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cerned with the development of the individual while art history has dealt principally with the evolution and development of style in painting, architecture, and sculpture. In the early development of both systems of analysis, outside cultural and historical forces were not given a great deal of attention. Both systems, however, have common origins in biology and nineteenth-century science, and more recently both psychoanalysis and art history have been influenced by the important developments that have taken place in sociology and anthropology.

One can hardly speak of a psychoanalytic school of art history, and considering the advantages of an acceptable and well crafted system (iconography and stylistic analysis), it is probably just as well that methods associated with psychoanalysis have remained marginally off-limits. There is something unique and strikingly individual in the approach of art historians (and others from outside the discipline) who had in one way or another been influenced by psychoanalytic theory. Among these important contributions are Jack Spector's work on Delacroix, Meyer Schapiro's work on Cézanne. Jack Lindsay's recent book on Turner, Michael Podro's essay on Freud and the numerous and sometimes quite eccentric essays of Adrian Stokes. Much of psychoanalytical theory, however, with its emphasis on the treatment of neuroses and psychoses, is quite distant from the concerns of the art historian. Kuhns, nevertheless, has demonstrated that it can be taken out of its clinical setting and applied to aesthetics and theories of culture. While these philosophical generalizations might be applied in areas of cultural history and the history of ideas, it is doubtful (even with the aid of semiotics) they will pene-

brate the citadel of traditional art history. Perhaps psychoanalytic theory has contributed more to linguistics and the study of literature because it is preoccupied with language. Also, at times, psychoanalytic studies give more attention to the life of the author or artist rather than to the work itself. Kuhns recognizes this weakness and feels that it can be corrected: "the object itself and its own establishment of reality must be the focus of attention." Kuhns mentions the successful use of biographical material in the employment of psychoanalytic theory, and feels that this can be combined with a psychoanalytic interpretation of the work of art ("the integration of enactments with the lives of those who created them"). "The art-life," writes Kuhns, "is far more than a psychoanalysis of the artist; it must establish psychoanalytically properties of the object as a work of art in the total context of a life and a historical movement." This sounds convincing enough on the abstract philosophical level, but unfortunately when Kuhns demonstrates how this might work he turns to literature rather than to painting or sculpture. Perhaps this is because literature offers not only more suitable subjects, but also a more receptive audience. Ideas about what is appropriate and inappropriate, "what is required and what is not required, are learned from the study of art history, but art history tends to 'rationalize' the visual and acoustic images, treating them as remote from the psychic life in which they originate."

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The history of ideas resulting from the iconoclastic controversy in Byzantium is the subject of Jaroslav Pelikan's Imago Dei, based upon the 1987 A. W. Mellon Lectures in Fine Arts at the National Gallery in Washington, D.C. Pelikan, a noted historian of Christian theology, is eminently capable of illuminating the doctrinal complexities of Byzantine iconoclasm. It is little surprise, then, given his own specialties and the dearth of material remains, that Pelikan has disavowed any intention of presenting a history of art. Images, however, inevitably creep into his discussion, and despite Pelikan's confessed position, a caveat concerning the use of visual material in this book is perhaps in order. Pelikan sees a close "interrelation between document and monument" and this analogical formulation leads him to see images as largely dependent upon text and thus simply illustrative of written sources.

This is not to say that the book will not be of use to art historians—they should simply not turn to it for enlightenment in their own area of specialty. Pelikan's strength is that he provides a helpful synthesis of many of the primary sources of the period, presented in a clear fashion and cleaned of their eye-gouging rhetoric. These sources are chosen well and show the major developments of controversy that beset Byzantium in the eighth and ninth centuries. It is not until Photius's sermon inaugurating the apse mosaic of the Virgin and Child in Hagia Sophia in 867, 150 years after Leo III moved to eradicate religious images, that the iconoclastic threat was finally quelled.

