Food for Thought in Rousseau's *Emile*

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Volume 14, 1995

URI : id.erudit.org/iderudit/1012511ar
https://doi.org/10.7202/1012511ar

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In 1975, Jean-Claude Bonnet published an excellent article on the various levels of meaning of the many references to food in the writings of Rousseau. He showed the relationships between these references and Rousseau’s ideas on the nature of man, sexuality, politics, economics and a host of other aspects of Rousseau’s philosophy. He also indicated ways in which some of the remarks about the role of food in society were influenced by Rousseau’s own peculiar temperament and experience. Bonnet’s seminal article is full of insights of which I propose to explore the one having to do with Rousseau’s observation in *Emile* that because children are naturally greedy, one can turn their passion for food, and especially for sweet things, to good account by using it as a strategy for controlling their behaviour and for educating them: ‘le moyen le plus convenable pour gouverner les enfants est de les mener par leur bouche’ (393).

It is well recognized, and Rousseau himself points it out in *Emile*, that his treatise on education contains many autobiographical elements. His own interest in the importance of food, in all its physical and symbolic aspects, is well documented in the *Confessions* where, in order to reveal his character and philosophy to the discerning reader, Rousseau refers frequently to his youthful preoccupation with eating and drinking. Sometimes his anecdotes have sexual implications as, for example, in the incident at Mme de Waren’s table when, seeing her take a mouthful of food, ‘je m’écrie que j’y vois un cheveu: elle rejette le morceau sur son assiette, je m’en saisis avidement et l’avale’ (OC 1:108). With Rousseau (as later with Freud), the oral is inextricably bound up with the sexual. At other times, Rousseau links the offer of food to the essence of social activity, displayed through hospitality, protection and friendship, as demonstrated by Mme Basile who gave him shelter in Turin; by Mme de Warens whose perfect sympathy saved his life, ‘Comme si les pleurs étaient ma nourriture et mon remède’ (222); and by the powerful duc de Luxembourg at whose table he was a welcome guest. Eating as a mark of social status is forcefully brought home to Rousseau, in his capacity as valet in the service of Mme de Vercellis and the comte de Gouvon,
and as a déclassé in the house of Mme de Bezenval, among others. All these experiences, as well as his views on the relationship between food, politics and economics as, for example, in his unjust treatment at the hands of M. de Montaigu, French ambassador in Venice to whom Rousseau was assigned as secretary, or the poor hospitality he was accorded by a countryman who thought he might be a tax inspector, all these humiliations play a part in the design of the education of Emile.

There is no need to dwell on why Rousseau should attach such importance to the role of food in the child’s bodily development. One of the two basic instincts identified in the Second discours is ‘amour de soi,’ or self-preservation, of which the initial component is food. What we eat and drink, particularly in the first few years, affects our health and, consequently, the physical quality of our lives. In Emile, Rousseau selects as his fictitious pupil not a defective baby, but one born robust, one with the best chance of surviving the high rate of infant mortality. Unlike animals, humans, endowed with free will, choose the food they eat and determine its preparation. Indeed, in the Second discours, Rousseau identifies the change from eating raw to cooked food as a turning point in the history of mankind, an observation endorsed by Claude Lévi-Strauss who regarded Rousseau as the first ethnologist. It is because of the importance of the right kind of food for the physical and, later, moral development of the child that Rousseau devotes so much of Book I of Emile to the details of the correct diet for the mother or, as he deplores, more frequently the wet-nurse, and for the baby. The golden rule where food is concerned (and indeed where all aspects of life are concerned) is to follow the simplicity of nature as opposed to the practices of corrupt society whose diet is based on complexity and superfluity: ‘Conservons à l’enfant son goût primitif le plus qu’il est possible: que sa nourriture soit commune et simple, que son palais ne se familiarise qu’à des saveurs peu relevées, et ne se forme point un goût exclusif’ (408). Rousseau’s reference to the ‘goût primitif’ is clearly an evocation of his portrait of natural man in the Second discours, a portrait influenced by the accounts in seventeenth and eighteenth-century récits de voyage of the primitive ‘savage’ whose nourishment consisted entirely of what was readily available in nature without the embellishment of extensive preparation.

