Résumé de l'article

L'auteur du De Intellectu connaît le De Anima d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise et il offre une interprétation néoplatonicienne de ce texte dans sa considération de la doctrine noétique d'Aristote du De Anima 3.5. Cette interprétation révèle précisément cette autonomie philosophique par opposition à un examen purement philologique des textes aristotéliciens que le présent volume explore. Le De Intellectu, en raison de son caractère néoplatonicien, doit dater de quelque deux à quatre siècles après Alexandre. Il ne contient aucune référence à un Aristote de Milet, maître d'Alexandre, contrairement à ce qui a été suggéré.
THE DE INTELLECTU REVISITED

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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of the present volume to explore how commentators on Aristotle reveal their philosophical independence from a purely philological examination of Aristotelian texts by virtue of their exegetical style, practice, and method. We offer this paper as an examination of that very independence as it is shown forth in the reception and interpretation of the analogy of light in Aristotle De Anima 3.5 in two texts, the De Anima (henceforth DA) of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the De Intellectu (henceforth DI), a work which, while dependent upon the former treatise, modifies its doctrine with reference to Neoplatonic noetic.
I. EXEGETICAL STYLE IN THE DE INTELLECTU

Schroeder argues that the DI exhibits the influence of Plotinus.\(^1\) Because Porphyry in the *Vita Plotini* 14 tells us that Alexander (sc. of Aphrodisias) was read in Plotinus’ seminar, scholars have sought the influence of Alexander, particularly the noetic doctrine of the *DA*, on Plotinus. Sometimes they seek the influence indiscriminately of the *DA* and the *DI* in that author. Obviously if there is a question about the Alexandrian authorship of the *DI*, it is unjustifiable to seek the influence of that work upon Plotinus. Still, there are remarkable similarities between the *DI* and Plotinus. We are persuaded that the influence runs in the other direction, i.e., that Plotinus influences the *DI*. The first example of an author influenced by Alexander who also consults Plotinus is Themistius in the fourth century.\(^2\) Thus, if the *DI* betrays the influence of Plotinus, the provenance of that work should be assigned to a period much later than that of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Schroeder discusses Alexander, *DA* 42.19-43.11 where Alexander treats of the genesis of natural illumination. He there argues that illumination is to be explained as a qualitative change (*kinêsis*) induced according to the relation or juxtaposition (*schêsis*) of the source of light and the illumined object and that illumination is a joint effect of both the source of illumination and the illumined object.\(^3\)

Accattino and Donini object to Schroeder’s taking both the sources of colour and light and the coloured or illumined objects as the referents of “change (*kinêsis*) from both” (\(\alpha\pi\tau\omicron\upsilon\chi\rho\omicron\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\alpha\ ) […] \(\tau\omicron\nu\phi\omicron\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\) (42.23-43.1).\(^4\) Even if we adopt their view of the proper referents of “change (*kinêsis*) from both” (\(\alpha\pi\tau\omicron\chi\rho\omicron\nu\nu\nu\nu\tau\alpha\ ) \(\tau\omicron\nu\phi\omicron\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\) (43.2-3),” here presence is interpreted with respect to relation, not *vice versa*. Therefore the source of light is not the sole cause of illumination: Both the source of light and the illumined object are necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of illumination. Yet the referents suggested by *AD* Bruns properly contains in a parenthesis. It is preferable to look before the parenthetical statement in which they are contained to the distinction at the beginning of the sentence between the source of light and colour and the diaphanous.

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AD also argue against Schroeder’s view that kinêsis is to be viewed as a qualitative change in the potentially transparent. They show that Alexander In De Sensu 131.20-134.19 denies that illumination is kinêsis in the sense of alteration. Alexander says (132.2-6):

> For air and the diaphanous are not illumined through change (kinêsis), but all at once the diaphanous and the illumined come about from that which is potentially diaphanous and illumined, passing from a state of not having to a condition of having, not through receiving and being affected (kineisthai). For it is by relation and presence (σχέσει γάρ καὶ παρουσίᾳ) of the source of light toward that which is by nature to be illumined that light is brought about.

The genesis of illumination through this relation is contrasted with the causation of sound and scent which required a transition (diadosis) and change (kinêsis) that takes place in time (132.14-15). It is to be noticed that the kinêsis that is rejected here is an alteration communicated over time through a medium (sc. air). In Alexander, DA 43.1-2, illumination arises through τις...κίνησις, “a kind of kinêsis.” The function of the indefinite pronoun here is doubtless to dissociate the change involved from that kinêsis that we find in the case of sound and scent. Alexander says (DA 43.10-11): “For it is by relation of the source which is capable of illumining and those things that are capable of being illumined that light is. For light is not a body.” The incorporeal nature of light forbids that light be transmitted through a corporeal medium over time. Here we can see Alexander’s understanding that light is not an emanation from a source of light (42.20-21).

AD also advance another text, which, since it exhibits strong similarities to the In De Sensu, may be thought to reflect the genuine position of Alexander: The treatise in the Mantissa entitled “How seeing comes about according to Aristotle” (143.4-18). The author asserts that sight does not require a change (tropê) that comes about in air and the illumined object such as occurs in objects that are altered (alloiômenoi). The author denies that illumination consists in an alteration (alloiôsis) defined as a change (kinêsis) that comes about in time and involves transition (kata metabolên). Illumination comes about by the presence (parousia) of the luminous source and its relation with or juxtaposition (schesis) with the illumined object. This relationship is compared with that between something which is on the right of something else. When the object to the right is removed, there is no change in the object with respect to which it is now relocated. This illustration might lead us to think that illumination simply is a relation, so that a change in that relation need not affect the object or objects with respect to which the relation comes about or is changed. This comparison leads Sharples to believe that illumination is a “Cambridge change.”

