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## Canada in the Making Presidential Address

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## CANADA IN THE MAKING

Presidential Address by GEORGE W. BROWN  
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IN a moment of exuberant introspection about the American temperament and the temperament of New York in particular, the *New Yorker* some months ago made the following remarks:<sup>1</sup>

One thing we know—there will be no token bombing of New York. An air raid or two, yes, probably, but whether Hitler's intention is to bomb us or just to prove that he *can* bomb us, we New Yorkers will make of the occasion something too stupendous to be dismissed with the feeble adjective "token." If even one German plane flies over and drops one bomb, vast and unpredictable upheavals will take place. We may all plunge into whichever river is handier, like lemmings, or we may equally well embark on a bender, or *kermesse héroïque*, with record throngs in Times Square and the velvet rope up at all the night clubs. We aren't Londoners, and it's no use pretending we are. You can't get a preview of the New York raid by reading "Digging for Mrs. Miller." (We'd get Mrs. Miller out of the rubble all right, but not without holding a monster Mrs. Miller Benefit at Madison Square Garden.)

Canadians also indulge in introspection. Indeed they seem in recent years almost addicted to it if one may judge from a stream of books, articles, public opinion polls, and radio discussions. On the whole, however, it is a gloomy business; there is no exuberance in it, certainly no exhilaration. "Sometimes," writes a Canadian novelist, "I think a Canadian is like a man wandering around a big city feeling very insecure because he has not been able to get a card of identity from the police. At any moment he is apt to be picked up by the cocksure and hard-faced people who run the world and be compelled to tell who he is and what he is doing on the earth, and he'll have to explain that he has lost his papers. In his heart he'll know that his inquisitors don't believe him; they'll see clearly that he's bluffing; they'll see that he simply lacked the confidence to go around to the proper authorities, and demand a card of identity."<sup>2</sup> At best it appears from such efforts in self-analysis that we have developed, or gone far toward developing, a kind of type, which on examination turns out to be a dull, though worthy, combination of virtues and frustrations. Canadians, we are told, are industrious, thrifty, and reliable, but cold, cautious, conservative, and lacking in initiative and imagination. Carrying around a terrific load of inhibitions, they are, as compared with their American neighbours, less sentimental and spontaneous, perhaps more dependable, but nevertheless wanting in power of decision and magnetism of personality.

When we turn to Canada, rather than Canadians, we get the same impressions of uncertainty. No question is more persistently perplexing to Canadians than Canada itself. For three-quarters of a century Canada has been an expression on the map, a half continent stretching from sea to

<sup>1</sup>*New Yorker*, April 3, 1943.

<sup>2</sup>Morley Callaghan, "What It Means to Be a Canadian" (*Chatelaine*, July, 1943).

sea. But what, if anything, has it been more than that? Has it as a nation achieved anything distinctive in personality or culture, or is it no more than a sort of artificial political contrivance, as Goldwin Smith argued, put together in defiance of geography and economic interest and kept together merely by the perverse stupidity of people who refuse to recognize realities? "Caught in the swirl of this vibrant epoch of history," writes a Canadian journalist, "we find ourselves dull and lacking in pride and confidence. Perhaps we are not a nation. Perhaps we are merely a series of communities stretched across a vast continent, like a lot of black specks, struggling but static, on a field of fly paper." The language may change from one decade to another, but the mood continues, an apparently ineradicable element in Canadian thought.

