A Regional Framework for Urban History

Gilbert A. Stelter

Résumé de l'article

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Urban history may not have fulfilled the predictions made for it by H.J. Dyos because it has limited itself too narrowly to the boundaries of the city itself. A broader regional framework is proposed based on the insights of the traditional metropolis/hinterland concept. Four types of city-region relationships are identified by distinguishing several levels of these relationships: cities and an international urban system; the nation-state as a region; regions within a nation-state; a city and its local hinterland. Examples are chosen from the Canadian, American, Latin American, and Australian urban experiences. An important consequence of this regional approach is that the smaller places, the villages and towns, must also be seen as an integral part of the complex web of population concentrations within a region.

The heroic function which H.J. Dyos predicted for urban history in the 1960s seems unfulfilled in many respects. Dyos hoped urban history would be a field of knowledge in which many disciplines converged; it would not be a single discipline in a narrow sense, but a dynamic focus stimulating a vigorous reexamination of social change. Two decades later, urban history is a healthy member of the historical establishment, but like other successful subdisciplines such as those emphasizing labour, women, family, and ethnicity, it has not managed to escape from a self-imposed intellectual ghetto. At the same time, a Weberian sociology questions whether there is such a thing as an “urban” phenomenon. And Marxists challenge the validity of “urban” as an explanatory device, and regard urban places merely as containers within which more important processes of historical change take place.

A great deal of solid work has been produced about the urban past, much of it informed by a strong interdisciplinary approach. And yet, the lack of a large conceptual framework continues to plague efforts to explain one of the most basic of all social phenomena in history — the growth of cities and the urbanization of society. It is, for example, still extremely difficult to define exactly what “urban” means. Phenomena such as class distinctions and class consciousness, poverty, economic growth, housing, and so on, occur in urban settings but also have a wider existence as well. Perhaps the concentration on the city itself, often to the exclusion of its context, has led to the underestimation of the extent of the interaction between towns and cities and the larger society in which these places exist.

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Historical Association, Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., December, 1982. I wish to thank Michael Ebner, Michael Frisch, Alan Artibise, Blaine Brownell and David Farrell for constructive criticism.

Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (February/février 1985)
While historians are engaged in looking for new frameworks which might be adequate to the task of "reading" society, an older historiographical tradition may in fact offer an excellent vantage point. The metropolis/hinterland approach, long familiar to urbanologists, puts cities into their regional contexts. As a framework, it is complementary to, not competitive with, currently popular frameworks such as class and social structure, capital and labour, family, ethnicity, and others, by providing a spatial basis for relationships, a basis often lacking in many social analyses. This is not to suggest that there is a carefully defined metropolis/hinterland approach in the historical literature. Donald Davis has recently identified several variations on this common theme, including the "centre and margin" of Harold Innis; the "exploitation-dependancy" of Arthur Lower; the "entrepreneurial" of Donald Creighton; and the "ecological" approach to metropolitanism of J.M.S. Careless. Nevertheless, the beginning of what is now known as urban history in Canada stemmed from this tradition, for the metropolitan approach saw cities as the focal points of aggressive commercial elites in pursuit of local and regional hegemony.

The close connection between urban history and metropolitanism was eroded during the 1960s and early 1970s when the study of urban phenomenon often took place in isolation, without much interest in the urban place's larger local and regional context. Many studies ignored the Canadian context entirely; American models were imported, and with them, American questions, usually based on the attractions of Stephan Thernstrom's "new" urban history, an excellent vantage point. The metropolis/hinterland analysis of social mobility. Michael Katz's work on Hamilton, extremely significant for its analysis of family and class, was of this type, but most traditional urban biographies also suffer from the same limited notion of context. Another reason was probably the fragmentation of scholarship, with sub-specialities beavering away at particular tasks without much interest in or knowledge of what was going on in other sub-specialities. Anyone who regularly attends the meetings of the Social Science History Association gets a good idea of this tendency, as historians get to know more and more about minuscule subjects, but less and less about the total picture. This stage of imported models and detailed social science-oriented quantitative work saw the hey-day of urban history as the history of particular cities and subjects specific to urban places such as internal organizations and planning, public transportation, or municipal government.

A much broader approach is recently evident as students of the urban past begin to look at comparative perspectives, at the relationship of culture (as a mental system) and urban development, and especially at city and region relationships. Although Canadians have long considered "metropolitanism" as their own special scholarly product, the application of the idea — if not the name — is more fully developed in the United States where historians and historical geographers have demonstrated the importance of urban development in a regional context. This approach has also become a significant way of explaining urban development in other countries which are the product of European colonization, especially Australia, and Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It is also possible to go beyond a reliance on conventional sources. The Latin American novel, for example, seems particularly sensitive to city-region relationships and to distinctions between city, town and country life, which suggests that historians might take literature much more seriously in this regard than they have in the past.

