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delled on New York City's Bureau of Municipal Research. The commission form of administration was introduced and popularized between 1900 and 1910, and when reformers became disillusioned with it, they turned to the city-manager system, which "combined the supposed virtues of the strong executive and commission government and hence would facilitate the entrance of more professional administrators into municipal government." Finally, reformers enlisted specialized professionals to head departments, and greatly expanded and rationalized the city's social services. Many reformers by World War One interpreted the efficiency of civic order in terms of humanitarian facilities as well as fiscal soundness.

This account of urban reform's modernization drive is a familiar one, but Schiesl examines a number of significant contradictions within the reform movement. First, reform politicians were faced with the problem of being elected to office and remaining in power, which necessitated the marshalling of broad electoral coalitions. Mayors such as Pingree and Johnson, placed into office by elite-backed structural reformists, shifted to social-reform measures for mass support in order to compensate for a loss of elite support. Some reform politicians became backsliders insofar as the abolition of patronage was concerned. The most perceptive in their ranks realized that, both in the interests of efficiency and voter popularity, reform administrations had to assume social services provided by the bosses to ensure the support of the working class and immigrants. Moreover, there was the contradiction between centralized bureaucracy and the democratic protestations of reformers. Schiesl generally accepts at face value reformers' arguments that "efficiency meant a modernization of urban democracy rather than the destruction of popular government." Reformers were concerned with political results; these could only derive from a centralized and professionalized political process.

The book's primary concern is not the effects of this modernization upon the urban masses, but it does indicate a number of cases in which the efficiency drive harmed the immediate interests of working-class and immigrant residents. Patronage was an important avenue of advance for many of them. Hiring clerks, firemen, and labourers in over-abundance could be regarded as an early form of counter-cyclical public finance, but it was this sort of patronage that reformers sought to eliminate. In one case a Boston labour leader argued that slashing city payrolls hampered workers because such costs resulted from "direct employment of labor by the city, or giving municipal work only to fair contractors," and therefore were "sound economically and beneficial to the whole community." To take another example, commission government and the city-manager system, particularly when coupled with at-large elections, were both designed to reduce the election of working-class and lower middle-class candidates. These innovations thus aroused the ire of labour forces. Proposals for commission or manager administrations, as well as for civic research bureaus, were often initiated and bankrolled by businessmen. Reform clearly reduced representativeness in favour of "the business view of what was good for the community."

Schiesl acknowledges that the efficiency drive can be regarded as "a program to develop and insulate the power of emerging metropolitan elites from sustained pressures from the masses as expressed in machine politics." But he assumes that urban politics contain trade-offs. Despite bureaucratic pitfalls, reform made it easier for organizations "representing all occupational classes to gain greater access to government without the intervention of the machine and with the assurance that their goals would be more readily achieved." By rationalizing democracy, reformers adapted it to the urban environment. Furthermore, they often instituted efficient and rationalized civic governments that paved the way for what Schiesl regards as today's competent, responsive, and humanitarian cities. Most of all, reformers promulgated "the concept of public responsibility for the welfare of all urban dwellers." By launching various social welfare measures, they demonstrated that "efficient government did not simply mean the retooling of administrative machinery to fit the needs of modern business. Governmental efficiency... also involved the creation of a modern system of social security for the urban masses" which encompassed child welfare, housing regulations, public health, and the like.

The assumption that the urban historian must analyze the trade-offs and net benefits in civic politics makes this book significant. Similarly, the author demonstrates that urban reform was not a monolithic movement, but contained contradictory methods and goals. Both features suggest useful modifications for the sharply critical literature on progressive reform of the last fifteen years. Schiesl's account, however, would be more valuable had he displayed more scepticism regarding reform's beneficial impact. He does not come to terms with the problem of why business reformers did desire hegemony over civic administration. The book might have sketched the broader goals and accomplishments of business within the class politics of urbanizing America. Those corporate capitalists referred to by Schiesl desired optimal economic inputs such as healthy public and private credit, expanded transportation links, and regularization of business-government relations. Advancements in civic social services likely owed as much or more to business needs for a contented and productive labour force than to efficient humanitarianism.

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The political machine of the late Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago is one of the best known and most studied political organizations in American history. At least four biographies of Daley have appeared in recent years, and numerous political scientists have analyzed the machine's nuts and bolts, from Harold Gosnell's Machine Politics Chicago Style (1937) to Milton Rakocev's Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers (1975). Still, an element of mystery has always surrounded the Chicago machine's continued existence in an era when machine politics were supposed to be extinct. If the classic machine boss simply bought votes with jobs and favours, as is widely supposed, how does a boss survive today when the welfare state has made such material favours largely irrelevant? If a boss gained some of his power from primordial ethnic ties with transplanted peasants living in "urban villages," as another theory surmised, how does a boss continue to exist when the descendants of the immigrants...
have long since become middle-class suburbanites? How, in sum, did Richard J. Daley, who appeared as such a backward Neanderthal Man on the television screens of America during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, enjoy such political invincibility in Chicago up until his death in 1976? Were Chicagoans simply more corrupt or more easily deceived than most Americans?