The author of “How seeing comes about according to Aristotle” argues that the greatest proof that the diaphanous is not subject to change or alteration is that such

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5. Ibid., p. 181-182.
6. Ibid., p. 181.
change or alteration takes place in time, whereas illumination is not subject to temporal duration (143.23-28, trans. Sharples):

[The following] is the greatest sign that what comes about is neither an alteration nor a change (μήτε ἄλλοισιν μήτε κίνησιν) of the transparent: everything that changes (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον) does so in time and proceeds first in a shorter time to what is closer, next and in a greater [time] in this way to what is further. But light and the forms of the things that are seen come to be altogether and in a similar way in all the transparent over against them, as also do shadow and darkness.

We have seen how it is that, in the In De Sensu, sound and scent involve a communication of change over a distance and in time. Doubtless in the present text it is the same kind of corporeal change that is denied to illumination, as in the In De Sensu. It is doubtful that the author simply means that light is a relation. He is rather saying that illumination occurs under the conditions of juxtaposition. At DA 43.1-3 Alexander speaks of a "certain change [...] according to presence and a kind of relation" (τις [...] κίνησις [...] κατά παρουσίαν τε καὶ ποιῶν σχέσιν). It is change in accordance with a relationship. Similarly in “How seeing comes about according to Aristotle” we read (143.18) that the apparent alteration of the diaphanous occurs κατά σχέσιν. In De Sensu 31.11: κατά σχέσιν; In De Sensu 42.27-43.1: ἀλλὰ κατά σχέσιν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸ ποιῶν φωτίζειν περικότος ποτέ μὲν πεφωτισται, ποτὲ δ’ οὐ; (here we have as in DA 43.3 ποιῶν σχέσιν); In De Sensu 133.24-25: ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε σχέσει τὸν φωτίζοντος πρὸς αὐτό.

Alexander then avoids that language of change that would induce us to think that illumination is temporal and conveyed by means of a material medium. He explains the relationship (schesis) necessary to the generation of illumination with examples of relationships that avoid internal change. Yet it is improbable that Alexander thinks that illumination is a relationship and that it is a “Cambridge change.” We may think of our present understanding of magnetism. Magnetism comes about when a negative and a positive pole are juxtaposed: Yet we do not say that magnetism is that juxtaposition.

It is significant that Alexander at DA 43.3 uses mirrors as an example of illumination which involves juxtaposition. The word κάτοπτρον can refer to any reflective surface, not just the artifact. Now the mirror or reflective surface is not changed qua bronze, water, etc. by the fact of illumination. Yet it is changed or altered qua reflective surface, reflecting now one thing, and then another. We hope that this interpretation has been justified by the argument above. By a parity of reasoning, a diaphanous object is affected qua diaphanous by its manifestation of light or colour (e.g., being now one colour and then another) without there being any change in its material sub-

8. At In De Sensu 31.16-18, Alexander says: “It is clear that light is a relation, and is dependent upon a relation (ὅτι δὲ σχέσις τις καὶ κατά σχέσιν) between the illuminant and the illumined, and is not substance and body, from the fact that <light> does not persist even for a little while when the illuminant has been turned away” (trans. Towey). Towey does not translate the τις. It is a “sort of” relation and what sort it is is defined by the words “dependent upon a relation.”

strate. Again, there is no necessity to think that illumination (or reflection) is the relation between the source of light and the illumined object.

Schroeder is concerned to argue that illumination is a joint effect of the source of light and the illumined object. As long as we understand that the kinēsis that comes about is not in time and not conveyed through a material medium, we may still see it as (in some undefined sense appropriate to illumination) a kind of qualitative change that requires both the source of illumination and the illumined object. AD further take Schroeder to task for applying the pattern of joint causation to the analogy of the Active Intellect to light (DA 88.26-89.6) in such a way that the intelligibles, once abstracted by the human mind from their material substrate, make their own contribution to intelligibility. They argue that Schroeder, having misunderstood the relationship between the source of light and the illumined object at DA 42.19-43.11, may not apply his understanding of that relationship to the Active Intellect and intelligibility. Yet surely that interpretation is justified.

Plotinus polemicizes against Alexander’s understanding of illumination as a joint effect of the source of light and the illumined object. Rather illumination is the effect solely of the source of light which is both the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of illumination. At 4.5.7.33-49 Plotinus, taking issue with Alexander, DA 42.19-43.11, stresses that sensible illumination is uniquely an effect of the source. This difference on the question of sensible illumination reappears as both authors draw the analogy of light. As we have seen, Alexander in the DA sees intelligibility as a joint effect in accordance with the juxtaposition of the Active Intellect and the intelligible objects even as illumination is a joint effect of the juxtaposition of the source of illumination and the illumined object. For Plotinus, the supreme hypostasis, the One, is the unique source of noetic illumination for the hypostasis of Intellect (5.1.6.27-34).

To return to the DI, the intellect from without is there said to confer intellect in the state of possession (the hexis) on the material intellect (107.29-34 ; 111.29-32). This view appears to contradict the view of Alexander, DA that intellect in the state of possession is reached by the human intellect in the natural course of its evolution. At the same time the human intellect does, according to the DI, of itself advance to the abstraction of intelligible forms from matter and the hexis. Its role is not, as the role of the eye in vision, passive: It was already intellect before it entered into act and the act of intellection belongs to itself. Yet it is said to be augmented and per-

10. AD, p. 290.
fected by the intellect from without (111.29-112.5 ; cf. 110.31-111.5). So how do we reconcile the role of the intellect from without in producing the *hexis* and the apparent autonomy of the human intellect?

