Reported Speech in The Winter's Tale

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Résumé de l'article

La pièce The Winter's Tale fait un usage considérable du discours rapporté dans ses moments décisifs, tels que l'oracle de Delphes déterminant à propos de la fidélité de la reine, la vision qu'Antigonus se remémore alors qu'Hermione lui dit comment accomplir son voeu d'ostraciser leur petite fille, la description du langage corporel de l'épouse lorsque le vieux berger explique à Perdita comment remplir son rôle de maîtresse de la fête, et la conversation de trois gentilshommes relatant la réunion de Léonte, Polixène et Perdita juste avant la scène finale. Ces relations sont des énoncés performatifs dans le sens défini par le philosophe J. L. Austin. Ils remplissent une fonction essentielle entre la narration et le drame, étant donné l'emphase que met le titre de la pièce sur le récit, et par l'impression ingénieuse que les actions les plus importantes se déroulent au-delà du cadre dramatique conventionnel. Les narrations clarifient certains aspects de la praxis intrigante de cette pièce. Les narrations contiennent toute une panoplie de types de discours — le jugement, la menace, l'avertissement, l'instruction, la dénomination, la séduction, la cajolerie et la prophétie — dont les narrateurs eux-mêmes ne sont pas en mesure de comprendre toutes les implications du message. Quel est le lien entre ces types de discours au début et à la fin de la pièce The Winter's Tale ? Les forces en jeu sont-elles de nature humaine ou divine ? Quelles sont leur influence sur la construction de l'effet cathartique de sa conclusion spectaculaire ?

Citer cet article

Reported Speech in *The Winter’s Tale*  

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Reported speech occupies a rather ambiguous area somewhere between narrative and drama. Since it deals with things past, it can feel like a narrative of a completed action. Since what it reports is speech, it can have the dramatic immediacy of the spoken word. In Shakespeare, reported speech is nearly always loaded, alive with implication, motive, or mystery. The words seem to be doing something; they are speech acts. In the most obvious sense, they constitute an act of reporting, but the reporters also tend to select and highlight especially those words that seem decisive or determinate, those words...
that are memorable precisely because they have a continuing force in the present and the future. Moreover, if the reporters are minor characters (which they often are) reporting on the sayings and doings of major characters (which they often do), the reported speech offers a unique perspective on the quality of the action or plot of the play. This perspective is often more complicated than what is usually attributed to a chorus or a choric voice—though the nature of the reporter’s interest can include a choric dimension—because it doesn’t simply comment on the main action but presents it, or represents it, from a fresh or unusual angle. The action has happened but is also still ongoing, still in the process of happening or unfolding, and the choices or decisions that the reporters make in their speech acts intersect with—and may even help to shape—the choices and decisions that propel the main action. In a play such as *The Winter’s Tale,* in which drama and narrative conspicuously overlap and in which the plot enfolds a large number of crosscurrents or counter-movements, reported speech can serve as an index to the peculiar nature and complexity of the action.

Two of the most striking instances of reported speech occur near the middle of the play. One is the report of the oracle from Delphos which exonerates Queen Hermione from the charge of having committed adultery with King Polixenes, and the other is the report that Antigonus gives of his vision of what Hermione tells him to do as he fulfils his oath to cast out the infant daughter of King Leontes. In both cases, the spoken voice being reported has a mysterious existence, even as it also has a marked authority. That the voice in either case appears strangely disembodied seems somehow appropriate for a play in which a major part of the action goes underground for a substantial period. The two utterances are filled with a series of speech acts—judging, threatening or warning, giving directions, naming, and prophesying—and both are said to derive their authority, ultimately, from the god Apollo. Both utterances are loaded with implications for the larger issues and movements of the play, but they leave mysteriously open the question of agency. What forces are at work here, human or divine? How do these speech acts, located in the middle, connect with the beginning and end, the overarching action, or the praxis of *The Winter’s Tale?*

The oracle, in particular, appears to give a succinct summary of the complete action of the play, judging the mistakes of the beginning and prophesying the consequences for the future, the judgment a model of clarity and the prophecy a model of oracular obfuscation:
Reported Speech in *The Winter's Tale*

Hermione is chaste, Polixenes blameless, Camillo a true subject, Leontes a jealous tyrant, his innocent babe truly begotten, and the King shall live without an heir if that which is lost be not found. 

Since these are the words of Apollo, there is really no question about the accuracy of the judgment, and while the prophecy remains an enigma, partly because it eschews the named particularities of the judgment, there is really little question that it will prove true—in at least one of the many options it leaves open. Given the divine pronouncement, the play may seem to suggest that divine forces are at work in shaping or controlling the action as well as merely describing it, and this impression may deepen if we consider how little the reporters of the message have to do with the content of what they deliver.

Most examples of reported speech require, at a minimum one would suppose, at least the action (performative in Austin’s sense) of reporting, but in this example Cleomenes and Dion are shut out from even that minimum. They are the bearers of the oracle’s message but not its conduit. It is the priest of Apollo who reports, in writing, on the words of the god. The messengers in this case, far from being held accountable for the accuracy or faithfulness of their report, are in fact forced to take an oath that they have no idea what the report contains: they must swear on the “sword of justice” that they “have not dared to break the holy seal / Nor read the secrets in’t” (3.2.122–28), and once this oath is performed, the task of reading out the report is left to an unnamed “officer.” Given this procedure, one might wonder why the messengers are not left similarly unnamed and anonymous (as they are in *Pandosto*, Shakespeare’s source). Why are the messengers so carefully characterized as Cleomenes and Dion, and what need is there for two of them?

Interestingly, though they are not party to what the oracle says about events in Sicilia, they do apparently have direct experience with the voice of the god; in fact, for them, as Cleomenes explains to Dion, that was the most impressive thing about their whole expedition.

But of all, the burst
And the ear-deaf’ning voice o’ th’oracle,
Kin to Jove’s thunder, so surprised my sense
That I was nothing. (3.1.8–11)
If Leontes, for his part, wants them to swear that they have not broken the seal, presumably because as mere humans they might tamper with or contaminate the report, this account suggests that even had they been entrusted with the relaying of it, they might have had nothing to say: the mere hearing of the voice leaves them senseless, annihilated. And this strategy of emphasizing the danger and difficulty of reporting, in this particular instance of reported speech, seems once more to locate the speech itself in some realm beyond the human. When the officer finally reads out the message, it is effectively at two removes from the original source—a report of reported speech—the voice of the god too powerful to be experienced unmediated.

