Planning Urban Waterfront Industrial Districts
Toronto’s Ashbridge’s Bay, 1889-1910

Gene Desfor

Résumé de l’article
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Abstract

The process by which one particular section of Toronto's waterfront, Ashbridge's Bay, was developed during the 1889-1910 period is analysed in the context of broader industrialization and urban reform movements. Primary sources, largely from the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Archives recently opened to the public, and the City of Toronto Archives, provide the basis for the analysis. Evidence demonstrates that Toronto's influential 1912 waterfront plan, crucial in reshaping the lakefront, was built on numerous previous schemes for improving the port, the harbour, and adjacent areas. Ownership of Toronto's waterfront remained under the control of civic authorities more from pragmatic considerations than from a commitment to serve community-wide interests.

Résumé

Le processus de développement de l'une des sections de Toronto en bordure du lac, Ashbridge's Bay, de 1889 à 1910, est analysé ici dans le cadre de grands mouvements d'industrialisation et de réforme urbaine. Cette analyse est fondée sur des renseignements tirés des sources, en grande partie des archives de la Toronto Harbour Commission (récemment mises à la disposition du public) et de celles de la Ville de Toronto. Des preuves démontrent que l'important projet d'aménagement des rives du lac, datant de 1912, qui a tant marqué cette partie de Toronto, était inspiré de nombreux projets antérieurs visant à l'amélioration du port et des propriétés avoisinantes. Le sort des rives du lac est resté entre les mains des autorités municipales bien plus pour des considérations pratiques qu'en raison du souci de servir les intérêts de la collectivité.

The extraordinary achievements of the harbour commission in implementing the plan have given rise to the perception that few if any constructive measures to improve the conditions of the harbour and its surroundings were taken prior to 1911.4 The extent to which the plan was a heir to development processes that preceded its formulation has been overlooked. This paper argues that the 1912 plan can only be understood in light of events prior to its formulation. The plan's uncontested acceptance and the broad public support for it were possible only because the development concepts on which it was based had already become conventional wisdom. These generally accepted ideas emerged gradually between 1889 and 1910 as various schemes were proposed and debated. Even though these earlier schemes may not have been formally adopted, they did express two principles of development that became accepted over the years: the first was that the Ashbridge's Bay area should be reclaimed primarily for industrial land uses and the second was that ownership of waterfront lands should be held by a public authority. The process by which these concepts became so generally accepted is the focus of this article.

The Ashbridge's Bay marsh area included about 1,300 acres of land, marsh, and waterlots located on the eastern flank of Toronto's harbour. It formed the centre-piece of the 1912 plan and was given much more detailed attention than either the central or the western sections of the waterfront (see Map 1). Although the area was considered to have enormous development potential, it had numerous problems and caused great controversies.

The idea that Ashbridge's Bay should be reclaimed for industry was strongly influenced by the prevailing Canadian pattern of urban growth. The last three decades of the 19th century have been called Canada's industrial era. A booming agricultural and resource economy impelled industrial expansion. Raw materials were increasingly demanded in industrial centres in Europe, the United States, and Canada. British Columbia's lumber was shipped south to American cities. From the Prairies wheat helped to feed urban residents throughout the world. Quebec relied on its traditional agricultural base, with Montreal having established a strong manufacturing base in the 1880s. The Atlantic provinces produced pulp, paper, and fish products for export. In Ontario exploitation of northern mineral and forest wealth as well as the expansion of the agricultural sector were important determinants of the rapid expansion of industrial centres in the southern part of the province.

Toronto, in particular, achieved phenomenal growth in industrial activity during this time. Population grew from about 86,400 in 1871 to more than 234,400 in 1901, reflecting the increase in industrial employment, the large numbers of immigrants, and the annexation of suburban neighbourhoods. In 1871, 9,400 industrial employees produced goods valued at $13,686,093 by 1901 there were 42,515 industrial employees making goods valued at...
Industrial growth between 1880 and 1890 was especially rapid: population almost doubled and the value of articles produced more than doubled. The factory system, based on technologies of iron and steam, was being introduced as a means of producing consumer articles, replacing those goods previously made by craftsmen. Prominent among the industrial establishments was Massey Manufacturing Company, which moved to Toronto in 1879 to make agricultural implements and which by 1890 employed 575 people. Near the mouth of the Don River, Gooderham & Worts was producing more proof spirits than any other company in Canada. Poison Iron Works operated a large marine engine and boiler factory toward the eastern end of the harbour. Other factories found Toronto a convenient location. According to J.M.S. Careless, "Manufacturing advances in the now thickly settled southern Ontario region partly centred in Toronto because of its large amounts of capital and labour, its well-developed entrepot structure and radiating transport network." The production of consumer goods, such as clothing, wood products, and non-ferrous metal products, helped to replace imported articles and was a large part of manufacturing activity in the city.

By 1910 industrial activity in Toronto was concentrated in several different areas in the city. However, a waterfront location, as argued by Toronto's industrialists, was optimal for many industries because it would minimize transportation costs. They proclaimed the logic of classical industrial location theory in their support for the reclamation of Ashbridge's Bay. In 1908 a trade journal article summarized the argument:

...unless the manufacturers get the benefit of water transportation they are going to lose out. They must have it to bring in their raw material. They must have it to distribute their finished products. If they do not get the

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Map 1: Plan for Eastern Section of Toronto's Waterfront: Toronto Harbour Commissioners, 1912

Photo 1: Reclamation Work in Progress, Ashbridge's Bay, 21 November 1914

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service in Toronto they will get it somewhere else...

Here is the proposition in a nut-shell. ...At the eastern end of the bay the city owns an extensive area of marsh land, readily accessible by railway lines, which could be filled in and made into an admirable site for factory purposes.6

From 1889 to 1910 the question of whether the City of Toronto, another public authority, or the private sector should retain ownership of port facilities and the surrounding water front was a major issue. This issue was entangled with the larger movement for reform that seized municipal governments across North America during this period. The reform movement was a response to both the wretchedness of urban industrial life and the abuses of municipal government that accompanied the unprecedented growth of cities. Industrialization produced enormous discrepancies between rich and poor — the city was the home of progress and good living but it also brought disease, crime, alienation, and the misery of poverty. Reformers focused their attention on health and education programs, moral improvement to purify city life, care for the underprivileged, revival of the environment, and reorganization of municipal government. One of their central tenets was that certain essential services could be more efficiently and honestly provided by the public rather than private sector. Developing these services was a community-wide problem, and the appropriate role of government was to serve collective needs rather than any particular special interests. Public ownership not only provided improved service, but it also "injected virtue into civic affairs."

