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## EMPIRE UNITY AND COLONIAL NATIONALISM, 1884-1911

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In considering the relation between the movement for closer Empire unity and the rise of colonial nationalism, the dates which I have suggested, 1884 to 1911, need not be taken too exactly, for Professor Egerton once reminded us that "Where tendencies, not events, are being considered, divisions by time must, in the nature of things, be somewhat rough and arbitrary. No one can say the exact hour when the *zeitgeist* is found pointing in a particular direction."

The mid-Victorian pessimism regarding the colonies, amounting in some cases to anti-imperialism, characteristic of the Manchester school and shared by both political parties and by permanent officials of the Colonial Office, began to give ground in the late sixties and seventies. In 1852 Disraeli was talking of "the wretched colonies" which would "all be independent in a few years, and are a mill-stone round our neck." In 1866 he was still referring to the "colonial deadweights which we do not govern." A few months later Galt was writing to his wife from London: "I am more than ever disappointed at the tone of feeling here as to the colonies. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that they want to get rid of us."<sup>1</sup> Almost immediately after Canadian Confederation, however, a new attitude began to develop.

One of the first signs of reviving interest in the Empire was the foundation, in 1868, of the Royal Colonial Society—later the Royal Colonial Institute—which within a year of its establishment was taking issue with the Colonial Secretary regarding the withdrawal of troops from New Zealand, and beginning its propaganda on behalf of "United Empire." Proposals for closer Empire unity began to appear in the reviews, and Ruskin's inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1870, striking the note of expansion, contained the well-known passage that made such a deep impression on Cecil Rhodes: "This is what England must do or perish. She must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; seizing any piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea."<sup>2</sup>

Disraeli's Crystal Palace speech of 1872 has sometimes been regarded as marking the turn of the tide, but more probably it indicates that the tide had already turned, and that the new attitude to colonies had already become sufficiently widespread to warrant the attention of one of the great political parties. It is unlikely, however, that his plea for reconstruction and consolidation was made purely for election purposes. It was also a recognition of changing conditions both within the Empire and in the world. But Disraeli's imperialism was largely an imperialism of prestige. "The issue is not a mean one. It is whether you will be content to be a com-

<sup>1</sup>Quoted in C. A. Bodelsen, *Studies in mid-Victorian imperialism* (London, 1924), 45.

<sup>2</sup>S. G. Millin, *Rhodes* (London, 1933), 29.

fortable England modelled and moulded upon Continental principles and meeting in due course an inevitable fate, or whether you will be a great country, an Imperial country, a country where your sons, when they rise, rise to paramount positions, and obtain not merely the esteem of their countrymen, but command the respect of the world."<sup>3</sup>

By the eighties statesmen were becoming less concerned about Britain's prestige than about her industrial and commercial condition and prospects. Living by the export of her manufactures and unable to feed herself for long, Britain began to feel the competition of foreign industry and to find herself faced with rising tariff walls. She was also experiencing a depression that continued, with two short recoveries, from 1873 to 1896. The condition of both trade and investment led Britain to a new appreciation of the possibilities of her Empire. In 1884 Lord Randolph Churchill startled the country with his picturesque exaggeration: "Your iron industry is dead, dead as mutton; your coal industries . . . are languishing. Your silk industry is dead, assassinated by the foreigner. Your woollen industry is in *articulo mortis*. Your cotton industry is seriously sick."<sup>4</sup> But Churchill's Royal Commission on Depression in Trade and Industry confirmed the popular impression that there was a connection between the shrinkage of trade and foreign competition, and strengthened the Fair Trade movement already winning support.

With even Britain's own imports of foreign goods increasing, the question was being asked, "Is it fair" to keep open market for nations that are closing theirs? Two remedies were proposed by the Fair Trade League; first, moderate import duties on foreign manufactures from countries refusing to accept British manufactures on terms of fair exchange; second, a moderate general tax on foreign foods, but free entry for food from the Empire. Here was a foreshadowing of Chamberlain's imperial preference, and a recognition of the value of colonies as sources of raw materials and granaries for industrialized Britain.