Canada, indeed, seems to show an extraordinary reluctance to grow up, a kind of incurable adolescence which drags on from one generation into another. Judged by some of the most commonly accepted standards of nationalism, we have deficiencies which seem to outsiders, even those who know us best, inexplicable. We lack, through our own inhibition, some of the conventional marks of nationhood, such as the technical right to amend our constitution. We make the mystery of symbolism doubly mysterious by refusing, in such matters as that of a flag, to reach clear-cut decisions which would bring symbolism into line with reality. We have a genius for indirection, for refusing to let our right hand know what our left hand is doing, or at least for refusing to let them both get out into the open at once. Unlike other nations, moreover, we draw little inspiration either from ideology or national tradition. In contrast with our American neighbours, we have little faith in abstract statements of rights or in written guarantees of our liberties and ways of life. So little, on the other hand, do we regard history as an inspiration of national thought and action that we display an almost total disregard of it in any national sense. History is still commonly thought of in Canada as the preserve of the antiquarian, as a proper ornament or decoration for a respectable society, but with little practical consequence in revealing the realities or direction of national development. Outside an extremely narrow academic circle, we make little attempt either to study or teach it effectively. Nor do we think enough of it to preserve with any consistency the materials on which it is based. With a few honourable exceptions we treat the records of our past with neglect, even to the point of detriment to the public interest. The records of governments, the papers of public men, have shared this unenviable distinction almost equally with other materials of less obvious importance. Few countries with any claim to national pride would be content with such a condition.

These are but a few illustrations of Canada's apparent failure to reach a maturity which is satisfying to her people. Always she seems on the threshold of something which she never quite reaches. Always she seems entangled by the same confusion of spirit, the same hesitation and uncertainty, the same pre-occupation with her deficiencies. On the verge of growing up, she seems unable to shake off the last vestiges of adolescence, and insists on carrying about with her the adolescent's qualms as to the present and fears as to the future.

Is this, however, the whole story? Surely to state the case in its extreme form is to deny its validity, for have we not at the very least a paradox

of frustration and accomplishment? If we insist on the one we cannot close our eyes to the other. Canadians may take a certain gloomy satisfaction in "getting out their souls, propping them on their knees and staring into them to discover what's the matter with them," but the fact of Canada remains, and a very considerable fact it is. A people of scarcely more than four millions at Confederation, Canadians have spanned a continent and flung a network of highways and institutions across it. To ask us now to believe that Canadian history has no distinctive quality or meaning, that it has no definable lines of direction, that it begins nowhere and ends nowhere except as the tag end of someone else's story is to ask us to deny the plain evidence before our eyes. The great mass of Canadians have taken no such view. Whatever difficulties they may have had in defining or rationalizing themselves, they have very clearly been proceeding on the simple assumption that they could create a Canada, and that in fact they were doing so.

It is this persistence of purpose which demands explanation. Canada, we may remind ourselves, is the only country in the American hemisphere which has not in the last hundred years had a violent change in government or a civil war. The frustrations which have disturbed the Canadian spirit might have been predicted by anyone looking at the British North America of a century ago. The fundamental causes of them were obvious in the geography and history of its divided fragments. But who could have predicted with any assurance the persistent tendency toward nationhood? Durham, it is true, suggested the possibility of a united British North America, and other traces of similar sentiment can be found in the historical sources of a century ago. But against the background of division, misunderstanding, and bitterness of the 1830's and 40's these suggestions seemed no better than romantic bits of wishful thinking. Nationalism in spite of our familiarity with it, still defies exact explanation. It is a strange complex of variables, of ideas, attitudes, emotions, and interests which baffles the analyst. But, whatever one may say of it, one thing is certain. The nation must be something greater than the sum of its parts. If it is not so, it ceases to exist, it has lost the will to continue. By this elusive yet valid test, the Canadian people have created and are creating a nation. One cannot cross the boundary anywhere between Halifax and Vancouver without a consciousness that one has stepped into another environment of ideas, problems, and practices. These differences and distinctions stem back into the beginnings of Canadian history. They have been created by forces which run deep in Canadian experience, and there seems no probability of their disappearance in the near future. Canadians assume now more than they have ever done that Canada is taking her place among the nations of the world. They may differ as to the precise nature of her role. They may differ as to means and immediate objectives, but they take it for granted that she has, like other nations, her own part to play, and there is no evidence that they will voluntarily abandon that view.

Where then shall we find the distinctive elements, the permanent lines of direction, in Canadian development? It seems to me that they are to be found chiefly in the creation of Canadian institutions and attitudes, and in the course of Canada's external relations.

