Some Comments on Aristotle's Major Works on Ethics

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W. Jaeger, who might deservedly be called the originator of modern Aristotelian scholarship, insists that the so-called Urethik — the initial concrete formulation of Aristotle's thought on ethics — is reflected in the Eudemian Ethics; and that the Eudemian Ethics was composed during Aristotle's sojourn in Assos (c. 347 to c. 345 B.C.), that is, immediately after the death of Plato. Jaeger bases his thesis upon the observation that in many respects the ethical notions expressed in the Eudemian Ethics resemble certain ideas advanced in the Aristotelian Protrepticus, which is generally dated between 352 and 350 B.C. For example, the concept of the ϕηνήσις, as it appears both in the Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics, denotes a kind of "rational-intuitive apprehension" (Platonic), while in Aristotle's later works ϕηνήσις implies a kind of "mental habit related to practical action." This fact would indicate, Jaeger concludes, that the Eudemian Ethics is a wholly authentic work of Aristotle, and that it constitutes an essential link in Aristotle's intellec-


2. See, in general, A.-H. Chroust, "The First Thirty Years of Modern Aristotelian Scholarship (1912-1942)," Classica et Mediaevalia, vol.24 (1965), pp.27-57. Already T. Case, in his remarkable article, "Aristotle," in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th edit., 1910), vol.2, pp.501 ff., suggests that there can be detected in Aristotle's writings a distinct "evolution of thought." Thus it could be maintained that Case, and to a greater extent Jaeger, simply destroyed the traditional and wide-spread belief that the extant Corpus Aristotelicum, on the whole, constitutes a single integrated doctrinal unity reflecting in an essentially uniform and systematic manner the final and authoritative teachings or views of Aristotle on logic, physics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics and metaphysics.

3. It is generally held that the Aristotelian Protrepticus is a sort of "rebuttal" of Isocrates' Antidosis, which was published in 333/2 B.C. Hence, the most likely date for the publication of the Protrepticus would be the years between 352 and 350 B.C. See, for instance, A.-H. Chroust, Aristotele: Protrepticus — A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, 1964), p.IX.

4. Already P. von der Mühll, De Aristotelis Ethicorum Eudemiorum Auctoritate (Göttingen, 1909), and E. Kapp, Das Verhältnis der Eudemischen Ethik zur Nikomachischen Ethik (Freiburg, 1912), had established the authenticity of the Eudemian Ethics, which for some time had been seriously disputed by scholars. See infra.
tual development that ranges from the *Protrepticus* to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The argument which Jaeger offers is but a special application of his more general theory that in his intellectual evolution Aristotle begins as a Platonist, but gradually "moves away" from Plato. Correlatively, Jaeger also dispenses with the old and widespread assumption that the *Eudemian Ethics* had been written after the death of Aristotle (322 B.C.) by Eudemus of Rhodes, who in this work was to have related some earlier ethical teachings, including those of Aristotle. Because the *Eudemian Ethics* is grounded in the kind of "theology" which Aristotle expounded in book III of his *On Philosophy*, Jaeger contends that the *Eudemian Ethics* must be approximately contemporaneous with the *On Philosophy* which, according to Jaeger, was composed during the Assian period. Moreover, since Jaeger also holds that book A of the *Metaphysics* — the so-called *Urmetaphysik* — is slightly anterior to the *On Philosophy*, the *Eudemian Ethics* would seem to belong to the same period of Aristotle's philosophic development as book A of the *Metaphysics*. These are, in brief, the essential theses of Jaeger as regards the evolution of Aristotle's ethical doctrines.

For some time prior to the publication of Jaeger's *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, in 1923, as well as afterwards, fierce battles were waged over the authenticity and the proper chronological sequence of the ethical treatises credited to Aristotle. While the authenticity of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has never been seriously challenged, that of the *Eudemian Ethics*, and especially that of the so-called *Magna Moralia*, has frequently been questioned. In the year 1835, F. Schleiermacher advanced the rather fantastic thesis that among the three ethical works ascribed to Aristotle only the *Magna Moralia* is truly authentic. In 1841, L. Spengel insisted that only the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a truly authentic work of Aristotle, while the *Eudemian Ethics* was composed after the death of Aristotle by Eudemus of Rhodes. According to Spengel, the *Magna Moralia*, on the other hand, is a compilation of Peripatetic ethical teachings authored by an anonymous Peripatetic, who must

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3. F. SCHLEIERMACHER, Über die Ethischen Werke des Aristoteles, in : F. SCHLEIERMACHER, Sämtliche Werke, vol.III, part 3 (Berlin, 1935), pp.306 ff. — Schleiermacher's thesis, needless to say, is completely unacceptable. His main argument runs as follows: the *Magna Moralia* is pronouncedly "anti-metaphysical"; hence, it comes nearest to the ideas expressed by I. Kant in his *Critique of Practical Reason*; hence, it is the only authentic Aristotelian work on ethics. In brief, the *Magna Moralia* is essentially Kantian and, hence, Aristotelian.
have lived after Eudemus of Rhodes.1 Spengel's theories, which were accepted without question by such scholars as E. Zeller, C. Brandis and F. Susemihl, became a sort of canon which for almost three-quarters of a century dominated Aristotelian scholarship. Only in the year 1909 did P. von der Mühll challenge the views of Spengel by accepting the authenticity of the Eudemian Ethics; 2 and in 1912, E. Kapp fully confirmed the findings of von der Mühll.3 The "rehabilitation" of the Eudemian Ethics received its ultimate confirmation from W. Jaeger in 1923.4 The Magna Moralia, however, at least for the time being, is still considered by most serious scholars "spurious" and, as to its date, posterior to Aristotle. In this respect the theory of Spengel seems to have persisted successfully.

