hoc pertinet ut homo bene se habeat in acquirendo rectam opinionem ab alio;...”


4. Cf. Ibid., q.48, a. un.: “Quorum octo quinque pertinent ad prudentiam, secundum id quod est cognoscitiva; scilicet: memoria, ratio, intellectus, docilitas et solertia.”

"Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence." Later he comes back to give a more detailed explanation of this earlier notice.

Prudence, like the other cardinal virtues, has integral parts. Those elements which are prerequisite for a perfect act of the cardinal virtue are known as the integral parts of that virtue. From all such elements previously assigned by other authors Aquinas selects eight as being necessary to the perfection of prudence, and, in consequence, lists eight integral parts of prudence, among them docility. Of these eight, five are assigned to prudence in view of the knowing process of which prudence must acquit itself. These five are memory, reasoning, understanding, docility and shrewdness. The Angelic Doctor gives even further clarification on the function of docility when he says that it regards neither knowledge itself nor the use of this knowledge, but rather its acquisition, and that by way of learning from a teacher. The relation of docility to prudence is thus very clearly traced. This relationship may be summarized very well in what approximates a definition of docility as the following: docility is that integral part of prudence which perfects it by assuring to it a good acquisition of discipline. This is as close as St. Thomas ever comes to actually defining docility.

A remark of St. Thomas, contained in the commentary on the Sentences, merits very close attention. After he had explained what he

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1. *Ia Iae*, q.57, a.6, ad 4: "Dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia, et providentia; similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia; sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam, sicut partes integrales: inquantumomnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae."

2. Cf. *Ia Iae*, q.48, a. un.: "Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium: ut sicilicet illa dican tur esse partes virtutis aliquis, quae necesse est concurre rere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius." Cf. also *In III Sent.*, d.33, q.3, a.1, sol.1, n.269: "Et secundum hunc modum tripli citer assignantur partes prudentiae et aliis virtutibus. Uno enim modo assignantur ei partes quasi integrales, cum sicilicet partes virtutis aliquis ponuntur aliquis quae exiguntur ad virtutem, in quibus perfectio virtutis consistit."

3. Cf. *Ibid.*: "Et, sic, ex omnibus enumeratis possunt accipi octo partes prudentiae: sicilicet: sex, quas enumerat Macrobius; quibus addenda est septima, sicilicet memoria, quam ponit Tullius; et eustochia, sive solertia, quam ponit Aristoteles."


5. Cf. *Ibid.*: "Quorum diversitatis ratio patet ex hoc quod, circa cognitionem, tria sunt consideranda. — Prima quidem, ipsa cognitione: quae, si sit praeteritorum, est memoria; si autem praesentium, sive contingentium sive necessariorum, vocatur intellectus, sive intelligentia. — Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio: quae fit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet eustochia, quae est bona coniecturatio. Huic autem para... est solertia, quae est velox coniecturatio medi. — Tertio, considerandus est usus cognitionis: secundum sicilicet quod, ex cognitis, aliquis procedit ad alia cognoscenda vel judicanda. Et hoc pertinet ad rationem..."
meant by an integral part of a virtue, he states quite definitely that integral parts of a cardinal virtue do not designate virtues in the strict sense of the term, but rather conditions of a virtue, which must enter into its complete notion. "Et hae partes, proprie loquendo non nominant per se virtutes, sed conditiones unius virtutis integrantes ipsam." 1 This, of course, is in line with his other remark in the same vein. 2

We feel that these latter two remarks should not be passed over lightly. And from them we conclude that docility does not, strictly speaking, designate a virtue. And if, in the course of this chapter, we refer to the virtue of docility, it will be virtue in this less exact sense.

A fuller understanding of the reason for St. Thomas’s making docility an integral part of prudence will cast great illumination on docility itself and on the role it is to play in any acquisition of knowledge by way of discipline. First, we shall merely state the reason given by the Doctor of the Schools for making docility a part of prudence, and after that we shall give a more detailed analysis of prudence and its acts of counsel, for an understanding of both of these is imperative to a fuller realization of docility and its function in the disciple.

In its most fundamental expression, the necessity of docility for prudence arises from the very matter with which prudence deals. For, as Aristotle defines it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, prudence is right reason of things to be done. 3 Thus, prudence must treat of particular operables. 4 And since these are limitless in number, no man, by himself, is capable of knowing all of them. And, as a result, in the matter of prudence, man has to seek this knowledge from others, especially from old people who have, because of their long experience in practical life, a sound understanding and knowledge of these matters. Thus man must be disposed to listen to and learn from his elders; and docility is that quality of mind which makes for a proper reception of this teaching and information. Briefly, because of the insurmountable difficulty in learning by means of personal discovery and research all that prudence needs to know to act wisely, men have to resort to other men to be taught by them in this matter.

As stated above . . . prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no man can consider

1. *In III Sent.*, d.33, q.3, a.1, sol.1, n.269, p.1073.
2. Cf. *Ia Iae*, q.57, a.6, ad 4.
4. Cf. *Ia Iae*, q.47, a.3, c.: "Dicendum quod . . . ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis; sed etiam applicatio ad opus: quae est finis practicae rationis. Nullus autem potest conveniency alteri aliquod applicare, nisi utrumque cognoscat; scilicet: et id quod applicendum est; et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus. Et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes."
them all sufficiently: nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.  

The exact role of prudence in this frame of reference is better seen after a brief analysis of prudence and its acts. We now pass on to consider these.

Prudence is the virtue which perfects the practical intellect in view of operation. It governs and directs the other virtues. For, while from the point of view of its matter, human operation, to wit, prudence may be classified as a moral virtue, nevertheless, because it is subjected in and perfects an apprehensive faculty, in this case, the practical intellect, it is considered formally as an intellectual virtue and is listed with the other four intellectual virtues. Being of a superior order, for it is in the intellect, as we have just said, prudence unites in itself what is found separately in the moral virtues which it governs. As Cajetan puts it, what exists divisively on an inferior level is to be found united on a superior plane. It would not seem to be unreasonable to expect that the two modes of moderation, on the one hand, and firmness and stimulation, on the other, which characterize the virtues of temperance and fortitude respectively, and which are opposed on the inferior level of the sensitive appetite, will be found united on the higher level of prudence. In fact, this is just the case, for to be simply prudent, man must be regulated both from the point

1. Ibid., q.49, a.3, c.: "Dicendum quod ... prudentia consistit circa particularia operabilia: in quibus, cum sint quasi infinitae diversitates, non possunt ab uno homine sufficienter omnia considerari, nec per modicum tempus, sed per temporis diuturnitatem. Unde, in his quae ad prudentiam pertinent, maxime indiget homo ab alio erudiri; et praecepue ex senibus, qui sanum intellectum adepti sunt circa fines operabilium ... Hoc autem pertinet ad docilitatem, ut alius sit bene disciplinae susceptible. Et ideo convenienter docilias ponitur pars prudentiae."

2. Cf. I1a I1ae, q.47, aa.4, 5; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, chap.5; St. Thomas, In VI Ethic., lect.4.

3. Cf. I1a I1ae, q.47, a.7, c.

4. Cf. Ibid., a.5, c.: "Sic, ergo, dicendum est quod, cum prudentia sit in ratione ... diversificatur quidem ab alius virtutibus intellectualibus, secum materialem diversitatem obiectorum. Nam sapientia, scientia, et intellectus sunt circa necessaria; ars autem et prudentia circa contingentia; sed ars, circa factibilia, quae scilicet in externiori materia constictuntur, sicut domus, cultellus et huiusmodi; prudentia autem est circa agibilis, quae scilicet in ipso operante consistunt. ... Sed a virtutibus moralibus distinguitur prudentia secundum formalem rationem potentialium distinctivam; scilicet: intellectivi, in quo est prudentia; et appetitivi, in quo est virtus moralis."

5. Cf. Cajetan, In Iam I1ae, q.23, a.4, n.4: "Et cum dicitur quod dispersa inferius sunt unita superius, verum est, ceteris paribus."
of view of moderation as well as from that of firmness. In other words, both moderation and firmness are required for prudence. A brief consideration of the acts of prudence will make this statement clearer.

Prudence has three acts; or, to put it in another way, there are three steps in the prudential act. These are counsel, judgment and command. The first act of prudence is to take counsel, that is, to inquire what means are to be taken to achieve the end desired and intended.

Having deliberated on the various means brought to his attention by either his own research or the suggestion and teaching of another, the prudent person then judges that this is the means conducive to the end he has proposed to himself. He then proceeds to the execution of the work, applying the means to the end.

Prudence must display the mode of firmness especially in commanding. Promptness is definitely needed in the execution of the work, and he who hesitates in this final stage of the prudential act is truly lost. "... And they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation..." That the mode of firmness must characterize this final stage of the prudent action is evident upon examination of the errors or vices which militate against a proper execution of the work.

Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus by defect of counsel... precipitation or temerity is a species of imprudence; by defect of judgment... there is thoughtlessness; while inconstancy and negligence correspond to the command which is the proper act of prudence.

Inconstancy implies the abandonment of a good purpose. It has its origin in the inordinateness of the appetite, but it is consummated in the defect of reason which now falters and repudiates what it had

1. Cf. IIa Iae, q.47, a.8, c.: "Dicendum quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium... Unde oportet quod ille sit praeceptus actus prudentiae, qui est praeceptus actus rationis agibilium. Cuius quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consiliari; quod pertinet ad inventionem: nam consiliari est quaerere... Secundus actus est iudicare de inventis; et hic sistit speculativa ratio. Sed practica ratio, quae ordinatur ad opus, procedit ulterius; et est tertius actus eius praecipere: qui quidem actus consistit in applicatione consiliatorum et iudicatorum ad operandum. Et quia iste actus est propinquier fini rationis practicae: inde est quod iste est principalis actus rationis practicae, et, per consequens, prudentiae."


3. IIa Iae, q.53, a.2, c.: "Alio modo, secundum partes quasi potentiales prudentiae, quae sunt virtutes adiunctae, et accipiantur secundum diversum actus rationis. Et, hoc modo: quantum ad defectum consili: circa quod est eubilia, est praeceptatio sive temeritas, imprudentiae species; quantum vero ad defectum iudicii, circa quod sunt synesis et gnome, est inconsideratio; quantum vero ad ipsum praecipere, quod est proprius actus prudentiae, est inconstantia et negligentia."
rightly arrived at. This repudiation arises from a weakness in not firmly holding to the good in spite of the upsurge of contrary passions. 1 From this it is evident that the prudent person must be properly regulated as regards firmness and to prevent such faltering prudence must envelop in itself the mode of firmness. “The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.” 2

Likewise negligence, being the defect of solicitude, which sees to a speedy execution of what is to be done, may from lack of firmness atrophy command. There is a slight difference between inconstancy and negligence, though both are defects opposed to a proper execution of the work. Inconstancy vitiates execution of the work because it hinders command itself, whereas negligence renders command sterile because it does not have a prompt will to execute it. 3 The prudent person avoids both of these defects because he is properly regulated as regards firmness in pursuing the good work.

