City Making And Mending In The United States: On Capitalizing a Social Environment

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Résumé de l’article
Le présent exposé étudie les attitudes adoptées à l’égard de l’urbanisation depuis la fondation des villes à l’époque coloniale américaine jusqu’à nos jours aux États-Unis. Il traite des activités propres à l’établissement et à la transformation de la ville du point de vue des institutions et du comportement modal, et non d’une iconographie urbaine ou de l’opinion qu’en ont les intellectuels éminents. Il s’agit de savoir, en fin de compte, si la somme des mutations sociales tend à rendre désuète la société urbaine un peu comme l’a fait le « progrès » pour la société rurale à la fin du XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle.

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"Profit is the very thing from whence, as from a principal cause, the greatness of cities growth."  
Giovanni Botero (1588)

"Our cities were built for the sake of making money. If we wish to rebuild them...we should make it profitable for the entrepreneur to undertake the task."
Louis Justement (1946)

Résumé/Abstract

Le présent exposé étudie les attitudes adoptées à l'égard de l'urbanisation depuis la fondation des villes à l'époque coloniale américaine jusqu'à nos jours aux États-Unis. Il traite des activités propres à l'établissement et à la transformation de la ville du point de vue des institutions et du comportement modal, et non d'une iconographie urbaine ou de l'opinion qu'en ont les intellectuels éminents. Il s'agit de savoir, en fin de compte, si la somme des mutations sociales tend à rendre désuète la société urbaine un peu comme l'a fait le «progrès» pour la société rurale à la fin du XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle.

This paper surveys attitudes toward city building from the foundation of cities in colonial America to the present day in the United States. It treats the activity of city making and mending in terms of modal behaviour and institutions, not the iconography of cities nor their reputation among prominent intellectuals. It is ultimately concerned with whether capitalized social change tends to render the forms of urban society obsolete much as "progress" outmoded rural society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

During the period of conquest and settlement of those Anglo-American territories which established themselves in the late eighteenth century as the United States of America, some twenty odd clusters of population on the Atlantic seaboard grew to a size and legal status approximating a twentieth-century United States census definition of "urban" as an incorporated place with 2,500 or more residents. The concentrations of 1770 contained about a twentieth of the population of the thirteen colonies. One hundred years later when a quarter of the greatly enlarged population — now occupying three million or more square miles across the continent — was thus "urbanized", more people lived in the 663 census cities than had inhabited the entire nation a half-century before. By 1970, when almost three-quarters of the population resided in cities, there were over 7,000 of them in the conterminous U.S. — fifty-five had populations in excess of 250,000 and six had a million or more residents. In sheer quantitative terms, the people of the United States must surely be ranked among the most indefatigable and accomplished city-builders in history.

This paper discusses attitudes toward city building in the United States from the standpoint of what was done by those in a position (and with motivation) to do something. It treats the activity of city making and mending in terms of modal behaviour and institutions, not the iconography of cities nor their reputation among prominent intellectuals. It is ultimately concerned with whether capitalized social change tends to render the forms of urban society obsolete much as "progress" outmoded rural society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The physical and social settings encountered by English and Dutch invaders early in the seventeenth century proffered no indigenous urban environments. As an ever larger proportion of the growing population subsequently adapted to experienced conditions of their own town life, however, an urbanized society — almost literally — took place across the continent. What moved this wonder-working transformation of wilderness into commonwealth was a widening and deepening conversion of nature into artifact; the environment took on a symbolic (as well as metabolic) significance. From the outset, the North America experienced by the invaders differed profoundly from that of the native "Eastern Woodland" peoples. By investing alien America with their imported notions of what was "worthwhile," the settlers began turning nature's properties to their own account: as various modes of "real" and "personal" estate. From this reinterpretation stemmed the capitalization of the environment whence an accession of "good," "benefit," or "profit" might accrue to those persons or corporations able to hold and dispose of such possessory interests, subject only to what Blackstone termed "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom." Meanwhile those without such possessory rights must either purchase a lease from, or contract their service to, one who did. Given nature's bounty, even the propertyless in America — tenants or servants — might expect to acquire a modest stake for themselves and their dependents in due course. So inviting was this early prospect for those able to possess a piece of the environment that, while moving to emancipate the land from common rights and other vestigial restraints, they revived and extended the most odious forms of human chattel bondage. The great real estate boom in North America thus produced not a "second serfdom" but rather a settler society at once the land of "the free" and, for the African, the home of "the slave."

If the power of labour did not of itself guarantee the acquisition of property, in the Lockean manner, neither did mere possession of a worldly estate assure income or capital gain. Only when a possessor mixed his effort with the soil to gain a competence could the property be said to have "produced" his livelihood. Such a person or family manufactured his (its) own environment and, in this sense, determined his (its) own standard of living with little or no dependence on others (except where common rights or obligations still obtained). The worthwhileness of ownership was thus to be reckoned from its yield either by the self-evaluation of the owner or by an exchange-
valuation of the product in use (i.e. by a "market" transaction). In the latter case the owner assumed a risk-bearing entrepreneurial role or, as a lessor, would share the risk with a rent-paying tenant.

All assets and faculties were liable to capital gain or loss, even if not currently employed in producing goods or services for exchange. Few property owners could altogether escape tax assessment by those exercising what Blackstone called "the power of public police and economy." Likewise the Crown might constrain a vassal to vacate his holding in order to accomplish some "necessary" public use — a road, harbour, fortification, or other vital facility. If an owner were unable to meet his communal obligation, endow his offspring with a satisfactory portion, or otherwise maintain his self-sufficiency, then he must submit his holding or its current performance in use to evaluation by others. The greater their expectation of the asset, the more it appreciated in value. A falling rate of return, on the other hand, might lessen their interest and would tend to lower its value until a more productive use could be found for it. If the owner would not devise such a betterment on his own account, he must in time abandon it or convey it (for what he might get) to others willing and able to contrive a more profitable use. Meanwhile he might still realize an "unearned" increment or decrement in value from environmental changes independently brought about by the activities and efforts of others. The problem for those who became dissatisfied with the self-sufficiency of their holdings was, in nineteenth-century terms, "to place production on a level with capital."