Rousseau’s two guiding principles with regard to manipulating children through food are (i) that children are naturally greedy: ‘La gourmandise est la passion de l’enfance’ (409); and (ii) that a child has no concept of the future, lives only for the moment, and would sell his soul for a candy: ‘ne songeant qu’à se tirer d’affaire dans le moment présent, tout moyen qui n’a pas un effet présent lui devient égal: en promettant pour un temps futur il ne promet rien, et son imagination encore endormie ne sait point étendre son être sur deux temps différents. S’il pouvait
... obtenir un cornet de dragées en promettant de se jeter demain par la fenêtre, il le promettrait à l’instant’ (336).10

At first glance, it seems surprising that Rousseau would consider greediness or a taste for sweet things as a natural trait since, in the Second Discours, discussing the habits of natural man, Rousseau maintains that he was quite abstemious: ‘En le considérant … tel qu’il a dû sortir des mains de la Nature … je le vois se rassasiant sous un chêne, se désaltérant au premier ruisseau, trouvant son lit au pied du même arbre qui lui a fourni son repas, et voilà ses besoins satisfaits’ (134-35). It could be argued that, in the Second discours, Rousseau portrays the man and not the child, who hardly figures in the Discours. However, apart from a superior physique, natural man is, in all other respects, like a child. Certainly this was the impression of many explorers and missionaries in Africa and the New World, although others regarded him as the devil incarnate.11 Of course, they did not encounter Rousseau’s hypothetical man, and Rousseau himself was well aware of the structured life of contemporary tribal communities as opposed to that of the non-gregarious creature of his invention, but he nevertheless exploited these travel reports to provide support for his theories. It must be, then, that the children referred to in Emile who prefer sweets, although born in a natural state, quickly acquire the tastes of the society that produces them. In the beginning, unlike the wild beasts who searched for their food and gorged on it when they could, natural man always had his nourishment readily available, could eat when he liked, and so never experienced hunger, at least until changes in climate brought about changes in his way of life. The eighteenth-century child, however, particularly the offspring of the aristocracy and the haute bourgeoisie, was restricted not so much through the absence of free will but rather through the lack of opportunity to exercise it, since he could satisfy his hunger only at the hours when meals were served, when the adults, with their jaded palates, were ready to eat.12

The second guiding principle for manipulation through food, namely, that children live only for the present, is in keeping with Rousseau’s depiction of the solitary individual who has no imagination and, therefore, no notion of time. In the Second discours, Rousseau offers the parallel of the modern Carib ‘[qui] vend le matin son lit de coton, et vient pleurer le soir pour le racheter, faute d’avoir prévu qu’il en aurait besoin la nuit prochaine’ (144). The behaviour of the Carib is very similar to that of the Grasshopper in La Fontaine’s well-known fable of ‘The Grasshopper and the Ant,’ which hinges on the former’s lack of foresight in failing to store up food for winter. In Emile, Rousseau is strongly against teaching the fables of La Fontaine to children since their prosaic minds are totally unable to comprehend the artificial, sophisticated, and often cynical
judgements involved. The child’s sympathies will naturally and inevita-
ably be with the carefree Grasshopper who is punished solely for being
happy. All he will learn from the fable is how to be hard and miserly,
and to treat the less fortunate with disdain. Living for the moment and
being unaware of the passage of time are, for Rousseau, the fundamental
elements of earthly happiness. In the Confessions and the Rêveries, espe-
cially the fifth Promenade, he appeals to the ‘sentiment de l’existence’ in
which self-sufficiency and plenitude abolish the notion of time.

Another tenet of Rousseau’s educational philosophy is that children
are naturally vegetarian and have no interest in meat. This observation
first occurs in the Second discours, where Rousseau attempts to prove that
natural man was not initially a carnivore. In Emile, he claims that exces-
sive eating of meat leads to the development of a cruel and ferocious
nature, and points to the English nation as evidence of this contention.
The origins and significance of this opposition to meat are well brought
out by Bonnet (249-50), who notes that the culinary paradise of the
Garden of Eden depended on fruit and vegetables, and that Rousseau’s
own preferences were for a vegetarian diet, as demonstrated in the
Confessions and by Julie in La nouvelle Héloïse. In short, if you want to use
food to control a child’s behaviour and develop his character, it is
advisable to use ‘des nourritures végétales, telles que le laitage, la
pâtisserie, les fruits, etc.’ (411).