Counsel presents a difficulty of another nature. Counsel is, as we have said, the first act of prudence and consists in a certain inquisition in view of determining means conducive to the attainment of the end desired. It is nothing more than a diligent acquisition, ordering and comparing all the various means. It is a careful study of all that one is to know in order to make a prudent choice of suitable means. Aristotle gives a fine description of counsel in the *Ethics* when he writes:

> We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade,

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1. Cf. *Ibid.*, a.5, c.: “Inconstantia importat recessum quendam a bono proposito definito. Huismodi autem recessum principium quidem habet a vi appetitiva: non enim aliquis recedit a priori bono proposito, nisi propter aliquid quod sibi inordinatum placet. Sed iste recessus non consommatur nisi per defectum rationis, quae fallitur in hoc quod repudiat id quod recte acceptaverat; et quia, cum possit resistere impulsi passionis: si non resistat, hoc est ex debilitate ipsius, quae non tenet se firmiter in bono concepto. Et ideo inconstantia, quantum ad sui consummationem, pertinent ad defectum rationis. Sicut autem omnis rectitudine rationis practicae pertinent alqualiter ad prudentiam; ita omnis defectus eiusdem pertinent ad imprudentiam. Et ideo inconstantia, secundum sui consummationem, ad imprudentiam pertinent. Et sicut praeceptatio est ex defectu circa actum consilii: et inconsideratio, circa actum iudicii; ita inconstantia, circa actum praecepti: ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis esse inconstans, quod ratio deficit in praecipiendo ea quae sunt consiliata et iudicata.”


nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is produced by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause which in order of discovery is last.¹

The prudent person will come by some of this knowledge through personal reflection and research, but, as St. Thomas says, because of the impossibility of learning all by this method, for much of his knowledge the prudent man must depend on teachers. Aristotle says that "we call in others to aid us in deliberating on important questions."²

Now whereas command should be prompt, counsel should proceed slowly. "Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly."³

In commentary upon this passage, the Angelic Doctor says that prudent counselors deliberate a long time in order to diligently ascertain everything which could have an influence on the work.⁴

_Eubulia_ is the virtue which perfects counsel. It is rectitude of counsel in view of an end which is simply good after deliberation on suitable means for a sufficient length of time.⁵

Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.⁶

The error, then, to be avoided in taking counsel is to proceed too quickly. "It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,

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⁴. Cf. St. Thomas, _In VI Ethic._, lect.8, n.1219: "... Eubulia enim ... est cum inquisitione rationis, et ex alia parte non est velox, sed magis boni consiliatores consiliantur multo tempore, ut diligenter perquirant omnia quae pertingunt negotium. Unde, et proverbia dicunt, quod oportet ea quae sunt determinata in consilio velociter exequi, sed consiliari tarde."
⁵. Cf. op. cit., n.1234: "Ex omnibus ergo quae dieta sunt accipit potest quod eubulia est rectitudo consilii ad finem bonum simpliciter per vias congruas et tempore convenienti."
which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly,
which is a vice contrary to prudence..." 1 Such haste is ruinous of
counsel. St. Thomas names this defect precipitation and says that
the name, when referring to the acts of the soul, is used metaphorically,
according to a certain comparison with corporeal motion. For this
latter is said to be precipitate when as the result of some impulsion a
body falls at a more speedy rate than it normally would, as when some­
one slips at the top of a stairs, his descent is precipitate, for he does
not follow the ordinary decline of each step. Likewise, reason proceeds
precipitously when it moves too quickly to its conclusion, not passing
through the proper gradation of middle terms. The proper progres­
sion of steps to be followed in taking counsel consists in remembrance
of past events, understanding of the present, shrewd insight into
future happenings, a certain process of reasoning whereby these are
compared and, finally, docility in accepting the decisions of more
experienced men of action. The wise counsellor pays strict attention
to each of these steps; but he who omits any of them because of
impulse of the will or of passions acts in a precipitous manner. 2 His
counsel is faulty and, as a result, his judgment will be rash. His
deliberation lacks the moderation which should be the proper mark
of counsel. In other words, such a one is not properly regulated from
the point of view of moderation.

We are now in a position to understand the role of docility in
counsel and, by extension, its role in every acquisition of knowledge
through discipline. Precipitation is the ruination of counsel, which is
to proceed with due reflection for a sufficient time. Thus, to take
counsel properly, one must be so disposed that he will give sufficient
time to properly acquiring the knowledge prerequisite to the selection
of means to the end. To be so disposed, the person has to be resolved
not to omit the protracted exercise of memory and reason, and also
not to neglect because of pride and contempt, consulting and listening

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1. *IIa Iae*, q.127, a.1, ad 2: "Operatio festina commendabilis est, post consilium,
quod est actus rationis. Sed si quis ante consilium vellet festine agere, non esset hoc
laudabile, sed vitiosum: esset enim quaedam praecepitatio actionis, quod est vitium
prudentiae oppositum..."

2. Cf. *op. cit.*, q.53, a.3, c.: "Praecepitatio in actibus animae metaphorice dicitur,
secundum similitudinem corporali motu acceptam. Dicitur autem praecepitari, secundum
corporalem motum, quod a superiori in ima pervenit secundum impetu quemdam proprii
motus vel alieculi impellentis, non ordinate descendendo per gradus. Summum autem
animae est ipsa ratio. Inum autem est operatio per corpus exercita. Gradus autem
medii, per quos oportet ordinate descendere, sunt memoria praetectorum, intelligentia
praesentium, solertia in considerandis futurius eventibus, ratiocinatio conferens unum alteri,
docilitas per quam aliquis acquisescit sententis maiorum: per quos quidem gradus aliquis
ordinate descendit, recte consiliando. Si quis autem feratur ad agendum per impetu
voluntatis vel passionis, pertransitis huiusmodi gradibus, erit praecepitatio."
to the teaching of men of experience, 1 for to omit any of these is to be guilty of precipitation. 2

Now the two integral parts of prudence which St. Thomas assigns to perfecting the very acquisition of knowledge are docility, which makes for a good reception of teaching from others; and shrewdness (solertia) which perfects discovery. 3 Shrewdness, by definition, is a swift conjecture of the means. 4 So that if one is to be properly disposed for the gradual and ordered acquisition of knowledge which counsel requires, it seems that such moderation must be given by docility. In other words, docility assures that the prudent person is so regulated from the point of view of moderation that he does not omit any of the steps in that acquisition of knowledge which wise counsel requires. Thus, we can say that docility secures for prudence the mode of moderation in acquiring the knowledge necessary for counsel, which moderation is the proper mark of counsel. In consequence, to docility itself is to be attributed the mode of moderation.

The explanation of the relationship of docility to prudence which Aquinas gives in his commentary on the Sentences, though much less detailed than that contained in the Summa Theologica, leads to this same conclusion as to the role of docility. According to the argument of the Sentences, docility serves to remove one of the three obstacles which could vitiate foresight. Foresight, circumspection, caution and docility are all required for prudence inasmuch as practical reason is dependent upon this virtue for its decision for the future based upon information drawn from past events, modified by present circumstances. Through foresight the prudent person not only has to find means accommodated to the end but also has to remove anything which might impede the attainment of the end. There are three possible hindrances to foresight. The first of these concerns the means itself, which may seem good but in reality is not. Caution prevents the selection of such an apparently suitable means, for it discerns between true virtues and vices which have the appearance of virtue. A second hindrance may intervene and prevent a truly suitable means

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1. Cf. Ibid., q.49, a.3, ad 2 : "Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent: secundum aptitudinem quidem, est a natura: sed, ad eius consummationem, plurimum valet studium: dum scilicet homo sollicite, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbia.

2. Cf. op. cit., q.53, a.2, c. : "Quod autem aliquis deficiat a docilitate, vel memoria, vel ratione, pertinent ad praecipitationem.

3. Cf. op. cit., q.48, a. un., c. : "Secundo, ipsa cognitionis acquisitio: quaerit, vel per disciplinam, et ad hoc pertinet docilitas; vel per inventionem, et ad hoc pertinet eustochia, quae est bona conjecturatio. Huius autem pars . . . est solertia, quae est velox conjecturatio medi . . . "

4. Cf. Ibid.
from attaining the end. Circumspection looks after this obstacle by preventing interference from contrary vices. Finally, the prudent person may not be able to find means conducive to the end. And, in such an event, he must seek advice from others. It is docility which disposes him to a facile reception of this teaching from others.¹

Docility, then, is included among the integral parts of prudence because, by reason of its mode of moderation, it rectifies man’s appetite in such a way that he is disposed to make use of all the means of learning which the proper acquisition of knowledge requires; and, in the matter of prudence, not the least of these is recourse to the teaching and advice of others. Docility renders the prudent person apt not only to receive well teaching from others but also apt to sollicit frequently and carefully the aid of teachers and to reverently heed what those teachers have to say. It thus prevents the disciple’s too infrequent recourse to teachers as well as moderates his pride and self-assertiveness, which would be serious obstacles to the acceptance of the doctrine given by the teachers once consulted.²

2. Docility and Acquisition of Knowledge in General

This is the only point we have been seeking to assert about docility, namely, that docility is characterized by moderation, and that the quality of docility in the student regulates, by moderating it, his appetite, making it receptive to teaching given by others. This is the


275. "Contingit autem providentiam tripliciter impediiri. Uno modo ex parte ipsius viae inveniendi, quae quandoque videtur bona et non est; et hoc impedimentum cautio auferit, cuius est a virtutibus virtus speciem praeferentia discernere.

276. "Alio modo ex ordine ipsius in finem, ne scilicet viae quae de se apta est ad finem, aliena extrinseco impediat ne in finem ducere posset; et hoc ad circumspectionem pertinet quae est cautela vitiorum contrariorum, quibus praecepi quidem prudentia impeditur.

277. "Tertio modo ex parte ipsius hominis tendenti in finem qui vias accommodas ad finem intentionem invenire non potest. Unde oportet quod per doctrinam ab aliis accipiat; quia principi operabilia vel a se habere prudentem vel ab aliis faciliter accipere. Qui autem neutrum habet, hic inutilis est vir... Et sic est docilias passive dicta. Si autem docilias accipiatur actae, tune pertinebit ad prudentiam secundum suum perfectissimum esse, prout sollicit non solum sibi, sed etiam alius quae sunt utilia ad finem invenit; et sic dictur prudentia erudiendi imperitos.”

². Cf. Ila Iiae, q.49, a.3, ad 2: "Docilitas, sicut et alia quae ad prudentiam pertinent: secundum aptitudinem quidem, est a natura; sed, ad eam consummationem, plurimum valet humanum studium: dum sollicit homo sollicitae, frequenter et reverenter applicat animum suum documentis maiorum, non negligens ea propter ignaviam, nec contemnens propter superbiam.”
role of docility in prudence; and we feel that it exercises this same role in the other intellectual virtues.¹

3. Growth in Docility

That moderation is the mode which characterizes docility seems to be corroborated by a short study of two virtues which aid greatly in the acquisition of this virtue or quality of soul. In this connection it may not be out of place to note that for docility, as well as for the other parts of prudence, and, in fact, for all the moral virtues, too, nature may give man a certain aptitude and facility, which may even be designated as proximate dispositions to virtue.² Nevertheless, for the full flowering and perfection of docility, education and training are of great value.

Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.³

As can be readily supposed, humility aids greatly in the acquisition of docility. Pride is a fatal obstacle to learning from another, for the proud man refuses to learn from either God or man.

Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matth., xi, 25, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent, i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, and hast revealed them to little ones, i.e. to the humble. Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Eccles., vi, 34): If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction. The other knowledge of truth is affectionate, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth. . .⁴

1. Cf. Ibid., ad 1: "Dicendum quod, etsi docilitas utilis sit ad quamlibet virtutem intellectualen: praecepite tamen ad prudentiam pertinet . . ."


3. Ila Ilae, q.49, a.3, ad 2.

Thus humility, which restrains and moderates man's pride and self-assertiveness, puts him in a favorable position to learn from teachers. It causes the disciple to distrust his own ability and makes him realize his native incapacity to master all truth by his own efforts. Such a humble attitude towards truth and its teacher makes the student docile. Docility thus would seem to have a close kinship to humility, and, in a certain sense, to follow from it.