Recent histories of urban reform reveal that the motivation of reformers may not have been as altruistic as the rhetoric suggested. Rather than making government more responsive to collective needs, urban reformers were intent on reducing participation, narrowing the role of the state, promoting the interests of a wealthy elite, and establishing a municipal corporation run by efficient managers. Although some urban reformers were no doubt sincere in their concern for community-wide interests, it is reasonable to assume that the "motives behind most urban reform measures were not primarily humanitarian. Reformers went about their business with a high degree of self-interest; they were intent on manipulating the urban environment as much for their own benefit as for any desire to help others."10

While the cases concerning public ownership of Toronto's street railways, the generation and distribution of electricity, the provision of telephone service, and the distribution of natural gas have all received attention, the development of the port, the harbour, and other waterfront land has been mentioned only sparingly in the urban-reform literature.11 During the 1889-1910 period, elected officials, prominent persons, and the staff of the municipal government frequently proclaimed the virtue of not abandoning the public's interest on the waterfront. Public pronouncements emphasized the special qualities of the waterfront and the right of the public to control development. The extent to which these sentiments were influential in maintaining public ownership of the waterfront will be examined later in this paper.

As early as 1835 there had been suggestions that the marsh lands of Ashbridge's Bay should be reclaimed. That year Captain R. H. Bonnycastle reported on the conditions of the harbour, focusing on the influence that the Don River had had on bringing silt into Toronto Bay and Ashbridge's Bay. He suggested "reclaiming the great marsh of upwards of a thousand acres in extent, which is at present a fertile source of unhealthiness to the city." and noted that a company could be formed to undertake the work and that the reclamation would "well repay the projectors."12

Almost 20 years later Kivas Tully discussed the conditions of, and possible improvements to, the harbour in an 1853 article for the Patriot.13 Tully, a prominent engineer who was also a member of City Council in 1853, worked for Toronto's harbour trust, the body that was the operating authority for the port and harbour from 1850 to 1911. Tully was associated with it for 55 years, and in his
1853 article he noted that the harbour had become a cesspool: the city emptied its sewers directly into it and the spring floods of the Don River annually added quantities of silt. Tully suggested that the conditions of the harbour could be ameliorated by the construction of a trunk sewer system and by altering the course of the Don River so that it would flow into the marsh lands of Ashbridge's Bay, immediately east of the harbour. He wrote that the deeper waters of Ashbridge's Bay at its eastern end should be dredged for docks and the material removed from the bottom could then be used to reclaim the shallower areas. Warehouses could be built on the reclaimed lands. In summarizing the benefits from the development proposal, he said the "source of these endemic diseases (e.g. cholera) which afflict the citizens, would be thus destroyed, and what is now a positive evil would be converted into a benefit — and a profit to the city." 

The use of the reclaimed marsh lands for industrial purposes was given added impetus in the late 1860s and early 1870s. The harbour trust undertook piling, cribbing, and dredging to create a breakwater for a navigable channel near the mouth of the Don. Manufacturing activity was to be located on the reclaimed lands. By 1872 Tully reported that "there can be no doubt that the facilities offered on the completion of the permanent channel, will lead to the construction of ship yards, and buildings for manufacturing purposes, on the vacant land in the possession of the city." The project was not brought to fruition because of the destruction of the piles and cribs from rotting and spring flooding in the mid 1880s.

By the late 1880s the water condition in Ashbridge's Bay had seriously deteriorated. The breakwater reduced the currents in Ashbridge's Bay, creating an area of stagnant and highly unsanitary water. In addition to the city's sewage, refuse from a large number of cattle byres, or dairy and beef fattening yards, was also being dumped into the marsh lands. Gooderham & Worts owned a substantial number of cattle byres which were located east of the distillery on the shores of the marsh lands. Grain mash, a waste product in the fermentation process, was fed to the cattle. This "wash," "swill," or "slops" was conveyed from the distillery to the byres. By the 1880s there were seven byres with a capacity for more than 4,000 animals. The waste from these cattle went directly into the marsh lands.

Further evidence of the conditions in Ashbridge's Bay is provided by actions of the city and from letters of complaint to the harbour trust. In 1889, City Council requested the Local Board of Health to investigate ways of improving conditions in Ashbridge's Bay, and to report on the advisability of making an opening in the recently completed
Evidence of the conditions at the eastern end of the harbour may be found in letters written to the harbour trust from the late 1880s. Letters from land-owners at the eastern end of the harbour complained of the shallow water at the owners’ slips and requested that the harbour trust do something about the conditions. For example, a letter from Gooderham & Worts to the harbour master on 26 September 1887 noted that a vessel carrying coal grounded almost abreast of its dock and asked how ships loaded with corn for its operations could possibly navigate safely.

By the 1890s business associations and individual citizens were calling for improvements to the harbour and Ashbridge’s Bay. For a three-year period, 1889-1892, alternative proposals for the improvement of Ashbridge’s Bay were presented. Central to the lively struggle among the proponents and backers of these proposals was the battle for control of the waterfront waged between private and public interests. A group of private citizens, headed by Messrs. Beavis & Brown; their agent W. E. Redway, a naval architect; and C. A. Simons of Imperial Trust, presented a scheme to City Council in 1889 (see Map 4). At about the same time the city commissioner, Emerson Coatsworth, reported to City Council on his plan for the development of Ashbridge’s Bay. Both plans had three major aspects: improvement to the Don River, construction of a channel along the north shore of the marsh lands, and the reclamation of the deeper waters of Ashbridge’s Bay.