It is questions such as these which Thomas M. Guterbock addresses in his book *Machine Politics in Transition*. As a young man, Guterbock had been active in anti-machine, independent politics in Chicago; but when he began to pursue graduate studies in sociology at the University of Chicago, he decided to switch sides and study the Daley machine from the inside as a participant-observer. From 1972 to 1975, he resided in a machine ward on the North Side of Chicago and worked as part-time political assistant to an alderman. Besides gathering random impressions of the machine's operations, Guterbock also conducted interviews with 160 ward residents, trying to discover how widespread the machine's "jobs and favors" were and what effect these material incentives had on voter behaviour. The result was a doctoral dissertation completed for Morris Janowitz in 1976, and now this book in Janowitz's *Studies of Urban Society* series.

Guterbock found that the Chicago machine did, indeed, spend a great deal of time and effort trying to do favours and provide services for the voters. At least one-third of the ward's residents in his random sample had at some time requested aid from the ward organization. Yet, surprisingly, Guterbock found that the recipients of these services were not generally impoverished, lower-class residents. Nor did use of the machine's services correlate very highly with voting behaviour and Democratic party loyalty. Though patronage jobs and economic self-interest clearly motivated the party leaders in the ward, such material incentives did not provide the primary motive for machine supporters (the voters). Thus Guterbock concludes that a "material exchange model" (voters trade their votes for material favours) does not adequately explain machine success. Similarly, he finds an "affectional exchange model" (voters support the machine out of close ethnic ties with the boss) unsatisfactory. In the ward he studied, the political leaders were nearly all Jewish whereas the voters were largely Catholic and Protestant. Ward residents did not consider the machine leaders as friends or close associates. Thus, neither of the traditional explanations of machine loyalty—material favours or bonds of sympathy—explain very much in Guterbock's case study.

The author offers as an alternative explanation what he calls a "commitment model" of machine-voter support. The machine gains votes by appeals to dearly held value commitments of the voters. The lower-class residents of Guterbock's ward vote largely out of an unthinking Democratic party loyalty—based either on ethnic or class attachments. But more sophisticated voters in the ward support the machine because they perceive it as a bulwark of their local community. Machine leaders employ a complex strategy of symbolic and substantive actions which appeal to voters with localistic attachments. In this view, the famous jobs and favours of machine lore have more importance as symbols than as actual material inducements. Those who use the machine's services tend to be homeowners and long-time residents of the ward. Though they may not "need" such services as much as the lower-class proletariat, they value them more highly. The fact that the machine still provides services for voters is important as proof of interest in local community welfare. The Chicago machine emerges then, from Guterbock's study, as the personification of local civic pride. The ward boss identifies with the neighbourhood, Daley identified with Chicago; and voters supported them on that basis. Toattack either was to attack the voter's neighbourhood and city.

Guterbock's conclusions are not altogether novel to anyone who has observed the Chicago machine. Chicagoans have long known that the outsider's view of the machine as a corrupt engine of vote buying was distorted. The average Chicagoan recognized that Daley and his minions somehow personified Chicago, just as Jean Drapeau somehow personifies and enhances "la gloire de Montréal." *Machine Politics in Transition*, though based on a single ward, provides interesting and persuasive evidence for this point of view. Unfortunately, the book will probably not reach a wide audience, for it is expensive and is written in a mechanical, hypothesis-testing style. Nevertheless, Guterbock's book deserves the attention of anyone interested in machine politics.

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By 1870 New York was firmly established as America's largest and most significant city. It had a population of some 900,000 and was served by numerous street railways, ferry boats, and trans-oceanic steamers. The population density averaged two hundred persons per acre. Eighteen different railway companies brought passengers and freight from a cluster of eastern states and delivered the city's goods to much of the nation. Over the next fifty years New York continued to surge ahead as thousands of European migrants settled there. By 1920 it was approaching the 6,000,000 mark.

Such massive growth required a major extension of a host of urban facilities whether for housing, parks, transportation, education, lighting, water, or fire protection. Professor Condit has assumed the mammoth task of providing a detailed history of metropolitan New York's entire railway and terminal system—its birth, growth, operations, capacity, technology, and total urban consequences. The sheer magnitude of the task is intimidating, but what is most impressive is that the author has actually achieved what he set out to achieve. Whether one seeks a detailed treatment of some two dozen major railways, or a brief glance at some one hundred seventy-five others, it is available here. Similarly one will find detailed, precise, scholarly accounts of the problems encountered in the control systems, the improvement of motors, or the electrification of the Pennsylvania Railroad and its many subsidiaries. Yet the sheer abundance of factual detail tends to overwhelm the reader after he has read many, many paragraphs such as:

The Schiff group reorganized the road as the New York Ontario and Western, and in recognition of the plain fact