Philosophy in Review

Béatrice Longuenesse, "I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again" and Alison Laywine, "Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: A Cosmology of Experience"

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Citer ce compte rendu

In Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* the Transcendental Deduction (hereafter: TD) establishes that the faculty of the understanding cannot apply to pure concepts a priori to things-in-themselves, but only to what may be sensibly be given to us. Thus unspools Kant’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics, countering the assumption that metaphysics is a science of non-sensible things. Broadly construed, the TD’s program is to show how the categories relate to objects a priori, and what is truly unique to Alison Laywine's programmatic undertaking with *Kant's Transcendental Deduction* is how she pel-lucidly cultivates points of contact between the TD and Kant’s earlier pre-critical writings, taking the TD to be a reinterpretation of Kant’s early metaphysics.

As this is Laywine’s second book, those familiar with the interlocutors of contemporary Kant scholarship—particularly those philosophers who take Kant’s pre-critical body of work seriously, including Herman Vleeschauwer, Paul Guyer, Theodor Häring, Michaelf Wolff, and Wolfgang Karl—may not immediately recognize Laywine’s name (unless they are readers of publications like *Kant-Studien* and *Kantian Review*). Indeed, *Kant's Transcendental Deduction* and its masterful bricolage proves that this is a most unfortunate oversight, as Laywine not only counters, engages, and supplements such secondary scholars, with footnotes unfolding some of the most erudite and pointed points of contention relevant to today’s Kant scholarship, but also makes readily available points of contact and rifts between Kant’s pre-critical period and the first *Critique* so as to untangle previously eluded points in the latter vis-à-vis the former. To call this work a significant advancement in the field of Kant scholarship—no small feat—is only apt. Furthermore, Laywine’s considerations regarding the synthetic unity of apperception as the ground of all judgement offers a successor-program to the binding of representations that Longuenesse’s *I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again* adjudicates in its working through Kant’s first-person ‘I think.’ First, however, let us properly expound on Laywine’s project.

Before parsing the TD, Laywine moves through Kant’s pre-critical literature with the incisive, rigorous comprehension characteristic of only the closest readership. Specifically, Laywine traces how Kant’s commitment to the conversion of appearances into experience develops along a continued metaphysical register while progressively abandoning the confluence between the understanding and things-in-themselves. This involves weaving a trajectory from Kant’s 1755 *Nova dilucidatio*, the *Physical Monadology* of 1757, the 1770 inaugural dissertation, the so-called *Duisburg Nachlaß* (a collection of loose leaves Kant used to stitch together different ideas), relevant passages from a student transcript referred to as L1, and Kant’s logic seminar student transcripts up to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (hereafter: CPR). Laywine shows Kant’s concern in this period as adapting the early general cosmology to the special human case of producing a world out of appearances vis-à-vis the conditions of human knowledge and, in doing so, steps up to Dieter Henrich's 1969 challenge ‘to lay the foundations of a cosmology of experience that distinguishes the second step of the B-version of the Transcendental Deduction from the first step’ (213). Laywine achieves this and more, developing a theory of the subject qua apperception, revealing that the TD develops the understanding—the outcome of synthesis or ‘self-activity’ (*Selbsttätigkeit*)—to be a legislative faculty which ‘sets out appearances’ by appealing to the object of empirical intuition.
Laywine inaugurates her first chapter with the trajectory of the critical rift she will elaborate throughout the next four chapters: ‘in the Duisburg Nachlaß, the application of the categories and their corresponding universal laws of nature to appearances ultimately depends on the human mind’s direct intellectual recognition of itself as a simple, immaterial thinking substance. This recognition is the origin of the categories, and consequently the mind itself is their first object: because the categories apply to the mind, by formally expressing the truth about its nature, they apply a priori to appearances—indeed, to all possible appearances—and thus they are the conditions of possibility of experience’ (11). The CPR, according to Laywine, departs from the Duisburg Nachlaß on two critical points. The first is Kant’s idea that the mind can have direct intellectual insight into anything at all. This is rejected in the TD’s provision for intellectual intuition in an understanding that can generate its own ‘manifold’ by appealing to inner determination, or by the mere thought or consciousness of itself, while denying that such an understanding is possible for apperceptive agents like ourselves. In our case, empirical intuition, or sensibility, of appearances is converted into perception by way of the rule-governance of the unity of a thinking subject—pure apperception, the self-activity of the ‘I think’ which is associated with the understanding and does not itself come packaged with a manifold of its own. Rather, apprehension is an act of image-formation for us which involves the ‘setting out’ of the manifold of empirically given elements of a relevant image—i.e., the relation among appearances of simultaneous coexistence—where the process of ‘going through’ sensible appearances always takes time to complete. One of Laywine’s most consequential contributions thus unravels: the idea that experience is something like the ekthesis (exposition) of a proof in classical geometry where the enunciation as such involves a labelled diagram. This is first located in the Duisburg Nachlaß but ekthesis as such is retained in the ‘setting out’ of appearances as specifications of the universal laws of nature in the B-Deduction. It turns out that, for Kant, I cannot know or represent myself, except according to my external relations, which means that I must ‘set myself out’ in time, just as I set out bodies or things other than myself (78). The second area of departure is with the idea that the categories can apply to, and yield knowledge of, the human rational ‘soul’ as an immaterial thinking substance. This is explicitly rejected in the section of Kant’s CPR on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason and, more broadly, Kant’s move away sense-experience qua reflection. Kant denies in the Paralogisms that the categories apply a priori to the mind or soul in such a way to yield knowledge of ourselves as such while, in the Duisburg Nachlaß, Laywine provides evidence that Kant took them to apply a priori to the mind or soul as a simple substance there.

