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# THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL CATHOLICISM IN SOUTH GERMANY 1799-1814

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The French defeat of 1814 had as one consequence the establishment in Bavaria of the *Literarischen Verein zur Aufrechterhaltung, Verteidigung, und Auslegung der römisch-katolischen Religion*.<sup>1</sup> More profoundly, however, the formation of a union to protect Catholic interests was in response to the Napoleonic reorganization of Germany. Indeed, the early history of political Catholicism is important precisely for what it tells us of this latter experience. Prior to 1799 Germans witnessed events in France with fascination and even delight, but especially in its day to day politics the Revolution was distant and easily misunderstood. How could the open and violent challenge of the French bourgeoisie make sense in western and southern Germany, an area of hopeless fragmentation, overshadowed by the interfering tribunals of the empire? This situation changed radically as Bonaparte's ambition flooded across the Rhine. The empire was destroyed and the tiny principalities amalgamated into viable states. Far from being dismayed by this transformation, Germans in significant numbers gave expression to an extraordinary disassociation from their past and threw themselves into the task of reform with much skill and energy. Germany thus had its French Revolution, diluted, but perfectly meaningful and intelligible.<sup>2</sup> This world of the Rhine Confederation probably is viewed best through the eyes of its proponents in the various bureaucracies, but one may also follow its progress in company with dissidents—in our case certain politically conscious Catholics who felt deeply threatened by French intervention in German affairs. In rejoicing at the fall of Bonaparte the members of the *Verein*

<sup>1</sup> The *Verein* is generally credited with being the first Catholic political organization in Germany: Ludwig Bergsträsser, *Studien zur Vorgeschichte der Zentrumspartei* (Tübingen, 1910), chap. I; Karl von Mueller, "Probleme der neuesten bayerischen Geschichte," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 188 (1917), p. 237; Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der Deutschen Zentrumspartei*, I (Köln, 1927), p. 214.

<sup>2</sup> The somewhat revisionary argument that the Rhine Confederation provided a revolutionary experience for Germany, and that its programs and ideals were closely related to the French Revolution, may be found in the following works: Franz Schnable, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, I (4th ed.; Freiburg, 1948), pp. 147-159, H. Hölze, "Das Napoleonische Staatssystem im Deutschland," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 148 (1933), *passim*; Fritz Valjavec, *Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland, 1770-1815* (Munich, 1951), pp. 343-360; Heinrich Heffter, *Die Deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 65-66, 77-83, 103-109; Theodor Schieder, "Particularismus und Nationalbewusstsein im Denken des deutschen Vormärz," *Staat und Gesellschaft im deutschen Vormärz*, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 26-29.

signified their hostility to the whole complex of changes associated with the age of the French Revolution, of which state despotism over the church was only part. Moreover, their expectation that the end of French hegemony and the restoration of "German liberties" would favor their cause demonstrates a clarity of purpose and political vision for which Germans usually are not given sufficient credit.

In 1799 Karl Theodor of Bavaria died without male heir. His successor, Maximilian Joseph of Zweibrücken, appointed as chief adviser Maximilian von Montgelas, a determined modernizer and one time member of the notorious Illuminati. For more than a decade thereafter the electorate (later kingdom) underwent continuous alteration of its basic institutions, the pace of which was particularly intense following alliance with France in 1805. For those involved it was a cataclysmic upheaval, as Ludwig Feuerbach, an important official in the government, proclaimed in 1808: "Bavaria is engaged in a total revolution, though bloodless. The past is demolished and a new order of things founded."<sup>3</sup> The Catholic Church was drawn into this net of reform quite early. In 1801 Protestants were invited to settle in Bavaria and by 1809 enjoyed full equality with Catholics. The position of Jews also greatly improved, though some forms of discrimination remained. During the same period nearly all the many Bavarian cloisters were dissolved and secularized, and the Catholic clergy lost their status as a privileged caste, entitled to representation in the estates. Montgelas was less successful in "purifying" Catholic services and ceremonies, but managed to break the clerical monopoly on education. In all this the church was treated as a subordinate and dependent agency of government.<sup>4</sup>

The notion of a Catholic defense group was also of early origin. In 1789 a Benedictine monk named Rupert Kornmann proposed to counter the "rage for freedom" emanating from the west with a literary club and correspondence society for the monasteries of Bavaria and the Palatinate.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, when Bavaria absorbed the ecclesiastical princi-

