
Warren J. Murray

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Citez ce compte rendu

Cet ouvrage facile d'accès exprime des vues d'un grand intérêt sur un problème contemporain de la pensée chrétienne. Il a de plus le mérite de tenir constamment le lecteur près des sources bibliques.

Colette Dubeau


The title of Professor Henry Veatch's newest book might lead the casual reader to the conclusion that the author's sole intention was to examine the conflict between two schools of philosophy. In point of fact, however, a much more ambitious task is proposed, which is no less than the confrontation of two radically different kinds of knowledge, each of which is inexorably tied to a particular type of method, or "logic" as Professor Veatch would have it. These kinds of knowledge are usually designated as scientific and humanistic; and, as we have been told for some years now by no less imposing philosophical figures than Ortega y Gasset and C. P. Snow, they divide the intellectual world into two distinct cultures. Professor Veatch goes far beyond any vague re-hashing of the characteristics of these two cultures. His purpose is to show how they differ. He even makes so bold as to advance the thesis that what characterizes humanistic culture, as over against scientific culture, is the use of what-logic. Hardly have the average reader's shock and astonishment permitted him to continue his perusal when he realizes that the battle-lines have been drawn, and that he is about to become a spectator to a conflict not unlike that which pitted David against Goliath, or, perhaps better, Hercules against the hydra. The author undertakes the defense of the humanities in the name of their foremost discipline — traditional philosophy, proposing to show not only that traditional philosophy has a right to an autonomous existence, but that the type of knowledge which it obtains,


A.-M. Parent

L'A. traite de la Parole et de l'Esprit en deux parties bien distinctes; mais les deux thèmes sont intimement liés, dans la pensée de l'A. Il ne peut y avoir Esprit du Christ sans Parole du Christ.

Mais où peut-on reconnaître la Parole de Dieu? L'Écriture — paroles écrites — n'est pas la parole immédiate de Dieu, en ce sens qu'elle ne saurait constituer un appel direct et personnel adressé à chaque homme d'aujourd'hui. La Parole de Dieu découvre sa présence là où elle manifeste son efficacité, c'est-à-dire dans la prédication par l'intermédiaire de laquelle la Parole rejoint l'homme de chaque époque et de chaque milieu. Aussi la prédication ne serait-elle pas le moment de vérité de la théologie, comme le pense l'A.
and subsequently permits for all the humanities, is prior in importance, more basic to us as men, than that prototype which is suggested by the experimental sciences, and of which neo-analytic philosophy gives us the most systematic explicitation.

Professor Veatch is admirably equal to a task which few philosophers would dare undertake today, so that even if one is obliged to admit that some of the hydra’s heads remain, our modern-day Hercules has left no doubt that the beast will never be quite the same again. The author has a good knowledge of neo-analytic philosophy, and his attacks are almost always to the point. He avoids the pitfalls of vacuous style and dry pedantry. As a result, the book is as full of wit and charm as it is of concision and truly rigorous logic.

The central proposition of the book is that knowledge in the humanities is obtained through the use of a logic which seeks the “whats” or essences of things; whereas the knowledge obtained in the experimental sciences is one that is mediated by a logic whose concern is exclusively with relations or structures, and not at all with what things really are. Borrowing from Jonathan Swift’s famous Battle of the Books, he characterizes the first sort of logic as a bee-logic, and the second as a spider-logic. Such a comparison may be very useful, and is certainly amusing, especially as seen through the satire of a Swift. It would seem better, at first glance, to have referred the reader back to the original source of this comparison of bee and spider which, although considerably dryer in style than the version of the great satirist, would no doubt have made it more palatable to those readers of a scientific bent. This version is, of course, the one which Bacon gives in the Novum organum, no. xcv, wherein, by one of the most beautiful similes in philosophical literature, is expounded what the author believes to be the true attitude of the philosopher towards knowledge.

Those who have been concerned with the sciences have been either empiricists or rationalists. The empiricists are like the ant; they only collect and use; the relationalists are like the spider, who makes webs out of his own substance. But the bee takes a middle course. She gathers her material from the flowers of the garden and the fields, but transforms and digests it by her own power. The true concern of philosophy is not unlike this; for it neither depends solely or principally on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the materials which it has gathered from natural history and mechanical experiment and store them up whole in the memory as it found them; but rather lays them up in the understanding changed and digested.

Bacon’s version brings in an empirical ant as well, and the context makes it evident that by philosophy he means the experimental sciences. Swift’s version has no need of the ant; nor, for that matter, does that of Professor Veatch, both of whom wish to oppose the humanist bee to the modern (analyst) spider. A careful reading of Swift’s narrative shows several reasons why the author of Two Logics might be more in sympathy with the modified comparison of dean Swift than with the original baconian form. What is at stake here is not just the comparison of bee and spider, of traditional humanist and modern analyst, but also the very conditions of the battle to be fought. On whose territory is the war to be waged?

Swift answers: “‘SIRR’, replied the spider, ‘if it were not for breaking an old custom in our family, never to stir abroad against an enemy, I should come to teach you better manners.’” And again, if one wishes to know what sort of battle will be generally carried on by our spider, Swift leaves no doubt:

At this the spider, having swelled himself into the size and posture of a disputant, began his argument in the true spirit of controversy, with a resolution to be heartily scurrilous and angry, to urge on his own reasons, without the least regard to the answers or objections of his opposite, and fully predetermined in his mind against all conviction.

Thus, in full knowledge of the general nature of the antagonists, and of the sort of skirmish to be expected, Professor Veatch charges into battle, forcing us to drop the happy similitude of Hercules and the hydra in order to adopt the even happier one of the bee and the spider.
Prof. D. C. Veatch has recently drawn our attention to the differences between the two logics: substantive logic and what-logic. He has put it this way:

In short, the proposition is this: Recognize a difference between the two logics and abide by it; it should then be possible to accord a proper status to both that substantive knowledge which we have of ourselves and of the everyday reality of the world and that calculative knowledge which in the sciences enables us so successfully to keep going on from phenomenon to phenomenon (p. 265).

Certainly some complementarity would seem to be in order. The problem here is that Prof. Veatch has so successfully shown the limitations of a relating-logic that one is perhaps justified in wondering whether this complementarity can be quite what he now makes it out to be; for, if what he has shown is true, then it must be admitted that a what-logic is not only necessary for the humanities, but also, in some way, for the experimental sciences; and that this what-logic must preceed a relating-logic in these same sciences. After all, was not Bacon proposing a bee-like activity for the scientist? Moreover, has not a real contact with experience always been the distinguishing mark of the experimental sciences as compared to other disciplines of an almost pure spider nature? And, does not this necessarily bee-like activity of the scientist require him to make use of a conceptual, rather than a relating logic? Perhaps more care should be taken before identifying the total method or logic of the sciences with that proposed by various schools of neo-analytic philosophy. In this respect more attention might be paid to the scientist than to the philosopher who claims to have the same method, but whose criteria of judgment fall far short of those demanded by this method as it is practiced in the sciences.

Whatever might be one's opinion on the question raised by Prof. Veatch, it is difficult not to find this book immensely interesting and highly stimulating. It certainly merits as one of the most important contributions to the debate between the humanities and the sciences to have appeared in recent years; in brief, a highly provocative book, an one not to be missed.

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