Having these primary sources translated, accessible, and theologically contextualized can only be useful in the end. One further caveat, nonetheless: Pelikan is thoroughly versed in the modern literature and his text is peppered with quotations from secondary sources. This often becomes distracting, even dizzying, at times when quotations invade quotations, or when an extract from one scholar's work follows hard on the heels of another scholar's words. However, on the whole Pelikan leads the reader across this archipelago of primary and secondary sources with a clarity and assurance that emanates from his mastery of this often abstruse material.

Although Pelikan is primarily interested in plotting a history of theological ideas, he does not deny the fact that iconoclasm was not only a theological debate. In his first chapter he states that "the conflict over Iconoclasm was always much more than a political struggle; at the same time, it was certainly never less than political." It is often observed, and this book is no exception, that there was no distinct separation of church and state in the Byzantine empire. The emperor, in acknowledging his subservience to the Heavenly King, also indicated whence his worldly power derived. By this divine sanction the emperor was as closely involved in major ecclesiastical affairs as political.

The emperor's wide-ranging political might was at the centre of the outbreak of iconoclasm and the doctrine which is Pelikan's concern was not the determining factor. The ruling against images in the late 720s
was a direct result of the imperial policy of a hard-nosed autocrat, Leo III. This policy of iconoclasm in its initial phases was a specific response to a particularly difficult situation. As Stephen Gero,1 Dietrich Stein,2 and Hans Belting3 have shown, Leo III reacted as emperor in a largely personal way to a number of threatening crises, namely, military defeats, economic hardship, and natural calamity. The theological reaction was slow in rising to this iconoclastic challenge. With the accession of Leo’s son, Constantine V, and only after pressing military demands were met, a council was convened to ratify and clarify the iconoclastic position. The *Horos*, or definition, of 754 is the first comprehensive statement of the iconoclastic position, and is generally attributed to the emperor himself. We have an extensive version of the *Horos* because the council convened at Nicaea in 787 in order to restate the icon addressed the iconoclastic arguments point by point. The destruction of the image of Christ on the Chalke Gate of the emperor’s palace by Leo III has no place in Pelikan’s narrative but it long antecedes the theological formulation.

Pelikan moves on to examine the attitudes in pre-iconoclastic Christianity concerning images, so that this sudden outbreak in the 720s might seem more comprehensible. Though slow off the mark, each side of the controversy spent great energy in order to secure the convincing weight of tradition for their side. Great anthologies of scriptural and patristic authority, or *Florilegia*, were compiled with little scholarly objectivity in order to support the opposing positions. Pelikan gives the iconoclasts the upper hand in this battle for historical sanction, since he argues that the iconoclasts were able to “draw upon an unbroken succession of fathers and apologists” to support their cause. The historiographical problems make this contention questionable. Sister Charles Murray4 has thrown considerable doubt over the long-accepted notion of aniconism among the upper echelons of the early Church and the attendant inclination to image worship “natural” to the masses. The texts adduced by the iconoclasts, as the iconophiles charged at Nicaea II, were falsified or at the very least deliberately misinterpreted and decontextualized. The iconophiles were able, and this is only an *apparent* weakness, to cite the greater silence of authority on the question of images, the custom of the ages, and the incontrovertible existence of miraculous images (such as the Mandylion, the result of the direct imprint of Christ’s face on a cloth). The moral is that sources used by both camps should be approached with caution in any attempt at reconstructing pre-iconoclastic attitudes to images.

From 754 on a new phase was initiated in the history of iconoclasm when we have evidence of real theological muscle being exercised, and Pelikan is particularly good on these issues. The iconoclasts mustered a more sophisticated attack than simply authority or appeal to the Second Commandment, and they set the agenda by focusing primarily on Christological questions arising from the worship of images. The iconoclasts charged that images of Christ either confused the two natures of Christ by depicting God as man only, or that images denied Christ’s divinity by attempting to circumscribe the unincircumscribable in base matter. Thus it is heretical to worship the material image. For the iconoclasts the only true image was consubstantial with God, that is, the eucharist (as Pelikan says, “the only place where sign and what the sign represented were identical”).