<sup>3</sup> This quotation is from Marcel Dunan, *Napoléon et l'Allemagne, Le système Continental et les Débuts du Royaume de Bavière, 1806-1810* (Paris, 1943), p. 111. Dunan is the most reliable and informative author on the subject of Bavaria during the Napoleonic period. See also Hans H. Hofmann, *Adelige Herrschaft und souveräner Staat* (Munich, 1962), pp. 211-322. There is still no biography of Montgelas; the most interesting discussion of his career is in Ludwig Doeberl, *Maximilian von Montgelas und das Prinzip der Staatssouveränität* (Munich, 1925), *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> In addition to the works mentioned in the preceding footnote, see: Michael Doeberl, *Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns*, II (Munich, 1928), pp. 480-514; Herman von Sicherer, *Staat und Kirche in Bayern von Regierungsantritt des Kurfürsten Maximilian Joseph IV bis zur Erklärung von Tergernsee, 1799-1821* (Munich, 1874), *passim*; Chester Higby, *The Religious Policy of the Bavarian Government during the Napoleonic Period* (New York, 1918), *passim*; Harold Vedeler, "The Genesis of the Toleration Reforms in Bavaria under Montgelas," *Journal of Modern History*, 10 (1938), *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> Hugo Lang, *Der Historiker als Prophet. Leben und Schriften des Abtes Rupert Kornmann, 1757-1817* (Nürnberg, 1947), p. 10.

pality of Würzburg in 1803 the bishop, Gregor Zirkel, decided that a journal was needed to speak out against a government so obviously committed to the revolutionary philosophy of the day. "I feel called upon to bring competent men together," he told the prince bishop.<sup>6</sup> Joseph Sambuga, along with Kornmann and Zirkel a founding member of the *Verein*, dreamed of editing a clerical magazine in opposition to the Enlightenment ever since his arrival in Munich in 1800. In 1806 he and several friends began to meet regularly to discuss religious and perhaps political matters, but after four years they had to disperse, accused by Montgelas of being anti-French.<sup>7</sup> An essay by Sambuga which appeared in 1817 indicates clearly the spirit behind this striving for organization. It could not have been written later than 1815, the date of Sambuga's death, and some of the passages suggest the period when France was still a republic, as does the title, "To the Catholic Clergy on the Threshold of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century."

Brothers, contemplate the world about you. Measure! Evaluate! Then act according to the demands of your profession . . . . Remain not aloof from the errors of the age, but work against them with all your might. You no longer need to be the despised butt of abuse . . . . Too much patience is treason to the good cause . . . . I do not hesitate to say publicly that you must establish secret societies.<sup>8</sup>

Disgruntled Catholics depended for leadership upon two types of men. On the one side were those who never waived in their assurance that the intellectual climate of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was essentially destructive. In this connection it is noteworthy that Bavaria provided the setting for one of Germany's earliest examples of self-conscious political conservatism. In 1786 Karl Theodor ordered the dissolution of the Illuminati, ostensibly shielding his government from the treasonous activities of a conspiratorial sect. In fact, this was the beginning in central Europe of a bitter counter-attack against the philosophy of the Enlightenment and its political and administrative implications. Especially virulent in seeking the Illuminati's downfall was a group of ex-Jesuits residing in Augsburg, later a center of recruitment for the *Verein*. It would seem no accident that the charter which Bishop Zirkel composed for his new organization in 1814 strongly

<sup>6</sup> A. F. Ludwig, *Weihbischof Zirkel von Würzburg in seiner Stellung zur theologischen Aufklärung und zur kirchlichen Restauration* (Paderborn, 1904-1906), I, p. 296.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph Anton Sambuga, *Auserlesene Briefe; Erste Sammlung* (Munich, 1829), pp. 154-155. Max Spindler, *Joseph Anton Sambuga und die Jugendentwicklung König Ludwigs I* (Aichach, 1927), pp. 70-73. Maximilian von Montgelas, *Denkwürdigkeiten des bayerischen Staatsministers Maximilian Grafen von Montgelas, 1799-1817*, ed. Ludwig von Montgelas (Stuttgart, 1887), pp. 231-232.

