Necessary Leaven: Hypocrisy and the Heptaméron

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Résumé de l'article

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Hypocrisy is a recurring concern in Marguerite de Navarre’s Heptaméron, part of the wider dynamic of dissimulation, pretence, and exposure explored in the storytelling project. This article discusses the contexts in which hypocrisy is revealed and debated in the Heptaméron. While clerical and feminine hypocrisies are familiar from medieval discussions of lecherous friars and unchaste women, Marguerite de Navarre’s evangelical emphasis presents hypocrisy more generically as an inevitable consequence of the Fall. Beyond general statements about the human condition, there emerges a more nuanced condemnation of hypocrisy that acknowledges relative positions of power and exploitation.


On the third day of Marguerite de Navarre’s Heptaméron, Oisille, the group’s spiritual authority, announces: “Affin, Mesdames, que l’ypocrisie de ceulx qui s’estiment plus relligieux que les autres ne vous enchante l’entendement, […] il m’a semblé debvoir racompter une histoire.”1 Oisille offers a warning against a dangerous, seductive hypocrisy and proposes storytelling as both an antidote

1. From nouvelle 23 (N23) in Marguerite de Navarre, Heptaméron, ed. Renja Salminen (Geneva: Droz, 1999), 229. This will be the edition of reference unless otherwise indicated; citations will appear in parenthenses in the main text. In the earliest known manuscript of the Heptaméron (BnF fr. 1513) this pronouncement appears as the very first line. See Heptaméron, “Introduction,” xliii, and “Apparat critique,” 579. For more on the earliest manuscript, see two chapters in Marcel Tétel, ed., Les Visages et les voix de Marguerite de Navarre (Paris: Klincksieck, 1995): Nicole Cazauran, “Sur l’élaboration de l’Heptaméron” (19–39), and Mireille Huchon, “Définition et description: le projet de l’Heptaméron entre le Caméron et le Decaméron” (51–65). This article has gone through many iterations and readers; I’d like to thank in particular Julian Weiss, Ben Schofield, and the three anonymous reviewers for Renaissance and Reformation for their invaluable advice and careful reading.
and a duty. This critical investigation of hypocrisy is part of a wider concern with all forms of dissimulation and pretence that are tirelessly probed by the storytellers. Dissimulation is balanced by a compensatory narrative revelation that suggests not only that storytelling can show us how things actually are, but that it can also make manifest how we acquire that knowledge; the storytelling project acquires an epistemological edge.²

In medieval and early modern genealogies of vice, hypocrisy was associated with other forms of pretence, dissimulation, and lying. Aquinas categorized hypocrisy alongside deception as a sin against truth, offering this distinction: “hypocrisy is deception; not, however, just any form of deception, but only that whereby one poses as someone else, as in the case of a sinful person pretending to be virtuous.”³ Pretence was important in early modern accounts of hypocrisy, supported by the Greek term’s etymological roots in theatre. This understanding differs from current descriptions of hypocrisy which include breaking your own moral code or behaving in opposition to professed principles.⁴ Aquinas is clear on this: “in the case of someone putting on the garb of holiness with the intention of entering a state of perfection, he is no deceiver or hypocrite should he fail through human frailty.”⁵ Merely failing to live up to the aspiration to holiness did not make a hypocrite; there must be


3. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 60 vols. (London: Blackfriars, 1964–81), “De simulatione et hypocrisi” (Deception and hypocrisy), 2.2, q. 111, 41:168–83; quotation at 175 (article 2). Other sins against truth are lying, boasting, and self-deprecation (or “irony” as Aquinas has it).


5. Aquinas, *Summa* 2.2 q. 111, art. 2, p. 175.
an “intention” to deceive others of inner beliefs and convictions. Early modern moral philosophers shared Marguerite’s sense that hypocrisy and other forms of deceit were rife; while any period might claim a particular affinity with it, the confessional pressures of the Reformation and the social demands of civility provided specific co-ordinates for early modern discussions of hypocrisy.

The term hypocrisy and its cognates, while linked to deception more broadly, nevertheless occur in limited contexts in the Heptaméron. In what follows, I focus exclusively on the term hypocrisy in its restricted early modern sense at the expense of its apparent synonyms (such as dissimulation, feinte, or even fiction) in order to follow it through these different contexts, noting both its familiar critical deployments and some rather more surprising and ambivalent ones. While the Heptaméron contains stories of hypocrisy familiar from medieval representations of lecherous clerics and dishonest women, the discussions become more complicated and nuanced in the exploration of a more pragmatic hypocrisy where moral judgments are less absolute. From the storytellers’ evangelical acknowledgement of their own weakness there emerges a sense that hypocrisy is an inevitable consequence of humanity’s fallen condition; but alongside this generalization, individual stories are discussed that raise very particular questions of power and exploitation.


Hypocrisy: word histories

Before hypocrisy became play-acting, it was a broader form of interpretation. The Greek *hypokrisis* originally meant an act of interpretation as discrimination; etymologically it is an exercise of *krisis*, or judgment. Only later, in Attic Greek, did it become the technical interpretation of a playwright’s words on stage, making the hypocrite an actor, a player of parts. This etymology of hypocrisy was well known in the medieval and early modern periods, when the hypocrite was represented as playing a part or wearing a mask like the actors of classical Greece. In what seems to have been a separate development, the Greek translators of the Septuagint in the third and second century BCE used *hypokrites* for the Old Testament Hebrew term *hanef*, meaning a deviator from the faith, but without any connotations of pretence. The Christian tradition drew on both semantic strands, combining the mimetic skills of the actor with the degenerate virtue of the impious in a figure that is recognizable as the modern hypocrite. In the synoptic gospels, Jesus repeatedly calls the Pharisees *hypokrites*, alluding to both their over-zealous interpretation of the law and their ostentatious performance of virtue, a combination of characteristics embodied in the most famous religious hypocrite of all, Molière’s Tartuffe. Some biblical scholars now argue that “hypocrite,” with its connotations of acting and deception, is an anachronistic reading of the first-century Greek and that New Testament usage is closer to the original sense of “interpreter.” This would make the New Testament *hypokrites* guilty of “over-scrupulous, pettifogging concern with the minutiae of the law” and casuistry, rather than of deceit; but early modern translators, including Marguerite’s protégé Jacques

Lefèvre d’Etaples and the King James translators in English, followed earlier commentators and used “hypocrite.”

The associations of hypocrisy with pretence and play-acting are deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. Augustine’s preaching on one of the most important gospel texts on hypocrisy, the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5–7), glosses the hypocrite as a deceitful actor: “For hypocrites are deceivers, narrators as it were of other characters, just as in the plays of the theatres.”

Early modern biblical commentators such as Erasmus similarly understood the Greek to carry the charged sense of pretence and simulation. Erasmus’s paraphrase of Matthew 23:6 makes the theatrical connotation of “hypocrite” explicit: “They are actors, and, as though masked with a false image of religion, they act out a play in order to be seen by men.” Later, Jean Calvin offered a similar lesson in historical semantics in his Harmony of the Gospels:

tous ceux qui sont connoiteux de vaine gloire, sont nommez Hypocrites: car comme ainsi soit que les auteurs profanes ont signifié par ce nom les ioueurs de farces, qui representoyent par feintize quelques personnages


14. Augustine, The Preaching of Saint Augustine: Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, trans. Francine Cardman (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), bk. 2, 2.5, p. 97, on Matt. 6:2; “Sunt enim hypocritae simulatores tamquam pronuntiatores personarum alienarum sicut in theatricis fabulis” (Latin text from Sant’Agostino, accessed 21 February 2020, augustinus.it/latino/montagna/index2.htm). Augustine goes on: “For one who acts the part of Agamemnon in a tragedy, for instance, or of any other person belonging to the story or fable which is acted, is not really the person himself but impersonates him and is said to be a hypocrite. So in the church or in any part of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite.” If the actor as “hypocrite” might be construed as a neutral usage, the second is more judgmental.

