Winnipeg's Civil Political History and the Logic of Structural Urban Reform: A Review Article

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The fascinating history of Winnipeg's development as a Canadian metropolis is only beginning to attract the public and scholarly attention which it so obviously deserves. In terms of official public concern, Winnipeg is still at a nascent stage, having no formal City Archives in spite of the $750,000 spent on the City's Centennial activities in 1974, and a new Centennial Library subsequently built downtown. Civic records remain unsorted and uncatalogued somewhere in the City Hall basement—with no personnel assigned to archival work. Fortunately, this state of affairs has not impeded the development of scholarship, collections of primary materials, and publications devoted to the description and evaluation of Winnipeg's social and political history. A basic survey of sources and materials on Winnipeg government and politics indicated a broad range of primary materials and secondary studies.¹

In recent years a number of notable publications have appeared, of which the most numerous are the articles and books by Alan Artibise. His seminal study of the 1874-1914 period appeared the same year that Lloyd Stinson revived a tradition of autobiographical descriptions of Winnipeg civic politics.² That year also saw the publication of an excellent collection of civic maps detailing the spatial aspects of Winnipeg's development and social class segregation.³ 1976 was the year that the two central foci of this review were published,⁴ along with my own


collection of Studies in Winnipeg Politics. Finally, in 1977 Artibise's *Winnipeg: An Illustrated History* was released.\(^5\) Providing for the first time a comprehensive survey of Winnipeg's civic history, it provides an outstanding basic compendium of facts, illustrations, and references against which all future efforts must be measured. Over the same time period, there was also the emergence of literature detailing the evolution of Winnipeg area local governments,\(^6\) the creation of Winnipeg's new amalgamated City, "Unicity,"\(^7\) an evaluation of the Winnipeg experiment in urban structural reform,\(^8\) as well as initial analyses of the property industry connections of Winnipeg City Councillors.\(^9\)

Winnipeg is known as the city of the 1919 General Strike, and of subsequent class and party politics at the civic level.\(^10\) However, Artibise demonstrates a second major theme: Winnipeg's boosterism and the civic hegemony by a commercial (downtown business) elite who allied themselves with residential property owners (and real estate interests) by forming "Citizens" electoral organizations as early as 1884.\(^11\) It is


\(^10\) Rea, "Parties and Power."

the major contention of this article that the latter theme (community power structure politics) and not the former themes (class and civic party politics catalyzed by the Winnipeg General Strike) is at the core of past and present Winnipeg civic politics, and that this nucleus must be taken into account in any attempts to reform Winnipeg's politics—whether by structure, as proposed by the Taraska Committee, or by practical politics, as proposed by Lorimer and others.

Winnipeg has long been a center of urban structural reform—perhaps being the foremost North American metropolis in this regard. Early in the century, Winnipeg followed Toronto's lead in adopting the Board of Control system (it was dropped in 1919—fifty years before Toronto area disbandings of the system). At the same time other major urban reforms were undertaken, such as the municipalization of (some) utilities, the expansion of city works operations, and attempts at city planning, parks, and provisions for recreation. Winnipeg was also the center of (volunteer) urban social reform, and was given a proportional representation system in 1920 which guaranteed "Citizens" control while spawning a continuing tradition of elected communist office holders on City Council and its School Board. While Winnipeg's Metro government was based on the successful experience of Toronto's earlier structural reform, it innovated in having the electoral districts cut across municipal boundaries. The New Democratic Party continued this tradition of urban structural reform by amalgamating the twelve area municipalities and the Metropolitan Corporation into one City and one taxing authority, creating Canada's only Provincial Department of Urban Affairs, and by other innovative provisions written into the 1971 City of Winnipeg Act.

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is therefore cited as a leading example of the structural reform of Canadian urban governments.  

