The Urban Worlds of Latin and Anglo America: Prefatory Thoughts

Richard M. Morse

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Résumé de l'article

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Résumé/Abstract


This introductory paper examines some of the main questions raised by the papers presented to the urbanization symposium in Vancouver. Comparisons between the Latin American urban experience and that of the United States and Canada revealed basic contrasts in spite of some broad hemispheric similarities. Differences were particularly apparent in the residual influence of native society on later European settlement, in the role of the state versus private commerce in growth and development, and in the differing class structures.

The papers that follow were presented at the Seventh Symposium on “Latin American Urbanization from its Origins to Our Time” held in conjunction with the Forty-Third International Congress of Americanists at Vancouver, British Columbia, August 10-17, 1979. The previous six Symposia (listed in the Appendix), the first held in 1966, focused on Latin America with only occasional external forays. Indeed the region itself offers ample opportunities for comparative historical inquiry with its geographical diversity; its varied pre-Columbian civilizations; the divergent European settlement strategies employed in the Spanish Indies, Portuguese Brazil, and the non-Hispanic Caribbean; and the differing urban responses to the region’s increasing involvement with the world economy and, eventually, to industrialization. While the 120 or so papers of the first six Symposia do not offer an integrated conspectus of this formidable subject matter, they do provide guideposts and case studies for a wide range of topics and issues. After the Sixth Symposium, the conference organizers felt the time had come to place Latin American cities in perspective alongside those of the United States and Canada, thus fulfilling the hemispheric aims of the Congress of Americanists. For the Vancouver meeting, accordingly, specialists in British North American urban development were invited to join Latin Americanists in sessions that would feature the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with special attention to demography, socioeconomic change, technological and industrial evolution, urban design, and intellectual orientations.

Although Woodrow Borah and Tulio Halperin Donghi made valiant efforts to synthesize the Latin American urban story, it was clear that this region is more unwieldy for the comparative enterprise than the United States or Canada, not only because it is larger and more heterogeneous but also because, being plurinational and unevenly researched, it lacks the unified statistical and historiographical base that Anglo Americans take for granted. Understandably, some of the Latin American papers were confined to single countries or, given lacunae in our knowledge, to basic research. Two additional factors complicate the task of summarizing the proceedings: first, none of the papers explicitly compares the three regions and, second, certain “intermediate” cases such as French Canada, the United States plantation South, and the British and French West Indies, were not addressed. Enlightening comparisons did of course flash forth in the discussion periods, but the spontaneity and occasional inspiration of these exchanges are difficult to recover in a post-mortem. Here the judicious course is to point out possible lines of comparison arising directly from the papers the reader has before him.

These prefatory reflections will feature contrasts between urban Latin-and urban Anglo America. In jostling for academic visibility, each of us is tempted to claim uniqueness for his professional turf. I trust it is not wholly in this spirit that I stress Latin America’s divergence from the United States and Canadian patterns. I merely seek to bring somewhat under control the flickering perspectives one experienced at the sessions as deeply knowledgeable scholars shuttled nimbly between professional minutiae and lofty conceptual discourse. It is of course true that the Canadian and the United States urban systems show, internally, significant regional variation and that the Canadian case as a whole differs interestingly from that of the United States. It is also true that one can demonstrate similarities for all of the Americas. Gilbert Stelter’s observation that early Canadian towns were products of European imperial expansion and Peter Goheen’s claim that they formed part of an international system are propositions of Pan American validity. The use of towns as instruments for territorial appropriation and economic development can be documented hemispherically. One can point to common European sources for urban design; the form of the medieval bastide had sequels in both Spanish and Anglo America, while Vitruvian principles show up in the plan for New Haven as well as in Spain’s colonizing ordinances. For a later period pioneer Canadian economic historians gave leads for analyzing settlement patterns in export-oriented rural areas that have been applied all the way south to Argentina. Architectural historians would find similarities in late-nineteenth century bourgeois residences and public buildings of Toronto, Chicago, and Buenos Aires. In many ways, however, the differences between Anglo and Latin American urban history overshadow both the Canada-United States contrast and broad hemispheric similarities.