Thus, the Paralogisms not only seek to problematize rationalist psychology but Kant’s earlier thought. Kant’s provision in the CPR so describes an understanding like ours—‘one that must always receive its manifold under conditions of sensibility and then take it up into the synthetic unity of pure apperception’ (B135, B138–139 in Laywine 11). This rift will foreground the ‘cartography of the sensible’ that Laywine’s project ultimately demonstrates, wherein universal laws come from us—specifically from our understanding rather than form God's intellect, as the early Kant claimed, for then they would not be meaningful for us and our ‘map-making,’ a critical idea around which Laywine develops her thesis regarding the ‘cosmology of experience’ (209).

This cosmological cartography and its relation to the universal laws of nature is the anchoring of Laywine's reading of how legislation through the categories is possible; the necessary condition of our map-making, vide Kant, lies ultimately in the categories, such that the categories must prescribe universal laws to nature a priori. Laywine's argument, on Kant's behalf, is that the universal laws of nature must come from the categories and depends on the idea of ‘self-activity’ that she develops eruditely in connection with the idea of synthesis in Chapter Two. Laywine draws out Kant’s insight that ‘[w]e can represent nothing as combined in the object without having ourselves
combined it beforehand” (B130 in Laywine 260). That is, we cannot represent the objects of our perception as connected under laws unless we ourselves connect them. This means we—or, more precisely, our understanding—must be the source of these universal laws and the categories must therefore be law-givers for nature.