Both the Toronto and Winnipeg reforms were under review in 1975 and 1976. The well-funded Toronto inquiry was headed by former premier John Robarts who acted as a one man Royal Commission. His investigations included numerous empirical research studies by staff and consultants as well as public hearings and visits to England, Winnipeg, and other centers of urban structural reform. His two-volume summary report was released in mid-1977 (Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, 1977), and included no recommendations for sweeping changes in the municipal-representation federalism of Metropolitan Toronto, toward the Winnipeg form of amalgamated government. The Manitoba N.D.P. Government created a three-member "Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act," rather than a Royal Commission. The members of the Committee were Immigration Judge and former alderman Peter Taraska, urban consultant and former Metro chief planner Earl Levin, and political scientist and former Halifax (N.D.P.) Mayor Allan O'Brien. Taraska served as the Committee Chairman. Although the Department of Urban Affairs prepared some studies in advance, the Committee chose to rely mostly on testimony at its public and private hearings—which ran to over 200 hours and 3000 pages of typescript. Hearings were held in the fall of 1975, and the winter and spring of 1976. The Committee's Report and Recommendations was released in October, 1976. It called for further reform of the Winnipeg structure toward "a modified parliamentary form" of civic government based upon civic party politics. Its major empirical referent was its Appendix IV, published separately as the "Rea Report," an analysis of alderman/councillor characteristics and City Council roll call voting patterns from 1919 to 1975.

These two Reports are the subject of the two following sections of this review. I will attempt to give the reader a summary of their contents and an indication of how I see them in relationship to our present knowledge of Winnipeg's civic past and present. Following these two sections, I will attempt to review events subsequent to the release of the Reports and the implications for the future of Winnipeg politics.

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16 Plunkett, "Structural Reform of Local Government."

17 Robarts discussed the Winnipeg situation with members of the committee, its staff, and other informed sources and observers, including the author.

18 A Royal Commission would have had subpoena powers, while the committee did not. No figures have been made available on the budget of the Winnipeg Committee.

19 Taraska was one of the ethnic candidates recruited by the Citizens. He began on the school board where he was denied citizens endorsement. As an Independent, he went on to be a City Alderman, Metro Councillor, and the chairman of several N.D.P. unicity boundary commissions prior to this committee post.
The Rea Report and the "Real World" of Winnipeg Politics

The "Rea Report" is pathbreaking in both its use of roll call analysis in historical research on Canadian civic affairs, and in its scope or time frame, which covers the period from 1919 to 1975—fifty-six years. Most of the 175 page report is devoted to the information contained in the report's thirty-six appendices. They contain tabulations of alderman/councillor characteristics, voting turnouts, election advertising, and a listing of all the roll call votes in odd-numbered years from 1947 to 1975 (with Council Minutes' page numbers and group support scores). The 19 page text of the Report is divided into two parts: "The Politics of Class: Winnipeg City Council, 1919-1945" and "The Consolidation of Power: Winnipeg City Council, 1946-1975."20

Both parts develop the thesis previously expounded21 that "the General Strike of 1919 was the fundamental determinant in the modern, political history of Winnipeg." Rea hypothesizes that with the economic power of labor in Winnipeg broken by the Strike, the Citizens League and its successors22 were organized to assure "firm political control of the city" and to limit labor's expanding political power. Thus, ".... the basic cleavage in Winnipeg politics was class orientation" and as a result ".... the ethnic variety of the city did not manifest itself directly but was largely subsumed by class polarization."23 Rea demonstrates how successful the "Citizens" aldermen were, and how different they and their supporters were to "Labor" aldermen and their supporters in terms of occupation, housing, and education (though more similar in ethnic homogeneity, religion, and place of birth—if anything, the Citizen aldermen were increasingly less male, WASPish, and non-local born than the Labor aldermen). He does this by analyzing various indices of socioeconomic status. By roll call vote analysis (using the Rice Index of Cohesion), Rea also demonstrates how very cohesive these groups were in their roll call voting—especially on the six policy issues of civic employee wages and working conditions, welfare costs, expansion of public services, rates of taxation (especially the business tax rates), electoral reform (including investigation of plural property voting), and appointments.


22. A listing of the successor organizations can be found in Artibise, Winnipeg: An Illustrated History, Table 15. A fuller description of the development of these organizations has been rendered by Paul Barber in Lorimer, A Citizen's Guide.