At the outset we must warn the unwary about Borah’s agile and deceptively entitled “sketch” of eighteenth-century Latin American cities with its effortless survey of urban and general population growth, founding of new towns, modernization of production, commercial quickening, land use and architecture,
urban services, and cultural amenities. Any of these points suggests loose equivalence with Anglo America. Indeed, from Alexander von Humboldt’s description of late-colonial Mexico City one might even imagine that metropolis to have been rather more elegant and urbane than its northern counterparts. The novitiate, however, should complement Borah’s “sketch” with an earlier paper (Borah 1980) that follows the transition from aboriginal to European settlement patterns. Here he examines the early impetus of the Iberian colonizing effort along the highland backbone from Mexico to Peru where mineral deposits lay and where native populations were available as a source of labor and tribute. Indian settlement systems largely survived until the mid-sixteenth century, alongside a limited number of Spanish towns created incrementally for administration. By circa 1600 reorientations were in full course as a result of Indian mortality, European immigration, and the Spaniards’ need for a disciplined, spatially nucleated labour supply. None the less, the pre-Columbian pattern showed inertial persistence, and even towns that were founded or reshaped to European design became control centres for Indian groups in adjoining barrios or surrounding villages. In short, both the spatial distribution and the community organization of pre-Columbian societies in highland Spanish America exercised residual influence on European settlement that was without parallel in British America.

Even the period that Borah treats in his present paper — a time when Indians in larger cities were being absorbed into a racially indistinct plebe — implies lively contrasts with Anglo America. Daniel Smith addresses some of them when he places United States urbanization before 1815 in a “Malthusian framework.” He calls this a time of “extensive” economic growth when resources were available to supply means of subsistence, growing at an arithmetic rate, to a population growing at a geometric rate. Only in the 1810s did industrialization take hold to support increments in per capita productivity. Until then, the spatially extended growth of a population whose work force was 80-90% agricultural caused “ruralization or decommercialization.” Under these conditions, Smith holds, a stable per capita income, or “the attainment of stagnation,” was “a considerable achievement by the indices of comparative economic history.”

While we may assume Smith’s conclusions to rest on unimpeachable statistical evidence, his emphases vary from those that I developed in a comparative sketch of the period (Morse 1975). What struck me was that while the proportion of United States population residing in towns of 8,000 or more fluctuated before 1780, after that date it rose steadily from 2.7% to 8.5% in 1840, leveling off only in the war decade of the 1810s. In Latin America, by contrast, one finds relative decline in the population of larger cities from the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, with occasional fluctuations in the independence period of 1810-30. Before 1780 the British colonies, it is clear, witnessed “ruralization” in a statistical sense. I wonder, however, whether either this or the subsequent period was marked by “decommercialization.” Studies by Taylor (1964) and Rubin (1967) suggest that townsman and farmer alike shared a “commercial” outlook that made them regard subsistence farming as an ephemeral frontier condition. The key indicator for economic change was not movement of goods but migration of people who, accustomed to a relatively high living standard, created for inland regions, in Rubin’s words, the “financial equivalent of the modern mass tourist industry.” The commercialization of Anglo America was furthered by a diversity of exports that resisted monopoly, encouraging local merchants to improve their promotional techniques and to develop specialization in marketing, insurance, and finance.