In Chapter Two, Laywine also masterfully unfolds the two-step process of the B-Deduction. The first step plays out from §§15-21 and is a purely formal ‘cosmology of experience,’ as Laywine coins it, by which she means an argument that treats experience as a sensible world, i.e., as a unified whole of appearance with appropriate qualities to guard against antinomies (55). §15 of the B-Deduction analyzes the concept of combination, which Kant says involves not only the concept of the manifold and its synthesis but also that of its unity. This argument establishes experience's conditions of possibility by showing that its unity comes from laws legislated to appearance. The second step of the B-Deduction, from §§22-26, deals with empirical pattern recognition, one of Laywine’s most expertly elaborated concepts, which will prove of interest to Kant scholars and those interested in the philosophy of mind/perception—particularly those interested in cognition’s so-called ‘binding problem’ of individual percepts, which Kant is considered to have foreseen. Laywine characterizes synthesis as an activity involving constructing the manifold, where the concept of unity has a certain priority—that is, unless some kind of unity is added to a manifold, we will just have a manifold but not a combination of its parts. Taking up the concept of unity, all the categories seem to presuppose the concept of unity as their possibility. The case of empirical pattern recognition is one of the vivid examples Laywine plucks from Kant, describing how, for example, when a person observes cloud formations, they apprehend a manifold of white-and-gray patches against a blue background as they coalesce and come apart; the observer does not take in the scene passively but actively perceives different parts of it as grouped together in a certain way (203). This active grouping-cum-synthesis is a way of unifying a certain manifold.

All use of concepts depends on the synthetic unity of apperception; it follows that the synthetic unity of apperception is the principle under which concepts relate given representations to objects and thereby yield knowledge. In chapter three, Laywine details the Deduction to show how judgment is always an act of the understanding: all acts of the understanding are governed by the supreme principle, which makes judgment possible, and the ‘association of ideas’ (note: Laywine chooses here to translate 'Vorstellung' as 'ideas' instead of 'representations' because it befits the eighteenth-century German equivalent of the eighteen-century use of the English ‘idea,’ as Locke and Tetens confirm). As we see, pace §17 of CPR, the synthetic unity of pure apperception is ‘objective because it secures the relation between our sensible representations and an object’ (152).

Specifically, the unity of consciousness associated with the imagination, where the imagination supplies perception with the manifold in empirical intuition to form images, is purely subjective. Laywine shows that the ‘synthesis of reproduction in imagination’ introduces a special case of association and highlights that, in the A-Deduction, we see the use of the qualifier ‘subjective’ such that the association of ideas are subject to a ‘merely empirical law’ (155). Following §§18-19 of the B-Deduction, which distinguishes between the objective and subjective unity of self-consciousness, the ‘laws of association’ speaks to Vorstellung that results from such laws as such. The ‘law of association of ideas’ in the A-deduction does not derive its origin from pure understanding—we cannot demonstrate them deductively from the synthetic unity of apperception, the source of the law of connection of all appearances. Yet, as Kant speaks of an ‘affinity of appearances’ at A121-122, we see that there are right and wrong associations, and so our associations are not ‘completely contingent,’ as he claims. Laywine illuminates that this is not the weak claim that, necessarily,
appearances must be associable somehow or other, ranging from person to person, but that, necessarily, appearances are associable in certain ways that are predictable for all of us. This association by itself does not count as knowledge but can help us build up such knowledge and to that extent is ‘suited for a connection’ with it (156). Readers are reminded of the A100-A101 famous passage about cinnabar and the associated color redness. Laywine pulls new relevant and far-reaching insights from this passage, as it comes to bear that I would never have had the opportunity to form the associations I do were there no rules or regularities that allow my imagination to settle into me. Such regularities point to the presence of an ‘objective ground’ underlying our associations. Here Laywine works through a series of very important questions: how does this come to bear with the highly idiosyncratic associations one may have (e.g., if I think of the ocean when I rummage upon cinnabar in my imagination)? If these associations are ‘completely contingent’ how could it be governed by empirical laws, and how could it point to anything ‘objective’?