Meekness, another potential part of temperance, which represses and moderates the passion of anger, greatly facilitates docility. For meekness sees to it that "man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger." Thus, the meek readily accept teaching from those who are supposed to have the truth. And by so disposing the disciple, meekness is no inconsiderable help to docility.

So closely is docility allied with the moderating virtues of humility and meekness that it, too, may be regarded as exercising a moderating role.

From our detailed analysis of the integral parts of prudence, and especially of those parts which perfect the act of counsel, the role of docility has been delineated. Docility is necessary to prudence because prudence requires wise counsel and deliberation about the means most suitable for the attainment of a desired end. That the counsel be complete and perfect, one must acquire all the knowledge he can about the various possible means. To obtain such knowledge not only must the prudent person make use of personal reflection, but, because of the vastness and uncertainty of the matter of prudence, he must have recourse to the teachings of experienced men of action. If this latter teaching is to be of any value to him, then the prudent person must be prepared and disposed to accept this teaching. This is where docility enters the picture. It will serve to moderate all haste in taking counsel, and will thus assure that sufficient consultation with others is made and that the disciple "carefully and reverently" heeds the sage advice of his elders.

Because, as St. Thomas says, docility is useful not only to prudence but to all the intellectual virtues, since they all are acquired by way of

1. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.157, a.1, c.: "... Nam ex passione irae provocatur aliquis ad hoc quod graviorem inferat poenam. Ad elementum autem pertinet directe quod sit diminutiva poenarum; quod quidem impediri posset per excessum irae. Et ideo mansuetudo, inquantum refrenat impetum irae, concurret in eundem effectum cum elementia. Differunt tamen ab invicem, inquantum elementia est moderativa exterioris punitonis; mansuetudo autem propri de minimuit passionem irae."

2. *Ibid.*, a.4, ad 1: "Dicendum quod mansuetudo praeparat hominem ad Dei cognitionem, removendo impedimentum. Et, hoc, dupliciter. Primo quidem, faciendo hominem compotem sui per diminutionem irae... Alio modo, quia ad mansuetudinem pertinet quod homo non contradicat verbis veritatis; quod plerumque aliqui faciunt ex commotione irae."
learning, we concluded that docility will exercise its moderating function in every acquisition of discipline, whether that be in the matter of prudence or in the larger field of knowledge in general.

### III. STUDIOUSNESS

There is, in man, a natural desire for knowledge. This is the thought with which Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics*. “All men by nature,” he says, “desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight.”

But in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the same Aristotle laid down as a condition for achieving the virtuous mean, and thereby acquiring virtues, the avoidance of those things to which we are most naturally inclined, either by our individual make-up and temperament, or in common with other men.

But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially . . . ; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray.

In commenting upon these passages, St. Thomas says that he who wishes to acquire virtue must look to that to which his appetite most naturally moves in order that he may direct himself to the contrary of that to which he is inclined by nature or custom. Furthermore, states Aquinas, since all men are naturally inclined to seek pleasure, it follows that to become virtuous men must steer clear of pleasures.

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3. Cf. In II Ethic., lect.11, nn.374-377: “... Et dicit quod oportet eum qui vult fieri virtuosus attendere quid sit illud ad quod magis appetitus eius natus est moveri : diversi enim ad diversa naturaliter magis inclinantur. Ad quid autem unusquisque naturaliter inclinetur, cognoscere potest ex delectatione et tristitia quae circa ipsum fit ; quia unicumque est delectabile id quod est sibi conveniens secundum naturam.


376. “Et est hic considerandum quod haec via acquirendi virtutes est efficacissima ; ut, scilicet homo nitatur ad contrarium eius ad quod inclinatur vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine . . .
From these two preliminaries, it is not a long step to the positing in the virtuous man of some virtue which will regulate, by moderating and checking, this natural desire for knowledge. Nor could it be considered premature were it to be stated that such a virtue will in some way be connected to temperance, for, as has been shown in an earlier part, the cardinal virtue of temperance is characterized by a mode of restraint and moderation, and any other virtue whose mode comprises a type of moderation is to be joined to temperance as one of its potential parts.¹

Likewise, in view of the discussion about modesty which has just been concluded, it may also be stated that not only will such a virtue be a potential part of temperance but also that it will be such a potential part as to be at the same time one of the species of modesty. For modesty, understood as a general virtue, is that potential part of temperance which moderates those diverse matters which need to be moderated, but in which there is found only the ordinary and no special difficulty to the achievement of this moderation.² And among these matters which present but an ordinary difficulty of moderation is included the desire of things regarding knowledge, which thus gives rise to a species of modesty known as studiousness. "... And held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation... The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness, which is opposed to curiosity."³

At this point, after having studied in detailed fashion both temperance and general modesty, but not yet having considered the various species of modesty, we may claim a certain, though as yet a rudimentary and confused, knowledge of studiousness. According to this quasi-premature knowledge, studiousness is a moral virtue which moderates a matter which presents but ordinary difficulty of moderation, for it is a species of modesty, which in turn shares the mode of temperance; and it has something to do with knowledge, the desire of knowledge and whatever else may pertain to knowledge. This is but a skeleton within which a more precise and illuminating analysis of studiousness is to take form.

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¹ Cf. IIa Iae, q.143, a. un.
² Cf. Ibid., q.160, aa.1, 2.
³ Ibid., a.2, c.: "... Ponens modestiam circa omnia quae relinquuntur moderanda... Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem; in hoc moderatur studiositas, quae opponitur curiositati."
It may not be out of place here to state clearly the reason for this detailed consideration of studiousness. As we have explained, wonder, the beginning of philosophy, contains both a desire to know the truth and a fear of error and falsehood in coming to that knowledge. That man's pursuit of knowledge and truth be a truly human one each of these aspects of wonder must be rectified by moral virtue. For unless man's desire for knowledge is controlled, it will become so dissolute as to defeat its very purpose. Consequently, in man there is posited a need for a moral virtue which will govern his quest for knowledge by making his natural desire to know subservient to the demands of right reason.

The study of temperance and its parts had lead to the discovery of such a moral virtue. Studiousness, a species of modesty, is directed towards knowledge and the desire for knowledge as its subject-matter. A thorough consideration of studiousness will lead to an understanding of the moral rectification of this first aspect of wonder.

In our study of the virtue of studiousness, we shall treat first of all with the matter of this virtue; secondly, with the mode of reason it introduces into this subject-matter; thirdly, with the subject of this virtue; fourthly, with the vices opposed to it. A fifth and last point will comprise some brief remarks on the use of the terms "studiousness" and "curiosity".

1. Subject-matter of Studiousness

Studiousness, as we have just said, is a species of modesty and, therefore, a potential part of temperance. This means that studiousness moderates some of those matters less difficult to master and control than are the concupiscences of touch and the effervescence of anger; for these two matters were already excluded from the matter of the general virtue of modesty. The particular matter with which studiousness, or studious application as the French renders the Latin studiositas, deals is knowledge. This, of course, needs to be made more precise. Aquinas's first statement on the subject had mentioned studiousness as being the species of modesty which moderates the "desire of things pertaining to knowledge." But when he moves on to a more thorough and, as it were, ex officio consideration of this virtue, he says without equivocation that knowledge is the proper matter of studiousness. And his argument in stating this is very straightforward. Studiousness is the state of being studious, and one

1. Cf. IHa IIae, q.160, a.2, c.
2. Ibid.: "... Ponens modestiam circa omnia quae relinquuntur moderanda. Quae quidem videntur esse quatuor... Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem: et in hoc moderatur studiositas..."
3. Cf. Ibid., q.166, a.1, c.: "Et ideo studiositas proprie dicitur circa cognitionem."
is studious because he is given to study. Study is nothing more than
the application of the mind to some problem or question, which
application is achieved only in knowing that problem and question.
The mind is, then, first concerned with knowledge before dealing with
those things in which man is directed by knowledge. The direct
object or proper matter of studiousness is obviously knowledge. Sensing
the evident objection that knowledge is the concern of the
intellectual virtues and not of the moral virtues, thus not of tem­
perance, and by way of further clarification, the Angel of the Schools
shows how knowledge can constitute the matter of a moral virtue.
In fact, all he does is point out the distinction between the orders
of specification and of exercise, a distinction with which we have
already treated in the first chapter.

The objection is well put. "Knowledge," it runs, "has no
connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part
of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are
in the cognitive part... Therefore studiousness is not a part of
temperance."2

The reply of the Common Doctor is pregnant with precision and
piercing with clarity. Because the will moves to its acts even the
reason, there is room to distinguish a double good in reference to know­
ledge. The first of these concerns the very act of knowledge. And in
this connection, it is an intellectual virtue which must assure the
good of knowledge. It will be the intellectual virtue of science which
will assure a true consideration in Geometry or Metaphysics. Only the
intellectual habitus of Geometry can assure a good, that is, true and
valid, deduction of any geometrical conclusion. Studiousness, or any
other moral virtue, avails us nothing in deriving such a conclusion.
But there is another good which engages our attention when we speak
of knowledge. This second good is the object of a moral virtue and
concerns the act of the appetitive faculty. This latter good consists
in man's appetite being properly rectified so that it makes a good and
fitting application of the knowing faculty, making sure that the
mind is properly applied to right and proper objects of study.

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1. Cf. Ibid.: "Studium praeципue importat vehementem applicationem mentis ad
aliquid. Mens autem non applicatur ad aliquid nisi cognoscendo illud. Unde per prius
mens applicatur ad cognitionem; secundario autem applicatur ad ea in quibus homo
per cognitionem dirigitur. Et ideo studium per prius respicit cognitionem: et per pos­
teriorius quae cumque alia ad quae operanda directione cognitionis indigemus. Virtutes
autem proprie sibi attribuunt illam materiam circa quam primo et principaliter sunt :
... Et ideo studiositas proprie dicetur circa cognitionem."

Ad 1: "... Et ideo per prius studiositas cognitionem respicit, cuicumque materiae
studium adhibeatur."

2. Ibid., a.2, obj.2: "Studiositas, sicut dictum est, ad cognitionem pertinet. Sed
cognitio non pertinet ad virtutes morales, quae sunt in appetitiva parte animae, sed magis
ad intellectuales, quae sunt in parte cognoscentiva: ... Ergo studiositas non est pars
temperantiae."
The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers... Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of studiousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

Cajetan raises a difficulty whose solution throws no little light on the question at hand. His objection is to the effect that knowledge in se is good and does not need the regulation of a virtue. By way of reply, he makes a necessary distinction and one which throws light on St. Thomas's succinct formulation of the same doctrine. Not in knowledge but in man's quest and appetite for knowledge consists the proximate matter of studiousness. It is man's application to knowledge with which this second species of modesty is concerned. In other words, it is the use of the faculties of knowledge in knowing that is the proper matter of studiousness. For use in this sense is an act of the will, and one which needs regulation in order that it be constituted morally good. It can fall short of this moral goodness either because it treats of improper matter, or because of other unpropitious circumstances of time, motivation, etc. This distinction of Cajetan

1. Ibid., a.2, ad 2: "Actus cognoscitivae virtutis imperatur a vi appetitiva, quae est motiva omnium virium... Et ideo circa cognitionem duplex bonum posset attendi. Unum quidem, quantum ad ipsum actum cognitionis. Et tale bonum pertinet ad virtutes intellectuales: ut scilicet homo circa singula aestimet verum. — Aliud autem est bonum quod pertinet ad actum appetitivae virtutis: ut scilicet homo habeat appetitum rectum applicandi vim cognoscentiam sic vel aliter, ad hoc vel ad illud. Et hoc pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde computatur inter virtutes morales."