15. Erasmus, Paraphrase on Matthew; Collected Works of Erasmus vol. 45, trans. Dean Simpson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 313. For the Latin, “Histriones sunt, & ceu personati falsa religio[n]is imagine, fabulam agunt, ut spectentur ab hominibus;” see Erasmus, Epistola nuncupatoria ad Carolum Casesarem: Exhortatio ad stadium Evangelicae lectionis; Paraphrasis in Evangelium Matthaei (Basel: Johann Froben, 1552), [17]: A similar definition appears in his annotation on Matthew 16:3 (Paraphrase, 241n3).
en des ieux & sur l’eschaffaut, la saincte Escriture a transferé ce nom aux hommes doubles de cœur & feints.16

Joueurs de farce, feintise, personnage: for Calvin, scripture transfers the semantic field of insincerity onto the hypocrite. For early church fathers such as Tertullian, the theatrical was innately dishonest, the popular mimes in Roman North Africa synonymous with dishonesty, insincerity, and dissimulation, making the actor a deceitful hypocrite.17 Human actions are figured as theatre and spectacle in key gospel passages on hypocrisy (Matt. 6, Matt. 23, Luke 11) in which Jesus criticizes the Pharisees for their ostentatious piety, performed (in his accusation) for men rather than for God. Erasmus again makes this explicit in his paraphrase on Matthew 23:7: “Thus would they be pleasing in the eyes of God, for whom alone our lives are, as it were, a sort of play. But with disdain for God as spectator they chase after the most sordid praise among the ignorant multitude.”18 In a variation on the theatrum mundi motif, where all the world is a stage, this emphasis on the spectator is a recurrent one in discussions of religious hypocrisy; the ultimate spectator—God—is ignored by the hypocrite in favour of the misguided judgment and approval of men.19

Hypocrite and hypocrisie are attested in French from the twelfth century, where they indicate dissimulation and pretence.20 François Rabelais, however, seems to have thought “hypocriticque” an unfamiliar enough word in 1552 to

be included in the “Briefve Declaration,” the glossary he added to the revised edition of the *Quart Livre*, where it is defined as “Faincte. Desguisée.” Later in the *Quart Livre*, Xenomanes describes the sinister and reclusive inhabitants of Chaneph (glossed as “Hypocrisie” in the *Briefve Declaration*, from the Hebrew *hanef*) as “Hypcrites, “hypcritetess,” and “hypcritillons.” Living exclusively from alms, they are arguably a satire of the mendicant friars; and like the *Heptaméron’s* friars, they are also associated with illicit sexual activity through their offspring (the “hypcritillons”) and in the enthusiastic (but slightly obscure) enquiry of Panurge: “En tîrroyt on hypocriticquement le petit traict Hypocriticque?” Overwhelmingly, the early modern hypocrite appeared in religious contexts like Rabelais’s Chaneph, and was charged with simulated piety, as in Matthew, Luke, and Aquinas. André Thevet, for example, in his *Cosmographie du Levant*, describes the inhabitants of Candie (Crete) as “grans hypocrites, semblables aux sepulcres blanchis par dehors, & puants dede[n]s […] Chrestiens de mine, & souz apparence d’habis simples, au demourant tres malicieux.” Cotgrave’s French-English dictionary of 1611 also emphasized the aspect of feigned virtue: for the verb “hypocrize,” the English equivalents are “To dissemble, or counterfeit goodnesse, to set a good face on a bad mind”; and for “hypocrisie,” “Hypocrisie, dissembling, counterfeit goodnesse, fained holiness.” One of the most urgent tasks the *Heptaméron’s* storytellers set for themselves is exposing the “bad mind” that is hidden by the “good face,” an aim echoed by one of Marguerite’s most attentive sixteenth-century readers, Henri Estienne, in his comprehensive catalogue of contemporary deceit and

deceptions, the *Traité preparatif pour l’Apologie d’Herodote*. This task is not always straightforward.

**Hypocrisy and exposure**

The *Heptaméron* suggests various narrative strategies to deal with hypocrisy: removing the mask, uncovering the body, deciphering a puzzle. These strategies all suggest that the hypocrite conceals the truth of their beliefs, character, or desire with the covering of their language or actions; in Aquinas’s terms, “the thing signified does not match the sign.” The hypocrite, then, is one whose words or deeds do not reflect their nature or character; from this perspective, the hypocrite appears as the polar opposite of the *parrhesiastes*, the truth-teller, especially in Michel Foucault’s definition in which *parrhesia* is constitutively linked to *ethos*: “La parhésia établit donc entre celui qui parle et ce qu’il dit un lien fort, nécessaire, constitutif.” In contrast, the words and deeds of the hypocrite disguise their character. In his 1584 *Instruction aux princes pour garder la foy promise*, a work clearly riffing on Machiavelli’s notoriety, Mathieu Coignet entitled one of his chapters “Qu’il faut que l’effet corresponde à la parole, & fuir l’hypocrisie,” arguing that “Puis que la parole est l’ombre du fait, il y faut telle union qu’il n’y ait diversité: par ce que c’est gra[n]de tromperie de dire autre chose que le cœur ne pense.” If the vocabulary of the *Heptaméron*’s storytellers suggests that they have access to what “the heart thinks,” their discussions probe this assumption and make it more problematic.


Strategies of unveiling, that is, of visual exposure, will be my focus here, but the hypocrite is also a figure of epistemological uncertainty and of “cognitive confusion” resulting from the baffled desire to infer inner reality from outer appearance.\(^\text{30}\) In the Heptaméron, consequently, the cognitive challenge posed by the hypocrite demands an intellectual response in the discussions and debates that follow each story. When Oisille claims to tell nouvelle 23 so that “l’ypocrisye de ceulx qui s’estiment plus relligieux que les autres ne vous enchante l’entendement” (229), the husband in her story demonstrates precisely this uncritical faith in the religious. An exercise of judgment, or krisis, is necessary to undermine the hypokrisis of the wicked friar; this is an intellectual exercise of critical interpretation, or discernment, which is also the practice of storytelling and debating.\(^\text{31}\)

Hypocrisy emerges early in the Heptaméron frame narrative. When the ten French nobles are stranded in the Pyrenees by floods and broken bridges, they take refuge in the monastery of Serrance whose abbot, a “vray ypocrite” (7), is reluctant to welcome them but “leur fist le meilleur visaige qu’il estoit possible.” This early reference to the abbot’s hypocrisy was suppressed, prudently, in the printed editions of 1558 and 1559, although other religious figures were not spared in the stories that followed. But in the manuscript tradition, the storytelling enterprise is begun under the hypocritical protection of the abbot who has offered refuge for reasons of his own. At the same time, his designation as a “true” hypocrite questions the straightforward opposition between inner truth and outer appearance that moral accounts of hypocrisy such as Coignet’s were eager to establish. It might be in direct response to this undercurrent of simulation that the storytellers sketch out the rules of their storytelling game: that their stories will be truthful (“veritable”), attested, and unrhetorical, “de