But it is much more difficult to get a precise handle on a series of "relationships" between city and region than it is to describe "things" such as the bricks and stones of the physical city. J.M.S. Careless, in particular, has wrestled with explaining the "complex of reciprocal relationships between the concentrated population centre and the extended community beyond it." S.D. Clark, on the other hand, has argued that "it serves no useful purpose to work with such categories or concepts as metropolis and hinterland when what is metropolis can also be considered hinterland and what is hinterland can also be considered metropolis." Clark's criticism is akin to saying that human and family relationships are meaningless because a man can be a father, son, uncle, etc., at the same time. Family historians "treat family as a highly malleable social relation," and dealing with different levels of city-region relationships is really a kind of complex family history.

The lack of a relevant social theory in this area has often been cited as one of urban history's problems, but whether we should be working toward theory construction remains an open question. Those Social Sciences which are best at theory — Economics and Psychology — tend to create lawlike propositions divorced from time and place. What is more likely to be desirable is a typological scheme that takes account of time and place and is flexible enough to incorporate evolutionary change. An ideal type, as described by Max Weber, is a synthesis of diffuse phenomena which are arranged into a mental construct which "cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality." A recent attempt to develop a typology of American cities recognizes that "typologies, by their very nature, simplify reality." Yet the authors conclude that "they are invaluable for simplifying and ordering data in terms which are comparable and for sensitizing us to the properties of social phenomena."
Cities and an International Urban System

The phenomenon of the metropolis — a Greek term for a mother city which gives birth to smaller cities and colonies — is as old as civilization itself. At the beginning of the modern era, young aggressive nation-states of western Europe, centred in Madrid, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Paris, and London, began a worldwide competition for hegemony by founding colonies and colonial towns in the Americas and Southeast Asia. Immanuel Wallerstein's distinctions between the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery of the modern world system of capitalism are relevant to the understanding of this early urban development in the new world. The core's cities contained the controlling institutions and classes and the highest levels of economic development. Towns of the periphery tended to be administrative or military centres, ensuring the production of export crops and raw materials for shipment back to the core. The giant cities at the core are world cities, part of an international system of commodity flows which is partially independent of their own national urban networks.

The negative aspects of the relationship between the metropolitan centre and the satellite periphery of the world capitalist system are emphasized by "dependency" theorists such as André Gunder Frank. The nature of capitalism itself, Frank argues, requires the polarization of the system into central and peripheral portions. The development of the metropolis and the underdevelopment of the periphery are the "opposite sides of the same coin." Frank's interpretation is based on the assumption that underdevelopment is perpetuated by the continuing expropriation of its surplus capital through international trade. He gets support for this view from a surprising source, Jane Jacobs, who argues that "backward" cities cannot buy development from highly developed economies. Rather, they must rely on each other or improvise; the simple two-way trade of imperial-colonial relationships is a dead-end form of trade.

The Nation-State as a Region

There are several possible perspectives on the relationship between the nation-state and urban development. One is that of the national political culture. Although a nation-state may be an amalgam of diverse regions and populations, what its cities and towns have in common is the nature of the national political and economic systems. This is often a nebulous type of analysis, yet it has some explanatory and interpretive powers. Among the most provocative works of this type is Sam Warner's critique of the political economy of the United States in his The Urban Wilderness (1972), a book generally disregarded by Americans but highly regarded elsewhere. Warner argued that a kind of political culture which he designated as "privatism" dominated American approaches to city building and management. According to Warner, profit-oriented private concerns controlled areas of public concern such as services and housing; elite groups dominated municipal government for their private interests rather than that of the community.

In an effort to compare Brazilian and American contexts for urban development, Gerald Greenfield has studied São Paulo with Warner's "privatism" concept in mind. While there were superficial similarities, there were also basic differences based on what Greenfield referred to as a Latin American ethos, "particularly the elitist authoritarianism of political traditions, and the influence of the holistic organic notions of Thomistic Catholicism."

While the Brazilian and American national experiences have some readily apparent differences which would affect the nature of urban development, differences of a more subtle nature — as between Canada and the United States — could also have an impact on the character of urban places. The basic difference between the two was the consequence of the Revolution, for it represented the American answer to the question of who made the decisions about things like town government and land assignment. The early English-speaking Canadians were either refugees from the American Revolution or British officials, and the early French-speaking Canadians looked askance at American notions of republicanism and democracy. For early towns, the consequences included a great deal of imperial control over town location and planning, with a conscious effort to set up a local aristocracy by the way land was assigned. This garrison style of town creation and operation had gone out of practice more than one hundred years earlier in the American colonies. Such conservative thinking — defined as decisions made from the top down — was reflected in the difficulties cities ran into acquiring some degree of autonomy, for charters were delayed until the 1830s and 1840s. As late as the early twentieth century, the franchise remained extremely restrictive and some influential thinkers justified this feature on the grounds that an excessive form of democracy in the United States was responsible for many of the political problems faced by American cities.
That differences between Canada and the United States continue to exist in political culture, values and institutions is forcefully argued by John Mercer and Michael Goldberg. In a survey of ideological positions they find a greater acceptance of government involvement in economic affairs in Canada, a greater stress on the pursuit of individual goals and the protection of private property in the United States and a correspondingly greater interest in collective action in Canada. The implications of these differences for urban development include the following: that a greater emphasis on public transportation in Canada has led to more compact urban forms; that income redistribution policies have resulted in a smaller degree of income disparity and spatial segregation by class than is the case in American cities; and that Canadian cities are financially healthier because they have more support from senior levels of government.28