2. Cf. In IIae, q.16, a.1, c.

3. Cf. In IIam IIae, q.166, a.1, n.4: "Ad secundum dubium dicitur quod materia proxima studiositatis non est cognitio, sed studium cognoscendi, ut patet in littera. Studium autem cognoscendi cum significet vehementem applicationem hominis ad cognoscendum; et applicatio... significet actum voluntatis qui est uti: oportet ut materia studiositatis et curiositatis sit hoc quod dico, uti potentia cognoscentiva. Hoc autem quod est uti potentia cognoscentiva ad cognoscendum, non est actus moraliter bonus nisi sit in medietate constitutus prout sapiens determinabit. Tum quia potest cadere super indebita materia, ut si quis applicet intellectum ad perspicuendum supernaturalia... ita utens intellectu ad videndum excedentia peccat. Tum propter circumstantias: puta, quando oportet uti intellectu vel sensu, et quando non; et propter quid oportet, ut scilicet homo non utatur intellectu ad cognoscendum, nisi ad debitum finem."

"Ex differentia igitur inter ipsam cognitionem et studium cognoscendi, apparat solutio dubii. Cognitio siquidem non est materia proxima moralis virtutis; sed ex virtute intellectuali, aut naturali in parte sensitiva, bene vel male se habet. Studium autem cognoscendi, quod est actus voluntatis passive in potentia cognoscevis exists, propria est materia appetitus quem moderari oportet per virtutem studiositatis: et manifeste indiget regulatione ad hoc ut bonum moraliter sit."
was already contained in germ in the distinction the Angelic Doctor had made regarding the twofold good of knowledge. In fact, St. Thomas says the very same thing in one of his succeeding articles.

As stated above . . . studiousness is directly, not about knowledge, but about the desire and study in pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally . . .

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong . . .

The opinion of the Carmelites of Salamanca is essentially the same. Study is the subject-matter of studiousness; and study consists in the use and application of a knowing power to knowing, whether it be the intellect, imagination or memory — even the eyes to seeing — that is, to such effort in both the sensitive and intellectual spheres of knowledge. In this application of the knowing power, they distinguish what they prefer to call a usus passivus and a usus activus. Usus passivus is simply the act itself of knowledge, and so regards an intellectual virtue; usus activus is the act of the will applying the faculty of knowledge to its acts. Study includes both the usus activus and the usus passivus, and thus both in some way comprise the matter of studiousness.

Perhaps the distinction of remote and proximate matter would be more felicitous, as being more consonant with the reality it is meant to explain. Certainly, such a distinction is not foreign to their own line

1. *IIa IIae*, q.167, a.1, c. : “Sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est iudicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis : et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognition, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala . . .

   “Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem . . .”


   “Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium : huncque perficit, tum moderando ne plura vel altiora seire velit, quam scientis conditioni et capacitate conveniat : ne dum altiora quam oportet, aut aliter quam oportet quaerit, potius in errorem labatur . . . Quo affectu moderato, modum etiam recipit ipsum studium et conatus ad ascendendum, ut fiat sicut oportet.”
of argument, for when they first announce the matter of studiousness, they refer to it as being study or the appetite of knowing.¹

Joseph Pieper is a good example of a modern Thomist who confirms what the Angelic Doctor taught in the thirteenth century. For him, the matter of studiousness is knowledge, both intellective and sensitive. He variously refers to studiousness as dealing with "the natural hunger for sense-perception or for knowledge,"² "the natural striving for knowledge,"³ "the urge for knowledge"⁴ and "the natural wish to see."⁵

Temperance must hinder man from giving himself in an inordinate manner towards an object to which he is drawn by nature. Man's thirst and desire for knowledge are given to him by the Creator. And studiousness is the particular form of temperance which is to moderate this desire. Through a virtue man's will is rectified in regard to the matter of that virtue; and the virtue of studiousness consists in this that man uses properly his apprehensive powers. There are certain things which certain men must study and know, and this at certain times and for definite purposes. Other pursuits there are which are harmful for certain men, useless at certain times and corruptive of certain ends. Studiousness is the virtue which must regulate and determine all this. Only after a study of the vices opposed to this virtue has been made can one truly appreciate all the obstacles and hindrances to a virtuous application to study. Only when man's appetite is properly regulated by studiousness will his pursuit of the speculative life be a moral activity and worthy of praise. Then only, too, will man avoid the excess of curiosity and the defect of indolence and negligence.

When fully explained it is not at all startling that a moral virtue, one of the species of modesty, called studiousness, has knowledge as its proper matter. Even if the intellect seems to be a faculty somewhat separated from the rest of man's life, there is yet a moral virtue which regulates intellectual activity and striving. This is the role of studiousness, which is a fundamental virtue extending to every matter of knowledge and ruling the very appetite and desire of knowledge.

2. Mode of Studiousness

Temperance, to repeat what has been said already, is characterized by a mode of restraint and moderation, a bridling influence, by which it

4. Ibid., p.111.
5. Ibid., p.112.
checks the lure of passions of the pleasures and concupiscences of touch and subjects these to the control of reason. That is the *ratio propria* of temperance. Its mode of restraint and moderation separated from this proper matter gives rise to what we designated as the *ratio communis* of this fourth cardinal virtue. And any virtue whose chief reason of praise consists in checking and moderating any other matter is to be classed as a potential part of temperance. Continence, clemency, meekness — these all exert a restraint and control on their various subject-matters. Modesty, the fourth of the potential parts of temperance, is, in the Thomistic arrangement, a quasi-general virtue which gives issue to several species, each of which checks and moderates one of the matters which present no extraordinary difficulty of moderation. One of these species is studiousness whose matter, as we have just pointed out, is knowledge, the study and desire of and the application to knowledge. Being a species of modesty, it follows *a priori* that studiousness should exhibit a kind of moderation and restraint similar to that of the general virtue from which it stems. And this is just what we find when we examine the reality.

Aquinas’s first brief mention of studiousness refers to it as performing a restraining and moderating role. “The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness…” And, as he progresses to a deeper study of this unique virtue, the Dominican Doctor gives the thorough-going reason for the faith that is in him. The role of temperance is to moderate the movements of the appetite, thereby assuring that it does not give itself inordinately to that to which it is drawn by nature. Just as man is naturally drawn toward corporeal pleasures, so is there implanted in his soul a natural desire for knowledge. This latter desire has to be regulated by some virtue, just as sexual desires and affections are checked and controlled by chastity. In the domain of knowledge, the virtue of studiousness is to play a parallel role to that played by chastity, sobriety and abstinence in the realm of corporeal desires and pleasures. Studiousness, then, is a check and control on man’s desire and appetite for knowledge.2

Joseph Pieper does not miss this essential duty of studiousness in checking man’s quest for knowledge. He well realizes that temperance must instill its restraint even to the depths of this most noble of man’s pursuits.

1. *Ila Ilae*, q.160, a.2, c.: “Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quae pertinent ad cognitionem; in hoc moderatur studiositas, quae opponitur curiositat.”

2. Cf. *Ibid.*, q.166, a.2, c.: “... Ad temperentiam pertinet moderari motum appetitus, ne superfue tendat in id quod naturaliter concupiscitur. Sicut autem naturaliter homo concupiscit delectationes ciborum et venesorum, secundum naturam corporalem; ita, secundum animam, naturaliter desiderat cognoscere aliquid: ... Moderatio autem huius modi appetitus pertinet ad virtutem studiositatis. Unde consequens est quod studio-
But we have not, as yet, fully explored the range of the concept of temperantia. — In “humility,” the instinctive urge to self-assertion can also be made serviceable to genuine self-preservation, but it can likewise pervert and miss this purpose in “pride.” — And if the natural desire of man to avenge an injustice which he has suffered and to restore his rights explodes in uncontrollable fury, it destroys that which can only be preserved by “gentleness” and “mildness.” Without rational self-restraint even the natural hunger for sense-perception or for knowledge can degenerate into a destructive and pathological compulsive greed; this degradation Aquinas calls curiositas, the disciplined mode studiositas.

To sum up: chastity, continence, humility, gentleness, mildness, studiositas, are modes of realization of the discipline of temperance; unchastity, incontinence, pride, uninhibited wrath, curiositas, are forms of intemperance.¹

The Carmelite Fathers explain very well how studiousness exercises its role of moderation. It sees to it that a man does not try to know more nor more abstruse matters than his condition of life and his mental, physical and social capacity warrant. By hindering him from dabbling in matters beyond his ken, studiousness keeps him from error. It also prevents his giving himself to intellectual effort to such an extent that he neglects to cultivate those other virtues more necessary or more useful to his office. Studiousness gives a man a true esteem of and love for study, contemplation and knowledge.²

The Angelic Doctor, in another context, has a very worthwhile description of the type of moderation studiousness is to effect. It is true that he is speaking more of supernatural studiousness as he comments upon the Pauline admonition that, “Knowledge puffeth up: but charity edifieth.” But what he there narrates is true, positis ponendis, for the acquired virtue, too.

Here the Apostle does not approve of much knowledge, if the mode of knowing is ignored. Moreover the mode of knowing is that you should know in what order, with what eagerness, to what end each thing must be known: in what order, that you should know first that which is more proper

². Cf. Salm. op. cit., XVI, n.152, p.499. “Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium: huncque perfect, tam moderando ne plura aut altiora scire velit, quam scientia conditioni et capaciti conveniat: ne dum altiora quam oportet, aut aliter quam oportet quaeant, potius in errorem labatur. Et rursus, ne pluris fyjacat scientiam quam oportet, praeponendo illam alia virtutibus ad salutem necessaribus, vel magis conducentibus; sed eam aestimet et amat in suo gradu. Quo affectu moderato, modum etiam recipit ipsum studium et conatus ad discendum, ut fiat sicut oportet.”
for salvation; with what eagerness, that you should seek with greater ardor that which is more efficacious to inflame love; to what end, that you should not wish to know anything for vainglory and curiosity, but for your own and your neighbor's edification.¹

What we have been describing shows how studiousness imposes its moderation on all excessive attraction for and effort in view of knowledge. But another disorder is possible, even frequent, in this domain. It is the attitude which characterizes the "slacker," who is too listless to make the effort involved in pursuing knowledge in accordance with his state and duties of life. In other words, studiousness has to determine the mean between too little and too much effort, between excess and defect in its own subject-matter. The virtue of studiousness has to be a remedy not only for the too keen effort and desire of knowledge but also for the too feeble and weak-willed application to study, the defect in this realm. It overcomes the superfluous effort by repressing and bridling man's appetite and desire to know, as we have already said. But the defect in this matter can be surmounted, not by repression, since it is already a lack of effort and push; but rather by stimulating and inciting man to give forth the constant effort which studiousness requires, and that in spite of the pain and trouble which the labor of studious application may involve. St. Thomas puts this whole matter much more clearly and summarily.

As the Philosopher says... in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behoves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination, studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name.²

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¹ St. Thomas, In Omnes S. Pauli Epistolam Commentario, Vol. I, Marietti (Taurini), 1929, In Iam Epistolam ad Corinthios, cap. VIII, lect. I, p. 297. "Hic non approbat Apostolus multa scientem, si modum sciendi nescierit. Modus enim sciendi est, ut scias quo ordine, quo studio, quo fine scire quaeque oporteat: quo ordine, ut id prius quod maturius ad salutem; quo studio, ut id ardentius quod efficacius est ad amorem; quo fine, ut non ad inanem gloriam vel curiositatem velle aliquid, sed ad aedificationem tui et proxim i."