<sup>8</sup> "An die Katholische Geitlichkeit beim Eintritte des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts." A full text of the essay is in Joseph Anton Sambuga, *Reden und Aufsätze*, ed. J. B. Schmitt-Hug (2d ed.; Augsburg, 1847), pp. 42-126. I have quoted from pp. 43, 96-97. A shortened version of the essay also appeared in the *Literaturzeitung für katholische Religionslehrer*, ed. F. K. Felder (Landshut), 1817, II, p. 45 ff.

recalls the program formulated by these ex-Jesuits in the 1780's: arousal of mass antipathy for the Enlightenment through a series of journals written for the parish priest and his flock.<sup>9</sup>

The stifling reaction of Karl Theodor's last years also left its mark on the *Verein* through the work of Joseph Klein. A Munich priest and official on one of the many boards of censorship which flourished in Bavaria until 1799, he devoted all his considerable talents to winning converts for the embattled old regime. In particular he influenced Abbé Sambuga. The latter had been a moderate before the outbreak of the French Revolution, displeased with the complexity of Catholic services in rural areas and mildly critical of monastic life and the papacy. Contact with the armies of the French Republic after 1792 (he was then near Mainz) caused him to veer right, but more important was his close association with Klein, which began in 1800 when he moved to Munich. Sambuga soon hardened into an extreme papalist and advocate of church supremacy over the state.<sup>10</sup>

Rupert Kornmann was another steadfast conservative. His plan of 1789 for an anti-revolutionary journal has already been mentioned. In 1790 he was elected abbot of his monastery, located near Regensburg, which then became an assembly point for clerical émigrés fleeing France. Also at this time he entered the Bavarian *Landschaft*, an offshoot or rump committee of the *Landtag* which had not met since 1669. The *Landschaft*, it might be added, experienced something of an aristocratic resurgence during the last twenty years of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, greatly increasing its effectiveness as an organ of the privileged classes. Kornmann performed his parliamentary duties with such fervor that he soon was acknowledged leader of the clerical estate. In this capacity he fought mightily to defeat Moontgelas' reform program. Appealing to both the elector, Maximilian Joseph, and the pope, he also argued for class solidarity in defense of the constitution. Aristocracy and clergy must stand together against "the revolution from above." In 1803 Kornmann's own monastery was secularized, and the *Landschaft* abolished in 1808. Even in retirement, however, he was a center of opposition to the government. His adherence to the *Verein* in 1814 was especially valuable for the many contacts he had maintained with monastic brethren and colleagues of the defunct *Landschaft*.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Valjavec, pp. 271-302. Jacques Droz, "La légende du complot illuministe et les origines du romantisme politique en Allemagne," *Revue Historique*, 226 (1961), pp. 313-338. R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton, 1959-1964), II, pp. 452-453.

<sup>10</sup> Spindler, pp. 15-52, 70-72. Adalbert Huhn, *Geschichte der Spitales, der Kirche und der Pfarrei zum hl. Geiste im München* (Munich, 1893), pp. 277-316.

<sup>11</sup> Hugo Lang, pp. 12, 16-18. Anton Doeberl, "Abt. Rupert Kornmann von Prifing. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aufklärung, Säkularization, und Restoration in Bistum Regensburg," *Historische-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland*, 149 (1912), pp. 838-852; 151 (1913), pp. 88-90, 188-189. Rupert Kornmann, *Neueste*

A second and more interesting stimulus to Catholic action came from repentent liberals. The career of Lorenz Westenrieder is illustrative. He was a famous Bavarian scholar, dramatist, and art critic, his collected works of 1838 exceeding thirty volumes. He was also, at least in the beginning, a propagandist for the Enlightenment and a member of the Illuminati. His interests were popular education and social progress, and though a priest he had only scorn for monasticism, the Jesuits, and Rome. "The purpose of enlightenment," he remarked in the 1770's, "is to make the fruits of this earth accessible to the many, to make their lives joyous." These views led naturally to an admiration for France, home of the philosophes, and Joseph's Austria. Nonetheless, in 1814 Westenrieder became *Verein* representative in Munich. It was no mistake, for he was an utterly different person. This one time member of the Illuminati now spoke of himself as a profound obscurant, and already thought what he wrote some years later: "Just as one prevents the free sale of arsenic, so one must prohibit the moral arsenic of Voltaire and Rousseau."<sup>12</sup> In 1815 he passed the following judgement on Joseph II and the desirability of reform:

His fate stands as a warning to all monarchs. A prince should never allow himself to be led blindly by the spirit of the times. Tampering with ancient constitutions and usages is an unpredictable business which may well end in chaos. . . . Even under very imperfect constitutions wisdom often lies with the phrase, "Leave well enough alone."<sup>13</sup>

