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Most Assuredly Perpetual Motion: Police and Policing in Quebec City, 1838-58

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Résumé de l'article

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Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of the structure and function of Quebec City’s police force. Originally conceived as an instrument of British authorities, it was remodelled along Utilitarian lines. Provincial and municipal authorities disputed its control; both levels of government, however, shared the same professional and disciplined model of a force detached from the people. This ideal did not become a reality. The structure of Quebec society and the limitations of municipal power ensured that the police force was more concerned with routine ‘service’ functions than with social control. The conditions in the city played a larger role in shaping the force than the theories of police reformers.

Résumé

L’auteur retrace l’évolution du corps de police de Québec, de ses structures et de sa mission. D’abord conçu comme un instrument du pouvoir britannique, il se réorganisa selon des principes utilitaristes. Le gouvernement provincial et les autorités municipales s’en disputaient le contrôle, mais l’envisageaient tous deux comme un corps de professionnels bien préparés, séparé de la population. Ce projet ne se concrétisa pas. Étant donné l’organisation de la société québécoise et les limites du pouvoir municipal, le corps de police fut accaparé davantage par les tâches quotidiennes de « service » que par la fonction de contrôle social. Il fut ainsi modélisé par la ville elle-même et par les conditions qui y prévalaient, plus que par les théories des réformateurs de la police.

In 1981, Victor Bailey identified two major themes in the study of nineteenth century policing. The first of these is the debate over the motive for the creation of formalized bodies of policemen in the first half of the century. In Bailey’s view two distinct schools of thought have shaped this debate. The first emphasizes the widely-perceived need for an improvement over the antiquated local constabularies. Sir Robert Peel, Edwin Chadwick and the Benthamites are perceived as “statist Utilitarians” and “farsighted reformers acting with a benign regard for the public interest.” The second school of thought emphasizes the increasing social conflict of an urbanizing and industrializing society. For this group, “conflict” rather than “consensus” was the principal force leading to the creation of London Metropolitan Police in 1829.1

Bailey’s second theme is “the organization and day-to-day activities of the reformed police.” The institutional structure of policing is indeed one of the oldest issues in the field. Again, there are two traditionally opposed models, first defined by Sir Charles Keith. They are that of the “kin-police”, that is the police under local control and the “ruler-appointed” police, or police under the control of the central government.2 While this distinction was originally formulated to oppose the British police ideal with the French state and political police, it has been used more recently to contrast British and American police development.3 Eric H. Monkkonen has described a “change in the nature of the police from an informal, even casual, bureaucracy to a formal, rule-governed, militaristic organization” as part of the general evolution of policing in the United States from 1800 to 1920.4

The routine operations of the police have also produced different interpretations in Britain and America. Stanley H. Palmer has noticed a peculiar void in their interpretations: the police themselves. As Palmer comments: “historians have made a quantum leap in our knowledge of the motivations and aims, composition and tactics, of crowds and protesters . . . . By contrast, we still know little about the other side of the confrontation, the forces of order.”5 Weaver and Marquis in particular have become interested in the police and
policemen in larger contexts than that of simple 'social control.' Weaver has suggested the possibility that in Hamilton by the end of the nineteenth century "the overwhelming volume of police functions was devoid of class or social control implications," and that it was this very multiplicity of roles that enabled the police to operate when necessary as class agents. Marquis has emphasized the extent to which Toronto's policemen at the beginning of the twentieth century were a part, if an "ambiguous" part, of civilian Toronto.

Quebec City in the first half of the nineteenth century provides a useful testing ground for this range of approaches. First and foremost, its development as a city during this period was marked by the characteristics that have elsewhere been identified as the causes of a crisis in 'social control.' The city's population grew rapidly from under 9,000 in 1805 to nearly 46,000 in 1851. More importantly, this growth had been uneven; Quebec's population grew by nearly 30 percent between 1844 and 1851. The city became a centre for immigration, a major ocean port, an important garrison town and the focus of the colony's timber trade. It can be understood that these changes made Quebec a city of desperate poverty. Within it were concentrated four impoverished and potentially dangerous groups: pauper emigrants, sailors, soldiers and workers in the seasonal and highly unstable timber industry. Such 'dangerous classes' formed the principal criminal problem in early nineteenth century Lower Canada.