At the same time colonies were receiving a greater share of England's foreign investment. As Richard Pares has pointed out: "Foreign railway and government securities must have been sold and the proceeds reinvested in similar securities within the Empire. This process is hard to trace or to explain, but it is there."<sup>5</sup> It provides an example of "the usefulness of a political Empire as a standby: the investor, like the seeker for a market or the consumer of raw materials, is glad to turn to the Empire when, for one reason or another, the more fully developed independent countries begin to be less attractive than they were." Pares defines imperialism as "a process—and to some degree a policy—which aims at developing complementary relations between high industrial technique in one land and fertile soils in another." This is not only true of tropical imperialism, it also helps to explain the hostility of temperate colonies seeking to develop a balanced economy, to all proposals of Empire free trade.

The imperialist expansion of the European powers in Africa and the Pacific was at its height in the eighties and nineties. The year 1884 has been called Germany's *annus mirabilis*, and the Berlin Conference met a year later. One result of Britain's activity in Africa and the Pacific was

<sup>3</sup>W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, *The life of Benjamin Disraeli* (London, 1929), II, 536.

<sup>4</sup>W. S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill*, I, 291, cited in J. H. Clapham, *An economic history of modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1932), II, 250.

<sup>5</sup>Richard Pares, "The economic factors in the history of the Empire" (*Economic history review*, VII, May, 1937, 140).

the acquisition of 2,600,000 square miles of additional territory. Another was the intensification of rivalry with foreign powers and a further step in the direction of an isolation which Britain found less splendid by the turn of the century.

The new imperialism was not exclusively economic, but combined also political, psychological, and racial factors in a way which gave it a wide appeal. It may be possible to over-emphasize the importance of writers in directing the course of events, but in the last quarter of the nineteenth century they did reflect the prevailing currents of opinion. They combined the two chief aspects of British imperialism, the movement toward expansion and the movement toward closer union, and provided a philosophy which justified both.

If Ruskin had inspired his thousands, Seeley inspired his tens of thousands. To be exact 80,000 copies of *The Expansion of England* were sold in the first two years without benefit of Book Clubs. Although from the point of view of colonial or even Scottish nationalism the title involved a misinterpretation of history, few could fail to be impressed with the sweep of Seeley's ideas, and some probably took to heart his reminder that "Bigness is not necessarily greatness: if by remaining in the second rank of magnitude we can hold the first rank morally and intellectually, let us sacrifice mere material magnitude."

Both W. T. Stead, who became editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1883, and his assistant, Alfred Milner, were admirers of Seeley. "The building up of new Empires beyond the sea," wrote Stead in 1884, "the peopling of waste and savage continents with men of our own speech and lineage, the knitting of the world-sundered members of the English realm into one fraternal union, that is the first great task imposed upon us."<sup>6</sup> Sir Charles Dilke's two books on Greater Britain enjoyed a deserved success, but probably a wider public was reached by Tennyson and Kipling, the official and unofficial poets laureate.

Mr. Kipling's extraordinary faculties of observation and visualization [says Wingfield-Stratford] were just what was needed to bring home to what he contemptuously characterized as "the poor little street-bred people", their membership of an Empire upon which, as it became fashionable to say, the sun never set. And not only membership but, in some unexplained way, ownership, for the clerk on a pound a week was thrilled with a profound conviction that by the mere fact of his being an Englishman he held the gorgeous East in fee and was among the lords of the Seven Seas. . . . The Golden Gate and the Horn, the Karoo and the great, green, greasy Limpopo became as real and vivid to the city dweller as his own street of desirable residences.<sup>7</sup>

For those who took their imperialism more seriously Mr. Kipling provided the stirring conceptions of the Blood, the Law, the Flag, the Queen, and the White Man's Burden.

Though Tennyson might rejoice at the time of the Golden Jubilee over

Fifty years of ever-broadening Commerce!  
Fifty years of ever-brightening Science!  
Fifty years of ever-widening Empire!

<sup>6</sup>Cited in J. E. Tyler, *The struggle for imperial unity (1869-1895)* (London, 1938), 67-8.

<sup>7</sup>Esmé Wingfield-Stratford, *The history of British civilization* (London, 1928), II, 1165.

it was consolidation, rather than expansion that he urged in "Hands All Round" (1882) and the lines on "The Opening of the Indian and Colonial Exhibition by the Queen" (1886).