Accattino accuses Schroeder of confusing the development and the completion of the potential intellect, which culminates in the thought of that which is by its own nature intelligible, with the perfection which that object of thought confers on the intellective faculty. There is no confusion here. The Active Intellect, as that object which is by its own nature intelligible, is present to the potential intellect from the first. As such, i.e., as the primary object of intellecutive vision, it enables the potential intellect to develop to the *hexis* and ultimately to its direct knowledge of the Active Intellect. As such it both progressively perfects the potential intellect as it develops and crowns that process with the ultimate perfection in which the human intellect achieves direct knowledge of the Active Intellect in its role as that which is by its own nature intelligible.

Now Accattino also agrees with Schroeder that the apprehension of the object of intellection that is intelligible by its own nature and the apprehension of that which is intelligible by its own nature (the intellect from without) is simultaneous. In the analogy of light, we behold the light and the objects that it illumines simultaneously. Even so we behold the potential intelligibles and the intellect from without simultaneously.

The *DI* offers the following analogy of the intellect from without to light (B.2 111.27-36):

That which is intellect by nature and from without becomes co-operative with the intellect that is in us, since the other objects of thought would not even exist in potentiality unless there were an object of thought existing in its own nature [i.e., independently]. Since it is indeed an object of thought in its own nature when through being thought it has come to exist as intellect in the thinker and is thought from without, it is imm mortal and instills in the material intellect the state of possession (ἐντίθησιν τὴν ἕξιν) that results in its thinking the potential objects of thought. For just as light, being productive of actual vision, is itself seen along with its concomitants [sc. illumined things] (καὶ ἁρμόδια ὁπίσθεν καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐτῷ) and it is through it that colour [is visible], so also the intellect from without becomes the cause of thinking for us, when it is itself thought [by us], not by producing intellect itself, but by, through its own nature, completing the intellect that exists and bringing it to its proper [activities].

In the article in question, Schroeder nowhere denies that the human intellect autonomously abstracts intelligible form from matter and progresses to the preservation and knowledge of form. It is rather that the intellect from without is present to the human
mind, as a source of intellectual illumination, which enables the human intellect in its progress from the first. The human mind beholds the intellect from without at first and is illumined and enabled by it.

Sharples observes concerning that light that is seen together with its concomitants: “Alan Lacey points out to me that it is the source of light that is seen, rather than the light that it produces.” Lacey is correct in this interpretation. In this we may see the difference between the use of the analogy of light in the DA and the DI.

In the DI the intellect from without (or Active Intellect) is constantly present to the human intellect as an object of vision from the first. It is that primary vision of the Active Intellect that enables the human intellect to abstract, conserve, and know form. In the DA, by contrast, the vision of the Active Intellect consummates a noetic pilgrimage on the part of the human intellect.

Accattino establishes two stages: (1) the development of the human intellect; (2) its perfection and illumination by the intellect from without. On our interpretation there are not two stages. That simultaneity that Schroeder notices (and Accattino accepts) demonstrates that the intellect from without is active throughout the process of development. As Schroeder comments:

Now when we see visible objects, we see at the same time the light by which they are illuminated. The vision of light and of the visibles may then be distinguished as two aspects of a single event, without implying the temporal priority of either. Thus the Intellect from without qua object of thought remains an abiding and illuminating presence throughout the increase and completion of the human intellect.

This intellectual illumination contrasts with that which we find in Alexander, DA. In the DA the human mind progresses in a natural evolution from the potential intellect, to the intellect in a state of possession, to the intellect in act. It is at that final stage that the natural and metaphysical orders meet in a moment of illumination as the natural intelligibles are put into that juxtaposition with the Active Intellect which allows intellectual illumination. In the DI, on the other hand, the human intellect is always illumined by the light of the intellect from without throughout its progress.

Schroeder compares the passage 111.27-36 with Plotinus 5.5.7.2-8 where Plotinus tells us how the human eye sees by means of light:

One thing is an object of vision for it, the form of the sensible object, another is that by means of which [i.e., the light] it sees the form of it [the sensible object], which [medium] is also an object of sensation for it, while being other than the form [of the sensible object] and the cause of the form of being seen and is concomitantly seen (συνορώμενον) both in the form and upon the form; for this reason it [the light] does not yield a clear sensation of itself, because the eye is turned toward the illuminated object; but whenever it [i.e., the light] is nothing but itself, it sees it in an immediate intuition.

Plotinus continues to show how this understanding of sensible illumination applies to the illumination of the hypostasis of Intellect by the One (16-21):

This then is what the seeing Intellect is like; this also sees by another light the things illuminated by that first nature [i.e., the One or Good as the sun of the intelligible universe], and sees the light in them; when it turns its attention to the nature of the things illuminated, it sees the light less, but if it abandons the things it sees and looks at the medium by which it sees them, it looks at a pure light and the source of light.

