

# Dynamics of Employee Reactance to Company and Union Dual Allegiance Revisited and Expanded

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Résumé de l'article

L'avènement des efforts de coopération entre les syndicats et les employeurs a ranimé l'intérêt pour la notion de double allégeance. La présente recherche constate la réciprocité significative entre la loyauté à l'employeur et au syndicat. Deux critiques majeures portent sur cette recherche. La première comprend le type des éléments utilisés et le sens donné aux phénomènes qu'on étudie. La deuxième se rapporte à la méthodologie que l'on emploie. Au sujet de la première critique, on a utilisé d'une façon générale les termes « double allégeance », « double

loyauté » et « double engagement » d'une manière interchangeable (Fukami et Larson (1982) Martin, Mageneau et Peterson (1982), Schreisheim et Tsui (1980). Il n'est pas évident que ces expressions aient une signification identique. Une simple relecture des éléments de la mesure de l'engagement énoncés par Porter, Steers, Mowday et Boulian (1974) en y substituant le terme « syndicat » au terme « employeur » ou encore en choisissant les éléments de l'engagement envers le syndicat fondés sur la seule conviction qu'ils s'apparentent aux éléments de l'engagement envers l'employeur ne semble pas être un procédé soutenable, compte tenu de la différence qualitative entre les employeurs et les syndicats.

La deuxième critique que l'on puisse formuler se rapporte à l'approche réciproque utilisée pour mesurer la double allégeance. L'approche réciproque changerait le sens de l'expression telle qu'elle est définie. Alors que la « double loyauté » met l'accent sur les réactions favorables aux deux parties, l'approche réciproque le met sur le degré de réactance affective comparable envers les deux, y compris la différence totale qu'il peut exister entre ce qui est favorable et ce qui ne l'est pas. De pareilles approches reflètent la double réactance plutôt que la double allégeance et le double engagement.

La présente recherche décrit les types d'engagement envers le Syndicat (U) et l'employeur (C) dans un cadre à quatre volets. Ce sont les suivants : 1) double engagement (C + U +), c'est-à-dire l'engagement à la fois envers l'employeur et envers le syndicat; 2) double rejet (C-U -), c'est-à-dire un manque d'engagement envers l'un et l'autre; 3) engagement unilatéral envers l'entreprise C + U -, c'est-à-dire engagement envers l'employeur et manque d'engagement envers le syndicat; 4) engagement unilatéral envers le syndicat (C-U +), c'est-à-dire engagement envers le syndicat et manque d'engagement envers l'employeur. En présence de ce cadre, on tentera de distinguer parmi les quatre groupes des modèles de réponse fondés sur des variables appropriées. Dans cette recherche, on a utilisé une mesure de l'engagement envers le syndicat qu'on a mise au point d'une façon indépendante (Gordon et autres, 1980).

Les résultats n'indiquent aucune réciprocité significative entre l'engagement envers le syndicat et envers l'employeur. Ceci démontre que la dualité de réactance, c'est-à-dire qu'une réciprocité positive entre l'engagement envers l'employeur et l'engagement envers le syndicat ne caractérisaient pas les travailleurs syndiqués qui avaient fait l'objet de l'enquête. Il est possible que la différenciation de l'engagement envers le syndicat et de l'engagement envers l'employeur pouvait être d'égale sinon de plus grande importance que les résultats de la double loyauté initiale. Les données sous-entendent que l'engagement envers le syndicat et l'engagement envers l'employeur ne sont pas une partie nulle. Si l'employeur veut accroître l'engagement de son personnel, la présente étude serait de nature à lui suggérer d'orienter ses efforts vers l'augmentation de l'autonomie dans le travail, ce qui serait sans doute avantageux, mais n'aurait aucune influence sur l'engagement envers le syndicat. D'un autre côté, les services de l'entreprise n'ont pas à se sentir menacés, à cause du déclin de l'engagement envers l'employeur, par les syndicalistes actifs dans les affaires du syndicat.

La participation aux affaires syndicales et l'autonomie dans le travail forment une équation, ce qui comptait pour 29 pour cent de la variance dans l'effectif du groupe prévisionnel. Les deux fonctions discriminantes qui sont significatives consistent en une « fonction unilatérale » et une « fonction de dualité ». La fonction unilatérale identifie les groupes C + U - et C-U +, tandis que la fonction de dualité identifie les groupes C + U + et C-U -. L'engagement double et le rejet double semblent être des images réfléchies l'une de l'autre. S'il y a à la fois autonomie dans le travail et activité syndicale, on constate qu'il y a un engagement envers les deux; s'il n'y a ni autonomie ni activité, c'est le double rejet qui semble se produire. L'engagement unilatéral se produit lorsque l'autonomie dans le travail et l'activité syndicale se rapportent de façon inverse l'une à l'autre. Il se peut que cela ne soit pas vrai pour d'autres variables indépendantes. S'il y a des variables spécifiques qui exercent un impact sur la double allégeance sans qu'il y ait double *desallégeance* (ou vice-versa), c'est qu'alors ces variables pourraient être mieux prévues par le recours à la fonction discriminante multiple plutôt que par l'analyse linéaire plus traditionnelle.

# *Dynamics of Employee Reactance to Company and Union Dual Allegiance Revisited and Expanded*

**James W. Thacker**  
and  
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*This study examines the relationship between company commitment and union commitment using the traditional dual allegiance approaches as well as a different methodology which utilizes multiple discriminant function analysis.*

When the concept of «dual allegiance» was first reported, it generated considerable interest. Scholars of union/management relations conceived of the relationship as being adversarial, whereas research findings suggested that unionized employees tended to have positive affective reactions to both organizations regardless of their apparent adversarial relationship.

The early research of the 1950's often obtained a single affective response regarding the company and union. If both responses were classified as positive «dual allegiance» was said to exist for that individual. Results of these studies demonstrated that well over half of those surveyed indicated dual allegiance (Seidman, London, Karsh, and Tagliacozzo, 1958; Dean, 1954; Purcell, 1960; Katz, 1949).

Other researchers who studied this phenomenon utilized a different approach. In this research, correlations between responses toward company and union showed a significant positive relationship (Stagner, 1954; Gottlieb and Kerr, 1950). This was said to reflect «dual allegiance» but after these studies in the fifties interest in dual allegiance waned (during the 1960's and 1970's).

There has been renewed interest in dual allegiance with the advent of joint union/management cooperative efforts in areas such as improving the

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quality of work life and the quality of goods and services, etc. Recent research has used multiple item scales, which addressed a criticism of the earlier research regarding single item responses. Research using multiple item scaling generally reported a significant positive relationship between company and union scales (Fukami and Larson, 1984; Fukami and Larson, 1982; Schriesheim and Tsui, 1980).

There are two major criticisms of recent research in this area. The first involves the type of items used and/or the designation given the phenomena being studied. The second, the methodology used. Regarding the first criticism, the terms dual allegiance, dual loyalty and dual commitment have been used interchangeably (Fukami and Larson, 1982; Martin, Mageneau and Peterson, 1982; Schriesheim and Tsui, 1980). It is not clear whether these constructs are identical. Simply rewording of items from the Porter, Steers, Mowday and Boulian (1974) measure of commitment to read «union instead of company» (Martin et al., 1982) or selecting items from a union commitment scale based on only the belief that they «match» the «company items» (Fukami and Larson, 1982) does not seem to be a defensible procedure, considering the qualitative difference between companies and unions.


The second criticism that can be made relates to the correlational approach used to measure dual allegiance. The correlational approach changed the meaning of the construct as originally defined. Whereas «dual loyalty» focussed upon favorable reactions to both parties, correlation focussed upon the degree of comparable affective reactance toward both including the entire span from favorability through to not favorable. Such approaches reflect dual reactance, rather than dual allegiance and/or dual commitment. Moreover, based upon Schriesheim and Tsui's (1980) review of the literature it appears that the average correlation reported only accounts for approximately nine percent of the variance. Based upon these findings they suggest abandoning the dual allegiance research. There is still an interest, however, in factors which impact on dual allegiance. In their article on «Company and Union Commitment: parallel models», Fukami and Larson (1984) use a multiple regression technique separately for company and union commitment to determine which, if any, of the independent variables will predict both union commitment and company commitment. In this study we are not only interested in the dynamics of dual commitment but also the other three conditions.

It is the strategy of this research to describe patterns of commitment toward the union and management in a four fold framework (See Figure 1). These are: (1) Dual Commitment, (C + U +) i.e. commitment to both company and union; (2) Dual Rejection, (C-U-) i.e. a lack of commitment to

both; (3) Unilateral Company Commitment, (C+U-) i.e. commitment to company, lack of commitment to union; and (4) Unilateral Union Commitment, (C-U+) i.e. commitment to union, lack of commitment to the company.

**FIGURE 1**

**Four groups are formed by dichotomizing the company and union scales at their scale neutral point**



Given this framework, attempts will be made to discriminate among the four groups response patterns in terms of relevant variables.

### **AUTONOMY**

Expressed satisfaction with the job itself has proven to be the most important factor in job satisfaction when predicting the company commitment phenomenon. When analyzing the research related to company commitment and «work itself», most research utilized Hackman and Oldham's job characteristics variables (Steers, 1977). Of these job characteristics, the

one most often specified was a measure of autonomy. Results indicated a positive relationship between autonomy and the measures of attachment to the company (Steers, 1977).

### **UNION ACTIVITY**

In that there is some evidence that participation in union affairs is related to union commitment (Dean, 1954, Tannenbaum & Kahn, 1958), a measure of union activity was included as a possible factor that would discriminate among the four groups.

### **TENURE**

Research has demonstrated that long tenured and older workers are more committed to the company than are short tenured and younger workers (Fukami & Larson, 1984; Welsch and La Van, 1981; Mowday, Steers and Porter, 1979; O'Reilly and Cadweel, 1981). Stevens, Beyer, and Trice (1978) also indicated that tenure may be the more important variable between tenure and age.

### **FIRST LEVEL SUPERVISORS' ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNION**

Based on past research, albeit less sophisticated measures, a consistent finding had been a majority of individuals being positive toward both company and union. Evidence supports the belief that dual allegiance is more likely to exist in a situation where union/management relations are good (Stagner, 1956: p. 402, Kerr, 1954). Heiders balance theory (Heider, 1958) provides a framework for explaining the phenomena. If you perceive union/management relations to be good, and you like the company, then in order to keep balance, you must like the union. If however, you perceive union management relations to be poor, then if you like the company, you will not like the union in order to keep the balance<sup>1</sup>. There is some evidence, however, that suggests that the quality of union management relations may not be a necessary condition. Dean (1954), for example, classified one of the companies studied as having strained relations. That company still indicated a high degree of dual allegiance among its employees. Earlier studies

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that the theory predicts a non linear relationship. Perception of a good relationship should lead to dual allegiance but a poor relationship predicts unilateral company or unilateral union allegiance.

used an evaluation of union/management relations in the most general, and therefore, most abstract sense. It is suggested that unionized employees may derive their assessment of the quality of relationship in a more restricted fashion, i.e. in terms of how their first level supervisor interacts with the union. Each first level supervisor reacts in his/her own way toward union authority (steward); and his/her attitude toward the union in general may reflect this behavior. In other words, if the first level supervisor perceives the union in a positive light, then his/her relationship with the steward will probably be positive and vice versa. This interaction may impact on how the supervisors's subordinates perceive the union/management relationship.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

Hypothesis 1. There will be no significant correlation between the two measures of commitment. The more significant correlations reported between union and company commitment have utilized union commitment measures based on rephrasing of company commitment terms (Martin et al., 1982) or taken the items primarily from Gordon's first factor, «loyalty» (Fukami and Larson, 1982). Where the two measures were independently developed, a positive correlation between the two scales was not found (England, 1960). This study will utilize two independently developed measures reflecting commitment and therefore should result in no relationship being found.

Hypothesis 2. Four characteristics, perceived job autonomy, union activity, tenure, and immediate supervisors attitude toward the union will distinguish among the four groups.

More specifically in terms of the four quadrants:

Corollary (a): Employees in the dual commitment category will be characterized by high perceived job autonomy, high reported union activity, and will have immediate supervisors who have favorable attitudes toward the employee union.

Corollary (b): Those employees in the dual rejection group will be characterized by: low perceived job autonomy, low reported union activity.

Corollary (c): The Unilateral Company Commitment group will be characterized by: high perceived job autonomy, long tenure, and low reported union activity.

Corollary (d): The Unilateral Union Commitment group will be characterized by low perceived job autonomy, high reported union activity, and short tenure. Research support for the variables used to differentiate among the four quadrants is as follows.

## METHOD

### Subjects

Subjects for this study were drawn from a sample of 647 nonmanagement employees in a large midwestern public utility located in the United States. The number of survey questionnaires completed and returned was 601, a response rate of approximately 93 percent. Ratings from the nonmanagement employees' supervisors were also obtained regarding the supervisor's attitude toward the union. Of the 95 relevant supervisors (who supervise from 4 to 15 subordinates), four did not respond to the survey, this being a response rate of 95 percent.

### Procedure

All subjects were informed in advance that they would have the opportunity to complete a questionnaire (on company time) regarding attitudes toward the union and the company.

### Scales

1. *Company commitment*: A nine item scale developed by Porter et al. (1974). Internal consistency of the scale (coefficient alpha) was .91.
2. *Union Commitment*: A twenty-three item scale was obtained from the Gordon et al. (1980) measure of union commitment. The Gordon et al. scale had 37 items. To reduce the scale a more stringent criteria for factor determination was used. An item required a primary loading of .40 or greater and a difference of .1 between the primary and secondary loading. Also items such as «reading the council newsletter» were removed as the union did not have one. Coefficient alpha for the total scale was .94.
3. *Union Activity*: A nine item scale to measure the degree to which an individual participates in union activity, developed by Huszycz (1980); coefficient alpha .90.
4. *Autonomy*: A four item scale taken from the Job Description Index developed by Hackman and Oldham (1976). Coefficient alpha .84.
5. *First level Supervisor's Attitude Toward the Union*: A ten item scale developed for this study. The items are responded to by the first level supervisor and measure their perception of the union. High scores indicate that the supervisor perceives the union positively and low scores indicate a negative perception of the union. Coefficient alpha .87.

### Data Analysis

Scores for each scale were obtained by summing the items that comprise that scale. Since there was a large sample, any missing values were handled by not calculating a score for that scale. Although this resulted in a loss of some subjects, this method presented a more conservative means of dealing with missing data than estimating these values. A total of 569 non-management questionnaires were not missing any data and these were utilized in the analysis. This still comprised 88 percent of the total sample of 647 nonmanagement personnel.

Hypothesis 1 utilized a correlation coefficient. Hypothesis 2 utilized a multiple discriminant function analysis. Individuals were classified into one of four groups based on their scores on the company and union commitment scales. Above the neutral point was considered favorable, and at, or below the neutral point was classified as not favorable on both scales.

### RESULTS

Prior to examination of hypothesis cell frequencies will be reported. The early research indicated most individuals were in the dual allegiance cell. In this study 49.6% (282 individuals) were in the «favorable toward both» category. The next highest category was the «favorable to company and not the union» where 23.7% (135 individuals) of the sample was categorized. The smallest number of individuals, 10.8% (62 individuals) were not favorable to either company or the union, and 15.8% (90 individuals) were favorable to the union and not the company.

Hypothesis 1 was supported. As table 2 indicates the correlation between the two commitment scales was not significant ( $r = .03$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

Hypothesis 2 was partially supported as only two of the variables were significant in the multiple discriminant analysis (See Table 1). Participation was the first variable which entered the equation ( $F = 37.43$ ,  $p < .001$ ) then Autonomy ( $F = 32.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Tenure and Supervisors attitude toward the union were entered third and fourth respectively and were both not significant ( $F = 1.82$ ,  $p > .05$  and  $F = 1.69$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

A measure of the strength of the relationship between group membership and the independent variables was computed. Table 1 indicates Wilks Lambda for Participation was .83. As  $1 - \lambda$  is equal to  $R^2$  in univariate



analysis this indicates Participation accounts for 17 percent of the variance regarding group membership. With the addition of autonomy, 1-lambda increases to 29 percent of the variance.

**TABLE 1**  
Significance of Independent Variables Entered into the Equation

<i>Variable</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Wilks Lambda</i>	<i>1-lambda</i>
Participation	37.43*	.834	.166
Autonomy	32.33*	.712	.288
Tenure	1.82	.705	.295
First level supervisors			
Attitude toward the union	1.69	.699	.301

\*Significant at the .001 level

All three discriminant functions were identified, although only two were significant. Using all three functions Wilks Lambda was .698 which was significant ( $\text{Chi} = 202.29$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Removal of the first discriminant function results in the remaining functions still contributing significantly to the discriminating of groups (Wilks Lambda = .884;  $\text{Chi} = 69.38$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Removal of the second as well as the first functions indicates the third function does not contribute to the differentiation of groups (Wilks's Lambda = .999;  $\text{Chi} = .52$ ,  $p > .05$ ).

Table 2 identifies the relative contribution of each of the four variables to the two discriminant functions. Participation in the union, and autonomy are both important in describing both discriminant functions.

**TABLE 2**  
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Function 1</i>		<i>Function 2</i>	
Autonomy	.62	(.61)**	.84	(.76)
Participation	-.78	(-.76)	.60	(.59)
Tenure*	.01	(.08)	-.29	(-.04)
Supervisor's Attitude Toward Union*	.19	(.17)	-.07	(-.04)

\*Not significant and therefore not used in describing the function.

\*\*Number in brackets are within group correlations between discriminant functions and variables.

Pedhauzer (1982) has indicated that in describing discriminant functions, loadings equal to or below .30 should be ignored, as they contribute very little to the understanding of the function. Tenure and supervisors' attitude toward the union which were both not significant in the equation are also below the .30 suggested by Pedhauzer, and do not, therefore, impact on the discriminant functions.

Function one, which has the highest loading on participation in union also has a high loading on autonomy. One should note, however, that participation has a negative sign and autonomy a positive one. This function could be labelled the *unilateral function*, particularly since it does discriminate the groups which are positive toward one organization and negative toward the other, (as will be seen later).

Function two, has its highest loading on autonomy, but participation also was high. In this function both variables have a positive sign. This function could be labelled the *duality function*; and, in fact, it does best discriminate those groups who respond similarly to both organizations (either positively or negatively).

In this research, forty three percent of the individuals were classified correctly. As 25% could be classified correctly by chance, these results are an 18% improvement in the ability to classify individuals over chance alone. Approximately 50 percent of the individuals in groups C + U-, C-U +, and C-U- were classified correctly whereas only 34% of group C + U + were correctly classified.

Table 3 indicates that group C + U- was differentiated from the other three groups by the unilateral function (function one). Group «C + U-» has a centroid of .57, which is most differentiated from group «C-U + » which has a group centroid of -1.09. It is also differentiated from «C-U-» and «C + U + » which have group centroids of -.13 and -.01 respectively (See Figure 2). This suggests that the corollary C of hypothesis 2 was correct except for the impact of tenure.

TABLE 3  
Group Centroids


Group	Function 1	Function 2
C + U +	-.01	.32
C-U-	-.13	-.80
C + U-	.57	-.09
C-U +	-1.09	-.02

Group C-U+ is also best differentiated by Function One, which has the variable «participation in union activity» as the most important variable (See Table 3). It is also the most discriminated from the other groups with a centroid of  $-1.09$ , which is  $.96$  away from its nearest group which as can be seen in Figure 2, is group «C-U-». Once again the corollary(d) was partially supported as tenure did not enter into the equation.

Hypothesis 2, corollary (b) was supported in that Group «C-U-» was differentiated from all other groups by Function Two. In Function two, the centroid for group «C-U-» was  $.80$ . Group «C+U+», with a centroid of  $.32$ , is furthest away from group «C-U-» (See Figure 2).

FIGURE 2

Graphic representation of the two orthogonal discriminant functions, and the centroids of the four groups



In regard to hypothesis 2 corollary (a) support was only partial. Supervisors attitude toward the union was demonstrated to be not significant, and in this respect the hypothesis was not supported. Group C+U+ had a centroid for group «C-U-» was  $.80$ . Group «C+U+», with a centroid of  $.32$ , is discriminated least well in the analysis. It was not differentiated very well from either group «C+U-» or «C-U+», which had group centroids of  $-.09$  and  $-.02$  respectively. It was discriminated to a greater degree from group «C-U-» (which is to be expected; centroid for group two =  $-.80$ ).

## DISCUSSION

The «favorable toward both» category (C + U +) represented approximately 50 percent of the sample, which is somewhat lower than early research findings. A number of factors could account for this; but the most parsimonious would seem to be the utilization of a more elaborate measure. The independently developed commitment scales are more psychometrically sound than the simple affect measures originally used. What appears to be more interesting, however, is whether or not the C+U+ category represents a meaningful conceptual category. Given the distributions on the two commitment variables (73% positive toward the company and 65% positive toward the union) it is possible that the high frequency in the cell, in part, may represent distributional not conceptual factors. It is possible that the C+U+ category, both in past studies as well as the present one, may not solely reflect favorability to both organizations in spite of the rigorous scale criteria used for inclusion. It well may represent response set in terms of social desirability, i.e. a need to indicate publically a commitment to groups in which one has membership. In that this category was also the most poorly discriminated by autonomy — union activity, it suggests that in future research perhaps a social desirability measure be included as a possible discriminator of this group. This may contribute to the relative poor showing of the independent measures to discriminate this category. It is interesting to note that as far as the measure of company commitment is concerned this study is not atypical. Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) published norms on company commitment indicating 73% of males and 79% of females demonstrate positive organizational commitment. Norms for the measure of union commitment developed by Gordon et al. are not yet available.

Although this study found that duality of reactance, i.e. a positive correlation between Company and Union commitment, did not characterize the unionized employees studied, it is possible that independence of union and company commitment may be of equal if not greater importance than the original dual loyalty findings. The data suggest that commitment to company and union is not a zero sum game. If the company wishes to increase commitment in its work force, this study would suggest that efforts directed toward increasing job autonomy would be advantageous, *but* in no manner would this have an impact upon Union commitment. On the other hand, company organizations need not be threatened, in terms of company commitment decline, by unionists who are active in union affairs. There is, therefore, no need to compete for the commitment of the work force. As the two commitment measures are independent both union and management are able to work in harmony even while they are attempting to increase commitment to their respective organizations.

Dual commitment was not predicted by supervisors' attitude toward the union. There are two possibilities regarding why this did not occur. First, it may be that the measure was not an appropriate measure of the union/management relations upon dual commitment (Dean 1954). The able to identify a more appropriate measure.

Second, it may be that dual commitment can and does occur, not because of a positive union/management relationship, as dual loyalty interpretations would suggest, but rather because commitment to the two organizations has different and discrete dynamics. This position is supported by the lack of consistent findings relating to the impact of quality of union/management relations upon dual commitment (Dean 1954). The position is further supported in this study by the lack of contribution of supervisory attitudes toward unions to the dual commitment category.

Dual commitment and dual rejection appear to be mirror images of one another. Given both job autonomy and union activity, one finds commitment to both; given neither autonomy nor activity, dual rejection seems to occur. Unilateral commitment occurs when job autonomy and union activity are reported in inverse fashion to one another. This may not be true for other independent variables. For example, if there are specific variables which impact on dual allegiance, but not dual disallegiance or vice versa they would be best predicted using multiple discriminant function rather than the more traditional linear analysis.

Considering that the correlatives of company and union commitment are qualitatively different, it may appear that this research may be of more direct utility to company organizations than union. Job autonomy can be manipulated by various intervention strategies that lead to a reduction of organizational constraints upon the employee. Union activity, on the other hand, apparently provides less potential for change.

Let us assume that a union wishes to increase union membership activity. It must be remembered, hypothetically, at least, that the same opportunities to engage in union activity are available to all members. Attempts made in the past to enforce attendance at union meetings by assessing fines for non attendance met with open hostility on the part of union members, and the approach was curtailed. It has been suggested that the closed shop, union shop and agency shop clauses that make membership a condition of employment may account for low union activity, i.e. for many membership was mandatory rather than based upon a belief in unions and/or the value of functions attributed to them. There have also been suggestions that unions are perceived of as being purely instrumental vehicles to meet the needs of members. Perlman (1928) suggested that many members have a «slot machine» and «let George do it» attitude, i.e. they ex-

pect officers to engage in the work required (activity) necessary to bring them benefits. More recently, there has been speculations that the concessions demanded and gained from unions to «keep the companies competitive» in the period of economic decline and increasing foreign competition have led union members to challenge the utility of spending time and effort in union activity when that activity does not pay off.

On the other hand, there is some evidence, gathered from the same sample of unionized employees but not incorporated within the present study, that suggest the opportunity to take part in union meetings is not equally available to all members because of inconvenient scheduling and distance to travel. Distance to the union hall has previously been mentioned as a reason for non-participation (Spinard, 1960). Moreover, many members complained that meeting content was largely neither relevant nor salient to them. To the extent that this represents valid causation, it may suggest that unions, as organizations, consider alternative approach for membership activity in union affairs. Perhaps a «mini» meeting approach would eliminate some of the stated constraints that deter membership union activity. Although «mini» meetings would necessitate a departure from current union practice, meetings scheduled after work, on or near the plant premises, for homogeneous membership groups under the jurisdiction of shop committeemen, logically should reduce the constraints stated for nonattendance and thereby increase union member activity and participation. This procedure would address the time and distance concern. By having these meetings of smaller homogeneous groups the issues discussed would presumably be more relevant to those attending. Whether or not such restructuring would result in greater union activity is an empirical question. Current research is underway to explore the viability of such meeting restructuring in terms of both activity and union commitment utilizing a pre-post, experimental-control design.

The methodology used in this study provides an advantageous way of studying dual commitment. It also provides for the examination of dual rejection and unilateral commitment. Although, in this study the C++ and C-- appeared to be mirror images in terms of discriminant variables (which could be interpreted from a correlational methodology) this may not always be the case. As more variables are examined, such as different measures of union/management relations and social desirability these new variables may impact on only one of the cells. Without this type of analysis, therefore, valuable relationships could be overlooked.

This study has some limitations. The number of independent variables which were able to predict group membership was small. It seems particularly important to try to determine which variables would impact on the

C+U+ group, as it was not well predicted. Even the remaining three groups have approximately half of the group members incorrectly classified. Examining more independent variables on different types of unions (private vs public sector etc.) should be the aim of future research in this area.

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## ***La dynamique de la réactance des employés envers l'entreprise et le syndicat: la double allégeance revue et appliquée***

L'avènement des efforts de coopération entre les syndicats et les employeurs a ranimé l'intérêt pour la notion de double allégeance. La présente recherche constate la réciprocité significative entre la loyauté à l'employeur et au syndicat.

Deux critiques majeures portent sur cette recherche. La première comprend le type des éléments utilisés et le sens donné aux phénomènes qu'on étudie. La deuxième se rapporte à la méthodologie que l'on emploie. Au sujet de la première critique, on a utilisé d'une façon générale les termes «double allégeance», «double loyauté» et «double engagement» d'une manière interchangeable (Fukami et Larson (1982) Martin, Mageneau et Peterson (1982), Schreisheim et Tsui (1980). Il n'est pas évident que ces expressions aient une signification identique. Une simple relecture des éléments de la mesure de l'engagement énoncés par Porter, Steers, Mowday et Boulian (1974) en y substituant le terme «syndicat» au terme «employeur» ou encore en choisissant les éléments de l'engagement envers le syndicat fondés sur la seule conviction qu'ils s'apparentent aux éléments de l'engagement envers l'employeur ne semble pas être un procédé soutenable, compte tenu de la différence qualificative entre les employeurs et les syndicats.