The central problem of Westenrieder's life is to explain this almost total renunciation of the ideals of his youth and early manhood. The chronology of his development suggests an answer. Toward the end of the 1780's he began to have doubts, engendered perhaps by the quickening pace of reform in Austria and the first signs of trouble in France. However, his sharp disapproval of Karl Theodor's reactionary policy at home outweighed all other considerations, and no decisive break occurred during the decade of the French Revolution. Rather, it was the arrival of Montgelas and his radical associates which acted as a catalyst; after 1800 Westenrieder moved rapidly and irreversibly into the camp of conservatism. Some say that he was disturbed most of all by Bavaria's subservience to France. To quote his biographer: "We must remember that Westenrieder's Enlightenment was Bavarian, far removed from the superficiality of French thought."<sup>14</sup> I cannot agree. While a liberal Westenrieder admired France, because he believed in the efficacy of change. Later he rejected both, telling an Austrian official in 1809,

*Aktenstücke des Prälatenstandes und der Landschaft in Bayern* (1802), pp. 4-15, 51. Otto Steinwachs, "Der Ausgang der landschaftlichen Verordnung in Bayern," *Oberbayrische Archiv für vaterländische Geschichte*, 55-57 (1910-1913), *passim*.

<sup>12</sup> Anton Grossl, "Westenrieders Briefwechsel," *Schriftenreihe zur bayerische Landesgeschichte*, 16 (1934), pp. 1-76 (biographic introduction).

<sup>13</sup> Lorenz Westenrieder, *Historische Calender* (Munich) XX (1815), p. 298.

<sup>14</sup> Grossl, pp. 39, 50-53, 58. The quotation is on p. 46.

"Bavarians of all classes are incensed by this spirit of newness."<sup>15</sup> The sin of his government was in destroying the old regime, not in making the Enlightenment French. Under Montgelas' guidance men effected the dreams of a generation, and it was this achievement which separated Westenrieder from his former self, just as it distinguished Napoleonic Germany from the well intentioned, but impotent world of *Kleinstaaterei*.

Gregor Zirkel, eventual founder of the *Verein*, shared with Westenrieder the same intellectual odyssey. He was born in Franconia in 1762, the son of an artisan. Having decided on the priesthood while quite young, he studied first at the University of Bamberg and then at the Priest's Seminary of Würzburg, where he was ordained in 1786. His fine scholarship led to a theological chair at the University of Würzburg in 1795, and four years later he became regent of the Priest's Seminary. Already at Bamberg he had fallen under the spell of the Enlightenment, a process which was completed at Würzburg, then a center of liberal Catholicism. According to his biographer, Zirkel barely remained a Christian during this period, let alone a Catholic. Like Westenrieder he scorned both Jesuits and monks, and ran the Priest's Seminary as a school of the Enlightenment, believing that the primary task of Christianity was to further secular progress. He had little sympathy for the French Revolution, especially its Jacobin phase, but in 1796 advised the Catholic clergy of Germany to surrender their privileges with good grace.<sup>16</sup>

Zirkel's adoption of a more conservative outlook dated from his investiture as bishop of Würzburg in 1802. Significantly, this was also the year of his first official contact with Montgelas, who had anticipated the approaching settlement of imperial affairs by sending troops into the principality. The famous *Reichshauptschluss* of 1803 did in fact award Würzburg to Bavaria, and the next year found Bishop Zirkel writing to the newly appointed governor of his diocese on the subject of church-state relations. Appearing quite moderate, he criticized the regular clergy and conceded in principle state pre-eminence over the church. Only on the basis of mutual, practical interest would he solicit greater understanding for Catholics. In part this was Zirkel of the Enlightenment speaking, in part Zirkel the skilful politician, for in private he expressed growing resentment of Bavarian rule. This is revealed in another memorandum of 1804 which he sent to the former prince-bishop, Karl Georg. The real aim of Munich, he charged, was to replace positive religion with an eclectic, rationalistic cult, compounded of Protestant,

<sup>15</sup> August Kluchhohn, "Aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlasse Lorenz von Westenrieders," *Bayerische Akademie von Wissenschaft, Abhandlungen, Historische Klasse, Abteilung*, XVI (1882), pp. 170-171.

<sup>16</sup> Bergsträsser, pp. 7-9. Ludwig, I, pp. 62-68, 99-180, 202-204. Ludwig was himself a conservative professor of Catholic theology, which definitely colors his interpretation of Zirkel's career. Still, his biography is excellent and a mine of information.

