
Donald Davis
illustrated how easily demographic shifts can cause urban violence. As Levitt and Shaffir conclude, “the swastika battles in Toronto during August 1933 were among the most violent expressions of ethnic animosity in the city’s history.” Their book is a tribute to the new “Toronto the Good,” a city which has taken great strides towards making the city feel safe, secure, welcome, and at home. In doing so, they have enhanced our understanding of the development of the “city that works.”

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In writing this brief, authorized history of the Parking Authority of Toronto (1952-1987), Holdsworth, a geographer, had both full access to the Authority’s files plus (to quote the foreword) “complete freedom in his work.” He used that freedom to extol the Parking Authority as “demonstrably economic, self-sufficient, and exemplary — and consequently representative of the established Canadian preference for benign government.” In other words, when he is not narrating the Authority’s history, garage by garage, Holdsworth is anxious to contrast (superior) Canadian public enterprise with (inferior) American private enterprise. “The American model was,” he writes, “largely one where municipalities built and then leased garages to private bidders, using their leverage over parking rates as their window on the industry. Toronto, in contrast, chose a different variant on the authority model, one where the municipality owned and operated the facilities.”

But Holdsworth does not explain why the Toronto model works better, just that it does. Yet why should the government construction of a carpark and its subsequent operation as regulated private enterprise lead to a situation where one “has to park one’s car, unlooked, in a seedy lot in some larger American city . . . ?” Holdsworth seems to suggest that urban pathology can be prevented by government-operated carparks. No doubt the Parking Authority would agree. But should scholars? Is not the difference between government ownership and regulation too minor, and the municipal carpark too insignificant (especially when most of Toronto’s have been privately-owned), to account for either American urban decay or the success of Toronto? And, since the “Toronto model” had only one other application in Canada, it surely cannot provide a foundation for differentiating Canadian from American cities.

Basically, Holdsworth expects too much of the carpark. It simply did not have the impact — judging from his own evidence — to make Toronto the “city that works.” But as a book on a parking authority, there are penetrating insights here into Toronto’s traffic history, and the debate over the automobile around 1970. Urban specialists should read this small book, perhaps the best on the subject when the subject is parking.

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There are few good books on Florence after the collapse of the republic, with the notable exception of Eric Cochrane’s well-known Florence in the Forgotten Centuries. This book is thus welcome on that account alone. Professor Litchfield is the author of three fine essays on Florence in this period: on the demography of the patriciate (Journal of Economic History, 1969), on their commercial investments (Annales, 1969), and on their access to office (Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, 1971). It has been almost 20 years since he promised us in those essays a general study of the patriciate during the principate: at last his long labours have reached fruition.

Unfortunately the end product is not a great book. The patriciate as members of the bureaucracy provides Litchfield with his guiding theme but little he has to say on this subject (for all the care and effort he has brought to it) surprises or excites. One cannot help regretting that he did not complete the more general social history of the patriciate that he seems once to have planned.

At the centre of his early work were the economic strategies of the patriciate: marriage customs designed to prevent the dissipation of patrimonies and extensive investments in land and (until the mid 18th century) in Florentine commerce. Office-holding, in his original view, gave them an influence on policy that served to protect their commercial investments: as a source of income it was of limited (though not negligible) importance. With the end of the Medici dynasty that influence collapsed. They saved what they could from the wreckage of their commercial investments, abandoning commerce to the urban middle class. But they were compensated by the end of controls on the grain trade which had kept down prices. What they lost in trade they stood to make up in rents. Paradoxically, then, their loss of power freed them from an outmoded economic strategy based upon guild monopolies.