The growth and distribution of the settler population in Anglo-America broadly conformed to the spatial ordering of accessible properties in nature. While the greater part of these assets was formed out of "unlimited" supplies of land and, in lesser portion, from other materials, human resourcefulness added value to such bounty by cultivation, mining, construction, manufacture and, not least, by the conduct of productive exchange. In America it was possible for the few to accumulate and dispose of considerable holdings without depriving the many of their competence or, more important in the long run, their expectations. By English standards there was unparalleled access of sufficiency with no commensurate rise in value. But whereas the occupation and improvement of a countryside took the form of variable accumulations of acreage or leases whose yields furnished subsistence, income from marketable crops, and the hope of a patrimony (including capital gain), the concentration of population in compact town settlements might accelerate the appreciation of land and other values without the soil yielding other than garden crops or weeds. A town manifested its population's capacity for capitalizing a particular site in its interaction with a wider social space. A town was a multifaceted node of more or less fixed location, variable size, and, depending on its inhabitants' resourcefulness, of indefinite accomplishment. A town might be more than a "central" place. The actual numbers and attainments of its residents would be given not so much by natural endowments or topographical advantage as by the volume and variety of value-adding transactions carried on by the residents in interaction with each other and the world around. Enhanced interaction via reductions in unit transfer of other costs of production or via increased congregation, would alike heighten potential for rising returns from greater specialization of functions and a more intensive differentiation of urban land uses. Yields to townsman accrued not only because of decisions affecting the profitable use of their assets but also from uncovenanted benefits (or losses) — "externalities" so to speak — generated by the concentration of people and activity in their vicinity. Appreciation of town land values (and ground rents) would be accelerated by the agglomeration of population as additional preferential bids for higher-yielding site uses prevailed over lower-yielding or traditional uses. While every town user would seek to reduce the "spatial" component of his costs (by choosing the lowest net combination of transfer and site rental costs relative to his expectation of income), each landowner (including owner-users) would as likely seek to increase the economic rent from his holding (for much the same reason as David Ricardo expected "rent" from the most fertile farm land to rise ceteris paribus with the pressure of population increase on the land). Hence a "substructure" of higher yielding site uses was, from a town landowner's viewpoint, a condition for sustaining a "superstructure" of land values and ground rentals (capital and income) insofar as the former was the actual foundation of the latter. A town might come to be regarded not simply as an incorporated community, a clustering of population, or an artifactual product, but also as a more or less notional structure of values affected by social relations. The development of Anglo-America by the investment of settlers' time and energies — as indicated by the valuation of their output — took hold locally in the seventeenth century between the Massachusetts and Chesapeake Bay areas in the form of tobacco, provisions, furs, ships and ships' services, etc. Development became more widespread and varied during the middle decades of the eighteenth century; it accelerated again around the turn of the century during the period of "neutral prosperity" before assuming a comparatively regular pattern of "long swings." These alternating periods of acceleration and retardation in output and population growth (of from 18 to 25 years duration) extended from the second quarter of the 19th century into the 1920s. The first of the identifiable nineteenth-century surges was initiated by relatively high rates of capitalization in transport undertakings (inland waterways and steam railroads), urban building and related construction. It involved the migration of country people to port cities and new manufacturing towns in the Northeast as well as related thirsts of western land occupancy. This investment boom (like its successors) was maintained by a highly elastic labour supply, the accessibility of physical resources, increased productive capacity and, not least, by the associated growth in demand at prices which sustained certain types of business and household spending and, for a while, justified further increases in capacity. During the later 1840s, for example, the formation of capital and population into urban settings was substantially reinforced by flows of emigrants from hard times in the British Isles and parts of continental Europe. While it lasted, the surge in investment also absorbed the greater part of domestic savings generated by rising incomes and thereby prompted further increases in demand. The growth of U.S. exports from the 1820s — chiefly sales of raw cotton to Britain — had meanwhile helped finance the import of capital which, in turn augmented the money stock, a necessary adjunct to rising nominal income and prices. By the 1840s the per capita product of workers outside agriculture already averaged almost twice as much in dollar value as workers on the farm. A growing share of work off the farm, moreover, was already becoming tantamount to work in towns and cities. If increasing/decreasing rates of urbanization may be regarded as among responses to variations in relative rates of return between investments in farming and nonfarming activities (attendant on rising incomes and more urbanized consumption patterns), they may also be included among the endogenous determinants of such variations. The experience of living in nineteenth-century cities was one in which a growing proportion of the population learned novel ways of doing things and discovered new and profitable things to do. The English had little experience of cities to ship as cultural ballast to North America. On the edge of Europe they had
remained among the least urbanized—not to say urbane—peoples in Christendom. A handful of provincial market towns, a few modest seaports, and the capital itself contained in all, no more than five per cent of their numbers. Even the wealth created by the production and export of the "new draperies" in the later 1500s largely originated in country manufactures. Much of the ambition and energy mobilized in society by centring financial interest, religious emotions, and political authority in the Tudor capital, however, went into the naval struggle with Spain and, after 1588, the reconquista of Ireland, not into peopling colonies or cities. While the London Virginia Company's first planters barely survived in their primitive triangular bastide at Jamestown, some 23 new townsites were being projected by regional planners for the Crown's Ulster Plantation with capital subscribed by many of the famous London companies. Plans for building Londonderry and Coleraine, respectively a Renaissance fortress and medieval-like stronghold, were among the special tasks reserved to a colonizing company created by the Common Council of the City of London.\(^7\) They represented the first English designs, c. 1611, for constructing new towns and fortifying villages among a hostile population: a land-grabbing enterprise that proceeded for more than two and a half centuries across North American "frontiers" until the West was finally won.

The Jamestown planted in 1607 was too early to be affected by the Ulster experience. Nevertheless, the instructions issued by the Crown-appointed Council in 1606 expressed many of the same concerns for security, storage facilities, religious and other "rooms of publick and necessary use," preserving broad street lines and open spaces (for maximizing the effect of field pieces fired from a central market square strongpoint,) as the Irish planners even when they differed in available means.\(^8\) Such instructions regarding the infrastructure of conquest also appear to have drawn upon common sources of principle and to have resulted in visually similar and stylized plans whether the invaders were English, Dutch, or French (or, for that matter, the crusading Spanish.) Their ultimate provenance was the Italian city-state of late medieval and Renaissance times (likewise for much of their absolutist political theory and economy). Even as Tudor England had finally and painfully withdrawn from under the ecclesiastical pall of Rome, its precocity and preciosity alike placed it under the cultural spell of Italy. The Italians were the first schoolmasters of modern statecraft and policy science. They taught both the fine and practical arts of mastery over physical and social environments. They were the preceptors of capitalism and urbanity. Giovanni Botero's Treatise Concerning the Causes of the Magnificence and Greatness of Cities appeared coincidently in English translation in the year of the London Virginia Company's instructions; Botero's prescription involved making one's city "commodious to other countries" by trade, mechanical arts, and wise public works.\(^9\)

The limited art and industry of Jamestown's inhabitants, combined with ignorance of their environment, meant that the settlement was almost overwhelmed by its alien setting. A primitive triangle of misfortune, malnutrition, and maladministration—a white ghetto in red America—emerged with but a single street. Its site and situation departed in almost every regard from the planner's instruction except as it was protected by distance from the sea; it proved vulnerable to pestilence, fire, and Indian attack. Only its connection to the capital resources and political clout of the London metropolis, together with the rigorous management of deputy governor Thomas Dale, enabled Jamestown to recover energies sufficient to launch the nearby towns of Henrico and New Bermuda. Successful cultivation and export of Indian Tobacco, together with private incentives and landholding, brought prosperity within a few years but not the growth of towns. A devastating Indian massacre wiped out much of Jamestown and led to revocation of the Company's charter by the crown in 1624. The subsequent tobacco boom brought on the severe exploitation of indentured servants by their masters, and settlement spread out in the form of autonomous plantations with residences, warehouses, stores, and slave quarters. Town development lapsed despite repeated attempts to legislate and finance compact centres—including an urban renewal of Jamestown in 1662—out of tobacco taxes.\(^10\)

The simple and somewhat conventional ground plans followed a century later in Fredericksburg and Alexandria showed the persistence of the seventeenth-century town idea. William Byrd's drawing for a projected town of Eden in 1736 to be settled by Swiss emigrants—nine squares and a central green—was virtually identical with that of the New Haven colony a century before. Virginia's rural counties were meanwhile administered mostly from "court house" squares planted in the middle of nowhere. While some of these clusters were architecturally quite imposing in their isolated settings, few ever grew into towns with more than a court house, jail, a few lawyers' offices, a custodian's cottage, a handful of tradesmen's shops, private residences, and a church or two.\(^11\) In Virginia and Maryland likewise, Jamestown, St. Mary's, and their kin were finally overwhelmed by the social environment created by the settlers, not by nature or the noble savage.

Much the same fate overtook the "two rows of houses and a fair street" at Plymouth Plantation. By rigorous economy of means the sickly band of saints and strangers survived the winter and in common worked the gardens within the wooden pale and the larger fields without—under the protection of the ordinance which commanded both the plain and the bay. Provisional disposition of the fields to families in 1623 became permanent as some family members, as well as newcomers, removed themselves beyond the fence and soon "there was no longer any holding them together...." Regrettably Governor William Bradford observed that: "no man now thought he could live, except he had cattle and a great deal of ground to keep them" and "this, I fear, will be the ruine of New England, at least of the Churches of God ther."\(^12\) But if settlers sought "great lots" for cultivation and cattle, it was not because they valued such lots more than their souls. Families sought greater self-sufficiency and the local exodus expressed their readiness to amend nature's occupancy by their own.

Compact town settlements survived in great profusion in New England, in parts of the "middle" colonies, and in some of the southernmost plantations. Countless towns from Port Royal, lower Québec, and Salem to sixteenth-century St. Augustine and eighteenth-century Savannah, exhibited variations on rectangular or elongated patterns of private land holding combining personal and common rights with communal management and predominantly nucleated (originally fortified) residences. These populations lived close up against their physical environments; their agricultural towns and conventional practices often came to resemble each other as much as their harbour stockades and hill forts had done at the outset. Their layouts, at least, persisted even into the nineteenth-century West. Nevertheless, climate, topography, and other elements of local colouration or inherited style gradually added richness and variation—local differences in England became regional divergences in America. Some clusters of population slowly and severally "distanced" themselves from the impress of nature and custom by interposing a more capitalized environment of artifacts and faculties in order to pursue more varied and productive roles.