In 1923 Jaeger proclaimed the authenticity of the Eudemian Ethics and indicated its proper place in the intellectual evolution of Aristotle's ethical theories. Subsequently, Hans von Arnim offered the startling suggestion that the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia are both authentic compositions of Aristotle. Moreover, von Arnim insisted that the Magna Moralia is Aristotle's first authentic work on ethics, preceding the Eudemian Ethics as well as the Nicomachean Ethics.5 In other words, von Arnim, who has contested nearly all of Jaeger's judgments,6 proposed nothing less than that the intellectual development of Aristotle's ethical thought progressed from the Magna Moralia to the Eudemian Ethics, and culminated in the Nicomachean Ethics. In developing his peculiar thesis, von Arnim attempted to refute all the arguments which had been made against the authenticity of the Magna Moralia since the days of Spengel. The priority of this work he attempted to establish by pointing out the manner in which it handles the problem of the φιλία, as well as the problems of the so-called ethical virtues. Relying on the views advanced by Theophrastus, as they have been compiled

2. See supra, p.63, note 4.
4. See supra.
6. It appears that H. von Arnim, a brilliant scholar whose fame and achievements in the field of classical scholarship are second to none, from 1923 on took delight in trying to prove Jaeger wrong. In so doing he might occasionally have gone beyond the limits of strict objectivity. In any event, the "dialogue" between Jaeger and von Arnim, which ended with von Arnim's premature death in 1931, was one of the most fascinating intellectual jousts of the twenties.
by Arius Didymus and preserved by Ioannis Stobaeus,¼ von Arnim arrived at the conclusion that the treatment of the φιλία and the ethical virtues in the Magna Moralia is rather “ primitive ” and, hence, must precede their more “ refined ” discussion in the later ethical treatises, that is, in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics.²

With one single (and somewhat half-hearted) exception,³ the thesis of von Arnim, that the Magna Moralia constitutes the first authentic Aristotelian work on ethics, was rejected by all scholars.⁴ Undismayed, von Arnim, heeding some of the suggestions made by his many critics, published two additional books in 1927 and in 1928 on the subject of Aristotle’s works on ethics. In the first book he attempted to investigate the relation of Aristotle’s ethical composi-


2. See also H. von ARNIM, “Arius Didymus’ Abriss der Peripatetischen Ethik,” Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philos.-Hist. Klasse, vol.204, n.3 (1926), passim. Here von Arnim tries to show that the “ compendium ” of Arius Didymus contains ethical doctrines that had been advanced by Aristotle in the Magna Moralia (and in the Eudemian Ethics), and that the Magna Moralia is in no way influenced by Stoic teachings, as some scholars hold.

3. K. PRAECHTER, in : Überweg-Heinze, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol.1 : Die Philosophie des Altertums (12th edit., Berlin, 1926), p.370, note 1. Praechter, however, somewhat modifies the views advanced by von Arnim. He believes that the Magna Moralia, as we have it today, is the editorial work of some of Aristotle’s disciples, who rewrote or re-edited an early Aristotelian treatise (or lecture) on ethics. Hence, according to Praechter, the nucleus of the present Magna Moralia might very well be Aristotelian.

4. M. J. L. Stocks, in his review of von Arnim’s Die Drei Aristotelischen Ethiken, reviewed in : Deutsche Literaturzeitung, vol.48 (May 22, 1927), cols.1057-1059, reproved von Arnim for having failed to show the proper place which the Magna Moralia, provided it is an authentic work, might have held in Aristotle’s intellectual or philosophic development. Von Arnim replied to Stocks in the Anzeiger der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philos.-Hist. Klasse, vol.14 (1927), pp.169 ff. E. Kapp, in his review of the same book, a review which appeared in Gnomon, vol.3 (1927), pp.19 ff., and ibid. at pp.73 ff., denied that, as regards the intellectual and philosophic evolution of Aristotle, the Magna Moralia could be dated prior to the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. Von Arnim replied to Kapp in an article, “Die Echtheit der Grossen Ethik des Aristoteles,” which appeared in the Rheinisches Museum, vol.76 (1927), pp.115 ff., and ibid. at pp.225 ff. In this new article von Arnim adds a novel twist to his previous argument. He contends that the treatment of pleasure in the Magna Moralia is definitely anterior to the treatment of the same subject in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics.— Among the many scholars and critics who rejected von Arnim’s theses is also A. MANSION, “La Genèse de l’Œuvre d’Aristote d’après les travaux récents,” Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie, vol.29 (1927), pp.446 ff. Mansion pointed out that if the Magna Moralia was actually older than the Eudemian Ethics (and the Nicomachean Ethics), it would in some way have to be reconciled with the Aristotelian Protrepticus. — On the other hand, the majority of von Arnim’s critics accepted Jaeger’s theories fully or in part.
tions to Aristotle's *Topics*, and in the second book he discussed their relationship to the *Metaphysics*.

