Relations industrielles

What Accounts for the Union Member Advantage in Voter Turnout? Evidence from the European Union, 2002-2008

Alex Bryson, Rafael Gomez, Tobias Kretschmer et Paul Willman

Résumé de l'article

Parmi plusieurs pays, l’adhésion syndicale et le taux de participation lors de scrutins populaires sont fortement corrélés. En termes non-ajustés les électeurs qui sont membres de syndicats présentent un taux de participation d’environ 0,10 à 0,12 points de pourcentage plus élevé que les électeurs non-syndiqués. Nous postulons et justifions un modèle, comprenant trois types de causes, qui explique cette corrélation, puis testons empiriquement la contribution de chacun à l’écart de participation global en faveur des électeurs syndiqués. En premier lieu, la dimension dite « monopolistique » du syndicalisme (c.-à-d. que l’action syndicale permet aux membres d’accroître leurs salaires alors que justement un des éléments déterminants du taux de participation électorale est le fait d’avoir un revenu plus élevé) favoriserait une plus grande participation électorale. En second lieu, le modèle de « tradition sociale » véhiculé par les syndicats constituait un incitatif pour les électeurs syndiqués à aller voter soit pour avoir le sentiment d’accomplir leur devoir d’électeur ou encore pour être vu par leurs collègues comme ayant accompli ce devoir. Enfin en troisième et dernier lieu le fait, pour des électeurs, d’être (ou d’avoir été) exposés comme employés, aux structures formelles de la négociation collective et de la représentation syndicale dans les milieux de travail, ce que l’on considère comme un des rôles fondamentaux du syndicalisme soit d’être un « porte-parole » ou en anglais « Voice–Face », les inciterait aussi à développer davantage d’attachement envers les structures de gouvernance démocratique dans la société. Nous cherchons à vérifier quelle proportion de cette « prime du vote syndical » brute au taux de participation électorale est redevable à ces trois types de facteurs à partir de données contemporaines en provenance de 29 pays européens. Nous observons que les trois types de facteurs sont bel et bien à l’œuvre, le facteur de type « porte-parole » ou « Voice » ayant un effet dominant (comptant pour environ la moitié de l’écart global - ou de la prime - observé) tandis que les deux autres types de facteurs (dimension monopolistique et tradition sociale) comptant environ chacun pour le quart de l’écart global.
What Accounts for the Union Member Advantage in Voter Turnout? Evidence from the European Union, 2002-2008

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Across countries, union membership and voter turnout are highly correlated. In unadjusted terms union members maintain a roughly 0.10 to 0.12 point gap in voting propensity over non-members. We propose a model—with three causal channels—that explains this correlation and then empirically tests for the contribution of each channel to the overall union voting gap. The first channel through which union members are more likely to vote is through the so-called “monopoly face” of unionism whereby unions increase wages for members and higher incomes are a significant positive determinant of voting. The second is the “social custom” model of unionism whereby co-worker peer pressure creates incentives for union members to vote alongside fellow members. The third channel is based on the “voice face” of unionism whereby employees who are (or have been) exposed to collective bargaining and union representation at the workplace are also more likely to increase their attachment to democratic engagement in society at large. We test to see how much of the raw “union voting gap” is accounted for by these three competing channels using data from 29 European countries. We find that all three channels are at work, with the voice accounting for half of the overall gap and the other two channels (monopoly face and social custom) each accounting for approximately a quarter of the overall union voting gap.

KEYWORDS: civic engagement, unionization, voting premium.

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Introduction

The hypothesis that unionization leads to increased democratic participation (Lipset, 1983) has received consistent empirical support (Delaney et al., 1988, 1999; Radcliff and Davis, 2000; Radcliff, 2002; Freeman, 2003; Zullo, 2004; Rosenfeld 2010; Sojourner 2013 and Bryson et al., 2013). However, theoretical rationales for this relationship remain largely unexplored and untested. In this paper we investigate both theoretically and empirically why it is that union members are more likely to participate in general elections than non-members. This is important for several reasons, most notably as it could potentially link declines in voter participation observed in many major western democracies over the past two decades to contemporaneous falls in union density (Radcliff, 2001). In a related fashion, the decline in the quality of “democratic governance” that political observers have been noting for some time (Burnham, 1982) is also coincident with union decline and large scale collective disengagement from formal political participation.

Our starting point is the connection between unionization and political participation observed in the political science literature. This connection has been emphasized by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995: Table 13.1) who see unionization as a crucial determinant of “civic culture” and participation in democratic politics. Union members, according to Verba et al. (1995) are more exposed to political discussion and activity and to developing civic-skills than non-members. Trade unions, along with their labour political parties, also comprise what Seymour Martin Lipset (1983: 6) termed “the two principal paths by which members of the working classes [are] accepted into the fabric of societies as political and economic citizens.” Lipset and Verba’s work has influenced empirical political science (Radcliff and Davis, 2000), industrial relations (e.g., Delaney et al., 1988, 1999) and sociological scholarship (e.g., Rosenfeld, 2010). Our work can therefore be seen as an elaboration of these ideas using theoretical and empirical tools of labour economics in the spirit of Freeman (2003) and Sojourner (2013). These studies focus more closely on individual socio-economic factors and, therefore, depart from the political institutional scholarship which has historically paid more attention to the effect of institutions on voter turnout (Blais, 2000, 2006).

Perhaps the most dramatic place to see the effect of unions on political participation is in leadership and advocating for social change. Craft-based guilds were at the forefront of improvements in working conditions in the early part of the industrial revolution (Kaufman, 2000). Union leaders played key roles in liberal movements in Europe in the middle of the 19th century (Adams, 1996) and were also some of the strongest supporters of universal suffrage (Lopez Pintor and Gratshcew, 2004). Indeed, the earliest countries in Europe to give legal recognition to a women’s right to vote were Finland in 1906 and Norway...
in 1913, both of which had the earliest trade union supported political parties that in turn extended support to the fledgling suffragette movements (See Lopez Pintor, 2004: 13-15).

In the late 20th century, union political organizations played a major role in the overthrow of the Apartheid regime in South Africa (Sakinofsky, 2012) and in the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe (Lopez-Pintor and Gratchew, 2004). Former union leaders have also taken on prominent and surprisingly “popular” political reformist roles as evidenced by Lech Walesa (Poland’s president from 1990-1995) and Luiz Inácio da Silva “Lula” (president of Brazil from 2003-2010).

It would be incorrect, however, to conclude from these examples that unions—perhaps because they value equality, freedom of association, or elections—everywhere and always have a preference for a particular form of government rather than for political participation per se. Union exposure is not always a pathway to democratic engagement. Benito Mussolini was a trade union activist before turning to fascism; Ronald Reagan was six-term head of the Screen Actors Guild before firing air traffic controllers in the infamous PATCO strike; public sector trade unions (rightly or wrongly) have been seen as endangering the general “will” of the electorate especially via general strikes; but perhaps most notable is the example of Juan Peron in Argentina who used his alliance with powerful trade unions (obtained as secretary of labour during the military regime that came to power in 1943) to later gain power himself and to thwart more progressive reforms urged on by students and other groups (McGuire, 1997). The evidence that unions organize to participate in elections and engage in non-workplace related collective action is quite compelling, more so perhaps than the evidence of their preference for a particular form of elected government. Our goal, then, is to explore more deeply the source(s) of what we take to be the established connection between unions and increased electoral participation.