The increasing scale of transactions was achieved more by local agglomeration and maritime improvements than by any enhanced capacity to reduce frictions of distance overland or
other costs. Only around 1720 did any concentration exceed 10,000 residents at which time Boston, "the entrepreneurial headquarters" of British North America, was almost twice the size of the next two largest clusters: New York City (finally surrendered by the Dutch in 1674) and Philadelphia (planted by William Penn as recently as the 1680s). Neither Boston nor New York had long conformed to any plan while Penn's design for his city was substantially altered for better by his "Irish" surveyor from Waterford, Captain Thomas Holme, a soldier and land settler under Oliver Cromwell, a surveyor and Quaker publicist with some twenty-two years of colonizing experience. By 1720 even Penn's Philadelphia — with one civic and four residential squares — had been extended by speculators in some directions along the city's street plan, far beyond the formal rectangular boundaries of its 6 square kilometres: "out over neighboring fields and small estates along which uniform housing of various classes quickly sprang up."13 Where their more insular and irregular shapes allowed, Boston and New York had grown out without benefit of a regular Irish grid plan from Waterford or Cork, more in the fashion perhaps of London's medieval maze.

Before the close of the first English century in America there was one major thrust to achieve urbanity beyond the charm of a rural New England town or a mercantile labyrinth like Boston. This occurred in two of the richest provinces, neither of which had hitherto had much success with town promotion. Both involved action by legislatures, but most of the energy and imagination was contributed by a remarkable military proconsul, Governor Francis Nicholson. Influenced by Sir Christopher Wren's design for rebuilding London after the Great Fire and by the Italian garden concept perfected by the landscape architect, André Le Nôtre, at Versailles, the plans for Annapolis (1695) and Williamsburg (1699) drew upon an array of axes, diagonals, ceremonial rondes points and residential squares. Williamsburg's principal axis was to link the recently founded College of William & Mary with an elevated Capitol 1.2 kilometres to the east. There were regulated lot sizes and house dimensions on either side of the central market square where the other public buildings were placed. Neither design was fully implemented (even by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in the twentieth-century) but the fact that both capitals failed to grow as well allowed each to retain an unspoiled elegance befitting the public dignity of a rich rural province (albeit one based in large part upon the capitalized bodies of slaves). An Act for Keeping Good Rules and Orders in the Port of Annapolis in 1695 banished the pursuit of such "annoying" and "disquieting" trades as "baker, brewer, tailor, dyer, or any such ... to a sufficient distance" on a parcel of land carved from the existing town pasture.14

Francis Nicholson had set a standard which a century later Major L'Enfant had to surpass in his plan for a capital worthy of the new Federal Republic. On top of a large grid he laid diagonals connecting important points at circles and squares. He succeeded in endowing a poor Maryland site across the Potomac from George Washington's Alexandria with an uncharacteristically public grandeur that was quite absent from the checkerboard "sketch" thrown into consideration by the republican theorist Thomas Jefferson. But what if, along with European models, Jefferson had remembered the philanthropic geometry so artfully devised for the Georgia Trustees by the soldier-legislator, turned humanitarian prison reformer, James Oglethorpe, in the 1730s? Surely Savannah was the gem: an orderly assemblage of "wards," each with its street focusing upon a residential public square with lots set aside for shops, assemblies, churches, and other common uses. Surrounding the whole was a greenbelt commons, two hectare (five acre) triangular garden lots, and still further out, the farms of 18.23 hectares (44 acres) — the deeds for which were designed to prevent speculation and subdivision by means of entail. Obviously, this was not the plan for a republic about to embrace a destiny already planned by higher authority. Yet it required another century — of industrial-urban transformation and embarking on a still wider globalism — before the rich progressive republic of Theodore Roosevelt was ready to write more of L'Enfant’s plan as a monument to its own grandeur in the form of the Senate Park Commissioners’ unified proposal for central Washington, D.C. in 1901-02. As the virtually novel plan of Charles F. McKim and his celebrated associates from the World’s Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893 was implemented during the first decade of "the American Century," the neglected and often despised capital was transformed from "The City of Magnificent Intentions" into the cynosure of "The City Beautiful." The planning historian, John W. Reps, has characterized this conjunction as "the rebirth of city planning in America under a philosophy of design which...thus had its spiritual roots in the Washington of Pierre Charles L’Enfant."15

But what was this city planning now suddenly reborn? Had some graceful art of known ends and orderly means ever died? Surely it had never been born. Was it ever more than a two dimensional street projection indicating lot boundaries of mostly private real estate? New England’s covenant, Penn’s brotherly vision, Oglethorpe’s humanitarian conviction, or Calvert’s feudal aspiration had, in their day, endowed such meagre maps with a corporeal integument and living spirit which did not exude from their design. Only as these plats otherwise took on a third architectural dimension indicative of social amenity, public facility and comity, as well as access rights and title to estate, did they adumbrate a human community. Neither Nicholson’s nor L’Enfant’s projects of political power represented anything but vacant and artificial communions. To be sure, advance platting could furnish a measure of public-private control over street lines and might designate, if not actually dedicate, some area of open space; a well-drawn plan could show the proportion and relation of parts to a conceivable whole. It provided a hedge against the unknown. By the time of the Washington Centenary in 1900 there were thousands of cities with hundreds of thousands of residents ranging upwards in area from 2.5 or five square kilometres (like Boston or Philadelphia in 1800) up to Philadelphia (337 sq.km.), Chicago (438 sq.km.), New Orleans (196 sq.km.) and recently consolidated New York, N.Y. (777 sq.km.) “so big they had to name it twice.” Such an ecological transformation went far beyond the prescience available to any nineteenth-century surveyor, landscape architect, or social scientist.

Journeymen plotters had, in fact, gone on doing their job furiously since the founding of the republic. They were engaged in what the American Society of Planning Officials would one day call “continuous city planning”: always ahead of the game, simulating and modelling in a most flexible dynamic way, new towns, town extensions and renovations, projections of secular, commercial, and celestial harmonies from coast to coast. There were colonization and land development companies, townsite promoters, wholesalers and retailers of land by square mile or foot. The process of subdividing America involved hundreds of thousands of operators, singly or in syndicate, mechanics and farmers, rural as well as urban; any number could play. American city planning in this sense was alive and well throughout the nineteenth-century, riding the investment booms; it facilitated almost any development that one or many could freely imagine and afford to install.

The sum of “the unfettered possibilities of the average man” could be read in the appreciation of property values. Already in 1818 an English visitor to Illinois, Morris Birkbeck, affirmed that “Gain!, Gain!, Gain! is the beginning, the middle, and the end, the alpha and omega of the founders of the
American town." He found the same mentalité to characterize the Ohio farmers' attachment to land. In the early twentieth-century Samuel Gompers, the Moses of the American workman, put the matter most succinctly: "More!" And for that reason perhaps town planning turned out, with minor exception, to be "Grid!, Grid!, Grid!" all the way. The pattern was set in the Land Ordinance of 1785 — Jefferson's master plan for land unto "the thousandth and thousandth generation." The passion for land booming did not exhaust itself in Kentucky in the 1820s, Wisconsin in the 1840s, nor with Florida in the 1920s. The one essential book in American Urban History is still perhaps Homer Hoyt's One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago.16

Amidst the welter of land speculation around endless checkerboards, there were "diagonals by the dozen," ovals and radials too. Jefferson wanted to build on every other square such that "every square of houses will be surround by four open spaces and every house will front an open square." It did not happen any more than for Augustus Woodward's magnificent "honeycomb" plan for Detroit. Most "artistic" designs were shelved, subverted, or simply swallowed by the iron grid as its scale increased. On a small scale, as in the New England mill town, Pennsylvania colliery town, radical religious community, phalanstère, or other social or capitalist utopia, the grid might work until modified by growth or cruel circumstance as in the Mormon Cities of Zion or George Pullman's patronal challenge to Chicago's relentless sprawl. Canal and railroad towns could give a new lease on life to the linear plan such as old Salem had once exemplified; it was adaptable to the Illinois Central lands and the later railroad land boom in Southern California in the 1880s. Appropriate for some "patented" community or industrial village, in a large city such plans had no social integument nor any common legibility.