In Latin America at this time, it is true, many towns prospered with the growth of domestic and foreign markets and the swifter ships employed in maritime trade. But here commercial activity was conducted within a framework of mercantilist design, patrician status objectives, and prebendary administration. Urban merchants were adept at keeping alternatives open for social advancement and for the career orientation of their sons; they failed, that is, to constitute an enduring mercantile “class.” (see Brading 1971, Gôngora 1975, Socolow 1978.) Late-colonial port cities, like Havana, Guayaquil, and Buenos Aires, that tapped newly active export hinterlands offered nothing so developed as the financial and commercial institutions of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. Large administrative-commercial centers like Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires tended to centralize commercial functions rather than to diffuse them spatially throughout a farflung hinterland in the fashion that Lemon (1967) describes for Philadelphia. It would surprise me to learn that Anglo America of the late-eighteenth century offers an analogue to Mexico’s important “commercial” city of Guadalajara, where credit was largely controlled by the church; where private persons (merchants, priests, widows) lent money only once or twice in a period of decades; where capital circulated within a small group of businessmen and clergy, spilling into the hinterland only via large landowners; and where the volume of loans dropped by nearly 15% from the 1760s to the turn of the century (Greenow 1979).

In short, the “development” pole of the growth-development binomial was more heavily favored in Anglo than in Latin America. Moreover, the turmoil of the Latin American wars for independence accentuated the region’s institutional lag, precisely when the United States was passing from its “Malthusian” period into one of rising per capita growth. Coatsworth’s estimates of income trends (see Table) show retardation at this time that, despite later turnabouts, has conditioned Latin American urban-industrial growth ever since. This line of reasoning leads me to reformulate Smith’s assertion that staple production for export in the British colonies declined in the eighteenth century, relative to the national product, and was therefore not an engine for economic transformation. For we must consider the inhibiting effects on Latin American institutional development that are associated with the insertion of that region’s export economies into the arena of international trade as described by Halperin. In other words, hemispheric comparison suggests that the relative fall in exports in the British colonies was accompanied by a coiling of the economic mainspring — a strengthening of domestic institutions for production, international exchange, credit, and finance — that powered the economic surge that is statistically demonstrated above. If production for export was not the motor force for this “great leap forward,” the decline in such production, in a sense, was.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>73 (44)</td>
<td>62 (38)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>56 (20)</td>
<td>72 (26)</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Parenthesized numbers convert the figures for Mexico and Brazil to a per cent of those for the United States. Adapted from: Coatsworth 1978: 82

The field for comparative study unfolds further when we consider the westward expansion of transportation and urban settlement in the United States as it gathered force through the nineteenth century. Canada’s westward push, occurring later, was a comparable phenomenon — despite sectional deviations caused by the magnetic force of the United States — when we consider the jump in the urban hierarchy that Goheen demonstrates for Winnipeg, Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmon-
ton. The Spanish American conquistadors and settlers, in contrast, accomplished their westward Manifest Destiny immediately, in the sixteenth century, by appropriating the Pacific-facing coasts and highlands by urban settlement; opening Acapulco to transpacific trade in 1565; and establishing Lima as the administrative and commercial linchpin for South America, linked northward to Panama and eventually, as Borah shows, to Atlantic maritime routes via Cape Horn. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Latin American counterpart to the Anglo American westward movement, then, was an eastward shift, a relocation from the Pacific to the Atlantic of the axis of economic development, caused by the growth of foreign markets for subtropical and temperate agropastoral exports from the Antilles, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina and reinforced by Brazilian gold exports in the eighteenth century and finally Venezuelan petroleum in the twentieth. Though not marked by a reflux of population from west to east, the shift did induce heavy foreign immigration to the south Atlantic zone and to Cuba. This continental reorientation, to be sure, subsumed localized westward expansions, notably those of the Brazilian mineral and coffee zones and the Platine agropastoral zones. (Cuba's sugar economy, on the other hand, expanded from west to east.) But such export-oriented adventures reaffirmed the dominance of the Atlantic littoral postholes: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo-Santos, Montevideo, and Buenos Aires. For those seeking upward social mobility, it has been said, Latin American frontiers of this period were not safety valves but safety belts. There were no analogues to Winnipeg and Vancouver, to Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles. Dowd (1956) once pointed out that the United States West, while initially “exploited” by the East, never became its colony; it developed in reciprocal economic articulation with the rest of the nation. The same seems true of Canada but is much less so of the Western hinterlands of southern Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. And when we look, as Halperin does, at inland centres of the more traditional productive zones of Latin America, we find that nineteenth-century innovations advantaged them as well. Railroads enabled Mexico City to resume the commanding commercial role in the national commercial structure that it had enjoyed under the Bourbons; Santiago de Chile was similarly favoured.