The political history of Lower Canada itself provided a solid example of the challenges to public order inherent in the imperial context. The rebellions of 1837 and 1838 provided a backdrop to the initial phase of police development in Quebec City. It is also, however, important to stress the atmosphere of violence that continued throughout the period. The constitutional evolution of the colony in general, and the development of municipal government in particular, provided an arena for a variety of confrontations after 1840. While the old capital never matched Montreal in overt conflict, ethnic, political, religious and class riots were not unknown. In addition, individual violence among both the 'dangerous' and elite elements in society was constant and almost casual.

This paper is a study of implications of these developments for an understanding of the origins and nature of nineteenth century policing in a British colony. It will examine the changes in the organization of the force, underlying concepts of the nature of police in Quebec City, the composition of the force itself and, finally, its social role. From this will emerge an image of the nature and function of police and policing in an early Victorian colonial city whose primary focus is on the importance of local factors.

1 The Localization of Control

In June 1838, by an ordinance of the appointed Special Council of Lower Canada, Lord Durham created a new police force for the city of Quebec. Modeled ostensibly "on the plan of the London police," the new body was answerable to the Commissioner of Police, appointed by the executive. In 1841 W.F. Coffin, the Commissioner, presented a direct and utilitarian explanation of the motives for the creation of the city force. In the troubled years of 1835 and 1836, urban crime had risen to new heights. Burglaries were common, murders increased, and churches were robbed. The streets became increasingly unsafe as "the 'Disorderlies' rendered it impossible for a female to traverse the City after nightfall without protection." In contrast, he pointed to "the present tranquility and security of the City, the absence of crime and the great diminution of offences of a disorderly character" as proof of the benefit of the new police to Quebec.

In fact, Durham's invocation of the model of Peel's London police only thinly veils the extent to which the new Quebec force was in reality designed as an additional tool for the maintenance of British dominance in a rebellious colony. The very influence of the London model suggests an intent to deal with rebellion; Palmer has convincingly argued that the 'Peelers' derived from England's experience of rural disorder in Ireland. Even the Quebec force was more clearly a paramilitary body than Durham's description of it suggests. Unlike the London police, Quebec's constables were assigned military rank. Initially, the force was quite modest in size with only 33 members. The "disturbed state of the province" made a considerable expansion necessary to meet the challenge of disorders engendered by the second rebellion. By 1839 the force was composed 83 men. The sense that the new force was as much political as judicial clearly permeated its local command structure. In 1839, Thomas Ainslie Young, the force's superintendent, requested permission from Sir John Colborne to open the mail of Hector-S. Huot, a patriote activist.

It is clear that political considerations rather than civil peace were the determinants of the size and organization of the new force. On the other hand, as we shall see, Durham's city police was very soon largely transformed. Charles Poulett Thomson, created Lord Sydenham in 1841, became Governor-General in 1839. Thomson was a Utilitarian, a friend of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and a member of the Political Economy Club. He restructured the police force in the light of the principles of 'economy and efficiency.' Acting on the report of a commission of enquiry, he reduced the size of the force to 42, cut its costs, and abolished "the Military denominations and distinctions employed in the force" in order "to impart to the Police, in all particulars of name, and dress, its natural character of a Constitutional Constabulary." The reforms Coffin introduced at Sydenham's direction had, the Commissioner claimed, reduced crime more effectively and more economically than Durham's larger force.
This emphasis on utility and economy makes sense in the context of Sydenham's general urban policy and his plans for the Union of the Canadas. He included police reform as one of the measures that were "absolutely necessary before the union takes place, to admit of it being brought into operation with safety."[28] The cornerstone of Sydenham's grand strategy for the economic and political regeneration of the soon-to-be united colonies of Upper and Lower Canada was the removal of local issues from the arena of provincial politics.[27] One consequence of this policy was Sydenham's resolve that the newly-incorporated city of Quebec should be responsible for the costs of its own police force.

It was not yet, however, policy that the fledgling corporation should have any control over the body. In October, 1840, Coffin laid down the principle that the "Police will be organized, controlled (sic) and directed by the Government — which will also superintend its internal economy and discipline, providing for the execution of its duties through officers, who, in their several grades, will be responsible to the Executive for their administration."[36] The City was to pay for its police, but have no voice in its administration or any influence over its expenses. Coffin's portrayal of the motives for the creation of the police force, and his insistence on its economy and efficiency, were part of an attempt to persuade the city council to accept this urban policy.