It was not that planning had become a lost art but that nobody knew what it was to plan a later nineteenth-century city. With structural steel, improved power elevators, and new materials, many architects and their clients had begun to explore the profitable possibilities of the vertical dimension in order to support a firmer base of higher land values at the core. The scale of an individual office or apartment building, a park, cemetery, bridge, or reservoir, a civic centre or landscaped residential extension seemed eminently worthwhile. But urbanized areas and populations had become so vast and internally differentiated in functions, so heterogeneous in their protean townscapes and social distances, that nobody knew how they "worked." Even before the mid-century streetcar the pulls of cheaper peripheral locations as well as the push for space at the centre had produced a net drift of people and jobs to newly developed edges of older and larger cities. Circulatory congestion and unfocused residential crowding were as chronic in Boston's compact and irregular spaces as among the platted regularities of Philadelphia; south or north of Washington Square, New York had the best/worst of both worlds respectively. By the 1850s, the peninsula city of Boston was spending large sums of public money on reducing, levelling, and reclaiming land surfaces, together with straightening and widening main thoroughfares as if the city fathers were belatedly trying to give at least some of the city fathers the presumed advantages denied them hitherto by the "cortuous intricacy" of streets "that had been left to fashion themselves."17

One wonders if there were any "structural-physical form" that could have held the burgeoning urban populations together. Endless extension had indeed denatured the inherited eighteenth-century forms. But was "a flourishing community life" — Sam B. Warner, Jr.'s social desideratum for "the private city" of Philadelphia — planable in any large agglomeration under nineteenth-century competitive conditions when the involve-
sprawl. The first great project of the new American Civic Association (formed by the merger of NLIA and the AP&OAA) was the building of a model city exhibition in time for the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at St. Louis in 1904. There it built a street as an example of civic pride demonstrating both municipal architecture and decorative embellishments for street furniture in profusion.22

It was appropriate that the Civic League of St. Louis issued A City Plan in 1907 which, although overshadowed by Daniel H. Burnham’s more publicized plan for Chicago (1909), broke new ground. One of its committees brought the polite concern with “civic orderliness and beauty” into closer touch with progressive perceptions of social problems. Its proposal for a “neighbourhood centre” — developed without benefit of expert consultants years before Clarence A. Perry and the Russell Sage Foundation — were to group public and private schools, branch libraries, playgrounds, settlement houses, model tenements, churches, police and fire stations, and the clubs of voluntary social and athletic organizations around a common node. Their design was doubly strong in that it had the support of many spokesmen for “the rights” of foreign-born elements anxious to participate in more fully a part of the American life. The emphasis was aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the poor and arresting the physical deterioration of their neighbourhoods. The historian of the American Institute of Planners suggests that the forward-looking St. Louis plan helped transform the City Beautiful idea into “an instrument for social planning.”23

Needless to add, that instrument was not used. Nevertheless, Charles M. Robinson, a Rochester, N.Y. editor and publicist of the City Beautiful, had already made clear in Modern Civic Art (1903) that improved boulevards, open spaces, ornamentation, and other civic embellishments were not in themselves enough. His awareness of “life among the tenements” embraced the twin crusades for better housing and public health already more than half a century old. He hoped for an opportunity to shift certain types of factories and their workers away from the congested centres and supported restrictive building and health regulation to that end. Robinson’s feeling for people who could not afford even the “model tenement” accommodations recommended by housing reformers was part of the greater consciousness-raising swell that, in the decade of World War I, created both city managerialism and modern planning.24

V

During the first decades of this century public health, housing, and other social and philanthropic concerns intersected with planning interests around “problems” of physical density and congestion. By that time, however, a more extensive suburban trend — accelerated by the electrification of street railways — was beginning to ease certain pressures upon the city’s core areas even as it created new tensions which, as “metropolitan problems of the automobile age,” only came into public consciousness in the 1920s. Enthusiastic planners emerging from early meetings of the National Conference on City Planning and the Problems of Congestion after 1909 were to discover their vocation, if no more than a perfunctory role, in shaping the haphazard process of “peripheral sprawl” into a more orderly and efficient development.

Unlike city managers, however, the planners had great difficulty in focusing their “image.” There was indeed little that planners could do for local governments or property holders that did not already provide a basis for other interests and professions. It is no reflection on the achievements of the parks’ movement to recall that hydraulic and sanitary engineers, public health doctors, legal specialists, bookkeepers and charity workers, not planners or economists, had designed the facilities and
devised the regulations — in concert with politicians — which had enabled nineteenth-century city dwellers to survive.25 Planners now urged the necessity for a more “comprehensive” approach and advertised the availability of their services, but they had generally failed to earn credibility or clientele. To be sure, the handful of landscape-architectural consultants had executed numerous projects and obtained many special commissions, but they had not induced many large cities to follow Washington’s example of a comprehensive plan — what Charles M. Robinson called “a harmonious general scheme” as distinct from “spotty improvements.” Their reputation among most political and business leaders lay somewhere between that of impractical visionaries and crypto-socialists. It was the better part of valour, therefore, for would-be planners to project the installation of traffic arteries, water and sewage lines, and open space on comparatively low value peripheral lands into which developers and financial institutions were pouring millions of dollars rather than to insist on re-forming the complex structure of existing core uses where land values were already prohibitively high. Only when planners had finally earned the accrediting accolade “pragmatic” — as Walter D. Moody demonstrated over the years in obtaining financial backing for the promotion of Burnham’s 1909 Plan of Chicago — would they be “licensed,” as it were, to share in the business of capitalizing the urbanized environment.26

City planning became an acknowledged service early in the twentieth-century but not a marketable professional package. More garden suburbs and model factory villages were undertaken. Several dozen privately sponsored general plans were broached but they are better remembered as minor contributions to American graphic arts — attesting the odd affinity between boosterism and reform — than as effective calls to action. But in 1907 the Connecticut legislature, at the prompting of its capital’s parks department, amended the Hartford city charter to establish “a commission on the city plan” — the first such official standing body in the U.S. The eight person commission included locally influential political, administrative, and public members under the mayor; it received an express mandate to locate future thoroughfares, streets, parks, squares, and public buildings as well as a right to consider modifications of any existing facilities. It was not empowered to control private land uses nor, apart from the city engineer (an architect), did it possess any planning “expertise.” When it finally received a modest appropriation, the commission hired the architectural-planning firm, Carrère & Hastings of New York, to produce the Plan for the City of Hartford, 1911. In 1909 Wisconsin had meanwhile become the first state to enable its larger cities to establish commissions and prepare plans and to review all subdivision plats up to 2.4 kilometres beyond their existing city boundaries. In the same year A.W. Brunner and J.M. Carrère submitted a report to the Grand Rapids, Mich., commission stressing the necessity for relating all future public improvements to realistic provisions for their financing and the desirability of regulating land uses if plans were to be made effective and their implementation efficient.27

The deliberate turn from the concerns of “City Beautiful” to those of “City Functional” or “City Efficient” after 1909 was part of the planners’ search for a viable niche in the city building process. In their enlarged consulting role, well-known firms had presented “plans” to influential civic and commercial clubs for public improvements. Their commissions would enhance circulation and secure the “advantages” of expanding central business districts against potentially blighting effects of resources channelled by “market forces” into new peripheral growth. Although virtually all land uses were determined by private calculations, the installation of “social overhead” by the municipality was a condition for the profitability of many private investments and hence, as was already clear in Henry George’s day, a pre-requisite for upholding the values of urban land and things appurtenant to land (e.g. franchises to use city streets considered as leasehold interests.) Dependence of land uses and values on public improvements and services had heightened since the great surge in municipal indebtedness after the Civil War for, as Frederick C. Howe put it in 1905: “every dollar expended for improvements, sewers, streets, lighting, police, fire or health protection adds its increment to the value of building sites.” These items, plus schools and schooling, accounted for 75 to 80 per cent of all local government functional expenditures in the early 1900s (including debt service) and for almost all of the accumulating municipal debt. Planners understandably identified their own activity with the more “efficient” use of public funds committed to long-term improvements thereby conserving the property tax base at the least public cost. Planners and their private sponsors might recommend a programme of capital improvements “in the public interest” but only the political process could deliver the requisite levels of public spending. Clearly, planners had to get closer to politicians and real estate interests while intensifying their “educational” relationship to the voters who must ultimately approve the bond issues and pay the special assessments and taxes that even the most orderly development entailed. The problem for city property holders at the time was that, although they paid around 90 per cent of all local revenues, they rarely comprised even half the eligible voters.28