We may notice the parallel between 5.5.7.5-6 “concomitantly seen” (συνορώμενον) and DI 111.33: “is itself seen along with [its concomitants]” (ὁρᾶται… σύν). We have seen that Plotinus polemicizes against Alexander, DA in his use of the analogy of the Active Intellect to light (in which the Plotinian One plays a role similar to that of the Active Intellect in Alexander): The source is for Plotinus uniquely the cause of illumination, which is not produced, as in Alexander, DA, in the juxtaposition of the source and the illumined object. The intellect from without in the DI is the abiding presence which is the unique source of illumination to the human intellect which could not progress without that illumination from the first. That source is always seen together with the intelligible objects that it illumines. Yet the human intellect is not immediately aware of it. In the Plotinian passage the One as unique source of illumination is always present to Intellect, but that presence is not thematized in its habitual act of intellection.

The relationship between the One and Intellect in Plotinus is adapted by the author of the DI to the relationship between the intellect from without (or Active Intellect) to the human intellect. As the One illumines the Intellect and makes possible its acts of intellection, so does the intellect from without illumine the human intellect and make possible its intellective acts. We have seen that in the DI the intellect from without imparts the hexis of intellection (107.33-34: ἡξῖν ἔμποιόν τίνι νοητικήν; 111.31: ἐντίθησιν τὴν ἡξῖν). At a lower noetic level Plotinus speaks of the human intellect in its own characteristic act of intellect as “that state [hexis] of the soul which is one of the things that derive from Intellect” (ἡν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡξῖν ἐντίθησιν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ νοῦ). Here the human soul derives the hexis from Intellect: We may compare the way in which the intellect from without instills the hexis in the human intellect in the DI. The human intellect in Plotinus does not progress of itself to intellection, but derives intellection from the hypostasis of Intellect. Similarly in the DI the human intellect, while it progresses through stages to intellection, derives all of its progress from its primal vision of the Active Intellect which may be seen as corresponding to Intellect in Plotinus. The derivation of intellection on the part of the human intellect from Intellect rehearses the timeless derivation of intellection on the part of Intellect from its vision of the One.

Where Plotinus polemicizes against the analogy of light drawn in Alexander’s DA, the DI is pursuing mutatis mutandis a scheme of intellectual illumination very like that of Plotinus. It is reasonable to think that the DI, often indiscriminately used

by scholars along with the DA as a source for Plotinus, is in this instance using Plotinus himself as a source.

Accattino urges against Schroeder’s Plotinian interpretation that the simultaneous character of the vision of light and of the illumined objects is to be found in authentic works of Alexander. Accattino cites the In De Sensu 135.11-13 and compares DA 42.19-43.11. Both passages speak of the juxtaposition of the luminous source and the illumined object. In the De Sensu the discussion of the perception of light is preceded, as we have seen, by a contrast between the production of scent and the production of vision. In the case of scent, there is a cause that arouses scent which is communicated through a medium (air) over a period of time. In the case of light, the production of light is atemporal and it arises, not from a source that exercises an effect over an intervening medium, but in the juxtaposition of the source of light and the illumined objects. Thus vision is also atemporal. Perhaps the light is thus seen at the same time as the illumined objects, but this point is not brought out directly in the text.

Accattino then also cites Alexander, DA 42.19-43.11 for the same simultaneity. It is very difficult to find such a doctrine in the latter passage. Alexander does say that when one withdraws the illumined object, illumination ceases, as also, when one withdraws the source of illumination, the illumination comes to an end: Alexander is arguing for illumination as a joint effect of source of light and illumined object, as we have seen. Perhaps this statement implies that the source of light and the illumined objects are seen concomitantly, but this idea would be there only by implication. What is more, this passage is about the genesis of natural illumination and does not occur in the context of the analogy of the Active Intellect to light. Therefore one asks after its relevance. In any case, as we have seen, the production of illumination by juxtaposition stands in direct conflict with the monistic view of illumination, both sensible and intelligible, in the DI.

At 111.34-36, the intellect from without, there compared with light, is said to become “the cause of thinking for us, when it is itself thought [by us], not by producing intellect itself, but by, through its own nature, completing (τελειῶν) the intellect that exists and bring it to its proper activities.” The potential intellect produces objects of thought by being completed (τελειομένος; τελειοθείς, 112.2-3) by the intellect from without. Schroeder argues that this use of “complete” (τελειῶν) reflects Plotinus 5.1.7.16-17, i.e., in the Plotinian chapter we discuss above in the context of our discussion of illumination in the DI and Plotinus, where Plotinus says that the hypostasis of Intellect “is perfected (τελειούσα) by it [the One] and from it unto substantial existence.”

24. F.M. SCHROEDER, “The Potential or Material Intellect and the Authorship of the De Intellectu: A Reply to B.C. Bazán,” p. 116; at p. 116, n. 36, Schroeder also compares Plotinus 3.8.11.15-17 and 5.4.2.4-5 (with Henry and Schwyzer construing νοητὸν as the One and with Volkmann reading ἀποτελειουμένη [line 51]).
Accattino objects that in Alexander, *DA* 43.5-8 (this is the passage discussed above as illustrating Alexander’s theory of illumination), Alexander says: “When there is something which through them [the *illuminata*] is capable of being transparent and this in act, then they are eminently and in act transparent when they receive their perfection (τελειότης) and their native form *qua* transparent from the light. For light is the act and completion (τελειότης) of the transparent *qua* transparent.”25 Accattino admits the lack of precise verbal parallels, but insists that the idea expressed is the same. He observes, however, that the uses of the verb “complete” (τελειοῦν) in the passage from the *DI* occur in the context of the analogy of light. He says that it should not surprise us that, after having introduced the parallel between light and the intellect from without, Alexander can say that the latter perfects the potential intellect.

