
D. R. Woolf
drive conducted by the Reverend Jesse Jackson during his unsuccessful bid for the 1984 Democratic presidential nomination, by adding blacks to the election rolls, immediately afterward enhanced the black voice in suburban politics. Another effect of ethnic politics is the reflection of Washington’s black-majority population in the city’s governmental and political structure, a phenomenon akin to the Irish domination of urban political machines in the 19th-century. Regarding public education, middle-class blacks also followed patterns set by whites by leaving the city for better schools in suburbia. Though there are “disparate perceptions among white and black parents about educational needs” in the city, the result of great socioeconomic differences between the races, there was a great degree of agreement on public education issues among the more uniformly middle-class suburbanites in the increasingly black Prince George’s county, Maryland.

Fishman and Gale view the future of the city from different perspectives. Fishman sees the suburb as already becoming the technoburb, a decentralized city without boundaries. Inhabited by “multidirectional” commuters dependent on the automobile and communications technology, it “has become the true centre of American society,” he argues. This “new city” is part of a “techno-city,” a “whole metropolitan region that has been transformed” by its arrival. On the other hand, he admits that urban factory zones and workers “too poor to earn admission to the new city of prosperity at the periphery” will prevent present cities from disappearing “in the foreseeable future.” Yet it is clear from Gale’s study that the traditional city has far greater vitality than Fishman concedes, and that the process of suburbanization is continuing. Much of Washington’s improvement, Gale points out, was accomplished without governmental initiative or assistance, and many of the new suburbanites are middle-class blacks. Haussmann’s American heirs are revitalizing Washington and other cities while the American descendants of late 18th- and early 19th-century English merchants and manufacturers are dreaming of a “bourgeois utopia” in the countryside.

Robert D. Parmet  
Department of History and Philosophy  
York College  
The City University of New York


The study of English Restoration politics has entered a new era, with a number of recent books and articles challenging old orthodoxies about the re-establishment of the monarchy, the church settlement of 1662, and the growth of organized political parties in the 1670s and 1680s. While historians have also become more aware of the importance of popular involvement in political crises, they have generally been reluctant to move beyond the records of the central government to document the reactions of ordinary citizens to the world around them. Tim Harris’s study of the politics of the crowd in Restoration England, therefore, is welcome. Basing his account on a wide variety of published and archival sources, and making good use of the rich collection of visual propaganda (pictures, woodcuts, playing cards, and public spectacles) generated by a succession of economic and political crises, he provides sound study of the ways in which common people reacted to politics, and how politicians in turn reacted to them.

Harris posits a number of these in his introduction, which he then defends through several chapters. The first, and easiest to argue because it fits in with the current nominalist mood of historiography, is that there was no such thing as the crowd in the 17th century, only individual and occasional crowds. This is difficult to quarrel with, and Harris offers ample evidence to show that different crowds were motivated by different grievances. Harris’s second point is that anti-Catholicism has been overrated as a unifying political creed. Hatred of popery has generally been assumed to have provided a common ideology for the political orders, and to have furnished the restoration regime with the extended honeymoon it enjoyed till the late 1670s, despite occasional spats over bungled wars and the King’s periodic attempts to suspend the laws against Catholics and Dissenters. Harris argues, to the contrary, that “anticatholicism was not a consensual tradition but could equally well provide the justification for bitter division.” His analysis of several mob risings, such as the Bawdy House Riots of 1668 in which crowds attacked the London brothels, demonstrates that most Protestants could agree on disliking papists while disagreeing on much else. The same holds true for attitudes at the other end of the religious spectrum: distaste for dissent, whether of the moderate Presbyterians or of the various sects that had sprung up in the Civil War, was not the monopoly of the Tories, but could be shared equally by their Whig opponents, most of whom were particularly anxious not to be thought subservive of the established religion.

So far, so good: Harris offers plenty of proof that fundamental divisions along religious lines existed as early as 1662. He also disproves that notion that London itself was predominantly a Whig town during the Popish Plot of 1678 and its aftermath, the Exclusion Crisis of 1679 to 1681: he adduces a great deal of evidence to show the existence of Tory crowds, which may have helped the Tories gain the upper hand in 1681 before the government put new restrictions on assembly, thereby squashing crowd activity for the balance of the reign. Harris is on thinner ice, however, when he attempts to argue that the activity of the crowd (he is reluctant to use the term “popular,” primarily

137 Urban History Review/Revue d’histoire urbaine Vol. XVII, No. 2 (October 1988)
because the citizenship itself was deeply divided politically) was spontaneous and independent from the machinations and provocations of the gentry and aristocracy. The problem here is that he is attempting the difficult task of proving a negative, denying the direct control of the rival political factions over a populace raised to support them. He may well be right, but more research into the relations between the people and their political leaders will be needed before this argument can really be sustained. Harris himself betrays the weakness in the evidence for crowd independence: in the last line of the penultimate chapter, he speaks of how both Tories and Whigs were able to "command a following amongst the lower classes."

In sum, although one may disagree with some of Harris's arguments, his book is both an interesting and a generally well-written study that will advance the cause of early modern urban history.

D. R. Woolf
Department of History
Dalhousie University