Calvinist, and Catholic elements. This explained the introduction of toleration and mixed marriages, and the attack on two distinguishing features of Catholicism, celibacy and monastic seclusion. Furthermore, North and South were to meet in Franconia and complete the German revolution. Only Catholics were firm in their defense of throne and altar, since in their heart of hearts Protestants were democrats. In conclusion, he suggested that the church rest its case on the Council of Trent and the Treaty of Westphalia.<sup>17</sup> In 1806 Zirkel again set forth his general views on Catholicism and revolution, this time occasioned by the return of independence to Würzburg under Grand Duke Ferdinand. His remarks to the Hapsburg prince portray with classical sharpness the transformation of the Enlightenment from a system of ideas into a question of politics.

The heat of religious conflict has long since cooled here . . . . There can be no religious objection to the settlement of Protestant communities in Würzburg. However, the matter has now taken on a special political significance . . . . The Protestants of Germany form a political sect with special political interests. From the beginning they worked for the overthrow of the German constitution . . . . The Bavarian government allied with them against Catholicism which stood in the way of so called reform . . . . One strove for the amalgamation of the two religions . . . . and saw as imminent the final victory over the Catholic church . . . . From the political standpoint, therefore, toleration must be considered harmful to the cause of our church.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, Zirkel's attitude toward the internal structure of the church was changing apace and with equal thoroughness. He banished from his mind the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and, as well, the notion that material progress should be a central theme for Catholics, ordering his priests to serve God, not the agricultural needs of their peasants. Elaborate public ceremonies and processions now seemed vital to him, because superstition at least was preferable to indifference or disbelief. He even made peace with monasticism and the Jesuits, and more importantly, developed into one of the leading papalists in Germany.<sup>19</sup>

By 1810 the bishop completed his spiritual metamorphosis, and there remained only the problem of how best to implement his new vision of church politics and polity. The French presence in Germany precluded immediate action, which anyway was less urgent during the reign of Grand Duke Ferdinand, a friend of Catholicism. Also, the breach was slow in healing between Zirkel, the one time liberal, and conservatives of his faith. In 1814, however, Würzburg was again part of Bavaria, and plans for some special agency to coordinate Catholic resistance could be delayed no longer. Zirkel gathered around him forty odd prominent

<sup>17</sup> Ludwig, I, pp. 261-282.

<sup>18</sup> Ludwig, II, pp. 151-156.

<sup>19</sup> Ludwig, I, pp. 286-288, 307-316; II, pp. 164-167, 307-316, 334-335, 353, 418-487.



Catholics, and with their approval of his draft constitution the *Verein* was born. The members, all papalists, vowed to defend and support the Roman Catholic Church, mainly through systematic propagation of conservative doctrines. Their ultimate intention was to arouse the masses against policies of the Bavarian government considered hostile, but first it was necessary to re-educate the lower clergy and literate laymen. As official publication Zirkel designated the *Literary Journal for Catholic Teachers of Religion*, whose format and editorial position henceforth were to be formulated by the *Verein*. Founded in 1810 by the Badenese cleric, Franz Felder, the magazine was selected for its already large following and because Felder was sound ideologically. As a means of warding off government reprisals the existence and activities of the *Verein* were to be strictly secret. In each large city one man was appointed representative. His mission was to keep in touch with sister groups in other cities, for which a code later was devised, and to oversee the dispatch of articles to the *Literary Journal*.<sup>20</sup>

We now have reached a convenient point in our discussion to pause for a moment and review some of the material already covered. Bishop Zirkel and Lorenz Westenrieder broke with the Enlightenment at the same time and for the same reason: neither could abide the new and dynamic government establishing itself in Munich. German historians mostly blame Montgelas for this, arguing that his indifference to local traditions and the general ruthlessness of his administration thoroughly discredited the high ideals of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>21</sup> Certainly the creation of a modern, centralized state out of the scattered Wittelsbach holdings was marred by serious abuses. Nonetheless, Zirkel's warning of 1806 against toleration indicates deeper causes for his rejection of the commitments of half a life time than bureaucratic incompetence or malfeasance. In that year he was forced to see the Enlightenment as much more than an intellectual climate of opinion or an assemblage of fond hopes for the future; it was now an accurate picture of political reality and the powerful basis for further action. Germans finally could fathom the deadly seriousness of the 18<sup>th</sup> century demand for change, and while some were gratified, others found the situation insufferable. The reorganization of Bavaria did not go so far as the Revolution in France, but it affected a people whose institutions and way of life were relatively backward. Thus the distance traveled was comparable, and so was the shock. The Catholic *Verein* included a number of staunch conservatives, the kind existing in every society at all times; it also depended upon men who reacted to Montgelas' regime by a drastic shift along the whole spectrum of political, social, and moral attitudes. This second group, the repentent liberals,