And yet Dion and Cleomenes also speak emphatically for the human realm. The other part of the oath they are required to swear focuses on their direct, human contact with the island and the priest of the oracle. They swear they "have / Been both at Delphos, and from thence have brought / This sealed-up oracle, by the hand delivered / Of great Apollo’s priest” (3.2.124–26). The short scene depicting their visit to Delphos (3.1) seems contrived especially to substantiate just these points. They begin their conversation, employing the figure of *topographia* or “description of a place” and highlighting their first-hand experience of the place, by comparing it with the common report: “The climate is delicate, the air most sweet; / Fertile the isle, the temple much surpassing / The common praise it bears” (3.1.1–3), and they conclude by emphasizing that the oracle, now in *their* hands, was “Thus by Apollo’s great divine sealed up” (3.1.19). Their active interest in the whole scene and its broader implications is underlined by its animated conclusion—in quick succession a command, an exclamation (which is also a command), and a prayer: “Go. Fresh horses! / And gracious be the issue” (3.1.21–22). As J. H. P. Pafford notes, the call for fresh horses shows “that the messengers have travelled some distance since they landed,” and the physical activity that this implies seems also to reflect the spiritual and emotional investment they have in the case.

Their concluding prayer (or is it merely a hope?) that the “issue” be gracious seems strangely congruent with the latter part of the oracle, similarly focused on some unspecified result and similarly contingent on the issue or child who, if not found, might be the heir “the King shall live without.” In fact, for a couple of messengers who supposedly know nothing about the contents of the message they carry, they seem eerily accurate about what it should contain. As their conversation reveals, they are scarcely impartial in the matter. “If th’event
“o’th’journey,” Dion reasons, “Prove as successful to the Queen—O, be’t so— / As it hath been to us rare, pleasant, speedy, / The time is worth the use on’t.” And Cleomenes is quick to agree: “Great Apollo / Turn all to th’best! These proclamations / So forcing faults upon Hermione, / I little like” (3.1.11–17). These messengers are obviously on the queen’s side (their counterparts in Pandosto are, I think, meant to be “indifferent”), and the main reason, it seems to me, that Shakespeare makes use of two messengers is precisely in order for them to have this conversation. Their agreement on the matter signifies that this perspective is hardly unique or idiosyncratic but is an opinion more widely held, and in this sense the two messengers serve something of a choric function. What they believe is what everybody except Leontes believes. The oracle, then, both in its definitive judgment and in the ambiguous hope of its prophecy, articulates something already latent in the humans who are affected by the action, and while it does not thereby lose its divine sanction, it is surely in some measure humanized by the messengers entrusted with its safe transport.

The human dimension is further highlighted by the actions and attitudes of Leontes with respect to the oracle. In Pandosto, it is the queen who comes up with the idea of sending “to the isle of Delphos, there to inquire of the oracle of Apollo”; in The Winter’s Tale, it is Leontes himself who initiates this action—not however to discover the truth but merely to enforce a truth he thinks he already knows. He seems not to suspect that his messengers, Cleomenes and Dion, might have independent views, and he is therefore doubly shocked when the oracle’s pronouncement defeats his expectation. In what may be Shakespeare’s most significant departure from his source, Leontes at first refuses to believe the oracle, denouncing it as “mere falsehood” (3.2.139). He is brought to his senses within seconds when a servant enters with the news that his son is dead, and he finally reverses himself: “Apollo’s angry, and the heavens themselves / Do strike at my injustice” (3.2.143–44). This shocked recognition, accompanying reversal, is remarkable for the way it balances the role of the heavens against individual human responsibility. Leontes is depicted not merely on the receiving end of a divine message but as interacting with it, in terms of both its summoning and its reception; and to the list of his other tragic mistakes is now added his profanation of the oracle. And as he sees it (at least at first), his sin against the oracle is what precipitates the loss of his son: it even seems as if he somehow needed to lose that son before he could be stunned into recognition.
Whether this loss is what the oracle has referred to as “that which is lost,” however, is far from clear. The loss of Mamillius and the recognition of Apollo’s anger trigger, in turn, a series of recognitions of accumulated losses, itemized in quick succession as Leontes scrambles to redress his mistakes.

Apollo, pardon
My great profaneness ‘gainst thine oracle,
I’ll reconcile me to Polixenes,
New woo my queen, recall the good Camillo,
Whom I proclaim a man of truth, of mercy. (3.2.151–55)

However fitting these gestures may be in acknowledging the loss of Camillo’s council, of Polixenes’s friendship, of reverence for the divine, and of his love for his wife, they are clearly still inadequate. Hermione had warned him earlier with respect to her own case that when he came to “clearer knowledge,” it would not be enough then simply “to say / You did mistake” (2.1.99–102), and part of the reason for this is that he has yet to understand either the true nature of his mistakes or the full extent of his losses. To the loss of his son is shortly added the loss of his wife when Hermione is reported to be dead.

In terms of losses, then, Leontes has an embarrassment of riches to choose from, as he tries to come to grips with the oracle’s prophecy. He elects to focus on his wife and son:

Prithee bring me
To the dead bodies of my queen and son.
One grave shall be for both. Upon them shall
The causes of their death appear, unto
Our shame perpetual. Once a day I’ll visit
The chapel where they lie, and tears shed there
Shall be my recreation. (3.2.232–38)

This exercise proves an effectively ironic “recreation.” It keeps Leontes alive, but in keeping with the prophecy it keeps him alive without an heir. Both his queen and son are, he thinks, irrecoverable; his losses as well as his shame, perpetual; and in the case of his son he is right to think so. If Mamillius is “that which is lost,” he stays lost, whatever hope the oracle may seem to glance at. Or, if he is
found, he is found only as the storyteller who launched a sad tale, “best for win-
ter” (2.1.27), a tale which reports, “There was a man … Dwelt by a churchyard” 
(2.1.31–32). Leontes finds his son only in the sense that he becomes the man 
reported on—dwelling by a churchyard—in the boy’s tale.8

But the loss conspicuously omitted from any mention in Leontes’s reflec-
tions at the climax of the third act is the loss of his infant daughter, and it is this 
loss that is the focus of concern for Antigonus, in the next scene, in my second 
major example of reported speech in The Winter’s Tale. The mariner who guides 
Antigonus is concerned, in a way that seems to parallel Leontes’s concern, that 
the heavens “are angry” (3.3.5) with the business they have in hand. Antigonus, 
likewise, is eager to see that “Their sacred wills be done” (3.3.6), and in this 
mood and with the infant in his arms, he recounts his vision of Hermione.