Sons be welded each and all,  
 Into one Imperial whole,  
 One with Britain, heart and soul!  
 One life, one flag, one fleet, one Throne!  
 Britons, hold your own!

This was also the outlook of the Imperial Federation League, founded in 1884.

The League reflected both a growing interest in the general question of imperial unification, and the fear that if nothing were done to check the centrifugal tendencies resulting from divergent interests and policies in the self-governing colonies, and to consolidate the strength of the Empire in the face of foreign economic and territorial aggression, the result would be disaster. Although the avowed object of the League was "to secure by federation the permanent unity of the Empire," not all members were convinced that political federation was the only alternative to dissolution, and throughout its history the League was characterized by considerable divergence of opinion regarding both objectives and methods. The break-up of the League in 1893 was largely the result of failure to agree whether the major emphasis should be placed on tariff preference or on defence.

Both political parties were represented in its membership, and it had branches carrying on active propaganda in the colonies. In general, however, its appeal was greater in England than in the colonies, despite the able advocacy of Sir George Parkin. It was not that the colonies did not desire the continued power and security of the mother-country and of the Empire. They simply assumed it, and, with the exception of Australia, scarcely felt menaced themselves by foreign imperialism. Canada, feeling secure behind the Monroe Doctrine and already tending to be drawn into the orbit of the United States, suspected that Great Britain had on occasion sacrificed her interests in an endeavour to conciliate the Americans. In so far as the appeal of the League was made on economic grounds it was evident that in the colonies national interests were likely to take precedence over imperial. In so far as the appeal was made on grounds of racial solidarity it had little interest for the French Canadians and Boers or even for Australia's large Irish population. Still the League performed at least two useful services. It focused attention on the really important question of the future relations of Great Britain and her maturing colonies, and in its magazine *Imperial Federation* provided a medium for their discussion, a service taken over later by the *Round Table*. In the second place, it took the initiative in securing the calling of the first Colonial Conference in 1887.

The Colonial and Imperial Conferences have played an important role in the development of Empire relations, both as a forum for discussion of fundamental problems and as a technique, really as an alternative to the imperial Parliament or Council desired by the Federationists. The minutes of their proceedings reveal the variety and frankness of the discussions. The matters that came up with the greatest regularity and that provided the crucial issues on the settlement of which depended the character of imperial relations on the eve of the war, and the course of post-war development,

were political federation, imperial preference, and defence, with which was related foreign policy.

At the first Colonial Conference of 1887, a gathering of colonial personalities in London for the Queen's Jubilee, imperial federation was ruled out as a subject for discussion on the ground that "there had been no expression of colonial opinion in favour of any steps in that direction," and Lord Salisbury had dismissed it as still nebulous, though it might later take solid form. He suggested co-operation in defence as the chief subject for discussion. But the Federation League continued active in its propaganda, and after the break-up of the League the idea survived. At all subsequent Conferences up to the war, in the press and in the British and colonial Parliaments, the matter was thoroughly canvassed.

Twenty-three plans for formal parliamentary federation are analysed in Cheng's *Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire*,<sup>8</sup> and innumerable proposals for some sort of closer Empire union appeared in the quarterlies and reviews. Federation was advocated for sentimental, logical, economic, idealistic, and realistic reasons, both as the basis for, and as the outcome of, closer economic and defensive co-operation. When, after the South African War, some of the members of Milner's "kindergarten," who had carried through one job of imperial reconstruction, founded the Round Table movement to urge the necessity of another, the case for federation was based on logic, on the postulate that the Dominions would achieve complete autonomy. When that time came the issue of sovereignty would arise. If the Crown were offered contradictory advice by Governments in Great Britain and the Dominions the Empire would face dissolution. But since it was believed the Dominions did not desire separation, some form of federation remained the only means of reconciling the sovereignty of the Crown with the autonomy of the Dominions. It was a restatement of Lord John Russell's dilemma.

Though most of the colonies or Dominions were prepared to admit the first premise, and to say with Deakin of Australia, "We look forward to . . . a gradual assumption of all the responsibilities of maturity," they were not prepared to accept with him the conclusion, that federation was the only alternative to dissolution. Australia, up to 1900, was less interested in federation of the Empire than in federating her own colonies, and when that was achieved she was, as Professor Hancock has said, "prepared to accept the privileges of nationhood but willing to deny herself some heroics—and some responsibilities." New Zealand, "a Dominion in spite of itself," and feeling its isolation, consistently exerted its influence to maintain close imperial ties, and from Ballance and Seddon to Sir Joseph Ward favoured the establishment of some form of federation.

