Port Authorities as Urban Land Developers: The Case of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and Their Outer Harbour Project, 1912-68

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Résumé de l'article

Les autorités du port ont toujours tenu une place importante dans les villes portuaires du Canada et en sont venues à être largement responsables de l’aménagement et de la vocation des sections des villes en bordure de l’eau. Leur rôle déterminant explique l’intérêt que leur ont porté les spécialistes s’intéressant au développement des villes au Canada. La présente étude porte sur l’une de ces autorités portuaires, la Toronto Harbour Commission, et se penche sur le rôle que celle-ci a joué à titre d’organisme voué à l’aménagement du terrain. Une analyse de l’un des projets de la commission, portant sur l’avant-port, de 1912 à 1968, démontre que l’aménagement du territoire était une préoccupation majeure pour la commission. Ce projet, qui était censé être une installation portuaire, était en fait l’un des principaux éléments d’un plan de réaménagement de la commission : celle-ci avait en effet l’intention de transformer la partie centrale de Toronto donnant sur le lac à des fins rentables, commerciales et résidentielles. Ce projet illustre également l’importance des travaux de remblai dans l’aménagement urbain fait par la commission et explique, entre autres, la présence de la pointe artificielle de trois milles de longueur qui s’avance dans le lac Ontario, en face de Toronto. Le rôle de la commission est décrit à la lumière de son premier mandat de 1911 qui, à son tour, reflète les intentions de la chambre de commerce de Toronto, l’organisme qui avait mené la campagne de propagande pour la création de la commission.
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Abstract

Port authorities have been important presences in Canada's port cities, playing major roles in determining the physical form and land-use functions of urban waterfront lands. Their formative roles warrant attention from scholars concerned with the city-building process in Canada. This study focuses upon one such body, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, and how and why it has functioned as a land development agency. An analysis of the commission's Outer Harbour project between 1912 and 1968 shows the commission's central concern with land development; ostensibly presented as a harbour facility, the project was actually intended to be a key component in the commission's proposed redevelopment of Toronto's central waterfront for profitable commercial and residential use. The project also reveals the significance of landfilling in the commission's urban development role, and, incidentally, explains the existence of the three-mile artificial headland projecting out into Lake Ontario from Toronto's waterfront. The role of the commission as a development agency is explained in terms of its original 1911 mandate, which in turn reflects the intentions of the Toronto Board of Trade, the body that had led the drive to create the commission.

Résumé

Les autorités du port ont toujours tenu une place importante dans les villes portuaires du Canada et en sont venues à être largement responsables de l'aménagement et de la vocation des sections des villes en bordure de l'eau. Leur rôle déterminant explique l'intérêt que leur ont porté les spécialistes s'intéressant au développement des villes au Canada. La présente étude porte sur l'une de ces autorités...
Further to the success of the project, and even more relevant, the act
gave the harbour commission the power to
develop not only all of the waterfront land
assigned to it in 1911 but also all land that
might subsequently be placed under its
jurisdiction. The full impact of this became
apparent shortly after the act was passed,
when the city transferred to the commission
almost 2,000 acres of waterfront land and
water lots. With broad power to control land,
with extensive land holdings *ab initio*, and
with the opportunity of creating a land bank
through the simple mechanism of landfill, it
was certainly appropriate for the commission
to function as a land commission or
development agency rather than act simply
as a harbour-minding body.

Just why the commission was originally
assigned such a mandate is best understood
in terms of the intentions of the Toronto
Board of Trade, the body whose efforts had
led to the creation of the commission in
1911.7 The Board of Trade, then the most
active and effective organization in the city's
business community, was dedicated to
fostering the economic growth of Toronto. In
1907, concerned that the development
potential of the waterfront was being
neglected, it began in earnest its drive to
create a new agency to replace the
ineffective harbour trust. Adopting as its
model the proposed version of a new port
agency for Montreal, the Board of Trade
wanted ownership and control of the entire
waterfront concentrated in the hands of a
single body empowered to develop it. The
board advocated a systematic development
of waterfront sites for industrial and
commercial purposes, and emphasized that
large-scale landfilling offered enormous
promise for economic development and
growth. The harbour commission that was
created in 1911, as well as the actual
legislation setting it up and defining its role,
were very much the product of the board's
effective lobbying efforts. Not surprisingly, in
view of its origins, the commission's mandate
reflected the Board of Trade's commitment to
land development.