Come, poor babe.
I have heard, but not believed, the spirits o’th’dead
May walk again. If such thing be, thy mother
Appeared to me last night, for ne’er was dream
So like a waking. To me comes a creature,
Sometimes her head on one side, some another.
I never saw a vessel of like sorrow,
So filled and so becoming. In pure white robes
Like very sanctity she did approach
My cabin where I lay, thrice bowed before me,
And, gasping to begin some speech, her eyes
Became two spouts. The fury spent, anon
Did this break from her: “Good Antigonus,
Since fate, against thy better disposition,
Hath made thy person for the thrower-out
Of my poor babe according to thine oath,
Places remote enough are in Bohemia.
There weep, and leave it crying; and for the babe
Is counted lost forever, Perdita
I prithee call’t. For this ungentle business
Put on thee by my lord, thou ne’er shalt see
Thy wife Paulina more.” And so with shrieks
She melted into air. Affrighted much,
I did in time collect myself, and thought
This was so, and no slumber. Dreams are toys,
Yet for this once, yea superstitiously,
I will be squared by this. I do believe
Hermione hath suffered death, and that
Apollo would—this being indeed the issue
Of King Polixenes—it should here be laid,
Either for life or death, upon the earth
Of its right father. (3.3.14–45)

The reported speech of Hermione at the centre of this account (ll. 26–35) is filled with a series of uncompromising performatives. This is a very clear example of how to do things with words. The very naming of her infant daughter “Perdita” seems to allow the child to be “counted” as lost, for nearly the first time, and as the queen imagines, “forever.” In this sense, this reported speech represents a very direct challenge to the prophetic part of the oracle’s reported speech concerning the finding of that which is lost. And since the prophecy in this reported speech about Antigonus never seeing his wife again proves true within a matter of seconds, the potency of these speech acts seems immediately confirmed (the perlocutionary act follows hard upon the illocutionary act, as Austin might say). When Paulina had first announced the death of Hermione, she warned that vengeance for it had “Not dropped down yet” (3.2.199). With Hermione’s words here, vengeance, if not for herself then for the “ungentle business” of throwing out her babe, drops down. In some measure, though, this seems like only rough justice (or as Bacon has it, “a kind of wild justice”), in part because the vengeance that might more properly target Leontes is here displaced onto his proxy, Antigonus.

Similarly rough and ready are the instructions to leave the child crying in Bohemia simply because it has “places remote enough.” If remoteness is the central consideration, the instructions seem fixed on guaranteeing that this child, too, stays lost. In certain respects this reported speech of Hermione seems as mysterious, as obfuscating, as the pronouncement of the oracle, and one may even harbour a sense that her words are in some measure punitive—and not merely descriptive. But of course, remoteness is not the central consideration for Hermione. Her emphasis is on enough. It is Leontes who had insisted that the child be carried to “some remote and desert place, quite out / Of our
dominions” (2.3.176–77), and she is now specifying where that should be. She places a limit on the remoteness and thus her speech acts intertwine with and modify his. Her reported words, aimed in the first instance at Antigonus, also continue to sustain an interaction with Leontes. Since this passage represents Hermione’s sole appearance between her reported “death” at the end of act 3 and her miraculous resurrection in act 5, it also represents the only opportunity to assess directly the nature of her actions and intentions during her long absence. Her appearance and her words show, at a minimum, that she continues to be a force to be reckoned with, a presence even in her absence, an actor operating primarily through reported speech.

An earlier premonition of her ongoing agency was evident when she was first sentenced to prison. Her waiting gentlewomen are ready to collapse in sorrow and pity for her plight, and she upbraids them for what she regards as a premature response:

Do not weep, good fools,
There is no cause. When you shall know your mistress
Has deserved prison, then abound in tears
As I come out. This action I now go on
Is for my better grace.   (2.1.120−24)

As Stephen Orgel notes in his edition of the play, this last sentence has been “variously explained”—never, to my mind, clearly—and he alludes to explanations offered by Johnson, Quiller-Couch, Dover Wilson, Furness, Schanzer, and Kermode before concluding that, “Action, in any case, has a wide range of meaning; and there is no reason to assume that Hermione’s metaphor cannot be, like so many others in the play, a mixed one.” It seems to me, however, that we might make more headway in understanding Hermione’s action by treating it, in the first instance, as literal rather than metaphorical. She means that her suffering, her imprisonment, is not something merely passively endured and eliciting only pity, the “tears” of the spectators, but that it is an action, an activity summoning the deepest resources of her soul and aiming high, her “better grace.” At the literal level, though, the scope of any possible action is severely limited. She is, after all, going to prison. What can she do there? How will she do it?
Aristotle has some interesting remarks on the nature of pathos in the *Poetics*, and in a surprising move that is usually not sufficiently noticed or credited he says that pathos is a praxis, an action.\(^{12}\) And since Hermione, ostensibly a figure of pathos, declares emphatically her commitment to action, it may be worth pondering just how this enigmatic notion of pathos-as-praxis might apply to her. For Aristotle, in this section of the *Poetics*, reversal and recognition are the tokens or signs of a complex tragedy, but pathos belongs to both simple and complex tragedy. It is, in a sense, the bedrock of tragedy. And it is said not only to be an act but a praxis; that is, an element in the overarching action that gives a tragic drama its wholeness, its unity.\(^{13}\) How far—and in what ways—can Hermione’s “action” extend? What is the reach or the arc of her pathos? It clearly reaches into the climax of act 3 and is most evident, as well as perhaps most active, in the great speeches she delivers in her own defense at her trial. Words, in her mouth, are clearly a potent resource for action, and her pathos can be understood as a praxis, first, in the language she finds to express it.