Laywine’s solution, which will undoubtedly interest those who approach Kant via the philosophy of language, is to show that Kant thinks that what we can associate with a word or its meaning is the thing we attach to it, such that the association of ideas can be a mark of linguistic understanding: ‘I can perhaps be taken to understand what words mean if I make the right association’ where an association of ideas is an act of the empirical imagination (159). The understanding and the empirical imagination are related but not the same faculty. The understanding, whether pure or otherwise, is essentially related, but not identical, to the imagination. The understanding rests as much on the unity of apperception as on the synthesis of the imagination. The imagination does not bring about this unity as the understanding does—Laywine’s lesson is that, for Kant, our linguistic associations are made possible by empirical laws which point in turn to a central ‘objective ground,’ which makes it possible for us speakers of the language to use words competently and thereby understand what we and our interlocutors are saying (cf. A121-122; Laywine 160). Following B140, the B-Deduction presupposes that if people associate anything at all with a given word, it is by having understood what the word means. Laywine illuminates the difference between Kant’s ‘original synthetic unity of apperception’ and the ‘empirical unity of apperception’ involved in the association of ideas: Kant tells us that the ‘original synthetic unity of apperception’ is ‘objectively valid’ (objektiv gültig, i.e., holds for all of us) whereas the ‘empirical unity of apperception’ has only ‘subjective validity’ (subjective Gültigkeit, i.e., holds for only some of us—indeed perhaps for only one of us, as with someone associating cinnabar with blueness due to an idiosyncratic memory with the ocean). Laywine demonstrates that the ‘empirical unity of apperception’ is derived under given conditions in concreto from the original synthetic unity of apperception and that it is clear from Kant’s discussion of the imagination that the reproductive synthesis of the imagination at work in the association of ideas and the productive synthesis of the imagination carried out a priori are to be distinguished. The A-Deduction stresses the relation of dependence of the association of ideas on the original synthetic unity of apperception whereas the passage at B140 in [section] 18 of the B-Deduction stresses the difference between them. This distinction is a novel insight and Laywine’s breathing new life into this passage is truly praiseworthy.

In chapter four, Laywine takes up §24 of the CPR’s B-Deduction, which introduces the figurative synthesis carried out a priori by the productive imagination, distinct from the intellectual synthesis of a manifold of sensible intuition carried out by the understanding. Imagination, for Kant, is supposed to be the faculty that produces images—it must include a capacity to produce images a priori and the imagination does this by carrying out its characteristic synthesis on a manifold of sensible intuition (247). This synthesis on a manifold of sensible intuition is ‘figurative,’ separate from the ‘intellectual’ synthesis carried out by the understanding through the categories. As a matter
of principle, image-formation—even with ‘a priori image-making,’ the faculty that allows us to relate sensible appearances to one another in space and time—is not the same as understanding. For Laywine, this is obvious because no image has logical structure and no judgment has an orientation in space; the former claim may sound controversial—particular if we call to mind Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning—but if we understand that by this Laywine is referring to the structure of term-logic, the logic Kant was dealing with in his day, then her point is better understood. Simultaneously, Laywine notes that the imagination and understanding do not operate independently of one another: ‘the imagination never synthesizes a manifold of human intuition without direction by the understanding’ for the imagination serves at the behest of the understanding (247).

In turn, the special feature of the ‘productive imagination’—the faculty that produces images—is that it mediates between sensibility and the understanding: following Kant, Laywine demonstrates that we can have no knowledge unless the sensibility and understanding cooperate (248). This demonstration and the connections Laywine makes with distinctions in Kant’s pre-critical literature, as it takes up a cosmology of experience, are worthy of further praise, but, notably, Laywine here denotes a successor-program to Longuenesse’s I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. Before dovetailing Laywine’s work on the synthetic unity of apperception/transcendental unity of apperception, and how it offers a successor-program to Longuenesse’s framework, there are a number of comprehensive developments taken up throughout the chapters that require further drawing out. This includes Laywine’s enumeration of: Kant’s work on classical geometry and the categories as different expressions of the objective unity of self-consciousness (39-45; 279); Kant’s biological conception of ‘function’ and its relation to the category of substance, including how this informs the logical function of the judgment by way of the categories—where the understanding has to put its concepts to work in a way that expresses their relation to an object as truth-value (193-202); Kant’s transcendental and formal logic—with careful attention to the affirmative categorical judgments and Kant’s breakage from the term-logic/logicians of his day (Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier), whom Kant thought left undetermined the relation between concepts as peculiar to judgment (173-193; 208). Herewith, Laywine’s research is particularly impressive, as not only does she underscore Kant’s intervention insofar as our associations invariably involve concepts but, in bringing these three points together, she draws attention to the distinction Kant draws between form and function, which has previously been misunderstood by Kant scholars. Indeed, H.J. Paton claimed Kant used the expression ‘logical form of judgment’ and ‘logical function of judgment’ interchangeably in Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience and Klaus Reich attributed the modern use of ‘Funktion’ to Kant. Thanks to Laywine’s study of Kant’s students’ logic notebooks and her philological erudition, we see that, for Kant, ‘function’ ought to be construed as a carrying out, a certain unity and what it ultimately achieves by way of the understanding (198). To provide an illustration that harkens back to the term-logic of Kant’s day: if we want to form a categorical judgment like ‘Dogs are canines,’ the relevant function is whatever my understanding does when it makes a judgment of that kind; each distinct logical form of judgment is a corresponding activity of the understanding that imposes form on the relevant matter—following Kant, we call these activities categories.