\(^{30}\) On the hypocrite Pharisee as a figure of “cognitive confusion,” see Nirenberg, 76. On cognitive and epistemological confusion more generally, see the essays in Ita MacCarthy, Kirsti Sellevold, and Olivia Smith, eds., Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture (Oxford: Legenda, 2016).

peur que la beaulté de la rethoricque fist tort en quelque partie à la verité de l’histoire” (11).32

The storytellers often claim to expose a hidden truth, deploying figures of clothing and costume which were commonplaces in medieval accounts of hypocrisy.33 Repeatedly pulling at the figurative “manteau de Dieu” (304) or “robbes [...] de dissimulation” (269), the storytellers also describe more literal moments when clothing covers a hidden truth, as when Camelle (known as Jambicque in other manuscripts) meets her lover in her *touret de nez in nouvelle 43* or the monk who has married for money is betrayed by his tonsure when his wife pulls off his nightcap in *nouvelle 56*.34 The medieval proverb “l’habit ne fait pas le moine” is given near-literal expression in stories where monks shed their clothes to indulge their lechery.35 Ennasuite declares, summing up her story of a Franciscan who usurps the groom on his wedding night and takes the bride’s virginity: “l’habit est si loing de faire le moyne que bien souvent par orgueil il le deffaict” (382). Ennasuite suggests that the monk’s habit is a spur to lechery, that a monk’s pride in his position can lead him astray, and that his habit can become a substitute for good action. Oisille draws our attention to the misleading charisma of the monk’s habit at the start of *nouvelle 23*, a particularly sensational tale in which a friar, invited into a private house by a naïve husband, takes his place and rapes his wife, causing three deaths. The husband is so devoted to Saint Francis that “il luy sembloit que tous ceuxx


33. Amory, 30–33; see Aquinas on the “garb of holiness,” *Summa* 2.2 q. 111, art. 2, p. 175.

34. Salminen takes as her base manuscript BnF fr. 2155, which refers to “Camelle” throughout *nouvelle 43*; “Camille” is used in Gruget’s 1559 edition and “Jambicque” in the earliest manuscript and others (*Heptaméron*, 757). The *touret de nez* was a kind of mask that could cover the nose or the lower half of the face; Simontault later refers to it as an emblem of feminine hypocrisy (403) and Parlamente puts hers on at the end of the second day after a skirmish with Saffredent (193). For other figurative deployments of clothing, see 303, 304, 317, 323, 346, 365, 404, 447 (*manteaux*), 260 (*habits*), and 159, 269 (*robes*). This description of the storytelling work is indebted to Mathieu-Castellani’s analysis, which gives an evangelical emphasis: “Robes, manteaux, couvertures, voiles, tout ce qui couvre et dissimule la nudité d’une créature en proie au péché est arraché d’une main ferme par les devisants, curieux de voir et de connaître ‘ce qui est dessous’” (Mathieu-Castellani, *La Conversation conteuse*, 68).

35. Amory cites another version of the proverb: “O hypocrita, cucullus non facit monachum” (hypocrite, the cowl does not make the monk! [Amory’s translation]) (Amory, 39).
qui portoient son habit devoient estre semblables au bon sainct" (229). This emphasis on clothing is characteristic of the *Heptaméron*’s treatment of hypocrisy, and while clothing is not precisely the mask of the classical role-playing hypocrite, it performs the same function of covering the body, which is consequently and rhetorically figured as a site of truth.

Women are the other recidivist hypocrites in the *Heptaméron*, and again it is suggested by the more cynical storytellers that a woman’s hypocrisy is principally there to cover the truth of her body and its desires. In a miniature conceptual history, Saffredent redefines women’s honour as fundamentally hypocrisy; he argues that after the Fall and the concomitant loss of innocence and transparency, women, seeing that “le nom d’ypocrisie estoit tant odieux entre les hommes, luy donnerent le surnom d’honneur.” This is an originary paradiastole in which women’s honour is nothing more than a calculated redescription of their hypocrisy. Saffredent is often cynical about the motivation behind what others call their “honour.” Elsewhere, he ignores Oisille’s reluctance to generalize from individual stories with a brutal conclusion—particularly brutal, perhaps, as it is addressed to Oisille, the group’s older, spiritual, maternal figure: “quelques beaux et honnestes acostremens que vous portez, qui vous chercheroit bien avant soubz la robbe vous trouveroyt femmes” (159). Saffredent’s image invites his male audience to become visitors of women’s virtue, not unlike the lecherous prior in *nouvelle* 22, granted complete and potentially scandalous access to nuns’ bodies under their clothing.

Underneath the habit, underneath the skirts: the work of the storytellers is to expose the hidden and dissimulated body. This work is given particular prominence in *nouvelle* 43, in which the ostensibly virtuous Camelle puts

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37. Paradiastole was described by rhetoricians with the clothing metaphor characteristic of hypocrisy, where vice “dressed up” as its neighbouring virtue: see Quentin Skinner, “Paradiastole,” in *Renaissance Figures of Speech* ed. Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 148–63, doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511988806.

38. *Accoustrement* had connotations of spin and duplicity: “O comme il accoustre les gens. Oh how vilely he disgraces, how badly he reports of, how filthy he handles, how skurily he deals with, all men” (Cotgrave, art. “accoustrer”).
on her *touret de nez* so that she can meet her lover unrecognized, only to be “uncovered” by his ruse (in Adrien de Thou’s summary “descouvrant son hypocrisie”), work that the narrator, Geburon, continues, claiming that “sa prudence ne son ypocrisie ne l’a pas garantie que son secret n’ayt esté revellé” (359)—although he does not in fact reveal her real name. Camelle makes the mistake of the archetypal gospel hypocrite, the Pharisee, in valuing human approbation over God’s judgment as “une qui avoit plus de craincte d’offencer les yeulx des hommes qu’elle n’avoit Dieu” (359).

The work of the storytellers is thus figured as revelation, and is associated with biblical eschatology by a storyteller, Longarine, who has a tendency for theological reflection. At the end of nouvelle 8, commenting on how the misfortunes of a man who accidentally cuckolded himself became common knowledge, she reminds her audience that “toute chose dicte à l’aureille est preschée sur le toict” (56), echoing Luke’s gospel in which Jesus promises (or warns) his disciples that “ce q[ue] vous auez parle en laurreille dedens les interiores parties de la maison sera presche sus les toictz” (Luke 12:3). This statement comes in the broader context of recognizing hypocrisie, as the chapter begins “Donnez vous garde du leuain des Phariseens leq[ue]l est hypocrisie: car riens nest couuert q[ui] ne soit reuele: & riens nest muce q[ui] ne soit sceu” (Luke 12:1–2). The “leaven of the Pharisees” appears in the other two synoptic gospels, but Luke is the only one to identify it as hypocrisie; elsewhere in the New Testament, leaven is a more generic wickedness that spreads quickly and invisibly. In his commentary on these passages, Calvin interprets leaven as a foreign and corrupting agent, “toue ce qui vient d’aillleurs, qui desguize, ou corrompt la pureté naifue de chacune chose,” elements that swell without increasing substance, “qui ne font qu’enfler, & n’ont rien de ferme deuant


40. The “leaven of the Pharisees” appears in Matt. 16:6 and Mark 8:15, where it is synonymous with false doctrine. Leaven as a spreading agent is associated with wickedness and malice in 1 Cor. 5:6–8. On the metaphor of yeast in the synoptic gospels, see Nirenberg, 76–77.
Luke explicitly associates hypocrisy with eventual but inevitable manifestation in a Christological understanding of history. There are clear differences between the exposure of domestic secrets and the revelation of Christian truth, of course, but Longarine draws them together in a way that associates the storytellers’ exposure of hypocrisy with the eschatological truth of the gospels; in some ways she is licensed by Luke’s association of hypocrisy (in this world) and apocalyptic revelation.