South Africa's relations with the mother country throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century were closer than those of the Pacific colonies, partly because of the strategic importance of the Cape and partly because of the pressure of the Boer Republics and Britain's sense of responsibility for the native peoples. But closer relations were not necessarily better, and even Mr. Rhodes was anxious to "eliminate the imperial factor"<sup>9</sup> from South African internal affairs, though there was no doubt of his imperialism. The racial appeals of Mr. Chamberlain left the Boers cold. In 1907

<sup>8</sup>Seymour C.-Y. Cheng, *Schemes for the federation of the British Empire* (New York, 1931).

<sup>9</sup>See C. W. De Kiewiet, *The imperial factor in South Africa* (Cambridge, 1937).

General Botha startled the Conference by beginning to speak in Afrikaans, and later switching to English stated his conviction that the proper line to be followed was not centralization but co-operation. In 1911 he helped kill Sir Joseph Ward's scheme for an Imperial Council, saying that if it were given any real authority he felt convinced "that the self-governing powers of the various parts of the Empire must necessarily be encroached upon, and that was a proposition which [he was] certain no Parliament in any part of the Empire [would] entertain for one moment."<sup>10</sup>

Canada officially gave the movement no more support than South Africa. Macdonald called federation "an idle dream," and Laurier devoted his best efforts to blocking the movement for centralization in order to keep the way open for complete autonomy for Canada, even if it should lead ultimately to independence. Repeatedly he expressed the conviction that the strength of the Empire lay in local diversity and freedom; that Canada was a nation, loyal to Great Britain but prepared to assume responsibilities only in accordance with her own conception of her interests and duty. He said quite frankly in 1902 that "What Mr. Chamberlain termed the Empire's interest and the Empire's policy were in most cases Great Britain's interest and Great Britain's policy."<sup>11</sup> In 1907 Canada rejected Lyttleton's scheme for transforming the Imperial Conference into a Council, and in 1911, in condemning Ward's Imperial Council, Laurier said that foreign policy would have to be decided by a Government responsible to the Parliament of Canada. An interesting comment of Laurier, quoted by Skelton, on the effectiveness of social pressure in the federation campaign, suggests another reason for opposing federation. He says:

Once convinced that the colonies were worth keeping [the Englishman] bent to the work of drawing them closer within the orbit of London with marvellous skill and persistence. In this campaign, which no one could appreciate until he had been in the thick of it, social pressure is the subtlest, and most effective force. In 1897 and 1902 it was Mr. Chamberlain's personal insistence that was strongest, but in 1907 and after, society pressure was the chief force. It is hard to stand up against the flattery of a gracious duchess. Weak men's heads are turned in an evening, and there are few who can resist long. We were wined and dined by royalty, aristocracy and plutocracy, and always the talk was of Empire, Empire, Empire. I said to Deakin in 1907, that this was one reason why we could not have a parliament or council in London. . . .<sup>12</sup>

It is probably true to say that while the federationists had the better of the logical argument they failed to carry the day partly because of their inability to suggest a practical solution of such problems as representation, voting strength, financial contributions, the position of India; partly because of suspicion of Britain's motives and fear of becoming entangled in imperialist wars, since any share in the making of foreign policy would involve responsibility for its execution and results; partly because of the recognition that though Great Britain and the Dominions had certain interests in common, they also had interests peculiar to themselves which they must be free to follow in the international as well as in the domestic

<sup>10</sup>*Minutes of proceedings of Imperial Conference* (Ottawa, 1911), 74.

<sup>11</sup>O. D. Skelton, *Life and letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (London, 1922), II, 298.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 299-300, note.

field, and that racial and geographical considerations had to be given due weight in determining national policy. And they failed partly because of growing national sentiment, a growing realization that complete autonomy was implicit in responsible government, and a growing belief that even complete autonomy was consistent with membership in an alliance or league of equal states. When Sir Joseph Ward's resolution was withdrawn in 1911, imperial federation was removed from the realm of practical politics, though it is suggested that the Conference really slew the slain.