Consequently, there is indeed a certain relation between the logical form of judgment and the logical function of judgment: the logical function of judgment is just that work that brings about the logical form of a judgment (198). This is something absent from Longuenesse’s study and important to underscore as Laywine, alone, shows that according to Kant we may know all the forms of judgment from studying logic, but if we investigate these forms in the correct mode, we will discover the functions that bring them about (and that these functions are the categories, which exact the ‘housework’ of the understanding). Laywine’s claim is proven with the CPR, where this principle is evoked
in regards the derivation of the table of categories from the table of judgments (see: A70/B95, A79/B104, B144).

There have historically been a number of incongruities between Laywine and Longuenesse’s past readings of Kant—specifically the latter’s 1998 reading of the Transcendental Analytic in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*—but there is a surprising agreement over what, exactly, Kant’s ‘I think’ serves for the philosophy of mind and perception that is shared between these two projects. Laywine offers a local reading, sticking to Kant and secondary literature, whereas Longuenesse’s project is more global, taking a trans-historical aperture; yet they are both remarkably exacting readings of Kant’s ‘I think.’

According to Longuenesse’s thesis, Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception has to be understood distinctly in the B-Deduction from the A-Deduction:

Three conditions are necessary, Kant claims, for any representation of an object: a manifold of intuition, the synthesis of that manifold, and the unity of the synthesis of the manifold. One can readily recognize here the three stages of the ‘threefold synthesis’ expounded in detail in A (Deduction): apprehension of a manifold in intuition (for which, as I briefly recalled above, the a priori condition was the apprehension of space through time), associative synthesis of that manifold in imagination (for which the a priori condition was a priori rules of association and reproduction), and recognition of the reproduced manifolds in concepts (for which the a priori condition was the transcendental unity of apperception). But in the new version of the Deduction, Kant quickly mentions the three stages and their a priori conditions and proceeds to ask: what is that ‘unity of synthesis’ that is necessary for any representation of an object? (80)

In turn the transcendental unity of apperception is distinct from the syntheses of sense, imagination, and recognizing a concept by apperception (where the third is only possible if the former two remain available). While the three syntheses are the prerequisite for making judgements, the ‘I think’ is what expresses the ‘unity of apperception’ and it is only when these three syntheses come together that the ground that is common to cognizing objects and the ability to use ‘I think’ unspools as the transcendental unity of apperception. Longuenesse, like Laywine, takes seriously the distinction between the analytic unity of apperception and the synthetic unity of apperception, where the former is the activity and the latter is brought forth by the activity. For Longuenesse, Kant’s ‘I think’ licenses a thoroughgoing connection to apperception. Laywine offers a similar critical insight: the analytic unity of the ‘I think’ is ‘just the fact that this thought remains one and the same no matter what it accompanies’ (Laywine 124). That is, analytic unity is equivalent to the numerical identity of the ‘I think’—following Kant, I can become conscious of the numerical identity of the 'I think' only under the condition that I synthesize a given manifold and all synthesis presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. Similarly, for Longuenesse, in using the 'I' in 'I think,' I, with every instance of its use, use the 'I' such that it refers to one and the same unified entity, 'myself' (10). In addition to the matter of numerical identity, the common implication for cognizing between Longuenesse and Laywine is that if all knowledge is through concepts and all concepts are specifications of the analytic unity of apperception, there can be no thinking without the synthetic unity of apperception.

Drawing from Wittgenstein’s *Blue Book* and Sydney Shoemaker’s reinterpretation, Longuenesse begins by bifurcating two uses of ‘I’: ‘I’-as-object and of ‘I’-as-subject. Following Wittgenstein, all uses of ‘I’ as object depend on identity statements (e.g., ‘I have a bump on my forehead’) where knowing the predicate to be true of someone is not, ipso facto, knowing it to be true of oneself, the current believer of the thought or speaker of the corresponding sentence. With judgments in which 'I' is used as subject (e.g., ‘I think’), Wittgenstein posits self-ascription of
psychological predicates—there is no criteria of identity qua reference. Following this use of ‘I,’ no recognitional capacity and no criterion of identification is in play in order to determine whom the predicate is true of. According to Shoemaker's amendment, judgments in which ‘I’ is used as subject are characterized not by the fact that they are not about a particular person but by the fact that they are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (31). Notably, Longuenesse robustly offers a reading of Kant that counters a recently popularized critical position by demonstrating that this putative critique does not identify Kant’s fallacious philosophy of mind, rather, is ignorant of a key insight of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. The rendering which Longuenesse takes task has been recently popularized by Gareth Evans, Cassam Quassim, and Sydney Shoemaker (xiii). These thinkers, instead of prioritizing the fundamental role of ordering- and binding-representations according to a priori conditions via the synthesis of apperception, ground the transcendental unity of apperception in proprioception—the synthesis that is intractably bound up with experience of the self as a phenomenal self. For these readers, Kant had too weak and flimsy an understanding of ‘I’ which eluded embodiment.

Longuenesse, however, shows that all uses of ‘I’ depend at least in part on the kind of information that, if expressed in a judgment, would ground a use of ‘I’ as subject, and that the use of ‘I’ as object is partly supported by a kind of information that is apt to ground a judgment in which ‘I’ is used as subject. This occupies the subsequent three chapters, as Longuenesse specifically seeks to enumerate that the aforementioned readings ignore the activity of combining representations. Indeed, Kant means to claim that all the representations I ascribe to myself are so ascribed in virtue of being taken up in one and the same act of combining and comparing them, an act determined according to some universal concepts of the understanding. In Chapter Five, Longuenesse shows how we should understand Kant to mean that the unity of apperception—as the unity of synthesis of sensory manifolds, and the systematic unity of the act of combination of concepts in judgment and inferences—contains ‘the form of every judgment’ (106). The ‘I think’ accompanies all categories as their vehicle and makes possible all reflection of sensory manifolds under the categories, rather than a judgment being an experience, which would depend on a determinate perception, and not licensing a priori image-formation. In short, ‘I think’ is a proposition any thinker can think, and must be disposed to think, insofar as they are disposed to think at all. The unity of apperception, which the proposition ‘I think’ expresses, plays two roles: it contains the form of all judgments (or more accurately: the form of all judgments originates in the unity of apperception), in addition to being the vehicle of the categories.