John Nolen’s presidential address to the 19th National Conference on City Planning in 1927 was a brave effort to make the most of his profession’s accomplishment twenty years after Hartford: 35 more garden suburbs and “new towns,” 176 cities “broadly replanned,” 390 planning commissions in place, 28 universities and technical schools belatedly running after Harvard to promote a planning curriculum. But Nolen concluded his “aeroplane view” of planning progress with the concession that his profession still lacked political and financial backing. Indeed, when the Planning Foundation of America was formed two years later under NCCP auspices with business support both to conduct research and convert the wayward country to planning, it accentuated the negative: 84 per cent of communities were “unprotected” by zoning ordinance, 86 per cent had no planning commissions, and 94 per cent of all cities and towns, 2,500 and over, were “unprepared” for future growth.29

Nevertheless, there were important landmarks along the way. In March 1914 the Newark, N.J., planning commission had hired Harland Bartholomew, an assistant to its former consultants, George B. Ford and E.P. Goodrich, as a “full-time city planner” to develop the comprehensive city plan ordered by his former employers. In 1916 the National Municipal League was sufficiently impressed with the potential of planning for “good government” to insert a requirement (in the form of a suspensive veto by a planning board) in its model city charter. In 1917, the 9th NCCP in Kansas City had authorized Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. to organize the American City Planning Institute as the professional planning society in the United States. Within a few days of the conference Olmsted, Ford, and Goodrich presented themselves to the General Munitions Board in Washington offering the profession’s planning skills in the construction of housing for war workers and cantonments for the troops. The wartime experience of federal funding and frustration for those serving in the Quartermaster Corps or the Department of Labor’s U.S. Housing Corporation proved to be a brief dress rehearsal for the twentieth-century. Construction of camps and housing “subcommunities” on the edges of cities confirmed the profession’s view of the priority of the “few big things”: local transportation routes, water supply, sewers and storm drains, schools, parks and playgrounds, and the “districting” of land uses. Henceforth planners would need to concentrate on these more structural and schematic features while leaving “the
Although real estate interests and most housing reformers were alarmed by wartime experiments in “socialized housing,” the former were more fearful that planners would ruin the grand old gridiron game of “fast killings on small lots.” Real estate and financial interests could agree that the “districting” of land uses would be a sound innovation. They had welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hadaccheck v. Sebastian, 1915, upholding a Los Angeles ordinance which excluded a brick manufacturer from “a residence district.” Then they realized that this vague power latent in municipal corporations to decree “progress” was as much a threat as a relief to property. Hence, the assurance given by Edward M. Bassett in supporting the New York City zoning power resolved by its Board of Estimates, in 1916: “nonconforming uses would only be changed by natural causes” over time, while the intent of zoning “was to stabilize and protect lawful investment and not to injure assessed valuations or existing uses.” Now it was the planners’ turn to be alarmed for the appeal of zoning produced a notable loss of planning momentum. This instrument favoured by planners on the basis of German precedent did not, in fact, depend on planning for its utility. By the time the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly upheld the device in the Ohio case of Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 1926, three times as many local governments (upward of 400) had instituted zoning regulations as had yet commissioned city plans. Designed to “preserve” rather than promote property values, it was found by local authorities that any exclusive designation almost always endowed affected sites with added market value. The zoning permit (or variance) turned out to be a more potent resource than the utility franchise or the inspection certificate. Herbert Hoover, an enthusiastic convert to zoning while serving as Harding’s Secretary of Commerce, paid no more than lip service to planning in his sponsorship of a model or standard state zoning enabling act in 1924. His attitude resembled that of any local politician when he described the power as just “reasonably neighbourly agreements as to the use of land.”

Hoover’s belated sponsorship of a standard city planning enabling act in 1928 attempted to recapture the zoning power for planning. It accorded the term “master plan” a legal status, if not a consistent exposition, and it endowed planning commissions with a suspensive veto. The model urged states to put regional as well as city planning on a surer legal footing and seemed to imply federal recognition of the planning function. Regional planning was, on paper at least, the bold new thrust of the 1920s toward statewide planning in line with the reality of “metropolitanization,” state highway construction, the automobile, and electric power transmission. The Regional Planning Association of America, founded in 1923 only six years after the ACPI itself, had projected the faltering planning movement into the larger orbit of state politics, conservation, and agricultural land problems at the same time as it fostered wider intellectual and administrative interests in resource management and community development far outside the built-up areas around cities.

If the functional planners — apostles of efficiency and applied social science — had been unable to pose any serious challenge to the rapidly evolving metropolitan form, their fears concerning its debilitating consequences for physical and social environments in “inner cities” were, nevertheless, proving amply justified. The first volumes of the Regional Survey of New York and Its Environments in 1927-28 (particularly parts written by the land economist Robert M. Haig) had documented some of the deleterious effects of metropolitan growth upon older sections of the nation’s most heavily populated urban area. They revealed the extent of a phenomenon already noted in a half dozen other major centres as well as older, one-industry towns: the emergence of “blighted areas” larger in acreage and more varied in land uses than nineteenth-century slums. Manufacturers and people were moving away from “down town” but, as Recent Social Trends reported in 1932, the general effect of this drift, coupled with the more intensive use of sites brought on by ever larger steel-framed structural units, had been “to hasten the obsolescence of much of the older pattern of the city.” The blight was not so much “the cause” of jobs and households leaving as their consequence. At the same time congestion had persisted in many central districts and was, if anything, aggravated by the inability of the real estate industry to revitalize the adjacent “blighted zones.” Even in the prosperous mid-1920s business and finance could seldom afford to renovate such neighbourhoods since, apart from large-unit office space and fancy apartment houses, “these areas are always in competition with newer subdivisions which offer a more inviting field for private enterprise.”

Before the collapse of the great 1920’s property boom the costs of renewing obsolete or derelict urban neighbourhoods was beginning to exceed the possibility of profitable current use. When the intensification of depression in the early 1930s, property and land values could still not be deflated fast or far enough to make redevelopment attractive to private capital. The point was made by Preliminary Reports of the President’s Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership in 1931 when endorsing Hoover’s proposal for a system of “home loan banks” to shore up the tottering mortgage industry and rescue the distressed lower middle classes who had been lured into “home ownership” by real estate advertising in the previous decade. It was reiterated by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Interior Secretary, Harold Ickes, in 1933 when he urged “slum clearance” as one of the salients in which his new Public Works Administration could “supplement and stimulate” private business via public projects and “limited dividend” corporations. The National Housing Act of 1934 provided federal insurance for Savings and Loan Associations and established the Federal Housing Administration to underwrite both loans for home improvements and long-term mortgages for new homes and rental accommodations which met federal standards.

Planning commissions were an obvious target for depression budget cutters. At a time when the planning function was being ballooned up to the PWA’s National Planning Board, local boards could barely preserve their temporary veto over projects of state-sanctioned local housing authorities which were to be partially financed by PWA’s Housing Division. Planners rapidly rediscovered their own roots in housing since it was “emergency” federal aid for real estate which furnished their lifecycle. A new National Association of Housing Officials, formed by federal, state, and local “housers” to secure their own stake in the emerging partnership with private enterprise, threw out the lifeline in October 1934 when they affirmed that all projects should “contribute to the building up of the city plan.” NAHO was also a model for the American Society of Planning Officials (the fall of 1934) which aimed to improve “communications” between planning commissions, city managers, other functionaries and the founding profession. ASPO recruited over 700 members (half from California) in the first two years of its existence whereas the older ACPI had barely doubled its original 52 members after nearly two decades (240 by 1946). But it was one thing to escape the bureaucratic fate, promised as far back as 1913 by Olmsted Jr. , quite another to achieve it even under the New Deal. When the project procedures for federal condemnation and land acquisition developed by the PWA Housing Division were disallowed by the Appeals’ Court in a Louisville case, July 1935, the National Public Housing Conference put a bill into the Senate which emerged as the watered-down U.S. Housing (Wagner-Stegall) Act of 1937 aimed at “the eradica-
tion of slums”; it contained no provision for planning referral. Some implemental state statutes, following Wisconsin, did make a local board’s approval mandatory before submission to Washington for funding, but the Housing Act generally represented a blow for planners even while it made only token gains for public — largely segregated — housing and altogether avoided the more critical economic issue of urban redevelopment.36

Private spending on nonfarm residential and other construction only began its slow recovery after 1936 and, despite federal supports, did not attain 1929 levels — even in current dollar values — until after World War II. Public nonmilitary construction spending followed a parallel course (only minuscule sums on housing) but rose rapidly after 1940. The volume of municipal indebtedness had stabilized after the flood of early 30s’ defaults but soared to pre-depression levels again after 1948. Meanwhile, local outlays on construction had risen somewhat as intergovernmental aid programmes took hold in the late 1930s. By that time it was apparent to many that urban redevelopment would have to be one of the major sectors of public spending required to offset the “surplus saving” which had come to characterize a “stagnant” private economy. It was as if, after 300 years, only governments could prevent the American social environment from running itself down.