Another possible perspective on the relationship between a nation-state and urban development in an emphasis on the system of cities which provides a sort of structure or skeleton for the nation as a region.29 The power structure so obvious in an imperial-colonial context is paralleled by disparities in the distribution of power within the nation-state. J.M.S. Careless has graphically depicted the "feudal-like chain of vassalage" between cities within the Canadian system, with Winnipeg, for example, tributary to Montreal, but serving as the metropolis of a large region of its own in the prairie West.30 What is emerging in Canadian historiography combines the concepts of metropolitanism, staples theory and regionalism in an all-embracing core-periphery interpretation of the country as a whole. According to this interpretative framework, the core provides the capital, the technology and the entrepreneurial skills that help to develop the staple products of the periphery. The periphery in turn ships the raw materials to the source of demand for processing and distribution. Essentially the core is Southern Ontario and Southern Quebec; the periphery is the Atlantic region, the West and the North. Cities in both types of regions act as intermediaries, their functions determined by their place in the system. Core cities have a fully developed, diversified economic base, including manufacturing; cities in the periphery tend to specialize, depending on the raw materials being produced in their region.28

The Canadian example provides us with a situation where the cities of the central region dominate a complex system of cities in other regions. In some countries a single primate city is so powerful that the entire nation is in effect that city’s hinterland, as is the case with Buenos Aires in Argentina. As Jorge Hardoy and others have described it, Buenos Aires replaced Spain as a controlling force after the Revolution, maintaining a monopoly of power through its control of the army and its jurisdiction over foreign trade as it had the customs house in the only port equipped to handle foreign trade. A series of commentators and politicians throughout the nineteenth century criticized the resulting regional imbalance of economic activity and the extent to which living conditions deteriorated with the distance from the privileged centre.31 A far different pattern of power could be described for Australia, for it developed as a series of six distinct regions, each with a major port serving as the organizational node. Even though regional isolation was strong in the early years, the regions were remarkably homogeneous in function and in population origin. Compared to the regional disparity of most other recently developed countries, Australia does not seem to have had distinctly rich and poor regions but a relatively uniform living standard and way of life in each.32

Regions Within a Nation-State

Regions at this level tend to be extremely flexible, for boundaries will vary depending on the particular issue. In many cases a formal region, such as a province or state, may be subdivided into several functional sub-regions. But this flexibility does not negate the objective reality of regions. An excellent non-technical definition is Josiah Royce’s, based on California in the 1880s: to him, a region is “any one part of a national domain, which is, geographically and socially, sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other parts of the country.”33

The relationship of cities to such regions is necessarily complex, for the relationship varies from region to region and often changes over time within the same region. A general model might look something like this: cities represent a window on the larger world, serving as agencies of national, standardizing trends. In J.M.S. Careless’ words, “regions usually centre on metropolitan communities, which largely organize them, focus their views and deal with the outside metropolitan forces on their behalf.”34 This metropolitan function includes the activities of national corporations and financial institutions as well as the national communications media. In turn the towns, villages and country more clearly represent the region’s distinctive character, reflecting the particular economic base and mixture of population. This distinctive character is brought to the city through migration and constant interaction.

The shifting balance between these two idealized processes has been the subject of a good deal of recent scholarship. Perhaps the most sensitive application of this kind of regionalism to urban history is David Goldfield’s regional framework of the urban Southern United States.36 Goldfield’s point is that it is difficult to treat the South as a geographic or statistical entity, yet it is a distinct region because of its culture. The particular combination of ruralism, race and colonialism are distinctive to this American region alone. The regional context, Goldfield asserts, was
more significant in determining the character of Southern cities than their membership in the general group of American cities. His argument is compelling. For example, the impact of ruralism on cities includes not only the physical structure and the economic basis of urban places but the persistence of rural values of the millions of migrants to the cities. Their distinctive cultural baggage included the strength of family ties, a propensity to violence, and a strong commitment to evangelical Protestantism. Equally convincing arguments are made for racism and colonialism which clearly show how the region determined the character of the cities.34

The established view of urban development in the several regions that make up the American West still seems to be that its cities were essentially a nationalizing force. What the urban historians of the frontier west, that nebulous moving region, have in common is an emphasis on a process which reproduced familiar urban patterns. Richard Wade, Charles Glaab, Lawrence Larsen, and Kenneth Wheeler, to name only a few, describe an urban thrust which precedes general settlement. Western urban dwellers did not wish to innovate, to create something new; rather, they wished to emulate the character and culture of the great cities of the east coast.35 Gunther Barth even coined the term “metropolism” in writing about San Francisco and Denver, to describe “the tendency of certain citizens in emergent urban societies to inaugurate and maintain a style and time of life characteristic of great cities and to foster a quality of urban behaviour symptomatic of large centers.”36 But recent work on the Far West and Southwest tends to echo the regional approach advocated by Goldfield. Robert Fogelson, for example, suggests that the environment of southern California stimulated a new type of dispersed urban form.37 And Harold Platt, writing about Houston, concludes that “a more balanced picture is now emerging” for current work shows “the reciprocal interactions of town and country collectively molded a characteristic pattern of development for every section and stamped a unique imprint of regional culture on each of them.”38