But even more potently linked to the ongoing action—the sustained movement of the whole play—than her rhetorically impressive speeches at her trial are some things she is reported to have said in the events leading up to it. When Paulina comes up with the idea of presenting the newborn infant to the king in the hope of softening his jealous rage, she finds that she has been anticipated in this project by Hermione. As her attendant puts it,

I’ll presently
Acquaint the Queen of your most noble offer,
Who but today hammer’d of this design,
But durst not tempt a minister of honour
Lest she should be denied. \(^{2.2.50–54}\)

The queen’s speech, though not reported directly, seems particularly emphatic, the report of her intention perhaps all the more forceful for not reproducing her words verbatim but summarizing their effect in the striking word “hammered.” In this word, Hermione’s action is presented metaphorically, but the metaphor works to support the literal “design” or plan to present the baby to its father. That the queen is the first to come up with this plan suggests that in this as in other respects it is she, rather than Paulina, who is the principal mover of
the action. Even offstage and out of sight, she is doing things—and doing them, primarily, with words.

Her appearance in the vision of Antigonus, then, is a continuation of an action begun earlier in the play and focusing on the “issue” (in several senses) between Leontes and Hermione. Antigonus, like his wife Paulina, seems to be somehow instrumental in the carrying out of the wishes of Hermione, and he does so in spite of a number of serious reservations about the nature of the vision which gives him his orders. He has heard that “the spirits o’th’dead / May walk again,” but he hasn’t himself believed it, and he thinks dreams are ordinarily trivial but that this one is so vivid it seems more like “a waking”—in which case, what would it be? A hallucination or a delusion? If, on the other hand, we are right to take this waking as referring primarily to a certain quality in his own experience, we might ask what exactly is it that he is awakening to? That he offers various answers to that question himself shows him to be sorting through the possibilities, neither fully crediting nor fully dismissing any. J. L. Austin thought that the concept of “illusion” was often summoned in an inadequate way, made to cover too many different sorts of things, and too easily conflated with “delusion”—and that it therefore could lead to an inadequate account of reality.\footnote{Antigonus seems to be arguing himself into a similar position. His vision appears in various lights as illusory or even delusional, and yet he determines to be “squared” or guided by it, as if it were somehow real—or perhaps some part of it were real. He makes this decision, as he says, “superstitiously,” because he can give no rational account of it, and yet it seems to him the right thing to do. He squares this uncomfortable sense of doing something irrational, finally, by attributing it to the will of “Apollo” (l. 42). He ends up, in fact, performing a more specific version of the oath that he had sworn to the mariner at the beginning of the scene with respect to the heavens: “Their sacred wills be done” (l. 7).

Does this mean that the reported speech of Hermione in this scene operates as a parallel to the report of the oracle, each declaring the will of Apollo and each suggesting the invisible shaping influence of the divine? Perhaps. But as with the humanizing elements that are part of the contextualizing of the oracle, there are clearly human forces at work here too. The human dimension is highlighted in the way that Hermione is not only audible to Antigonus but also visible—that’s part of what makes his vision seem more real, even as its unique qualities also defamiliarize that reality:
I never saw a vessel of like sorrow,
So filled and so becoming. In pure white robes
Like very sanctity she did approach
My cabin where I lay, thrice bowed before me,
And, gasping to begin some speech, her eyes
Became two spouts. (3.3.20–25)

Clearly, what moves Antigonus, what prepares him and makes him fully receptive to the words he is about to report, is an overpowering sense of the sorrow of Hermione, her pathos. He is moved by the action of her sorrow as well as by the performative actions of her words. And he is moved to put into effect the illocutionary force of her words precisely because he believes her to have “suffered death” (l. 41). Her pathos, in this context, is a praxis. And while Antigonus may ascribe his motive for action to the will of Apollo, it is also very clearly rooted in the very human suffering of the queen. Unlike in the oracle, in the reported speech of Hermione Apollo has a human face.

And yet there is also something inhuman about the encounter of Antigonus and Hermione in this scene, or perhaps less than human, a feeling registered in the somewhat unreal or stylized representation of the body of the queen. She is there and yet not fully there. Antigonus struggles to give an account to us (or to the babe he is addressing—our proxy?) of a body that is not now present and perhaps never was present and is certainly now vanished, “melted into air” (l. 36), dead. In the attempt, he resorts to the figures of speech that Puttenham describes as hypotyposis, or counterfeit representation, and prosopographia, or counterfeit countenance:

The matter and occasion leadeth us many times to describe and set forth many things in such sort as it should appear they were truly before our eyes though they were not present, which to do it requireth cunning, for nothing can be kindly counterfeit, or represented in his absence, but by great discretion in the doer. And if the things we covet to describe be not natural or not veritable, then yet the same asketh more cunning to do it, because to feign a thing that never was nor is like to be proceedeth of a greater wit and sharper invention than to describe things that be true.

And these be things that a poet or maker is wont to describe sometimes as true or natural, and sometimes to feign as artificial and not true, videl,
the visage, speech, and countenance of any person absent or dead. And this kind of representation is called Counterfeit Countenance.\textsuperscript{15}

The poet or maker in this case is, of course, Shakespeare, but he is depicting his character with “matter and occasion” that also require him to be a “doer” in the art of representation, and this characterizing of the art of reporting tends to make the “cunning” of the report more fully evident. Antigonus here exercises “great discretion,” and in fact, the discretion here operates not only in the usual sense of care or circumspection but also in its Renaissance sense of “decorum” \textit{(discretio)}. By this I mean that Antigonus finds (or invents) images that are both descriptive and also appropriate to the character of Hermione and to his understanding of her and her words.\textsuperscript{16} In Puttenham’s terms, he offers not “bare Resemblance but Resemblance by Imagery or Portrait”;\textsuperscript{17} that is, the resemblance is iconic, a visible representation of abstract qualities—for Hermione, the qualities of beauty, sorrow, purity, and sanctity. Even the ritualistic act of bowing three times has an iconic feel to it, especially in combination with the biblical metaphor of the body as a “vessel” (l. 20). This stylization of the portrait tends to give it an air of being disembodied. And of course since Antigonus believes that what he has seen is either a ghost or a dream and is, in any case, merely the form of a person now dead, this sense of disembodiment is in some measure obviously appropriate—for him.