And yet, while Geburon and the other storytellers posit an unwholesome truth hidden by hypocrisy and uncovered by the storyteller—a mission glorified by Longarine’s eschatological analogy—the debates following the stories suggest a more complex relationship between truth, hypocrisy, and desire. To reverse Saffredent’s misogynist formula, “hypocrisy” is often what rejected suitors disparagingly call “female honour” when it becomes an obstacle to their own desires. This is what happens in Simontault’s *nouvelle* 14, in which Bonnivet effectively creates the “ypocrisie” of an Italian lady by manipulating her into yielding to her *serviteur* whose place he then usurps. Simontault’s judgment aligns himself with the masculine ethic of his protagonist: “les finesses du gentilhomme vallent bien l’ypocrisie de ceste dame” (142). Hypocrisy appears here less a cause of righteous outrage than a coercive accusation that can be deployed for personal profit.

**Hypocrisy and ruse: nouvelle 5**

Drawing on a long medieval tradition of anti-fraternal satire, and on the figure of the lecherous monk in the *Decameron* and the late-fifteenth-century Burgundian *Cent nouvelles nouvelles*, the *Heptaméron’s* storytellers single out the mendicant orders, particularly the Franciscans, for a critique that may have been grounded in their relative autonomy from local ecclesiastic authority and their visibility in the world as itinerant preachers. In Jean de Meun’s *Roman* 41. Calvin, *Commentaires*, 316 and 315.


de la rose, Faux Semblant associates monks with duplicity and deceit, and in Baldesar Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier the Magnifico denounces friars as “damned hypocrites” for their ostentatious and deceptive piety. Marcel Tetel, Gary Ferguson, and Mary McKinley have argued that the French common name for the Franciscans, the cordeliers—from the distinctive cord that the friars wore around their habits—represents from an evangelical perspective the restrictions that the medieval church used to bind the laity to obedience, suggesting the over-zealous interpreter of the Law embodied by the Pharisee in Matthew and Luke. The Heptaméron’s friars are thus obliquely associated with older, biblical understandings of hypocrisy as extreme zeal as well as the more familiar—and more obvious—figures of degenerate and simulated piety.

The proverbial hypocrisy of the friars is perhaps the most straightforward category in the Heptaméron; while they are not the only criminal clergy in the stories, they are the most visible. Parlamente has a long speech after nouvelle 44 on the cupidity and hypocrisy of the Franciscans and the necessity of comparing their teaching with the word of God. Geburon tells nouvelle 5, an unusually comic story with a happy outcome: the devastating consequences of

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hypocrisy lie in wait later in the storytelling project. While being rowed across a river, two Franciscans amuse themselves by trying to seduce the ferrywoman, deciding to rape her when she refuses; but she outwits them, marooning them on different islands in the river, from which they are taken to prison, mocked and denounced by the villagers.


The villagers’ deployment of the key gospel texts on hypocrisy against their teachers might seem an enactment of the evangelical project: having assimilated the relevant passages, they are able to apply them to their own lives and denounce the Franciscans who, like the Pharisees in Erasmus’s paraphrase of Matthew, “do not practise what they teach.” Geburon’s moral point is, however, focused less on the gospel’s empowerment than on a kind of innate virtue in simple people like his heroine who “n’oyent quasy en tout l’an deux bons sermons” (44). Nicole Cazauran reads the gospel intervention as the voice of divine authority; it could also be the reappearance of the fleeting authorial voice, gathering New Testament passages in order to condemn this uncontroversial instance of hypocrisy.

The reference to tombs full of death and corruption is not a neutral one for an evangelical like Marguerite, and she means something rather different than Matthew, whose gospel is characterized by a keen reflection on Jewish law. The passage in Matthew, and its equivalent in Luke, comes from a long warning Jesus gives against hypocrites and the ostentatiously pious. In Matthew, the whitened sepulchres recall rules of cleanliness and defilement, suggesting a believer

47. Erasmus, Paraphrase, 313 (on Matt. 23:3, “ilz disent & ne le font pas”).
who outwardly follows the strictest propriety but who is impious within.49 For Marguerite, these friars are theological scandals, whose bad example and influence could potentially seduce the faithful from the path of salvation and ultimately to eternal death. Although the white colour of the tomb in the gospels is there to draw attention to the corruption within, the whitened sepulchre became a compelling image for the whitewashed exterior of the religious hypocrite, claiming a virtue they do not possess or feigning a virtue to cover vice.50 This is indeed how Erasmus interpreted the passage: just like a white tomb exhibits “false cleanliness,” “So also you, with your verbose prayers, broad phylacteries, wide fringes, with your pallor and fasting and similar pretences, seem outwardly religious and unblemished, while your hearts everywhere gush with pretence, and drip with every kind of vice.”51 The antisemitism of this passage works to associate the figure of the Jew with the figure of the hypocrite in a long tradition that David Nirenberg has explored.52

The second quotation (“Par leurs fruictz congnoissez vous quelz arbres ce sont”) comes from another key gospel text on hypocrisy, especially its iteration in Luke, where it is immediately preceded by a warning to the zealously critical: “hypocrite, iette premierement la poultre de ton oeil: & adonc tu regarderas de ietter hors le festu qui est en loeil de ton frere” (Luke 6:42). Marguerite’s spiritual advisor and correspondent in the 1520s, the evangelical bishop of


50. Whitewash preserves what is underneath, a fact known and exploited by reluctant English reformers, covering up but simultaneously conserving newly forbidden images, which is how it became an emblem of hypocrisy. See Juliet Fleming, Graffiti and the Writing Arts of Early Modern England (London: Reaktion, 2001), 76.

51. Erasmus, Paraphrase on Matthew, 320. “Sic & uos prolixis precibus, latis phylacterijis, spaciosis fimbrijs, pallore, & ieiuio, simulibusq[ue]; fucis, foris uidemini religiosi, & integr[i]: qu[u[m] animus undiq; sectat simulation, omniq[ue]; genere uicioru[m] madeat” (Paraphrasis, u3’). Erasmus also emphasizes Jesus’s critique of the over-scrupulous interpreter of the law. See Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 107–12, doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226327259.001.0001. Calvin’s interpretation of these passages is similar: see Commentaires, 427.

52. Nirenberg, especially 69–77.
Meaux, Guillaume Briçonnet, wrote a long exegesis to her in 1522 on knowing the tree by its fruit and, like Luke, associating hypocrisy with eschatological revelation:

Pour neant n’est il escript: “A fructibus eorum cognoscret eos.” Par les œuvres on congoist quelle est la semence de l’espirit et, combien que ypocrisie ou dissimulacion puisse pour quelque temps regner, il est impossible que le fruct ne se montre tost ou tard et se descouvre vital ou pernicieux.53

Briçonnet points here to the manifestation of intention in this world, which he hopes is inevitable, as the “seed” in the mind is eventually bodied forth in behaviour; he is hoping that Marguerite’s work will demonstrate her evangelical convictions, and is perhaps also issuing a veiled warning against flagging commitment. Again, there is a confidence here in the eventual manifestation of true character and true intention. Marguerite echoes this association in the Heptaméron two decades later, where Briçonnet’s embattled desire for retribution and recognition in this world is shared by the storytellers in the Heptaméron and is dramatically represented in nouvelle 5, in which the outraged villagers follow the disgraced and unmasked friars, shouting their judgment. The friars themselves feel their disgrace as precisely this kind of public exposure, refracted through the shame of original sin when they try to hide, “comme Adam, quant il se veid nud devant la face de Dieu” (44).