Two of the papers on Latin America pay special attention to the inertial advantage of other cities and to the heroic policies that decentralized and transformed European administrative centres into regional centres where neither ranching, mining, nor plantation agriculture supported complex urban infrastructure, and “the financial largesse of the central state begins to compensate those [provincial capitals] whose districts are lagging in the expansive process stimulated by exports.” Armando de Ramón and José Larraln attribute the inordinate growth of larger nineteenth-century Spanish American administrative centres to allocations of public investment dating from the late-colonial period. Their case study of Santiago de Chile from 1800 to 1880 correlates the subsequent process of intrarural renewal with economic change largely to the extent that public revenues underwrote the state’s interventionist policies. For the United States Michael Conzen acknowledges the role of government largesse in the form of capital development projects, but made available “in the absence of restraint;” the government’s role was passive, “within and beyond the city,” given “a political context of coolness towards government involvement, not to say intervention.” Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot do speak of “the crucial role of the state” in Canada’s urban development, and indeed, the Canadian papers contain hints that the country’s urban development was, at various stages, rather more centrally orchestrated than that of the United States. Even so, these co-authors mention only such indirect state controls as tariff protection and tax exemptions, which they cite, along with other factors, to warn against technological and industrial determinism.

The issue of state intervention is further clarified when we consider sources for urban design. Stelter speaks of an era of “imperial control” over town layout in Canada that yielded to “a laissez-faire system of no regulation,” roughly mirroring the transition from colonial town to commercial town in about 1820. The mechanism of “imperial control” is exemplified in Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe’s eclectic use of United States designs to devise a plan for York in 1793 embodying his “desire to re-establish the British class system on American soil” and creating a pattern of land use “whereby future expansion would contribute to the creation of a hierarchically structured society.” A similar rationale applies of course to the sixteenth-century Spanish American grid plan. Of interest here are, first, that “imperial control” of urban design and land use in Canada was a relatively brief moment in the nation’s urban history and, second, that once Canada entered the nineteenth-century “laissez-faire age,” control of urban functions and areal expansion were abandoned to market forces of real estate speculation, commercialization, and industrialization. In Mexico City, by contrast, Moreno Toscano and González Angulo (1977) show that the years 1810-45 were a period of demographic and economic stability or stagnation; yet it was precisely then when changes originated in the “político-institutional order” to provide a framework for innovations linked to transport technology and industrialization in the latter half of the century. That is, they hold that administrative measures — such as regulating forms of personal service, limiting access of Indians to the core city, and rescheduling taxes on rent and real estate — contributed more to changing the “spatial structure” of the urban population than did technological and industrial innovations occurring later during more rapid urban growth.

All this is not to say that, as the nineteenth century progressed, large Latin American cities did not experience convulsions caused by real estate booms and rapid transit systems. It is rather that the spatial development of a city like
Buenos Aires, as analyzed by Torres (1977), failed to accompany “the orderly advance of an evolutionary sequence (from the ‘preindustrial’ to the ‘industrial’ city)” of the sort that Michael Katz implies when he inserts Canadian cities into successive stages of commercial, industrial, and corporate capitalism. Torres finds it impossible to link such variables as transport technology, population growth, economic development, operation of the real estate market, and state intervention (e.g., the early Peronist policies promoting income redistribution) so as to present the city’s growth either as an outcome of economic and technological change or as a reflex response to shifting social composition. The development of urban social structure and its spatial distribution exhibits notable “hiatuses and fractures” in the twentieth century, with the process of population dispersion showing occasional “regressive” tendencies. Torres concludes with the paradox that although Buenos Aires is the Latin American city with the longest period of industrialization and metropolization, it is also the one “that most fully departs from the ‘industrial’ ideal type.”