The plans did differ in some major components, particularly in their treatment of the Don River. Coatsworth’s plan would have widened the Don from the Grand Trunk Railway bridge to its entrance into Toronto Bay. Beavis & Brown proposed to divert the Don directly southward from the bridge until it met a 300-foot-wide channel. This channel, dredged from Toronto Bay to Ashbridge’s Bay’s deeper waters, was intended both to cleanse the waters of the marsh lands and to improve shipping.

While the treatment of the Don was an important difference, there was a more fundamental one: Coatsworth’s scheme would have been undertaken by the city, Beavis & Brown’s by a private company. Beavis & Brown presented themselves as the heads of a syndicate that proposed to undertake the work in exchange for a lease on the reclaimed lands from the city at a nominal rate and for some tax concessions. After a 45-year period the lands were to be returned to the city free of charge.

Vociferous debate raged among the supporters and opponents of the Beavis & Brown syndicate. Boomsters (supporters of the syndicate) claimed that prominent businessmen, particularly English capitalists, were ready to invest $20,000,000 to improve the Ashbridge’s Bay area and create a large manufacturing and shipping centre worth twice the initial cost without costing the taxpayers a cent. The opponents doubted the existence of the investors, especially since Beavis & Brown steadfastly refused to reveal their identity. On 5 January 1891 one Toronto newspaper, the Globe, claimed its reporters had determined that the syndicate did not exist, whereas two days earlier another, the Toronto World, had “ascertained that the money necessary to carry out its scheme had been underwritten by three of the largest trust companies in London, England, but as a matter of ordinary business precaution their identity cannot be made known until the ratepayers...show by their vote they are willing to let the work proceed by a private corporation.”

A second issue in the debate was an apparent conflict of interest by certain city aldermen. Alderman J. Knox Leslie, a staunch supporter of Beavis & Brown, was a member of a firm that purportedly stood to gain substantially from the scheme. The firm owned land with 1,300 feet of frontage on the marsh. In the event a navigable channel was dredged, the firm would profit from the wharfs and docks that would be constructed. The Globe claimed:

The most prominent promoters of the scheme in the City Council are east end aldermen whose private interests would be

Map 3: Ashbridge’s Bay Improvement Plan, by Beavis and Brown, 1889

51 Urban History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine Vol. XVII, No. 2 (October 1988)
served by the deal... (and they have already) shown clearly that they are ready to serve
the city and themselves if the two interests
do not conflict, and themselves first if the
city’s interests and their own are different.31

A third aspect of the controversy concerned
a fundamental relationship between the state
and business: should municipal government
be providing publicly owned land to private
typecorporate. The Labour Advocate announced,
“Like all other schemes for bonusing or
subsidizing private industrial enterprises with
public grants of land or money, it is an
unmitigated fraud and swindle on the
taxpayers.”32

The staff of City Council was requested to
review the Beavis & Brown scheme for
council’s deliberations. W. T. Jennings, then
city engineer, reported to a sub-committee of
council on 7 July 1890, describing a number
of disadvantages to the city of the Beavis &
Brown plan.33 First, there was concern that
the plan promised more than it could deliver
at the estimated cost. V. M. Roberts, a
commentator on Toronto’s early waterfront
history, wrote “Alice in Wonderland never
saw such beautiful things as the magician of
the march proposed to do, and all for a 45
year lease at a nominal rate.”34 Secondly,
there was doubt about the existence and
reliability of the Beavis & Brown syndicate.
Finally, Jennings said “if profit is to be derived
from its execution, the City should not only
get the full benefit, but be always in a position
to control its lands.”35

At the council meeting of 24 November 1890
the merits of the Beavis & Brown plan were
debated.36 This plan was expected to cost
$4,500,000 while the city’s was estimated at
$5,000,000 for the same work. After a heated
discussion, Alderman Leslie affirmed that the
electorate should decide the issue, and he
moved that the question be resolved by a
referendum. His motion carried, and two
questions were put to the ratepayers on
5 January 1891:

1. Are you in favour of Ashbridge’s Bay
lands being reclaimed at the expense of
the Corporation of Toronto generally?

2. Are you in favour of the adoption of the
scheme of reclamation of said property
by means of a syndicate somewhat as
devised in the written proposal to the
Council in that behalf by Beavis &
Brown?37

The first question was rejected by a vote of
1,284 to 1,737; the second question was
approved by 5,083, with 838 oppposed.38 A
number of factors had influenced the
outcome. The first was the city’s deteriorating
debt position. On 19 January 1891 Mayor E.
F. Clarke would draw attention to the fiscal
problem in his inaugural address calling for
financial restraint, saying that local
improvements should not be undertaken
unless they are absolutely necessary.39
Second was a claim that the structure of the
referendum was confusing and that the
wording of the questions favoured Beavis &
Brown’s syndicate. Third, according to the
Globe, voting irregularities were widespread
with bands of men in outlying wards
impersonating ratepayers and voting for the
syndicate.40 In addition, the newspaper wrote
that the reason for the overwhelming
approval of the Beavis & Brown scheme was
that ratepayers were in such a state of
despair from aldermanic incompetence and
bungling that they did not want City Council
to undertake the work.41

City Council was in an awkward position.
The professional staff (including the city
engineer and city solicitor) did not want
Ashbridge’s Bay to be developed by a
private syndicate, but council was obliged to
abide by the results of the referendum. Only
a few days after the voting was reported to
council, Mayor E. F. Clarke, in his inaugural
message, said he wanted the city to
undertake the work. He was convinced the
clean-up was absolutely necessary.42 But the
referendum results could not be overturned
so easily. Council constituted a Special
Committee on the Reclamation of
Ashbridge’s Bay to consider the problem. It
reported to council a number of times, with
debate focusing on insuring the city’s
interests by means of the detailed
specifications in a contract for undertaking
the reclamation work.43