In Section 2 below, we present some old and new facts about unionization and voter participation. We show that, across a range of studies, union members are more likely to vote and engage in a range of pro-social civic behaviours than non-members and that the relationship between unionization and political participation holds within as well as across countries. The correlation at the national and individual level between union membership and civic activity is therefore clear; the reasons for this correlation are less obvious.

After establishing that a correlation likely exists, we identify three micro-motivated channels—the monopoly face, social custom and voice face of unionism—through which union membership can lead to greater participation in politics and voting. The monopoly face refers to two potential effects working in tandem. First is the well noted wage premium that is imparted from being a union member.
Second, and tied to this observation, is the noted increase in voting propensity that comes with increased income. We refer to the positive relationship between unionism and voting associated with the union premium as the monopoly face in keeping with the original formulation found in Freeman and Medoff (1984). The social custom channel refers to the effect that social norms and/or peer pressure can exert over current union members to get out and vote. The choice of terms is again in keeping with original terminology found in Booth (1986) who used this channel to explain why membership dues would still be paid by workers even in a non-compulsory union environment. The final channel we call the voice face, appropriated again from Freeman and Medoff (1984), refers to the effect of union democratic structures on lowering the costs of political participation and electoral representation more generally. Exposure to some degree of democratic governance at work should increase life-long attachment to democratic engagement outside as well.

After describing the data in Section 3, we test our hypotheses empirically in Section 4 using a unique multi-country dataset for Europe—the European Social Survey (ESS)—that includes individual micro-data for 29 countries over four survey periods (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008). To our knowledge, this is the first time micro-data has been used to test for the existence of a union voting premium outside of North America. It is also the first time, again to our knowledge, that the separation of members and non-members into three groups (i.e., current members, never-members and ex-union members) has been undertaken and linked to voting patterns on such a large representative scale (see Booth, Budd and Munday, 2010 for the importance of this distinction). The identification of detailed individual level data that includes a raft of socio-economic factors and the comparison of non-members to ex and current members allows us to distinguish amongst the three channels of union influence noted above. Crucially we can at least see whether i) the indirect union channel (monopoly face) explains most or all of the union voter gap by controlling for the background factors linked to increased wages, notably household income, or whether a gap between union members and non-members still remains after controlling for individual determinants of voter turnout. By examining whether ex-members are as likely to vote as current members, we could see whether ii) union voice imparts a “legacy voice effect” on members even when they retire or leave the union. If, on the other hand, differences between ex-members and never-members are small and not significant, then the union member voter premium may be interpreted as less a function of voice and more iii) a function of social custom-peer pressure which should only obtain for current members.

In addition to presenting empirical support for its core assumption and delivering the broad empirical predictions documented in our hypothesis generation section,
the model of democratic engagement developed in this paper has several new implications. It predicts that union members (both current and ex) should be more participatory at everything including a broad range of civic activities. This hypothesis is assessed along with the three earlier channels that assume unions do “do” something to voters, either indirectly through monopoly-face wage gains or directly through voice-face or social custom (peer pressure) effects. The paper concludes in Section 5 with some final observations and suggestions for further research.

Some Background on the Empirical Relationship between Union Membership and Political Participation

In the absence of some experimental condition (natural or otherwise) linking union membership to civic behaviour, we are left to decide whether there is any plausible underpinning between the two constructs based on the existing weight of evidence and a testable theory demonstrating a relationship. The development of such a theory is undertaken in sub-sections 2.3 and 2.4. In sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2, we turn to the cumulative weight of evidence showing that, consistent with the original political science literature, unionization is associated with greater democratic participation.

Individual Voter Turnout and Union Membership: Assessing the Existing Literature

Prior to the late 1990s, there were very few papers exploring the union-voting relationship and virtually nothing examining unions and the wider range of civic behaviours. Freeman and Medoff (1984) devoted a chapter to unions in politics; Juravich and Shergold (1988) studied the impact of unions on voting using a small sample of Pennsylvania union members; while Masters and Delaney (1987) and Delaney et al., (1990), argued that unions invest resources in political action to defeat laws designed to weaken unions. Examining the turnout of union members and their response to labour endorsements in the 1978 election, Delaney et al., (1988) concluded that union members turned out more than non-members, but that people in union households did not. Radcliff’s (2001) examination of electoral participation of people in union households in the National Election Survey (NES), from 1952 to 1992, found a positive union effect with respect to voting. What distinguished all these early studies, however, was that none used standard econometric techniques such as multivariate regression to examine the impact of union membership on individual (as opposed to household) turnout and voting preferences.

It was not until Freeman (2003b) that valid measures and estimation techniques were identified such that comparison across datasets and countries could be undertaken. Freeman (2003) identified the union voting gap, defined
as the mean difference between the proportion of union members (or members of union households) who vote and the proportion of non-union members who vote; and the union voting premium, defined as the difference in voting rates among persons with and without union attachment who have observationally similar characteristics. The union voting gap is analogous to the mean difference in wages between union and non-union workers. The union voting premium provides an estimate of the causal impact of unionization on turnout analogous to labour economists’ estimates of the union wage effect. Freeman (2003) found a gap of approximately 12 percentage points between union and non-union members in the US (actually he uses both membership and coverage to identify union respondents). After adding personal characteristics that would predict voting behaviour such as income, marital status, education and age, he finds a premium of 3 percentage points (or one fourth as large as the overall gap) suggesting that many of the same characteristics that predict union membership are also involved in the voting decision.

However, there was a small but notable discrepancy in the interpretation Freeman (2003) ascribed to his findings. Unions serve to increase wages for members and though the union wage premium may be on the decline (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010) it is, nevertheless, a standard feature of what unions “still” do. Attached to this is the well-known feature of election prediction that the rich outvote the poor. In the US, for example, presidential election data reveal a stark difference in the electoral participation of the poorest quintile of the population as compared to the richest quintile (Jaime-Castillo, 2009). Although differences have narrowed in the recent 2008 and 2012 Obama election wins, with 15 percentage points separating the highest income earners (77%) from the lowest (62%) in 2012 as compared to 20 percentage points in the 2000 election, these differences are still large and significant.

Thus, part of what unions do is to raise wages for members, which, as it turns out, is an important determinant of voting, one comparable to the correlation that remains once individual and income controls are accounted for. This means that what Freeman calls the overall or “true” union voting premium of just 3 percentage points is actually the voice-only premium, or that portion of the union effect left over once controls for demographics and union wage impacts are accounted for. Because unions have a hand, albeit an indirect one, in explaining the voting behaviour of workers through higher incomes, this needs to be disentangled from any estimate using general socio-demographic characteristics.

Rosenfeld (2010), in a follow up to the Freeman study, found a similar voting gap of 12 percent but a voting premium of approximately 6.6 percentage points—which is higher than Freeman’s. What distinguishes his work, however, is the breaking up of the union voting premium between the private and public sector.
In the private sector, the difference between union and non-union members is slightly larger at 6.8 percentage points while in the public sector (where the vast number of union jobs now reside), it is much lower at 2.4 points. The implication is that the public sector is not an area where unionism, per se, seems to have a large independent impact on voting. It is in the private sector, amongst lower educated and less skilled workers that unions can act in Rosenfeld’s (2010: 392) words as:

… the rare covariate that operates to reduce class bias in the electorate. Most of the other positive predictors of voting—including income, home ownership, residential stability, education, and marriage—tend to exacerbate class and educational inequality in who turns out to vote. Private-sector union membership—with the exceptions of some very well paid and well-educated unionists—operates in the other direction.