In *DA* 43.5-8, which concerns illumination as such (i.e., not light as the term of an analogy), the *illuminata* receive their perfection from the light. At 111.34-36, which by contrast undertakes an analogical use of illumination, it is the potential intellect that receives its perfection from the intellect from without (compared with the light that actualizes vision). It is difficult to determine the relevance of Accattino’s comparison.

II. AUTHORSHIP, PROSOPOGRAPHY, AND UNITY OF THE *DE INTELLECTU*

Now that we have clarified that the *DI* is to be regarded as a late and Neoplatonizing work which views the doctrine of Alexander’s *DA* through the lens of Plotinian noetic, we must also conclude that the *DI* is not a work from the hand of Alexander of Aphrodisias. A major reason that scholarship has been prevented from evaluating the true character and provenance of the *DI* is attachment to a prosopographical identification of the “Aristotle” referred to in *DI* 110.4 with an Aristotle of Mytilene who is then thought to be the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This prosopographical claim has been previously examined in Schroeder’s work (“The Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of Aphrodisias,” 1981; “Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus,” 1984; “The Provenance of the *De Intellectu* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias,” 1997) and in *ST*. We wish now to defend this previously expressed skepticism in the light of contemporary scholarship. We shall see that the identification is groundless. Since it cannot be established, there is no reason why that identification would quarrel with the conclusions concerning authorship, date, and provenance set forth in the first part of this paper.

We may first turn to a question of prosopography. At *De Intellectu* 110.4 we read: “And I heard <views> concerning the intellect from without from Aristotle and I have preserved them for myself” (Ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ †

Ἀριστοτέλους, ἃ διεσωσάμην). Suppose that we construe “I heard” (ἤκουσα) with “from Aristotle” (παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους). The verb “hear” (ἀκούειν) with the preposition “from” (παρὰ) governing the genitive case refers, in all of its attestations, to oral instruction. Now if the “Aristotle” of this sentence is the Stagirite, then we are presented with a baffling crux. Since the text is clearly to be dated well after the Stagirite, there cannot be reference here to contemporary oral instruction.

Zeller emended the text to read “from Aristocles” (Ἀριστοκλέους), so that it would refer, not to the Stagirite, but to Aristocles of Messene who was a contemporary of Alexander. On this basis, Trabucco gave us a whole new chapter in the history of ancient philosophy concerning Aristocles. Yet there is no doctrinal agreement between the preserved texts of Aristocles and the De Intellectu. Subsequently Moraux found in Galen a reference to one Aristotle of Mytilene as an important Aristotelian philosopher. On this basis he retained the reading of the MSS., but took the reference to be to this Aristotle of Mytilene. He then found a reference in Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics to an “our Aristotle” (ἡμέτερος Ἀριστοτέλης) whom he further identified with Aristotle of Mytilene. On this basis, Moraux, in his large study of Greek Aristotelianism, provides a chapter on the noetic of Aristotle of Mytilene based on the De Intellectu. Accattino, independently of Moraux, also detected a reference to an “Aristotle,” contemporary teacher of Alexander, in the same text.

ST find titles of works in the De Anima Mantissa (the collection of texts in which the De Intellectu is to be found) that invite comparison with the passage at hand:

(1) Τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκείου (“[Selections] from Aristotle concerning what is first endeared to us”), 150.119.

26. Bruns seems to have supplied the obelus out of deference to Zeller.

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In these examples the phrase τὰ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν means “the views derived from Aristotle.” On the basis of these parallels, we venture an emendation at 110.4: ἤκουσα δὲ <τὰ> περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους ὃ διεσωσάμην (“I heard <the> [views] on the intellect from without [derived from] Aristotle.”).

This emendation severs the link between “hears” (ἀκούειν) and the genitive so that there is no necessary reference to oral instruction. It also allows us to understand by “Aristotle” the Stagirite. If this emendation is adopted, there is no need to identify the “Aristotle” of the passage with Aristotle of Mytilene (or any other homonymous “Aristotle”).

Opsomer and Sharples argue that there is no necessity for the emendation advanced by ST. They construe “hear from Aristotle” (ἀκούειν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους) with “about the intellect from without” (περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν). Thus we may understand the text to mean: “I also heard, about the intellect from without from Aristotle, [things] which I preserved.” Again the link between ἤκουειν and παρὰ and the genitive is severed, so that we may continue to understand that the “Aristotle” of the text is the Stagirite. In so doing, they revert to something very like the position that Moraux originally adopted before he engaged in his prosopographical enquiries: “J’ai eu connaissance d’une théorie d’Aristote sur l’intellect extérieur, et je l’ai conservée fidèlement.” Opsomer and Sharples properly argue that if we construe “hear” (ἀκούειν) with “from Aristotle” (παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους) then the author shall in the third person be explaining to Aristotle what his own motives are for introducing his views on the intellect from without.