Katz’s paper introduces the central issue of urban class structure.* In it he assimilates a Canadian and a United States city to a general type and gives the “social question” not only the prominence it receives in Latin American analyses but even greater determinative force than Torres accords it for Buenos Aires. He further assists comparative inquiry by his use of Marxian categories, thus associating his work with a prominent strain of contemporary Latin American urban research. Katz’s point of departure is that Anglo America became a capitalist society after the mid-eighteenth century. This, followed by the shift from commercial to industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century, polarized urban populations into a two-class structure “based upon capital and labor.” Katz vows that he intends no reductionism and that his purpose is to give structural anchor­age for the nuances of stratification analysis. Without this, he argues, stratification studies gloss over the asymmetry of the social system; they neglect the determinants of group destinies in favour of a melioristic assessment of possibilities for private advancement. He implicitly accuses Anglo American social scientists of giving ponderous scientific legitimation to bourgeois political rhetoric that discourages systemic social analysis, features an atomistic social philosophy, and encourages privatized incentives for upward mobility. His critical stance even leads Katz to endorse reward by group ascription rather than individual achievement, and to applaud “affirmative action” as “the first sustained attempt in American history to foster the mobility of particular groups, if necessary at the expense of individuals.” At this point Latin Americanists can take heart that their region of study is no longer “underdeveloped.” For theirs is a family of societies that Parsons (1951: 198-200) explicitly categorized as oriented to particularism and ascription rather than to universalism and achievement. From the appointment of Father Las Casas as the first Protector of the Indians down to Perón’s inclusionist policies for the “shirtless ones” and Fidel Castro’s “mobilization” of Cuba’s dispossessed, Latin American history is replete with strategies, earnest or feigned, for “incorporating” the dispossessed on a basis of group ascription. Indeed, it has not escaped scholarly notice that “affirmative action” programs operate in the United States — with their consolatory rhetoric, palliative largesse, and tactical co-optation — bear analogy to Latin American “populist” strategies dating from the 1920s.

Associated with the advent of capitalism in Europe, Katz tells us, was a “massive upsurge in transiency” that inflated the new Anglo American proletariat after the mid-eighteenth century. Latin American conquest and settlement were of course the product of an earlier tide of transiency, reflected in: (1) the transatlantic migration of some half-million Iberians by 1650 and perhaps another half-million or more in the less documented period to 1800; (2) the dislocation by epidemics and retribalization of fifty million Indians (give or take a few tens of millions); and (3) the transatlantic migration of some three and a half million Africans by 1800. These groups and their descendants became identified by an increasingly complex system of socioethnic nomenclature. Its categories, however, were not the income-occupation labels of modern stratification analysis but markers that denoted status ascription and connoted access to formal or informal power and influence. The logic of this taxonomy persists to the present. The colonial version, according to Mörner (1967: 60), was a dual hierarchy applying to the “society of castas”: one defined by five categories of “legal condition,” the other by six categories of “social status” as this was determined by public opinion. In 1909, on the eve of his country’s Revolution, a Mexican observer (Molina Enriquez 1909: 220-21) proposed another dual classification for his national society based on socioethnic and functional criteria. The first presented a prestige ladder of seventeen subgroups arranged in descending order of foreigners, Creoles, mestizos, and Indians. The second shuffled the subgroups into a ranking that showed their relative access to political and economic power. A third and contemporary example is an anatomy of Peruvian society constructed by Delgado (1968), who substitutes “composition” for the term “stratification” that derives from nineteenth-century European and North American social thought. Citing Engels on the inapplicability to “Patagonia” of England’s “laws of political economy,” he organizes Peruvian society into forty-two occupational groups. These are combined under nine categories, and these in turn subsumed under four basic ones that constitute “a power continuum between two polar realities: on one side the groups living under extreme conditions of domination and on the other groups that exercise the greatest control in Peruvian society.” (For contemporary Mexico, R. and I.H. de Pozas [1978] propose a social paradigm that unites neo-Marxian, political, occupational, and socioethnic criteria.)