Rousseau’s first illustration of how foods may be employed in the
service of social and political education occurs in Book II of Emile, in the
encounter with Robert the gardener. Here Emile receives a basic lesson
in the understanding of the convention of private property. The teaching
is carried out through Emile’s initiation into the art of gardening, spe-
cifically, the growing of beans. Gardening is, of course, one of the key
symbols involved in defining the education of children. Indeed, the word
‘kindergarten’ derives from Rousseau’s analogies between education
and cultivation in the opening of Emile. Agriculture, according to Rous-
seau (and to a long tradition revived by the physiocrats of his day), is
‘le premier et le plus respectable de tous les arts’ (460) and, therefore, ‘le
premier métier de l’homme ... le plus honnête, le plus utile, et par
conséquent le plus noble qu’il puisse exercer’ (470). The garden in
literature has a distinguished history beginning with Eden, the Elysian
Fields, and the amoenus locus of medieval origins, to cite a few of the
standard topoi. Rousseau himself invests Julie’s garden with all the
virtues of a man-made paradise of peace, innocence, and implicit, ideal-
ized sexuality.

Emile’s introduction to economics and class distinction through the
medium of food occurs when he and his tutor are invited to a midday
meal at the house of a wealthy man where they find ‘les apprêts d’un
festin, beaucoup de monde, beaucoup de laquais, beaucoup de plats, un service élégant et fin’ (463). As one dish follows another, and the noise increases, Emile’s tutor asks him to guess how many people have had a hand in producing the excess they see on the table and all around them. What will Emile think when he discovers that the food has been brought from the four corners of the earth, ‘que vingt millions de mains, peut-être, ont longtemps travaillé, qu’il en a coûté la vie, peut-être, à des milliers d’hommes’ (463), and that all of it will simply be deposited in the toilet that same evening? To reinforce this lesson in the iniquities of luxury, inequality and exploitation, Emile is taken to dine with his neighbours and to savour the delights of simple, home-cooked, rustic fare in an authentic and egalitarian community.

It is through a study of a child’s attitude towards food that one can understand and shape his attitude towards situations beyond his experience. When it comes to the question of self-sacrifice in the form of giving charity, for example, a child has no idea of what it means to deprive himself for the sake of others. He does not in the least mind handing over money to the poor. After all, you can’t eat money, and the question of what money will buy is too far removed from the moment of giving. But when it comes to handing over something he really values, ‘un enfant donnerait plutôt cent louis qu’un gâteau. Mais engagez ce prodigue distributeur à donner les choses qui lui sont chères, des jouets, des bonbons, son goûter, et nous saurons bientôt si vous l’avez rendu vraiment libéral’ (388).

A further illustration of the child’s inability to see the world through adult eyes is provided in an anecdote about a young boy’s reaction to an account of how Alexander the Great displayed his confidence in his doctor by drinking a potion the doctor was said to have poisoned. When, at the dinner table, the boy expressed his admiration for Alexander, it was assumed he had appreciated the moral implications of the story. It turned out, however, that having recently been forced to swallow some disagreeable medicine, he was most impressed that Alexander had done the same thing without complaining. The moral aspects of the situation, concerning friendship and risking one’s life, were entirely lost on him as were all similar didactic illustrations. In the fable ‘The Crow and the Fox,’ for example, the child’s main interest is in the fate of the cheese. As Rousseau points out: ‘il y aura … bien peu d’enfants qui sachent comparer une leçon à un fromage, et qui ne préférassent le fromage à la leçon’ (355). Grown-ups think this fable teaches children to beware of flatterers whose only motive is self-interest, but what the child really learns is how to imitate the flatterer: ‘le fromage gâte tout; on leur apprend moins à ne pas laisser tomber de leur bec qu’à le faire tomber du bec d’un autre’ (356).
One of the many novel and profound ideas of Rousseau’s system is that, in order for children to learn something in a meaningful way, they must want to do so. If they cannot see the usefulness and the advantage to them of what is being taught, they will have no interest in it. If, therefore, you want your child to be able to read, for example, you must provide some compelling motivation such as the chance to eat something delectable. Arrange for him to receive written invitations to parties that he misses because he can’t decipher the message. What an incentive to learn how to read: ‘Ah! si l’on eût su lire soi-même ... On s’évertue, on déchiffre enfin la moitié du billet: il s’agit d’aller demain manger de la crème ... on ne sait où ni avec qui ... Combien on fait d’efforts pour lire le reste!’ (358).