In work that uses a similar methodology to Freeman (2003) and Rosenfeld (2010), Bryson, Gomez, Kretschmer and Willman (2013) analyse General Social Survey (GSS) data for Canada and find a remarkably similar union voting gap of approximately 12-13 percentage points. This is reduced to a 6-8 percentage point premium once background controls (excluding income) are accounted for and to 3-4 percent points once income is controlled for. Bryson et al. (2013) interpret the overall union effect to be the 6-8 percentage point premium, half of which is driven by monopoly voice effects (i.e., union wage premium) and the other half by voice effects such as the exposure to participatory workplace structures. Bryson et al. (2013) also find that the union premium extends to other civic behaviours such as signing a petition, attending a public meeting and volunteering for a political party.

In summary, while quantitative research on the topic is quite recent, most investigations into the effect of unions on individual political participation reveal a strong positive relationship in the United States (Freeman, 2003; Leighley and Nagler, 2007; Radcliff, 2001) Canada (Bryson et al., 2013) and in United Kingdom (Booth and Williams, 2013). The evidence at the macro level and for Europe as a whole, however, has been lacking. This is addressed below.

**Macro-level Evidence on Unions and Voter Turnout**

Using electoral data obtained from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) database and unionization figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see summary statistics in Table 1), we find a strongly positive (see Figure 1) relationship between voter turnout in either a parliamentary or presidential election and union density over the period 1972-2012 across 23 European states. The correlation between these variables is 0.52 and the elasticity (unadjusted for country specific effects) is 0.36, implying that a one standard deviation move (21.3 percent, see Table 1) in union density is associated with a 7.2 percentage voter turnout increase across our sample of European member states.
FIGURE 1
Scatter plot of Union Density and Voter Turnout across Europe, 1972-2012

Source: Voter turnout data from IDEA dataset (2012) and union density data from OECD (2012).
In Table 2 (Columns 2-4), we consider the effect of union density and voting, adjusting for countries that have compulsory voting laws and also using the full set of country dummies to capture any persistent country differences in the propensity to vote. Compulsory voting (Column 2) has a large and significant effect, increasing voter turnout by 16 percentage points relative to other countries lacking such laws. The union density coefficient is barely altered (0.37 vs 0.36), however, and retains its high degree of significance. Adding fixed-effects to the model (Column 3) serves to increase the union effect by approximately a third (0.37 to 0.48) but reduces the magnitude and significance of the observed relationship between compulsory voting (Column 4), suggesting that compulsory laws were introduced in already relatively high-voting jurisdictions that also had relatively high union density levels.

The fact that the union density coefficients increase significantly in fixed effect estimates, reflects the fact that the correlation between unionization and democratic engagement is stronger within countries than across countries over time. The bottom line is that Table 2 shows a strong relationship between unionization and democratic engagement as measured by voter turnout within as well as across countries. Both the between and within fit of the models as measured by the R-squared are equally high suggesting that union density appears positively and significantly associated with voting in general elections across as well as within countries.

| TABLE 1  
Summary Statistics for Selected European Countries, 1972-2010 |
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<td><strong>Pooled Data (All Years)</strong></td>
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<td>1. Voter Turnout as Percent of Eligible Population (VAP) a</td>
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<td>2. Union Density b</td>
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<td>4. Number of Observations d</td>
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Notes: The table contains sample means and standard deviations in ( ) for the years in which data was available on both voter turnout and union density.

a The total number of votes cast divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a percentage.
b The number of workers who are paid members of a union divided by the number of potential union workers, expressed as a percentage.
c A dummy indicating 1 if the country in question makes voting at elections compulsory and zero otherwise. During the time span surveyed, some countries stopped/started making voting compulsory, in which case the country is assigned 1 for the years in which voting is compulsory and zero otherwise.
d There are 219 unique year-country observations and 23 countries that enter into the final estimations.

Source: Voter turnout data from IDEA dataset (2012) and union density data from OECD (2012).
The last two columns in Table 2 (Columns 5-6) take account of the fact that the dependent variable (voter turnout) is bounded between a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 1 (100 percent) and would then attenuate the effect of a variable such as union density at values approaching the upper limit. Therefore, building on the last model used in Column 4, we use a quadratic specification for union density (Table 2, Column 5) that yields an estimate that is consistent with the non-linear scatterplot displayed in Figure 1 (curved line), where over the lower-to-middle range of the union density data, the coefficient of 0.97 implies a nearly 1 to 1 correspondence in union density increases and voting gains. The turning point happens at approximately 50 percent, beyond which union density is no longer associated with increased voter turnout. However, as most countries, apart from Scandinavian countries, are located below this level (the mean of union density in Europe is 40 percent), this implies that union density and voter turnout are positively correlated in the observed data. In the final specification in Table 2, Column 6, we add a dummy for each year to capture time trends in voter turnout. Although the time trend over this period is negatively significant and lowers the direct effect for union density by approximately one third (from 0.97...
to 0.65), the turning point remains roughly the same (0.529). It should be noted, as well, that in many countries union density declined over much of the period, such that the time trend will capture some of the union decline effect.

In sum, high union density countries are more likely to display greater voter turnout than low density ones, and as voter turnout is limited to 100 percent, this relationship is naturally non-linear (Lamare, 2010). The turning point estimate—of nearly 50 percent trade union density obtained by dividing the main effect coefficient over two times the mean and the squared coefficient term—shows a rather large positive range over which union density and voter turnout is positively related.

The question remains: is this relationship causal? Causality is not likely to run from higher turnout to greater union density, nor would permanent country or year specific causes be the explanation, as we controlled for fixed effects and time trends in Table 2. However, a causal explanation is still elusive and would be strengthened with some more micro-foundational evidence and a plausible theory.

A Micro-Model of Voter Turnout and Workplace Voice

Motivated by the cross-country empirical evidence, and drawing upon existing scholarship in the area of industrial citizenship (McCallum, 2010), we propose a model of workplace civic engagement that may explain the link between unionization and democratic participation, both at the micro and macro level. Beginning with the concept of industrial citizenship, we note that it was built on four main “assets” that bear upon the well-being of democracy both inside the workplace and in broader society. In the “Golden Age” of post-war growth (1945-1965) these assets were embodied in a legal framework that in Anglo-Saxon economies encouraged unionization and collective bargaining. They included (Arthurs, 1967; McCallum, 2010):

1. Protection against arbitrary treatment by employers;
2. Protection against economic insecurity and the risks of losing one’s working capacity;
3. Participation in local regulation of labour (negotiation of collective agreements); and
4. Broader social participation in State regulation of work (for the labour movement).

Although an active source of scholarship for several decades, industrial citizenship faded from practical view as the historic post-war compromise between labour, capital and the State broke down in the stagflation period of the 1970s. Thatcher and Reagan era reforms that precipitated trade union decline through-
out the 1980s and early 1990s, also made the trade union movement itself less interested in advancing these rights, caught as it was just trying to maintain representation where it could.