To show that land development has always
been the major concern of the commission
this paper focuses upon the commission's
Outer Harbour project. The history of this
artificial harbour, one of the most ambitious
and innovative development projects ever
carried out by the commission, is revealing in
several ways. Both the original concept and
its actual creation provide insight into the role
and goals of the commission. The project,
ostensibly designed as a port facility, was in
reality part and parcel of a multi-purpose
land development scheme. Further, the
project reveals the commission's reliance
upon transforming water into land, by the
process commonly known as landfilling
(more accurately, lakefilling). Finally, the origin
and development of the Outer Harbour
serves to explain the existence of the
Harbour Headland (Leslie Street Spit), a
three-mile artificial promontory curving out
into the lake from the city, the fate and use of
which has been a subject of continuing
controversy for more than a decade.8

The years 1912 and 1968, chosen as the
starting and ending points for this study,
represent landmarks for both the Toronto
Harbour Commission and the development
of the city's waterfront (Fig. 1 shows how
the shape of the waterfront changed
between these two key years9). The first
major plan for the Toronto's waterfront,
produced in 1912 by the harbour
commission, together with the only major
revision to it, made in 1949, shaped the
course of waterfront development for more
than half a century. In 1968 the commission
presented a second plan which, although not
similarly formative, did foreshadow the
beginning of the latest and current phase of
central waterfront development.
The idea of an outer harbour to serve the port of Toronto surfaced in the first half of the nineteenth century. Earlier, in the second half of the nineteenth century the area known as Toronto's harbour comprised the sheltered waters between, on the south, the Toronto Islands and on the north, the central waterfront located approximately between Bathurst and Parliament streets (see Fig. 2 for the location of these and other waterfront place-names referred to in the text). This sheltered body of water was then referred to as the bay or the harbour, during the twentieth century, however, the original harbour gradually came to be identified as the Inner Harbour, to differentiate it from the Outer Harbour, an idea, and ultimately an actual place, conceived as a location for shipping activities and facilities.

The commission's 1912 proposal for...
Toronto’s waterfront, endorsed by the City of Toronto in a formal agreement in 1914, was in effect a bold master plan for the redevelopment of the waterfront along its entire ten-mile length. It was a multi-purpose scheme, designed to create shipping facilities, industrial and commercial lands, and parks and recreational amenities, all served by improved transportation and transit services. For more than half a century the commission reshaped and rearranged Toronto’s waterfront using the 1912 plan as its basic guideline. In this important initial plan there was no trace of an outer harbour. (Fig. 3 shows Toronto’s eastern waterfront in 1912 and Fig. 4 shows the new version of its planned in 1912).

In 1914 Commissioner Robert S. Gourlay, the Board of Trade representative on the commission, gave a major presentation on the 1912 plan, in an address entitled “Basic Principles of Waterfront Development as Illustrated by the Plans for the Toronto Harbour Commissioners,” to an international conference of planners and politicians held in Toronto that year. From the transcript of the session it is clear that the presentation provoked much interest and protracted discussion. One member of the audience, attending the conference from New York City, commended the commissioners for their waterfront plan but felt obliged to draw attention to the eventual need for an outer harbour. The point was made at the end of what had been a fairly lengthy question-and-answer session and there is no evidence that the point was taken up, either by Gourlay or by anyone else in the audience. Nor is there any evidence that the commission was at all interested at this point in modifying its new waterfront plan.

By 1925, the commission did begin to look with favour upon the idea for an outer harbour as part of a scheme to revise the eastern section of the 1912 plan. That year the commission’s Board authorized its consulting engineer to prepare revised plans of the proposed developments along the lake.
The engineer, Edward L. Cousins, subsequently reported to the general manager that the revised plans called for "as much study as was given the development of the Inner Harbour." Of prime importance for Cousins was the need:

...to work out what might be termed a flexible plan. ... and it is our hope that we will be able to devise a plan along the lines that will permit of development from time to time as conditions warrant and finances permit, having in mind the fact that any development, at any point in that area, will ultimately adjust itself, ... to the comprehensive plan as a whole.¹²

A number of different possible revisions were prepared and considered before the commission finalized, in 1928, its revised version of the 1912 plan. A major feature of the proposed revision was an outer harbour to be developed between the Eastern Channel and the foot of Leslie Street.

While an outer harbour represented an "ultimate aim,"¹³ there was a more immediate goal behind Cousins' revised version of the waterfront plan. This was the elimination of a strip of parkland and recreational facilities, approximately 1,000 feet wide and 3 miles long comprising 352 acres. In accordance with the plan of 1912, Ashbridge's Bay had been filled in and the newly created land was designated for industrial uses (see Figs. 3 and 4), with the exception of the strip along its former southern edge between the Eastern Channel and the foot of Leslie Street. Designated as parkland in the 1912 plan (see Fig. 4) this land was now being proposed for industrial purposes, the industrial lands to be lined with wharfs and quayside facilities.¹⁵

The 1928 revision was an important one. From the commission's point of view the idea of parkland in the eastern sector of the waterfront had outlived its usefulness. The proposal for parkland extending more or less continuously all along the waterfront had been included in the 1912 plan, as Cousins later acknowledged, simply to enlist public support for the costly program of port and waterfront development.¹⁶ Although parkland might be a valuable amenity for the city, it would not produce revenue for the commission. Selling or leasing the land for industry, on the other hand, would be profitable. There was, however, some resistance to this change: one newspaper story noted that the parkland and other improvements envisaged in the original plan would be "abandoned or mutilated beyond recognition" if the new revision were to be adopted.¹⁷

In an effort to ensure adoption of the revision and to overcome resistance prompted by the loss of promised parkland, Cousins became a major advocate of the new plan. Whenever possible, both inside the commission and through the media to the general public, he articulated a rationale for the revision. After an interview with Cousins, one reporter, making no mention of the abandoned parkland, focused upon what would be gained:

An artificial harbour from the Eastern Gap to Leslie Street, a miniature of Toronto Harbour itself is the ultimate aim. Extending three thousand feet into the lake from the present shore line, reclaimed industrial land would surround a stretch of water which would accommodate the largest of vessels, protected completely from the waves of the open lake, and providing thousands of feet of additional dock space.