In Canada, the public and academics tend to think in regional terms; in fact it has been suggested that it is in such “limited identities” that true Canadianism can be found. The confederation of 1867 which created the nation has often been interpreted as the coming together of regions which have maintained their own identity. The situation is somewhat akin to that of the confederate states of America prior to the constitution — not one sovereign people but particular societies of people under a sovereign crown. This may be partly attributed to English-French dualism, but there are also several English-speaking regions which have a distinct identity. The tendency to treat people as groups and communities rather than individuals and citizens is reflected in their persistence of ethnic groups which contribute to a particular ethnic mix in each region.39

But these general suggestions have not been thoroughly applied in working out the nature of regionalism in Canada. Rather than a concern for ideological and cultural factors, the concentration has been almost exclusively on economic and political factors. A key feature is usually a reliance on staples theory, not surprising in a country where regional economies are dominated by the production and export of primary resources.40 The towns and cities directly involved in the export of staples varied in function from region to region, depending on the type of staple exported. In this respect, the nature of the staple had a direct bearing on the emergence of regional disparities. Those communities connected with agricultural hinterlands were particularly favoured and usually were able to replace imports with domestic production. But towns depending on fish or lumber remained colonial entrepots, collecting the primary products of their hinterlands for shipment abroad and importing processed goods in return. The tendency seemed to be for the dominant staple to organize the economy around itself, inhibiting diversification and leading eventually to regional stagnation. At least three main regions — Central, Atlantic and Western — can be designated in Canada but each really must be further differentiated for our purposes. For example, geographers regularly refer to the Central Canadian “urban system” or to the “Quebec City to Windsor Urban Corridor,”41 but these definitions ignore the realities of provincial boundaries and of major cultural differences. Thus, it is possible to begin with Ontario, although until recently this most populous (one-third of the country’s total) and powerful province did not think of itself as a region, but equated itself with the country, sort of like Prussia in nineteenth-century Germany.

The story of Ontario’s regional development begins with the evolution of a wheat producing region which led to a widely dispersed urban network of relatively small towns and cities. A maturity of sorts was achieved with a measure of independence from Montreal’s control and the rise of Toronto’s hegemony over the region. The agricultural staple base proved conducive to manufacturing of consumer goods and the region emerged as the urban industrial heartland of the country by the late nineteenth century, spurred on in part by federal government tariff policies.42

In contrast to Ontario, Quebec developed an urban system based on two large cities, Quebec City and Montreal, and virtually no middle-sized places. This centralized urban system has dominated Quebec from its origins in the seventeenth century, a product of a highly centralized administrative, religious and military establishment and a concentration on one or two staples exports. The province as region has been characterized by a French-English dualism since the conquest and this has been translated spatially into an urban-rural dualism as well. While the countryside, villages and towns usually were overwhelmingly French and Catholic, the population of the largest city, Montreal, was
split between English and French, with the English-speaking population usually dominating among the commercial and industrial elite. Until recently Montreal served as the major metropolis of the whole country and its business ties to its region and the immediate hinterland were tenuous, a product in part of the language differences between city and region.\textsuperscript{43}

The regional history of the Maritimes usually seems to be an explanation of why the region and its cities did not fare better within the total Canadian system. Based on a combination of staples exports and trans-Atlantic shipping, the Maritimes and its cities were at least the equal of other regions at the mid-nineteenth century mark. The region's decline after this has been explored in terms of the failure of the local entrepreneurial class, structural and political change in transportation systems, the marginal quality and poor management of the region's resource base, and using the core-periphery concept, its location on the periphery thereby giving market advantages to the industrial cities of Central Canada.\textsuperscript{44} One of the social consequences for the urban places of this region is their relative ethnic homogeneity, for the great non-British immigration of the early twentieth century passed them by, leaving the region and its cities as primarily "old-British."\textsuperscript{45}

The western region of Canada emerged even as the Maritimes declined, with boom towns like Winnipeg and Vancouver leading the way. The rapid settlement and development of the region is usually described in the context of transportation technology and staples production. Winnipeg had an initial advantage as a kind of gateway city to the entire developing region but at least five other substantial cities soon challenged it for the hegemony over portions of the region. The character of the region was essentially that of Central Canada (and especially Ontario) moving west and its cities reflected this dependence. On the West Coast, however, the American west coast influence has been important with California-style architecture and living styles mingling with British and Central Canadian features.\textsuperscript{46}