Depression had enlarged the areas of urban decay without altogether arresting the tendency to metropolitan sprawl. Even before Pearl Harbour the endorsement of private urban redevelopment corporations in New York, Michigan, and Illinois with powers of condemnation, tax abatements, and long-term assessment limitations (not Illinois) was evidence of mounting concern over the plight on leading industrial states. A Twentieth Century Fund proposal (1940) suggested the piecemeal public acquisition and private renewal of all existing blighted area properties over the next decade and a half. The FHA’s Handbook of Urban Redevelopment for Cities (1941) advocated federal aid for land acquisition and the rehabilitation of existing structures, aid for public improvements in redevelopment areas, and cheaper credit for private redevelopment corporations by additional mortgage insurance. Two prominent economists Guy Greer and Alvin H. Hansen published, under the auspices of the National Planning Association, Urban Redevelopment and Housing (1941) which called for a new agency to supervise all federal activities affecting “the structure of urban communities.” They wanted to strengthen the municipal planning power as a condition of increased aid to home ownership and sought to revive public housing (unfinanced since 1940). Finally they urged insuring the risks of large private investors in rental housing (life insurance companies, savings and loan associations, trust estates, and foundations) and guaranteeing them a minimum profit (around 2%) for up to 30 years. The National Resources Planning Board’s Report for 1942 seconded the agency proposal and pressed for funds to “free” land in redevelopment areas from inflated assessment values. The time for postwar planning was “now.”37

Most far-reaching was the proposal advanced by the National Association of Real Estate Boards’ autonomous Urban Land Institute in 1942 to set up “metropolitan land commissions.” These bodies were to purchase urban and suburban land in metropolitan areas with long-term, low-interest federal loans and would be empowered to take over any land already held by local authorities. The MLCs would then “reallocate” such lands to “local land commissions” whose plans for redevelopment met MLC standards. The local commissions were to do everything necessary to revitalize blighted areas in accordance with mandatory master plans except the erection and sale of new structures — tasks reserved for private enterprise. NAREB’s Committee on Housing and Blighted Areas had already conceded the principle of “federal grants for public improvements” (since city governments could no longer afford them on the requisite scale) but this scheme even sought to curb the venerable business of speculating on the urban “frontier,” at least insofar as redevelopment was concerned! In April 1942 Charles Ascher’s pamphlet Better Cities captured the spirit of the early war days when he foresaw that peace would bring “the chance to rebuild American cities . . . by the square mile, rather than by the block.”38

In the November 1942 issue of Fortune Alvin H. Hansen and Guy Greer gave the emergent planning consensus a deeper significance. “To keep the economy on an even keel” they argued, “all the savings made out of current income must flow promptly into investment — in plant, equipment, houses, inventories, and other additions to our store of capital goods.” Furthermore, “all the net savings must go into . . . something that expands the store of capital goods or wealth rather than merely maintaining or replacing it.” The implication of this new “growth” imperative was that governments must be prepared to capitalize “something” in the volume necessary to keep private investment profitable. The more explicit and effective the commitment to “full employment” of productive resources, the smaller the actual amount of government spending need be. Given the New Deal’s limited success in finding politically-acceptable forms of capital expenditure in the 1930s — public works, reforestation and conservation projects, regional river valley development, grants to state and local governments, highways — it is not surprising that planners saw the financing of large-scale urban reconstruction as furnishing just that “vast stimulus to private enterprise” which postwar profit making would require.39 In fact, the massive federal spending on war brought on both the resurgence of prosperity and urban growth despite the continued fertility decline and the shrinkage of many large city populations reported by the 1940 U.S. Census.

Such was the momentum of war spending that by 1944 some of the earlier enthusiasm for “compensatory economics” had waned as free enterprise enlisted “cost plus” for the duration. Congress finished off the executive’s NRPB in 1943 just as planning officials and consultants were multiplying around the country in implementation of programmes brought together under the newly created National Housing Agency. At a Chicago housing conference in 1944, Herbert U. Nelson, of NAREB, denounced the late public housing programme as threatening “the new slavery of our cities to Washington.” NAREB wanted private investors to buy up the long-term, tax exempt bonds of local redevelopment agencies and preferred to build low-rent housing with private “capital . . . also deductible from current taxable federal income.” But housing officials, such as Hugh Pomeroy, defended the principle of public housing (it scarcely existed in practice) and indicted the century-old “filtering” process of the hand-me-down housing market as the very cause of “all our slums and blighted areas.” In 1944 Senator Robert A. Taft’s subcommittee on “housing and urban redevelopment” heard testimony to a coming rush to “the suburbs.” Surveys by the Urban Land Institute showed that as much as three-quarters of postwar housing would be built on new undeveloped acreage (much of it with federally-insured financing). Its director insisted that blight could only be contained by comprehensive federal redevelopment legislation designed to secure “the highest and best use for the redevelopment area” which would almost certainly preclude the rehousing of displaced slum dwellers on the same site. In August, 1944, the Municipal Finance Officers Association Newsletter warned local governments against returning to the 1920’s policy of large outlays on capital improvements “for the benefit of subdividers.”40 To
replay the 1920s would be to bleed the cities of their population and their assessed valuations.

By the end of the war in August, 1945, there were many “born again” enthusiasts for “free market” solutions as well as others who believed in a restored capacity of local “self-government” to determine its own fate. Among those who feared a return of stagnation, however, there was still no agreement on the most effective and efficient mode of federal spending for urban reconstruction. Whereas the Twentieth Century Fund’s plan for public acquisition and private renewal of all (1940) blighted area properties would now cost a modest $16 billion to be written off over a 15 year period, Louis Justement’s ambitious project for the public land ownership and private rebuilding of all cities (25,000) over half a century would require $108 billion. Justement’s New Cities for Old (1946) envisioned a continuous city-building operation both to prevent the recurrence of blight and to promote a stable business environment. The only way to prevent “an oversupply of buildings” (one definition of blight), he thought, was at public expense “to tear down, each year, an increasingly large proportion of old buildings.” A semicentennial city to match the annual model automobile. If spending an additional five to eight billion dollars annually on public and private investment in urban reconstruction did not represent — in light of the “growth” expenditures after Pearl Harbour — a fiscal equivalent of war, it would nevertheless help balance aggregate investment with savings and, as its proponents affirmed, retain the rebuilding of the cities for private enterprise.

There was, of course, no way to rerun the 1920s or the 1930s in the postwar era. A “general housing bill” introduced by Senators Ellender, Wagner, and Taft in 1945 strove to accomplish the disparate goals of private and public housing, redevelopment interests, and grant long-deferred recognition to the planners. It came to a deadlock in the House of Representatives. The issue of compensatory spending was effectively shelved under the largely symbolic terms of the Employment Act of 1946. A Housing and Home Finance Agency was set up in 1947 as part of the President’s Reorganization Program and in 1948 another Congressional action enlarged and liberalized the FHA’s mortgage insurance programmes to aid the private housing market (in addition to the Veterans Administration home and farm loan guarantees) and assured a minimum yield to private capital invested in “moderate income” rental accommodations. City governments and municipal associations had commenced their own lobbying in 1947 to increase the share of the new national highway network to be located in and around 182 large cities countrywide.