Should all these dreams of the future come true, the outline of the eastern waterfront would be altered beyond recognition, but would afford immense areas for future industrial development.¹⁸

Cousins, however, did not believe that the proposed outer harbour was the critical component in the revised plan. He was convinced that the greatest economic benefit, for both the city and the commission, would be derived from the reclamation of land for industrial and commercial purposes. On 24 June 1929, after Cousins had discussed with General Manager J. G. Langton ways and means of improving harbour revenue, Cousins put his views in a formal letter to the general manager:

... it should be borne in mind that the Harbour Commissioners' original development plan was founded not so much on increased harbour dues or revenue from Great Lakes tonnage as from the general benefit that would accrue to the City as a whole as a result of the increased industrial and commercial growth following the development of the harbour properties. In other words, no body of businessmen could have justified recommending the expenditure of $25,000,000 on Toronto's waterfront in 1912 based on the water-borne tonnage offered either then or in the near future in and out of Toronto Harbour.¹⁹

Cousins anticipated that the improvements in the Welland Canal would increase harbour revenues and that someday the canalization of the St. Lawrence would provide a further boost. But he insisted that industrial and commercial growth was the essential source of revenue. Although Cousins promoted an outer harbour, he did not believe that trade, either through the new harbour or even through the existing inner harbour, was the key to the financial well-being of the commission. It was the revenue from industrial and commercial development that would enable the commission to meet the sinking fund and interest charges that confronted it.²⁰

On 14 March 1931 the weekly magazine section of the Toronto Star carried a feature story on "Two Harbors for Toronto!," illustrated with a dramatic bird's-eye view of Toronto and its waterfront, and captioned, "A Glimpse Into the Future." The new "Proposed Harbor" was sketched in on the eastern waterfront replete with docks and steamships.
Cousins suggested that the outer harbour would be needed within 25 years, but he emphasized a more immediate priority:

The harbour is only a fraction of the picture. In the last five years alone the commission has leased $8,195,000 worth of industrial property that was under water ten years ago. The total value of harbour property, according to the city's own appraisement, was only $1,976,804 in 1912. The value of harbour commission property at present, less than twenty years after, is $19,190,650. There's an increase of over $17,000,000 in assessed value with only one-third of the reclaimed land disposed of.

Cousins went on to identify the confusion and misperceptions fostered by the commission's name:

The harbour commission has always laboured under the liability of its name. It should never have been created as a harbour commission. That was a misnomer. It should have been called an industrial and commercial development commission or some such name. No sane man would ever have spent $25,000,000, which was the amount of the original bond issue, on Toronto's ambitions to be a lake port.

But the harbour was only secondary to the industrial area that was to be developed, with parks third. The basic idea was to reclaim 2,000 acres of waterfront land, of which 800 were to be parks and 1,200 for industrial purposes.

As Cousins "waxed warm" with his interviewer, he emphasized that every piece of work in waterfront development:

has been part of a comprehensive plan. Whether it was a piece of park, a dock, a street or an industrial area, it fitted and it fitted properly. The commission hasn't departed from that principle in twenty years.21

In the proposed revision of the 1912 plan, the outer harbour clearly fitted in with the proposed new industrial land: if the parkland and recreational facilities planned earlier were eliminated then the proposed docks could be located adjacent to the industrial sites, thereby making both docks and the industrial sites more attractive in marketing terms.
To adopt and implement its revision the harbour commission needed the cooperation and endorsement of both the city and federal governments, as well as major commitments of funds from both. The commission tried to use the alleged need for the outer harbour as its warrant for the proposed revision but neither the federal nor the city government found the case convincing. The federal reaction is apparent in the response of the deputy minister of the ministry of marine. The commission claimed that there was a pressing need for more dockage for the port, asserting that the need was urgent because there was already (in 1932 and 1933) a dockage shortage. But several years later the federal ministry of marine was still not impressed with the urgency of the need, noting “that areas in Toronto Harbour available for dockage construction and development had not been fully utilised.” The city was no more interested in the outer harbour proposal than the federal government. After an initial conference in the spring of 1927 between the commissioners and the city’s Board of Control, there was only infrequent correspondence for several years between the commission and the city’s politicians and staff on the subject. There was a meeting between city and commission staff in September 1931, and about six months later the city’s Commissioner of Parks, wrote to the general manager of the harbour commission to remind him of an earlier understanding that the commission would keep the city informed of their plans and intentions for the eastern waterfront. The general manager responded that plans were still being developed and he promised to advise the commissioner when they were completed. That was their last communication on the subject in the 1930s.