In Latin America, Brazil has received a good deal of attention in terms of the relationship between regionalism and urban development. As the largest country in the world still undergoing significant frontier expansion, Brazil's regional identities have been formed in the context of this expansion. In a major study of frontierism, regionalism and urbanization, the economist Martin Katzman has outlined several distinct regions and graphically portrayed the stark disparities between them. The prosperous South Central region was the coffee frontier and has become the agricultural supplier of the industrial cities like São Paulo. Since the 1930s the frontier has shifted to the Central West region, where the federal government has promoted settlement, including capital cities as spearheads, Goiânia and Brasília. The Northeast remains the largest depressed area in the world in spite of major attempts at regional planning. Katzman argues that this disequilibrium continues to exist in spite of government intervention because of the process of industrial agglomeration in São Paulo.\textsuperscript{47} This sort of disequilibrium between regional development is even more apparent in Argentina. James Scobie refers to regions such as the littoral or coastal, the Northeast Lowlands, the mountainous Northwest, the plains of the pampas and the plateau of Patagonia; but he shows that in reality there are only two regions; the primate city of Greater Buenos Aires with a third of the country's population, and the interior. Even the country's second city, Rosaria, only one-tenth as large as Buenos Aires, is really part of the coastal region dominated by Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{48}

In contrast to the kind of regional framework being used in North American and Latin American urban history, Australian historians have not made much use of the approach in spite of repeated calls for such directions by J.W. McCarty.\textsuperscript{49} Australia may be one of the best examples of city-region relationships for it is really divided into a series of large functional regions, each presided over by a coastal capital city. These will be discussed in the following section. Historians who dealt with smaller, homogeneous units have tended to concentrate on relatively small areas which are based on pastoral farming, but the country towns of these regions have not been dealt with adequately.\textsuperscript{50} The New Zealand experience appears to fit the general pattern established in Australia. Coastal towns established in the mid-19th century became focal points for regional economies based on British-style arable agriculture.

### A City and its Hinterland

This level usually involves one major city and its surrounding network of smaller cities, towns, villages and countryside. The wide variety of possible city-hinterland systems has been effectively summarized by John Sharpless into three "idealypical" patterns which will be described briefly before we look at some specific cases in more detail. The first type is the most common: a single centre of overwhelming commercial and administrative dominance with a hinterland that is largely nonurban and nonindustrial. The regional transportation system is a sort of drainage basin for a non-urban economy based on extractive activities. Examples of this type include most large ports such as New York, Montreal, Buenos Aires and Melbourne, as well as a host of smaller places. In a second type, two major cities grow together and share the functions of one large port. Usually one of these, that located inland, eventually dominates, forming the locus of the hinterland transportation network. The hinterland, as in Type I, is extractive in orientation. Examples of these "coupled nuclei" are Houston/Galveston, Birmingham/Mobile, and in Latin America, São Paulo/Santos and Santiago/Valparaíso. A third type is the least com-
mon, involving a commercial and administrative centre surrounded by a number of highly specialized manufacturing or processing towns. Sharpless gives the example of Boston, but Toronto might also be cited, with highly specialized manufacturing towns surrounding it like Oshawa, Hamilton, Kitchener, and Guelph.  

The third type described by Sharpless is somewhat similar to the city/city region extolled by Jane Jacobs in her recent *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* (1984). Jacobs uses the term “city region” to refer to the dense hinterland of rural, industrial and commercial work places surrounding some cities. What distinguishes cities that generate city regions, in Jacob’s view, is the “capacity of the city to replace wide ranges of its imports exuberantly and repeatedly.” She cites Boston as an example of a city which has produced a city region covering most of eastern Massachusetts but also extending into the southern part of New Hampshire and all of Rhode Island. Sam Warner has analyzed the evolution of this city region in the twentieth century in terms of its population, economy, communications networks and natural environment. He points out that the old inner city/suburban contrasts no longer sufficiently cover the complexity of modern urban clusters. His definition of the boundaries of the city region tends to be based, as are those of other specialists, on journey to work data, which indicate the extent to which a city region is a single economic unit. Perhaps more than any other urban historian, Warner recognizes the close connection between the scholarly and the public difficulty of identifying that “middle distance” community beyond the family, the neighbourhood and the town.

The study of city and hinterland appears to be an established tradition in countries where urban development and staples production are clearly related, such as Canada, Brazil and Australia. In Canada, an early study by Donald C. Masters, *The Rise of Toronto, 1850-1890* (1947) traced the growth of Toronto’s domination over most of Ontario and its competition with Montreal for the hegemony over the broader Canadian hinterland. In this pioneering work, Masters applied the ideas of the Canadian-born and educated economic historian, Norman S.G. Gras, who, in his *Introduction to Economic History* (1922) emphasized the mutual dependence of the metropolis and hinterland and outlined four economic stages of metropolitan growth: a city began its growth as a marketing centre, developed a manufacturing complex, became the hub of a communications network, and finally emerged as the focus of a financial system. The Gras model perhaps was more applicable to the British scene; as Masters recognized, the communications network often preceded other stages in Canadian urban development.