² 11a IIae, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "Sicut Philosophus dicit... ad hoc quod homo fiat virtuositus, oportet quod servant se ab his ad quae maxime inclinat natura. Et inde est quod quia natura praecepe inclinat ad timendum mortis pericula, et ad sectandum delectabilia carnis: ideo laus virtutis fortitudinis praecepe consistit in quadam firmitate per
It will be recalled that we characterized the modes of temperance and fortitude as being contrary one to the other. Temperance displays a mode of restraint; it holds back an appetite that is straining at the bit to break forth to follow the infinite whims of its fancy in the desires and concupiscences of touch. Fortitude, by contrast, is characterized by a mode of stimulation; it strengthens and arouses an appetite which is already shrinking from the duty-call of reason, because blinded by frightening passions and foreboding dangers. It was in view of these contrary tendencies of man when faced with the problem of knowledge and his application to it that we made a special point of singling out the contrariety of mode found in these two cardinal virtues. Each of these tendencies has to be mastered and made virtuous in the good student; and it is studiousness which will administer this regulation.

This is the very pith of our argument in this essay, which can be resumed in the rather simple and unpretentious statement that among the virtues which govern man's use of and quest for knowledge there are virtues of moderation and not only of stimulation. And now here the very antithesis of our position seems affirmed by the Universal Doctor. Too many, alas! have seen in the question of the student faced with the task of applying himself to learning and knowledge only this one facet, namely, the tendency of the body to shirk the disagreeable and costly effort which study demands. They have thought this the only possible disorder in man's intellectual pursuit; this was the only rectification necessary. With this in mind they have adopted as their watchword a rather catchy but nonetheless misleading slogan, "Courage to think." And, in the name of this false courage, they have gone on to disparage any system of education which argues for a control and check on the student's appetite and desire for knowledge, insisting that it is not a restraint that is needed, but rather an unhampered devotion and attention to learning, thus affirming that not temperance but fortitude is to be the basic governing influence on the natural human desire to know.

It cannot be gainsaid that the appetite does need an impulsion and incitement and stimulant to overcome the drudgery and fatigue and constant discipline which are a necessary part of the student's life. Without such a pressure and aid the student may well lack the
proper diligence in his quest for knowledge and truth, or may even completely abandon this praiseworthy avocation. To be sure, one of the roles of studiousness does consist in giving this stimulant and motivation to the appetite. In fact, as the Angelic Doctor has said, it is from this element of studiousness that it derives its name.¹

But we feel that this text of St. Thomas does not infirm nor invalidate our argument; rather, in pithy phrase, it is our thesis, which this essay does but expand.

Aquinas speaks in the first place of the contrary tendencies in regard to knowledge. One of these tendencies is rooted in and springs from the soul of man. "For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things..."² And this desire needs a restraint. The other tendency in the face of study is to back away from what seems like the insurmountable effort and very great expenditure of labor involved. This cowardly retreat is the reaction of the body, as could be expected. "...Whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge."³ This second tendency to retreat would seem to be another of the numerous instances of the dire results of the necessitatis materiae.

However, the Angelic Doctor himself gives the resolution to the problem when he states that the first function, that is, the curbing and restraining of the soul's desire to know, is the more essential element of studiousness, whereas the second function, the stimulating and pushing-on of the appetite to conquer the effort, is the concern of studiousness only because it is an obstacle which must be removed—an obstacle which would not exist, indeed, in the angel's application to study and knowledge. Yet the angel's desire to know did need a curbing, as the case of Lucifer and the other fallen angels demonstrated.

The curbing of the desire to know, then, is, in the words of Aquinas himself, "more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle."⁴

¹. Cf. Salm an., loc. cit., p.499: "Proprius vero et immediatus illius actus est amor et affectus erga studium: huncque perfect... Tum etiam impellendo et incitando appetitum, ne propter laborum et fatigationem quae studio admissentur, ab illo retrahatur, aut sufficientem diligentiam non adhibeat. Et quia hoc posterioris plerisque accidit, nominata fuit praedicta virtus ab officio impellendi, potius quam ab officio refraendi. Unde quantum ad illud quod nomen ex vi sua denotat, imitatatur fortitudinem, posseque inter partes eius potentiales referri."
². Ila Ilae, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "...Quis ex parte animae inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret..."
³. Ibid. : "...Ex parte vero naturae corporalis, homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam vitet."
⁴. Ibid. : "...Primum autem est essentialius huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor
For this reason, studiousness is more correctly considered a potential part of temperance than of fortitude, its name notwithstanding. And this being so, its mode is a restraining and controlling one, directly attaining the desire of the spiritual soul of man, placed therein by nature, to know and seek the knowledge of things.\(^1\)

We have no hesitation in stating that any campaign to ameliorate the problem of the student’s application to study should adopt as its slogan a phrase which is very Thomistic and very true, but which has been badly received in liberal circles. Though there may be no “eggheads” to carry the placards, there will be plenty of honest intellectual plodders to go along with a “Meditate but moderate” campaign.

3. The Subject of Studiousness

In his analysis of studiousness, Aquinas does not make direct mention of the subject of this virtue. He may well have felt that an explicit statement about the subject of studiousness was unnecessary. Being a moral virtue, studiousness must obviously be found in man’s appetitive faculty. But this is twofold, embracing the sensitive appetite, both concupiscible and irascible, and the intellective appetite or the will. To which of these is studiousness to be assigned as to its subject?

There seems to be little doubt but that studiousness is to be attributed to the will. St. Thomas suggests this reply when he speaks of the second good of knowledge and in that frame of reference says that the role of studiousness consists in assuring that man’s appetite is directed aright in applying the cognitive power to the act of knowledge.\(^2\) Since it is the will which is charged with this function of applying all other powers to their acts, it is but logical to conclude that the will is the subject of studiousness.

This conclusion seems justified when one considers the matter of studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. For, as we have seen, the matter of studiousness and curiosity is not only sense knowledge but

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{Salman}, \textit{loc. cit.} “Sed adiungitur potius temperantiae, quia difficultas, quae est in moderando studii appetitum, magis per se habet ad virtutem, utpote tenens se ex parte animae, in qua est inclinatio et propensio ad cognoscendum, quam illa quae est in impellendo, quae provenit ex impedimentis se tenentibus ex parte corporis.”

also intellective, even praeternatural and supernatural knowledge. Because of the elevation of these latter above the realm of the senses, it follows, as Cajetan points out, that the virtue as well as the vice which regard this matter must be placed in a higher faculty than the sense appetite, that is, in the will.

But precisely because of its double matter, that is, sensitive and intellective knowledge, studiousness would seem to require as subject not only the will but also the sensitive appetite. St. Thomas gives us the principles for solving this difficulty when he speaks of the subject of humility and pride, which pose the same problem in reference to their matter.

In seeking to determine the subject of pride, St. Thomas says that the subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object, since the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Since pride is the desire of one's own excellence, its proper object is something difficult. Hence pride must in some way pertain to the irascible appetite. But the irascible may be taken in two ways: first, in a strict sense, and, taken in this way, it is a part of the sensitive appetite. It may also be understood in a broader sense so as to belong also to the will.

If the difficult thing which is the object of pride were always and only some sensible object to which the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be posited in the irascible appetite, understood in its first sense as being but part of man's sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and spiritual things, it must needs be that pride is in the will inasmuch as it includes in an eminent manner the formalities of both the irascible and concupiscible appetite. Understood in this broader sense, the irascible is not distinct from the concupiscible. The

1. Cf. CAJETAN, In IIae Ilae, q.166, 167, n.1: "In quaestionibus dubius simul... de studiositate et curiositate duo dubia occurrunt. Primum, de subiecto studiositatis et curiositatis... Et ratio dubii est quia ex parte materiæ apparat quod in voluntate sint subiective: quia, cognoscere, quod est materia utriusque, non arcatur ad cognitionem... Ex hoc enim quod materia est altior omni sensibili et imaginabili, sequitur quod ad appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, spectet: sicut de humilitate et superbia ex simili ratione consecutum est.

2. Cf. IIae Ilae, q.162, a.3, c.: "Subiectum euislibet virtutis vel vitii oportet inquirere ex proprio obiecto. Non enim potest esse aliud obiectum habitus vel actus, nisi quod est obiectum potentiae, quae utrique subiectur. Proprium autem obiectum
intellective appetite does not admit of such differentiation of powers. Since the object of the will is good according to the common notion of good, it is, in consequence, not differentiated according to special differences which may be contained under that common notion. It is for this reason that we may not speak of the will as being divided into distinct irascible and concupiscible powers.¹

Under a certain aspect, however, the will may be thought of as irascible or concupiscible. It may be said to be irascible inasmuch as it wills to repel evil, not from any movement of passion, but from a judgment of reason. And similarly it may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. This is what is meant when charity and hope are sometimes said to be in the concupiscible and irascible appetites respectively.² And this is what is meant, too, when it is stated that the will in an eminent manner includes in itself the formalities of both the irascible and concupiscible powers.

This same argument is applicable to the question of determining the subject of studiousness. If the desire which studiousness regulates referred to the knowledge of sensible things only, then studiousness

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¹ Cf. In Pars, q.82, a.5, c.: "Irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia... potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas... Appetitus autem sensitivus non respiciet communem rationem boni: quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo, secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivus. Nam concupiscibilis respiciet proprium rationem boni, inquantum est delectabilis et commensurabilis alicuius ratiocini. Et ideo non diversificatur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit, in appetitu intellectivum, alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis: sicut etiam, ex parte intellectus, non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicantur ex parte sensus."

² Cf. Ibid., ad 2: "Ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex judicio rationis; et, eodem modo, potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes, id est in voluntate, secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus."
would be assigned to the concupiscible appetite alone, understood in its strict sense, as forming part of the sensitive appetite. But since the desire which studiousness regulates extends to intellective knowledge as well as to sensitive knowledge, then it will necessarily claim as its subject not the concupiscible appetite strictly so-called, but the will itself as including in an eminent manner the concupiscible faculty, too. This is what Cajetan means when he says that studiousness is subjected in the will principally, secondarily in the concupiscible appetite.¹

There may be some doubt regarding the particular formality under which the will is the subject of studiousness. Is it under its irascible or concupiscible formality that the will becomes the subject of the virtue of studiousness? It seems to us that it is according to its concupiscible aspect that the will is the subject of studiousness. For man looks upon knowledge and truth as something most pleasing and suitable to him, which is the aspect under which the concupiscible regards its object. It is only accidentally that the acquisition of knowledge and truth takes on the aspect of an arduous good, difficult of attainment. For, as Aquinas says, the desire for knowledge is a desire of the soul, whereas it is on the part of his bodily nature that man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. If this latter tendency of man be considered, the acquisition of truth and knowledge might possibly be considered an arduous good. But the desire for knowledge is more essential to studiousness, since only accidentally and indirectly is this virtue concerned with the trouble and effort of learning, which it treats as an obstacle to be removed.²

In view of this fact, it seems to us that it is under its concupiscible aspect that the will is the subject of studiousness.

The assigning of the will as the subject of studiousness raises another difficulty. St. Thomas teaches elsewhere that the will, in respect to the good of reason proportionate to it, has no need of virtue, but is inclined thereto sufficiently by its very nature. Only when man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as the Divine good, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, only in these

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¹ Cf. *In Iham IIae*, q.166, a.1, n.3: "... Consequens est ut studiositas subjective in voluntate sit principaliter, secundario autem in concupiscibili..."