In order for children to learn naturally and without effort, their education should be presented in the form of games so that there is never any feeling that work is involved. When the games are competitive, the prize should be something worth winning, something the child wants. What better prize for a growing boy than candies or cake? So as to teach children not to be afraid of the night, Rousseau recommends a game in which, in a darkened room, children must try to find, among a labyrinth of furniture and a series of boxes, the one box containing candies. Similarly, in order to transform an indolent child into a competitive runner, Rousseau provides cake as an incentive. He recounts a time when he and a lazy boy used to take walks together and, during the walk, share a cake supplied by Rousseau. On one occasion he took along an extra cake that the boy wanted as well as his own share. Rousseau had a better idea: ‘Non, lui dis-je, je le mangerais fort bien moi-même ou nous le partagerions; mais j’aime mieux le voir disputer à la course par ces deux petits garçons que voilà. Je les appelai, je leur montrai le gâteau et leur proposai la condition. Ils ne demandèrent pas mieux. Le gâteau fut posé sur une grande pierre qui servit de but. La carrière fut marqué, nous allâmes nous asseoir; au signal donné les petits garçons partirent: le victorieux se saisit du gâteau et le mangea sans miséricorde aux yeux des spectateurs et du vaincu’ (393-94). This game was repeated on many subsequent excursions over a variety of lengths and with different competitors. When the runners tried to cheat by jostling each other, Rousseau resorted to staggered starts. Meanwhile, the lazy boy, tired of seeing others win the cakes, decided to practice in secret so that he could join in. The tutor, by excluding the best runner and by cheating on the staggered start, arranged for his pupil to win the race and the cake. After that, there was no holding him, and he soon was able to win races entirely through his own efforts. An unexpected by-product of this new-found athleticism was that, as a result of his frequent triumphs, the boy no longer gobbled up the cake all by himself but took to sharing it with the
others. It was thus that Rousseau demonstrated that the secret of generosity lies in one’s ability to afford to be generous. A further result of the game was that the children eventually learned to measure distances very accurately with their eyes.

Perhaps the most celebrated example of the use of food as a pedagogical device occurs in the Montmorency episode where cosmography is taught through hunger. Emile and Jean-Jacques decide to take a walk in the forest before lunch. They get lost, the day is hot, and Emile starts to cry: ‘Je suis las; j’ai faim; j’ai soif; je n’en puis plus.’ Jean-Jacques replies that he is in the same state but that tears won’t help. He asks Emile what time it is:

Emile: Il est midi, et je suis à jeun.
Jean-Jacques: Cela est vrai; il est midi, et je suis à jeun.
Emile: Oh que vous devez avoir faim!
Jean-Jacques: Le malheur est que mon dîner ne viendra pas me chercher ici.

By a series of Socratic-type questions, Jean-Jacques encourages Emile to remember his previous lessons in astronomy and to deduce the way home from the position of the sun. On emerging from the forest, Emile claps his hands and shouts with joy: ‘Ah, je vois Montmorency! Le voilà tout devant nous, tout à découvert. Allons déjeuner, allons dîner, courons vite: l’astronomie est bonne à quelque chose’ (449-50). So once again, food is the incentive for learning.