In his first book, *Das Ethische in Aristoteles Topik*, von Arnim also attempted to demonstrate that the *Magna Moralia* constitutes an essential phase in the intellectual development of Aristotle. He endeavored to substantiate this by proving that there exist some important connections between the *Magna Moralia* and the *Protrepticus*, and between the *Magna Moralia* and the *Topics*. At the same time, he assigned the *Topics* to the Assian period, that is, to the years between 347 and 345 B.C. On the basis of these alleged connections — the Aristotelian *Topics*, in fact, touches upon ethical problems — von Arnim concluded that the *Magna Moralia* must definitely be anterior to the *Topics*. As regards the evolution of the Aristotelian concept of *φρονήσις* — a particular evolution upon which Jaeger had based his thesis that Aristotle gradually moved away from a "Platonic" meaning of *φρονήσις* in the direction of a practical-applied meaning — von Arnim concluded that in all three ethical treatises of Aristotle this particular term always and exclusively referred to an ethico-practical virtue, and not to a "theoretic-normative standard." Hence von Arnim suggested that this concept with Aristotle always had a peculiar meaning diametrically opposed to the specific meaning of the purely Platonic *φρονήσις*. In this fashion von Arnim also hoped to discredit Jaeger's basic assumption that in his ethical works, as elsewhere, Aristotle gradually evolved from Plato to "Aristotle."

In his second book, *Eudemische Ethik und Metaphysik*, von Arnim suddenly maintained that all of the three works of Aristotle, including the *Magna Moralia*, were composed during his "master years" at Athens, that is, between c. 335 and 323 B.C.; and that they were later than book II of the *Rhetoric*, which he dated about the year 338. Moreover, he proposed that the *Magna Moralia* was definitely anterior to all the books of the *Metaphysics* in that it showed no influence of the *Metaphysics*, while the *Eudemian Ethics* was obviously posterior to the *Metaphysics*, or at least to the *Urmetaphysic* — von Arnim saw in books K, L and N the *Urmetaphysic* — and, hence, was influenced by the latter. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, he concluded, was posterior to the whole of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*.

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In the year 1928, Jaeger also published a lengthy paper, *Über den Ursprung und Kreislauf des Philosophischen Lebensideals*.\(^1\) In this remarkable essay he took issue with some of the theses and theories advanced by von Arnim. Above all, he denied categorically that von Arnim had properly understood and applied his — Jaeger’s — evolutionary or generic view.\(^2\) Jaeger stressed once more that originally Aristotle fully accepted Plato’s notions of the “ideal philosophic life.”\(^3\) The “ideal philosophic life” of Plato, Jaeger insisted, is the purely theoretic life and as such encompasses the “ideal practical life,” provided that this “ideal practical life” is wholly determined by the theoretic apprehension and intellectual understanding of the immutable Ideas. For theoretic philosophy alone can possess the true norms of human action. Aristotle originally the accepted fundamental position of Plato;\(^4\) but later, after he had abandoned Plato’s extreme intellectualism, he made a clear dis-

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1. In: *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Histor. Klasse*, vol.25 (1928), pp.390 ff. An English translation of this paper, under the title, *The Philosophic Ideal of Life*, is appended to the English translation (or version) of W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His development* (Oxford, 1948), pp.426-461.— It will be noted that in this paper Jaeger takes issue with von Arnim’s views expressed in his *Das Ethische in Aristoteles Topik* of 1927 (see note 1, page 67), as well as with von Arnim’s *Die Drei Aristotelischen Ethiken* of 1924 (see note 6, page 65), and von Arnim’s *Arius Didymus’ Abriss der Peripatetischen Ethik* of 1926 (see note 2, page 66. In addition, Jaeger also takes up the problem which had arisen with the “intervention” of U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. In 1927, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff had published an article, “Neleus von Skepsis,” *Hermes*, vol.62 (1927), pp.371 ff. In this article he did point out that the *Magna Moralia* contains a reference to Neleus of Skepsis, a contemporary of Theophrastus. Hence, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff concluded, the *Magna Moralia* must be assigned to the scholarchate of Theophrastus (322/21-288/87, or 287/86 B.C.). Von Arnim had replied to von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in his article, “Neleus of Skepsis,” *Hermes*, vol.63 (1928), pp.103 ff. In this article von Arnim tried to show that Neleus was a member of the Peripatus (Lyceum) during the scholarchate of Aristotle (335-323) and, hence, this reference proves nothing.— Jaeger, in his paper, *Der Ursprung und Kreislauf des Philosophischen Lebensideals*, likewise took up the reference to Neleus found in the *Magna Moralia*. He maintained that in the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle refers to Choriscus (or Coriscus), the father of Neleus. It would indeed be strange, Jaeger continued, if Aristotle should quote Neleus in a work — the *Magna Moralia* — which, according to von Arnim, is anterior to the *Eudemian Ethics*, and to Neleus’ father Choriscus in a work — the *Eudemian Ethics* — which in von Arnim’s opinion is posterior to the *Magna Moralia*. Jaeger concluded that the reference to Neleus in the *Magna Moralia* must be taken as an indication that the latter belongs to the post-Aristotelian period of the Peripatus.

2. In a lengthy footnote (*The Philosophic Ideal of Life*, pp.440-442), Jaeger takes von Arnim to task for having called the *Magna Moralia* the earliest and most authentic Aristotelian work on ethics.


4. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle fully advocates the purely theoretic (or philosophic) life envisioned by Plato. Jaeger is of the opinion that in establishing a universal science of being *qua* being (metaphysics), the young Aristotle was even a more ardent believer in the theoretic life than Plato himself. *Ibid.*, at p.435.
tinction between the “purely theoretic life” and the “practical life.” 1 This “break-away” seems to have been manifested initially in the *Eudemian Ethics* — according to Jaeger the earliest ethical treatise of Aristotle — where we are told that the natural goods of life are moral goods for man, provided, however, that they help him to know and serve God 2 — definitely an echo of the Platonic “ideal theoretic life.” Only in the *Nicomachean Ethics* does Aristotle fully set apart the practical life from the theoretic life. Here, the concept of the *φρονήσις*, which once meant to Aristotle (as it did to Plato) theoretic knowledge, signifies only a sort of “practical moral insight,” devoid of all theoretic significance: it is now solely concerned with practical human affairs, 3 with the practical “human condition” within a “practical existential world.”

Jaeger also maintained that the significant apposition of purely “theoretic attitude” and “practical human deportment” can be detected in the *Magna Moralia*. Hence, the latter must be of a fairly late date. To place it in close proximity to the *Protrepticus*, or to be more exact, to date it between the *Protrepticus* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, is to Jaeger’s mind wholly erroneous. The only sensible solution, Jaeger suggested, is to concede that the *Magna Moralia* was composed by some Peripatetic after the death of Aristotle, 4 especially since, as Jaeger opines, the *Magna Moralia* definitely reflects the influence of Dicaearchus of Messene, a man who absolutely rejects the Platonic ideal of the purely “theoretic life,” in favor of a “practical (political) ideal.” 5 In a separate paper, *Ein Theophrastuszitat in der Grossen Ethick*, 6 Jaeger also pointed out that the *Magna Moralia* contains a reference to certain ethical teachings of Theophrastus and, hence, must have been written during the scholarchate of Theophrastus, or shortly thereafter.

As was to be expected, von Arnim at once attempted to refute Jaeger’s criticisms and suggestions. In a paper, *Nochmals die Aristotelischen Ethiken*, 7 which carried the significant sub-title: *Gegen Jaeger, zur Abwehr (Against Jaeger, A Refutation)*, von Arnim once more pointed out that Jaeger’s basic distinction between the “ideal (theoretic) philosophic life” and the “practical life” is unsupported by

2. *Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics* 1249 b 16. See also *ibid.*, at 1215 b 1 ; 1215 b 6 ; 1216 a 11 ff.
3. See, for instance, *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics* 1141 b 2 ff., and *ibid.*, at 1140 b 7 ; 1141 a 9 ff. In *Magna Moralia* 1182 a 10 ff., for instance, Pythagoras, rather than Plato, is chastised for having failed to keep apart ethics and metaphysics.
the available evidence and, hence, pure fantasy. According to von Arnim, there never was, and there never could have been, a clear cut progressive development in Aristotle from a purely “theoretic position” to a “practical point of view.” The “ideal life,” as it has been advocated by Aristotle, essentially remains the same in all three ethical works: it never underwent any significant changes as Jaeger suggests. Unfortunately, von Arnim’s paper ended on an extremely bitter note which made any further exchange of ideas between him and Jaeger practically impossible: he admitted that in the past he had admired and respected at least some of Jaeger’s views, but that now he felt compelled to reject in toto these views, as being wholly erroneous and untenable, if not ridiculous.1

In the year 1929, the disciples of von Arnim and those of Jaeger entered the “great debate.” P. Gohlke, a pupil of von Arnim, tried once again to confirm the thesis of his teacher, namely that the fundamental evolution of Aristotle’s ethical views proceeds from the Protrepticus, through the Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics, to Nicomachean Ethics.2 Jaeger’s position, on the other hand, was brilliantly and successfully defended by R. Walzer, a disciple of Jaeger.3 In what may be regarded as a most thorough and most scholarly refutation of von Arnim’s insistence that the Magna Moralia constitutes an authentic early work of Aristotle, Walzer, by employing with much success Jaeger’s evolutionary theory, demonstrated that the Magna Moralia in fact reflects the influence of Theophrastus, not only as regards the terminology it employs but also as regards the specific manner in which the problems are posed and discussed.4

Concerning the relationship of “theoretic knowledge” (σοφία) and “practical knowledge” (φρονήσις), Walzer reached the conclusion that the Magna Moralia is a sort of compromise between the views espoused by Theophrastus and those advocated by Dicaearchus of Messene. Hence, Walzer concluded, the Magna Moralia must have been composed during the time of Theophrastus’ scholarchate, or shortly thereafter. It must have been written by an author who still essentially adheres to the ethical doctrines advanced by Aristotle in his Eudemian Ethics and in his Nicomachean Ethics, as well as to

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1. Ibid., at p.56.
2. P. Gohlke, Überblick über die Literatur zu Aristoteles (bis 1925), part 2: Ethik, Politik, Rhetorik, Poetic, in: Jahrbuch über die Fortschritte der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft (Bursian), vol.55 (1929), pp.275 ff. In this work Gohlke also tries to confirm von Arnim’s early dating of the Magna Moralia, showing that this composition antedates the Aristotelian potentia-actus doctrine.
4. Walzer’s basic method is to painstakingly trace certain key topics, such as free will, virtue, happiness, friendship, etc., through the Eudemian Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Magna Moralia.
the views held by Theophrastus in his *Ethics*. This unknown author, however, also assumed a philosophic position quite different from that maintained by either Aristotle or Theophrastus. Hence, this anonymous author might very well be post-Theophrastian.¹