The first major push to revise the 1912 plan in order to develop an outer harbour was clearly over. It had surfaced in the mid 1920's as part of Cousins’s vision for the eastern waterfront. But the 1928 proposal was not adopted and the concept of an outer harbour faded into the background early in the 1930s. Even the increased volume of trade and traffic in the port after the opening of the new Welland Canal (the first full season was in 1931) did not demonstrate any immediate need for a new harbour. And the diminished opportunities and hopes of the Depression years no doubt contributed to the fading.

Immediately after the end of World War II the idea of developing an outer harbour was revived. The first post-war harbour priority was improving and elaborating the docking facilities along the central waterfront, between Yonge and Parliament streets. In 1945, at the same time as the harbour commission was pressing the federal government for funds to embark on this project, it was also raising the need for “planning ... additional harbour facilities in view of the St. Lawrence Deep Waterway project.” The point was made more explicitly next year, in a letter to the minister of public works from T.L. Church, a former harbour commissioner, former mayor, and, since 1921, a Member of Parliament.

Church’s advocacy of a breakwater and outer harbour development fell on deaf ears, the minister’s response noting that:

The development of an outer harbour east of the Eastern Gap has not yet been given any detailed study by the Department. The need for this is not yet urgent. This negative response did not deter the harbour commission, and although the idea was not one of their major post-war priorities they were determined to keep it alive. On 15 March 1948, for example, the senior staff members of the commission met to develop a scenario “Re Overall Planning for the Future.” On 7 April the group met with Cousins (employed as a consultant) to review and revise their ideas. Out of this meeting with Cousins came a report identifying nine projects or areas of development and assigning particular staff members to study or work on each of them. One of them was a study of the development of the area east from the Eastern Channel, which was to include the possibility of an outer harbour.

The harbour commission initiated a new effort to revise the 1912 plan soon after it was presented with the opportunity of selling large parcels of land on the eastern waterfront (adjacent to the Ship Channel and the Turning Basin) to the Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario (Ontario Hydro) and to the Consumers’ Gas Corporation. For the commission there were two obstacles to selling the parcels for industrial purposes. First, the land in question included acreage that had formerly belonged to the city and could not now be sold without city consent. Second, the parcels of land included parts of the eastern waterfront that had been designated for parkland and recreational facilities in the 1912 plan and in the 1914 commitment to it by both the city and the commission.

Early in 1949, after receiving bids for the lands from Ontario Hydro and from Consumers’ Gas, the harbour commission took steps to remove both obstacles. It asked the city to allow it to sell the two parcels of land and to amend the 1914 agreement on the 1912 plan:

to permit of harbour development in the section of the waterfront between the Eastern Channel and Coatsworth Cut leaving the waterfront ... (further east) for development for park, recreational and aquatic purposes. The city was as enthusiastic about these two sales as the harbour commission: when the chairman of the commission, W.H. Bosley, and its consultant, Cousins, attended a special session of City Council on 25 March 1949, an amended agreement, already recommended by the city’s Board of Control, was unanimously approved by council.

The first and only major revision of the 1912 plan was now accomplished. The way was clear for the sale of the two parcels of land. More important in the long run, industrial development, including an outer harbour,
could now be substituted for the parkland originally proposed in the eastern waterfront.

Newspaper reports presented, in text and in illustrations, details of the revised plans, of Cousins's resurrected vision of an outer harbour, and of his detailed elaborations of the form it might take. Editorials endorsed the new agreement, noting that when the St Lawrence Seaway became a reality:

the prospect is in view of great ships that ply the ocean entering the port of Toronto, of great mercantile activity that will enrich the city and that will demand of it a commensurate growth in all its industries and institutions to match the opportunities approaching it.29

The commission, however, even if it shared such hopes for the future, had no convincing evidence of any immediate need to begin constructing an outer harbour in 1949. For a decade, throughout the 1950s, the commission staff simply continued to consider and study various possible versions of an outer harbour without actually committing itself to build one.

On 20 December 1960 the commission finally took the plunge when the board adopted the general manager's formal submission of policy with regard to the development of an outer harbour. The explicitly identified "basic precept" of the development was described in a single sentence and was submitted on a separate page accompanying the formal submission of policy:

The construction of the best facilities for shipping and related uses in relation to area development plans on a staged programme that permits continuing availability for new business with maximum of flexibility within the financial capabilities of the Port.

This "basic precept" is remarkably similar to the definition of a flexible plan that Cousins had formulated in 1928 (see p. 96 above). and reflects the commission's continuing concern with keeping open as many land-use and construction options as possible. The general manager, who wrote the text of the policy and of the approach, emphasized that:

the most important individual aspect is complete flexibility in order to meet changing conditions that will arise from any forecast made to-day. The area served is too dynamic, too young and much too unpredictable with its dependence on so many factors beyond its control, for any firm long range commitment to be made.

It is therefore suggested that the ideal plan is one which sets forth a minimum first stage and will permit the largest number of different types of future development for succeeding stages.30

With the formal adoption of a policy in 1960 the commission had committed itself to the construction of an outer harbour. But when construction started there was no certainty about the form it was to take, when it was to be completed, or even how it was to be built. Until 1965 there was no pre-determined development programme or specific goal other than the creation of some kind of outer harbour. Construction simply proceeded on a trial-and-error basis and was characterized by an ad hoc approach.