² Cf. *Ila IIae*, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "... Sed quantum ad cognitionem est in homine contraria inclinatio. Quia ex parte animae inclinatur homo ad hoc quod cognitionem rerum desideret; et, sic, oportet ut laudabiliter homo huiusmodi appetitum refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendat. Ex parte vero naturae corporalis homo inclinatur ad hoc ut laborem inquirendi scientiam velit. Quantum ergo ad primum, studiositas in refrenatione consistit et, secundum hoc, ponitur pars temperantiae. Sed quantum ad secundum, laus virtutis huiusmodi consistit in quadam vehementia intentionis ad scientiam rerum percipienda; et ex hoc nominatur. Primum autem est essentialis huic virtuti quam secundum. Nam appetitus cognoscendi per se respicit cognitionem, ad quam ordinatur studiositas. Sed labor addiscendi est impedimentum quoddam cognitionis; unde respicitur ab hac virtute per accidens, quasi removendo prohibens."
cases does the will require the rectification of virtues such as charity and justice.¹

Cajetan does not fail to see this possible argument against his conclusion to the effect that studiousness has the will as its subject. Since studiousness seems ordered to the proper good of its possessor, namely, to the rectitude of his desire for knowledge, the foregoing teaching of St. Thomas seems to militate against our conclusion that the will is the subject of studiousness.² The answer which the famous Commentator of St. Thomas gives in resolving this doubt is very brief. He is content to point out that since studiousness rectifies man’s desire for knowledge not only of natural things but even about things of an order superior to man, there is no reason for hesitating to assign the will as its subject.³

In his Cursus Theologicus John of St. Thomas considers this same problem, and at greater length than Cajetan treats it. His conclusion on this topic merits more than passing attention.

First of all, he explains very clearly what St. Thomas means when he states that the will does not need the rectification of virtue to attain the good of reason which is proportioned to it. To attain its proper good, formally considered and represented as such, the will needs no virtues; but, to achieve its proper and convenient good in a determinate matter, the will may indeed require the rectification of some virtue. In other words, for its proper good, considered in the concrete, the will may have need of a virtue that it be rightly inclined towards that good and not suffer any of the hindrances which may arise from either the appetite or the intellect or even

¹. Cf. Ia Ilae, q.56, a.6, c.: “Cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine ad obiectum. Unde, cum . . . obiectum voluntatis sit bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum : quantum ad hoc, non indiget voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed, si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis, sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi : ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum sunt in voluntate siue in subiecto, ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.”

². Cf. Cajetan, In I Hom Ilae, q.166, a.1, n.1: “Ex natura autem tam talis virtutis, quam vitii, apparat quod non est subjective in voluntate. Nam . . . nulla moralis virtus ordinata praecise ad naturale bonum habentis, est in voluntate : quia voluntas ex propria natura inclinatur in secundum rationem proprium habentis bonum, non supernaturale. Constat autem quod studiositas ordinatur per se primo et directe in proprium habentis bonum, siliet in rectitudinem appetitus cognoscendi; et non supernaturale, quia hoc rationem naturalis luminis non excedit. Igitur nec studiositas nec curiositas est in voluntate.”

³. Cf. Ibid., n.3: “Quoniam ex hoc quod studiositas ad bonum hominis non solum respectu naturalium, sed super et praeter naturalium, ordinatur, non prohibetur poni in voluntate.”
from the indifference and difficulty of the matter to prevent its obtaining it.  

Applying this distinction to the matter of studiousness, he goes on to show that, though the knowledge of truth is a good proper to man to which his will has a natural inclination, the virtue of studiousness is needed, nevertheless, to properly compose this desire, lest it be excessive or defective. Even though man does not need a virtue to will the knowledge of truth in general, he does need some virtue, studiousness, to wit, in order that in a determinate matter he may apply his knowing faculty in a proper and ordinate manner, since man’s proper good is not found in every matter of knowledge. The proper good of man consists in the knowledge of truth; but his highest good consists not in the knowledge of just any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the highest truth. Because there can be a defect in knowing certain truths inasmuch as this knowledge may not be ordered to the knowledge of the highest truth, the will requires the rectification of the virtue of studiousness, not on account of its inclination to truth in general, but in its application to particular truths to assure that the knowledge of these may be properly ordered to the knowledge of the highest truth.  

1. Cf. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Cursus Theologicus, VI, Disp. XV, a.1, n.27, p.413 (Vives), 147 (Laval) : "Unde sequitur, quod ad bonum proprium, et conveniens formaliter, representatum ut tale non indiget habitu voluntas, quia est necessitata quoad specificationem ; ad bonum autem proprium, et conveniens in materia debita potest indigeri habitum non propter se, sed propter impedimenta, quae sunt vel ex parte intellectus, vel ex parte appetitus, vel ex parte propriae excellentiae cum excessu, et non subiectio ad altem, et pro istis oportebit ponere habitum, vel in appetitu ad moderandas passiones, vel in voluntate ad subiecendum se alteri, vel in intellectu ad recte iudicandum, et prudenter ; non tamen ad ipsum bonum conveniens formaliter loquentem, quatenus aestimatur conveniens ; sicut de beatitudine dicimus quod naturaliter, et necessario amatur quod specificationem, si sumatur formaliter pro ipsa ratione summi boni secundum se. Res autem ipsa in qua hoc summum bonum inventur, quod sit Deus in se, et vita virtuosa, vel voluptuosa, vel bona temporalia, hoc difficultatem habet, praesertim in his, qui ad sensibilis, quae corruptur, proni sunt, non ad aeterna, et quae durant post mortem."

Also, n.30 : "Quare ut uno verbo dicamus sensus D. Thomae est, quod ad bonum rationis proportionatum, et conveniens formaliter sumptum, non requirit voluntas habitum ut inlinetur in illud, quia est prorsus ratio potentiae ordi ad tale bonum, et ly propria ratio est idem quod formalis ratio. At vero ad bonum proprium concretus sumptum in hac vel illa materia, indigere potest habitu voluntas, ut in il in intellectu, vel propter impedimenta tollenda, ex parte appetitus, aut intellectus, vel propter ipsius materiae indifferentiam, et difficultatem, ut proportionata reddatur secundum rationem, vel ab ipsa deviet."

2. Cf. Ibid., nn.xxiv, xxvii, xxix : "Sicut etiam ipsum scire, et cognoecere veritates est bonum maxime proprium, et desiderabile, et quoad specificationem necessarium, quia omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant... et tamen hoc non obstante datur virtus studiosatias ad componendum hoc desiderium ne sit nimium, aut defectuosum...

XXVIII. "Ex quibus etiam patet ad ultimas instantias de appetitu scientiae fraenato per studiostatem... respondemus enim... quod tam scientia, quam propria excellencia indigent habitu ut moderate, ut debite appetantur, quia non sunt proprium, et conveniens
Thomas sees no difficulty in assigning the will as the subject of studiousness.

In view of the authority and arguments of both Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, who seem to faithfully interpret the master on this point, and because of the nature of the matter with which studiousness is concerned, the conclusion that the will in its eminently concupiscible aspect is the subject of studiousness seems to be well-founded and is to be held as the only true answer to this question.

4. The Vices Opposed to Studiousness

Though to learn truth and to have science of things are goods worthy of man’s esteem and greatly desirable in themselves, which is evidenced by the fact that all men naturally desire to know, as Aristotle states in elegant fashion in the opening sentence of the Metaphysics, this natural desire must, nevertheless, be kept within reasonable limits. It is the virtue of studiousness that can properly regulate this desire lest from lack of control it assume excessive proportions, or from stifling sloth and refusal of effort it atrophy. Between the two extremes, by excess and deficiency respectively, of curiosity and negligence, studiousness must train and develop that natural desire. To a study of curiosity and negligence, the vices opposed to studiousness, we now turn.

A. Curiosity

It is difficult to give a suitable English rendering of curiositas. It is easy enough to render it, following the dictionary, as inquisitive-

bonum in quasumque materia cognitionis... Et ideo licet non indigeat habitu ad volvendam cognitionem veri ut sic in communi,... et quatenus hoc dicit formaliter rationem boni proprii convenientis, tamen ut in hac vel illa materia applicetur ad cognitionem ordinatam, ac debitam, et recedat ad indebita, indiget habitu studiositatis, et non per se naturaliter inclinatur...

XXIX. “Unde D. Thomas... dicit, quod licet bonum hominis (hoc est bonum proprium) consistat in cognitione veri, non tamem summum hominis bonum consistit in cognitione cuiuslibet veri, sed in perfecta cognitione summæ veritatis. Et ideo potest esse vitium in cognitione aliquorum verorum, secundum quod talis appetitus non debito modo ordinatur ad cognitionem summæ veritatis. Ex quo colligitur, quod virtus studiositatis, quae opponitur huic vitio, requiritur non propter inclinationem ad verum in communi, et ad verum quatenus conveniens homini bonum est formaliter loquendo, sed in applicatione talis vel talis determinati veri, quatenus in illo inventur debitus ordo ad summum verum, vel non inventur.”


2. Cf. St. Thomas, Q. D. de Malo, q.8, a.2, c.: “… Sicut appetitus sciendi est homini naturali; unde si scientiae intendat secundum quod recta ratio dietat, erit virtuosum et laudabile; si vero transcendat aliquis regulam rationis, erit peccatum curiositatis; si vero deficiat, erit peccatum negligentiae.”
ness. But this seems to suppress its fullest meaning, for it deludes the reader into thinking that we speak but trivially and condescendingly of the more or less harmless weakness of the woman gossiping across the back fence. And the English "curiosity" has little vicious in its connotation, so strange has the use of the term become, as we shall point out in an ensuing section on the use of these terms "studiousness" and "curiosity." For want of a better word we shall use the English "curiosity." Basically, curiosity means immoderate-ness in the natural desire to know; lack of restraint in the sensual perception of the manifold sensuous beauty of the world; profligacy in the desire for "knowledge and experience," as St. Augustine put it.1 It is the immoderate striving for the knowledge of things.2 It is the result of man's natural desire to know having been allowed to go rampant and uncontrolled.

Curiosity, being the immoderate striving for "knowledge and experience," is the vice opposed by excess to studiousness and consists in a too-great and too-refined desire of, care for and application to useless knowledge.3 This uncontrolled and rampant desire for and study in view of knowledge is not confined to any particular sphere, but penetrates the domain of intellectual knowledge, as well as the realm of sensation. Nothing is beyond its ken.

At first sight, it may seem strange to speak of vice in reference to intellectual knowledge, since knowledge of truth is so great a good. Yet, though the knowledge of truth is in se a good worthy of man,4 man's appetite for and study in view of acquiring knowledge may be good and proper or wrong and perverse, depending on certain circumstances.5 The causes of the perversity of man's study in view

2. Cf. Ila Iiae, q.166, a.2, ad 3: "... Et, sic, oportet ut laudabiliter homo huiusmodi appetitum refrenet, ne immoderate rerum cognitioni intendet."
3. Cf. Salaman., op. cit., n.153, p.499: "Opponitur studiositati duplex vitium: aliud per excessum, quod vocatur curiositas... denotatque nimiam et superfian curam vel diligentiam circa res inutiles: et specialiter applicatur ad materiam studiositatis: cum quis superfian diligentiam adhibet ut alicui sciat, quod nihil ad ipsum seire attinet, vel quod eius captum superat, aliqua id genus..."
5. Cf. Ila Iiae, q.167, a.1, c.: "Sicut dictum est, studiositas non est directe circa ipsam cognitionem, sed circa appetitum et studium cognitionis acquirendae. Aliter autem est indicandum de ipsa cognitione veritatis: et aliter de appetitu et studio veritatis cognoscendae. Ipsa enim veritatis cognition, per se loquendo, bona est. Potest autem per accidens esse mala: ratione sic licet alicuius consequentis; vel inquantum alicuius de cognitione superbit, ... vel inquantum homo uititur cognitione veritatis ad peccandum."

"Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem."
of truth may be classified, according to the Angelic Doctor, under two main headings. It may arise from the student himself, or from the matter of his study.1

If we consider the perversity of study according as it originates in the student himself, we can delineate two principal defects. First, the student may be wrongly motivated, proposing to himself a blame-worthy end. And thus to his study evil is joined accidentally. Such is the case of one who studies that he may achieve a reputation as being a man of science and vast learning in order to rejoice and take pride in such renown. Such, too, is the sad plight of one who studies that he may be the better equipped to perpetrate some crime.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge... In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in sinful study...