Elsewhere in the Heptaméron, stories are told about abusive friars who are allowed access to young girls and women through the naïveté and foolishness of their guardians.54 Nouvelle 5 is, potentially, another story about licence and trespass: the Franciscans move freely around the country, as peripatetic mendicants. Faced with this unrestricted enemy, the ferrywoman must resort to dissimulation, pretending to give in to their demands. Geburon calls this “finesse” (42) and “tromperye” (43), emphasizing the element of play-acting as

54. See N23 and N31, which condemn the weakness and credulity of husbands; and N41 and N46 in which mothers give friars too-easy access to their daughters.
she drops one friar off on an island, “faignant d’attacher son bateau à ung arbre” (43). Neil Kenny has examined the moral value of the *Heptaméron*’s ruses and tricks through Michel de Certeau’s terminology of tactics; the ferrywoman’s “tromperye” appears from this perspective as an example of the “art du faible,” a tactic that resists institutional power through cunning and sleight-of-hand. Unlike Briçonnet’s confidence in ultimate revelation, there is nothing inevitable here in the exposure of the hypocrites. The hypocrisy of the friars must be met with ruse and trickery if it is to be exposed and successfully shamed.

**Hypocrisy and transparency: nouvelle 25**

The hypocrisy of the friars in *nouvelle* 5 seems beyond discussion: in the debate that follows, there is no mention of hypocrisy, unless Nomerfide and Oisille are reminded of the New Testament warnings so recently quoted in their references to those who have resisted or surrendered without “sonner la tromppette” or “sonner le tabourin” (45). Other occurrences of the term *hypocrisie* in the *Heptaméron* are not so clear. One of the most compelling of these comes in *nouvelle* 63, narrated by Dagoucin, in which a gentleman asks his wife to lie for him. When he tells her he is going to feign illness so he doesn’t have to accompany his king on an amorous adventure, and tells her that “votre contenance me pourra bien fort servir,” she replies: “Voilà […] une saincte et bonne ypocrisie, et à quoy je ne fauldray de vous servir de la myne la plus triste dont je me pourray adviser” (455–56). Hypocrisy here appears stripped of its condemnatory moral undertow and appears as a synonym for playacting and pretence, the “contenance” and the “myne” the wife will willingly put on like an actor’s mask. The choice of “ypocrisie”—rather than Geburon’s “finesse”


57. The Calvinist Philippe de Marnix also uses hypocrisy as synonymous with acting, in a loaded description of the Catholic church: “l’Eglise representatieve, c’est-à-dire histrionique ou hypocritique en
or “tromperye,” or even “mistere” (the term used for the theatrics of the fake ghost in nouvelle 39)—draws attention to itself, as its supremely negative connotations mean that the adjectives “saincte et bonne” transform it into a striking oxymoron. The wife is not disguising a vice with a histrionic virtue, or feigning a virtue she does not have, and so is not a traditional hypocrite. The proximity of the king and the term itself might recall the bad counsellors and courtiers in Plutarch’s “How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend” and Castiglione’s Courtier, who combine hypocrisy with flattery and a craven inability to challenge the prince.58 Again, the hypocrite is the opposite of the parrhesiastes, whose characteristic function is to speak truth to power. The wife suggests this context when she asks her husband what he is going to do, “veu que les princes treuvent souvent mauvais ceulz qui ne louent ce qu’ilz ayment” (455). In this sense, “saincte et bonne” might be read as expedient: the recourse of the subordinate who does not dare, or cannot, risk challenging the sovereign. And yet, the king does not appear as an imperious tyrant (he actually abandons the adventure for state business), and the discussion that follows the nouvelle does not focus on the couple’s “ypocrisie” or “dissimulation” but rather is dominated by Oisille’s claim that mortification is within ordinary lovers’ reach.

The term hypocrisy comes under more scrutiny in another tale of princely exploits: nouvelle 25, in which a young prince (clearly François I) tricks his lawyer in order to sleep with his wife; using a monastery as a shortcut, he impresses the monks with his commitment to early morning prayer. Longarine, the storyteller, introduces her story with the concession that “leur [aux princes] est non seullement permis mais commandé de user de mensonge, hypocrisye et fiction, qui sont les moiens de vaincre leurs ennemys, selon la doctrine de maistre Jehan de Meung” (249). Longarine’s acknowledgement of the expedience of hypocrisy seems to define and dismiss the prince’s actions before the story starts—a suggestion that is picked up by Adrien de Thou, who in his summary of nouvelle 25 uses the phrase “soubz couleur de,” associated elsewhere

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in the *Heptaméron* with hypocrisy, to describe the prince’s manoeuvres—but the discussion and indeed the story itself do not follow her cue.\(^{59}\) Longarine skirts the question of the prince’s responsibility by putting the whole charade on Love’s account: “il n’y a malice d’advocat ne finesse de religieux que amour, en cas de nécessité, ne face tromper” (254). In the scene from the *Rose* that she refers to in her introduction, Ami advises Amant to use any tactic necessary to reach his beloved, on the principle that it is always praiseworthy to deceive those who deceive others (particularly the unsavoury Malebouche who threatens the success of Amant’s quest).\(^{60}\) There is a certain satisfaction among the storytellers to see “amour […] tromper les trompeurs,” a role reversal which the Calvinist Georgette de Montenay later attributed to God’s justice; lawyers and monks are clearly deceivers elsewhere in the *Heptaméron*.\(^{61}\) And yet this emphasis on love ignores the political implications that Longarine alludes to in setting up the story.

Despite the reference to the *Roman de la rose* and the context of a clandestine love affair, Longarine’s statement seems more Machiavellian than courtly. Discussing the prince’s relationship to his allies and subjects in chapter 18 of *The Prince*, “How Princes Should Honour their Word,” Machiavelli recommends: “A prince, therefore, need not necessarily have all the good qualities I mentioned above [including compassion, good faith, chastity, and religious belief], but he should certainly appear to have them.”\(^{62}\) Innocent Gentillet explicitly condemned

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61. “Frustra me colunt” (they revere me in vain) is an emblem of “Hipocrisie,” a tongue in her hands and a heart trailing behind her on a string; the verse concludes, “Dieu clair-voyant rend moqué le moqueur.” Georgette de Montenay, *Emblemes ou devises christiennes* (Lyon: Jean Marcordel, 1571), 25, online, accessed 19 March 2019, emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/french/emblem.php?id=FMOa025.

the authorization of feigned religious devotion in chapter 18 as “hypocrisie et dissimulation” in his 1576 work that became known as *L’Anti-Machiavel*.

For Machiavelli, hypocrisy raised practical questions rather than moral ones, as the maintenance of the state required flexibility and dissimulation; hypocrisy was a potential persuasive strategy, given that “Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are.”

As recent scholarship has shown, Marguerite had ample experience of the politics of hypocrisy and dissimulation throughout her career, particularly in 1525 when she was in Spain negotiating her brother’s release from the emperor’s captivity after he was taken prisoner at the battle of Pavia. In a letter to Anne de Montmorency in October 1525, she noted the absence of honourable and straight dealing on the part of the Spanish; in such circumstances, she advised similar tactics: “ne craignés d’ung petit temporiser, car pour retourner à Madil devers luy et pour revenir icy, cela n’est riens, car j’espère que en ces dissimulacions ilz se ravisert.”