The creation of attitudes and of the institutions through which they

are preserved and expressed is the most familiar and pervasive, yet most elusive, process in the life of any people. "To understand in the best sense," wrote Mahan, "it is necessary not only to recognize the interests of a nation, but to enter as well into its feelings; tracing them where possible to the historic origin which once occasioned, and may still account for them." This is cultural history in its truest and broadest meaning, and it is only by a study of it that we shall explain those patterns of thought and action which are the most tenacious and characteristic elements in a nation's life and which largely determine the course of its development. From the beginnings of the first settlements, this process of creating attitudes and institutions can be seen working itself out in the Canadian environment. Men and women brought with them not only their material possessions, but their ways of life, their practices, prejudices, and ambitions, and here under the relentless pressure of geography and circumstance they moulded them into new patterns of thought and action. This is the process which has run through the whole of American history, and which has created with their similarities and differences all the varied societies of the New World. Canada has shared fully in this common experience. From her own background of European and American origins, she has like every other American nation created in her own environment, institutions fitted to her own needs and purposes.

So familiar are we, however, with this process that we take it for granted and underestimate the significance of results which seem commonplace to us. Thus, our political development has been a distinctive welding of British and American precedents. Its central element, the parliamentary principle, we have drawn from Britain, but into it we have of necessity moulded much that is American, until the product is *sui generis*. We have, for instance, been forced to adapt the parliamentary principle to the compelling pressures of federalism. In doing so we have rejected, in its typically American sense, the device of a written constitution based on theoretical concepts of the limitations of government and the division of powers, and have adhered rather to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Yet we have at the same time been forced in response to our own needs to accept a written constitution for the purely practical purpose of embodying the compromises on which Canadian federalism rests. Our approach to constitutional questions has been a pragmatic, not a theoretical, one. It has been one of ingenious adaptations hammered out under the pressure of necessity—not an heroic process certainly, but one whose results have on the whole served us well. Had it been the product of theory as seems to have been the case with the constitutions of some other nations, we might conceivably have gotten a great deal more emotional satisfaction out of it. But we seem not to be cast in that mould. By the same pragmatic token we have not carried constitution-making into the provincial field, unlike our neighbours of the United States, whose inalienable rights and privileges are buttressed by forty-eight state constitutions, varying in length and in definition of the citizen's fundamental rights but all revealing an unwavering adherence to the same patterns of political thought.

The parliamentary principle shows in Canada the effects of its environment, however,—the almost invariable practice of choosing representatives who are residents of their constituencies is but one of many examples. In this, as in a multitude of other cases, the Canadian point of view lies between

that of the United States and Britain. Parliament in Canada does not occupy the eminence in the public regard that it does in the British Isles. Membership in it has seldom been thought of as a career, certainly not as a career comparable in significance to that of success in business. Nevertheless Parliament is the centre of public life in a sense that Congress can never be in the United States, where the citizen is taught to put his faith in the written constitution rather than in elected representatives. The perversity and inherent disposition of elected representatives to betray the public interest are indeed almost assumed in the United States as a constitutional principle. This very real distinction between the Canadian and American points of view is intensified by the difference between the principle of cabinet responsibility and the principle of the division of powers. The one assumes the necessity of concentration of authority, the other the necessity of the conflict between executive and legislature. The one emphasizes the responsibility of the elected representatives: the other disperses responsibility so that in effect it lies nowhere except in the inevitable frictions of a complicated machine. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the United States much more faith has been put in the possibility of curing the ills of democracy by tinkering with the machine than has been the case in Canada. Devices like the initiative, the referendum, and the recall, have had little if any appeal in Canada, while the primary election and the problem of the long ballot are unknown.