While I think that Rea has correctly and successfully demonstrated the nature of the Citizens and Labor aldermen, and shown their cleavage on roll call votes, I have several reservations about concluding that Winnipeg civic politics has been dominated by class and party politics since 1919. First of all, the methods though effective are limited. Social and economic differences have been demonstrated, but class consciousness can only be inferred by "labor" voting cohesions and electoral support (which is not studied in the Rea Report). Second, the quantitative data is not supplemented with relevant qualitative data such as descriptions of what went on in and around City Council meetings. Unfortunately, roll call votes and party affiliations reveal only public, fixed expressions of political stance which can be manipulated and belied by less (or non-)public interactions. My experience and discussions with former aldermen and more recent City Councillors suggest to me that the party-class cleavages very soon (after the Strike) gave way to more behind-the-scenes co-operation and comradeship ("clubbishness") than Rea's analysis and commentary suggests. Third, the Mayor is excluded, and the role of Independents is almost totally ignored. The role of personalities, a major element in Lloyd Stinson's descriptions, is almost totally lacking--as are attitudes toward development, property industry connections, and how the bulk of Council business (which didn't involve roll call votes) was handled. Finally—and most important—the nature and operations of the "Citizens" groups' core committees, and the specific interests they represent, are not here evident. I noted above the 1884 origins of "Citizens" groups in Winnipeg: an alliance of property owners to some of the downtown businessmen through a "front" (legitimization) organization using the "Citizens" name, and claiming to be nonpartisan and disinterested except in the "public interest" of "a better Winnipeg." I submit that further research will show that these organizations were run by a relatively few Winnipeggers (not the whole "commercial elite") who had direct and indirect connections with real estate and other urban development interests, and that the "Citizens" organizations were secretly the funnels for funds from these interests in return for which many of those interests received both direct and indirect benefits. The focus on class polarization and party politics merely explains one facet of the results of this operation; the broader framework is that of "democratic elitism" internal metropolitanism, in which a small class-based elite (community power structure) controls a large hinterland (the city) by political organization and control. In this characterization of Winnipeg's past civic politics, the 1919 Strike and subsequent labor organization was merely a catalyst for the revival, not the creation, of the "Citizens" group technique for assuring "the proper direction" to Winnipeg civic politics.

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24 For an initial attempt at separating ethnicity and party/class factors see C. Watts, "Ethnicity and Voting Patterns in City of Winnipeg Elections," in Wichern, ed., Studies in Winnipeg Politics, pp. 53-68.

25 I have reliable information on at least three long-term citizens' "bagmen"--all three are either in real estate and insurance, or related occupations.

26 On democratic elitism see P. Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic
Thus, we can be grateful to Rea for his exposure of the Citizens groups as party operations and as class-biased. He had done a first-rate job. However, it seems to me that we have more research to do in order to conclude either a class-party basis or a property industry basis for Winnipeg civic politics; or come to a proper conclusion as to the actual impact of either. Artibise argues, as Rea has privately, that class/party divisions on Winnipeg City Council improved the quality of Winnipeg politics and public services.27 While I have no doubt that this may be correct, we do not yet have suitable evidence of this or other conclusions about the impact of class-party politics in Winnipeg. Furthermore, this neglects the broader questions of who has been controlling Winnipeg politics all these years.

The Taraska Report and Urban Structural Reform in Winnipeg

The Report and Recommendations of the Committee of Review, City of Winnipeg Act (The Taraska Report) is divided into six parts. After an introductory section, a five-chapter second part reviews "the traditions of urban government in Canada," "achievements of the new city," ".... major areas of concern," six criteria for evaluation of contemporary urban government structures, and evaluation of various rejected alternatives for change. A third part provides the justification for the Committee's choice of "a modified parliamentary form of urban government." The two chapters argue that the proposed system will provide the leadership, accountability, and policy orientation lacking in the existing system, and develop party politics on the "sound foundation" which exists in "the maturing system of party politics at city hall" (as demonstrated by the Rea Report).

Part Four describes the structure of the proposed system which includes retention of election by wards every three years, community committees, and a relatively large (39 member) council. The key parliamentary features would be the election of the mayor, who would head the civic government, by all councillors for a term of one year; a chief critic ("leader of the opposition") who would be chosen by a majority vote of those councillors who did not vote for the winning mayoralty candidate; The Mayor would not chair the council meetings, but instead a chairman ("speaker") would be selected by the Council. The Mayor would nominate ("appoint") the Deputy Mayor and the members of the executive committee of Council. Together, this Executive would structure the Standing Committees and the Administration, and major staffing would