The second disorder in the desire for and study in view of knowledge which may be traced to the student himself is present when his appetite of knowing is itself perverse. "Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate."2 And this inordinateness of the appetite would seem to be of the very nature of curiosity. Such inordinateness may manifest itself in four different ways, according to the analysis which Aquinas gives in the Summa Theologica.

First, man's perverse appetite for knowledge may lead him to forsake a study which is required by his present state and condition of life, and in its place prefer one which is less useful, one, indeed, which may even be harmful. "First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him..."4 Examples of such inordinate study are not far to seek. The college student who spends his time in reading murder-mystery novels but lays aside his Physics and Mathematics displays, at least, unconsciously, the unruliness of his appetite and clearly shows his need for


2. Ila Ilae, q.167, a.1, c.: "Sed ipse appetitus vel studium cognoscendae veritatis potest habere rectitudinem vel perversitatem. Uno quidem modo, prout aliquis tendit suo studio in cognitionem veritatis, prout per accidens coniungitur ei malum: sicut illi qui student ad scientiam veritatis ut exinde superbiant... Similiter etiam illi qui student addiscere aliquid ad peccandum, vitiosum studium habent: ..."

3. Ibid.: "Alio autem modo potest esse vitium ex ipsa inordinatione appetitus et studii ad discendam veritatem. Et hoc quadrupliciter."

4. Ibid.: "Uno modo, inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit."
the virtue of studiousness. It is curiosity, too, which leads young minds to reject the works of the recognized masters, prescribed or suggested by a course of studies, in favor of moderns whose works now happen to be the recipients of popular acclaim. It is curiosity, too, which prompts the college freshman to pick and choose his subjects of study, allowing personal interest and youthful whims to guide his cultural training and intellectual formation. The fact that school curricula and teaching authorities, who are charged with the intellectual development of these young people, permit such a state of intellectual disorder merely transfers the blame from the shoulders of the student to those of the administrative and teaching body. It is curiosity, too, which leads the major seminarian to dissipate much of the four-year period prescribed for his theological and spiritual formation in perusing existentialist novels and in being taken up with premature apostolic endeavour.

In the commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas lists two disorders which can be attributed to the student himself. The first of these is the one we have just spoken about, which consists in the omission of some study or other duty because of one's preoccupation with some other study which should not be his concern at the moment. The examples which St. Thomas there cites are very apt, and concern the case of a judge who is hindered in his prosecution of justice because of his inordinate devotion to the study of Geometry; and of a priest who fails to fulfill his ministry to souls because of some similar unruly interest. The second disorder mentioned in the commentary on the Sentences seems to be a result of the first disorder. It concerns the case of one who would become so taken up with a matter of personal study as to conceive contempt for a more worthy branch of learning. He refers to the example of St. Jerome, who became so enamoured of the classical style of Cicero that he abhorred the less cultivated writings of the Sacred Authors.

Secondly, the profligate desire to know may lead the student to seek his knowledge from an unlawful source, resorting to magic and other occult media to penetrate and predict the future and its contingencies. “Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the


"Unum est quando propter occupationem in studio alieius scientiae impeditur ab executione officii ad quod tenetur ; sicut judex si propter studium geometriae desisteret a causis expediendis, vel sacerdos a confessionibus audiendis quando eas audire teneretur."

2. Cf. Ibid: "Aliud est quando propter delectationem in aliqua scientia veniret in contemptum alieius quod revereri oportet, sicut de Hieronymo accidit ; quia tantum delectabatur in ornatu verborum Tullii, quod despiebat ei inculitus sermo prophetarum, ut ipse dicit. Sicut etiam accidit illis qui tantum adhaerent rationibus humanis quod a fide discedunt et eam impugnant."
The evil that may follow from such superstitious curiosity is only too well portrayed in the tragic succession of events in which Shakespeare's Macbeth found himself involved as a result of the prognostications of the Three Weird Sisters. Other examples of students who, in the name of liberty, cast off what they consider the shackles of custom and authority and place themselves under the spell of illegal teachers could be cited by referring to the ever-increasing number of "liberal" intellectuals, who, at least for a time, find no difficulty in accepting the tenets of Marxian communism and the other artificial systems of thought at variance with reason and Catholic theology. In the case of superstitious curiosity, not only does the unruly desire to know have recourse to teachers from whom man may not learn, but it also seeks to learn from these infernal teachers a matter which it is not fitting for the mind of man to know. St. Thomas's reference to the immoderateness in striving to know as exemplified in magic may make modern readers smile; but are the curious minds of today really so far from being willing to pay the price, even of their salvation, for the unlocking of impenetrabilities, should the choice be open to them — that is the question.

A third disorder of man's appetite for truth and knowledge is signaled by St. Thomas as existing "when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God." And, in this frame of reference, Aquinas sees fit to quote St. Augustine to the effect that the study of creatures should ever lead the mind of man upwards to Eternal Truth Itself.

St. Thomas, in refutation of the scorners of natural creation, sees nothing immoderate in the fact that the mind of man strives to unseal the natural mysteries and locked places of creation; that is, he finds nothing deserving of reproach in secular science per se. Concerning the study of Philosophy, for example, he states in the Summa Theologica that it is in itself "lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them." But he does reproach those philosophers who misuse the truth to

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1. Ila IIae, q.167, a.1, c.: "Alio modo, inquantum studet aliquis addiscere ab eo a quo non licet: sicut patet de his qui aliqua futura a daemonibus perquirunt; quae est superstitiosa curiositas."

2. Ibid.: "Tertio, quando homo appetit cognoscere veritatem circa creaturas, non referendo ad debitum finem, scilicet ad cognitionem Dei."

3. Cf. De Vera Religione, cap. XXIX. Quoted by St. Thomas, Ila IIae, q.167, a.1, c.: "... In consideratione creaturearum non est vana et peritura curiositas exercenda; sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus."

4. Ila IIae, q.167, a.1, ad 3: "Studium philosophiae secundum se est licitum et laudabile, propter veritatem quam philosophi perceperunt, Deo illis revelante, ..."
assail the faith, for their intellectual activity leads them into a realm foreign to them.¹

A fourth instance of the disorder of uncontrolled study and desire of knowledge is found in the attempt of many to pursue branches of study for which they plainly do not have the natural intellectual ability and mental training. Confusion, error and heresy cannot but be the harvest reaped from such misguided and unregulated intellectual endeavour. And yet how many are fooled by such a temptation, and even men of no mean intellectual timber! Because they have attained to a certain competency in some advanced branch of human study, they feel they are qualified to scrutinize the whole realm of learning. Hence, the erroneous, even stupid, solutions to moral and political problems advanced by physicists and other scientists. They do not hesitate to publish their opinions even on matters of religion. It is this same curiosity which prompts some theologians to probe the mysteries of Faith with such untold harm to the Church in personal defection and even national schism. These are examples of men whose desire for knowledge is so rampant that they simply refuse to admit the incapacity of human reason in the realm of the supernatural.

Because man’s inordinate desire to know usually falls upon a matter which, too, is improper for the student to learn, St. Thomas’s consideration of this topic in his commentary on the Sentences is based rather on the impropriety of the matter of study. There is no opposition between what he teaches here and his doctrine of the Summa, which we have just outlined. He regards the same facts from two different points of view. And from his manner of consideration in the commentary on the Sentences he finds that one’s study may be inordinate because of the subject-matter, and that for three different reasons. First, when the matter of one’s study easily leads to evil and is, in itself, only of slight uselessness; secondly, when the branch of study is beyond the student’s capacity; and thirdly, when the matter of one’s study is absolutely useless — in each of these cases the student would be considered curious, were he to venture into such vain pursuits.²

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¹ Cf. Ibid.: “Sed quia quidam philosophi abutuntur ad fidei impugnationem, ideo Apostolus dicit...”


‘Unum est quando cognoscibile de facili ad malum inclinat, et praeterea in se parvae utilitatis est. Et propter hoc prohibita sunt scientiae magicae, ne homo in exercitium earum labatur.

‘Aliud est quando cognoscibile est supra potentiam cognoscendis,...

‘Tertium est quando in se nullius utilitatis est, sicut facta contingentia hominum. Unde et curiosi dicuntur qui sunt scrutatores conscientiarum proximi.

174. ‘In omnibus autem istis tribus contingit quod illud est uni curiosum quod non est curiosum alteri ; quia aliquid est supra unius intellectum quod non est supra in-
Desire for and study in view of the knowledge of sensible things is perverse and disordered and, accordingly, is to be termed curiosity when the sensitive knowledge desired is not directed to a useful purpose but rather has the effect of turning man from some useful pursuit. Accordingly, to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful pursuit.”

Likewise, when man directs his sensitive knowledge to something harmful, he is giving in to the vice of curiosity. “Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people’s actions is directed to detraction.”

With these two exceptions, it seems that man’s ordered pursuit of knowledge of sensible things is in no wise reprehensible. In fact, the knowledge of sensible things is ordered to two great human goods. In man, as well as in the other animals, the sensitive knowledge and subsequent pursuance of what is good and the avoidance of what is harmful, is greatly beneficial, even necessary, for the preservation of the body. And, in the case of man alone, the knowledge of sensible things is a stepping-stone to his acquisition of knowledge of an intellectual order. And when the knowledge of sensible things serves these two purposes, there is nothing of the curious in such a desire, but rather an exercise of the virtue of studiousness, which requires that man pursue in an ordinate fashion and for a useful end the knowledge of sensible things.

While on the subject of curiosity in reference to sensitive knowledge, it may not be amiss to point out that the Doctor of the Schools considers that curiosity concerns itself with all sensitive knowledge, and not merely with the knowledge acquired through the sense of

tellectum alterius; aliquid etiam est utile uni quod non est utile alteri; aliquid etiam facile in peccatum praecepit in unum quod non praecepit alium.”

1. Ila IIae, q.167, a.2, c.: “Apponere ergo studium circa sensibilia cognoscenda, dupliciter potest esse viciosum. — Uno modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva non ordinatur in aliquid utile; sed potius avertit hominem ab aliqua utili consideratione.”

2. Ibid.: “Alio modo, inquantum cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquid noxium: sicut inspectio multieris ordinatur ad concepiscendum; et diligentia inquisitio eorum quae ab aliis sunt, ordinatur ad detrahrenudum.”


“Si quis autem cognitioni sensibilium intendit ordinate, propter necessitatem sustentandae naturae, vel propter studium intelligendae veritatis: est virtuosa studiositas circa sensibilia cognitionem.”
sight. And Cajetan’s remarks on this point leave no doubt about the fact that one can be truly curious about all types of sensitive knowledge. For the curious person tries to learn about and distinguish all types of sensation, not for the sake of the sensible delight gained therein, but rather for the sake of the knowledge itself. In this phenomenon lies the difference, for example, between gluttony and curiosity, which St. Thomas has signaled in answer to this objection. Gluttony, luxury and similar sensualities seek the pleasure concomitant to the use of sensible things, but curiosity aims only at learning about these different sensations, and for this purpose the curious person does not refuse even to suffer inconvenience and pain. St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine, who is very clear on this question when he says:

By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savoury, soft; but curiosity, for trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge.

There is a close affinity between curiosity and concupiscence of the eyes, as the writings of authors on Ascetical Theology attest. But such a linking together of the two in no way means to deny that curiosity extends its ugly head to all sensible knowledge, for concupiscence of the eyes is an expression, consecrated by use, to mean all excessive desire to see, to hear and to experience all that goes on in the world and the secret intrigues that are woven there merely to indulge the craving for frivolous knowledge.