Distinctions such as these might be followed through a score of familiar examples. Canadian political parties, for instance, in contrast with those in Britain, show the sharp and constant effects of sectionalism. Like those in the United States, they must try to be all things to all sections, until differences in principle are often whittled to the point of disappearance. They have, however, a continuity in leadership and a direct relation to government which are impossible in the American system, and are much more akin to English practice. A party once in power has a control of policy which no President even with a nominally favourable Congress enjoys. These distinctions and many others are worn deep in Canadian thought and practice.

Canadian economic development shows the effects of the same historic process, the mingling of forces running East-West and North-South, and working themselves out in the Canadian environment. Canada's economy is meshed in with that of this continent, but it is no less dependent on the markets of the wider world, and this is but the modern manifestation of long-established tendencies. The notion that Canadian interests all run North-South while only sentiments run East-West is a fallacy which contradicts the obvious facts of Canadian history. These divergent and balanced interests are, in fact, the framework within which the Canadian economy has been developed. It is no easy framework but without it there would have been no Canadian economy, and Canadians have adapted themselves to both its limitations and opportunities with the same persistent ingenuity which they have shown in their political difficulties. This is not to say that they have solved their problem. Geography, and its problem child, sectionalism, we have always with us. We never have had, certainly we have not now, an integrated and harmonious economy, and I am fully aware that academic realism is thought to lie in a diagnosis of aches and pains rather than in a record of accomplishments. Nevertheless, the fact

remains that Canadians have created an economy of distinctive quality; that they have developed the institutions and attitudes necessary to maintain it; and that at no critical point have they shown a willingness to abandon these purposes.

Canadian economic, no less than political, institutions are the product of hard compromise. They spring from individual initiative and enterprise not less than in the United States. But individualism in Canada always had a narrower stage than it had in the United States in the lush days of American expansion. Constantly it faced the pressures of a relentless American competition, even the dangers of complete absorption, and so was forced into the necessity not only of larger integrations but of close relations with government. From the days of the fur-trading companies and the first St. Lawrence canals to those of the Wheat Pools, the Bank of Canada, and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the history of Canadian transportation, finance, and business is studded with illustrations of this process. Canadian economic institutions are a strange and at times annoying mixture of private enterprise and public policy, but they are a very Canadian mixture, and they have shown themselves equal to tremendous strains in the past twenty-five years. In this respect the Canadian economy can bear comparison with that of any American country. Canadians, moreover, may remind themselves that they are not the only ones who have had to face the question of combining public and private interest. It is one of the central problems of our age, and Canada has, perhaps, in her own fashion gotten farther with it than Canadians realize. She has, under the unprecedented pressures of recent years, shown no small evidence of self-discipline, of ingenuity, and of willingness to support far-reaching measures necessary to the maintenance of her economic structure.

When we turn to other types of institutions, religious, educational, professional, we touch upon a field which has been largely neglected in comparison to the attention given to Canadian political and economic history, and in recent times even to the discussion of whether Canada has produced a distinctive art and literature. This neglect has obscured from consideration a network of institutions and relationships which has been woven inextricably into the Canadian fabric, and which exerts a continuous and increasingly powerful influence. Canadian churches, and universities, professional and other organizations, are a product of the same process which has produced Canadian political and economic institutions. They are a Canadian amalgam of ideas and practices drawn into the Canadian environment and adapted to its needs. In some cases their development is recent and immature, in others far advanced. In the case of the churches, it stems back into the pioneer beginnings of the country: in French Canada to the days of Champlain and the earliest missionaries; in English Canada to the establishment of the first settlements at various points. Proportionately the churches in Canada have played a much greater part than in the United States, and they provide one of the best examples of the process which we have been describing. Canadian Methodism, for instance, drawing divergent and conflicting elements from the United States, England, and Ireland, amalgamated them first into several Canadian Methodist churches, and then into a single, nationally organized church, which in turn under the pressure of Canadian conditions became part of a still larger United Church of Canada. In Upper Canada, where Methodism became peculiarly

entangled in all the stress and bitterness of the Rebellion years, its largest and most characteristically Canadian branch organized its own college, its own publishing house, and its own form of church government, and these were among the central institutions around which Canadian Methodism was later developed.