Critics of Rousseau’s educational strategies have frequently accused him of wanting to apply to the raising of children the same methods used for the training of animals, with the result that the child seems more like a robot than a sensitive individual. Martin Rang, for example, refers to Emile as:

un solitaire, comme le bon sauvage du second Discours; il ne connaît du monde que des choses, et de lui-même que ses rapports avec les choses: ses sensations et ses expériences physiques. De là cette étrange construction d’un enfant sans émotions, sans affection, sans pitié, même sans amour, d’un enfant foncièrement enfermé en lui seul, bref d’un enfant sans âme, raisonnable certes, mais froid et insensible et qui — avouons-le franchement — si nous le rencontrions en réalité, nous ferait frissonner.16

Lester-Crocker, likewise, terms Emile ‘a puppet whose strings are pulled by his tutor-guide.’17

To a certain extent, the accusations are true in that Rousseau anticipated the theories of behavioural modification and engineering pioneered by J. B. Watson and further developed by B. F. Skinner who, in
his novel, *Walden Two,* described how a small, isolated community, under experimental conditions, might eventually become the nucleus for a new kind of society, just as Rousseau wrote *Emile,* to show how, in a similarly isolated environment, one could outline a science of education by which it might be possible to reform society. Skinner argued that, if properly conditioned, children can achieve responsible behaviour and acquire an enormous amount of knowledge at a very early age. As an illustration of his method for teaching self-control in children aged three to four, Skinner, who was just as aware as Rousseau of the child’s fondness for food and sweet things, devised a situation in which children are given lollipops that they are not allowed to eat without permission:

We give each child a lollipop which has been dipped in powdered sugar so that a single touch of the tongue can be detected. We tell him he may eat the lollipop later in the day, provided it hasn’t already been licked ... The children are urged to examine their own behavior while looking at the lollipops. This helps them to recognize the need for self-control. Then the lollipops are concealed, and the children are asked to notice any gain in happiness or any reduction in tension. Then a strong distraction is arranged — say, an interesting game. Later, the children are reminded of the candy and encouraged to examine their reaction (98).

When the experiment is repeated, a day or so later, the children all run to their lockers with their lollipops and put them out of sight. In a later refinement, the children are made to wear the lollipops around their necks. Another experiment obliges them to drink cocoa with decreasing amounts of sugar until they can imbibe bitter-tasting fluids without complaint, unlike the boy in Rousseau’s story of Alexander the Great. Skinner’s children, when they are tired and hungry, are required to stand in line for their food even though it is ready and in front of them. These are some of the ways in which they learn self-control.

Rousseau’s system is quite different from Skinner’s, and much more subtle. He would have been appalled at Skinner’s system of ethical training since the essence of Rousseau’s pedagogical approach is that the pupil must, at all times, be kept absolutely unaware of the tutor’s role in his education, unaware, in fact, that he is being educated at all. When it is time for Emile to learn about private property, for example, the tutor concocts an elaborate scheme with the gardener whereby both Emile and the tutor are castigated for their lack of foresight. When the tutor wants to reinforce Emile’s knowledge of cosmography, both of them lose their way in the woods. Never at any time is there an imposition of wills or the suggestion that the incidents referred to are other than accidental.
Skinner’s haste to inculcate standards of morality at an early age runs counter to Rousseau’s theory of passive or negative education that allows Nature to do its work as the child’s physical powers develop. Skinner’s use of food as a direct reward for correct behaviour is contrary to Rousseau’s use of it as an indirect means of furthering other ends: ‘Jamais un bon repas ne doit être une récompense, mais pourquoi ne serait-il pas l’effet des soins qu’on a pris pour se le procurer? Emile ne regarde point le gâteau que j’ai mis sur la pierre comme le prix d’avoir bien couru; il sait seulement que le seul moyen d’avoir ce gâteau est d’y arriver plus tôt qu’un autre’ (410-11). Rousseau, then, is all in favour of fostering the competitive spirit so long as the prize is ostensibly awarded as a result of the effort and not for the sake of the effort itself which is an abstraction of no interest to the prosaic child.

Food, as an element of education, can be exploited only so long as it remains a major preoccupation of the child. But as he gets older, his interest in it begins to wane. By adolescence, one has to resort to other strategies: ‘Dans l’enfance on ne songe qu’à ce qu’on mange; dans l’adolescence on n’y songe plus; tout nous est bon, et l’on a bien d’autres affaires’ (410). Other passions now come to the fore and are less easily satisfied, especially the sexual one that has to be sublimated by a variety of distractions and subterfuges. The basic principle, however, is the same. There must be no apparent connection between appetites and upbringing.