She may well have discovered for herself in Madrid the force of Machiavelli’s warning that possessing and exercising exclusively virtuous qualities is more harmful to a prince than helpful. Indeed, she later explicitly condemned Charles V’s “hypocrisy” to one of Henry VIII’s ambassadors, though this too may be an example of a political strategy, telling an English ambassador and his king what they wished to hear.


66. “I would even go so far as to say that if he has these qualities and always behaves accordingly he will find them harmful; if he only appears to have them they will render him service” (Machiavelli, 57).

67. The context is one of constructed solidarity. “[Henry] and I be both of one opinion in religion, for neither of us loveth the Pope; and I think he would be glad to see both our destructions, for the which purpose he practiseth with th’Emperor, that is to say, with hypocrisy; for the Emperor is hypocrisy and
Following Longarine, who sets up the *nouvelle* in terms of hypocrisy and statecraft, we might read it as a story of princely hypocrisy and self-indulgence. Renja Salminen, in an editorial comment, identifies an ironic purpose (730), quoting Longarine’s introduction in which she condemns “mensonge et dissimulation: qui est ung vice laid et infame, principalement aux princes et grans seigneurs” (248). Thus, the prince’s ruse is only commendable “selon la doctrine de maistre Jehan de Meung,” a judgment attenuated in the discussion, which Salminen argues must have been added later, after the death of the beloved brother (730, her emphasis). The prince’s sister makes an appearance in the *nouvelle* as “celle qui aymoit son frere plus que toutes les creatures du monde” (252–53), and is astonished by his prayers in the monastery, which she dismisses as “supersticions” and “ceremonyes” (253). Marguerite’s presence is often a sign that the *nouvelle* is playing with levels of authorial and narrative distance, and irony is one of the more prominent rhetorical figures in the *Heptaméron*; while it is intriguingly associated with hypocrisy in classical accounts—so close for some authors that the two terms appear broadly synonymous—the *devisants* tend to deploy it as a salutary mechanism that precisely unmasks the hypocrites.  

If the purpose of the *nouvelle* is ironic, it was missed by Montaigne: “ce n’est pas par cette preuve seulement qu’on pourroit verifier que les femmes ne sont guières propres à traiter les matieres de la Theologie.” Marguerite’s devotion to her brother was already legendary

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during her lifetime and a potentially obfuscating commonplace by the time of the *Essais*.

But this is not the direction the other storytellers take the discussion, as they turn to more general and *(pace Montaigne)* more subtly theological concerns. Montaigne’s dismissal of Marguerite’s theology stems from his assertion that she takes the prince’s defective “prieres et oraisons” as “un tesmoignage de singuliere devotion.” But this is to read the story through the superstitious eyes of the monks, who believe the outward gestures and actions of the prince (the “supersticions” and “ceremonyes” dismissed by his sister) are proof of a genuine faith, whereas Marguerite’s evangelical theology would refuse any correspondence between outward actions (especially ceremonials) and inner faith. So we might conclude that the hypocrisy is in fact the monks’, whose unexamined assumption that the prince’s prayers are transparent proof of his faith enables the kind of hypocrisy embodied by the Pharisees. But this doesn’t quite capture the tenor of the discussion, either, which hinges on a scandalous admission from Hircan.

The discussion is short, but it contains a complex polyphony of views, even by the *Heptaméron*’s standards. Geburon first commends the prince’s delicacy and unusual scruples in saving the townswoman’s reputation through his simulation of piety, and Oisille agrees, citing the prince as an example for his peers given that “le scandalle est souvent pire que le peché” (254). Nomerfide then comments ironically on the quality of the prince’s post-coital prayers: “Pensez […] que les prieres qu’il faisoit au monastere où il passoit estoient bien fondées!” Montaigne misses the ironic charge of this judgment, despite echoing it himself: “Je vous laisse à juger, l’âme pleine de ce beau pensement, à quoy il employoit la faveur divine.” Parlamente’s pious suggestion that the prince could have been truly repentant is dismissed as naïve by her husband, who then goes on to make his own admission: “le peché me desplaist bien et suis marry d’offenser Dieu, mais le plaisir me plaist toujours” (254). Oisille is horrified at this suggestion of defective repentance, and the pleasure that

70. Montaigne, 1.56.324.
71. Montaigne, 1.56.324.
72. On Hircan’s rhetoric and ethics of desire, and on this pronouncement in particular, see Jeffrey C. Persels, “‘Qui sommes tous cassez du harnoys’ or, the *Heptaméron* and Uses of the Male Body,” in *Heroic Virtue, Comic Infidelity: Reassessing Marguerite de Navarre’s *Heptaméron*,* ed. Dora E. Polachek (Amherst, MA: Hestia, 1993), 90–102.
Hircan cannot disavow is likened to idolatry by Geburon: “ne ferez vous pas ung Dieu nouveau” (254). But what Hircan is recognizing here is the inevitability of sin, given humanity’s fallen condition, and the cognitive dissonance that this recognition produces in those who would, despite everything, be virtuous. Elsewhere, Hircan refers explicitly to the story of the Fall to make a similar point: “elle [Parlamente] et moy sommes enfans d’Adam et de Eve; parquoy, en bien nous myrant, n’aurons besoing de couvrir nostre nudité de fueilles, mais plustost confesser nostre fragillité” (N26, 270). And yet Hircan’s crushing cynicism about the quality of the prince’s prayers in nouvelle 25 (also shared by Montaigne) should not eliminate the possibility of genuine repentance, however implausible it may seem. If Nomerfide, following Longarine, suggests hypocrisy at work, Parlamente counters with the inscrutability of the human heart: “Sy n’en debvez vous poinct juger” (254).73 Anything other than this suspension of judgment risks giving credence to the hypocrites whose success is founded on a confidence in the equivalence between action and belief.

**Hypocrisy and civility: nouvelle 52**

The lesson Hircan takes from nouvelle 25 is one of inevitable human weakness. This is developed further in the discussion of hypocrisy that follows nouvelle 52, a perky and interestingly abject story of a valet who tricks a lawyer into picking up a piece of frozen excrement, thinking it is a sugar loaf, which then thaws out in the tavern where the lawyer has taken a friend to eat. The debate following the story soon turns to the question of obscenity and whether words can offend as much as the things they represent. Oisille admits that “telles parolles ne puent point, mais il y en a d’autres que l’on appelle villaines, qui sont de si mauvaise odeur que l’ame en est plus fasché que le corps n’est de sentir ung tel pain de sucre que vous avez dict” (402–03). Oisille alludes here to the Stoic position on obscenity, familiar from Cicero’s discussion in De Officiis, that words are arbitrary signifiers of things and so cannot be “dirty,” only to reject it in the case of certain words that have an unsettling effect on an “honneste femme.” Villain

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73. The discussion recalls the first story in the Decameron in which a spectacularly defective deathbed confession is offered with the intention to deceive; and yet the narrator Panfilo reminds his audience, “albeit he led a wicked, sinful life, it is possible that at the eleventh hour he was so sincerely repentant that God had mercy upon him and received him into His kingdom.” Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron, trans. G. H. McWilliam (London: Penguin, 1995), day 1, story 1, p. 36.
was one of a range of vernacular options used to translate the Latin obscenum in dictionaries such as Robert Estienne’s Dictionarium Latinogallicum; two others were ord and sale, both of which figure frequently in the story itself.74