About the time agreement on the contract
specifications was near, council received a
cheque for $25,000 from Beavis & Brown.44
The cheque was intended to be evidence of
good faith, but Beavis & Brown reserved the
right to withdraw it at the end of three months
if they desired. Council’s initial suspicions
about the reliability and motivations of the
syndicate were again aroused by this
manoeuvre. The argument was made in
council that the syndicate “existed” only to
the extent that it wanted an unchallenged
option for three months to arrange a deal.
During this time the syndicate would attempt
to find investors, but if it was unable to do so,
then it could withdraw its cheque. Council
was sufficiently concerned that no “real”
syndicate existed that it modified the
committee’s recommended procedures for
granting the contract. Rather than simply
awarding the contract to Beavis & Brown,
council decided to issue a general call for
bidders to do the work of reclaiming
Ashbridge’s Bay.45 Council was not
overwhelmed with responses. It extended the
deadline to obtain submissions other than the
Beavis & Brown scheme46 and rumour had it
that a syndicate from New York City was in
the process of preparing a submission.47

The anxiously awaited tender from Beavis &
Brown’s competitors was submitted on 1
December 1891 to the special committee on
Ashbridge’s Bay.48 The rival syndicate,
headed by Col. Robert Alexander and L. H.
Stevens (both from New York City) and
known as Alexander’s syndicate (although it
was officially named the Toronto and
Ashbridge’s Bay Improvement Company),
submitted two different tenders for
consideration. One was based on completing
the work in Ashbridge’s Bay according to the
city’s specifications, the second was more ambitious and would “completely abate the nuisance at present existing” in Ashbridge’s Bay. Highlights of the second proposal were a 300-foot-wide, 15-foot-deep navigable channel on the northern boundary of the marsh lands, 700 acres of reclaimed marsh land, a 230-acre harbour of safety, construction of a swing bridge across Cherry Street, filling in marsh lands on the north side of the channel, and diversion of the Don River until it met the 300-foot channel. Payment for the work was based on a 45-year lease at $10,000 a year. As with the Beavis & Brown group, Alexander’s syndicate would let out the reclaimed land to tenants, but it reserved the option to purchase the city’s land at the expiration of the lease or earlier for $200,000.

Alexander’s proposal received mixed reactions. In January 1892 Mayor R. J. Fleming stated in his inaugural message that the city should maintain title to its waterfront, but a few days later, on 15 January, the special committee on Ashbridge’s Bay reported and recommended to council that Alexander’s second tender be accepted provided it was modified to meet certain concerns.

An intricate negotiating process ensued. The special committee’s report was referred back for further clarification of the legal, legislative, financial, supervisory, and design problems that it had identified in Alexander’s proposal. On 15 February 1892 council adopted a draft bill for the Parliament of Canada and the Legislature of Ontario that would enable the city to make arrangements with Alexander’s syndicate to lease, with the right to purchase, lands in Ashbridge’s Bay. On 14 March Mayor Fleming reiterated his position that negotiating with Alexander’s syndicate was a mistake. Nevertheless, the next day council adopted a bill to be supported in the provincial legislature entitled, “An Act to Incorporate the Toronto and Ashbridge’s Bay Improvement Company.” The bill outlined the terms and conditions Alexander’s syndicate would have to fulfill in reclaiming Ashbridge’s Bay. With an apparent change of heart, Mayor Fleming then wrote both to his civil servants, urging them to do everything to get Alexander’s syndicate to submit a revised tender that would satisfy the city’s and province’s terms, and to Alexander’s syndicate itself.

From April to September 1892 numerous letters were exchanged between the mayor, council staff, and Alexander’s syndicate, but negotiations were not going well. Both the city’s and the province’s concerns were impeding the syndicate’s submission of a revised tender, and, moreover, the syndicate itself delaying, so as to clarify its obligation in cleaning up an extensive health menace. The syndicate’s solicitor revealed the company’s interest when he wrote to the city engineer, “Any money spent in opening channels, disinfecting sewers, etc. is so much money thrown away as far as the objectives of the Company are concerned.”

Summer weather brought stronger protests to abate the nuisance in Ashbridge’s Bay. The Ashbridge’s Bay Property Owners Association complained to the provincial government and threatened to resort to legal proceedings if the city did not mitigate the evils in the bay. By June the provincial Board of Health instructed the city to “procure an abatement to the nuisance” in Ashbridge’s Bay. The measures to be taken included: dredging of a channel through the marsh lands and the breakwater to connect Ashbridge’s Bay with Toronto Bay, reopening the eastern outlet (Coatsworth’s Cut), extending the sewers that emptied into Ashbridge’s Bay into deeper waters, and instructing Gooderham & Worts to dispose of the refuse from their cattle byres in another manner.

Under these pressures council acted. First, in July the city moved to take legal action against Gooderham & Worts to cease the disposal of their cattle byre refuse in the marsh lands. The Local Board of Health informed Gooderham & Worts that after 15 October they would not be permitted to discharge any sewage in the marsh. By November the city engineer reported that Gooderham & Worts was making provision for the removal of manure and was introducing a filtration system for the liquid refuse. Second, also in July, the city made an application to the dominion government to open a channel between Ashbridge’s Bay and Toronto Bay. The city’s initiative to open a channel between the two bays rekindled a battle with the harbour trust. As in the previous year the city lost this round. Council was notified by telegram in September that the Ministry of Public Works was not prepared to allow an opening in the breakwater.

As fall approached, the city was running out of time to act. Health officials had predicted that cholera would reach Canada by the summer of 1893, meaning that improvements to Ashbridge’s Bay would have to begin during the 1892 season. On 26 September, the same day council received the Ministry of Public Works’ telegram, Mayor Fleming stated that the duty of the city was to open immediately a channel along the north shore of Ashbridge’s Bay into the harbour. He indicated (in a somewhat oversimplified statement) that Alexander’s syndicate had not been heard from, despite his entreaties to their solicitor urging them to submit a revised tender. The provincial Board of Health had instructed the city to improve conditions in Ashbridge’s Bay, and there were several suits pending against the city for allowing a nuisance in the bay to be maintained. Mayor Fleming concluded that the waters of Ashbridge’s Bay had to be put in a sanitary condition as quickly as possible.