Accattino sees two possibilities, each with its own problems: (1) The “Aristotle” of 110.4 and 110.5 is the same person. Yet, if this is the case, why does the author introduce the name “Aristotle” a second time one line after its first mention and not use a pronoun as in 110.25 to refer to the Aristotle concerned? (At 110.5 we hear about the concerns that motivated Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without (τὰ... κινήσαντα Ἀριστοτέλει εἰς θύραθεν τοῦ θύραθεν νοῦν) and at 110.24-25 we have “these are the concerns that motivated him” (ταῦτα... τὰ κινήσαντα ἐκεῖνον): (2) The “Aristotle” of 110.4 and the “Aristotle” of 110.5 are different persons. Yet it must strike us as strange that the author has not given us some indication of the difference in person other than the simple repetition of the name. The view that those...
who do not take the “Aristotle” of 110.4 to be a teacher of Alexander cannot explain the repetition of “Aristotle” at 110.5 is the major axis of Accattino’s argument.37

There are, however, other explanations of why the “Aristotle” of 110.4 is reprised at 110.5. The first “Aristotle” occurs in a statement of tradition, a tradition derived from Aristotle. The second Aristotle is Aristotle as interpreted by that tradition. So the first Aristotle is indeed the Stagirite, viewed as standing at the head of a tradition. The second Aristotle is that Aristotle as understood by that tradition that the author of the DI is relating. In the interpretation of ST: “I heard (or read) the things in a tradition derived from Aristotle concerning the intellect from without which things I have carefully preserved. That tradition holds that what moved Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without were the following things.”38

Opsomer and Sharples are concerned lest the ST emendation at 110.4 be thought to provide a title, so that the object of “I heard” would be a work entitled: “The Views on the Intellect from Without Derived from Aristotle.” They argue that the particle γὰρ at 110.5 refers back to “which I have preserved” and explains why the views preserved were worth preserving. In the case of other uses of the particle following a title in Alexander, the particle shows “a logical connection between the sentence following the title and a controversy already indicated in the title.”39 That is not the case here. They also point out that the other titles observe a different order: “The Views derived from Aristotle on x,” whereas here the phrase “on the intellect from without” precedes the phrase “from Aristotle.” Also the other titles refer to Stoic doctrine, 150.119 to “what is first endeared to us” (περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου) and 169.33 and 172.16 to “what is in our power” (περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). The function of the prepositional phrase παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους (“from Aristotle”) is in each case to distinguish the Aristotelian usage from the Stoic sense of the term concerned.40

Nevertheless it may be urged that there could have been a phrase identical in format to the relevant Mantissa titles: “The [views] derived from Aristotle concerning the intellect from without (Τὰ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν) which the author of the DI has restructured. So the point is that all of the components of a title paralleled in the Mantissa are here. However, the compelling reason for retaining the emendation of ST is that the definite relative pronoun ἃ requires a specific antecedent which would be supplied by substantive phrase “<the> [views] on the intellect

37. This argument is anticipated in AD, p. XXVII, n. 27. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 255 and n. 21 remark that AD (p. XXVII, n. 77) here reject the emendation advanced by ST “partly because of the emendation it involves”: curiously they do not complain of the emendation itself, although such a reservation might be seen as advancing their argument.
39. Ibid., p. 255-256; and Quaestio 2.12; and Ethical Problems 7.
40. J. OPSOMER, R. SHARPLES, “Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 254-256. Actually, as they (ibid., p. 255) observe, ST do not construe these words as a title. They also argue that the particle γὰρ at 110.5 would point back to the noetic argument of the previous section.
We do not need to think of the phrase as a title in order to accomplish this argument.

If then we follow ST at 110.4, then what we have is an announcement of the author’s subject: “The things in a tradition derived from Aristotle concerning the intellect from without.” If this is the case, then there need be no embarrassment at the reprise of “Aristotle” at 110.5 where the author then tells us what were the reasons that were said to induce Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without. Accattino refers to the Greek produced by the construal of Opsomer and Sharples as a “barbarous expression” (espressione cosi barbara) although he does not explain this harsh judgment. In any case, the emendation advanced by ST does not present infelicitous Greek, if that is the concern, and may on that ground be preferred to the construal by Opsomer and Sharples.

Accattino compares “according to Aristotle” (κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη) for reference to the Stagirite at 106.19: “Intellect, according to Aristotle, is threefold” (νοῦς ἐστι κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη τριττός) and 113.3: “If really we must assume that according to Aristotle” (εἰ ὅλως ὑπολαμβάνειν χρὴ κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλη κτλ.) and wonders why, if the author intended to refer to the Stagirite here, he would not use the same formula? The answer to his question is surely that the author intends to relate a tradition that he has received concerning why Aristotle introduces the intellect from without and is not (as in these passages) proceeding apodictically to explain Aristotle.

Accattino divides the argument of the DJ as follows:

A. 106.19-110.3. Alexander expounds his theory in his own person.

B.1 110.4-25. Alexander recounts a lecture he has heard from Aristotle of Mytilene explaining what were the motives that induced Aristotle the Stagirite to introduce the intellect from without. Here Alexander refers to a tradition that must be connected to the “Aristotle” of 110.4 (the “were said” [ἐλέγετο] of the following line supports the idea that we are speaking of a tradition).

B.2. 110.25-112.5. The author advances his own theory about the intellect from without.

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41. We owe this observation to Schroeder’s colleague Margaret Reesor. W.W. GOODWIN and C.B. GULICK (Greek Grammar, Boston, New York, Chicago, London, Atlanta, Dallas, Columbus, San Francisco, Ginn and Company, 1930) remark: “The antecedent of a relative may be omitted when it can easily be supplied from the context, especially if it is indefinite” (§ 1 026). They remark further (§ 1 027): “In such cases it is a mistake to say that ταῦτα, ἐκεῖνο, etc. are understood […]”. The relative clause here really becomes a substantive and contains its antecedent within itself.” J. OPSOMER and R. SHARPLES (“Alexander of Aphrodisias, De intellectu 110.4,” p. 253) translate DI 110.4-5: “I also heard about the intellect from without, from Aristotle, (things) which I preserved.” This translation obviously does, contrary to the rule set forth by Goodwin and Gulick, understand or supply an antecedent pronoun. The relative pronoun here requires a specific antecedent as provided by the ST emendation.