The first step in building an outer harbour was to construct a breakwater to create an area of sheltered water. A conventional breakwater would have been prohibitively expensive so the commission's engineers began by experimenting with the use of fill from excavation sites. Use of such material created many engineering problems, especially when it had to be placed (and stabilized) in increasingly deep water away from the original shoreline. But anticipated large increases in the supply of fill in the next few years (from subway construction, excavations for apartment and office buildings, the Leslie Street Slip, and expressway development) meant that large amounts of basic raw material for lakefill were available free of charge. A breakwater could be constructed at minimal cost to the commission, and at a fraction of the cost of a conventional breakwater.

It took approximately five years, from 1960 to 1965, to work out the most advantageous way of depositing the large amounts of free fill in the lake and to decide upon the basic shape of an outer harbour. By the spring of 1965 the commission had approved, received federal authorization for, and started construction on two headlands, one from the foot of Leslie Street and the other from near the foot of Cherry Street, designed as two arms to enclose a sheltered harbour of about 200 acres. But before the end of the year the plan was revised again: the western (Cherry Street) arm was aborted, and it was decided to enclose a much larger harbour by developing a single breakwater. The headland, which came to be known officially as the Outer Harbour East Headland and more popularly as the Leslie Street Spit, was to be the key element in what was presented a tentative five-year harbour development plan.31

Even after the 1965 flexibility remained a paramount consideration in the outer harbour project. Apart from building the headland, no construction work was undertaken. The final shape, length, composition, and mode of stabilizing and armouring the headland were still uncertain. As construction proceeded on the headland, the engineering staff of the commission was still considering and weighing various options, such as what kinds of docks and terminals should go in the outer harbour and whether or not to expand the width of the headland in order to develop an airport on it. The physical consequences of the headland upon water quality, and upon shoreline erosional and depositional patterns, were unknown and the commission tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain federal funding to hire consultants to conduct a series of major studies of the physical and engineering...
aspects of the undertaking. Just about all that was certain was that the commission was indeed now developing an outer harbour, a sheltered body of water to be enclosed by a long breakwater.

The way in which construction got underway between 1960 and 1965 provides an additional illustration of how pragmatic and flexible the commission’s approach to the project was. For the commission a particularly advantageous feature was the opportunity to build a breakwater simply by supervising the dumping into the lake of free materials coming from a variety of sources. It was probably the opportunity to utilize the large amounts of such material becoming available in the early 1960s that prompted the commission to launch the project then, even before commission members knew what form it was going to take, or what additional function or functions it might perform, or what kind of docks it might be used to protect.

Certainly, it could not have been begun at this time because of shipping needs. There was no more evidence in the 1960s than there had been earlier that the port needed a new harbour and more docks to accommodate likely increases in ships and cargoes. The St. Lawrence Seaway had opened in the 1950s and the buoyant economy of the early 1960s was contributing to a growing volume of cargo passing through the port of Toronto. But the port was operating nowhere near its existing capacity. Increased use of containerization was one of several changes threatening to diminish the future role of the port. The federal government was sufficiently concerned about the implications of shipping changes that the Department of Public Works commissioned a major study “Future Port Requirements of Canadian Harbours and Ports in Western Lake Ontario.” The study, completed in March 1969, was based on a comprehensive analysis of past trends and present conditions. For Toronto the main finding was that the port’s future was not a bright one. The report concluded:

Neither general cargo nor bulk cargo is likely to increase significantly during the next twenty years. The existing facilities are more than adequate.32

The year the report appeared, 1969, turned out to be the port’s peak year for trade, which reached 6.3 million tons. But, as if to underline the message of the report, trade in the following year showed a drastic drop to 5.3 million tons, the beginning of a sharp decline that has never been reversed.33

Despite the rapid growth of the headland, until 1966 the outer harbour project attracted virtually no attention. Between 1960 and 1965 approximately 120 acres of land had been created by filling at the base of the headland and along the spine. In 1966 the headland was being extended at a rate of about 10 feet per working day.34 But it was not closed to the public, because it was a construction site, and what was being built at the site was virtually invisible, being located increasingly far out from what was in any case a little-visited section of the city’s waterfront. The commission itself had not publicized or even announced what it was doing.

By the mid-1960s, however, a waterfront planning initiative taken by the government of Metropolitan Toronto began to restrict some of the commission’s actions with regard to its outer harbour project. After Metropolitan Toronto set up a Waterfront Technical Committee in 1962 to develop a plan for the waterfront of all of Metropolitan Toronto, the committee assigned to the commission the planning of the central waterfront (including the original inner harbour and the new outer harbour). Even to this committee the commission was not very forthcoming initially about what it was planning and, in the case a little-visited section of the city’s waterfront. The commission itself had not publicized or even announced what it was doing.