Over the centuries, then, Latin American social hierarchies have been seen as determined by access to power rather than by ownership of means of production. This supplies the dichotomizing principle for which the academic no less than the popular imagination hungers. The classic version is the distinction, prevalent in late-colonial Latin American cities, between gente decente and the plebe, decent folk and the populace. This division was long-lasting, as Hardoy and Langdon remind us when they cite the Chilean, Váltés Cange, who in 1910 contrasted the opulence of the “dominant classes” with the “inhuman life” of the “populace,” “the despotic necessities of the magnates and the spoliation of the weak.” Even as late as the 1950s when Ralph Beals (1953) devised rural and urban stratification schemes (still partly based on ethnic criteria) for four Latin American countries, he found that trifurcation into upper, middle, and lower classes was problematical and that the term “middle class” was unusual in local vocabularies. “Upper” and “lower” classes, though more widely recognized, were generally designated by terms more expressive of power relationships: gente decente, gente de razón, los ricos, la clase dirigente as against mestizos, Indians, cholas, caboclos, negros, rotos, ladinos, indígenas, and naturales.

The dichotomous view long entertained in Latin American popular wisdom is not therefore a “class” division into those who control the means of production and those who sell their labour

* Towards a Two-class Model of the 19th Century City in North America.” This paper was not available for publication and is therefore described in some detail here.
as a commodity. Rather, it stands as a lasting reminder of the failure of the colonizing powers to have achieved the high Iberian ideal of “social incorporation.” Still today, the “inclusionist” challenge to incorporate the “marginalized” (a term, controversial to be sure, but with no apparent equivalent in Katz’s analysis) overshadows the problem of class conflict. (See Germani 1973; Berlinck 1975; Kowarick 1975; Lomnitz 1978.) It is true that cities like Buenos Aires and São Paulo which industrialized early by regional standards offered congenial settings for class definition. Indeed, their factory hands and labour leaders were largely of European origin and sympathetic to socialist class analysis. However, in his comparative study of labour movements in Europe, the United States, and Latin America Rodrigues (1974) points to circumstances that differentiated the Latin American case, inhibiting the vision of “a socialism based on the working class and on Marxist conceptions of class struggle.” (See also Touraine 1961; Touraine and Pécaut 1970.) Here are three of them:

1. In nineteenth-century Europe, industry was labour-intensive, recruiting a large proletariat that was relatively homogeneous in its professional composition. Industry in twentieth-century Latin America is capital-intensive at its modern pole, thus offering limited employment opportunities, and labour-intensive at its traditional pole. The latter therefore expands in response to the restricted absorptive capacity of the modern sector, creating a proletariat of heterogeneous educational and professional background.

2. The European industrial work force was recruited from artisan groups, rural and urban, who experienced their incorporation into the proletariat as social demotion and were therefore available for “class” mobilization. Latin American industrial labour is divided into a privileged sector, enjoying (intermittent) government protection, and a vulnerable, unorganized sector.

3. Nineteenth-century European workers were excluded from political decision-making, and the state limited its intervention in the industrial process and the “social question” to “anti-syndical” policies. The political participation of organized labour was legitimized only when its numbers were large and its solidarity proven. In twentieth-century Latin America, industrial labour was admitted to high political and bureaucratic councils when it represented but a modest fraction of the national work force and its organizational capacity was immature. Here, moreover, tutorial godfathers who were not directly linked to the economy — such as technocrats, progressive intellectuals, the military — were available to assist the selective co-optation of labour as they had not been in Europe.