However, more recently, the idea of reconceptualising work (Budd, 2011) and adding the crucial link to citizenship (Coutu and Murray, 2010a, 2010b) and political action (Boyte, 2012) has had a surprising resurgence in both Canada and the United States. Trade unions themselves are starting to realise the crucial importance that imparting “work” with more values than merely a union “wage windfall” has on gaining support amongst not only members but the broader voting public as a whole (CFLR, 2013). This, we feel, is most welcome from a conceptual standpoint, as it legitimizes the argument made here that work and the workplace are crucibles in which democratic behaviours can either be forged and encouraged, or where a lack of voice can foster apathy and non-participation in civic society.

In our model, as in the industrial citizenship literature, the political success of a democracy hinges on having a large number of citizens whose benefits (costs) of political participation are sufficiently high (low) that they engage in civic activities such as voting despite the low personal pecuniary incentives. Workplace-based engagement and representation supplies countries with such supporters and buffers democracies against non-democratic tendencies such as voter apathy and a feeling that “only outside interests are in control of the political process”. Conversely, in countries with low levels of unionization, lower participation is likely (all things being equal) because the incentives (either induced through work-based peer pressure or voice) needed to entice people to participate in democratic institutions are lacking.

In this model, we define workplace civic engagement as a workplace regime where employees are afforded the tools of representative democracy through either on-the-job input and/or through a “say” on how the company manages its affairs. In unionized workplaces, there is also the undeniable addition to workplace voice of a wage premium that may come with union representation and the peer pressure provided by the social custom effects of unionism. The fact that workplace representation traditionally has been harnessed through the trade union movement does not mean that it could not be transmitted via statutory representative systems as well, which is why we generalize the model to include all forms of representative voice structures. Works councils, such as those that started in Germany and are now part of European Union membership, are obvious non-union forms that could generate similar democratic advantages for workers but these are not really part of the industrial landscape in North America. Although some jurisdictions have emulated Ontario’s long running use of health and safety workplace committees, there has been no sustained call for
an expansion of these institutions to include other workplace-related areas of concern (Storey and Tucker, 2005).

Finally, some measure of non-union voice could be provided, however minimally, in the non-statutory sense through employer provided high-commitment devices such as non-union grievance procedures (Budd and Colvin, 2007). No-voice workplaces (Bryson, Gomez and Willman, 2006; Pendleton and Robinson, 2010), on the other hand, offer little in the way of these sorts of voice or social pressure channels but they do create opportunities for pecuniary advancement via promotion or managerial roles. Directing personal effort toward the firm as opposed to leveraging civic skills that are translatable outside of the workplace should make workers lacking any experience with voice (through unions or otherwise) much less likely to vote as well. Our main insight is that workplace engagement of any kind raises the (perceived) benefits of civic engagement and political participation and, at the same, it lowers the costs. As a consequence, a relatively greater number of people engage in politics as workplace voice increases.

One final note, although our model has been defined here to include all forms of participatory structures at work (both union and non-union), the lack of data on non-union structures will impede any empirical generalizations and hypothesis generation beyond unionized individuals, at least in this current study. We, nevertheless, leave this more general model in the current paper with the hope that others may find some useful insights and so that it may act as a guide for future data driven analysis.

Unionization and Civic Engagement: A Test of Three Micro-level Hypotheses

Based on our theory of voter turnout and workplace voice and the existing literature emphasizing the importance of workplace citizenship to society as a whole (Coutu and Murray, 2010a), greater unionization is predicted to promote democracy because it raises the awareness and benefits (or reduces the costs) of political activity for union members. In this section, we identify three specific hypotheses that explain why, at an individual level, being in a union raises civic participation.

HYPOTHESIS 1: Unions increase voting by raising member wages.

Perhaps the simplest hypothesis explaining the link between union membership and civic participation is built on the observation that, by virtue of their ability to monopolize the supply of labour to employers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), unions raise wages for members. This combined with the finding that higher income has long been noted as a major driver of voting (Jaime-Castillo, 2009) provides evidence for an indirect positive union effect on voting.
If the union effect was primarily driven by a rise in wages (monopoly face), then most of the union gap in voting would be accounted for once income and other socio-economic controls are accounted for. Further, there would be little spill-over of union member activity into other areas of pro-civic behaviour with little private return such as attending public meetings or boycotting a product for ethical/political reasons.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Unions affect voter behaviour via social customs.

Our second hypothesis holds that union membership raises political participation because it increases the personal benefits of such participation, or otherwise stated, because it raises the costs of non-participation. If one belongs to a voluntary organization run on democratic lines that require member participation, this is treated by members as a social norm. Since the health of the organisation is dependent upon member participation, there may be reputational benefits of being seen to be an active participant. Further, there will be reputational benefits accruing to those who are seen to engage actively in democratic behaviour beyond the unionized working environment. Conversely, those who fail to exhibit such traits may be ostracised, or at least suffer some reputational damage. This is akin to the social costs of deviating from agreed upon norms such as paying union dues when not compelled to do so (Booth, 1985; Booth and Monojit 1995). In this interpretation, the impact of unions on social compliance does not have to be limited to the workplace domain; union members may be more likely than non-members to be pressured (subtly or overtly) to vote for certain labour-friendly political or civic leaders. Higher returns from electoral participation or increased costs from non-participation for union members may explain a positive link between unions and civic engagement.

Social customs only exert influence over those within the group (Booth, 1985), so the social custom hypothesis predicts that union effects on voting will be confined to current members. They should not be apparent among ex-members. If any significant relationship between union membership and ex-membership is detected, the social custom effect of unions cannot be the only direct channel at work. There must be another union channel that imparts some of the lasting effect on ex-members as well.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Unions affect voting behaviour by habituating unionized workers to voice-related institutions and democratic concerns more broadly.

A third hypothesis holds that participating in union activities leads unionized workers to learn how to voice their concerns. In a union setting, this happens through grievance procedures, voting for representatives and collective bargaining. This learning process lowers the costs of civic interactions and may do so permanently. According to this view, a primary outcome of unionization is
political socialization—teaching people such as factory workers or retail clerks, who would otherwise be untouched by the elementary levers of democratic rule, such as voting to ratify a collective agreement and learning about the grievance arbitration systems. Union members learn how to interact successfully with co-workers in a political endeavour by organizing or bargaining for better working conditions. Such successful interaction includes understanding and appreciating the value of political participation as an end unto itself, building solidarity and fomenting common cause with others whom one may not know personally but with whom one shares common interests. When people participate successfully in one arena, such as the workplace, they may extend this to other areas outside of the workplace as well.

This connection between political efficacy and the structure of workplace decision making has been noted in the industrial citizenship literature (Arthurs, 1967) and explicitly in the political science literature (Elden, 1981) but also stretches back further to the classical school of economic thought. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx wrote memorable passages describing the effect of working conditions on the state of “men’s minds”. Work as a pathway to citizenship and participation was a hallmark of the recent Democratic electoral victories in the 2008 and 2012 US presidential elections (Boyte, 2012).

In our model, workplace union voice can be thought of as raising the net benefits of civic participation—either by reducing the costs of such engagement, or by increasing the productivity of pro-civic behaviour. In any of the above permutations, the voice hypothesis predicts that the socialization provided by union membership should impact all forms of social involvement. Its ability to predict political engagement should be no stronger than that for other forms of social participation. This hypothesis also predicts that the impact of union socialization on democratic engagement activities should extend beyond current members to ex-members as well, meaning that the voting premium difference between ex-members and current members should be rather small. An ex-member, in this context, can be someone who is still in paid work but who has lost its membership status or chosen not to renew. An ex-member can also be a non-paid person (retiree) who once had paid membership and identifies as such. Indeed, if ex and current members have statistically identical coefficients, we will presumably have a very strong voice carry-over effect, whereas if the differences are large and ex-members display very little difference relative to never-members, the voice effect will be less important. The social custom model, Hypothesis 2, will be the stronger candidate.