Early in 1966, however, the harbour commission finally made public through the media some details of what it was doing at the outer harbour site, and what it was planning for its five-year development programme for the new harbour. The commission’s participation in the Metropolitan Toronto waterfront planning effort meant that in any event its plans for the central sector, including the Outer Harbour, would obviously have to become public as soon as the planning process was completed and the results presented to the metropolitan government. Acting perhaps to anticipate forthcoming public exposure, in January 1966 the commission provided one of Toronto’s newspapers with information on its construction activities and plans for the Outer Harbour. A newspaper story, prominently featured, appeared on 14 January 1966,35 the text being accompanied by a clear and simple sketch map of the outer harbour, embellished with cartoon-like drawings to illustrate some specific features of the scheme (see Fig. 6).

The article seems to reflect an effort calculated to present the outer harbour as a multi-purpose project benefiting a broad range of interests. The shipping opportunities of the outer harbour were alluded to, but the emphasis was upon other possibilities of the project. The new breakwater was to be a major recreational amenity for the city, to help “fulfil the dream of planners for a park system stretching across Metro,” and to play a recreational role likened to that of the parkland on the Toronto Islands. “City yachtsmen” were also to benefit from the project: they were to be provided with new moorings and with launching facilities and were informed that when the breakwater was finished “they’ll have their protected area for
smooth-water sailing nearly doubled as well.” The story also emphasized the relatively low cost of the project; the headline was “Our new harbour is dirt cheap” and the text noted that the breakwater was being built “at the ridiculously small cost of $1,000,000,” which the commission estimated to be only six per cent of what a conventional concrete breakwater would cost. The story noted that the commission claimed the headland would even save money by deflecting currents and deposits from the Eastern Gap which would eliminate the need for expensive annual dredging.

This public unveiling of the outer harbour project by the commission early in 1966 revealed something less than a complete picture. The commission was not yet ready to divulge any information about the larger plan it was preparing for the city’s central waterfront (which in turn was being drawn up as part of Metropolitan Toronto’s plans for the entire waterfront). Because the commission did not place the outer harbour project in the context of its plan for the central waterfront the basic rationale for the outer harbour was not apparent. It was another two years before the central waterfront plan made its public debut.

The commission’s plan for the central sector was finally finished just in time to be included in the Waterfront Plan for Metropolitan Toronto, which was printed in December 1967 and was the subject of a presentation to the Metropolitan Toronto Waterfront Advisory Board on 10 January 1968. The commission’s part of the larger plan was subsequently also presented by the commission itself, appearing in February as a separately printed report, entitled A Bold Concept for the Redevelopment of the Toronto Waterfront.

The commission plan was a dramatic one. The reference to the redevelopment scheme as a “Bold Concept” was designed to draw attention to two qualities of the plan: first, it was sweeping in scale, involving major transformations of large acreages of land and water; second, what was being presented was really a conceptual master plan, embodying some broad directions for change and the concepts and objectives behind them rather than a specific and detailed set of proposals. Noting that the 1912 plan had, in essence, been realized, the new plan was offered as an “even bolder plan” than the “bold concept of 1912.” Its basis was to be the relocation of deep offshore sand deposits “to create wholly new land areas.” The reclamation would use “sophisticated dredging techniques,” and the economic viability of the plan was assured because:

the financial return on the cost of the necessary dredging is amply provided by the enormous value — upwards of forty million dollars—obtained from the creation of revenue-generating land.

The costs of the reclamation would be more than covered by the revenue anticipated from the development project “of keystone importance” in the plan: called Harbour City, this project was to be a new residential development for 50,000 people, designed “to generate enormous revenue.”

In its A Bold Concept the harbour commission for the first time made explicit the purpose of an outer harbour:

The creation of the Outer Harbour opens up a new area for major Port development and use. In turn, the phasing-out of the Western Channel frees an area for uses compatible with major development in the surrounding downtown area.

An outer harbour was thus to be a key element in the redevelopment of the central waterfront. It was to provide a new setting for shipping facilities relocated from the central waterfront of the inner harbour. The shift would pave the way for the redevelopment of the commission’s lands on the waterfront adjacent to downtown for commercial and residential uses. And the commission expected that the redevelopment of the valuable land closest to the central business district would be highly profitable.

When federal Department of Transport officials analyzed A Bold Concept they noted two key points when they submitted their findings to their minister in summary form. First, they concluded that the plan:

seems to be a real estate operation to use the Toronto Harbour Commissioners’ lands to better advantage, considering the high cost of real estate in the centre part of Toronto harbour. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners wish to relocate the present freight terminals in Toronto Harbour to a new outer harbour in order to use the land on which the present terminals are constructed to better advantage.

Second, the Department of Transport officials saw no evidence to change their earlier judgement concerning the need for an outer harbour:

The officials in the Department are satisfied that the present harbour facilities as well as the present channels of access to the inner harbour are sufficient to serve the needs of navigation at Toronto for the next fifteen to
The needs of shipping were as irrelevant to an outer harbour project as they always had been.