As might be expected, a number of other Aristotelian scholars soon entered the von Arnim-Jaeger debate. Most of these scholars, however, sided with Jaeger, at least in part.² A. Mansion, for instance, reproached von Arnim for being guilty of certain undeniable inconsistencies.³ Mansion pointed out that if von Arnim's theses were correct, the *Magna Moralia*, as regards its fundamental philosophic position, would have to be closer to the *Nicomachean Ethics* than to the *Eudemian Ethics*, inasmuch as the *Magna Moralia* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* are obviously further away from Plato's basic teachings than is the *Eudemian Ethics*. This fact in itself, Mansion concluded, would discredit von Arnim's evolutionary sequence: *Protrepticus*—*Magna Moralia*—*Eudemian Ethics*—*Nicomachean Ethics*. For what von Arnim here proposes, according to Mansion, is nothing less than that Aristotle "moves away" from Plato (in the *Magna Moralia*), "re-approaches" him (in the *Eudemian Ethics*), and then once again "moves away" from Plato (in the *Nicomachean Ethics*).⁴

A few years later, in 1933 to be exact, K. Brink, likewise a pupil of Jaeger, undertook anew a detailed investigation of the *Magna Moralia*.⁵ Through a close analysis of the form and style of this work he came to the conclusion that its true author must have lived several generations after Aristotle. Hence, according to Brink, the *Magna Moralia* cannot possibly be credited to the Stagirite. Essentially the same conclusions were reached by K. Berg, who used research methods very similar to those employed by Brink.⁶ Berg

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². Von Arnim died in 1931, and only a few of his disciples tried to carry on the "cause" of their teacher. See infra.


⁴. *Ibid.*, passim.—Mansion, however, does not always completely agree with Jaeger or his particular method. He points out, for instance, that Jaeger failed to adequately explain the fact that the *Magna Moralia* apparently contains "Platonic" as well as "Aristotelian" elements. On the other hand, Mansion fully concurs with Jaeger's position that the *Magna Moralia* is spurious and definitely post-Aristotelian, and that the *Eudemian Ethics* is anterior to the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

⁵. K. Brink, *Stil und Form der Pseudoaristotelischen Magna Moralia* (Ohlau, 1933).

discovered in the *Magna Moralia* a number of stylistic peculiarities, as well as certain technical terms, which indicate that this composition must be dated considerably later than either the *Eudemian Ethics* or the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The alleged authenticity of the *Magna Moralia* was further discredited by J. D. Allan, who found in this treatise a citation from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as well as a gloss inserted to explain to the reader a basic Aristotelian doctrine. These facts, Allan conjectured, are indications that the *Magna Moralia* could not have been written by Aristotle, and that it was composed some time after his death.

By now there remained little doubt among the majority of scholars that the *Magna Moralia* was spurious. The only problems yet to be solved were the establishment of the approximate date of its composition and, if possible, the discovery of its true author. It has already been pointed out that Jaeger dated the *Magna Moralia* during the scholarchate of Theophrastus. Walzer simply accepted the dating proposed by Jaeger, while Brink placed it several generations after Aristotle. Berg and Allan put it considerably later than the authentic Aristotelian works on ethics. F. Dirlmeier offered perhaps the most radical hypothesis when he claimed that it was written during the second half of the second century B.C.

Nevertheless, there were still a few intrepid scholars who, by clinging to von Arnim's original position, stoutly defended the authenticity of the *Magna Moralia*, as well as the evolutionary sequence proposed by von Arnim, which places the *Magna Moralia* in close chronological proximity to the *Protrepticus*. P. Gohlke, a pupil of von Arnim, advanced the somewhat unusual theory that all the works incorporated in the extant *Corpus Aristotelicum*, including the


2. We shall not discuss here the thesis of J. Zürcher, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* (Paderborn, 1952). Zürcher not only claims that Aristotle was always, and always remained, a Platonist, but he also insists that the whole extant *Corpus Aristotelicum*, including the *Magna Moralia*, is by Theophrastus and, hence, spurious. The only authentic works of Aristotle, according to Zürcher, are his "lost" (or, "exoteric") works, which are wholly Platonic in form as well as content. Zürcher's theories were almost unanimously rejected. See, for instance, J.-M. Le Blond, review in *Critique*, vol.8 (1952), pp.858 ff.; C. Lacorte, review in *Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana*, vol.31 (1952), pp.422 ff.; N. Picard, review in *Studi Francescani* (1953), pp.290 ff.; D. F. Fox, review in *Ciencia y Fe*, vol.9 (1953), pp.75 ff.; F. Brady, review in *The New Scholasticism*, vol.27 (1953), pp.305 ff. See also A.-H. Chroust, "The Composition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *The New Scholasticism*, vol.28 (1954), pp.65-66, note 27.


Magna Moralia, are not only wholly authentic, but that they have been handed down to us exactly in the form in which they were edited by Aristotle himself. Gohlke also maintained that the Magna Moralia is the earliest of all of Aristotle’s writings on ethics; that it was composed as a self-sustaining or independent treatise; that it must be understood as an independent work complete in itself; that it is self-explanatory; that it must be considered a vital link in the intellectual development of Aristotle; and that it constitutes an absolutely necessary pre-requisite for our understanding of the Eudemian Ethics, as well as of the Nicomachean Ethics. Gohlke insisted that the intellectual evolution of Aristotle’s ethical thought actually begins with the so-called De Virtutibus et Vitiis, a composition which, Gohlke claimed, still adheres to Plato’s basic views on ethics. The Magna Moralia, on the other hand, proclaims that virtue is a “mean” and, hence, indicates that Aristotle had, to some extent, already freed himself from Plato’s extreme ethical intellectualism and rigorism. Thus, the Magna Moralia, if not regarded as strictly “Platonic,” must be considered the first truly “Aristotelian” treatise on ethics, though by no means the first work on ethics written by Aristotle. At the same time, V. Masellis introduced a number of interesting, though not always convincing arguments, in attempting to prove once again the authenticity of the Magna Moralia.