For us, who know that in believing the baby to be “indeed the issue / Of King Polixenes” (ll. 42−43) he has things wrong, the sense of disembodiment is a symptom, still, of something lost that needs to be found. In the development of the play, of course, the finding of Perdita, first by the old shepherd and his son and then, ultimately, by her real father and mother, dominates much of the action of the last two acts, but I want to focus here on another example of reported speech (or what I will argue can be counted as reported speech) which is centrally concerned with restoring a fuller sense of the claims of the body. In the novella that is Shakespeare’s source, the old shepherd has a wife named Mopsa. In \textit{The Winter’s Tale}, this figure is both dead and without a name, but she springs to vivid life when the shepherd invokes her memory as a model for Perdita on how to be the hostess of the sheep-shearing:

\begin{verbatim}
Fie, daughter, when my old wife lived, upon
This day she was both pantler, butler, cook;
\end{verbatim}
Both dame and servant; welcomed all, served all;  
Would sing her song and dance her turn; now here  
At upper end o’th’table, now i’th’middle;  
On his shoulder, and his; her face o’fire  
With labour, and the thing she took to quench it  
She would to each one sip. You are retired,  
As if you were a feasted one and not  
The hostess of the meeting. Pray you bid  
These unknown friends to’s welcome, for it is  
A way to make us better friends, more known.  
Come quench your blushes and present yourself  
That which you are, mistress o’th’feast. Come on,  
And bid us welcome to your sheep-shearing,  
As your good flock shall prosper.  

(4.4.55–69)

In a strict sense, of course, this passage might not be regarded as an example of reported speech since the emphasis is not on words (though the welcome and the song may imply them). But if we extend the definition of reported speech only slightly to include body language (as I think Puttenham does in his definition of _prosopograpgia_; see note 16), the passage is obviously a remarkable example of that. By contrast with the stylized counterfeit countenance of Hermione, the counterfeit countenance of the old shepherd’s wife is concrete, full-bodied: “her face o’fire / With labour.” The shepherd supplements his _prosopograpgia_ with what Puttenham calls a _pragmatographia_: “if such description be made to represent the handling of any business, with the circumstances belonging thereunto, as the manner of a battle, a feast, a marriage, a burial, or any other matter that lieth in feat and activity, we call it then the Counterfeit Action, _pragmatographia_.” Since Shakespeare’s old shepherd is expressly concerned with the “manner” of a “feast,” it seems possible that this particular piece of rhetorical advice lies directly behind his procedure.

The activity of the feast is concentrated in the body of the wife, as the shepherd reports her energetic hospitality, and since that extends across multiple roles, it is (as Puttenham suggests) a “feat,” a noteworthy accomplishment. Her quick, darting life is emphasized by the rhythm of the lines and even by the minute schemes that rhetoricians such as Thomas Wilson call “figures of a word,” involving elisions or the suppression of letters or syllables: o’th’table,
i'th'middle, o'fire. Such phrases, along with the repeated caesuras or pauses, capture the rushed, breathless, bodily presence of the wife, and they also register the speaker’s unqualified admiration for such vivacity. This hostess is noteworthy for the attention she gives to her guests, all apparently male, and to the physical contact involved—“on his shoulder, and his”—and in what is perhaps her climactic feat, she drinks to their health even as she also quenches her own thirst. The shepherd, in his report of his wife’s body language and in his vividly remembered sense of its animation, produces a kind of resurrection of the body, which seems in some rather mysterious way to connect with the resurrection of the spirit that is generated by the vision of Hermione that Antigonus reports. Both reports are in some measure anticipations of the resurrection of Hermione herself at the end of the play, and both illustrate the interinanimations of reported speech and dramatic action—embodied action.

They are also both comments of a sort on the jealous rage of Leontes at the beginning of the play. Antigonus suspects Hermione of infidelity, as does Leontes, yet he also trusts in the validity of her suffering as Leontes does not (or not at first); the shepherd celebrates the kind of hospitality that seems to trigger the king’s jealousy, encouraging a body-language similar to that which so disturbs the king. Both reports also reveal, therefore, that some aspects of the play’s wholeness, its praxis or overarching action, are carried forward by the performative utterances or speech acts of secondary characters. Perhaps this also happens elsewhere in Shakespeare, but it seems especially marked in *The Winter’s Tale*, possibly because this play gives so strong a sense of major and cryptically-defined undercurrents to its main action. Why is Leontes so suddenly jealous? What does Hermione mean by the action she goes on? Who lets Paulina call the shots? What or who, exactly, is being referred to as “that which is lost”? Even if the oracle refers primarily to a lost person or persons—the child or children or the queen or some combination—the mere possibility of their being found seems to rest, at least in part, on a re-discovery of the life of the spirit and of the body registered so forcefully in the reported speeches of Antigonus and the old shepherd.

The climax of the play also conspicuously summons the energies of minor figures, as Leontes’s reconciliation with Polixenes and his reunion with Perdita are not dramatized but reported on by a series of three gentlemen. And as when the delegation to the oracle is divided between Dion and Cleomenes, the distributing of the responsibility for this report to more than one character is
itself significant. The scene has been derided as theatrically ineffective, and it has also been defended as setting up a necessary contrast with the spectacular theatre of the concluding statue scene, the dramatic potential of the reuniting of father and daughter sacrificed to the high histrionics of the resurrection of Hermione. But the conversation of the three gentlemen has its own dramatic interest. The gentlemen are, as Joel Altman suggests, “audience surrogates,” but they are also independent actors with differing degrees of intimacy and knowledge about court affairs, and each report highlights a different aspect of the action.