Of recent Canadian work of this type, that by L.D. McCann most consciously relates the question of staples to industrialization and urban growth. An example is his analysis of why Halifax failed to become a major manufacturing centre in spite of vigorous efforts in that direction. McCann concludes that while it did act as a commercial entrepot for a sizeable share of the Maritime region’s fish, forest, mineral and agriculture products to external markets, it could not function as a processing centre for these resources because they were too scattered and too weakly endowed. In addition, Halifax and its hinterland, in fact its entire region in the larger sense of the word, was peripheral to the industrialized core of the country which had a variety of competitive advantages. Ironically, the city’s significance was and is maintained, not by its regional staples or industrial base, but by a federal government which has made the city an important defense centre and a winter port facility for central Canada.

The interdependence between a city and its hinterland is effectively analyzed in the Brazilian case by Martin Katzman’s work on São Paulo. Until the 1940s, São Paulo’s development was dependent on processes taking place in its rural hinterland associated with the expansion of the coffee frontier: the accumulation of capital, the building of transportation facilities and the rise in market demand for coffee. Katzman deals with the impact these had on São Paulo in terms of the “multiplier mechanism” of staples theory. But the transition to an industrial centre under these circumstances is by no means inevitable. The change involved the depression of the 1930s which disrupted the world coffee market and led to a new political ideology more favourable to industrialization as a solution to the boom and bust cycles of a staples export market. From the 1940s, rapid population growth associated with industry created a vast new market for diversified agricultural products, which stimulated expansion, diversification and eventually some modernization of the agricultural sector. The result, according to Katzman, is that São Paulo “is clearly the engine of growth in a hinterland that now encompasses nearly all of South-Central Brazil.”

The most important Australian study of a city and its agricultural hinterland is J.B. Hirst’s *Adelaide and the Country, 1870-1917: Their Social and Political Relationship* (1973). The capital city held between one-third to one-half of the colony’s population, but economic power was heavily concentrated in it, for most of the owners of the colony’s staple industries of mining, grazing and agriculture lived in the city, which was also the focus of the import-export system. But it was often a two-way relationship. Merchants and professionals invested in mining and grazing; pastoralists and squatters from the country often were directly involved in banking and urban property. Hirst also successfully deals with the political dimension of city-region relationships, a subject seldom attempted by urban historians. From the 1870s to 1917 the pendulum of power swung from the city to the country in terms of representation in the colonial legislature. But in another sense the city continued to govern because the bureaucracy, with its city-based administration
and city standards continued to control education, the police, poor relief, and was chiefly responsible for public health.

The study of cities and their hinterlands has also become a major thrust in American urban history. A recent study of Syracuse and its hinterland in the nineteenth century by Roberta Miller is an excellent example. Miller takes issue with the theories of regional development which are still based on the early nineteenth century scholar, Johann von Thünen, which presuppose an isolated subsistence village economy as a first stage, followed by regional development characterized by improved transportation and increased trade and small scale industry within the region, and finally, integration into the national economy and interregional trade. In reality, she points out, American city-regions grew out of the westward expansion of the coastal economy during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and regional development followed this interregional connection. Some of her findings for Syracuse and its region are of general significance in understanding this type of regional urban history. First, what may seem like a cliché, yet is hardly ever followed in urban biographies is the extent to which regional urban development is the product of the interplay of national, subnational and local conditions. Second, the importance of interregional transportation improvements (in this case the Erie Canal) in the subsequent formation of a regional economy. Third, urban growth did not benefit all parts of the city and its hinterland equally. As Syracuse grew, for example, it took over many of the functions of nearby villages and stunted their growth. The city was enriched by the migration of some of the ablest people and by hinterland investment capital being drawn to the city. In turn, of course, the city provided services and an invaluable market for agricultural products.

While city growth directly affected the surrounding countryside, empirical examination of this question in North America is very recent. Perhaps the growing interest in rural history accounts for the new interest, for urban and rural history could be regarded as different sides of the same scholarly coin. One example of a study of this kind is Michael Conzen’s analysis of the impact of Madison, Wisconsin’s “urban shadow” on a nearby rural township, Blooming Grove. The township itself had no settlements, but the presence of Madison affected the pattern of land purchases and eventually of land use. For example, the high price of land near the city seems to have resulted in higher rates of tenancy than on land further from the urban centre.

Several examples of Canadian studies of urban influence on rural life deserve mention. David Gagan’s book on rural Peel County, near Toronto, includes an analysis of an emerging urban centre, Brampton. With bold strokes, Gagan describes what it meant to be “urban” rather than “rural” in the county by comparing fertility ratios, age-at-marriage, and occupational structures, and concludes that “after less than a dozen years of separate development the two populations had quite distinct demographic characteristics which set them worlds apart.” Brampton’s families were comparatively smaller; children left home at an earlier age, cutting down the period of active parenthood; and children were more likely to go to school. By 1870, Gagan argues, rural society had begun to change, partly because urban places like Brampton acted as “instruments through which the grip of conventional wisdom, tastes, attitudes, modes of production, and forms of social organization among hinterland populations was gradually loosened.”