H. G. Gadamer launched a particularly violent attack upon Jaeger and his theory of the evolution of Aristotle’s ethical thought. With intent to prove erroneous the hypothetical “evolutionary sequence” proposed by Jaeger, and the general outline of Jaeger’s “generic thesis,” Gadamer carefully analyzed the Aristotelian Protrepticus, which in Jaeger’s opinion is the foundation as well as the systematic starting point of this “evolutionary sequence.” Gadamer reached the following conclusions: (1) the Protrepticus, strictly speaking, is not a philosophic — technical, doctrinal or systematic — treatise, but rather a general “hortatory essay,” urging the reader to dedicate himself to the pursuit of the philosophic (theoretic) life; (2) primarily for “hortatory purposes,” the Protrepticus touches upon a multitude of philosophic problems and topics; (3) the Protrepticus does not advocate a particular ethical doctrine; and (4) the Protrepticus does not really divulge the philosophic or ethical views of its author. Hence, according to Gadamer, the Protrepticus cannot pos-

1. I. Bekker, Aristotelis Opera Omnia (Berlin, 1831), 1249 a 1 ff. See also E. Zeller, op. cit., vol.II, part 2, at p.3, note 1. Zeller is of the opinion that this short essay must be dated around the first century B.C. The majority of scholars consider the De Virtutibus et Vitiis spurious.


possibly contain Aristotle's original views on ethics or, as Jaeger would have it, constitute the "generic starting point" of Aristotle's ethical thought. Subsequently Gadamer proceeded to challenge Jaeger's assumption that the Eudemian Ethics is anterior to the Nicomachean Ethics — a vital sequence in Jaeger's thesis. He essayed to show not only that there are no significant or substantial doctrinal differences between these two works, but also that in essence the Eudemian Ethics treats the same ethical concepts as the Nicomachean Ethics. Gadamer, however, went still further. He claimed that the discussion of ethical problems in the Eudemian Ethics is more scholarly and systematic than that of the Nicomachean Ethics. He concluded therefore that the Eudemian Ethics, being the work of a mature scholar, must be posterior to the Nicomachean Ethics. The alleged references in the Eudemian Ethics to the Protrepticus — references which Jaeger employs to prove the authenticity of the Eudemian Ethics — are of a doubtful nature, according to Gadamer. Even if these references could be established beyond all doubt, this in itself would by no means prove that the Eudemian Ethics is the work of Aristotle, rather than that of some other member of the Academy. Gadamer further maintained that the "Platonism" of the Eudemian Ethics might very well be the general Platonism which became popular once more in the Peripatus after the death of Aristotle.¹

Although Jaeger and von Arnim disagreed, often violently, on practically every aspect of the intellectual development of Aristotle, on one point they concurred: that the Nicomachean Ethics is posterior to the Eudemian Ethics. In 1940, however, E. J. Schächer, in a new attempt to disprove certain features of Jaeger's evolutionary theses, endeavoured to demonstrate that the Nicomachean Ethics is actually anterior to the Eudemian Ethics, and that the latter had been composed by Eudemus of Rhodes rather than by Aristotle. He supported his thesis by comparing the passages on friendship found in both the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics. At the same time, he insisted that the Magna Moralia, which he considered an authentic work of Aristotle, is anterior to the Eudemian Ethics.²

Schächer's attempt to prove the priority of the Nicomachean Ethics over the Eudemian Ethics was, however, not an isolated effort. Soon, P. Wilpert, who otherwise seems to accept in toto Jaeger's evolutionary theses, reopened the question of the "chronological

¹. The arguments made by Gadamer were rejected by A. Mansion, "Autour des Éthiques attribuées à Aristote," Revue Néo-scolastique de Philosophie, vol.33 (1931), pp.219 ff. Mansion points out that it would be difficult to conceive that Aristotle should compose an "exhortation to pursue philosophy" without himself having a definite philosophic standpoint. Aristotle's philosophic position at the time he wrote the Protrepticus, Mansion contends, was definitely Platonic: he professed, as Jaeger has shown, the Platonic philosophic ideal.

². E. J. Schächer, Studien zu den Ethiken des Aristoteles (Paderborn, 1940).
sequence” of Aristotle’s ethical writings. He contended that the undisputed “Platonism” of the Eudemian Ethics is insufficient evidence to firmly establish either the priority of the Eudemian Ethics over the Nicomachean Ethics, or the personal authorship of Aristotle. G. Verbeke, who probably relied on the findings of J. Burnet, and W. Will have pointed out that the Nicomachean Ethics, especially book X, employs a kind of psychology which is more akin to the basic psychology of the Aristotelian Protrepticus than is the psychology underlying the Eudemian Ethics. Hence, Verbeke surmised, the Eudemian Ethics must be posterior to the Nicomachean Ethics.