The first gentleman, on being dismissed from the royal presence, has only heard that the shepherd has “found the child” (5.2.7), but he remains long enough or close enough to witness the reunion of Leontes with his old retainer:

…the changes I perceived in the King and Camillo were the very notes of admiration. They seemed almost with staring on one another to tear the cases of their eyes. There was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they looked as they had heard of a world ransomed, or one destroyed. A notable passion of wonder appeared in them, but the wisest beholder that knew no more but seeing could not say if th’importance were joy or sorrow. (5.2.9–17)

In terms of reported speech, this reporter is able to record the punctuation marks (“the very notes of admiration”) without the sentences that might have generated them. But the king and Camillo appear not to have been capable of speaking anyway, and the report here (like the report of the old shepherd’s wife) is a report of body language. In a paradoxical way, then, the scene that seems to forgo the sense of embodiment available to dramatic representation manages in its own way to highlight a strong sense of the body. Moreover, the body as reported in this manner seems to lead the way in the matter of reconciliation and harmony, an initiative that seems especially fitting given that it was a profound distrust of the body that lay at the root of the jealousy and estrangement of the play’s beginning. At the heart of this account of the language of “their very gesture” lies silence and wonder, an emotional response that belongs to the principal figures as well as to the audience, or the audience surrogate.

The second gentleman, though he appears to have witnessed no more than the first, is a somewhat wiser beholder, and he is given a name, Ruggiero.
(The common practice of referring to the gentlemen as anonymous tends to overlook this fact.) And though he too is struck with amazedness, he ventures to expound on the meaning of the event: “the oracle is fulfilled, the King’s daughter is found; such a deal of wonder is broken out within this hour that ballad makers cannot be able to express it” (5.2.20–23). Like Cleomenes and Dion, Ruggiero manages to express something of the expectations or hopes of the wider community of Sicilia, a community here emblematized not simply as a mass of anonymous people but as a named individual. And his assessment of the challenge awaiting the ballad makers expresses his sense of the intense and widespread interest that this wonder of fulfillment will occasion. Significantly, although he is reporting what has happened, his verb tenses look to the present and the future. Significant as well, though he too is held by the exhilaration of the moment, he is the speaker who expresses a note of skepticism: “This news which is called true is so like an old tale that the verity of it is in strong suspicion. Has the King found his heir?” (5.2.25–27). It is a measure of the nature of his interest and of the wisdom of his beholding that he entertains a doubt and a question about the truth of the news, even as he so obviously wants it to be true. He is a reporter who knows that reports can sometimes be unreliable.

The third gentleman is identified as “the Lady Paulina’s steward,” and he is obviously closer to the inner circle than are the other two, so that he is able to offer “proofs” of the verity of what he nevertheless also concedes is “like an old tale.” Like the other two, he emphasizes the wonder of the event, which defeats expression, or as he puts it, “lames report” and “undoes description” (5.2.51). And like the first gentleman, he emphasizes body language and gesture as he gives his account of the central reunions of Leontes with Polixenes and Perdita, starting with “the meeting of the two Kings”:

There might you have beheld one joy crown another so and in such manner that it seemed sorrow wept to take leave of them, for their joy waded in tears. There was casting up of eyes, holding up of hands, with countenance of such distraction that they were to be known by garment not by favour. Our King, being ready to leap out of himself for joy of his found daughter, as if that joy were now become a loss cries, “O, thy mother, thy mother!”; then asks Bohemia forgiveness, then embraces his son-in-law; then again worries he his daughter with clipping her. (5.2.39–48)
The narration here moves significantly from the past tense in its account of the reunion of the kings to the present tense as it turns to the meeting of father and daughter, and this part also significantly contains the crucial bit of explicitly reported speech, as it focuses on the very centre of the action. Leontes’s exclamation is a very compressed (and somewhat opaque) expression of mixed emotions and of primal relations. On the one hand, it is very likely that when he looks at Perdita, he sees and delights in the image of her mother (he says as much earlier, 5.1.226–27, before he knows that he is looking at his daughter). On the other hand, his anguished cry highlights the loss of that mother and his own guilt for her death. In this sense, it is a speech act, an act of confession, and it is the more impressive for its simplicity—and for its spontaneity in addressing the person next himself most injured by his actions. And again in a paradoxical way, that spontaneity seems the more genuine for being embedded in reported speech rather than in stage presentation, where it could easily seem contrived or acted or stagey. It is also the case that reported speech allows for the minimalism of “thy mother, thy mother,” whereas a staged scene would almost certainly demand more in the way of words.24

Similarly minimalist is the reported speech of Perdita in response to the more explicit confession of her father’s guilt that Paulina’s steward describes:

...when at the relation of the Queen’s death with the manner how she came to’t bravely confessed and lamented by the king how attentiveness wounded his daughter; till from one sign of dolour to another she did, with an “Alas!”, I would fain say bleed tears; for I am sure my heart wept blood. Who was most marble there changed colour. Some swooned, all sorrowed; if all the world could have seen’t, the woe had been universal.

(5.2.76–83)

The third gentleman seems at this moment to be most emphatically the steward of Paulina, highly attuned to the effect of a theatrical scene, though perhaps it is fair to say (as Snyder does) that profound emotion is here told about rather than shown, or (as Altman suggests) that the ecphrastic description tends to aestheticize or distance the emotion. In any case, the gentleman withdraws from the principals to describe the effect on him and those around him and, hypothetically, to “all the world.” But though the conclusion of his speech develops a choric perspective, the heart of it focuses on Perdita and, more precisely,
on her “attentiveness.” And since that attentiveness moves “from one sign of
dolour to another,” it is an action, and more than simply an emotional response,
profound or otherwise. In her single word of reported speech—“Alas!”—Perdita
fuses her response to the news of her mother’s death (the first sign of sorrow or
dolour) with her response to the pathos of the king’s lament (the second sign
of dolour). Her single word is the perlocutionary effect of Leontes’s confession.25 By fusing her responses, Perdita demonstrates that she understands the
overarching action that has led to this moment. In the terms that I have earlier
used of Hermione, her reported speech expresses a pathos that is a praxis, and
this pathos-as-praxis now embraces father and daughter as well as wife and
mother. The narration of 5.2 thus prepares the way for the statue scene, the
climax, not only by setting up a foil to its striking theatricality but by advancing
the action.26