To 1846 the British Empire had been considered an economic unit, and its policy, made in Great Britain, was protection. Before the middle of the century that policy became free trade, but after responsible government, Canada, followed by Australia and other colonies, set up protective tariffs against even Great Britain, at first for revenue and later for the benefit of colonial industries. In 1897 Canada offered Great Britain a preference in the Canadian market, and this policy was later followed by other Dominions. It was this development that led Joseph Chamberlain to believe that it was in the field of economic co-operation that the first step could be taken toward his full programme of imperial consolidation. "If we had a commercial union throughout the Empire, of course there would have to be a council of Empire. . . . Even Imperial defence could not be excluded from its deliberations, for Imperial defence is only another name for the protection of Imperial Commerce."<sup>13</sup>

He had other motives for the campaign which he launched in 1903. It is generally asserted that he hoped to divert public attention from the blunders of the South African War and, as H. A. L. Fisher says, "from sordid and trifling squabbles over church schools and public houses and refresh the waning authority of the Unionist party by identifying it with the majestic theme of imperial consolidation."<sup>14</sup> He was probably also convinced that the future lay with great empires, and certainly was alarmed at Britain's isolation in Europe and the hostility to her revealed at the time of the Jameson Raid. Imperial preference, or as Chamberlain would have preferred, imperial free trade, was not only an imperial policy, it was also part of a policy of tariff reform designed to give some advantage in the increasingly stiff competition with Germany and the United States. Chamberlain was prepared to split the Unionist party in advocating a partial abandonment of free trade and the establishment of food taxes on foreign imports in order to give a preference to colonial, and to provide a means of retaliation against foreign rivals. He resigned from the Government to carry "the fiery cross of the new protection" through the country.

In the colonies proposals for straight imperial preference were generally well received, and Chamberlain had found considerable support in the conferences of 1897 and 1902. But an imperial *sollverein* or imperial free trade was another matter. Preference could be given to the mother country by raising the tariff against the foreigner. But Canadian and other colonial industrialists saw that what Chamberlain wanted was the freest possible field for British manufactures, and realized that this would stereotype colonial economic development, and involve a virtual return to the Old Colonial System, Great Britain manufacturing for an Empire producing food and raw materials. Preference the colonies were prepared to give, and more than once offered increased rates in exchange for similar prefer-

<sup>13</sup>C. W. Boyd (ed.), *Mr. Chamberlain's speeches* (Boston, 1914), I, 367-8.

<sup>14</sup>H. A. L. Fisher, *A history of Europe* (London, 1935), III, 1079.



ential treatment in the British market. But Britain was not prepared to depart from free trade or increase her manufacturing costs, believing that "markets can be conquered by cheapness." Chamberlain's campaign was defeated partly by the reluctance to abandon free trade, and partly by increasing prosperity. As Clapham has pointed out,<sup>15</sup> by 1903-4 exports of British capital had begun to climb from the low levels of 1901-2, carrying with them the export of goods, and the country was starting on its last and greatest campaign of capital export. And as Chamberlain's critics pointed out, by 1907 Britain was trading more with her rivals than with her Empire, and the growth in the value of foreign trade between 1904 and 1907 was over twice that in the value of imperial trade.

The question in regard to Empire defence was not its desirability, which all colonies were prepared to admit, but the extent and method of contributions and the control of forces raised. The issue can almost be stated in the words of the Social Contract: "The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."

The British position, stated by the Colonial Secretary supported by the Admiralty and War Office, was that an imperial fleet, to which the colonies would make contributions in money or ships was strategically, as well as politically, the only sound principle. An imperial military force was also proposed but was rejected even by colonies which had sent contingents to the South African War, though subsequently they approved of the creation of an Imperial General Staff and Dominion membership in the Committee of Imperial Defence. Opinion regarding naval defence was more divided, and while New Zealand and South Africa preferred contributions to the British navy, Canada and Australia had decided by 1909 on navies under their own control at least in time of peace.