The likelihood that Alexander’s syndicate would undertake the work declined dramatically. Immediate action was necessary because of the condition of the bay and the political response to it, yet Alexander’s syndicate was not forthcoming.
with a revised tender. Moreover, council staff as well as some aldermen wanted the city to undertake the improvements. At its meeting of 24 October 1892 council urged the city engineer to submit a proposal for improving the conditions in Ashbridge’s Bay.\textsuperscript{62}

In November 1892 City Engineer E. H. Keating submitted his report and plan (see Map 5). He introduced the report by noting he understood that Council’s desire was to take immediate action to cleanse the waters of the bay “as cheaply as possible” and that the work should be in accord with longer-term development plans. His proposal, which was adopted by council, was intended to do just that.\textsuperscript{63} The principal features of the plan were: an opening of a wide channel from Toronto Harbour through the marsh into Ashbridge’s Bay, the extending of this channel through the bay along its northern boundary and the subsequent opening of a new cut through the sand-bar into Lake Ontario (Coatsworth’s Cut was to be closed), the dredging of the deeper waters in Ashbridge’s Bay to accommodate shipping, and the gradual filling-in and reclaiming of the shallower water and marsh lands (for which a time schedule was not included). A step to be taken without delay was the removal of that portion of the breakwater that lay in the way of the proposed channel. The report recommended that a vote be taken to allow for the raising of $125,000 to undertake this work.

The adoption of Keating’s plan in November 1892 marks the end of a significant phase in the process of developing Ashbridge’s Bay. From 1889 to 1892 private business had failed to wrest control of the bay area from municipal government. Business syndicates had proposed, essentially, to trade cleaning up the polluted waters of the marsh in exchange for development rights to the reclaimed lands. But the city was primarily interested in mitigating the unhealthy, foul-smelling conditions in the marsh; extensive land-filling was not so important for sanitary reasons. The syndicates, however, were interested in generating profit from letting out or selling the reclaimed lands. The less spent on cleansing the waters or the more land-filling expenses they could pass on to the affected property owners the greater would be their profits.

The success of municipal government in maintaining ownership of its waterfront lands differs from other contemporary struggles in which urban reformers attempted to gain control of certain widely used services or utilities. In this case, the city already owned the land. While a certain group of private entrepreneurs were convinced that the municipality was unable or unwilling to reclaim the bay according to their desires, other representatives of private enterprise understood that civic ownership of Ashbridge’s Bay was a policy which advanced their interests. For example, at the annual meeting of the Toronto Board of Trade in January 1892 the president queried:

\begin{quote}
Why hand this property over to any man or company of men to improve it, and enjoy the rents of it for 40 or 50 years ... when the City itself may undertake the work of carrying it out gradually and economically according to plans framed in the public interest ... and dispose of the reclaimed lands for parks and private dwellings, as well as the site for factories, warehouses and smelting works.\textsuperscript{64} (emphasis added)
\end{quote}

Ostensibly, the board’s president supported the city’s obtaining the benefits from reclaiming the bay. These benefits, however, were of dubious value, because the reclamation work was fraught with uncertainties and extraordinary expenses. No doubt the board’s president recognized the risks associated with the reclamation work and, therefore, preferred that it be undertaken by the city. Upon completion, the lands could be “disposed of” by renting out or selling them to private enterprise.

Events during this phase also reveal the extent to which municipal government was committed to following the results of a referendum. In spite of the outcome of the January 1891 referendum, in which ratepayers strongly opposed Ashbridge’s Bay being reclaimed by the city, council decided to undertake the work. In council minutes as well as in contemporary newspapers, no
accounts were found making reference to this apparent discrepancy.

Even with the adoption of Keating's plan, the city continued to have difficulty in starting its reclamation work. On 29 December 1892 the electorate rejected a by-law to provide for the issuing of $138,888 in general consolidated loan debentures for cleansing the water and reclaiming Ashbridge's Bay as stated in Keating's plan. The by-law was rejected by only 10 votes, 1,207 to 1,197, but this defeat was not totally surprising.  

At a meeting in November 1892 Mayor Fleming predicted that such a by-law would be defeated. He stated that the city's debt load had increased substantially and that ratepayers would not want to jeopardize the municipality's financial position. The treasurer's reports show that in 1891 the city's net debenture debt was $14,900,000, whereas by 1892 it had increased to $16,600,000. As important, total receipts of the city dropped from $9,600,000 to $7,800,000 meaning that the ratio of debt to receipts increased from 1.50 to 2.13. The position taken by a number of contemporary newspaper editorials was that, although the work of "cleansing the waters of the Bay" was absolutely necessary, the city should not go further into debt. They suggested that the project be financed from tax revenues.  

At least one newspaper recommended that the province should pay for the work to be done because it had instructed the city to undertake it. With the by-law's defeat, council did approach the provincial government to obtain funds for the Keating plan. After some negotiating, the province agreed to allow the city to issue debentures in spite of the municipality's financial position. The By-law was rejected by only 10 votes, 1,207 to 1,197, but this defeat was not totally surprising.  

Progress reports on Keating's plan indicated that improvement was being achieved in the immediate relief of unsanitary conditions in the bay. For example, by the end of 1894 a channel 80 feet wide had been dredged from west of the breakwater to about Leslie Street. Council was so optimistic about possibilities for the Ashbridge's Bay area that it instructed its Special Committee on Manufacturing Industries to investigate the feasibility of locating industry there. By November 1894 this committee had reported to council that industries could be located on the north shore of the marsh lands with relatively little civic expenditure, but farther south the city would incur large costs in making land available for any purpose whatsoever.

Work had begun on opening channels at both the western and eastern ends of Ashbridge's Bay, but nothing was done about diverting the Don River. According to Keating's plan, the Don was to be diverted at the Grand Trunk Railway's bridge so that it would flow directly south to meet the new channel being cut from the harbour to Ashbridge's Bay. The city and the harbour trust, however, had different understandings of this improvement scheme. The harbour trust had been anxious to have the Don diverted immediately to reduce the costs of dredging the harbour, while the city was in no hurry to begin this project. After several unsuccessful attempts to settle the dispute amicably solicitors were called in, legal opinions were obtained, and a full-scale court battle seemed imminent. However, by early 1898 both the city and the harbour trust were seeking non-litigious ways of resolving the dispute.  