The debut of *A Bold Concept* early in 1968 represents a convenient stopping point for this scrutiny of the outer harbour, which appeared as a major element in the report. The construction of more than three miles of headland as a breakwater created a harbour in the sense of a sheltered body of water. A deep channel into and through it was even dredged in the early 1970s. But the outer harbour that has been created is a harbour in only a limited sense: it has no dockwalls, quays, piers, or berths, or any of the usual accoutrements of a harbour, and has never been used for shipping or cargoes.

The Harbour Headland, extending more than three miles into the lake and sprawling over several hundred acres, gives witness to the traditional importance of the commission's remarkably productive landfilling operations on Toronto's waterfront. The implementation of the 1912 plan rested on the effectiveness during subsequent decades of harbour commission engineers in creating land out of the shallow waters at the edge of Lake Ontario. By filling in the lake the commission constantly acquired new land, for its own use or for selling or leasing to others. The methods used in the landfilling process changed somewhat between 1912 and 1968, and the promontory-like shape of the headland is not like that of the typical commission landfill project. It stands nevertheless as an appropriate symbol of the historical role of The Toronto Harbour Commissioners: it reflects the commissioners' long-standing and characteristic reliance upon the device of converting water into land, transforming Toronto's waterfront at the same time as it was ensuring substantial economic benefits both for itself (directly, through land sales and leases) and for the city (indirectly, through taxes from and jobs provided in industrial and other developments on the new lands).

It has been suggested in the pages above that the outer harbour was not an element in the commission's original 1912 plan for the waterfront, but that it represents a major subsequent revision to the plan. The concept of an outer harbour was first vigorously promoted by the commission in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The initial effort was fruitless. The high cost of such a project made federal and city support imperative, and the city's blessing would have been necessary in order to revise the 1912 plan and eliminate some parkland proposed in it for the eastern waterfront: neither level of government saw any reason to support the scheme.

In 1949, however, a critical change was made in the 1912 plan. Change was prompted by the common enthusiasm of both the city and the commission for a modification to the plan in order to facilitate sales of two specific sites on the eastern waterfront. The commission, still concerned to pave the way for an outer harbour, used the occasion to achieve city endorsement of a complementary modification in the 1912 plan, one which proposed harbour development instead of park development along the eastern waterfront east of the Eastern Channel entrance to the inner harbour. The way was now open for the development of an outer harbour.

During most of the 1950s, however, no major step was taken to launch the project.
commission was preoccupied with other development priorities; the cost of building an outer harbour without federal financial support would have been prohibitive, and the commission’s long-standing rationale for seeking external support, the need for facilities for ships and shipping outside the Inner Harbour, was still not convincing. Late in the 1950s circumstances began to change.

The increasing availability of very large amounts of free fill materials opened up a new prospect. Initial experiments with these free supplies convinced the commission that it could use the fill to build a headland, thus creating an outer harbour. The headland could be built at a fraction of the cost of a conventional breakwater structure, sufficiently cheaply that the commission was willing to undertake the project without financial support from the federal government. And it went ahead despite the fact that there was apparently still no need for an outer harbour for shipping and trade purposes, although the commission proclaimed that such a need existed. The extent to which the commission itself was convinced of the validity of this rationale is uncertain, and, in any event, a moot point.

More relevant is the perception of the commission that the new outer harbour could be used as a relocation site for the shipping facilities of the central waterfront, so that the latter could be redeveloped “for uses compatible with major development in the surrounding downtown area.” A relocation process of this kind would certainly have represented a rational “real estate operation,” the profitability of which was already being demonstrated by the waterfront redevelopment taking place in a number of North American port cities in the 1960s. In sum, the outer harbour project was a case of land development, or redevelopment, rather than an effort to cater to anticipated increased shipping needs in the port of Toronto, even if it was long advocated and promoted in terms of these shipping needs.

Cousins’s point, made in 1931, that The Toronto Harbour Commissioners laboured under a misnomer and that “it (they) should have been called an industrial and commercial development commission or some such name,” has remained pertinent.

In 1986 the commission celebrated its 75th birthday. Among the good works to which it proudly drew attention, as it modestly celebrated its birthday, were about half a dozen major development projects, either just begun or about to be launched. These included a $400 million complex comprising five office and residential skyscrapers, on central waterfront landfill that had been created by the commission decades earlier, and the sale of one of the commission’s marine terminals on the central waterfront to permit development of offices, shops, and residences. Such ventures seem to represent fitting latter-day assertions of the commission’s traditional role as a land development agency, as well as providing a reminder of the fact that the body bears a misleading name.

Notes


3 The corporate body created in 1850, commonly referred to as the harbour trust, was legally known as The Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto. Its role is discussed in F. N. Mellen, “The Development of the Toronto Waterfront During the Railway Expansion Era, 1850-1912” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1974) and in Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine 16 (February 1988): 242 (and see also Notes 1-3, on p. 252).
To date there are only three studies that focus upon the harbour commission: James O'Mara, *Shaping Urban Waterfronts: The Role of Toronto's Harbour Commissioners 1911-1960* (York University Department of Geography Discussion Paper Series, No. 13, March 1976); Roy Schaeffer, *The Board of Trade and the Origins of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, 1899-1911* (York University Department of Geography Discussion Paper Series, No. 27, September 1981); James O'Mara, *The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Financial Arrangements and City Waterfront Development, 1910 to 1950* (York University Department of Geography Discussion Paper Series, No. 30, November 1984). My indebtedness to these three studies is especially large: they represent an essential starting point for any study of the commission's role.