Canadian Presbyterianism followed the same patterns with characteristic infusions, as one would expect, of Scottish inflexibility, and even the Church of England, commonly thought to be much less amenable to Canadian influences, exhibits unmistakably the force of the same tendencies. No better proof of this can be found than the career of Bishop John Strachan himself, who turns out on examination to be a very Canadian figure indeed, prejudices and all. His innovation of the synod as an essential part of the governing machinery of the church is only one illustration of his willingness to make bold adaptations to the Canadian scene.

Canadian universities and Canadian education in general, while not easily defined or described in a few words, are equally the products of their environment. Drawing heavily, especially in their early stages, from the British Isles, from France, and the United States, they are none the less Canadian, and have reached the point where they are taking their place in the fraternity of scholarship in their own right. The contrast in the position of the liberal arts in Canada and the United States during the war years, for instance, has been by no means fortuitous. It is true that the difference is not to be explained solely in terms of a Canadian love for higher learning, but the significant fact remains that the liberal arts have been recognized in Canada as essential elements of war-time education, and the view has prevailed that we could not afford to throw them overboard in times of crisis. Canadian education, while deeply marked by influences which have affected education in the United States, shows like many other things Canadian, far less disposition to extremes. It is characteristic also of Canadian patterns that in recent years there has been a marked tendency, while preserving distinctive points of view and provincial differences, to develop organizations which are national in scope for the consideration of common problems. The Canadian Universities Conference, the Canadian Association for Adult Education, the Canada and Newfoundland Education Association, the Canadian Historical and Political Science Association, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, are among the bodies which provide channels of discussion cutting across geographical and sectional barriers. A limited population has paradoxically enough been not entirely a disadvantage in this respect, since, once initial obstacles have been overcome, it has been one of the factors tending to discourage the creation of too many regional and over-specialized organizations, and to encourage the bringing together from all parts of the country of individuals and groups representing widely varied opinions and interests. In a period when the central problem is increasingly one of harmonizing conflicting interests this is a fact of no small consequence.

What has been said about Canadian churches and education could be applied still more widely to the whole network of Canadian institutions and attitudes. Here a field, whose surface has only been touched, awaits investigation. In its details we still know little of the process which has woven these essential elements into the Canadian scene, for it is not to be studied merely in great affairs or in the lives of national leaders. In the



history of every local community we can see it going on as under a microscope—people of little consequence outside their own circle and beyond their own generation laying down patterns of thought and action, establishing practices of local government, attitudes to law and order, and the thousand and one other elements that enter into the fabric of every society. Who were these people, and especially the leaders among them, the doctors, clergymen, school teachers, and holders of public office; whence did they come; where were they educated; what did they bring with them of traditions and loyalties; how were they influenced, and what did they preserve in their Canadian environment? Some of the intangibles in this fascinating pattern of cultural history will always elude us. But we could know much, certainly far more than we do, and certainly enough to show why Canadian society, though it is woven of many threads and though it is incomplete at many points, is still a tough and resistant fabric. Perhaps we would then accept the essential Canada which we see before our eyes, and would cease being repeatedly surprised by the emergence of the same characteristics in one generation after another. Of Canada's history it is also true, *Plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose!*

No pattern in Canadian history is more persistent than the survival within the Canadian framework of two cultures, French and English, and in no other respect is Canada more clearly distinguished from her American neighbours. Especially is this so in comparison with the United States, whose nationalism and democracy in spite of an emphasis on individualism, are marked by concepts of standardization sharply different from those in Canada. It is true that the union of French and English-speaking Canada is a marriage of convenience and always has been, but if it has lacked the glow of romantic attachment, it is none the less valid. The balance of interests which holds it together, may be precarious, but it has nevertheless withstood repeated and severe strains. The parties may not even know precisely what they have in common, but whatever it is, they have never been willing to give it up, and however little their satisfaction has been in living together they have shown even less disposition to live separately. Extremism in French-English relations we have always with us, and periodically it emerges in acute form, but no less persistently have Canadians refused to accept the extremist solutions either of separation on the one hand or of standardization in a single cultural pattern on the other.