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27 Artibise, Winnipeg: An Illustrated History.
be in their hands. The Board of Commissioners, the existing top administrative unit, would be abolished, and powers of structuring the administrative hierarchy left to the new Mayor and his Executive. (A Board of Management would report to the Executive, but supposedly only on implementation and administration). Though retained, the functions of the community committees and their Resident Advisory Groups would be restricted to community planning and direction of local culture and recreation operations. The primary focus for these local structures would be "... the preparation and implementation of city plans and, in particular, the district plans and action area plans" (p. 89). In addition, the Committees would also retain the power of hearing zoning applications. The Committee also recommends that the Communities be reduced in number from twelve to six, the latter roughly corresponding to the existing six public works districts developed by the administration for the decentralized handling of public services delivery. Of course, in this change wards and communities become larger in geographical area and population. This part of the Report concludes by making recommendations concerning the Resident Advisory Groups, establishment of a central information office, and better compliance with the Official Languages section of the Act.

Part Five of the Taraska Report is called "the policy development process," but deals extensively with problems in the City's planning processes and the handling of zoning matters, making specific suggestions and recommendations for improvement of those processes. In a third and final chapter, the Committee recommends elimination of the controversial Section 653 of the Act which required the preparation of Environmental Impact Reviews for major public works undertaken by the City. The sixth and final part deals with provincial-municipal relations, and recommends greater local autonomy, that the Province rescind the section binding itself to local zoning and planning decisions, and that financial arrangements and consultation between the Province and the City continue to be studied and improved.

It is not possible to deal with all of the findings and recommendations of this 162 page Report. Rather, I will mention some of its positive aspects, and concentrate on what I believe to be its crippling defects. First, its positive aspects: it does detail the "urban structural reform" position and attempt to carry it to its logical conclusion in the most promising setting for its realization in North America. The Committee is correct, I think, in seeing the urban structural reform postulates as being unfulfilled in the final Act and operations of the new City. Party politics and responsible policy-making were implied, but not realized. Also, the Committee has done a service in sponsoring the Rea research and in bringing

28 The City has been taken to Court on at least two cases, including the controversial Trizec development at Portage and Main. See D. Walker, "Winnipeg and Trizec: Giving It All Away," City Magazine, Vol. 2, No. 3 and 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 24-33.
into publication many of the problems and viewpoints which limited the success of various aspects of the Unicity innovation in urban government.

On the other hand, there are some very major defects to this Report. First, the Report substitutes logic and unsubstantiated generalization for good, empirical research. In this regard, it can be very unfavorably compared with the Robarts inquiry. The Rea Report is the only major piece of research which the Committee commissioned, and this was only after the Committee discovered the probable conclusions and discerned the manner in which they might serve the Committee's predisposed argument.

Second, the Committee defines their focus as "nothing less than the quality of government being provided the people of Winnipeg," and their central research question is "how do the people feel about their City government?" (p. ix). Rather than surveying the public as both Lloyd Axworthy and I did several years ago, the Committee adopted the methodology of holding public hearings. While this technique elicited 87 written briefs and 74 oral submissions, it cannot, as the Committee contends, be equated with an accurate determination of what the "people" feel about Winnipeg civic government and politics. In addition, the Committee reduces the public hearing input (3000 pages of typescript) to findings by quoting particular passages from various presentations which justify the Committee's observations or points of view.

Third, the main reliance in the Report is not on evidence, but on the logic of urban structural reform. This logic is clearly outlined (without documentation) in Chapter One and perhaps best summarized in the following statements: municipal policymaking is arbitrary, confused, misunderstood and vestigially developed (p.1); the traditional "house-keeping" role of municipal governments has been rendered obsolete by "the new urban needs" of "a new kind of city and a new kind of citizen" (p.4). The answer is not the regional structures common in Ontario and Quebec since they do not change the basic function of local government. Rather, there is hope in the emergence of policy-oriented parties in Vancouver, Toronto (sic) and Montreal. These developments show that "... the difficulties of the contemporary metropolis can best be dealt with on the basis of clearly articulated and systematic policies ... and ... such definitive policies require cohesive political groups to formulate them and carry them out...." (p. 6). The remaining links in the chain of

29 The only existing volume on the subject is J. Masson and J.D. Anderson, eds., Emerging Party Politics in Urban Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972). However, one finds little there on the party politics in these cities. I am preparing an article with extensive references and data to update the only empirical survey, J.G. Joyce and H.A. Hosse, Civic Parties in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1970).
logic are apparently so obvious as to not even require stating by the Committee: policy-oriented, local politics are the answer to whatever deficiencies might be found in the Winnipeg system, and such politics can be legislated into existence through changes in urban government structure. I question both the general correctness of this popular viewpoint, and its specific application to the Winnipeg situation.

