Résumés
Abstract
This article analyzes the choice of export contracts of perishable goods. It draws on the Transactional Cost Theory, and particularly the literature of incomplete contracts. Using a 2014 database of 177,296 transactions and corresponding contracts performed by Chilean fruit exporters, together with qualitative information gathered from a field survey, we show through a binomial logit that the choice between firm sale and consignment is a function of the environmental uncertainty of the importing country, the temporal specificity of the transacted product and the frequency of transactions.
Keywords:
- export-import contract enforcement,
- contract completeness,
- environmental uncertainty
Résumé
Cet article analyse le choix des contrats d’exportation de produits périssables. Il se réfère à la Théorie des Coûts de Transaction et notamment à celle des contrats incomplets. Les données sont celles des 177.296 transactions et contrats de fruits réalisés en 2014 par le Chili avec le reste du monde. Nous montrons avec un logit binomial et en nous appuyant sur des données qualitatives recueillies par enquête de terrain que le choix entre vente en ferme et consignation varie en fonction de l’incertitude environnementale du pays importateur, de la spécificité temporelle du produit échangé et de la fréquence des transactions.
Mots-clés :
- exécution des contrats d’export-import,
- incomplétude contractuelle,
- incertitude environnementale
Resumen
Este artículo analiza la elección de los contratos de exportación de productos perecederos. El estudio se enmarca en la teoría de costes de transacción, particularmente respecto a la completitud del contrato. Se aplica un análisis econométrico logit binomial sobre 177296 transacciones y contratos de exportación de frutas de Chile con compradores mundiales en 2014. Además, se moviliza información cualitativa obtenida de una encuesta de empresas. Demostramos que la elección de contratos varía principalmente debido a la incertidumbre del ambiente de negocios del país importador, la especificidad temporal del producto objeto de la transacción y la frecuencia de las transacciones.
Palabras clave:
- cumplimento del contrato de exportación e importación,
- incompletitud del contrato,
- incertidumbre ambiental
Parties annexes
Bibliography
- Agosin, Manuel R.; Bravo-Ortega, Claudio (2009). “The emergence of new successful export activities in Latin America”, Inter-American Development Bank, N° R-552, p. 36-71.
- Agresti, Alan (2003). Categorical data analysis, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 721 p.
- Allen, Douglas W.; Lueck, Dean (2005). “Agricultural contracts”, in: Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Berlin: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p. 465-490.
- Anderson, James E.; Marcouiller, Douglas (2002). “Insecurity and the pattern of trade: an empirical investigation”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84, N° 2, p. 342-352. ASOEX (2013). Chilean Fruit Availability, Santiago: Asociación de Exportadores Chile, 219 p.
- Aulakh, Preet S.; Gençtürk, Esra F. (2008). “Contract formalization and governance of exporter–importer relationships”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 45, N° 3, p. 457-479.
- Cheung, Steven NS. (1969). “Transaction costs, risk adversion, and the choice of contractual arrangements”, Journal of Laws and Economics, Vol. 12, N° 1, p. 23-42.
- Coase, Ronald H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, N°16, p. 386–405.
- Codron, Jean-Marie; Aubert, Magali; Bouhsina Zouhair; Engler, Alejandra; Pavez, Iciar & Villalobos, Pablo (2013). “ Effects of the transaction characteristics on the side of dependence in a context of vertical coordination: the case of fresh produce exports from Chile to Europe”, Advances in International Marketing, Vol. 24, p.161-190.
- Corts, Kenneth S.; Singh, Jasjit (2004). “The effect of repeated interaction on contract choice: Evidence from offshore drilling”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 20, N°1, p. 230-260.
- Crocker, Keith J.; Reynolds, Kenneth J. (1993). “The efficiency of incomplete contracts: an empirical analysis of air force engine procurement”, The RAND journal of economics, p. 126-146.
- Dorward, Andrew (2001). “The Effects of Transaction Costs, Power and Risk on Contractual Arrangements: A Conceptual Framework for Quantitative Analysis”, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 52, N° 2, p. 59-73.
- Eun, Cheol S.; Resnick, Bruce G. (1988).”Exchange rate uncertainty, forward contracts, and international portfolio selection”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, N°1, p.197-215.
- Gibbon, Peter (2003).”Value-chain governance, public regulation and entry barriers in the global fresh fruit and vegetable chain into the EU”, Development Policy Review, Vol. 21, N° 5-6, p. 615-625.
- Gulati, Ranjay; Singh, Harbir (1998). “The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances”, Administrative science quarterly, Vol. 43, N° 4, p. 781-814.
- Heide, Jan B.; Miner, Anne S. (1992). “The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 35, N° 2, p. 265-291.
- Hosmer Jr, David W.; Lemeshow Stanley; Sturdivant Rodney X. (2013). Applied logistic regression, Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons. 500 p.
- Jaffee, Steven M. (1992). “How private enterprise organized agricultural markets in Kenya”, Agriculture and Rural Development Department, Washington D.C: World Bank, Vol. 823, 44p.
- Jones, H. S.; Muller, Andre (2016). The South African economy, Springer, p. 1910–90.
- Joskow, Paul L. (1987). “Contract Duration and relation-specific investments: empirical evidence from coal markets”, American Economic Review, Vol. 77, N° 1, p. 168-185.
- Kader, Adel A. (2002). Post-harvest technology of horticultural crops, Richmond: UCANR Publications, 535 p.
- Kandel, Eugene (1996). “The right to return”, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 39, N°1, p. 329-356.
- Klein, Benjamin (2010).”Asset specificity and holdups”, The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, p. 120-126.
- Knoeber, Charles R. (1983). “An alternative mechanism to assure contractual reliability”, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 12, N° 2, p. 333-343.
- Lafontaine, Francine; Slade, Margaret (2013). “Inter-Firm Contracts”, in Gibbons, R., and Roberts, J. (Eds), The handbook of organizational economics, Princeton University Press, p. 958- 1013.
- Liotard, Isabelle (2012). “Les plateformes d’innovation sur Internet: arrangements contractuels, intermédiation et gestion de la propriété intellectuelle”, Management international, vol. 16, p. 129-143.
- Lyons, Bruce R. (1994). “Contract and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory”, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol.3, N° 2, p. 257-278.
- Macher, Jeffrey T.; Richman, Barak D. (2008). “Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical research in the social sciences”, Business and Politics, Vol.10, p. 1-63.
- Macneil, Ian (1978). “Contracts: Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law”, Northwestern University Law Review, LCCII, Vol. 72, p. 854-906.
- Martinez, Steve W. (2002). “A Comparison of Vertical Coordination in the US Poultry, Egg, and Pork Industries”, Current Issues in Economics of Food Markets, Agriculture Information Bulletin, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, p. 747–05.
- Masten, Scott E.; Meehan James W.; Snyder Edward A. (1991). “The costs of organization”, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, N°1, p. 1-25.
- Masten, Scott E. (2000). “Transaction-Cost Economics and the organization of agricultural transactions”, Industrial Organization, Vol. 9, p. 173-195.
- Masten, S.E.; Saussier, S. (2000). “Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of recent developments in transaction costs economics”, Revue d’Economie Industrielle, N°92, p. 215-236.
- Ménard, Claude (1996). “On Clusters, Hybrids and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry”, Review of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 152, p. 154–83.
- Ménard, Claude (2002). “Enforcement Procedures and Governance Structures: What Relationship?”, in: C. Menard (Ed.). Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Cheltenham: Edward ldgar Pub, p. 234-253.
- Ménard Claude; Klein Peter G. (2004). “Organizational issues in the Agrifood Sector: Toward a Comparative Approach”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86, N°3, p. 750–755.
- Mondelli, Mario. P.; Klein, Peter. G. (2014). “Private equity and asset characteristics: The case of agricultural production”, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 35, N°2, p. 145-160.
- Morrissey, Joseph F.; Graves, Jack M. (2008). International sales law and arbitration: problems, cases and commentary, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 502 p.
- North, Douglas C. (1991). “Institutions”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, N° 1, p. 97-112.
- ODEPA (2015). Chilean Agriculture Overview, Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies. Ministry of Agricultura, Santiago, 142 p.
- Pasternack, B. A. (1985). “Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities,” Marketing Science, Vol. 4, N° 2, p.166-176.
- Pennings, Joost ME.; Wansink, Brian (2004). “Channel contract behavior: The role of risk attitudes, risk perceptions, and channel members’ market structures”, The journal of business, Vol. 77, N°4, p. 697-724.
- Pirrong, Craig (1993). “Contracting practices in bulk shipping markets: a transaction cost explanation”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.36, p. 937-76.
- Poppo, Laura; Zenger, Todd (2002). “Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23, p. 707–25.
- Reardon, Thomas; Barrett C.B.; Berdegué J.A.; Swinnen J.F.M. (2009). “Agrifood Industry Transformation and Farmers in Developing Countries”, World Development, Vol. 37, N°11, p.1717-1727.
- Reardon, Thomas; Chen, K.Z.; Minten, B.; Adriano, L. (2012). “The Quiet Revolution in Staple Food Value Chains in Asia: Enter the Dragon, the Elephant, and the Tiger“, Asian Development Bank, International Food Policy Research Institute: Mandaluyong City, Philippines, 286 p.
- Saussier, Stéphane (2000). “Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: the case of Électricité de France”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 42, N°2, p. 189-206.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1957). Administrative behavior: A study of decision-making processes in adminstrative organization, New York: Free Press, 4th Ed., 361 p.
- Schepker, Donald. J.; Oh, Won-Yong; Martynov, Aleksey; Poppo, Laura (2014). “The many futures of contracts: Moving beyond structure and safeguarding to coordination and adaptation”, Journal of Management, Vol. 40, N°1, p. 193-225.
- Tashakkori, Abbas; Teddlie, Charles (2003). Handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 784 p.
- Wang, Charles X.; Webster, Scott (2009). “Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 196, N° 3, p. 1113-1122.
- Welby, Ellen M.; McGregor, Brian M. (2004). Agricultural export transportation handbook, US Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, N°700, 148 p.
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1979). “Transaction-Cost Economics: The governance of contractual relations”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, N°2, p. 233-61.
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism Firms Markets Relational Contracting, New York: Free Press, 400 p.
- Williamson, Oliver E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance, Oxford University Press, 448 p.
- Zhou, Kevin Z.; Poppo, Laura (2010). “Exchange hazards, relational reliability, and contracts in China: The contingent role of legal enforceability?”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 41, N° 5, p. 861-881.