Steps toward cooperation began to emerge. The city engineer and the harbour trust's engineer devised a scheme for diverting the Don, and the harbour trust and the city applied to the dominion government to finance it. Later in 1899 City Council received a communication from the minister which indicated that "a sum of money (had been) placed in the Government estimates for dredging the River Don for the current year." The problem of diverting the Don appeared to have finally been settled. Events soon proved otherwise.  

The Board of Trade began seeking support for a comprehensive set of improvements for the ports and harbour area. It organized a conference with representatives from City Council and the harbour trust on 21 February 1900. A few weeks later the city's W. T. Jennings and the dominion government's J. R. Roy were appointed to work out a
comprehensive plan. Their report, submitted on 28 June,\textsuperscript{81} was hailed by the Globe as a means to "place Toronto in first-class shape to accommodate the marine traffic that may now or in the future come to this port."\textsuperscript{82} Contained in the report was a history of the harbour and a review of the major improvements that had been made previously. The report noted that in 1900 the harbour and the slips were too shallow to permit access by deep-draft vessels that would use the full capacity of the deepened St Lawrence River. The many improvements it suggested included: dredging of the harbour and slips to afford 16 feet of water, completion of the eastern entrance to the harbour, improvements to the western entrance, construction of groynes on the lake side of the Toronto Islands, diversion of the Don, reclamation of the marsh lands of Ashbridge’s Bay, and cessation of the discharge of sewage and sludge into Lake Ontario by constructing a trunk sewer system.\textsuperscript{83} Many of these improvements had been suggested previously, and their implementation already had proved to be difficult. Was it now possible that joint efforts could make them a reality?

Representatives of the city, the Board of Trade, and the harbour trust met with Mayor O. A. Howland in the spring and summer of 1901 about harbour improvements.\textsuperscript{84} Following prolonged negotiations, Mayor Howland sent a communication to council in January 1902 urging the city to decide on a proper sewage disposal system:

I may point out in addition to the sanitary reasons for grappling with the subject without further delay, it is also intimately connected with another highly important improvement, viz., the deepening of the harbour to St. Lawrence Canal depth. ... In several interviews with the Minister of Public Works, he has made the construction of a sewage disposal works a condition of the harbour improvement to be undertaken by the Government of Canada. He has pledged himself to urge upon the Dominion Government the contemporaneous undertaking of these harbour works, provided the condition referred to is complied with the City.\textsuperscript{85}

Although the Board of Trade promoted both the reclamation of Ashbridge’s Bay and the improvement and expansion of the port and harbour, it was now clear that these could not be achieved until the city made arrangements for proper sewage disposal. The dominion government was convinced that major improvements to the waterfront would be absurd unless the city ceased dumping its sewage into the harbour. But the Don River complicated the situation. It was a critical link between the harbour, a proper sewage disposal system, and the reclamation of Ashbridge’s Bay. In 1892 the city and the harbour trust agreed that the Don should be diverted as indicated in the Keating plan. However, the dominion government would not pay for the diversion because the Don was not considered to be a navigable stream.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, the city was faced with the need to finance both the sewage disposal system and the diversion of the Don.

To raise the necessary money, the Board of Control recommended to council that the ratepayers vote on an expenditure of $2,540,000 for the construction of a system of sewage disposal by means of intersecting sewers, septic tanks, and bacterial beds.\textsuperscript{87} In December 1892 council struck out this part of the board’s report. A comprehensive waterfront development plan did not appear as though it would become a reality in the near future.

At the same December meeting council had under consideration an application from Toronto Steel Company to locate near the mouth of the Don River.\textsuperscript{88} Council approved an exceptionally favourable lease to the company for 10 acres of land at a rate of $500 a year for 35 years. In addition, the city agreed to fill in the old Don River channel, provide railway connections to the Grand Trunk Railway, and dredge the Keating channel to a depth of 14 feet. All these concessions for the promise to spend $100,000 on buildings and equipment and with an expectation that employment by the firm would generate wages of $60,000 a year. While the funding problem remained unsolved, the city did manage to overcome another difficulty in its attempt to develop Ashbridge’s Bay. This concerned the use of revenue that would be derived from the rental of the reclaimed land. According to the original 1880 crown grant of the Ashbridge’s Bay land to the city, all net revenues derived from the land were to be used for the improvement or maintenance of Queen’s Park or other similar public projects. The city had this restriction removed by obtaining a dominion grant to the Ashbridge’s Bay land in 1903 that superseded the previous one.\textsuperscript{89} The new grant gave the city a fee simple title to the area and considerably wider scope in using the revenue it might derive from renting or selling the lands.

In 1904 another event occurred that had a major impact on waterfront development. A fire destroyed a considerable portion of Toronto’s downtown area. One of the consequences of the fire was that it provided the opportunity to review downtown development. The Ontario Association of Architects (hereafter OAA) was involved in this review and advocated an approach to development that was to have significant influence on future city-building processes. In 1905 the OAA established a committee to prepare a plan for the development of the entire area of Toronto.\textsuperscript{90} The following year this comprehensive plan was presented at the OAA’s annual meeting. W. A. Langton introduced the presentation: “Plan making is in the air; we have caught it from our generation: and Toronto in taking up this plan and carrying it out will be merely following a movement and following it a good way behind.” The grand plan to transform the urban area included, of course, a scheme for the development of the waterfront. Langton remarked, “Yet, with all its amplitude, the
waterfront is easy to accomplish. Its execution is nothing but a Street Commissioner’s job. It is merely a piece of filling in.”

The waterfront area of the OAA’s plan included the development of Ashbridge’s Bay. Its plan incorporated many elements from previous schemes: the marsh areas were to be reclaimed for manufacturing, the Don would be diverted into Ashbridge’s Bay, the southern boundary of the bay was to be devoted to parkland, the eastern section of the bay was not to be filled in, both the Eastern Gap and Coatsworth’s Cut were to remain open, and the northern shore of the area was reserved for a roadway. As well, many of the recommendations from a 1903 report by W. T. Jennings to the city engineer were also found in the OAA plan; the old Don Channel was to be filled in, the original sanitary channel was to be filled in and replaced with a new one farther south which separated the industrial area from the parkland, and there were provisions for the location of railway tracks and sidings on the filled-in Don Channel.