The iconophile position was expressed in different ways by John of Damascus and the fathers of Nicaea II, and later with learned sophistication by Theodore the Stoudite in the ninth century, but the strategies are similar. The iconophiles answered first that there was never a danger of confusion or denial of the two natures of Christ. Idolatry was unthinkable since Christian image worship was directed not at matter but to the person represented, and so reverence passed to the prototype. More significantly, the image signalled God’s renewal of His relationship with man by the fact of His incarnation. God has renovated the divine economy, which comprises all doctrines, “above all the doctrine of the Incarnation, dealing with the dispensation of God in history in relation to all creation and particularly in relation to the human race and most particularly in relation to the church.” By His participation in this world, moreover, He has sanctified matter. This paradox of God made man state the necessity of depicting Christ in earthly form on or in perishable matter. This necessity was affirmed by the Councils in 787 and 843, and it is still affirmed today in the Feast of the Restoration of Othodoxy.

The metaphorical truth of the iconophile formulations also had an epistemological side. Pelikan deals with this in a chapter on “The Senses Sanctified.” In iconophile theory seeing was implicitly the most important sense and Pelikan rightly points out that seeing and knowing are etymologically linked in Greek. The sight of God, accomplished through the incarnation, is also the factor which makes Christianity distinct from Judaism and Islam. Christians, grasped by this sight, cannot deny the image of Christ as this is tantamount to denying His incarnation. Because of God’s participation, the other senses are equally blessed in theory and in liturgical practice: in the hearing of the word, in the smelling of the incense, in the touching of the chrism, and in the tasting of the eucharist, all senses are shown to be sanctified.

This emphasis on the transformation of material reality by the incarnation was expressed after iconoclasm in a newly energized cult of the Virgin Mary. The title Theotokos, “bearer of God,” is consistently used in connection with the Virgin after this time, and this implicates the central paradox of Christianity, God borne by woman. Furthermore, as Pelikan puts it in his chapter on Mary, the Virgin is “the concrete content to a dazzling promise.” She is emblematic of human perfection since she shows the potential divinization of humanity by God having become man. Representations of the Virgin and Child, revealing God and His mother, are popular in the post-iconoclastic period for these reasons: uncontaminable God is depicted as man, conceived in the Virgin, who is in turn transformed by God’s grace.

Conversely, the propriety of representing invisible beings, namely, the angels, was implicated as a subsidiary theme of the debate over images. There were objections made by the iconoclasts that it was impossible to represent beings who were bodiless and immaterial. Pelikan speaks, in his final chapter, of a response on the part of the iconophiles leading to a “codification of an aesthetics of the invisible.” This may, however, be too strong since no systematic defense was mounted during
iconoclasm or afterward on behalf of the angels. It was primarily a common-sense appeal to scripture and tradition. The angels were known to have appeared, to the Virgin for instance, been seen, and are therefore circumscribable. The images of angels are a minor key in the Christological debate. Like Christ’s image, images of angels do not capture real natures, which are uncircumscribable, but only outward forms.

Finally, Pelikan uses “icon” throughout this book in ways which may jar readers since icon generally has a specific meaning in English. Unfortunately, this stretching of the semantic range of “icon” is only partly addressed in the final pages, where Pelikan discusses John of Damascus’s chain of images. The icon, with various values, is involved in a great cosmology in John of Damascus’s scheme. The chain begins with God who made the first icon, His Son and Logos, and secondly His “predeterminations”; in descending order He made man, who is an icon of God, the “names of God,” the special part of scripture,” and lastly the material image as icon. Though relatively early in the debate, John of Damascus’s cosmology is a proper climax to a work on the apologia for icons. It places the material image in a universal framework which exerted great influence during the controversy over images, a context to which Pelikan implicitly subscribes and which remains equally relevant today.