La deuxième critique que l'on puisse formuler se rapporte à l'approche réciproque utilisée pour mesurer la double allégeance. L'approche réciproque changerait le sens de l'expression telle qu'elle est définie. Alors que la «double loyauté» met l'accent sur les réactions favorables aux deux parties, l'approche réciproque le met sur le degré de réactance affective comparable envers les deux, y compris la différence totale qu'il peut exister entre ce qui est favorable et ce qui ne l'est pas. De pareilles approches reflètent la double réactance plutôt que la double allégeance et le double engagement.

La présente recherche décrit les types d'engagement envers le Syndicat (U) et l'employeur (C) dans un cadre à quatre volets. Ce sont les suivants: 1) double engagement (C+U+), c'est-à-dire l'engagement à la fois envers l'employeur et envers le syndicat; 2) double rejet (C-U-), c'est-à-dire un manque d'engagement envers l'un et l'autre; 3) engagement unilatéral envers l'entreprise C+U-, c'est-à-dire engagement envers l'employeur et manque d'engagement envers le syndicat; 4) engagement unilatéral envers le syndicat (C-U+), c'est-à-dire engagement envers le syndicat et manque d'engagement envers l'employeur. En présence de ce cadre, on tentera de distinguer parmi les quatre groupes des modèles de réponse fondés sur des variables appropriées. Dans cette recherche, on a utilisé une mesure de l'engagement envers le syndicat qu'on a mise au point d'une façon indépendante (Gordon et autres, 1980).

Les résultats n'indiquent aucune réciprocité significative entre l'engagement envers le syndicat et envers l'employeur. Ceci démontre que la dualité de réactance, c'est-à-dire qu'une réciprocité positive entre l'engagement envers l'employeur et

l'engagement envers le syndicat ne caractérisaient pas les travailleurs syndiqués qui avaient fait l'objet de l'enquête. Il est possible que la différenciation de l'engagement envers le syndicat et de l'engagement envers l'employeur pouvait être d'égale sinon de plus grande importance que les résultats de la double loyauté initiale. Les données sous-entendent que l'engagement envers le syndicat et l'engagement envers l'employeur ne sont pas une partie nulle. Si l'employeur veut accroître l'engagement de son personnel, la présente étude serait de nature à lui suggérer d'orienter ses efforts vers l'augmentation de l'autonomie dans le travail, ce qui serait sans doute avantageux mais n'aurait aucune influence sur l'engagement envers le syndicat. D'un autre côté, les services de l'entreprise n'ont pas à se sentir menacés, à cause du déclin de l'engagement envers l'employeur, par les syndicalistes actifs dans les affaires du syndicat.

La participation aux affaires syndicales et l'autonomie dans le travail forment une équation, ce qui comptait pour 29 pour cent de la variance dans l'effectif du groupe prévisionnel. Les deux fonctions discriminantes qui sont significatives consistent en une «fonction unilatérale» et une «fonction de dualité». La fonction unilatérale identifie les groupes C+U- et C-U+, tandis que la fonction de dualité identifie les groupes C+U+ et C-U-.

L'engagement double et le rejet double semblent être des images réfléchies l'une de l'autre. S'il y a à la fois autonomie dans le travail et activité syndicale, on constate qu'il y a engagement envers les deux; s'il n'y a ni autonomie ni activité, c'est le double rejet qui semble se produire. L'engagement unilatéral se produit lorsque l'autonomie dans le travail et l'activité syndicale se rapportent de façon inverse l'une à l'autre. Il se peut que cela ne soit pas vrai pour d'autres variables indépendantes. S'il y a des variables spécifiques qui exercent un impact sur la double allégeance sans qu'il y ait double *désallégeance* (ou vice-versa), c'est qu'alors ces variables pourraient être mieux prévues par le recours à la fonction discriminante multiple plutôt que par l'analyse linéaire plus traditionnelle.

## LE STATUT DE SALARIÉ EN MILIEU DE TRAVAIL

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