<sup>20</sup> Ludwig, II, pp. 292-307. The *Verein* charter is reproduced in full. The *Literary Journal's* title in German is *Literaturzeitung für katholische Religionslehrer*, hereafter cited as *LZ*.

<sup>21</sup> Ludwig, II, p. 478. Bergsträsser, p. 13. On Westenrieder see note 14, above.

are most important, for they tell us that 1799 was a fundamental turning point in the history of Bavaria, and of Germany.

## II

Despite the conspiratorial overtones of Zirkel's constitution, the *Verein* was not a revolutionary organization. In a freer society than Montgelas' Bavaria the members could have discarded their ill-fitting cloaks and daggers and come forward as the legitimate pressure group they really were. They hoped to see undone most of the prime minister's work and fervently desired his dismissal from office, but hardly were preparing to overthrow governments. Their methods were direct appeal to the Bavarian king and the Congress of Vienna, confidential missives to the papacy, and more radically, the attempt to mobilize public opinion in their support. Without being any sort of Carbonari they were quite active behind the scenes until 1818 when the revival of parliamentary institutions in Bavaria brought them into the main stream of German political life.<sup>22</sup> However, this is another story. Today the focus of our investigation must remain with the founding of the *Verein* in 1814. So far the latter event has served as a vehicle for depicting Germany's reaction to the era of the French Revolution. Now it will serve to illuminate that highly romanticized adventure of the 19<sup>th</sup> century — the War of Liberation.

Zirkel gave the call to action in July of 1814 because his conversion to the conservative cause was by then sufficiently well known to make cooperation with like-minded Catholics possible, and because the detested Montgelas again ruled in Würzburg. An equally compelling factor was the recent collapse of France. Word of the latter was incorporated directly into the *Verein's* charter. "Ours is a moment of special opportunity, for Europe now must be refashioned." Germans thus had come full circle in little more than a decade. During the period of Napoleon's first success, say until 1807, countless men felt themselves on the threshold of a great age. They fully expected to institute the radical schemes envisioned under enlightened despotism. After 1813 others were speaking of a new dawn, one which would cut short the progress of the reformers and

<sup>22</sup> Karl Buchheim, *Geschichte der Christlichen Parteien in Deutschland* (Munich, 1953), pp. 72-76. Sicherer, *Staat und Kirche . . .*, pp. 197-221. The problem of Montgelas' fall from power in 1817 is still unsolved. Certain Catholic writers tend to emphasize the role of the *Verein* members, especially through their influence with the crown prince, Ludwig, and princess Charlotte (daughter of the king and later wife of Emperor Francis). See Anton Doeberl, "Abt. Rupert Kornmann . . .", 151 (1913), pp. 189-190; and the probably unreliable, "Die Freimaurerei im Bistum Eichstätt," *Pastoralblatt des Bistum Eichstätt* (1865), p. 231. This interpretation is accepted with moderation by Bergsträsser, p. 30. The best study is Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, "Der Sturz des Grafen Montgelas," *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, 20 (1957). As an immediate cause of the minister's dismissal Aretin discounts any specific Catholic influence. However, he does not deny that Montgelas' anti-clericalism and admiration for the Enlightenment and France were important issues in the background.

reverse their victories. The *Verein* members had nothing to do with the outbreak of the War of Liberation, which resulted from decisions made by the great powers. Nor were they particularly concerned with the inspired patriots surrounding Baron Stein and the Prussian king. But they perceived with alacrity that the advancing allies were to wipe away years of defeat and frustration, and that the sound of drums and cannonade on the eastern horizon heralded a rebirth of triumphant Catholicism.