1. Cf. Ibid., ad 1: “Sed circa delectationem cognitionis omnium sensuum est curiositas.”
2. Cf. Cajetan, In Iam IIae, ibid., n.3: “… Ita quod differentia consistit in hoc, quod gula vel luxuria versatur circa delectationem tangibilium quae consistit in usu eorum, hoc est in applicatione eorum ad venerateos actus seu ad comedendum et bibendum: curiositas vero versatur circa delectationem eorum, scilicet tangibilium et etiam reliquorum sensibilium, scilicet gustabilium, odorabilium, audibilium ac visibilium, quae consistit in cognitione eorum. Curiosus enim quaerit cognoscere ac discernere sensibilia: luxurosus autem ac gulosus quaerit uti sensibilibus: Unde, ut Augustinus docuit allatus in littera, voluptuosus quaerit sensibilia quae decertat, curiosus quaerit sensibilia etiam si molestant: quoniam ad cognoscendum oportet contraria sentire, ad utendum autem delectabilia sola conveniunt.
3. Confessions, X, chap.35. Quoted by St. Thomas, Ila IIae, q.167, a.2, ad 1: “… Ex hoc evidentius discernitur quid voluptatis, quid curiositatis agatur per sensus: quod voluptas pulchra, canora, suavia, sapida, lenia sectatur; curiositas autem etiam his contraria, tentandi causa, non ad subeundam molestiam, sed experiendi noscendique libidine.”
says that this disorder is called concupiscence of the eyes because sight is the sense chiefly used for gaining this kind of trivial information.¹

The difference between the curious person and the intemperate person is thus clearly illustrated, for whereas a person may be curious about all types of sensation, he may be intemperate only in reference to the desires and delectations of the sense of touch, and of taste to the degree that this latter is reduced to touch, as we have already stated.² In regard to the other three external senses, the excesses may not be named nor be intemperance, except in the very general sense of this word; but they may well be termed curiosity, as St. Thomas points out in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when he speaks of the pleasures of seeing.³

St. Thomas, following St. Bernard, sees a certain opposition between humility and curiosity. For curiosity which causes one to spread his restless glance upon everything is in stark contradiction to the downcast gaze, which characterizes St. Bernard’s first degree of humility.⁴

Aquinas gives a very interesting and psychological analysis of the origin of curiosity. He assigns curiosity to the “roaming unrest of the spirit,”⁵ which he says is the first-born daughter of the capital sin of sloth (*acedia*). For no one can remain for any length of time in the morbid sadness of *acedia* without some consolation. To this dreary sadness man reacts in a twofold manner. First, he casts off what causes the sadness and then seeks for some consolation to fill up the emotional void. And so it is that those who cannot accept the conditions necessary for spiritual consolations give themselves over to the vain search for worldly pleasures.⁶


⁴. Cf. *Ila Iiae*, q.162, a.4, ad 4: “... Ila autem duodecim quae ponit Bernardus, sumuntur per oppositum ad duodecim gradus humiliatatis... Nam primus gradus humiliatatis est corde et corpore semper humiliatatem ostendere, defectis in terram aspectibus. Cum opponitur curiositas per quam aliquis curiose ubique et inordinate circumspicit.”

⁵. *Ila Iiae*, q.35, a.4, ad 3.

⁶. Cf. St. Thomas, *Q. D. de Malo*, q.11, a.4, c.: “Sed quia etiam nullus homo est qui absque delectatione in tristitia manere possit, ... ideo ex tristitia duo consequuntur:
For since, according to the Philosopher, ... no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant, it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that gave him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body. Now in avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of despair. In so far as a man has recourse to external objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called wandering after unlawful things.\(^1\)

Once man gives himself over to this roaming unrest of the spirit (evagatio mentis circa illicita) he puts himself on a path lined with many devious aberrations and when, in this frame of mind, he is led into the domain of study and knowledge, his mental meanderings are fittingly described by the term curiosity.\(^2\)

In summary, curiosity is the uncontrolled desire of and study to come to knowledge in both the intellectual and sensitive spheres of knowing. It is the excessive and immoderate search for knowledge and experiment, as St. Augustine put it. It designates a superfluous diligence in knowing things which in no wise pertain to the student, or things which exceed his knowing capacity, with this intention precisely, to know and discern. It is study prompted by a false affection for knowledge; study which gives too much importance to the secondary, while spurring the necessary and primary. It is the natural desire to know now having gone rampant and unfettered, quorum um est ut recedat a contristantibus, aliud est ut ad alia transeat in quibus delectetur; et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit ... quod illi qui non possunt gaudere delectationibus spiritualibus, ut plurimum transferunt se ad delectationes corporales; et secundum hoc ex tristitia quae concepitur ex spiritualibus bonis, sequitur evagatio circa illicita, in quibis animus carnis delectatur.

1. \(I^1a I^1ae, q.35, a.4, ad 2:\) "Quia enim, ut Philosophus dicit, ... nullus diu absque delectatione potest manere cum tristitia, necesse est quod ex tristitia aliquid dupliciter oriatur: uno modo, ut homo recedat a contristantibus; alio modo, ut ad alia transeat, in quibus delectatur: sic ut illi qui non possunt gaudere in spiritualibus delectionibus, transferunt se ad corporales ... In fuga autem tristitiae talis processus attenditur: quia, primo, homo fugit contristantia; secundo, etiam impugnat ea quae tristitiam ingerunt. Spiritualia autem bona, de quibus tristatur acedia, sunt et finis et id quod est ad finem. Fuga autem finis fit per desperationem. ... Inquantum autem propter tristitiam a spiritualibus aliquis transvert se ad delectabilia exteriora, ponitur filia acediae evagatio circa illicita."

2. Cf. \(Ibid., ad 3:\) "Illa autem quae Isidorus ponit oriri ex acedia et tristitia, reducuntur ad ea quae Gregorius ponit. Nam amartudo, quam Isidorus ponit oriri ex tristitia, est quidem effectus rancoris. Otiositas autem et somnolentia reducuntur ad torporem circa praecepta: circa quae est aliquid otiosum, omnino ea praeterrimitens; et somnolentus, ea negligenter implens. Omnia autem alia quinque quae ponit ex acedia oriri, pertinent ad evagationem mentis circa illicita. Quae quidem ... secundum autem quod pertinet ad cognitionem, dicitur curiositas; ..."
inordinate appetite which stands in dire need of restraint and moderation. Its true nature can be pithily expressed in the words of St. Bernard, which St. Thomas cites in his commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians. "There are those who wish to know for the purpose of knowing a great deal and this is curiosity." 1

B. Neglect of Study

Once curiosity is satisfied, it often gives place to intellectual sloth and negligence, the vice opposed by deficiency to studiousness. Aquinas does little more than mention this defect of studiousness. He states clearly that neglect of study is the vice opposed by deficiency to studiousness. "... Whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study..." 2

As has been already said in the section treating with the mode of studiousness, this latter participates to a certain degree in the mode of fortitude, and, in fact, is named by reference to it. Studiousness must rectify man's twofold inclination in regard to study and knowledge. The soul's desire for knowledge has to be restrained lest it develop into curiosity; this is the principal function of studiousness. And the body's natural shrinking from the labor that learning involves must also be guarded against. 3 The vice of neglect of study arises from this second inclination and is but indirectly the concern of studiousness, as the Doctor of the Schools teaches. In other words, because man is a composite of body and soul, the listlessness, wear and fatigue of the body have to be reckoned with, for they may at times prevent him from making the effort that study requires. If the student allows this bodily torpor to take its course without fighting against it, he gives in to the vice of neglect of study or intellectual sloth. According to the Salmanticenses, neglect of study is the complete omission or lessening of effort in learning those things which a person, according to his state, is expected to learn and know. 4 In final analysis, neglect of study may be reduced to laziness. It is not difficult to imagine the bad effects that such a vice may exert upon the student. No doubt, it is the cause of much wasted, because undeveloped, talent.

1. **In Cant., sermo 36, n.3.** Quoted by St. Thomas, *In I Cor.,* VIII, 1.
2. **In I Iae, q.166, a.2, obj.3:** "... Nomen autem studiositatis sumitur, e contrario, ex applicatione animae ad aliquid, unde magis videtur opponi vitio quod est in defectu, scilicet negligentiae studendi...
Of these two hindrances to a properly ordered habit of study, there can be no doubt that the much more deeply rooted and hence more difficult of regulation is curiosity, for it arises from a perversity in the appetite itself. Such a disordered appetite is ordinarily not found in the lazy student, that is, there are few inveterately indolent students. His inclination is usually good and with proper motivation and a more mature realization of the necessity of work, the lazy mind usually rallies from its torpor. Moreover, most systems of education are designed to cope with students who do not freely make the effort to study, but there are no sanctions by which the voracious study of the curious is checked. Neglect of study can be mastered through motivation; curiosity is conquered only by restraint.

5. The Use of "Studiousness" and "Curiosity"

As we have already hinted, the use of the English renditions of studiositas and curiositas is, at times, to say the least, confusing. That is why we deem it not out of place to add a few comments on the meaning and use of these words. From our detailed analysis of this whole question it is obvious that "studiousness" is the name given to the moral virtue, which is at the same time a species of modesty and a potential part of temperance; whereas "curiosity" is the term used to designate the vicious excess opposed to this virtue. Strange to relate, and no doubt because of mental confusion in regard to these two states, on the tongues of many their use and meanings have been almost reversed. It is not infrequent that we hear educators, for example, deploring the lack of curiosity which characterizes the modern student. They often cite the curiosity of the young child as an example to be imitated by his less "curious" older brother. Sometimes, too, a mother is worried about her precocious son's studiousness, meaning by this that he is too much given to books and study for one of his tender years.

Now, if the proper use of words means anything, and it does mean a great deal, then the student’s lack of curiosity should be praised. And if those who lament over its lack in their students mean to say that their students suffer from laziness and lack of application, then their remedy for this state should be to encourage in the student the virtue of studiousness, which is simply the virtue of the good student. And the mother of the child who is too much given to study and books, and who is thus a victim of his own curiosity, should begin to train her son in proper study habits, for studiousness like any other moral virtue is acquired from repeated studious acts. It is impossible to be too studious just as it is impossible to be too chaste and too humble. And curiosity is never a good thing, not even for the negligent student, and is not to be recommended as a
medicine for the slacker any more than lust is to be assigned as the cure for sexual frigidity.

It seems that there is something of a vicious circle connected with the use of these two words to describe a virtuous and a vicious state. Because “studiousness” and “curiosity” are improperly used, mental confusion about the two states which they designate has resulted. And this ensuing mental confusion continues to provoke a wrong use of the two terms. Make no mistake about it, the greatest praise a student can be given is to call him a studious searcher after truth; contrariwise, to brand the student as curious is only worse than telling him he is lazy.

In this last part, we have, following the lead of St. Thomas Aquinas, given a detailed analysis of the virtue of studiousness, that potential part of temperance and species of modesty which regulates and moralizes man’s natural desire for knowledge. According to the Angelic Doctor, the virtue of studiousness represses both vain curiosity and intellectual sloth in order to lead the student to the study of what should be studied, in the manner in which this should be done, when it should be done and for a moral (and even supernatural) end, and not for the purely personal satisfaction of the student. Studiousness is something of an asceticism of cognition. By uniting in itself the modes of temperance and indirectly that of fortitude, studiousness assures its possessor of a properly regulated intellectual activity, for it moderates the profligacy of the natural yen to know and indirectly stimulates the quasi-natural tendency of the corporeal part of man to refuse the effort that must necessarily accompany any study.

Thomas M. MacLellan.