On one hand, then, we have Katz’s two-class society for Anglo American cities (in an analysis that might require appreciable retouching within the transatlantic perspective of Rodrigues). On the other we have categories such as those of the anthropologist Leeds (1974), who uses evidence from six large Brazilian cities to posit a split between the classes (some 40% of the urban population) and the masses (some 60% of the population, a sector including but extending beyond the “marginalized”). The “classes” are defined by “power, wealth, prestige, and decision making” rather than by ownership of the means of production. They are horizontally subdivided by vaguely defined strata that “are by no means integrated, much less self-conscious, for which the Marxian term ‘class’ would be appropriate.” The boundaries of these strata rigidify near the bottom and near the top of the “classes” but are permeable in the middle range, where a host of informal, hierarchical interest groups transect them vertically. The critical threshold lies between the classes and the masses. At this point upward ascent to “class” status is throttled by scarcity of economic possibilities, to be sure, but also by the fact that the presentation of self of the “masses” — their dress, speech, and manners — excludes them from networks of “cue transmission” that facilitate formation of informal groups to support career advancement in the realm of the “classes.” Admittedly, Leeds’ interpretation of Brazilian urban society stresses behavioral description at the expense of systemic explication. But if we ascribe reasonable validity to his observations, they are symptomatic of a structural dichotomy that differs importantly from the one Katz proposes, perhaps problematically, for Anglo-American society.

Here, then, are some suggested contests and linkages for this set of unusually broad and enlightening papers. I have not attempted a neat synopsis of each contribution but allowed my private interests as a Latin Americanist to distribute the emphases. As a result, I have done justice to none of the papers, and three of them have lamentably fallen by the wayside. Maria Luize Marcilio’s paper that divides nineteenth-century Brazil into four “demographic systems” (subsistence economies, plantation areas, slave populations, and urban areas) shows how we might disaggregate national statistics to yield a base for more targeted historical comparison. Rosemary Bromley places three towns of highland Ecuador in a matrix of administrative, agricultural, and manufacturing functions, then isolates commerce as the key variable that differentiated nineteenth-century urban growth; she thus invites comparative inquiry on the nature of commercialization in the small towns of Latin and Anglo America. To follow up leads for comparison contained in Eric Lampard’s dizzying interpretive study of city making and meddling in the United States from Jamestown to the NASA space flight centre would require another paper. I invite the reader to compose his own.

APPENDIX: The Urban Symposia and Proceedings

Given below are publication data for the seven Symposia on “Latin American Urbanization from its Origins to Our Time”, held at meetings of the International Congress of Americanists. The volumes for the first and third Symposia are identical with the collections published in the official Acts of the Congress. Proceedings of the second Symposium appeared only in the Acts. Papers for the fourth, fifth, and sixth Symposia are available in Spanish in the volumes listed and in the original languages, usually in abridged form, in the Acts. Six papers selected from the sixth Symposium will be published in English shortly in a special number of Comparative Urban Research.


2nd Symposium, 38th Congress. Stuttgart, Germany, 1968.

Theme: Urban Transformations (Social Systems, Urban Density, Spatial Structures)
Theme: City and Hinterland

5th Symposium, 41st Congress. Mexico City, Mexico, 1974.
Theme: Settlement Patterns and Sociopolitical Systems

Theme: Research Reviews, Reports on Current Projects

7th Symposium, 43rd Congress. Vancouver, B.C., Canada, 1979.
Theme: Comparative Urban History of the Americas (Latin America, United States, Canada) since the Eighteenth Century
Twenty-one papers selected from the first four Symposia were republished in English versions together with the proceedings of a special session on Latin American urbanization that was held in conjunction with the Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences at Chicago, Illinois, and Oshkosh, Wisconsin, in 1973. This volume is:

REFERENCES: