Volume 24, numéro 4, 2017

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How do we learn the link between speech and money? What is the process of formation that legitimates the logic whereby speech is equivalent to money? What are the experiences, events, and subjectivities that render the connection between currency and speaking/listening intuitive? As educators and researchers, what do we do and say to shore up this connection, and—as we may be inclined—are there things we can do or say to loosen it? Educational discourse theory, specifically examining classroom discussion, is one of the most prominent arenas of educational research where the equivalence between money and speech is active. While it may seem tautological to say that “discussion is an exchange of ideas,” it is not trivial to do so. Definitions of discussion in both reference and academic texts use the word “exchange” for discussion like Kant would use the word “unmarried” to define a bachelor. Yet the exchange case carries connotations and denotations that the bachelor case does not. There is more to say about it. Take this one small case—whether discussion is an exchange of ideas—as a part of the more general inquiry about education and money/speech. Discussions happen throughout classrooms and other educational contexts in society, and the phrase most likely passes person-to-person in such a way as to make it obvious that what is happening in the discussion is an exchange, perhaps making it equally obvious that money and speech are equivalent. In other words, the claim in this article is that continually referring to discussion as an exchange of ideas teaches that speech and money are equivalent, a proposition that has serious political consequences. It is not obviously the case that discussion is an exchange of ideas, as I will show, and demonstrating this with a careful philosophical comb can go some distance towards showing (and therefore teaching) that money is not equivalent to speech.

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This paper investigates the intersection of big data and philosophy of education by considering big data’s potential for addressing learning via a holistic process of coming-to-know. Learning, in this sense, cannot be reduced to the difference between a pre- and post-test, for example, as it is constituted at least as much by qualities of experience as it is the situation, process of inquiry and its consequences. Long a perennial concern of philosophers of education, the author suggests that big data offers a budding opportunity for philosophers to engage in dialogue with empirical research in order to better understand the process of learning as coming-to-know. Drawing on John Dewey’s theory of inquiry and his philosophy of experience, the author demonstrates ways that both empirical and philosophical research stands to benefit from cross-dialogue. In offering an unprecedented glimpse of empirical detail, the author proposes that big data stands to afford new insights into this most complex human process and that Dewey’s philosophy offers a vital lens of interpretation that can help philosophers of education to make use of this data in addressing the perennial question of how humans come-to-know.

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This paper argues that the way future teachers are being initiated into the ethical dimensions of their future profession is largely out of step with the movement to professionalize teaching. After recalling the role that codes of professional conduct play in the ecology of professional self-regulation, and arguing that familiarizing students with their local code of ethics should be considered is the bare minimum of an adequate ethics education for professionals, the paper presents research findings indicating that education students are not leaving colleges and universities with a clear understanding of what is expected of them by society, their peers and the profession. The paper concludes with three suggestions about how to begin bringing ethics education for teachers more into line with teaching’s aspiration to professional status.

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Theoretical and practical issues concerning the justification of paternalism towards children are widely debated in a variety of philosophical contexts. The major focus of these debates either lies on questions concerning the general legitimacy of paternalism towards children or on justifications of paternalism in concrete situations involving children (e.g. in applied ethics). Despite the widespread consensus that the legitimacy of educational paternalism in important respects hinges on its principled, temporal and domain-specific limitation (e.g., via a soft-paternalist strategy), surprisingly little has been said about conditions and criteria that determine what exactly (if anything) is morally wrong with paternalism towards children. This contribution aims to further the understanding of these normative issues by providing a critical analysis of the theoretical and methodological difficulties involved in developing context-invariant criteria for the identification of specific wrong-making features of paternalist rationales and paternalistically justified practices in cases involving children. I am going to show that the moral status of pro- and anti-paternalist reasons is much more context-sensitive than usually assumed by proponents of standard generalist justificatory strategies. In conclusion my argument is that a moral particularist and casuistic framework may offer an adequate theoretical alternative to make sense of the context-dependent wrongs (and rights) of educational paternalism.

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Normative time is disciplined through what Freeman calls chrononormativity, and this disciplining is particularly evident in the experiences of disabled children. Despite the constant regimenting of the present reality for disabled children in time, they are essentially denied a future, the future generally being figured without people with disabilities. Exploring Muñoz’s critiques of Edelman, we emphasize the importance of futurity for children with disabilities, particularly one which they get to construct themselves rather than being constructed for them. We turn to Foucault’s discussion of the Ship of Fools in order to begin to imagine an alternative, queer time that is “steered” by children (and adults) with disabilities towards their own ends and goals.

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America is witnessing a new gilded age. Since the 1970’s, inequality in wealth and income has soared within the United States—and globally (Sayer, 2016; Therborn, 2013).  Such inequalities affect human flourishing because they allow the privileged class to convert their wealth into different, and unequal, lifestyles and life chances. In addition, such inequalities provide the privileged class with greater opportunity to convert their wealth, income, and social capital into influence within the political system that undermines democracy. Considering the vast class-based inequities, then, how can social justice educators help the students born into the world of class privilege understand their civic obligations to deepen democracy—particularly economic democracy? And, how can they do so without engaging in morally reprehensible teaching practices? This paper takes a ‘critical approach’ in attempting answer this question. First by analyzing the cultural and structural causes of behind the world of class privilege—what I term the pathology of privilege. As well as, explaining how the pathology of privileges undermines democracy. Then I analyze four possible social justice approaches for the class privilege—class suicide; political apathy; civic volunteerism; and activist ally. I concluded by explaining why the activist ally approach is both a more crucial and morally appropriate approach for educating the elite about their responsibility to deepen democracy and advance justice.

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Dieter Misgeld: A Philosopher’s Journey from Hermeneutics to Emancipatory Politics, by Hossein Mesbahian and Trevor Norris (2017), is a book-length transcript of a set of wideranging and extensive conversations with Professor Emeritus Dieter Misgeld. These interviews were conducted in 2005, on the occasion of his retirement from teaching at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. The “journey” referenced in the title reflects the sharp distinction between philosophy and politics that appears to inform Misgeld’s views throughout the text. In response to Misgeld, I propose that, while his understanding of philosophy as apolitical or quietist arguably holds on a narrow definition of the term “philosophy,” this definition forecloses a more radical understanding of philosophy as critique. A deeper and broader conception of philosophy as “theory,” I submit, can and should be drawn from the work of first generation Frankfurt School theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Properly conceived and undertaken, philosophy as critical theory can and does subvert political power, albeit not in ways that one might predict on the basis of the customary separation of theory and practice. I refer to numerous moments of the discussion to make this case so as to convey the breadth and richness of the book.