These villaines parolles that no honourable woman can hear without shame and physical discomfort inspire a discussion of obscenity, decency, and feminine hypocrisy, an attack on women who choose propriety over honesty. Saffredent sets up the question in terms of social performance and appearance and “les femmes qui se veullent faire repreter saiges” (403). As in his conceptual history of hypocrisy, women opt for the reputation of honour rather than honour itself. Following his lead, Simontault wonders what lies behind the performance of social proprieties: “combien de foiz ont elles mis leurs touretz de nez pour rire en liberté autant qu’elles s’estoient courroucées en faincte?” The touret de nez—the mask that Camelle uses to disguise her identity from her lover—is identified here by Simontault as a particularly successful enabler of social (and feminine) hypocrisy. Then, as if she is elaborating on the Magnifico’s advice to women in Castiglione’s Courtier, Parlamente claims it’s better to feign anger than to show amusement, and Dagoucin—the idealistic Neoplatonist—responds with a direct accusation of hypocrisy: “Vous louez doncques […] l’ypocrisie aux dames autant que la vertu?”75

At this point, Longarine gives another theologically inflected response: “La vertu seroit bien meilleure, dist Longarine, mais où elle deffault, se fault ayder de l’ypocrisie, comme nous faisons de pantoufles, pour faire oublier nostre petitesse” (403–04).76 The image recalls and reverses Tertullian’s denunciation of theatrical costume—and in particular the thick soles worn by


75. The Magnifico would not, however, have condoned Parlamente’s authorization of pretence: the perfect court lady treads the fine line between histrionic virtue and unrestrained familiarity (Castiglione, 3.212–13). On women’s reactions to perceived obscenity, see Jeanice Brooks, “Singing the Courtly Body: The Chanson lascive and the Performance of Obscenity,” in Obscénités renaissantes, ed. Roberts, Peureux and Wajeman, 193–206.

76. Renja Salminen (768) quotes a quatrain from Guillaume Coquillart’s 1480 satire Les Droits nouveaux (Oeuvres de Guillaume Coquillart [Reims: Brissard-Binet, 1847], 124): “Noz mignonnes sont si tres hautes / Que pour sembler grandes et belles, / Elles portent pentoufles hautes / Bien à vingt-quatre semelles.” Longarine makes explicit the metaphorical potential of the pantoufle.
tragic actors—in De Spectaculis: “the devil makes the tragic actor taller on his cothurni, because ‘nobody can add a cubit to his stature; he wants to make a liar of Christ.’”77 The familiar metaphor of clothing is deployed here not to cover up but rather to lift up: hypocrisy as a supplement for the infirm—a necessary leaven that, rather than fraudulently inflate human arrogance, on the contrary insistently draws our attention to our incapacities and our lowliness for which it nevertheless compensates and which, to a certain extent, it camouflages. Longarine does go on, however, to deploy the more familiar metaphor of the covering, adding: “Encores esse beaucoup que nous puissions couvrir noz imparfections” (404).

This understanding of hypocrisy as the consequence of our fallen condition chimes oddly but persuasively with Marguerite’s evangelical emphasis on human impotence and absolute dependence on God’s grace, revealing a kind of inevitable hypocrisy to which human beings are condemned. This acknowledgement of an inevitable and expedient hypocrisy might also be an oblique response to the broader critique of French evangelicals in Calvin’s 1544 polemic, L’Excuse de Jehan Calvin à MM. les Nicodémites, where he expressed his disappointment at what he considered to be their waning enthusiasm for reform following the persecutions of the 1540s. Calvin condemned a kind of timorous piety he called nicodémisme, after evangelicals compared their policy of circumspect, moderate compromise and reform from within the Catholic church to the example of the Pharisee Nicodemus who only went to hear Jesus teach at night. For Calvin, this behaviour was no more than a “couverture” for cowardice and lack of faith; the Nicodemite argument that in keeping a low profile they could convert others more effectively was “un blasphème oblique, avec ce qu’il n’y a qu’hypocrisie et mensonge.”78 Marguerite, particularly

associated with the French evangelical cause, may have been implicitly targeted here, and it was around this time that her rift with Calvin started to become apparent; it was also around this time that she may have started to compose the stories that became the *Heptaméron*.

From an Aristotelian point of view, a certain pretence or play-acting could hold a legitimate place in moral development, where virtue may be developed by acquiring the habit of virtue, or in Jennifer Herdt’s terms, “putting on virtue.” This is the kind of habit that, for Pascal, could become second nature, a virtuous corrective to original sin. But Longarine’s emphasis is not on hypocrisy as a potential step towards virtue; rather, she identifies it as a characteristic mark of fallen humanity. Elsewhere in the *Heptaméron*, Longarine describes this inevitable pretence as legitimate only when sanctioned by God’s grace. Introducing nouvelle 62—her story of the inadvertent self-betrayal of another narrator of stories—she claims: “ung peché qui à grant peine peult estre si secret qu’il ne soit revellé, sinon quant Dieu par sa misericorde le couvre de ceulx qui en ont pour l’amour de luy vraye repentance” (451). Longarine describes here the only legitimate instance of hypocrisy: when sinful subjects humble themselves in true repentance, and God gratuitously gives us the cover we crave, or “couvr[e] noz imparfections,” in the terms of the earlier debate. In other circumstances, Longarine argues, God’s grace should work the opposite way and uncover the sins that we try to keep hidden. After nouvelle 34—about two Franciscans who get more than they bargained for in listening to their host’s conversation—she concedes Hircan’s point that pride can grow, unknown even to the subject, under the cover of their good works: “Dieu nous faict grand grace, quant nous tresbucherons en quelque offence visible, par laquelle nostre peste couverte se puisse clairement veoir” (310). Here, God’s grace makes visible rather than covers up a hidden sin, even if this means disgrace in the eyes of the world. Longarine’s vision and vocabulary of scandal—*offence* commonly


accompanics, or even replaces, scandal in French bibles and discussions—is close to the Calvinist view of the scandal as an obstacle that should nevertheless prompt self-examination. Longarine similarly suggests that offence should be welcomed by the sinful subject as a forced step towards (painful and difficult) self-knowledge. This is precisely the lesson that the archetypal hypocrites of the *Heptaméron*, the Franciscans, are incapable of: as Oisille puts it in her introduction to nouvelle 23, they practise “l’hypocrisye de ceulx qui s’estiment plus religieux que les autres” (229). “S’estimer plus religieux que les autres” leads the friar in Oisille’s story to commit atrocious crimes, but this formulation also suggests that hypocrisy can be a deficiency in self-knowledge; in the fallen world, self-righteousness might be inherently hypocritical. In the discussion following nouvelle 34, Longarine uses this argument to counter Hircan’s covert accusation of hypocrisy, which he has directed specifically at women (“Mais vous, qui ne oousez mectre voz fruictz dehors et qui faictes tant de belles euvres apparentes” [309]), reframing it as self-delusion or unexamined and uncomfortable faults.

And yet Longarine’s theological reflections tend to overlook the difference between men and women, and the ideological stakes of their respective hypocrisies—and this is precisely what Parlamente is talking about, in the debate after nouvelle 52, when she tries to defend women’s decorum: “quant entre vous, hommes, parlez villainement par vostre malice, sans nulle ignorance, je ne saiche femme de bien qui n’en ayt […] horreur” (403). Obscenity is here figured as a potential weapon, a way of forcing a reaction from a female listener; the male aggression that Freud found in “smut” is identified here by Parlamente as an integral part of the dynamics of obscenity.