City Council continued to be occupied with its so-called “piece of filling in” on the waterfront. Council decided to ask the electorate to vote on the question of raising funds for the straightening of the Don. On 30 June 1906 the voters approved a by-law that authorized the city to issue $200,000 of general loan debentures for the cost of straightening the Don River and improving its surrounding lands in Ashbridge’s Bay.

The by-law issue had raised little enthusiasm with the ratepayers, with only about 1,100 people voting. While Mayor Emerson Coatsworth endorsed the cleaning up of Ashbridge’s Bay and the construction of a trunk sewer system in his inaugural message on 8 January 1906 the electorate was not enthralled with the issue. The mayor did mention that the city’s “finances are in a flourishing condition.” No doubt the city’s improved financial position influenced the by-law’s approval. On 10 December 1906 council adopted By-law 4821, which authorized work to proceed on the Don improvements, thus ending many years of false starts and struggles.

After years of controversy, significant steps were also taken to resolve the trunk sewer problem. The electorate approved a by-law on 27 June 1908 for the expenditure of $2,400,000 for construction of intercepting sewers and sewage disposal plants. Also approved was the construction of a water filtration plan for $750,000. City Council passed the by-law to allow for the construction of these two long-awaited improvements on 14 July 1908, and the trunk sewer system was completed in late 1913.

Between 1907 and 1910 intensive discussion and debate occurred concerning development of Toronto’s waterfront. Much of this debate centred on the appropriate institutional arrangements for undertaking development. Both the city and the harbour trust were thought to be inadequate for the task and so a new agency was sought that would be independent of the vicissitudes of political life, would be organized as a business operation, and would have adequate jurisdictional authority. James O’Mara, in his study of the formation of the harbour commission, noted that the major controversy with respect to the waterfront at that time was determining an appropriate institutional structure for undertaking development. The events surrounding that issue are documented in the literature, and one can find there a fuller discussion than will be presented here. However, three major plans for the development of Ashbridge’s Bay were submitted during this period and an examination of these is germane to the current discussion.

The first of the final three plans to be presented was formulated by the railway companies. They were well aware of the potential benefits to them from developing Ashbridge’s Bay. Industrial establishments located on the reclaimed lands would be served with new rail connections. Canadian Pacific Railway proposed a plan by James Oborne in April 1907. Oborne was divisional superintendent for the CPR and his plan envisioned the reclamation of 500 acres of the bay for factory sites, each served by a rail link, wharfage for 30 vessels, and a lakeshore park. The city was to undertake the reclamation work and sell the land to the manufacturing establishments. The railway companies were to be given connections into a common transfer yard. The Grand Trunk Railway was also interested in the area. E. L. Cousins, an engineer with the railway from 1906 to 1910, was trying to gain control of these lands for the company. Cousins, it should be noted, would work for the city, from 1910 to 1912, before becoming the harbour commissioner’s chief engineer, where he supervised the work of creating their 1912 plan.

The second plan was the well-known one presented by the Toronto Guild of Civic Art in 1909. This plan was built on the 1906 plan of the Ontario Association of Architects and its scheme for the development of Ashbridge’s Bay is not significantly different from the OAA’s earlier one. The similarity in plans is understandable since there was close cooperation between the OAA and the guild, and some members were in both organizations.

The third and final plan was produced by the Toronto Board of Trade (see Map 6) and was widely circulated. It was displayed in the board’s 1909 annual report, incorporated into its letterhead, and presented to City Council in January 1910 with great fanfare. The plan envisioned the reclamation of the marsh lands for both light and heavy industry. An area on the western side was to be used for wharfage, the southern boundary was to be reserved for parkland, and the entry of all railways was to be under city control. The Don was to be diverted south of the Grand Trunk Railway bridge, and the river’s old...
channel was to be closed. Along the northern boundary of the marsh the Keating Channel would be maintained, and it would lead from Toronto Harbour to the eastern part of the bay where additional docks were to be made available.

Submission of the Board of Trade’s plan in 1910 marks the end of this phase in the process of developing Ashbridge’s Bay. By 1910 all the major interest groups concurred that the marsh lands and the bay were ripe for development and should be reclaimed. Reclamation was favoured by the city as early as 1890. The dominion government and the harbour trust endorsed reclamation with the Jennings and Roy plan of 1900. In 1889 private enterprise had proposed reclamation with the Beavis & Brown plan. The railway companies acknowledged the importance of reclamation and the CPR had brought forward its own plan. And an élite group of professionals caught the urban planning fever moving through North America and proposed a comprehensive redevelopment plan, including a prominent role for the waterfront. The completion of the St Lawrence River system to a depth of 14 feet in 1899 and the expectation that the Welland Canal would be opened to a similar depth were economic catalysts that brought the various groups together to work toward their common interest.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Without any doubt, the re-formation of the harbour commission in 1911 and the acceptance of its comprehensive waterfront plan were critical events in the development of Toronto’s lakefront. The commission implemented its widely acclaimed plan and achieved virtually all its land reclamation objectives. By 1930 Toronto’s waterfront had been reshaped, with over 1,000 acres reclaimed for industrial lands and 340 for parkland. The achievements of the commission can be understood only in light of events which predate its re-formation. In particular, four conclusions can be drawn from the events analysed in this paper.

First, the question of what should be done with Ashbridge’s Bay had been settled before 1911. The marsh lands and the shallower waters of the bay were to be reclaimed for industry. In the 1860s Kivas Tully had recommended using the reclaimed lands for industry, and virtually every plan submitted during the 1889-1910 period echoed that recommendation. Not surprisingly, the harbour commissioners’ 1912 plan also expressed that approach.

Second, both the local and dominion governments accepted the principle that the reclamation of the bay could be a self-financing enterprise. As far back as 1835 a prediction was made that reclaiming the bay would “well repay” an investor. In the early 1890s two private syndicates proposed to reclaim the bay, anticipating that revenues from the rental or sale of the newly created lands would yield a profit on their initial expenditures. The city and the dominion government adopted the same position, reckoning that the schemes for reclamation would be, at least, self-financing. However, government assumed a policy that the private sector was not willing to accept. Agreement was not achieved on either of the private sector schemes, and during the public debate concerning these schemes, the president of the Board of Trade announced that his preference was for the city to undertake the reclamation work. The board’s president recognized that business interests were better served by taxpayers underwriting the uncertain and potentially enormously expensive reclamation of the bay, while private enterprise would gain access to the new lands after the filling-in had been completed.