These are facts, proven first in the days of the American Revolution and at point after point since that time, which Canadians should keep in mind when they consider their so-called racial problem (which is in reality not a racial problem at all), for on reflection it is not the disunity of Canada which impresses us, but the persistence of a determination to work within the Canadian framework. The marriage is indeed one not merely of convenience but of necessity. English, not less than French, Canada has had the determination to survive, the will to resist absorption, and only through this union could each achieve its purpose. At every crisis the intuition that this was so has prevailed, and no central fact in Canadian history has been more commonly overlooked. Is this to belittle the union? Surely not, for Canada's experience is not unique. It is but the Canadian version of a problem which forces itself relentlessly and increasingly on the modern world, the problem of harmonizing the particular and the general, of finding means for the preservation of special loyalties and interests within a frame-

work of wider co-operation. Human relations are not mathematical formulae to be worked out neatly and put on the shelf until needed. We do not solve them in any literal sense of the term, we live through them. By dint of effort and goodwill, we may even live through them constructively, and on the record, when all the evidence is in, Canadians may justly claim to have made no small progress in that direction.

If some sense of direction, some emergence of national purpose, are to be found in Canada's internal institutions, they are to be seen even more clearly in the history of her external relations. Yet here too we have had much confusion of thought, based on a failure to recognize obvious facts in Canadian history. Since Canadians have never, until recent years, thought of themselves as having a foreign policy, they have successfully obscured from themselves the fact that they have had in reality a policy of external relations whose essential principles have never varied. Those essential principles can be seen emerging even with the American Revolution, for the bits of British North America which were left swinging like fragments between the two great segments of the English-speaking world exhibited even in that period a determination to live their own lives, by refusing to be swept into the orbit of American nationalism on the one hand, and by reaching out towards the beginnings of self-government on the other. They were determined to find a place for themselves between Britain and the United States, and this they could only do in the long run by rejecting the extremes both of colonialism and continentalism. For more than a century and a half the rejection of these extremes has run like a red thread through Canadian history. It is the balance which has determined at every stage the character of Canada's external policy, and only by maintaining this balance has her growth to nationhood been possible.

Canada has of necessity, then, belonged to both the British and American worlds, and it was inevitable that if she were to grow to maturity she could do so only as part of an evolving empire. It is not by chance that at many points and in many ways Canada has been a bridgehead across the Atlantic from the days of Cunard to the days of the ferry command. This dualism is of the very essence of her history, an unavoidable quality in her development. Canada has never been an interpreter between Britain and the United States in any literal sense of that term, but she has occupied continuously an intermediary position, and that position she has never been willing to abandon. No more striking illustration can be brought forward than that of the present war, for Canada's adherence to the British Commonwealth in 1940-1 during the darkest months of the struggle was without question one of the determining influences in British-American relations, thus exerting an incalculable effect on the course of world events. Canada has indeed, at times, been a conditioning element in the relations of Britain and the United States. The situation has never been easy but neither has it been lacking in advantages and possibilities, and today the proof of that fact is Canada's distinctive place in the international scene.

The process by which Canada moved toward self-government within a changing empire was incapable of defence by any system of legalistic logic. It was not theoretical but pragmatic and intuitive and from the days of Durham was the work of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic whose understanding of the forces with which they were dealing transcended legalism.