42. P. ACCATTINO, Alessandro di Afrodisia, De Intellectu, p. 13, n. 13. The tone of this criticism reflects that of ibid., p. 52, in his critique of SCHROEDER (“The Provenance of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias”) and of AD, p. xxvi, n. 76 with respect to ST, p. 19 ff. on Aristotle of Mytilene. We have not bothered to reply in kind.


44. Ibid., p. 12-13.
C.1. 112.5-113.12. With the unattributed words “wishing to show that the intellect was immortal…” (βουλόμενος δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἀθάνατον δεικνύναι…) Alexander again introduces the voice of Aristotle of Mytilene who offers a Stoicizing view of the ubiquity of the intellect from without.

C.2. 113.12-24. Alexander offers an alternative interpretation to the ubiquity of the intellect from without in which he rejects the views of Aristotle of Mytilene.

There are two approaches to the problems of the *DI*. One belongs to textual recension, the other to prosopography. We may begin with textual recension. To take Aristotle of Mytilene as the referent of “Aristotle” (Ἀριστοτέλους) provides a convenient solution for the crux at 110.4. Accattino is then able to see Aristotle of Mytilene as the referent of “wishing” (βουλόμενος) at 112.5, so that we need not suppose a lacuna at this point in the MS.45

If we approach these questions from the horizon of prosopography, however, a different picture emerges. The onus of proof is always on the scholar who advances a prosopographical identification. For the purposes of prosopography the evidence seems insufficient. The fact that Aristotle of Mytilene provides a neat solution to the crux does not of itself prove that he is the referent of the “Aristotle” at 110.4. If we approach the passage as first readers, a reference to “Aristotle” would surely cause us to identify the referent as the Aristotelian, i.e., the Stagirite. Accattino attempts to solve this difficulty by supposing that the *DI* is a kind of personal memorandum that the young Alexander of Aphrodisias composed as a summary of his noetic education. Thus the reference to “Aristotle” at 110.4 would be known to himself as Aristotle of Mytilene. Since there was no intended reader, there was no reason to explain the reference to his audience (that consisted only of himself). The same is true of the referent of βουλόμενος κτλ. at 112.5.46 Accattino’s hypothesis that the *DI* is a document from the Nachlass of the young Alexander is indeed difficult to believe.

In ST we argue that it is most unlikely that the *DI* would belong to the youth of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Where we would agree with Accattino is that it does read very much like a set of notes. It also presents a very wooden and serial account of the threefold structure of intellect in Part A. The three phases of intellect it describes respond to the stages of intellect in Alexander’s *DA*. Yet this account is very different from the dynamic developmental account of the growth of intellect in Alexander’s *DA*. It is far more likely that such an account of intellect, which reads like a set of notes, is itself dependent upon Alexander’s *DA* than that it would precede the *DA*.47 If the *DI* is not to be relegated to the juvenilia of Alexander, then it is unlikely that the work is by him at all. If we are right that there are serious concerns about the authorship of the *DI*, then we must call into doubt that the “Aristotle” of 110.4 is the teacher.

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47. ST, p. 19-22.
of Alexander’s youth. This scruple casts a shadow on the whole prosopographical exercise of Moraux and Accattino.

Sharples, in the Introduction to his translation of the *Mantissa*, accepts Accattino’s argument that the *DI* “is an early work of Alexander.”48 In his commentary on the crux at 110.4, he persists in advancing the argument suggested by Opsomer: “I also heard, about the intellect from without from Aristotle, [things] which I preserved.”49 Sharples comments: “If it instead is translated ‘I also heard from Aristotle things about the intellect from without, which I preserved’, the reference will probably be to Aristoteles of Mytilene.”50

Now Accattino’s argument for classifying the *DI* as an early work of Alexander depends upon his prosopographical identification of the “Aristotle” of 110.4 with Aristotle of Mytilene. It is therefore surprising that Sharples, who adopts Opsomer’s translation, which excludes reference to Aristotle of Mytilene, would find that “Accattino […] persuasively argues that […] *On Intellect* […] is an early work of Alexander.”51 In another and later paper, Sharples also expresses agreement with Accattino’s argument52 that the *DI* is a work of Alexander’s youth.53

Subsequently Sharples expresses agreement with *ST* that we cannot know who is the author of the views expressed at C.1 and that the reference at 110.1 is to Aristotle the Stagirite. He also expresses the view that we cannot be sure that “the *de Intellectu* is a work by Alexander himself or from his time.”54 Here is a further consideration: At 110.5-6 Alexander says that “these were the considerations were said to have (ταῦτα ἔλεγετο εἶναι) motivated Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without.” If Alexander is referring to his master Aristotle of Mytilene, why does he use a passive construction? Surely a passive construction would better reflect views in general (as on the thesis of *ST*) about the intellect from without. On the other hand, Accattino seems to suggest that Aristotle of Mytilene might himself be relating a tradition concerning the motives that induced Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without: “In the first part of B Alexander makes reference to a tradition that should be connected to the Aristotle of 110.4 (cf. the following γὰρ [‘for’] and ἔλεγετο [‘were said’]).”55 Now, instead of having the views of Aristotle of Mytilene himself on the intellect

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49. Ibid., p. 32.
50. Ibid., p. 32, n. 71.
51. Ibid., p. 2.
54. He also argues against *AD*, p. XXVII, n. 77, whom he sees as rejecting *ST* on the grounds that there argument requires emendation, that the same result as *ST* offer may be achieved by the construal offered by OPSOMER and SHARPLES (“Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De intellectu* 110.4”).
from without, we have a tradition that he is reporting to us. We have to wait until the \( \betaουλόμενος \) of 112.5, itself a very insecure reference to Aristotle of Mytilene, for the views of Aristotle of Mytilene himself.