Fourth, the Committee did not attempt to investigate alternative methods of achieving party politics, such as electing Councillors at large (as in Vancouver). They did not attempt to try out their own alternative, showing that it could be workable and practical, or to consider how local and provincial politicians, interests, and the general public might react to the proposals. Nor does the Committee discuss the potentially harmful effects of its alternatives such as (1) the legitimatization of a power elite and backroom politics in the name of party government which characterize I.C.E.C. operations, and (2) the effect of Independents (Mayor and Councillors), some of whom are now among the most severe critics of the I.C.E.C.

Finally, the Taraska Committee does not address itself at any point to the problems of conflicting interests--property vs. City, inner city vs. suburbs, etc. This is ironic since the Chairman of the Committee is very familiar with the inside machinations which have characterized Winnipeg civic politics over the last 30 years. There is little or no concern for the preservation of ethnic and community identities, citizen organization, or other forms of extra-electoral participation. There is no mention or discussion of social concerns, human conditions, or other "people issues."

Reaction to These Reports and Subsequent Developments

The failure of the Taraska Committee to properly evaluate the local political scene became immediately evident. Virtually no one supported the parliamentary system proposal, and both City and Provincial politicians criticized the major proposal of the Report (one local politician referred to it as "pious goddam theory in the extreme"). After seven months, in May of 1977, the N.D.P. Government released its bill amending the City of Winnipeg Act. The amendments did not include creation of a "modified parliamentary form" of civic government, or even change the at-large election of the Mayor; but they did follow numerous other recommendations of the Taraska Committee, such as the reduction of the numbers of Communities to six, and the delegation of the right to structure the City's legislative and administrative structure to the City Council (or

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30 For public pronouncements see Winnipeg Tribune and Free Press, October 21-26, 1976.

31 See Winnipeg newspapers, May 7, May 25-26, and June 10, 1977. Final ward boundaries and numbers were announced July 21, 1977.
its majority group). In addition, the size of the Council, and number of wards, was reduced from 50 to 29, as over against the 39 recommended by the Taraska Committee. And the Taraska and Rea Reports were left to history as interest shifted to the nature and implications of the Government's proposed amendments.

In the meantime, there has been a Provincial inquiry into land and housing prices in the Winnipeg area (the "Bellan" Commission), and a local conflict of interest inquiry (the "Smith" Commission). Questions had been raised about relationships between councillors and developers which touches on the behind-the-scenes operations of some I.C.E.C. councillors, and the relationship between the City and major developers. All of this was eclipsed by the Amendments and the prospects of upcoming provincial and local elections in the fall of 1977. They both came about in October of 1977. The N.D.P. Provincial Government was defeated by Sterling Lyon and the Progressive Conservatives, and the current "Citizens" group, the Independent Citizens Election Committee, gained a one person majority on the new City Council.32 A key event in the electoral process was the withdrawal of Mayor Stephen Juba after a generation of battles with the Citizens and other councillors.33 The Citizens candidate, Bill Norrie, failed to capture the mayorality; it went instead to I.C.E.C. defector and Independent Bob Steen. Continuation of the "Citizens" hegemony, under the guise of nonpartisanship, appeared to be assured with the resignation of some of the top Councillors whose positions were taken by younger councillors rising through the I.C.E.C. ranks. It did not appear that the new Mayor would cause any more trouble than Juba, but Steen was "open" to the idea of an opposition group to the I.C.E.C.---not a party, but a group which would provide a counter weight to the I.C.E.C. dominance. There is no sign that either local historians, public officials, or the public are yet willing to pull the veil away from the operations of the I.C.E.C. and face up to the findings of the Rea Report---much less the murky reality that very possibly lies hidden behind the public mask of Winnipeg civic politics.

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33 Stinson, Political Warriors, Chapter 17