See Canada, Statutes, 1-2 George V, chap. 26, paragraphs 15 and 16, assented to 19 May 1911.


Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were drawn by Carol Randall in the Cartography Laboratory at York University, and I am indebted to her for her cartographic expertise.

The importance of the 1912 plan, in terms of the City of Toronto and of city planning in Canada, has long been acknowledged; see, for example, *Saving the Canadian City: The First Phase, 1880-1920*, ed. Paul Rutherford (Toronto, 1974), 211. Rutherford, however, has perhaps relied too much on the rhetoric of the plan's promoters and publicists (such as L. H. Clarke and R. S. Gourlay, both of whom were harbour commissioners), although it should be added that such a lop-sided approach was inevitable given the lack of available studies either of the plan's origins or of its implementation: see Rutherford's 1971 comments on the plan, reprinted in *The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History*, ed. G. A. Steiter and A.F.J. Antibebe (Toronto, 1979), 374-5, and the context in which Rutherford's approach is placed by the editors of the volume, on pages 337-9. The plan is now being subjected to detailed analysis. The first such study is John Hunt, "The 1912 Waterfront Plan: Some Considerations" (unpublished honours thesis, Department of Geography, University of Toronto, 1986). The accompanying article in this issue by Gene Desfor casts new light on the origins and political context of the plan. On the relative importance of the contributions of F. L. Olmsted and E. L. Cousins to the plan, see my submission to "The Feedback Loop," *City Planning* 3 (Spring/Summer 1985): 2.

The quotations in this and the previous paragraph are all from *Star Weekly*, 14 March 1931.

For the THC claims, see the *Telegram*, 30 Jan. 1933.

THCA, RG 3/3, (1618-G-1), Cousins to deputy minister of marine, 1 April 1936.


Ibid., letter from Alphonse Foumier, minister of public works to T. L. Church, 21 Aug. 1946.

The report, and the reference to the meetings that led up to it, are in THCA, RG 3/3, (1611-P-1, vol. 1).

The words quoted appear on page 2 of the printed and certified copy of Report No. 10 of the Board of Control as amended and adopted by City Council at its meeting of 25 March 1949.

The formal documents spelling out the agreement are all identified in the letter of the THC general manager to the THC Board, *ibid.*, (1760-G-1), 21 Jan. 1930. In an earlier memorandum, sent to his assistant, Cousins was even more explicit, noting that the work of the commission:

is really an industrial and commercial undertaking rather than purely harbour development; in other words, the industrial and commercial end takes precedence over everything else, harbour development being secondary (sic) and the parks, drives, etc., taking third place.


See Cousins's letter cited in the previous note, and, for the larger context, the study by O'Mara, *The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Financial Arrangements*.
This quotation is from the Telegram, 26 March 1949. Other relevant media reports, editorials, photographs, and maps appear in the Star, 23 March 1949, in the Telegram, 25 March 1949, and in the Toronto Globe and Mail, 26 March 1949.

This and the previous quotation are from the statements accompanying THCA, RG 1/1/1, vol. 31, board minute 21566, 20 Dec. 1956.

This paragraph is based upon the materials in THCA, RG 3/3, (1611 -P-1, vol. 2), letter of J. H. Jones to W. J. Manning, 8 Nov. 1966. J. H. Jones was the THC's chief engineer during the 1960s and he played a major role in the engineering, development, and planning work of the THC. I am grateful to him for submitting to a protracted interview (27 Aug. 1986) and for sharing with me his view of events leading up to the development of the outer harbour and "A Bold Concept." The only person who played a more central role during this period, serving as general manager from 1951 to 1980, was Ernest Griffith, who died in 1981.

The quotation, and the phrases quoted in the preceding sentences, are from A Bold Concept, 1-2.

A Bold Concept, 6.

A Bold Concept, 5.

Both of the quotations in this paragraph are from O. G. Stoner's memorandum to the minister of transport, 10 Sept. 1969, a copy of which was sent to the THC general manager by W. J. Manning in a letter dated 23 Sept. 1969, and was then submitted by the general manager to the THC Board. THCA, RG 1/1/1, vol. 34, board minute 25579, 14 Oct 1969 and RG 3/3, (1611 -P-4).

Instead, the sheltered waters enclosed by the headland are now being utilized by sailing clubs. Late in 1986 the THC began constructing a large marina within the outer harbour (which necessitated some filling in of the deep channel dredged in the early 1970s). The headland proper is currently being developed, partly as a park, partly as a site for dredged spoil and fill, and partly to provide landside facilities for sailing clubs. Efforts to preserve the headland as a public urban wilderness were rejected by the conservation authority that now has jurisdiction over much of the headland itself.

Early landfilling operations relied upon thick deposits of sand dredged out of shallow offshore waters, while the fill material for the headland was provided by rubble and various fill materials brought from city sites and then dumped into the lake.