On the eve of the 1911 Conference Laurier declared: "We are a nation of the Empire and the British Empire today comprises a galaxy of young nations. It is the part of a young and free country such as we are today, nation and free, to provide for its own defence." But he continued: "A school has lately arisen in Great Britain which has quite a number of disciples in this country, the object of which has been to draw the young nations of the empire, Canada in particular, into the armaments of England, into the maelstrom of militarism in which England is engaged as one of the great powers of Europe." He then declared it was the policy of the Government "that under present circumstances it is not advisable for Canada to mix in the armaments of the empire, but that we should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purposes, and leaving to the Canadian parliament, to the Canadian government and to the Canadian people to take part in these wars in which today they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so."<sup>16</sup>

The other Dominions were not prepared to go as far as this, but the comment of the newly-founded *Round Table* was that "It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent foreign policies and

<sup>15</sup>J. H. Clapham, *An economic history of modern Britain* (Cambridge, 1938), III, 50-1.

<sup>16</sup>*Canada, House of Commons debates*, XCVIII (1911), 449-55. Cf. Mackenzie King, *Canada, House of Commons debates* (unrevised ed.), LXXV, no. 65, 2612-13.

independent defensive systems of their own without destroying the Empire, even if foreign powers refrain from attack."<sup>17</sup>

The British position in face of a deteriorating world situation, and particularly of German trade, colonial and naval rivalry, was that Great Britain could no longer undertake alone the defence of the whole Empire and its trade routes. Colonial contributions were needed. It was admitted that defence requirements were intimately linked with foreign policy, and that if the Dominions contributed their proportionate share to imperial defence they should have a proportionate voice in imperial and foreign policy through a federal council. In the meantime, though contributions were gratefully accepted, it was held that since the British taxpayer was still bearing the bulk of the burden, control of foreign policy could not be shared. And foreign policy increasingly occupied the attention of British and colonial statesmen from 1909 to the war.

In his frank statement on the European situation, in 1911, to the Dominion delegates in the Committee of Imperial Defence, Grey declared, in words that suggest more recent happenings, that what Britain feared was ". . . a Napoleonic policy. That would be a policy on the part of the strongest Power in Europe or of the strongest group of Powers in Europe of first of all separating other Powers outside their own group from each other, taking them in detail, crushing them singly if need be, and forcing each into the orbit of the policy of the strongest Power or of the strongest group of Powers." If Britain became involved it would become for her a question of sea power.

"So long as the maintenance of sea power and the maintenance of control of sea communications is the underlying motive of our policy in Europe, it is obvious how that is a common interest between us here at home and all the Dominions."<sup>18</sup> The Dominions were convinced of the seriousness of the world situation, and were prepared to make increased provision for defence each in its own way.

It may not be unduly simplifying a complex situation to say that in the thirty years before the war the mid-Victorian pessimism and separatism had disappeared; an active policy of expansion had added large tropical areas to the colonial Empire; an active campaign to consolidate the Empire and unite the self-governing colonies more closely with Great Britain had failed to produce federation, *zollverein*, or *kriegsverein*. Instead, the Imperial Conference had become an established institution and the chief organ for consultation on imperial affairs. Imperial preference had become part of the tariff policies of the Dominions, and after the war was to involve reciprocal concessions on the part of Great Britain. Co-operation in Empire defence on terms satisfactory to the Dominions, begun before the war, received a striking extension during its course, and contributed to the success of what Dr. Dafoe has called the "flanking operations" which led to the recognition of autonomy in international as in national affairs.

Equality of status has not solved the questions of foreign policy and neutrality which have been canvassed as actively in the present session of the Canadian Parliament as they were before the war, and in much the same terms. But one can say at least, that in so far as the problems of Empire unity and colonial nationalism have been solved, they have been solved in

<sup>17</sup>Round table, I, 252.

<sup>18</sup>H. H. Asquith, *The genesis of the war* (New York, 1923), 124-6.

accordance with the tradition, not of Seeley and Chamberlain, but of Laurier, Botha, and Smuts. "All the Empires we have known in the past," said General Smuts in 1917, "and that exist today are founded on the idea of assimilation, of trying to force human material into one mould. Your whole idea and basis is entirely different. You do not want to standardize the nations of the British Empire; you want to develop them toward greater, fuller nationality. . . . That is the fundamental fact we have to bear in mind—that this British Commonwealth of Nations does not stand for standardization or denationalization, but for the fuller, richer and more various life of all the nations comprised in it."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>J. C. Smuts, *War-time speeches* (New York, 1917), 28.