What is more, Accattino does not detect a great difference in doctrine between the tradition reported from 110.4-112.25 (B.1) and the personal views of Alexander at 110.25-112.5 (B.2).\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} If both B.1 and B.2 were the views of Aristotle of Mytilene, it would seem surprising that Aristotle of Mytilene could be the author of C.1 which is at variance with the account of the intellect from without in B. By having Aristotle of Mytilene in B.1 report a tradition about what motivated Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without, instead of expressing his own views, he is still able to express in his own voice a view that is at variance with that tradition. Of course, Alexander can present his own views in B.2 and these views, as they belong to Alexander and not to the author of C.1, can differ from the views expressed in C.1. Is it not in the end more economical to suppose that the material in B.1 expresses an anonymous tradition than to have to ascribe that tradition to Aristotle of Mytilene in order to avoid a contradiction with C.1?\footnote{M. Rashed (“A ‘new’ text of Alexander on the soul’s motion,” p. 192, n. 28 ; reprint, p. 154, n. 28) argues against ST that the use of the first person at 110.4 is not of itself an argument for the independence of B from C.1 and C.2 and stresses that the first person occurs at 113.12 (ἐδόκει μοι). He omits to mention that ST argue that, in the rare instances of the first person in Alexander and Themistius (ST, p. 30), it introduces a text. It is the introductory character of the first person that persuades us that a new text is beginning at 110.4. The use of the first person at 113.12 need not be a resumption of the first person of 110.4. It could simply mean that the material that follows is criticizing the views expressed following the unattributed participle “wishing” \( \betaουλόμενος \) at 112.5. Admittedly the common use of the rare first person at both 110.4 and 113.12 itself might cause us to think that the author of both passages is the same. Yet the second use of the first person has not the strong introductory character of its use at 110.4. Whether or not we wish to accept Rashed’s views of the authenticity of the \textit{De intellectu} as a work of Alexander will depend on whether we agree with the elaborate source criticism by which he establishes reference in C.1 to Atticus of the view that the intellect from without is to be defended by claiming its ubiquity, a view criticized in C.2 in terms of thought processes. Rashed is, in any case, left with two possibilities for the referent of “wishing” (\( \betaουλόμενος \)) at 112.5: (1) either Aristotle of Mytilene; or (2) an associate of Alexander is modelling his critique of the author of the views expressed in C.1 on Alexander’s attack on Atticus (p. 194 ; reprint, p. 156). The first solution lands us in the same problems we have already confronted with that construal. The second demands that we extend an already complicated vein of source criticism to a putative author who shares the views of Atticus. Rashed argues that a fragment of Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} vi.4 (Parisinian suppl. gr. 643, 101r and ap. Simpl. in Phys. 964.9-23) betrays close lexical resemblance to \textit{DI} C.1 and C.2. In the commentary on the \textit{Physics} Alexander argues against the separation of soul and body on the grounds that something partless cannot move. In the \textit{DI} C.1 the intellect in motion is avoided by making the intellect present everywhere in the universe. In C.2 intellect is present or not according to whether it is made the object of thought. The neglect of the argument concerning partlessness in the commentary on the \textit{Physics} and C.2’s emphasis on being in place instead of moving is a sign of lesser sophistication on the part of C.2. Therefore C.2 is to be dated before the commentary on the \textit{Physics}. If this is so, then Schroeder (“The Provenance of the \textit{De intellectu} attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias”) is wrong in assigning a much later date to the \textit{DI} (R.W. Sharples, “Aristotelian Theology after Aristotle,” in Dorothea Frede, André Lak, ed., \textit{Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology. Its Background and Aftermath}, Leiden, Boston, Cologne, Brill [coll. “Philosophia Antiqua,” 89], 2002, p. 29, n. 132, entertains this possibility). Yet, as Rashed observes (p. 194 ; reprint, p. 156), this difference could be explained by the author’s adherence to the context of the exposition in C.1 (which Rashed thinks is authored by Aristotle of Mytilene).}
The *DI* has certainly spawned some wonderfully imaginative prosopography. And prosopography can be a most seductive muse. We have gone from identifying an Aristocles of Messene (with a whole new philosophy to go along with him) to Aristotle of Mytilene (and a whole chapter on the noetic of Aristotle of Mytilene in Moraux to go along with him). We should perhaps be wary of these projects. The approach of *ST* is quite willing to accept the fragmentary and adventitious character of the material in the *DI* and perhaps this is a better avenue than that of prosopographical ambition. We do not really know if the Aristotle of 110.4 is the Aristotle of Mytilene identified by Galen. The argument is circular. All we know of Aristotle of Mytilene is that he was a Peripatetic. We have no philosophical views imparted by him other than those putatively assembled by Moraux on the conjecture that the reference at 110.4 is to Aristotle of Mytilene. We also do not know if Aristotle of Mytilene is to be identified with the “our Aristotle” of the commentary on the *Metaphysics*. All that we can say with assurance is that Alexander might have had a teacher of the name of Aristotle and that that Aristotle might be the referent of 110.4. It is doubtless better to advance an analytic interpretation that questions both the unity and the authorship of the *DI* than to opt for a unitarian view that must accommodate its problems with circular prosopographical argument.