These three hypotheses all assume that unionization leads to civic participation. It is of course possible that characteristics that make people more likely to be union members also contribute to the likelihood that they will sign petitions or wait in line to vote. If this were true, then exogenous increases (or decreases)
in unionization would have no impact on overall levels of civic participation. Furthermore, if innate characteristics vary more within than across countries, this view predicts a low (or non-existent) relationship between unionization and civic participation at the aggregate level, something contradicted by the cross-country evidence reviewed in this paper.

**Data**

If we take the union voting gap as a given, how can one go about testing these three channels of causal influence? One way, in the absence of an experimental design, is to identify a dataset sufficiently large and rich that the inclusion of background controls can control for observable differences in characteristics that also predict voting behaviour. The data set should of course contain union membership and voting behaviour and, if possible, distinguish among three types of observable membership status: current union members, former (or ex-union) members and never-members of a union. This triangulation would allow us to (partially) distinguish between the indirect (monopoly face) and direct explanations (voice and social custom).

The data set used in this study includes 184,988 individuals from 29 European countries (including Israel and Turkey) and satisfies all of the above conditions. It also offers the first, to our knowledge, look outside of North America for a union voting premium. The survey providing this data is called the European Social Survey (ESS) and at the time of our analysis there were four waves of survey data to be accessed (2002-2008). Since the publication of this working draft, a new wave (Cycle 5) containing data for 2010 has been released. The ESS provides comparable national level representative survey data on a whole range of topics that would normally be found only in country-specific general social surveys. National teams meet to ensure that common question formatting and data collection procedures are adhered to. The survey data are then merged into a common format leaving repeated cross-sectional data available for downloading and analysis.10

Table 1 lists the variables used in the analysis along with their coding schemes and sample statistics. Whether an individual voted in the last election prior to the survey constitutes the main dependent variable used in our estimating equations. Because we use self-reported voting data, it is subject to the typical upward biases noted in the literature (Radcliff 2001, Lamare 2010 a,b). However, unless we have reason to believe that there is some non-random process at work in the over reporting data, we can assume that the over reporting affects union and non-union members in the same way.

In the first column of Table 3, we use the entire data set available to compute the sample statistics, including employed and non-employed persons. In Column
2 of Table 3, we include only those persons whose main activity during the survey year was paid employment while, in Column 3, we include only those engaged in non-paid activities. We do this because employed and non-employed persons self-identify as union members and indeed there is a strong history of trade union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>All Respondents (1)</th>
<th>Paid Workers (2)</th>
<th>Non-workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Voted in Last Election</td>
<td>0.79 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.80 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.77 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Union Member</td>
<td>0.21 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Union member</td>
<td>0.25 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.32 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Male</td>
<td>0.45 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.37 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age (years)</td>
<td>45.1 (16.45)</td>
<td>39.2 (15.40)</td>
<td>54.4 (18.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Married / Live In Partner</td>
<td>0.63 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.69 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Some High School</td>
<td>0.16 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>0.18 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>0.37 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.41 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Graduate</td>
<td>0.25 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Health Status (Score 1to5)</td>
<td>2.26 (0.93)</td>
<td>2.00 (0.77)</td>
<td>2.54 (0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Immigrant</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Never Attend Religious Service</td>
<td>0.32 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Main Activity Paid Work</td>
<td>0.51 (0.49)</td>
<td>– (–)</td>
<td>– (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS Survey Year 2002</td>
<td>0.23 (–)</td>
<td>0.22 (–)</td>
<td>0.23 (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS Survey Year 2004</td>
<td>0.26 (–)</td>
<td>0.25 (–)</td>
<td>0.27 (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS Survey Year 2006</td>
<td>0.23 (–)</td>
<td>0.24 (–)</td>
<td>0.22 (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS Survey Year 2008</td>
<td>0.27 (–)</td>
<td>0.28 (–)</td>
<td>0.28 (–)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample size</td>
<td>165 720</td>
<td>84 002</td>
<td>80 751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS data for 2002-2008 of individuals who were surveyed in 29 European countries in representative country-level Social Surveys. See Appendix Table 1 (available upon request).

Notes: The table contains weighted sample means and standard deviations in parentheses.
members maintaining associational ties into retirement sometimes to preserve pension and other health insurance related benefits but also to remain active in union hall politics (Clasen and Viebrock, 2008).

Looking at the raw gaps in voting propensity between our various measures of union status in the four periods covered by our data (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) reveals a fairly consistent picture. In Figure 2, Panel a), we see union members are more likely than non-members to vote, the gap being approximately 12 percentage points on average over the period. This overall gap changes if we

![Figure 2](image-url)
break up “non-union” members into two mutually-exclusive groups, ex-members and never-members, as we do in Panel b). Never-members are current non-union individuals that have never been union members. Ex-members comprise non-union individuals that have self-identified as having had past union membership status. All non-union respondents were asked about past union membership status, hence the ability to split current non-union members into these two exclusive groups. Of note is that the ex-member versus current union gap is much narrower (5 percentage points on average) than the never-member versus current union member gap (15 percentage points or three times the gap of the ex-member versus union member). Whether these differentials remain significant after controlling for covariates of voting is what we turn to next.

**Results**

We estimate the following model of individual voter turnout $\text{Vote}_{ijt}$ which takes the value 1 if a respondent voted in an election prior to the survey and 0 if not by least squares (linear probability analysis) and logit analysis, allowing for correlation of errors across countries $j$ and survey year $t$:

$$
(1) \quad \text{Prob } \text{Vote}_{ijt} = a_{ijt} + b1*\text{Member}_{ijt} + b2*\text{Ex-Member}_{ijt} + b3*Z_{ijt} + e_{ijt},
$$

where $\text{Member}$ is current union member, $\text{Ex-member}$ is a former union member (the excluded reference category is therefore the $\text{Never-member}$) and $Z$ is a vector of background characteristics (including age, gender, marital status, health status, education, immigrant status, and religious observance) that predict voting behaviour in the most recent literature (Lamare 2010).

If socio-economic controls wipe out the union voting advantage between members and non-members seen in Figure 1, we could conclude that it is the difference in personal characteristics between unionists and non-unionists, rather than their union membership per se, which drives the association. However, if a union voting premium remains after observably equivalent respondents are compared, we would be left to sort through the monopoly, voice and social custom models as chief channels of influence.

Table 4, Panel a), reports the results for the entire sample of respondents, including paid workers (identified from those whose main activity was paid work in the past year) and non-employed individuals from a logit analysis displaying only marginal effects—that is, reporting percentage point changes in the dependent variable in relation to the independent covariates. From Column 1, we see that the raw gap between union members and never-members, which is our excluded reference category, is 15.1 points while the gap between ex-members and never-members is lower at 8 points, both significant at 0.01 level. In Column 2, with all controls added and year of survey dummies to capture any time trends,
the union advantage is reduced to 10 points and 2 points for union and ex-
union members respectively, significant at 0.01 level only for union members
only relative to never-members. In Column 3—in addition to the clustering of
effects around a respondent’s country that was done in Column 2—we control
for possible country influences through fixed effect estimation that adds country
dummies. The only difference in results is that the ex-member effect increases
in magnitude and significance (3.5 points and significant at the .01 level) from
Column 2 but still half the size of the raw differential in Column 1. The positive
relationship between union membership and voting (relative to never-members)
remains significant at 8.3 percentage points.