An interest in the way urbanization has made an impact on the hinterland is central to the work of Fred Dahms on Huron, Bruce and Wellington counties in Ontario. Although Dahms does not locate his small, isolated communities within the sphere of any particular metropolitan centre, he examines the changing functions of small settlements undergoing a general “process of urbanization.” His basic conclusion is that these small places have evolved in the past century from being primarily agricultural service centres to the point where each has taken on one or two specialized urban roles such as tourism, wholesaling or crop processing. The point Dahms is demonstrating is that urban elements which were once concentrated in large cities can now be found scattered in the smaller towns and villages — the product of a process or urbanization of the countryside.

Conclusion: Towards a General Interpretation of Urban Development in a Regional Context

The identification of several possible levels of city-region relationships as ideal types does not tell much about how city-region relations have evolved over time, however. A serious attempt at periodization would require a fuller examination than is possible here, but some tentative suggestions about stages of development are offered. It seems unlikely that one scheme would be suitable for the entire group of countries which has been considered. Factors which play a role in shaping city-region connections vary widely in the “regions of recent settlement” and include the nature of political systems, levels of technology, the sophistication of economic development, and culture in the largest sense of the word. What follows, therefore, is applicable only to Canada in terms of stages of city-region relationships. The succession of stages is a cumulative process, with each era building on those previous to it, yet each stage has a distinctive set of linkages that sets it apart.

The earliest stage was a product of the mercantilist system, with colonial towns dependent on a close connection with the imperial metropolis. As agencies of imperial expansion, colonial towns were consciously conceived and planted to precede and direct more general settlement. In economic terms, these towns were entrepots — collection agencies for staples from their colonies for shipment to the mother coun-
try. The immediate areas around colonial towns were not highly developed, nor were colonial towns very closely related to each other. Individually each seemed to be connected directly with the metropolis abroad. Towns were the vanguard of established society from abroad, the carriers of civilization to the new frontiers. Long after American towns were relatively free of imperial control Canadian towns were forced to operate under an antiquated system of local government.

A second stage — during the commercial/industrial era of the nineteenth century — was characterized by increased regional and interregional development. The former colonial towns had now become concentrated settlements based on a combination of trade and industry surrounded by hinterlands based on forestry, agriculture, or fishing. The potential density of the hinterland population seems to have been a major variable in determining which urban places were successful in the race for the top positions in the Canadian hierarchy. In the same way that Quebec City was supplanted by Montreal, Kingston was replaced by Toronto as the agricultural frontier moved westward, for Toronto's potential hinterland was far greater than that of Kingston. While an external metropolis continued to loom large in the way in which power was sorted out, cities began to take on imperial functions of their own during this period, as improved transportation increased the possible connections with smaller places and countryside. But the urban world was still a strange new world representing only a minority of the total population.

In a third phase — from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century — manufacturing was regarded as the key factor, as transportation and trade had been in the previous period. But those places which moved beyond a dependence on industry exclusively, like Toronto, became the most prominent in the urban hierarchy. Functionally, the metropolis extended its economic and cultural dominance far beyond its boundaries, and an urban system emerged, with Montreal and Toronto at the head, although still dependent on an external metropolis, especially New York. With the majority of the population now living in urban places, an urban consciousness became more characteristic of the population even in smaller places.

In a final phase, traditional terms such as “urban” and “city” are in question for urbanity is no longer the exclusive trait of the city dweller. New forms seem to be emerging, but the city as a focus of cultural, economic, and transportation relations seems to have a future in Canada. This is not to take away from the vitality of the smaller places which seem to have made a comeback, if only for residential or tourist purposes. And people continue to identify with place in a traditional manner suggesting a good deal of continuity in how society perceives place, even though an increasing proportion of the decision-making authority may be concentrated in corporate boardrooms or distant bureaucracies which have no connection with any particular place or sets of place relationships.

The regional approach outlined in this essay represents a vital and continuing force in urban historical studies, even though the concept is still far from being able to offer precise analytical and diagnostic power. Urban history has been far more comfortable with urban as an entity, as a thing which can be graphically depicted in terms of land and buildings and jurisdictions, than it has been with urban as a relationship. But the regional approach may help us overcome some of the problems inherent in dealing with relationships in several ways. First, what is urban may become clearer when seen in conjunction with what is definitely not urban. The extent to which cities, towns, and countryside of a specific region are related can help us understand the urban places. In other words, the term urban by itself may not make sense; it only takes on meaning when seen in the context of the totality of a society. A not inconsiderable consequence of this sort of regional framework is that the smaller places, the villages and towns, must also be seen as an integral part of the complex web of population concentrations within a region. Second, by using the regional approach it may be possible to assess more carefully the role of cities and towns in society — whether they actively create, or passively reflect the larger society. This amounts to distinguishing between urban places as dependent variables — the products of larger social forces — and cities as independent variables — as agencies of social change. Cities are made, but they also make themselves and affect life around them. A significant challenge to this view is presented by Donald Davis who argues that metropolitan ambitions should not be attributed to cities but to “the individuals to whom they properly belong. Ambitions, like dominance and power, are attributes of elites not cities.” But this interpretation ignores the necessity of the community context, for elites do not operate in a vacuum, or from rural areas. Their activities form a portion of a larger enterprise which involves a wide spectrum of private and public concerns. Third, the regional approach offers the possibility of examining the question of power in society from a spatial perspective, with regional concepts such as core-periphery or metropolis-power (or its mirror-image — powerlessness) on the map of a region, a country, or even groups of countries. Fourth, it may be possible to distinguish between what is universal in urban development and what is the product of a particular societal context. This would, of course, require comparisons between regions, nations, and even civilizations, but it would allow us to recognize that what looked like a mountain in a local setting may well turn out to be a mole hill when seen in a larger context.