In 1810 Abbé Sambuga told a friend that life had become a burden, death a welcome possibility. There was no hope for the church, and the situation could only worsen. As early as March of 1813 his pessimism began to fade. "Some say," he wrote, "that if things don't happen now they never will. God grant they are right. We must pray that God finds us worthy of contributing to the restoration of His honor." By the fall of 1814 Sambuga's self-confidence was positively youthful. Utilizing a vast network of personal correspondents, he set to work raising the morale of Catholic priests, and also found time to participate in the establishment of the *Verein*.<sup>23</sup> We may surmise a similar experience for Rupert Kornmann with the aid of two letters he received from Count Preysing, the former *Landschaft* president. In 1810 Preysing advised his old friend that the revolution having ended in chaos, one could only retire from public life and maintain a sense of humour. Four years later he urgently invited Kornmann to visit him and discuss the latest turn of events. Together they could plan a future which surely would have a place for them.<sup>24</sup> Kornmann himself considered 1814 a propitious year to re-issue his major philosophical effort, *Die Sibylle der Zeit aus der Vorzeit*, an attack on the Enlightenment published anonymously in 1810. The book now was much enlarged and proudly bore the author's signature.<sup>25</sup> For Lorenz Westenrieder the outstanding occurrence of 1813 was the treaty of Ried, an agreement by the Bavarian government to desert France for the allied camp.<sup>26</sup> The lively rise of Catholic spirits can also be followed in the *Literary Journal*. The first cautious sign, appearing in December of 1813, was a prediction that the literary classics of Catholicism were about to regain the honored place they once held.<sup>27</sup> The next year this indirect manner of speech was replaced by a tone of real jubilation. "Our church shall recover all its splendor. Freedom and independence are at hand."<sup>28</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Joseph Anton Sambuga, *Auserlesene Briefe; Zweite Sammlung* (Munich, 1837), pp. 53-55, 67-69.

<sup>24</sup> Anton Doeberl, 151 (1913), p. 93.

<sup>25</sup> Rupert Kornmann, *Die Sibylle der Zeit aus der Vorzeit, oder politische Grundsätze durch die Geschichte bewähret* (2d ed. Regensburg, 1814), 3 vols. In December of 1813 the editor of the *LZ* informed his readers that the unknown author of the 1810 *Sibylle*, who had been forced to omit many critical remarks, was preparing to speak his full mind. *LZ*, 1813, II, p. 364.

<sup>26</sup> Westenrieder, *Historische Calender*, XX (1815), p. 503.

<sup>27</sup> *LZ*, 1813, II, pp. 370-371.

<sup>28</sup> *LZ*, 1814, I, p. 362.

The allied victory had more to offer than the simple elimination of French power in Europe. According to the editor of the *Literary Journal* the war also involved a specific mandate for the future, which he labeled "German freedom." Its applicability to the Catholic cause was announced toward the end of 1814.

No sooner was the fate of our fatherland decided at [the battle of] Leipzig, no sooner were Germans again free, when all were impressed with the unbearable plight of the Catholic church.<sup>29</sup>

An article written for the *Literary Journal* in 1815, which expressed the *Verein's* position on a number of issues, stated this relationship between the war and a restoration of Catholic rights and privileges with greater force and detail.

Are Catholics to be denied the chance to put forth their just demands after having fought so gloriously for the freedom of Germany and the preservation of their dynasties? With a general restoration of the legal order in progress, our question is especially pertinent . . . It is a profound need of our age to be perfectly clear that the Catholics of Germany, who sacrificed so much for the achievement of political freedom, expect precisely the same freedom for their church . . . Our pope stood like a rock against Napoleon, an example which stirred millions of believers to resist . . . Shall we, then, not seek our share of this worthy German freedom? <sup>30</sup>

Zirkel's group had already indicated the tenor of these Catholic demands in two briefs of 1814. Their solemn recommendations, addressed to the Congress of Vienna and the Bavarian king, were as follows: a church master in its own house and the leading agency of lay education; financial support provided by the secular arm, but administered by clergymen; an end to state interference in religious ceremonies and services; and the restoration of certain cloistral orders.<sup>31</sup> Even so, this was only a minimal program designed to fill the gap until public opinion was prepared for something more drastic.<sup>32</sup> The *Verein* disclosed its true purpose in a secret memorandum which the members drew up in Bamberg in 1814 and then forwarded to Rome. They informed the papacy that as loyal Catholics they would accept nothing less than a return to the situation of 1799. The "false Enlightenment" must be suppressed once and for all, and if Protestants were to remain in Bavaria, they would do so on Catholic sufferance.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> LZ, 1814, II, pp. 204-205.

<sup>30</sup> LZ, 1815, I, pp. 279-280, 326-327, 374.