All of the reports I have discussed are, in their distinctive ways, demon-
strations of the power of wonder, and, for this reason, the reported speeches
and the speakers involved with them are an on-stage illustration of the range
or kinds of reactions and responses the dramatist hopes to elicit in reader and
audience. A reported speech is, of its nature, an example of one character being
possessed or taken over (partly or wholly) by another. In most instances this
possession is deeply charged or shaped by the character of the reporter, but in
most instances as well, the report carries a strong sense of a different sensibil-
ity, a distinctive “other”—whether strange or strangely familiar. The reporter is
repeatedly charged with a responsibility that is fundamentally akin to the prin-
ciple that Hamlet, faced with Horatio’s “O day and night but this is wondrous
strange,” so memorably articulates: “Then as a stranger, give it welcome.” It is a
process of making way for that which is, at best, only partly understood, only
partly our own. The welcomes offered by the reported speeches in The Winter’s
Tale provide moving illustrations in the middle of the play of the emotion of
wonder that figures so centrally in its conclusion. They also tend to corroborate
a recent and highly original account, by Joe Sachs, of the nature of catharsis.

In the Poetics, Aristotle describes the experience of wonder with a word
that carries a metaphoric meaning […]. He says that when something
unknown becomes known in a tragedy, out of the action itself and in a
likely way, its effect is to knock something away from us (1455a 16–17).
His word is ekplèxis, which is usually translated as astonishment, but the
metaphor in that English word is a turning into stone, while the Greek word points instead to a loss of some sort of support. In the next-to-last chapter of the *Poetics*, Aristotle uses the adjective *ekpléktikos*, having the power to knock something away from us, as a description of the end of the art of poetry itself, without which it misses its mark (1460b 22–26). It follows that producing wonder is not some sort of occasional consequence of tragedy, but the very thing at which it aims; and Aristotle says exactly this in Chapter 24 (1460a 11–12). That claim amounts to nothing less than the long-delayed completion of the definition of tragedy that began eighteen chapters earlier. The *katharsis*, the washing away, is more aptly described as an *ekplêsis*, a knocking away, and the state in which we are left is wonder.\(^{27}\)

These remarks are merely the conclusion of a more complex argument, and they perhaps have yet to earn a place in the long and complex debate about the nature of catharsis, but they seem especially apt for the conclusion of *The Winter’s Tale*, even allowing for the further complexity of its being tragi-comedy rather than simply tragedy. When the statue of Hermione comes to life, we move from astonishment, a turning to stone, to an *ekplêsis*, a knocking of the ground out from underneath us. How this works and what it means are questions beyond the scope of this paper.\(^{28}\) But the exploratory process by which the underground action of *The Winter’s Tale* is glimpsed and experienced in its reported speeches suggests some interesting possibilities. The reporters are possessed by the drama of the play they participate in, even though they have the barest inklings of its ultimate meaning. As reporters, they are possessed by thoughts beyond the reaches of their own souls, and to follow the course of their actions is to get a clearer view of just how big the big picture really is.

### Notes

1. These speech acts are, I think, performatives in the sense defined by J. L. Austin in *How to Do Things with Words*, ed. J. O Urmson (1962; rpr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), even though, as Austin notes, there is some difficulty in determining “any single simple criterion of grammar or vocabulary” for identifying a performative utterance (59). Since an action implies a person acting, Austin is
inclined to think performative utterances can be reduced, at least in theory, to the
first-person, singular indicative (I bet, I promise, I name, or the like). Reported
speech in general poses something of a problem for this criterion insofar as the
first-person indicative is mediated by the reporter; The Winter’s Tale poses a more
particular problem insofar as the reported speech is sometimes attributed to a
divine as well as a human source.

2. William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, in The Norton Shakespeare: Based on the
E. Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, 2nd Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008),
3.2.131–34. Subsequent references to act, scene, and line, noted parenthetically,
are to this edition.

3. The text of Robert Greene’s Pandosto is included in J. H. P. Pafford, ed., The Winter’s

4. Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 2nd Edition (Berkeley:


7. As Lori Humphrey Newcombe observes, “the oracle is less help than we expect”
in determining who exactly is lost or found in this play: “‘If that which is lost be
not found’: Monumental Bodies, Spectacular Bodies in The Winter’s Tale,” in Ovid
and the Renaissance Body, ed. Goran Stanivukovic (Toronto: University of Toronto

8. For the notion that Leontes is the man who dwelt by a churchyard, see D. J. Enright,

9. The problems about how performative utterances are negotiated in reported
speech are sharply focused here. Is Hermione now performing the judgment
against Antigonus (such that it could be reduced to the first-person singular, “I
judge”) or is she herself merely predicting or reporting on a judgment dropped
down from above? Is this speech act human or divine? And the question of human
mediation in the performative utterances registered in reported speech is similarly
puzzling in the matter of naming Perdita. Does Hermione directly name the child,
or does she merely instruct Antigonus to do so, or was the name (the lost one) de-
termined earlier by the oracle? Since there is little question that in both cases some
action is performed, it may be that such examples of interlocking agency represent
a special challenge to invoking the first-person indicative as a distinctive marker
of performative utterances. And the connections seem too complex or obscure to be explained simply by resorting to the first-person plural: we judge, we name.


11. David Bevington offers a gloss on Hermione’s “action” that is better than Orgel’s in holding more closely to a literal meaning: “What I now must undergo will ultimately make me seem more gracious in others’ eyes and ennoble me by suffering,” in *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, 6th Edition (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), p. 1539, n. 122–23. The Norton editor offers something similar: “This trial I am enduring is for my greater honor (when vindicated); or This suffering I am enduring is to refine and purge me, leading to greater virtue” (218n9). The problem, however, is that the emphasis on sheer suffering and endurance is too passive and does not fully capture the sense of initiative or activity present, as I see it, in Hermione’s words. Similarly, equating “grace” simply with her own particular honour or virtue overlooks the fact that she herself sees honour in a less self-centred way: “For honour, / ’Tis a derivative from me to mine, / And only that I stand for” (3.2.41–43). As the play will show, Hermione does not simply suffer and endure but preserves herself “to see the issue” (5.3.129), and this purpose, declared at the end, can also be glimpsed in the middle, especially in her reported speeches with their action on behalf of her child and in their attempts to influence the outcome of the complete action. Finally, she is unlikely to be thinking of “grace” as simply or primarily a matter of reputation—what others think of her—and more likely to be invoking its theological import: “Apollo be my judge,” as she says elsewhere (3.2.114). The stakes of Hermione’s “action” are higher than the glosses have so far acknowledged.