Indeed the process is still incapable of legalistic defence, and the growth of responsible government which is a commonplace of Canadian history remains a mystery to those who have had no practical knowledge of it. No fundamental difference in political thinking marks Canada off so sharply from her American neighbours as this absence of the revolutionary tradition. To them, revolution and the assertion at one stroke of national sovereignty were the essential prerequisites of political growth, and the development of self-government without the revolutionary tradition is well-nigh incomprehensible. For Canada, the changing Empire of the nineteenth century was a framework within which the forces for nationalism were able to work toward fruition. No one will underestimate the strength of those forces, but it can scarcely be contended that they would have succeeded alone. Confederation itself was made possible by an Imperial Act, which the Fathers of Confederation, using a technique<sup>3</sup> that was unprecedented, were themselves able to frame for submission to the British Parliament, and the full weight of British policy was thrown not only behind its acceptance but behind that remarkable series of decisions and accomplishments which within a generation carried the bounds of the new nation west and north to the Pacific and the Arctic. Canada gained self-government and an empire because she was herself part of an empire, and this astonishing paradox Canadians took for granted as if it belonged to the natural order. Almost invariably in fact they talked about relations with Britain as if they rested on sentiment alone, a distortion the unfortunate effects of which can be traced even to the present.

Nor have Canadians ever fully realized the importance of the part which they have played in the transformation of the Empire. That transformation from the mercantilism of the early nineteenth century to the free association of our own day has been one of the central facts in the history of the modern world and at every stage of it Canada's influence has been a powerful, sometimes a decisive, factor. Responsible government which transformed the Empire of the nineteenth century was in a very real sense a Canadian creation, and already it appears that in the sweeping changes which were ushered in by the War of 1914-18 and through which we are still passing, Canada's role and responsibility have been equally important.<sup>4</sup> In the light of these considerations the significance of Canada's influence has gone far beyond her own borders or the limits of her own history.

The Empire in which Canada grew toward nationhood was, however, not merely an empire. It was with British sea power and finance the centre of the internationalism of the nineteenth century which has been well named the Pax Britannica. The Empire was, moreover, as the twentieth century opened, itself taking on the aspect of an international system within a wider world order in which there was a nearer approach to national self-determination and freedom of trade than at any other point in modern history. Canada grew therefore toward maturity not within the confines of a narrow imperialism but in reality within a world order in which she had a vital

<sup>3</sup>It had however been suggested in the discussions of the Albany Conference in 1754 when prominent colonial leaders felt it would be the only means of getting organic union among the Thirteen colonies. See L. H. Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution* (5 vols., New York, 1942), V, 134-5.

<sup>4</sup>See J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XXIV, Sept., 1943).

stake. Already, even before 1914, she was, within the Empire and in her association with the United States, moving toward a practical internationalism based on the principles of mutual respect and co-operation, and this favourable development was not only a justification of her historic policy but was essential to her interest. Canada's interests are still fundamentally the same, and two world wars have served but to intensify and enlarge them. They are based on no narrow or theoretical concept of national sovereignty, they are opposed as they have always been to the triumph of regionalism, and they can realize themselves fully only in the creation of a genuine internationalism. By moving toward such a world order in association with other members of the Commonwealth, Canada will only be carrying to their logical conclusion tendencies which have run consistently throughout her history.

Such are the persistent patterns which run through Canadian history. But it is not merely their persistence which is needed to explain the Canada which we know—it is also the fact that they have been woven together in a complex relation both of conflict and interdependence. Canada is a product of the delicate balancing of diverse forces and problems. She has had to face at one and the same time the baffling difficulties of geography and sectionalism, the necessity of developing and harmonizing two types of culture, and the problem of reaching political maturity within a complex and rapidly changing network of external relations. Few countries have had to face so tangled a pattern and few countries have had so convincing a record of achievement. When Canadians exhort themselves, as they sometimes do, to be themselves, the answer is that that is precisely what they have been doing throughout their history with the utmost persistence and with no small result, and that there is no prospect whatever of them abandoning the habit.

Today, however, the stage has suddenly widened. Canada has been swept as never before into the centre of the international scene, and she finds that her problems are more and more those of the world at large. Both geography and history have given her a place of significance. She has come to nationhood at a moment when the groundswell of vast changes is felt throughout the world, and she will if she follows her true intuition and interest play a distinctive role in creating that community of nations whose existence is essential to any hope of ensuring international prosperity and peace.