Rousseau considered Emile to be his most important work, the one that embodied the definitive account of his philosophy. In his Dialogues, he referred to it as ‘un traité de la bonté originelle de l’homme, destiné à montrer comment le vice et l’erreur, étrangers à sa constitution, s’y introduisent du dehors et l’altèrent sensiblement’ (OC 1:934). In defining man’s ‘bonté originelle,’ Rousseau made his greatest contribution to education, a contribution recognized by such diverse disciples as Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Montessori, by showing that children are children and not simply young adults. They have their own tastes and their own ways of behaving and reasoning. It was on this insight that Rousseau based his utopian aim of providing a programme and a mechanism for nothing less than a total reformation of society through the creation of a new kind of man who would govern himself according to the principles of virtue and justice. Emile is not to be confused, then, with a treatise on education in the modern sense, but is to be understood as more in keeping with the spirit and scope of a work such as Plato’s Republic. Despite the vastness of his project, however, Rousseau knew that, in order to achieve its end, one must control, albeit secretly, every aspect of the child’s education, in every detail, from the moment of his birth, much as Plato, in the Laws,
set out a series of practical prescriptions for the implementation of the theories propounded in the *Republic*.

As we have seen in a necessarily abbreviated way, among the numerous details to which Rousseau paid close attention was the question of food with all its physical, psychological and moral effects, and the role it can be made to play in the formation of the body and mind of the future, ideal individual and citizen. Modern, more pragmatic educators, when they think about the problem at all, see only the physical consequences of diet in the system as a whole. Of course, they do not have the luxury of the intimate relationship, the ‘contract’, that existed between the tutor and Emile from his birth, a relationship that occurs nowadays, but increasingly less so, in the bosom of the family. As far as forming citizens is concerned, most educators today hope that, as a by-product of the educational process, responsible and patriotic individuals will somehow emerge. The thought that the sole purpose of education should be to produce such individuals, with a view to the radical transformation of society, is quite alien to what the Western world understands by the principles and practices of a democratic upbringing. Rousseau’s system of private, individual education is clearly an impossible goal. But many of the policies he enunciates could still be incorporated (as a few of them have been) into a new, national, pedagogical programme. Its establishment would certainly be difficult and it would take a long time to assess the results but, as Browning has taught us, ‘Man’s reach should exceed his grasp, / Or what’s a heaven for?’

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Notes


2 Quotations are from Rousseau: *Oeuvres complètes*, 4 vol. (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-69); hereafter referred to as OC. The text has been modernized.

3 ‘Je me lasse de parler en tierce personne, et c’est un soin fort superflu; car vous sentez bien ... que ce malheureux fugitif, c’est moi-même; je me crois assez loin des désordres de ma jeunesse pour oser les avouer’; OC 3:563. See also, for example, 3:385-86, and P. D. Jimack, *La Genèse et la rédaction de l’Emile de J.-J. Rousseau* (Genève: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1960) ch.9.

‘Ils apprirent à conserver [le feu], puis à le reproduire, et enfin à en préparer les viandes qu’auparavant ils dévoraient crues’ (165). By this time, due to changes in climate, man has passed from the initial vegetarian to the carnivorous stage.


My reference to boys rather than girls is in line with Rousseau’s emphasis on Emile’s education of which the principles are quite different from those applied in raising Sophie.


‘Il n’ose manger quand il a faim, ni rire quand il est gai, ni pleurer quand il est triste, … ni remuer le pied que comme on le lui prescrit; bientôt il n’osera respirer que sur vos règles … Qu’a-t-il besoin de régler sa promenade? Il ne craint pas que vous lui laissiez passer l’heure du dîner. Tant que vous ne lui défendez pas de manger, il mange; quand vous le lui défendez, il ne mange plus; il n’écoute plus les avis de son estomac, mais les vôtres’ (360-61).


‘Ne lui commandez jamais rien … Ne lui laissez pas même imaginer que vous prétendiez avoir aucune autorité sur lui … Qu’il croie toujours être le maître et
que ce soit toujours vous qui le soyez … Sans doute, il ne doit faire que ce qu’il veut; mais il ne doit vouloir faire que ce que vous voulez qu’il fasse’ (320, 362-63).