NOTES


2. The recent A Reader’s Guide to Canadian History 2: Confederation to the Present, ed., J.L. Granatstein and Paul Stevens (Toronto, 1982), now includes a separate section on urban history as well as a section on labour and working-class history, while women’s history and ethnicity are listed as part of social history.


4. For the most recent assessment of this literature in Canada, see Alan F.J. Artibise and Paul-André Linteau, The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approaches and Interpretations, Report No. 4 (Winnipeg, Institute of Urban Studies, 1984).


7. An excellent analysis of this work and of more recent work as well is David Goldfield, “The New Reginalism,” Journal of Urban History, 10 (February 1984): 171-86.


9. A brief selection would include Jorge Amado, The Violent Land (1945) set in the frontier towns which sprang up during the cacao rush to Brazil’s Bahia region; Mario Vargas Llosa, Aunt Julia and the Scriptwriter (1977), contrasts the worlds of Lima and small town Peru; Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967) can be read as a history of an isolated Columbian village’s slow evolution to closer ties with the outside world; Carlos Fuentes, Where the Air is Clear (1960), evokes the character of Mexico City in terms of the regional origin of many of its residents.


In his voluminous studies, Harold Innis contended that staples exports set the pace for economic growth by a sort of spread effect. More recent empirical and theoretical work has defined the linkages between staples and other economic activity more precisely. While these studies usually do not deal directly with urban growth, the general concepts are applicable. For example, backward linkages are defined as the production of facilities and tools by those who supplied the primary industry with transportation equipment such as railroads and ships, storage facilities, and tools. The nature of the staple determined the impact of this linkage: little development took place as the result of the fisheries or the fur trade, but the agricultural sector stimulated a wide variety of production. As ships and factories grew up to supply these products, rather than importing them, the domestic economy grew. A second type of linkage, usually referred to as forward linkage, involves the processing of the staple before export. This has probably had the least impact, because Canadian staples were usually shipped in close to raw form with eventual processing taking place outside the country. A third relationship, final demand linkages, is more important. This involves the production of consumer goods for the workers of the staple export industries. Again, the nature of the staple determined the extentiveness of the impact, with the agricultural sector demanding the greatest range of goods and services. For the ideas of Innis, see some of the theoretical pieces in Mary Q. Innis, ed., Essays on Canadian Economic History (Toronto, 1956), and the chapter on Innis in Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History (Toronto, 1976). Some of the key literature on the staples theory is R.E. Caves, “The Development of Newly Settled Regions,” Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 24 (1956); R.E. Caves, “‘Vent for Surplus’ Models of Trade and Growth,” in James Theberge, ed., The Economics of Trade and Development (New York, 1968). For a summation of interpretations see M.H. Watkins, “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth,” in Approaches to Canadian Economic History, ed. W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins (Toronto, 1967), and his more recent “The Staple Theory Revisited,” Journal of Canadian Studies, 12 (1977), which forms part of a special issue on Innis and the role of staples in Canadian economic history.

I.S. Bourne and R.D. MacKinnon, eds., Urban Systems Development in Central Canada: Selected Papers (Toronto, 1972); Maurice Yeates, Main Street: Windsor to Quebec City (Toronto, 1975).


The great French geographer, Raulin, Burchard, pioneered the study of Quebec as a region made up of several sub-regions. Among his many books, which gave full coverage to cities and towns, were L’Est du Canada français, 2 vol. (Montreal, 1935); Le centre du Canada français (Montreal, 1948); L’Ouest du Canada français: Montréal et sa région (Montreal, 1953). The leading regional French Canadian historian has been Fernand Ouellet, whose Economic and Social His-


L.D. McCann, ed., Heartland and Hinterland: A Geography of Canada (Scarborough, Ont., 1982) is a major synthesis of Canadian development from this point of view by several leading geographers. David Ward has described a similar process in the United States in his Cities and Immigrants: A Geography of Change in Nineteenth Century America (New York, 1971), 11-49; and Donald Meinig has proposed a major effort based on this conception in “The Continuous Shaping of America: A Prospectus for Geographers and Historians,” American Historical Review, 83 (1978): 1186-1205.


For the view that southern cities represented a nationalizing trend, see Blaine Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, La., 1975); Leonard P. Curry, “Urbanization and Urbanism in the Old South: A Comparative View,” Journal of Southern History, 40 (1974): 43-60.


Panoramic View of Summerside, P.E.I., 1878.


Vue panoramique de Summerside, I.-P.-É., 1878.

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