Not before July 1949 could the political system deliver a postwar Housing Act and only Senator Taft’s strong interest and political ambition had kept it a housing as well as a redevelopment measure. It included the first federal public housing provision since 1940: 810,000 local authority units over a six year span. Since no more than a fifth of dwelling units built on redevelopment sites needed to be for “low and moderate income families,” some $308 million in grants and aids were required to be spent annually on rehousing families displaced by “slum clearance.” Other public housing could be constructed on “open sites” and the one-for-one demolition-replacement limitation was also relaxed. One billion dollars was allocated for loans and a half-billion for capital grants to defray the costs of two-thirds of any losses incurred by local authorities in acquiring and preparing sites for private redevelopment. State and local governments might contribute the balance of any loss in the form of public improvements or services to sites. Since the 1949 Act required all redevelopment projects to conform to a “general plan” for “the locality as a whole,” and because there was now an extraordinary financial incentive for municipalities and their clients to undertake such projects, it furnished a most convincing argument for planning. At the same time ambiguities and evasions in the law regarding the nature and scope of the planning function did not give any assurance regarding its outcome — especially in the context of metropolitan sprawl. Ample funds were, nevertheless, forthcoming for research and improvement of planning techniques whereby planners might discover what it was that needed to be done in what order for whom. In deference to the demands of home builders, realtors, and money-lending interests President Truman indicated that the federal role was simply to furnish “technical advice and financial assistance” while the task of the HHFA’s Director of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment was merely to ensure that “the requirements of the law as written are faithfully observed.” Everything by way of implementation was up to the local communities and the private sector as provided in state enabling laws.

The state laws were, however, part of “the problem.” Some courts sought to confine eminent domain proceedings to strictly “public uses” such as low income housing. Other state courts not only allowed general redevelopment of “cleared” areas but also of “open” land which was unsalable for reasons of tax delinquency, fragmented ownership, deficient improvements, or special assessments in excess of “fair” value (which faults often stemmed from obsolete nineteenth-century platting). Not before 1954 in Berman v. Parker, a District of Columbia case, did the U.S. Supreme Court uphold the contention that “slum clearance” did not determine subsequent uses of condemned land, once property rights had been satisfied by “just compensation.” The indeterminacy and inconsistency of state laws with respect to federal programmes had, nevertheless, proved to be time consuming and costly. Miles Coleman’s study for the Twentieth Century Fund in 1953, Renewing Our Cities, was a trenchant critique of federal-state city mending activity: blight and slums were accumulating faster than they could be cleared. His appeal for a continuous programme of planned maintenance and replacement for parts of the urban structure spurred Senator Taft and Eisenhower’s Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, a Cleveland steel magnate, to urge the appointment of a Presidential Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs. This committee, made up of financiers, mortgage bankers, executives of savings and loan associations, life insurance and title companies, as well as half a dozen architects, planners, and labour leaders, endorsed many of its colleague Coleen’s strictures. Under the existing programme only about 20.7 square kilometres in 86 cities (some 70,000 dwelling units) would be cleared out of the hundreds of square miles of blight and decay accumulating across the land. Altogether there were an estimated 5 million units to be removed and a further 15 million in need of rehabilitation. Even if federal outlays for clearance alone were raised fivefold to $300 million, it would have taken half a century to clear up the existing mess (quite apart from the new one already in the making).

The Housing Act of 1954 adopted most of the Advisory Committee’s recommendations to prevent decay. Although still concerned with slum clearance and redevelopment, the statute conditioned future federal grants, low rent housing, and new FHA insurance programmes on local efforts to rehabilitate useable structures and preserve stable areas from deterioration. In its application the act mandated the annual recertification of a long range “general plan” endowed with such instrumentalities as a zoning ordinance, subdivision regulation, and a budgeted programme of capital improvements. Also required were inventories of neighbourhood physical properties, codes setting forth minimum levels of health, sanitation, and safety services, together with enforcement personnel, a plan for financing the municipality’s share (usually a third) of all federally-assisted renewal project costs, as well as more effective arrangements for rehousing displaced families and involving organized neighbourhood and community “groups”. An Urban Renewal
Administration was created (co-ordinated with FHA and the Public Housing Administration) to implement the renewal programmes and assist smaller municipalities (under 50,000) in complying with their terms. Federally-funded assistance brought titles and HHFA administrative rules. While the FHA went out busily expediting peripheral subdivision, and the URA commenced its task of restoring land uses and property values (as well as the local political tax base) in down-town areas, only PHA remained a backwater unaffected by the rising tide of federal subsidy: no more than 35,000 public housing units were authorized for 1955. The 150,000 units promised annually for six years in the 1949 Act had been cut to 75,000 in 1950 after Korean War spending began; to 50,000 in 1951, 35,000 in 1952, and to a mere 20,000 for 1953 when Senator Taft went to his grave. Obviously, the Congress had no more intention of rehousing “slum dwellers,” displaced or otherwise, in 1954 than it had in 1949 or 1937. In less than two decades of struggle the threat to the American city building tradition from local public housing had been contained while the nation’s public credit had been aligned in support of real estate, mortgage, and construction industries. Acceptance of a terribly house-broken planning profession was a small and not entirely irredeemable “trade off.”

Even before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the rebuilding of cities was manifestly not the keystone in a federal structure of “compensatory spending.” The backlog of consumer spending and the removal of price controls carried the economy forward through 1948. Thereafter, surges in “foreign aid” and “defence” spending, along with domestic capital projects, agricultural and welfare supports (known from 1949 as Truman’s “Fair Deal”) sufficed to raise government purchases of gross national product to tolerably buoyant levels. Federal spending, however, was essential to the functioning of older metropolitan areas and accessory, at least, to the more rapid metropolitanization of the South and West. Knowing and somewhat ingenuously, given the postwar slogan of “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family,” a growing volume of federal spending was being committed to bolstering urbanized land uses and dependent land values a decade or more before the media capitalized “the Urban Crisis” of the 1960s. By that time the states (and their local governments), which had failed to react promptly or coherently to intimations of core decline during the peripheral boom of the 1920s, were ceasing to be autonomous partners in the federal system and accepting the status of administrative pensionaries in the stop-and-go spasms of a “finely-tuned” politicized economy.

If the city populations of America no longer formed a potent engine of economic growth, they contributed a growing part of its lengthening train. But, in underwriting the social and morphological fragmentation of urbanized areas along “class” and racial lines, federal programmes were the consequence rather than the “cause” of tendencies deep-rooted in the highly capitalized social environment. The multiplicity of subsidy and pacification programmes administered by the new U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development after 1965, federal general revenue sharing to buttress state spending in the 70s, and the colossal increases in federal loan and loan support guarantees (which exceeded half a trillion dollars by the late 70s) were the outcome of a syndicalist rivalry of “groups” contending for a larger piece of the social dividend under a system of increasingly socialized risk bearing. To be sure, much profit was being made extending urbanized areas and transplanting metropolitan forms across the South and West — by the late 1960s more than half the homes in the U.S. had been built since World War II — but a rising share of the underwriting and overhead costs was billed to the federal government. The forms of urban areas inherited from the early twentieth-century were as obsolete perhaps as the small-town rural environments which once typified America but had lost out to more “worthwhile” metropolitan forms in the late nineteenth-century. Since the 1920s, technological and organizational innovation had become virtually independent of the city artifact and of increments to urban population. Cognitive reinterpretation of the environment now turns on highly capitalized ventures in more extended and specialized research and development activity, in information processing and communications’ systems, under the aegis of managerial and planning functionaries institutionalized in mutually-accommodating networks of corporations and governments: “the Nonplace urban realm.”

