Résumés
Résumé
La présente étude, réalisée auprès de 252 entreprises québécoises, a permis de mettre en évidence que les politiques de rémunération sont davantage influencées par les stratégies internes de l’organisation que par leurs stratégies externes. Plus spécifiquement, les entreprises qui préconisent les équipes autonomes de travail, la qualité totale et la gestion participative optent davantage pour des politiques de rémunération orientées vers la performance individuelle et collective, tendent à accorder un pourcentage de bonis plus élevé et à favoriser une plus grande transparence dans leurs mécanismes de gestion. Les résultats montrent également que la présence syndicale joue un rôle déterminant dans le choix des politiques de rémunération.
Summary
The competitive position of companies is increasingly linked to their capacity to attract and retain competent personnel. Human resources management, in particular compensation, is a crucial component of this quest for competencies. Yet companies must choose between several types of compensation policies. They must determine on which basis to select a policy so as to maximize the effectiveness of the compensation system. These choices may be linked to external strategies of the company, e.g. diversification, differentiation, or internal strategies such as autonomous work teams, total quality and participative management. This article therefore attempts to analyze the extent to which external and internal strategies identified by companies dictate their choice of compensation policies. In other words, do companies that adopt particular external and internal strategies also opt for differentiated compensation policies?
The data were collected by a questionnaire mailed to vice-presidents and human resources managers of Quebec companies in competitive sectors. We received 252 usable questionnaires, equal to an 11.4% response rate. The variables have been grouped into four main categories: compensation policies, external strategies, internal strategies and control variables. By means of a multiple regression analysis using the forced entry method we have tested the contribution of each category of variables, thus allowing for verification of the hypotheses formulated. The control variables were entered first in a single block, followed by the external strategies and internal strategies. Utility tests were performed to verify whether the order of entry of the variables influenced the results obtained.
The principal findings suggest that internal strategies dictate the choice of compensation policy to a much greater extent than do external strategies. In effect, companies seek above all to create internal coherence among their HR policies and organizational development strategies. For example, companies that rely heavily on autonomous work teams, engage in more participative management and promote quality management have compensation systems that are less traditional and characterized by a greater emphasis on performance, transparency of information provided to employees and, to a lesser extent, leader pay policies and decentralization of decision-making, which is consistent with the literature. Regarding the impact of external strategies, our results are more mitigated. Only competitive strategies emanating from business units exert a slight influence on the choice of compensation policies. Moreover, corporate strategies such as degree of diversification do not affect the choice of compensation policies. This type of strategy is apparently too far removed from the concerns of HR managers. Lastly, of the control variables examined, unionization plays the most determining role in the choice of compensation policies. In fact, this variable is the most consequential in our analytical model. This result raises important questions about the importance of the strategic approach to human resources management and reinforces the relevance of exploring institutional approaches to compensation policies.
Resumen
El presente estudio, realizado con la participación de 252 empresas quebequenses, ha puesto en evidencia que las políticas de remuneración son mas influenciadas por las estrategias internas de la organización que por las estrategias externas. Mas especificamente, las empresas que preconizan los equipos autonomos de trabajo, la calidad total y la gestion participativa optan de preferencia por las politicas de remuneración basadas en el rendimiento individual y colectivo, tienden a acordar un porcentaje de bonificación mas elevado y a favorizar una mayor transparencia en sus mecanismos de gestión. Los resultados muestran igualmente que la presencia sindical juega un rol determinante en la selección de políticas de remuneración.
Parties annexes
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