NOTES
1 Stephen Gero, Byzantine Iconoclasm During the Reign of Leo III, with Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources (Louisiana, 1973).
2 Dietrich Stein, Der Beginn des byzantinischen Bilderkreis und seine Entwicklung bis in die 40er Jahre des 8. Jahrhunderts (Munich, 1980).

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From the very beginning of his career Rembrandt called attention to his own face. He assumed a variety of postures and guises in self-portrait paintings, etchings, and drawings, and by the end of his life these totalled over 70 works. As a whole, they form an altogether exceptional and provocative episode in the history of art. Earlier generations of art historians assumed autobiographical origins for the self-portraits and idolized their seemingly unconventional and profoundly human character, but these interpretations have largely fallen victim to a sweep of revisionist historicism that has dominated recent Rembrandt studies. Reacting to the subjective appreciation of these works, scholarship has tended to relegate them to a subordinate role in Rembrandt’s oeuvre, or to ignore them entirely. In studies of Rembrandt’s conformity to the patronage system in Amsterdam, or his reliance on iconographic precedents, there has been little room for confrontation with the unusual character of the self-portraits.

In light of this, H. Perry Chapman’s Rembrandt’s Self-Portraits: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Identity comes as a welcome contribution to the field of Rembrandt scholarship. Seeking to reaffirm the wilful artistic and individual self-consciousness evident in Rembrandt’s preoccupation with self-portraiture, she offers a corrective to the normative implications of the historians’ approach. In order to validate an assertion of independence as Rembrandt’s meaningful response to his social and artistic milieu, Chapman locates the self-portrait within a wide cultural framework. She synthesizes a broad range of research, tracing the iconographic traditions of the genre, focusing on its identifiable attributes and invoking contemporary theoretical, literary, and theological sources. Credit is due to her for reacquainting us with the originality of Rembrandt’s self-fashioning. She rightly underscores the lack of precedents for his informal self-portraits in working attire dating from the 1650s and 1660s, or, most extraordinary of all, the imposing self-portrait of 1658 in the Frick collection (Br. 50). Especially convincing is her interpretation of the heightened self-consciousness and profundity of Rembrandt’s biblical role-playing in the Raising of the Cross (Br. 548), the Self-Portrait as the Prodigal Son with Saskia (Br. 30), and as St. Paul (Br. 59). Relating these pictures to similarly confessional and moralizing literature of the period, Chapman successfully places them within a context of a new Protestant self-consciousness.

A fundamental premise of the book is Chapman’s revival of the notion that the self-portraits are indeed reflections of Rembrandt’s psychological states occasioned by feelings of alienation and marginality from a hidebound social and cultural milieu. For her, seventeenth-century Dutch middle-class culture is irreconcilable with Rembrandt’s ambition to be ranked with the greatest history painters. According to Chapman, “those socio-economic circumstances that gave Dutch painters greater artistic autonomy—freedom from a system of ecclesiastical and humanistically-inclined princely patronage—denied to them the very values on which the Renaissance artist had predicated his unprecedented sense of worth. For Rembrandt this called for a new conception of the artist” (p. 6). Her contention is that circumstances in bourgeois Holland necessitated Rembrandt’s obsessive preoccupation with examining himself and his professional status in a “necessary process of identity formation or self-definition” (p. xvii).

In applying this problematic assumption Chapman posits that each self-portrait type represents a definite chronological step in Rembrandt’s changing concept of selfhood. She isolates them from the rest of the artist’s varied production and generates a developmental scheme in which she identifies two clearly distinguishable phases of self-examination. As one would suspect, the earlier period of Rembrandt’s activity in self-portraiture is defined as an expression of “his protean, still unformed, concept of the self” (p. 8), an insecure posturing in imaginary guises, including the melancholic, the patriot-warrior, and in particular the aristocratic artist-virtuoso. Only twice, she correctly empha-