Recently, the practice of long range planning to enhance material and human capital is again in disrepute. The form and concept of “the master plan” is held to be out of date. Hard critics insist that planners fail to get and use data of sufficient quality and quantity to keep their knowledge-base current; so much planning takes place, so to speak, after the fact. Hence planners still appear “unrealistic” or “idealistic” notwithstanding their long pragmatic pilgrimage. On the other hand, soft critics affirm: “that planning is best which plans least.” In today’s pluralist settings only the most general features can be planned since people, in all other respects, prefer to be left to capitalize the complexity of their particular ethnic or “cultural” inheritance — provided they retain equal access to federal funds. But if, as the political scientist John M. Gaus maintained, “planning is an effort to improve the making of decisions,” then we are all planners now. Planning is no more to be identified with the making and mending of cities than with anything or everything else in the experienced environment. Insofar as piecemeal and ad hoc decisions — muddling through — are found to be ineffectual or “counterproductive,” we are collectively trying to design a comprehensible frame into which everything general and anything particular will fit provided, of course, that our resulting mastery remains “flexible,” “dynamic,” and “up to date” — as responsive as was the gridiron to the values of nineteenth-century decision-makers. We are not just forecasting but actively seeking to predetermine an environment of “growth and stability”: in which lead times are lengthening and uncertainties gathering: Dependence of so much in the future upon federal funding, loans, or loan guarantees assures that more or less anything and everything in our stylized lives must be planned in some fashion, otherwise planning would be a privilege to be exercised only by the financially or psychologically self-sufficient. By the same token, any contemporary planning horizon which extends far beyond its current budgetary span is likely to become an exercise in frustration, if not futility. Thus the strategical and operational arts of “deciding before acting” dissolve into budget making and mending: adapting to the exigencies of the political electoral cycle. To this end management scientists tell us that public “plans” should be remodelled along “cost effective” lines such as those exhibited by the great defence corporations or the NASA space flight centre. Continuous simulation of actual environments may soon be handled entirely on sophisticated output display devices connected to computer terminals and video tape storage. Then the comprehensible grid will be found in machine-readable form in the memory of a computer programme rather than in the mental maps of fallible planners. Nevertheless, it will still be “in the head” where, as the name capital implies, value has always resided.


33. Edith E. Wood, Recent Trends in American Housing (New York, 1931), 279-87. Hoover sought to promote profitable home building and put off the issue of blighted areas and slum clearance until it could be dealt with by a "more definitely organized national intelligence". Housing Objectives and Programs: President's Conf. ..1931, IL, 1-4. H.L. Keene, "Slum Clearance by Private Enterprise Impossible," City Planning, 9 (Oct. 1933), 180. H.S. Buttenhjem, "Trends in Present-day City and Regional Planning in the U.S., 1933," City Planning, 10 (1934), 63-64. B. Shubert, "Landowners and Owners of Community Planning and Civic Association — a "citizens"—promotional group. The younger Olmsted's view (1911) of planning as "a piece of administrative machinery" designed to prevent "ignorantly wasteful action and ... inaction in the control of the city's physical growth" led him to see such machinery, within 50 years, "fully established in the framework of municipal government accepted and supported by public opinion as firmly as the public school system or the fire department." Olmsted, "A City Planning Program," Proceedings 5th NCCP, 1913, 2-16. This "American as Cherry Pie" status was not fully attained before the federal funding incentives offered to local authorities in the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 — a decade ahead of schedule.

34. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as Amended, Sec. 2(2) [Public Law No. 412, 75th Cong. 1st sess.] The U.S. Housing Act was to lend up to 90 per cent of local authority low income project spending for 60 years. Some 166,000 low rent public units were built over the ensuing four years (in addition to the much smaller number built earlier under the PWA); not much to show for the decade-long "national housing movement" with its labour, philanthropic, and civil rights backing. Under the 1937 Act, the FHA urged mortgage valuations to respect covenants restricting the racial or religious uses, lower class occupancy, and "inharmonious racial groups." The Act embodied the wisdom of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), the National Retail Lumber Dealers, and the established banking and insurance interests against using public funds to make tenancy more attractive: Hearings on S4424 (U.S. Housing Act of 1936), U.S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor. T.L. McConnell, The Wagner Housing Act (Chicago, 1957), 51-87, 133-9 in defining "maintain the character" of a subdivision, the exclusion of Negroes was the industry's standard operating procedure: e.g. J.B. Spiller, Real Estate Business as a Profession (New York, 1924), 205; E. Fisher, Advanced Principles of Real Estate Practice (New York, 1930), 250-51.


39. NAHO, Legislative History of Certain Aspects of the Housing Act of 1949, Public Law No. 477, U.S. Housing Act of 1949, Public Law No. 171, 81st Cong., 1st sess. Contemporary estimates were of the need to build 11 to 11 million dwellings annually, 1945-55. W.L.C. Wheaton, "The Housing Act of 1949," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 15 (Fall, 1949). The proportion of federal government loans to private mortgage insurance issued by FHA, VA, and the Government National Mortgage Association guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities. In effect, the federal government pooled the risks of large numbers of small loans and borrowers funded the cost through their insurance premiums — repaid from which the FHA, VA, and Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities.
ing economic cycle" since World War II, see E.R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, 1978). Apart from mortgage loan guarantees, the major spending impact on urbanized areas originated indirectly in defence and other federal contract expenditures, military bases, public works, and assorted non-grant measures. The direct federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments since the 1960s (for community development, antipoverty programmes, welfare payments, Medicaid and medicare, educational assistance, etc.) probably accounted for no more than 20 per cent of total federal spending in urbanized areas. The net effect of these programmes was the more extensive and diversified development of ring areas and a revived property boom in many central business areas (notwithstanding continued loss of central city manufacturing jobs and residents.) In short, prolongation and profitable capitalization of the very disintegrative tendencies in urban life and livelihood which "market forces" could not sustain on their own account, at least since the "blight" of the 1920s. But federal aid since 1949 has often imposed spending commitments on state and local governments (at least on paper). A study by the Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio, for example showed that of $790 millions spent in the metropolitan area in 1973 on "community problems," only 47 per cent came directly from federal sources, the balance from local and, to a lesser extent, state government sources. Since the recovery from the 1974-75 recession, a rising proportion of all city governments have experienced operating deficits of which that of New York City is only the most prodigal. Many cities have maintained solvency only by running down streets, sewers, water mains, and other critical overhead. The situation of a majority of 300 cities (10,000) has been aggravated since 1975, according to a study by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, by the Carter administration's reduction of federal aid to which so many localities had become addicted. A successful "urban conservation strategy" which reduced all federal supports to ring areas (except those under legally-mandated formula) in order to support inner cities would doubtless blight the suburbs and outrage the Congressional "suburban caucus."

Competition among local public agencies and private groups for shares of federal cash or credit intensified in the wake of "the Urban Crisis." It had led, for example, to much overbuilding of "suburban" water and sewer facilities or "downtown" office space. The 790 million dollars in the Dayton area was spent by 270 separate public and private agencies (36 in drug abuse, 89 in crime and delinquency, 45 in "mental illness," etc.). On the basis of this 1973 finding, foundations and federal agencies financed studies of "bottoms up" or "negotiated investment strategies" in Columbus, Ohio, Gary, Ind., and St. Paul, Minn. Public and private agencies, competing for funds under 500-odd federal programmes by different federal departments, engaged in "labour union style" bargaining sessions to achieve "agreement among themselves" on who will get how much under what programmes in order to make "better decisions on the use of resources." New York Times, Nov. 25, 1979.

48. One hundred and sixty federal loan and loan guarantee programmes amounted to well over half-a-trillion dollars by 1979 — an increase of 162 per cent since 1970. Congressional extension of federal credit between 1960 and 1979 had reduced the mortgage insurance component from 93 per cent to about 66 per cent of the vastly increased total. The worst defaults to date are: in excess of one billion on 16.4 billion of student loan guarantees, 1967-77, and $100 million by the developers of all thirteen of HUD's "New Communities." Loans to purchasers of farm land and equipment for small business expansion, ship construction, and foreign arms purchases cost far more than they earn even though attendant risks are relatively small. Loans or guarantees to large single borrowers: Amtrak, Lockheed Aircraft, Washington D.C. Metro subway, New York City, Chrysler Corporation, etc., are more risky and might entail serious budgetary consequences. It is a nice "political" question why federal credit is extended to some at 2, 6, or 7 per cent and not to others who must pay "market" rates which presumably do not misallocate resources. Data from Office of Management and Budget reports.

49. M.C. Branch, "Continuous City Planning" Report No. 290, Planning Advisory Service, ASPO (Chicago, 1973), 1-26, for a critique of "end-state Master City Plans" and the model of "corporate analysis." Amos Rapoport, Human Aspects of Urban Form (New York, 1977) for the paramountcy of "ethnic" and "cultural" values.