### TABLE 4
Determinants of Individual Voting Propensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) All Respondents</th>
<th>Logit Analysis: Dependent Variable &quot;Voted in Last Election&quot; Mean = 0.79 (marginal effects reported)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Union Member [Never-Member]</td>
<td>0.151*** (7.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Union member</td>
<td>0.080*** (5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Controls a</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Survey Year dummy</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Country Fixed Effects</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R squared</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>165720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b) Paid Workers Only</th>
<th>Logit Analysis: Dependent Variable &quot;Voted in Last Election&quot; Mean = 0.80 (marginal effects reported)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Union Member [Never-Member]</td>
<td>0.127*** (6.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Union member</td>
<td>0.043*** (3.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Controls a</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Survey Year dummy</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fixed Effects</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R squared</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>84002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS data for 2002-2008 of individuals who were surveyed in 29 European countries in representative country-level Social Surveys.

Notes: Each entry contains the marginal effect (percentage point change in probability) and z-stats in parentheses ( ) from a weighted logit model using individual sampling weights. The pseudo R-squared is taken from unweighted estimates only. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual voted in a federal/presidential election in the period in question. Excluded reference categories indicated in square [ ] brackets. a The individual controls include gender, age, marital status, education, health status, immigrant status and religious observance.

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
In Table 4, Panel b), we confine our sample to those whose main activity in the last week was paid work. This group is earning a labour income thereby partially controlling for the instrumental or monopoly face of unionism. The reasoning relates to the “indirect” or “moderating” effect that unions have first by increasing incomes for their members relative to non-members. We know from a long line of social science research that the “richer you are”, the more likely you are to vote. By controlling for paid work, we pick up (indirectly) any positive income effect brought about by union membership; hence a diminishment would be anticipated in the strength of the union-voting relationship. We attribute this to the “instrumental or monopoly” face of unionism, a term used by Freeman and Medoff (1984) and others, to capture this wage advantage.

In Column 1 of Table 4, Panel b), we do find a small but notable fall in the raw union voting gap for paid workers as compared to the full respondent sample. Still, there is a 12.7 percentage point differential with respect to never-members and also a significant 4.3 percentage point differential with respect to ex-members. As noted in our discussion of Table 4, Panel a) results, our preferred estimation is in Column 3, as this specification controls for any unobserved country-fixed-effects. This time, amongst our sample of paid workers, we find a reduction of approximately forty percent in the estimated magnitude of union effects on voting. The union voting premium amongst paid workers is now 5.7 percentage points (versus 8.3 points for the entire population) and the ex-member premium is 2.3 points (versus 4.3 for the entire population). Both estimated effects are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively.

Given that, the union premium falls in magnitude but remains significant for paid current and ex-union members suggests, amongst other things, that the union membership voting advantage is likely working through more than one channel, i.e., not just a monopoly (rent seeking) or pure social custom face.

**Added Robustness Checks**

**Non-Workers and Retired versus Non-Retired**

In Table 4, Panel a), we looked at our entire sample while in Panel b), we concentrated on paid workers only, thereby partially controlling for the effect of paid income and any possible union wage advantages that contribute indirectly to an increased propensity to vote. There are other ways, however, in which the union advantage in civic participation could manifest itself. Indeed, the idea that unionization works through a variety of other channels, or more to the point, that it can be moderated by different variables, is certainly plausible. In Table 5, we show results from running the same analyses, as found in our preferred estimate
in Column 3 of Table 4, except that, this time, we focus only on non-workers. Our expectation is that the monopoly face would be less operative for non-paid workers; hence any significant union effects would be dependent on the voice-carry over effect and perhaps some residual social-custom effects.

We find in Table 5, Column 1, and as replicated in Figure 3, Panel a), that if anything union status (both current and ex-membership) has a larger effect on voting propensity amongst those who are not working than for paid workers. In each category, there is a 2.5 percentage point advantage in the propensity to vote (relative to never-members) for current and ex-members amongst non-workers versus paid workers.

We further split our estimates of non-workers by retirement status of the individual. The idea being tested here is whether retired ex-members differ in their propensity to vote from non-retired non-workers who are ex-members since retired ex-members might still feel a “monopoly-face” effect if their pensions and benefits are that much better than non-union retirees. Looking at Table 5, Columns 2 and 3, and replicated Figure 3, Panel b), we find not much of a difference in retired ex-members, although they do have the highest propensity to vote amongst ex-members (whether paid or non-retired).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
<th>Determinants of Individual Voting Propensity, Non-Workers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logit Analysis: Dependent Variable “Voted in Last Election” Mean = 0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(marginal effects reported)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All non-Workers</td>
<td>Retired only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Union Member [Never-Member]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>0.088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.86)</td>
<td>(4.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Union member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.91)</td>
<td>(4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Controls (^a)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Survey Year dummy</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fixed Effects</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R squared</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>80751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS data for 2002-2008 of individuals who were surveyed in 29 European countries in representative country-level Social Surveys

Notes: Each entry contains the marginal effect and z-stats in parentheses () from a weighted logit model using individual sampling weights. The pseudo R-squared is taken from unweighted estimates only. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual voted in a federal/presidential election in the period in question. Excluded reference categories indicated with square [ ] brackets. \(^a\) The specification found in column 3 of Table 4 is repeated here with all controls in and these include gender, age, marital status, education, health status, immigrant status and religious observance.

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
Broader Measures of Civic Participation

In Table 6, we use our paid workers sample again but, this time, widen the range of dependent variables to include three other forms of civic participation beyond just voting. These are based on a question in the ESS survey which asks: “There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent..."
things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?" The question goes on to list seven behaviours that include a range of civic activities spanning the most time-intensive (i.e., working for a political party or action group), somewhat intensive (i.e., taken part in a lawful public demonstration) to the least intensive (i.e., signing a petition). We take these three as alternate dependent variables and the estimates are once again based on the last specification found in Column 3 of Table 4. In each case, Column 1 through Column 3, we find that union members significantly out-participate their never-member counterparts in a broad range of civic activities by a magnitude equivalent, and even larger in the case of petition signing, to the voting advantage. Ex-members are once again in the middle with more participation than never-members but less than current members.

The findings in Table 6 are supportive of a conjecture made in our hypothesis section concerning the “source of the union voter advantage”; namely that, if built on more than a simple monopoly face, the union advantage should extend to a broad range of civic behaviours. This is also suggestive that it is not just a social custom/peer pressure channel motivating union members to outvote their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6</th>
<th>Determinants of Broader Civic Participation, Paid Workers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit Analysis: Dependent Variable: Broader Measures of Civic Participation (marginal effects reported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Worked for Political Party or Action group”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable mean</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Union Member [Never-Member]</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Union member</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Individual Controls</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Survey Year dummy</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fixed Effects</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R squared</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>84718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS data for 2002-2008 of individuals who were surveyed in 29 European countries in representative country-level Social Surveys.