Finally, P. Moraux, assuming an “intermediary position,” suggested that the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics are approximately contemporary and, thus, simply “overlap” chronologically.

Subsequently, Aristotelian scholarship once more raised the problem of the true authorship of the Magna Moralia. With the exception of a few dissentors, the general consensus was that this work was not personally “edited” by Aristotle, at least not in the form in which we possess it today. Nevertheless, the question remained as to who was ultimately responsible for its doctrinal content. As regards this latter issue, some scholars, even those who in principle denied the authenticity of the Magna Moralia, seemed to have conceded the possibility that at different times Aristotle offered three different (and distinct) “courses on ethics,” and that some of the doctrinal content of the Magna Moralia might ultimately go back to one of these three “courses.”

Thus, W. Theiler pointed out that there is an undeniable similarity between the Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics — a similarity which had already been recognized by other scholars. Hence, Theiler inferred that the Magna Moralia is probably a sort of “amended outline” of a course on ethics given

3. J. Burnet, in his Commentary to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (London, 1900), had pointed out the many “Platonic” elements in the psychology underlying the Nicomachean Ethics.
5. G. Verbeke, op. cit. supra, passim.
7. See, in general, F. Dehmeier, Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ Magna Moralia (Darmstadt, 1958); C. Librizzi, La Morale di Aristotele (Padua, 1960), pp.16 ff.
by Aristotle in the period between the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This ethics Theiler called the “intermediary ethics of Aristotle.”

A. Plebe, proceeding along similar lines, proposed the following theory: since Aristotle's ethical teachings evolve in three distinct phases, we must always distinguish between a “first ethics” (actually Jaeger’s *Urethik*), an “intermediary ethics,” and a “late ethics.” Plebe contended that the “first ethics,” which dates back to Aristotle’s stay in Assos, includes the *Eudemian Ethics*, except those books which share certain doctrines advanced in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This “first ethics,” Plebe maintained, reflects the predominant influence of Plato and, hence, is strongly “metaphysical.” It is inspired by an undeniable moral and intellectual rigorism. To Plebe’s mind, the “intermediary ethics,” which he dates in the Mitylenian period (345/44 – 343/42), includes the whole of the *Magna Moralia*, books IV, V and VI of the *Eudemian Ethics*, and books V, VI and VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This “intermediary ethics,” Plebe believed, is concerned with the practical needs and aspirations of individual man, as well as with the concrete actualities of historical existence. It also seeks to establish a working social harmony among different men. The “late ethics,” according to Plebe, must be dated in the so-called “master-years” of Aristotle (335/34 – 323). Plebe maintained that it comprises the remaining books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which are primarily “descriptive” in their content.

The evolutionary theories of Jaeger, as well as the many criticisms levelled against them, were reevaluated by R. Stark in what appears to have been a rather successful and sensible undertaking. Stark admitted — and in this he fully concurred with Jaeger — that there is a generic evolution in the ethical thought of Aristotle. He also conceded that this evolution begins with the *Protrepticus*, moves through the *Eudemian Ethics*, and culminates in the *Nicomachean

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2. A.-J. Festugière, *Aristote: Le Plaisir* (Paris, 1936), and G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles* (Munich, 1958), demonstrated that the treatment of pleasure in books IV, V and VI of the *Eudemian Ethics*, and in books V, VI, and VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is anterior to the treatment of the same subject in book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The basic ideas expressed in these “parallel” books were first expounded in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and are probably the basis of the view on pleasure discussed in the *Magna Moralia*.
He disagreed, however, with Jaeger's contention that this evolution proceeds in the form of a progressive "alienation" from Platonic philosophy, in other words, that it is primarily a progressive transition from a purely theoretic position (Protrepticus) to an essentially practical position. Stark maintained that Aristotle's ethics is always and everywhere an ingenious blend of the "normative" and the "workable," of theory and practice, of philosophic speculation and existential experience, in that these two sets of terms are always complementary. In this fashion Aristotle, according to Stark, escapes the one-sided intellectual rigorism of Plato's ethical position. This synthesis or integration of theoretic normativity and realistic practicability, Stark believed, is already manifest in the Protrepticus. Here, theoretic philosophy has the primary but practical function of supplying certain general practical guides for proper human action, including the correct political action. The same fundamental outlook, Stark maintained, can be found in book X, chapter 10, of the Nicomachean Ethics. It might therefore be inferred, Stark concluded, that in this particular regard Aristotle always retains the essential philosophic attitude which he first manifests in the Protrepticus.

Stark further contended that in his last major works Plato definitely asserts that politics — naturally, the "right" politics — is the ultimate object of all theoretic philosophy. Stark supported his statement, which in view of books X and XII of the Laws is certainly open to challenge, by referring to the (spurious?) Sixth Epistle, which he ascribed to Plato, dating it about 351-350. Aristotle, Stark concluded, always retains his "Platonism" to a certain degree, at least in his ethical writings. Stark reached this conclusion by insisting that the Protrepticus is much less "idealistic," and the Nicomachean Ethics much less "realistic" than Jaeger had suggested. Hence, according to this interpretation, from the very beginning Aristotle's ethical theories manifest a balance and mutual implementation of theory and practice. This reading sees Aristotle's ethical thought as an eminently workable "existential ethics," which fully accounts for the exigencies of the "human condition." Already in the Protrepticus, Stark observed, Aristotle emancipated himself, at least in part, from Plato, thus attaining a certain philosophic independence of thought — an independence which he managed to preserve.

Stark's argument seems to hinge on the question of whether or not the Aristotelian Protrepticus is in fact "a blend of theoretic

1. Stark denied the authenticity of the Magna Moralia, which, therefore, has no place in his particular evolutionary sequence.
2. R. Stark, op. cit., at pp.1 ff.
3. Ibid., at pp.5 ff.
4. Ibid., at pp.20 ff.
5. Ibid., at pp.93 ff.
(Platonic) speculation and practical application." On this particular point scholars disagree considerably. If, as Stark suggested, the Protrepticus already assumes in principle the basic philosophic position represented in the later Nicomachean Ethics, then there can hardly be a significant development in Aristotle's ethical thought. Hence, Jaeger's evolutionary theses, at least as regards the several Aristotelian works on ethics, would become wholly meaningless.

R.-A. Gauthier made a further effort to improve and amend the fundamental theses of Jaeger. Like Jaeger, Gauthier contended that the Eudemian Ethics definitely precedes the Nicomachean Ethics. He also emphasized that both of these treatises reflect essentially the same psychology. From all this Gauthier inferred that these two works were composed at approximately the same time — a theory already advanced by P. Moraux — and that both are anterior to the De Anima. Gauthier also maintained that the Eudemian Ethics does not adhere, as Jaeger suggested, to a "theological morality." Hence,

1. See, for instance, I. Düring, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Göteborg, 1961), passim. Düring holds that the Protrepticus is essentially "Aristotelian" rather than "Platonic," that is, it already displays some of the characteristics of Aristotle's later works on ethics. A.-H. Christou, Aristotle: Protrepticus — A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, 1964), passim, on the other hand, insists that the vast majority of the ideas and notions advanced in the Protrepticus are substantially "Platonic." They can frequently be traced back to some passage contained in Plato's dialogues.


3. It will be noted that in his analysis Gauthier heavily relies on F. J. Nuyens, L'Évolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote (translated by T. Schilling, Paris, 1948). Nuyens distinguishes between three phases in the development of Aristotle's psychology: the first phase is characterized by a (Platonic) dualism where soul and body are conceived as two wholly independent and often opposed entities. To this particular phase belongs the Eudemus (see, however, A.-H. Christou, "Eudemus or On the Soul: A Lost Aristotelian Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul," to appear in Mnemosyne, vol. 18 (1965),) and, to some extent, the Protrepticus, as well as the On Philosophy. F. J. Nuyens, op. cit. at pp. 100-106. But this "dualism" is also present in certain parts of the Organon, in books I-VII of the Physics, in the De Caelo, and in the De Generatione et Corruptione. Hence, Nuyens infers, all these works must have been composed prior to the death of Plato. See ibid., at pp. 106-123. The second phase, which Nuyens calls the period of "mechanistic instrumentalism," is characterized by a "collaboration" between soul and body, both of which remain, however, independent substances. The soul here uses the body as its tool or handmaid. This phase becomes manifest in certain passages from the Protrepticus, in the Historia Animalium, in books II and IV of the De Partibus Animalium, etc. See ibid., at pp. 147-171. But it is also present in the Prior Analytics, in the Posterior Analytics, in books A, B, M 9-10, K and N of the Metaphysics (see ibid., at pp. 171-184), in the Eudemian Ethics, in the Nicomachean Ethics (see ibid., at pp. 185-193), and in books II, III, VII and VIII of the Politics (see ibid., at pp. 194-197). The third phase no longer conceives of the body and soul as two separate substances, but "related" to one another analogous to the relationship of form and matter. The third phase first appears in book I of the De Partibus Animalium (see ibid., at pp. 302-304), and finds its complete and final expression in the De Anima.

it cannot be contemporary with book A of the *Metaphysics*. According to Gauthier, the actual ethical doctrines advocated in the *Eudemian Ethics* are almost identical with those advanced in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Gauthier also observed that Aristotle never really wrote a final and conclusive treatise on ethics, reflecting his mature thought. For such a conclusive ethics would have to take into account the psychology of the *De Anima*.

Nevertheless, it appears that the core of Jaeger's theses or hypotheses concerning the *genesis* of Aristotle's ethical doctrines, has on the whole retained its pre-eminence in the tradition of modern Aristotelian scholarship. Although Jaeger's theses have encountered objection, rejection and criticism — for when was there ever a time a great intellectual or scientific achievement did not attract opposition and criticism — they are still a general guide and, perhaps, the soundest starting point of good Aristotelian scholarship. One might dislike or find fault with Jaeger's views, but one cannot ignore them and still remain scholarly. No opposing theory of even remotely equal importance, effectiveness, general influence, and persuasiveness has been offered by the opponents of Jaeger. It might even be contended that, with some modifications and "adjustments" based on additional research, Jaeger's fundamental theories and methods will remain the dominant theses and the controlling methods of all future Aristotelian scholarship. Hence, all investigations which tackle the desperately difficult problems of the generic evolution of Aristotle's ethical writings will necessarily have to refer to Jaeger.

Anton-Hermann Chroust.

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1. F. DIRLMER, in his Commentary to *Aristoteles, Nicomachische Ethik* (Darmstadt, 1956), likewise maintains that Aristotle's basic philosophical attitude is the same in the *Eudemian Ethics* as it is in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Dirlmeier insists that throughout the ethical writings of Aristotle one can always find side by side "Platonic" and "Aristotelian" elements.