Third, both the diversion of the Don River and the construction of a proper sewage disposal system had to be resolved prior to the reclamation of Ashbridge’s Bay. Many schemes were proposed for the diversion of the Don into the bay because the harbour trust and private dock owners wanted to reduce annual dredging expenses. The marsh lands in the bay, however, had been thoroughly polluted by industrial and sewage disposal. A trunk sewer system and treatment plant were required, which Tully had called for in 1853. In 1902 the dominion government insisted that it would not fund comprehensive waterfront improvements unless a trunk sewer system was constructed; the city finally approved the
necessary by-law in 1908. Delays notwithstanding, both issues had been resolved prior to the formulation of the harbour commission’s plan.

Finally, public ownership of Toronto’s waterfront was maintained not because the collective interests of the community would be better served; rather a pragmatic agreement (Keating’s plan) had been adopted by which the city would cleanse the waters of the marsh, gradually reclaim the waterlots of the Bay, and eventually make the waterfront was maintained not because the harbour trust. Ratepayers were led to believe that Ashbridge’s Bay would be better served; rather a pragmatic agreement. Annamarie Gallaugher and Janet Thompson were vitally important with editorial review and production assistance.

Notes

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1 The establishment of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners came with the passage of Canada. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners Act - 1911, 1-2 George V, chapter 26. This new body represented a restructuring of the previously existing agency called the Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto, which had been created in 1850. Throughout this paper the earlier agency will be referred to by its common name, the harbour trust, and the Toronto Harbour Commissioners is called the harbour commission.

2 Toronto Harbour Commissioners, Toronto Waterfront Development, 1912-1920 (Toronto: Toronto Harbour Commissioners, 1912).

3 An important aspect of the 1912 plan that was not completed is discussed in Roy Merrens’s article, “Port Authorities as Urban Land Developers: The Case of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and their Outer-Harbour Project, 1912-1968” in this volume.

4 See for example J. M. S. Careless, Toronto to 1918: An Illustrated History, (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984), 155.


6 Ibid., 63.

7 Careless, Toronto, 105.

8 “A Plan for Improving Toronto Harbour,” Industrial Canada, November 1908, 374.

9 J. C. Weaver, “‘Tomorrow’s Metropolis’ Revisited: A Critical Assessment of Urban Reform in Canada, 1890-1920,” in The Canadian City, 354.


12 Canada. Department of Public Works, Memorandum with Accompanying Plans and Documents Relative to the Past and Present State of the Harbour of Toronto (Ottawa, 1881), 11.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


17 The grant stipulated “that all profits derived from the sale or lease of the reclaimed lands should be devoted under the direction of the Commissioners of Works, to the maintenance of Queen’s Park, or such other purpose of a municipal and public character as the Government might direct.” THCA. Vaughan Roberts Papers, SC 26, box 4, vol. 4, “The River Don and Ashbridge’s Bay.”

18 Canada, Department of Public Works, Memorandum (Ottawa, 1881).

19 THCA, SC 11, box 1, folder 1, J. B. Eads, Report on Toronto Harbour, 1882.

20 THCA, RG 12/3/5, 4 Oct. 1888.

21 Careless, Toronto.

22 E.G. Shuttleworth. The Windmill and Its Times (Toronto: E. D. Apted, printer, 1924), 125.


24 City of Toronto Archives (hereafter CTA), RG 1A, minute no. 541, City Council Minutes, 1889.
Good examples of the letters, written in 1887, are those from Poison Iron Co., Express of India, Elias Rogers & Co., and Hamilton Steamship. THCA, RG 1/4, box 3, folder 8.

CTA, Reports of the City Engineer. RG 8, 1890.

CTA, RG 1 A, minute no. 1270, 1889.


Globe, 5 Jan. 1891.

Toronto World, 5 Jan. 1891.

Globe. 5 Jan. 1891.

From the Labour Advocate, quoted in the Globe, 7 Jan. 1891.

THCA, SC 26, box 4, vol. 10.

CTA, Reports of the City Engineer. RG 8, Appendix D, 1890.

CTA, RG 1 A, minute no. 1300, 1890.

CTA, RG 1 A, Appendix C, 2420, 1890.

Ibid.

CTA, RG 1 A, Appendix C, 1, 1891.

Globe, 7 Jan. 1891.

Globe, 6 Jan. 1891.

CTA, RG 1 A, Appendix C, 1, 1891.

CTA, RG 1 A, minute nos. 538, 539, 540, 541, 615, 1891; Appendix A, 439.

THCA, SC 26, box 4, vol. 4, “The River Don and Ashbridge’s Bay.”

CTA, RG 1 A, minute no. 619, 1891.

CTA, RG 1 A, minute no. 875, 1891; Appendix A, 662.

THCA, SC 26, box 4, vol. 4, “The River Don and Ashbridge’s Bay.”

The tender was dated 1 Dec. 1891 but was not considered by City Council until 1892; see CTA, RG 1 A, minute no. 105, 1892.
Toronto's Ashbridge's Bay, 1889-1910

96 CTA, RG 1A, minute no. 370, 1908.

97 CTA, RG 1A, minute no. 444 and 445, 1908.

98 Ricky v. City of Toronto.


101 Evening Telegram, 16 April 1907 and THCA, SC 26, box 4, vol 4, “The River Don and Ashbridge’s Bay.”


104 The Guild of Civic Art contributed to the expenses of the OAA’s 1905 plan. Also, membership may be compared using the Ontario Association of Architects, Proceedings 1905 and 1906, and the list in the Guild’s “Report” of 1909.

105 THCA, RG 3/3, box 105, folder 1, Toronto Board of Trade, “A Plan Suggested by The Toronto Board of Trade for the Development of Ashbridge’s Bay,” 1909.

106 THCA, Annual Report, 15, 1930.