13. Whalley has a very interesting discussion of what he calls the “processive potential” of the “pathos-action paradox” (90n112). I have explored the possible application of these principles to one of Shakespeare’s early works, in “Action Figures in Shakespeare’s Lucrece,” *Renaissance and Reformation /Renaissance et Réforme* 33.1 (Winter 2010), pp. 81–107.


16. The rhetoricians seem not to identify a rhetorical figure specific to reported speech, but it is evident that Puttenham, at any rate, includes under the heading of *prosopopraphia* the feigned representation of both the countenance and the speech of any person absent or dead. For him at least, body language seems inextricably aligned with verbatim report.

17. Puttenham, p. 329.

18. Puttenham, p. 325.


20. Gail Kern Paster, in *The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), argues that the old shepherd's wife is “idealized” under pressure from a culture embarrassed by the practice of wet-nursing (277). My own view is nearly the opposite: the body of the wife is actualized, in the energy of her reported body language, and it is decidedly not embarrassed.


22. Susan Snyder, in *Shakespeare: A Wayward Journey* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2002), speaks of the “awkwardness of the 5.2 narration” and complains of “profound emotion told about rather than shown” but also thinks this may be necessary in order “to reserve full emotive force for the following scene” (222). Douglas Peterson, in *Time, Tide and Tempest: A Study of Shakespeare's Romances* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1973), argues that the gentlemen's exposition prepares us for “the mimetic superiority of the art of drama that occurs in the final scene” (204). Russ McDonald, in “Poetry and Plot in *The Winter's Tale*,” *The Winter's Tale: Critical Essays*, ed. Maurice Hunt (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1995), sees the method of 5.2 as a part of an overall “periodic” strategy that operates at the level of syntax as well as plot, though he does not undertake a detailed analysis: “The great penultimate scene, in which three unfamiliar gentlemen announce and annotate the numerous happy reunions, is fertile territory [for exploring the play’s larger strategy]. The prose they speak contains delays and indirections similar to those that mark Leontes's poetry, and again we are suspended, made to wait for and wonder about the final phase of the action. Indeed, the entire scene is a grand hesitation” (314).
23. Joel Altman, *The Improbability of Othello: Rhetorical Anthropology and Shakespearean Selfhood* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 427, n. 44. For Altman, Shakespeare's procedure here *aestheticizes* the experience of the gentlemen, “distancing it from the everyday while securing conviction, for the Gentlemen describe those wonderful events as though they had been seeing a play or gazing at a religious painting, and their amazed ecphrases are filled with the *enargeia* that makes all hearers viewers. Even the revelation that probable signs helped convince them of Perdita’s identity and Antigonus’s bizarre death only serves to corroborate audience belief in the improbable events they themselves had earlier witnessed. Thus primed to suspend disbelief, they enter the last scene.”

24. Leontes’s son, Mamillius, is conspicuously not mentioned in the closing scenes of the play, but “thy mother” contains the seeds of an acknowledgment of the damage to filial relations more broadly conceived. The minimalistic expression hints at the deep structure of family relations without suggesting that they are completely available to rational inspection, even in the harmonies of the close. See Stanley Cavell, *Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 193–221, for an interesting discussion of the ways in which Leontes’s difficulties with parenthood are implicated in his jealousy.

25. Lupton argues persuasively that Perdita shares with Hermione a certain reserve, in “Hospitality and Risk in *The Winter’s Tale*,” pp. 169–73. The minimalism of reported speech here works to protect that reserve in what could be seen as a moment of psychic crisis, but it is also a sign that even slender slivers of reported speech can serve to index a momentous pathos.

26. “Woe or wonder” is the option Horatio offers Fortinbras at the end of *Hamlet* (5.2.307). *The Winter’s Tale* appears to hinge on the same sort of disjunctive “or”: the wonder of the series of reported speeches in 5.2 veers towards a “universal woe” at their end, until the play turns once more in the direction of wonder in the final scene. J. V. Cunningham, in *Woe or Wonder: The Emotional Effect of Shakespearean Tragedy, the Complete Essays of J. V. Cunningham* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1976), suggests something of how wonder supervenes on the experience of woe when he defines it as “the shocked limit of feeling” (16 and 84) and also as that “which suspends and mediates between fear and pity” (80).

27. Joe Sachs, trans., *Aristotle: Poetics* (Newburyport MA: Focus Publishing, 2006), p. 15. This notion of wonder as the function or goal of poetry (or drama) highlights an interesting difference in Aristotle from the theories of Mikhail Bakhtin and his associates, whose central terms for the study of the novel (dialogism,
heteroglossia, hybridization, and the like) might also be relevant to the analysis of reported speech in Shakespeare. Bakhtin says, for example, that “even the slightest allusion to another’s utterance gives the speech a dialogical turn” and that any “utterance is related not only to preceding, but also to subsequent links in the chain of communication,” each speaker seeking “an active responsive understanding” from his listeners; see Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), p. 94. The role of wonder in generating this search for responsive understanding is, no doubt, crucial, but in the form of an ekplēxis or a knocking away it also represents a break in the chain of communication and an indication that the limit of responsive understanding has been reached, a moment when no further response (dialogical or otherwise) seems possible or even desirable.

28. Stephen Orgel argues that drama according to Renaissance theory seeks to bring about “the therapeutic catharsis that Aristotle described—not through the power of poetic language or heroic action but through the marvels of representation and spectacle”; see Orgel’s “Introduction” to The Winter’s Tale, p. 62. My analysis of reported speech suggests that poetic language and action actually do have a bigger role to play in bringing about a catharsis than this allows. Julia Reinhard Lupton analyzes the statue scene in terms of the Pygmalion story, summoning various religious readings of that story for its own unique artistic purposes, in “‘The Winter’s Tale’ and the Gods,” in Afterlives of the Saints: Hagiography, Typology, and Renaissance Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 207–18.