82. Hircan is talking about the “fruictz” of human nature and behaviour, in this context, the fruits of sin (see Romans 6:21–22); he is also alluding to the key gospel text on hypocrisy deployed by the villagers in nouvelle 5, “par leurs fruictz connoisseur vous quelz arbres ce sont” (44; Luke 6:44).

Parlamente and Dagoucin are talking about civility, and the rules agreed upon in courtly circles regulating the performance of civil conversation. As Ruth Grant points out, the arguments in favour of manners echoed those made in defence of hypocrisy. A certain amount of accommodation and flexibility was necessary, following the medieval description of the courtier as a *vir geminus*, a two-fold man. Critics of the court such as the Spanish courtier-turned-Franciscan Antonio de Guevara denounced the suppleness of the courtier, suggesting that paradiastole was a privileged rhetorical move of hypocrisy and flattery. In the decade after the *Heptaméron* was written, the expatriate Frenchmen Joachim du Bellay and Olivier de Magny described the papal court in Rome as the logical extreme of the tactics and procedures Castiglione advised, where hypocrisy was a defining characteristic. Magny contrasts the hypocrisy of Rome with a thoroughly French virtue—“je suis fidele et veritable”—in the same terms as the *Heptaméron*’s project is described in the Prologue. But even honesty and sincerity—which in the *Heptaméron* are ultimately presented as a utopian ideal, difficult if not impossible to achieve in the fallen world—are subject to ideological pressure. In the discussion of hypocrisy that follows *nouvelle* 33, Nomerfide praises a free-speaking ideal and the pleasure of “parler nayfvement” (304), offering, like Aquinas, simplicity as a kind of anti-hypocrisy. Geburon agrees, “l’ipocrisie […] est cause de

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84. Grant, 30.


88. Aquinas argues that hypocrisy is a sin against “simplicity,” which he says is the same as truth: *Summa*, 2.2 q. 111, art. 3, p. 177. Nomerfide’s “naïvement” seems close to Aquinas’s “simplicity.”
tous les maulx que nous avons,” but Longarine responds with asperity: “C’est pour engresser […], et je croy que vous donnez vostre opinion selon vostre condition.” Longarine’s evocation of feeding and fattening is a reminder that in the fallen world even sincerity is potentially profitable, and we should always look behind the professions of faith to discern who benefits.

In Matthew, Jesus accuses hypocrites of putting worldly glory before heavenly reward, or immediate profit before an implied future loss: “En vérité ie vous dis: quiz ont receu leur salaire” (Matt 6:2). Earlier in the Heptaméron, at the very end of the second day, Saffredent summarizes his story of a woman whose serviteur finds her in the arms of her stablehand in the same financial register: “les ypocrites sont payez de leur loyer” (N20, 191). But Saffredent’s moralizing might equally be put under Longarine’s scrutiny. He goes on to say, in precisely Nomerfide’s terms, “et Dieu favorise ceulx qui ayment nayfvement.” We might ask, with Longarine, who profits from this sincerity? That it would not be women—and that therefore sincerity is easier for some than others—is tacitly acknowledged in the discussion that follows, in which Simontault suggests that lower-class men (of “orde et basse condition” [192]) have the advantage, at least from the perspective of the noblewomen, of not being believed should they choose to reveal the liaison.89 Low-born men would not have the credibility of noblemen if they chose to exercise their naïve sincerity, marking this virtue as an elite as well as a masculine one. The female storytellers are all horrified by this remark. But Saffredent’s reference to the loaded virtues of sincerity and simplicity suggests that even the righteous gesture of unmasking the hypocrites itself hides more murky desires and motivations. Why would elite men like the chevalier de Ryant in nouvelle 20 or Bonnivet in nouvelle 14 want to expose their vulnerable lovers? Simontault suggests that, in the case of Bonnivet and his Italian lady, it is a case of power and revenge rather than guileless simplicity: “luy oster son honneur et chasteté, sans luy en savoir gré ny grace” (N14, 139). Grant argues that Machiavelli frames the choice for political leaders as between two forms of hypocrisy, and not between hypocrisy and honesty.90 Something similar is happening here, with Longarine’s exposure of “naïveté” as another mask. The gendered circumstances and consequences of simplicity invite us

89. The nobleman’s disgust at his lady’s choice of lover is, like Simontault’s remark, interestingly refracted through terms of obscenity: the stablehand is “laid, ord et infame” (190), suggesting potential uses for obscenity as well as its undercurrent of sexual attraction.

90. Grant, 30.
to reconsider even the self-righteous gesture of unmasking the hypocrite as a motivated and potentially hypocritical action. The unmasking of others’ degenerate hypocrisies can be one of the most potentially profitable actions of the ostentatiously righteous in quest of praise and power.

Half a century after the *Heptaméron*, Jean-Jacques Boissard analyzed in his book of emblems the dangers of hypocrisy in terms of power and justice, where hypocrisy was most damaging when it was deployed by those in positions of influence and credit. The concern with power points forward to the dynamics of Molière’s *Tartuffe*, whose hypocrisy becomes critically dangerous for the family when Orgon delegates excessive power to him. In the *Heptaméron*, this critique is equally directed at the cultural institution of the patriarchy in which love appears as another relationship of power. The double and contradictory demands on women of chastity and receptivity result in the instrumentalization of hypocrisy as a paradiastolic accusation made by men like Simontault and Saffredent against women who value their honour more than their supposed desires.

The complexity of its representation of hypocrisy marks the *Heptaméron* out from its influential predecessor, the *Decameron*, in which *ipocresia* is exclusively monastic and is criticized in a relatively light-hearted way by the storytellers, notwithstanding the references to the power of the Franciscan inquisitor to burn those he deems heretical if they can’t pay his price. This

91. “& tombons encores plus facilement aus pieges du calomniateur hypocrite, qui aura plus de moyens de nous faire sentir ses outrages, & les effects de sa mauvaize volonté, s’il tient rang d’homme de bien, & à credit & pouvoir entre le peuple.” Jean-Jacques Boissard, “Rien ne nuit tant qu’une feinte bonté,” in *Emblemes […] nouvellement mis de latin en françois par Pierre Joly* (Metz A. Faber, 1595), 86, accessed online 19 March 2019, emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/french/emblem.php?id=FBOc035. The “calomniateur” was a synonym for the devil, making hypocrisy a diabolical attribute.


93. Boccaccio, day 1, story 6, p. 52. *Ipocresia* and its cognates appear only four times in the *Decameron*: see “The Online Concordance to the *Decameron*,” on Decameron Web, accessed 4 April 2019, brown.edu/Departments/Italian_Studies/dweb/texts/concordance.php. My argument here turns on the term *ipocresia*; dissimulation and other forms of pretence that are not called *ipocresia* are, of course, rife in the *Decameron*, and not limited to the clergy; the difference in occurrences of the term itself in the *Decameron* and the *Heptaméron* might be explained by national-linguistic as well as historical and cultural factors.
complexity reflects a deeper uncertainty in the Heptaméron about the very possibility of honesty and transparency in a fallen world whose ultimate purpose is hidden from us, and a suspicion that hypocrisy is an inevitable consequence of that fallen condition. But this general point obscures the more specific critique of, on the one hand, those (like the Franciscans) who deploy their hypocrisy as a cover under which they can hurt others and indulge themselves; and, on the other, men like Simontault who use the accusation of hypocrisy to consolidate their power against women. Both use hypocrisy as a means of extracting advantage; one of the results of the discussions in the Heptaméron is to expose the hidden interests of the supposedly disinterested.