<sup>31</sup> A full text of the appeal to Vienna, entitled, "Rechtliche Bitten und ehrfurchtsvollste Wünsche der katholiken Deutschlands," is in Ludwig, II, pp. 567-571. The letter to the king is in the same volume, pp. 409-417.

<sup>32</sup> Zirkel wrote to Consalvi in 1814, "Do nothing until the concordat has become a popular cause." Ludwig, II, p. 422.

<sup>33</sup> Sicherer, *Staat und Kirche* . . . , p. 101. Otto Mejer, *Zur Geschichte der römisch-deutschen Frage* (Rostock, 1871-1885), II, pp. 96-99.

If 1799 was to be a normal year for determining the nature and extent of religious freedom, then the question arises whether a similar standard held for political freedom. Certainly the men associated with Zirkel and the *Literary Journal* were not pleading for an open, bourgeois society, the ideal of revolutionary France and, to a lesser extent, of Montgelas' regime in Bavaria. On the contrary, the prospect of intense social mobility and ceaseless change frightened them beyond measure. From past experience they identified liberalism with arbitrary confiscation of church property and self-righteous meddling in church affairs, and insisted on the repudiation of such practices. The recent military campaign was a step in the right direction, for the *Verein* believed along with Baron Stein that the war had been fought as much against the despotism of Rhine Confederation bureaucracy as against France.<sup>34</sup> With the return of peace it was the task of these conservative Catholics to see that Germany's newly won freedom assured the curtailment of princely authority, without, however, recalling the slogans of 1789. Quite naturally they turned to the glories of the German empire.

Westenrieder provides an excellent example of this continental version of grand whiggery. His *Historical Calendar* of 1815, though mainly devoted to current events, includes a carefully argued appreciation of the defunct imperial constitution. He began with a bitter condemnation of the many Germans who gullibly accepted cries of liberty, fraternity, and equality emanating from Paris at the beginning of the century, and at the same time rejected the political structure of their own fatherland. What better evidence that the so-called Age of Enlightenment was really superficial and blind! The empire, abused and despised, nonetheless offered the best hope for peace and justice in Germany, and to suppose that its destruction would set men free had been the height of folly. Under the old regime, we are told, imperial adjudication was always available for the subject whose legal rights were violated, and who failed to obtain satisfaction from his immediate sovereign. The tribunals of the empire could be counted upon to protect an individual from the tyranny of local government. Here was the famous German freedom which bound even princes and the free estates. Admittedly, grave difficulties beset Germans prior to 1806, but Westenrieder did not think the constitution at fault. Guilt rested with those who pursued their interests outside the law, following French notions of political realism. No doubt this tendency triumphed in the end, but did not the exception prove the rule? Collaboration with Bonaparte and disrespect for ancient institutions resulted, predictably, in Germany's enslavement.<sup>35</sup>

Germans are often accused of political naiveté; of an inability, for instance, to distinguish between modern democratic principles of

<sup>34</sup> Werner Gembruch, *Freiherr von Stein im Zeitalter der Restauration* (Wiesbaden, 1960), chap. I.

<sup>35</sup> Westenrieder, *Historische Calender*, XX (1815), pp. 388-394.

individualistic liberty and the customary liberties and privileges of numerically small corporations or classes. This does not seem to have been the case in Bavaria. Those who waved the banner of German *Libertät* in 1813 and 1814 usually knew what they were about. Conscious enemies of the Enlightenment and the Revolution, they hoped for a substantial restoration of the old order. The complaints of Zirkel and his clerical friends against overbearing government supervision of their affairs probably were justified; yet the freedom they championed was distinctly limited and exclusive. Their joy at the defeat of France reflected not only disgust for Bonaparte's irresponsible imperialism, but also an implacable opposition to the modernization of Western Europe. For some this second attitude developed after 1800, for others it was part of a tradition predating the French Revolution itself. Moreover, the men of Montgelas' bureaucracy were equally aware of the consequences attending an allied victory. As I have tried to show elsewhere,<sup>36</sup> they were not inclined to enthusiasm for the War of Liberation, and their suspicion of parliamentary checks on the monarchy indicated far more than a mere grasping for power. They had found the Napoleonic reorganization of Bavaria immensely exhilarating, and if the French emperor finally proved himself a treacherous and compromising ally, still, this was no reason to accept the myth of an imperial German paradise, which they knew never to have existed.

<sup>36</sup> Daniel Klang, "Bavaria and the War of Liberation," *French Historical Studies*, Spring, 1965.