In some fundamental sense, Laywine and Longuenesse distinctly seek to supplement P.F. Strawson’s reading of Kant, a reading that, while not comprehensive, has been unfairly taken to task. Laywine’s project begins by culling Strawson’s ‘metaphysics of experience’ in Bounds of Sense—Strawson’s idea is that Kant was trying to set up some kind of global system or framework of spatio-temporal relations as the backdrop to all our empirical thinking and knowledge of objects (Laywine 3). There is indeed, a great deal of sympathetic resonance between Laywine's conception and Strawson's sensitivity to the elements in Kant's Transcendental Analytic, as Laywine argues that the elements making up the Transcendental Analytic are best understood as adaptations by his critical philosophy of elements in his early general cosmology. Longuenesse’s rendering of the Third Paralogism takes inspiration from Strawson—according to Strawson, Kant had the groundbreaking insight that the self-ascrion of currently experienced or directly remembered states of consciousness does not rest on a criterion of identity through time of the referent of ‘I.’ Strawson read that, pace Kant, our taking an objective standpoint on ourselves can be known solely through the persistence of empirical elements through time, a process which unfolds by ‘applying empirical criteria of
identification and re-identification’ (Longuenesse 156). Kant saw that this makes the self-ascription of mental states different from the attribution of states or properties to objects of experience.

On Strawson’s own reading of the transcendental deduction, the thought ‘I think,’ or more generally the self-ascription of representations and experiences to oneself, depends on a connectedness of experiences that makes possible the distinction between experiences, as subjective states, and what those experiences are of (a world of independently existing objects). That connectedness of experiences, he says, is not a sufficient condition for the thought ‘I think,’ but it is a necessary condition, as a prerequisite for acquiring empirical concepts of independently existing objects and for acquiring the empirical concept of a subject of experience. We have already seen how critical it is for Laywine that Kantian observation relates our sensible concepts to objects a posteriori and that *ekthesis*, like construction, relates sensible concepts to objects a priori by making it possible for us to assign the objects of our empirical thought to their place in time relative to other appearances. Like Longuenesse’s demonstration regarding the binding of representations that is separate, but grounds, embodied cognition, Laywine eventually demonstrates that the CPR’s Analogies of Experience, unlike the Duisburg Nachlaß, brings to bear the role of schematism and the productive imagination wherein the latter assists pure apperception, from which it produces the combination of appearances. One of the resounding points of Laywine’s project is that a priori image-making gives us a way of keeping track of all things that can appear to us by making it possible for us to situate space, time, and space and time mixed together, relative to one another. Thus Laywine invokes the image of a toothed-comb-like timeline, where it is perpendiculars extracted from it and rearranged as spatial ‘slices’ as indices that make it possible for us to think of sensible appearances as externally related parts of one and the same sensible ‘cosmology,’ or world (Laywine 159). For Laywine, if cosmological cartography is possible, then the sensible world is too, for any sensible world’s cartography depends on the universal laws of community applicable to all possible appearances that makes it possible for every one of an appearance’s parts externally to relate with every other.

Like Laywine, Longuenesse is not satisfied with Strawson. Strawson denies that there is a Kantian ‘short-cut’ between the connectedness of representations and the referential use of ‘I,’ advising instead that we need an empirical consciousness of oneself as a person to explain the possibility of self-ascription (160). What Longuenesse’s project uniquely draws out is that many of the problems that post-Kantian thought has sought to naturalize, Kant had already dealt with. Longuenesse advises a return to Kant, stating that, contra Strawson, ‘Kant’s view that “I” in “I think” expresses the unity of consciousness (the “transcendental unity of apperception”) that is the condition for any representation of an object, including the representation of oneself as a person (an empirical entity endowed with consciousness and unity of consciousness, traveling through the world), is both correct and a discovery we have yet to fully absorb—Strawson’s criticism being a case in point’ (160). Unlike Laywine’s book, which, first and foremost, is a rigorous walkthrough of the bridge that brings the pre-critical works together with the two editions of the CPR—therein selectively engaging with secondary literature by way of footnotes and minimal exegesis—Longuenesse’s book is a work of the philosophy of mind proper. Yet I advise Kant scholars interested in the contemporary implications for Kant scholarship to read these two books together (preferably Laywine followed by Longuenesse) to demonstrate why Kant’s book is not only relevant for the philosophy of mind and perception, but that there are critical points that relate to empirical research in neurophysiology and perceptual psychology alike.

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