Notes: Each entry contains the marginal effect and z-stats in parentheses ( ) from a weighted logit model using individual sampling weights. The pseudo R-squared is taken from unweighted estimates only. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual voted in a federal/presidential election in the period in question. Excluded reference categories indicated with square [ ] brackets. * The specification found in column 3 of Table 4 is repeated here with all controls in and these include gender, age, marital status, education, health status, immigrant status and religious observance. *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and * at the 0.10 level.
non-union counterparts since there would be less of an anticipated spill-over emanating from union member activity in these less-monitored areas of pro-civic behaviour. There would also be little net private return differential owing to such things as attending a public demonstration or signing a petition.

**Household Income as a Control**

Unfortunately, as rich as the ESS dataset is, labour market earnings are absent. We, therefore, cannot calculate a union wage premium. Instead, what we have is a household income variable denoted in 10 bands, running from lowest household income to highest for the four periods covered in our sample. As a final check of our results, we repeat the estimates found in Table 3, Column 3, for our paid worker sample, only this time with household income as an added control. The estimated coefficients for the union status variables relative to never-members are shown in Figure 4. We find that current membership with household income controlled for confers almost the same advantage (0.057 versus 0.052) and with similar levels of significance as in estimates lacking direct income controls. The ex-member effect, however, is halved (0.023 versus 0.013) and becomes not significant.

**Interpretation of Results**

There are six key findings that emerge from the preceding analysis.

**FINDING 1:** In Europe union members outvote non-members by about 10 to 12 percentage points. If the union voter gap was simply based on observable...
what accounts for the union gap in voter turnout? evidence from the European Union, 2002-2008

Differences—as Freeman (2003) concludes—we would see this gap wiped out with a standard regression controlling for background variables. This is not the case across a wide variety of countries in Europe. In fact, there is remarkable consistency in the overall union voter gap (10-12 points) and union voter premium (5-8 points) found in the North American literature and across Europe.

**FINDING 2:** If the union voter gap was simply based on the indirect effect of a union wage premium—something Freeman (2003) did not fully address—we would see the gap wiped out with a standard regression controlling for background variables and whether or not a respondent was in paid work. Once again, this does not appear to be the case across a wide variety of datasets (US, Canada, Europe) and our ESS estimations. There is remarkable consistency in a remaining union voter premium (5-8 points) under these specifications. This has been ascribed as the “union voice voting” premium in Bryson et al. (2013) but as discussed in this paper it could also be attributed to the social custom/peer-pressure channel at work.

**FINDING 3:** If the union voter premium was simply based on the union social custom channel (Booth, 1985), we would see the voting differential virtually wiped out for ex-members relative to never-members, and especially so for those out of the labour force and not working in paid employment, as this group should be subject to the least amount of fellow union member social pressure. This is not the case (see Table 5), as non-working ex-members have a 6 point increase in voting propensity relative to never-members. There is also remarkable consistency in the ex-member union voter premium (2-4 points). This 2-4 points difference relative to never-members can therefore be ascribed to a remaining “voice” effect of the union voting advantage arising from unions educating workers about the value and use of their workplace voice. Unions also clearly do much to raise awareness amongst their membership about broader social and political issues, something that also goes a long way toward increasing the perceived benefits of broader civic and social engagement and which could explain our findings in Table 6, showing that the union advantage does, indeed, extend beyond the ballot box.

**FINDING 4:** If we assume that the social custom channel is the difference between ex-member and current-member voting premiums, this leaves a 4 percentage point social custom (peer pressure) effect, which is essentially the same for the non-paid and the paid worker samples respectively (see Figure 3, Panel a)).

**FINDING 5:** Current union members appear to be subject to all three union-voting channels (monopoly, social custom and voice), which explains their consistently large differential relative to never-members. Ex-members are more likely to vote than never-members but are less likely to vote than current members. This may be because they are likely only exposed to the vestiges of the union voice effect
and/or are less subject to the monopoly and social custom channels than current members.

**Finding 6**: In addition to voting, there appears to be a similar union advantage in broader areas of civic engagement such as working for a political party, participating in a lawful demonstration or in something as innocuous as signing a public petition. In every case, except for one (ex-members are not significantly more likely to work for a political party than never-members), current union members and ex-members are significantly more likely to take part in these broader range of civic behaviours than never-members.

More work is of course needed with even more detailed panel data that has labour market hourly wages and which perhaps observes switching in and out of union status, as one can never fully rule out in a non-experimental setting such as this whether everything we have observed is not, somehow, related to an unobserved proclivity to join a union and be simultaneously more likely to be civic minded in the first place. The fact that we observe ex-union members and union members not in the paid workforce out-voting and out-participating never-members over a range of civic behaviours seems in keeping with more than a monopoly face explanation.

**Conclusion**

In the context of how to interpret the union voter premium, one view states that unions indirectly influence voters through the “monopoly” face that translates wage gains for members into a greater political participation. This is based on the empirical evidence, which has largely concluded that electoral engagement is positively correlated with income (Blais, 2000, Norris, 2002, Freeman 2004). In a second view, union membership incorporates indoctrination about the virtues of political participation and thereby creates strong social pressures to “get out and vote” for causes that are broadly (or in some cases specifically) in labour’s favour. Not being seen on voting day by fellow union members could also impose sizeable social costs at work (the “silent treatment”). This is related to the “social-custom” model of union membership first advanced by Booth (1985) to explain how, even in situations where due payments are not compulsory, such as in Europe or in right-to-work states, workers covered by collective agreements nevertheless “voluntarily” pay dues. A third view holds that much of what unions do is actually building social capital and that unions teach (otherwise non-politically workers how democracy works at a grassroots level. Indeed, as long observed by industrial relations scholarship, much of what unions do is unknown to outsiders unfamiliar with trade union activity (Freeman and Medoff, 1984); it is experiential (Gomez, Gunderson and Meltz 2002; Gomez and Gunderson 2004; Bryson and Gomez, 2005) and it is these “voice-based” institutions of
unionism that stimulate interpersonal cooperation and political organization. By improving democratic skills (and thereby increasing the benefits and lowering the costs of democratic participation), union membership facilitates civic involvement outside the workplace as well.

Our empirical estimates show that, although the overall union voter gap of 12 points is attenuated by controls for individual and country-fixed effects, we find a remaining union voter premium of approximately 6-8 percentage points. This means that unions do have a large degree of influence, either through voice effects or peer pressure, as put forward in the social custom model. Ex-members do display a significant voting premium (of 3 to 4 points) relative to never-members but it is only half as large as that displayed by current union members (8 points), suggesting that there is both a social custom and voice channel explaining the differential between union members (current or ex-) versus never-members. These findings are attenuated further if we restrict our focus to paid workers only, with the size of the union voting premium essentially halved for both current and ex-members relative to never-members. However, the results are still empirically meaningful (relative to other independent categories such as education and age) and statistically significant.

For countries and union movements alike, these results point to a clear link between lower union density (i.e., weaker trade union movement) and lower voter turnout. Unless (or until) a competing workplace institution emerges that provides similar voice-enhancing demonstrations to workers otherwise unfamiliar with the benefits of civic engagement, it appears likely that declines in union membership will, at the very least, be tied to reductions in voter turnout. Governments intent on increasing labour market efficiency through the mechanism of restricting collective bargaining rights may wish to think twice about the spill-over effects this may have on the quality and quantity of democratic engagement.

Notes
1 According to Radcliff (2001) “… unionization helps explain much of the post-1960 decline in voter turnout. The magnitude of the relationship is demonstrated to rival that of more conventional determinants of voter turnout such as education.”


3 Notwithstanding his brush with trade union activism, Mussolini, it should be noted, proceeded upon seizing power (like all fascist regimes) to ban independent unions and form fascist worker syndicates beholden to the national socialist ruling party.

4 Yet, as noted by Jilani (2011: 23), Ronald Regan was not rabidly anti-union: “… conservatives may be shocked to learn that their idol Reagan was once a union boss himself. Reagan
was the only president in American history to have belonged to a union ... Additionally, Reagan was a staunch advocate for the collective bargaining rights of one of the world's most famous and most influential trade unions, Poland's Solidarity movement.”

5 It could be argued that the Thatcher and Reagan-era reforms were ushered in by the period of union activity/militancy that occurred in the stagflation years of the 1970s.

6 These studies tend to assume that the union causal effect can be obtained by conditioning on observable differences across members and non-members, an assumption that is frequently challenged.


8 Lamare also finds non-linear effects from rising union membership on voter turnout but does not ascribe them to the nature of the voter turnout data which is upper-bounded to 100 percent.

9 Although Marx did not deal directly with affective states—his 4 types of alienation are rooted historic conditions (see Manifesto, Grundrisse, and the account in Giddens, 1976)—he does offer this memorable passage in Das Kapital “Modern Industry, when it has attained to a certain pitch, is capable, by the revolution it effects in the mode of production and in the social conditions of production, of also revolutionizing people's minds.” And a century earlier Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations even more clearly elaborates this theme when he states: “But certain inconveniences arise from a commercial spirit. Men's views are confined, and "when a person's whole attention is bestowed on the seventeenth part of a pin or the eightieth part of a button, he becomes stupid."

10 The data is available to researchers from: <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>

11 Freeman and Medoff (1984) have a chapter on unions in politics. Juravich and Shergold (1988) studied the impact of unions on the voting, using a small sample of Pennsylvania union members. Masters and Delaney (1987) review studies of union political activities. Delaney and co-authors (1988, 1990) argue that unions have invested increasing resources in political action to defeat laws designed to weaken unions.

References


**SUMMARY**


Across countries, union membership and voter turnout are highly correlated. In unadjusted terms, union members maintain a roughly 0.10 to 0.12 point gap in voting propensity over non-members. We motivate empirically and propose a model—with three causal channels—that explains this correlation and then empirically tests for the contribution of each channel to the overall union voting gap. The first channel by which union members are more likely to vote is through the so-called “monopoly-face” of unionism (i.e., unionization increases wages for members and higher incomes are a significant positive determinant of voting). The second is the so-called “social custom” model of unionism, which argues that union co-worker peer pressure creates incentives to vote amongst members for the purpose of having cast a ballot or being seen at the voting poll. The third and final channel is based on the “voice-face” of unionism whereby employees who are (or have been) exposed to the formalities of collective bargaining and union representation at the workplace are also more likely to increase their attachment to structures of democratic governance in society as well. We test to see how much of the raw “union voting premium” is accounted for by these
three competing channels, using contemporary data from 29 European countries. We find that all three channels are at work, with voice the dominant effect (half of the overall gap attributed to this channel) and the other two (monopoly and social custom), each accounting for approximately one-fourth of the overall union voting gap.

KEYWORDS: civic engagement, unionization, voting premium.

RÉSUMÉ

Comment expliquer l’écart dans les taux de participation aux scrutins électoraux en faveur des électeurs syndiqués : le cas de l’Union européenne pour la période 2002-2008

Parmi plusieurs pays, l’adhésion syndicale et le taux de participation lors de scrutins populaires sont fortement corrélés. En termes non-ajustés les électeurs qui sont membres de syndicats présentent un taux de participation d’environ 0,10 à 0,12 points de pourcentage plus élevé que les électeurs non-syndiqués. Nous postulons et justifions un modèle, comprenant trois types de causes, qui explique cette corrélation, puis testons empiriquement la contribution de chacun à l’écart de participation global en faveur des électeurs syndiqués.

En premier lieu, la dimension dite « monopolistique » du syndicalisme (c.-à-d. que l’action syndicale permet aux membres d’accroître leurs salaires alors que justement un des éléments déterminants du taux de participation électorale est le fait d’avoir un revenu plus élevé) favoriserait une plus grande participation électorale. En second lieu, le modèle de « tradition sociale » véhiculée par les syndicats constituerait un incitatif pour les électeurs syndiqués à aller voter soit pour avoir le sentiment d’accomplir leur devoir d’électeur ou encore pour être vu par leurs collègues comme ayant accompli ce devoir. Enfin en troisième et dernier lieu le fait, pour des électeurs, d’être (ou d’avoir été) exposés comme employés, aux structures formelles de la négociation collective et de la représentation syndicale dans les milieux de travail, ce que l’on considère comme un des rôles fondamentaux du syndicalisme soit d’être un « porte-parole » ou en anglais « Voice–Face », les inciteraient aussi à développer davantage d’attachement envers les structures de gouvernance démocratique dans la société.

Nous cherchons à vérifier quelle proportion de cette « prime du vote syndical » brute au taux de participation électorale est redevable à ces trois types de facteurs à partir de données contemporaines en provenance de 29 pays européens. Nous observons que les trois types de facteurs sont bel et bien à l’œuvre, le facteur de type « porte-parole » ou « Voice » ayant un effet dominant (comptant pour environ la moitié de l’écart global - ou de la prime - observé) tandis que les deux autres types de facteurs (dimension monopolistique et tradition sociale) comptant environ chacun pour le quart de l’écart global.

MOTS-CLÉS : engagement civique, syndicalisme, prime au vote.
RESUMEN

¿Qué explica el influjo sindical en la participación al voto? 
EL caso de la Unión Europea, 2002-2008

En muchos países, la membrcía sindical y la participación electoral son fuertemente correlacionados. Grosso modo y sin ajuste, los miembros sindicalizados mantienen alrededor de 0.10 a 0.12 puntos de distancia en la propensión al voto comparativamente a la propensión, más baja, de los no sindicalizados. Se propone aquí un modelo – con tres modalidades causales- que explicarían esta correlación y se efectúan verificaciones empíricas para evaluar la contribución de cada canal a la explicación de esta brecha en el voto de los sindicalizados. La primera modalidad se refiere a los miembros sindicalizados que serían más propensos a votar que corresponden a la llamada « imagen monopólica » del sindicalismo (el sindicalismo aumenta el ingreso de los miembros y los altos salarios son un determinante positivo de la participación al voto). La segunda modalidad es el llamado modelo sindical de « clientela social » con el argumento que la presión de los trabajadores sindicalizados sobre sus colegas crea incentivos para ir a votar con el propósito de depositar un voto o de ser visto en los sondajes electorales. La tercera y última modalidad está basada en la « imagen de vocero » del sindicalismo por el cual los empleados que son o han sido expuestos a las formalidades de la negociación colectiva y de la representación sindical en el medio laboral son más propensos a aumentar su adhesión a las estructuras de gobierno democrática en la sociedad. Se evalúa que proporción de esta « prima del voto sindical » es explicada por cada una de estas tres modalidades utilizando, para esto, datos contemporáneos de 29 países europeos. Los resultados muestran que las tres modalidades juegan un rol, con un efecto dominante de la « imagen de vocero » (contribuye a explicar la mitad de la brecha); las dos modalidades contribuyen cada una a un cuarto de la explicación de la distancia global en el voto de los sindicalizados.

PALABRAS CLAVES: implicación cívica, sindicalización, prima del voto.