This question of the division of administrative power and fiscal responsibility was to remain an influence in relations between the municipal government and the city's police force until its final resolution in 1858. Its significance can best be understood from the perspective of urban history. In their 1984 study, A.J. Artibise and P.-A. Linteau outlined recent developments in this field. They identify as one concept that of "Controlling the City;" the struggle for local autonomy, and comment on the paucity of material in this area.[29] Nonetheless, it was during the first half of the nineteenth century that this question became important. Marquis has commented that "the struggle for responsible government in the 1840s ... was paralleled by a less-celebrated but equally-significant revolution that established the principles of local autonomy and self-taxation by property-holders."[40] For Quebec City, control over the police force became one of the tests of this principle.[31]

There was an additional factor. Sydenham had always been frank about his preferences for Upper Canada over Lower Canada, for Montreal over Quebec, and British Canadians over French Canadians.[30] To a large extent, opposition to his broad policies for the colony formed the basis for political organization in the first years of the Union on the local as well as provincial level.[32] It is clear, then, that Sydenham was one of Palmer's "enlightened statists who sought to impose unpopular ideas for the public good."[34] The antagonism which this approach aroused in the early days of the Union shaped attitudes towards police reform in Quebec.

The intensity of this politicization was manifested at the outset in the new city council. The Police Commissioner, on behalf of the provincial government presented quarterly bills for the monies due for the maintenance of the force. Payment was secured only by a combination of legal proceedings and threats to disband the force. The votes in city council to borrow the necessary funds were almost invariably along party and linguistic lines.[35] The resistance here was not to the existence of the police force itself;[36] it was to the central control exercised by the provincial government. What made the situation critical was that the provincial government finally acted on its long-standing threat, and disbanded the police force in April 1842.[37] The city thus found itself without a police force for six months. The anti-Sydenhamite faction was forced to capitulate and raise taxes to pay for the provincial police. The individuals involved in this confrontation dominated municipal life for the next decade.

The question of control over the police never again reached this level as a political issue. The evolution of party politics in the colony inhibited such a clear municipal-provincial divide. The question of municipal control did not, however, disappear. Sydenham's ordinance expired at the end of 1842, and Dominic Daly, the Provincial Secretary, wrote to enquire if the city wished to continue its financial support. The joint Police and Finance Committees resolved that "la corporation ne devrait pas contribuer en aucune manière au soutien de la Police de la cité jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit entièrement et exclusivement sous le contrôle du conseil de la ville."[38] In response, Daly announced the immediate disbanding of the police.[39] By a vote of four to two, the Police Committee recommended the creation of a municipal force with 25 subconstables, three constables and a chief.[40] The council passed the necessary by-law on May 2, 1843.

It would appear that the struggle over control between the municipal and the provincial government had finally concluded, and that the effect of Sydenham's ordinance had been effaced. The normal pattern of development towards police reform could then resume. This was not the case, and the question of local control continued to shape the attitude of the municipal government towards the structure of its police force. Durham's ordinance, unlike Sydenham's, had been a permanent piece of legislation, and thus continued in effect. Consequently, the force remained under the legal direction of the Inspector and Superintendent of Police, a provincial appointee. In addition, the tumults surrounding the cholera epidemic, the economic collapse and the political disorders of 1848-9 exercised a considerable influence on the dispute.

In 1848, William K. McCord, Inspector and Superintendent of Police, informed the City Clerk that under the Ordinance the Chief of
Police was "under the control of the Inspectors and Supervisors of Police and not under the control of the Corporation." This control, in McCord's view, extended to the men. The Inspector was in fact an enthusiastic supporter of Sydenham's statist and centralist police policy. Citing his experiences of the pro- and anti-Elgin riots of 1849, and the election riot of 1850, he wrote to the Provincial Secretary that "experience has taught us that Police forces under the control of Corporate Bodies have not answered the ends for which they were raised, as there cannot be twenty heads to one body, and at the same time the efficiency of the Corps maintained." He specifically recalled the "utility in 1839, '40 and '41" of the centralized force created by Durham and Sydenham.

McCord's stance consistently received the support of the central government, concerned as it was with the political and economic crisis. The city, however, had its own reason for trying to assert control: the fiscal crisis that struck the city in 1848. At the request of council, the Police Committee resolve unanimously to reduce the size and wages of the force. It justified its retrenchments partly by citing the control that McCord still claimed over a force maintained exclusively by the city. The grievance continued to be a problem even after prosperity returned. Charles Alleyn, the Mayor of Quebec in 1852, made the distinction in his annual report between a "municipal force" and "judicial officers." The function of the former was the enforcement of the city's by-laws, while the latter had the principal responsibility of dealing with crime. He commented on the "glaring and embarrassing" anomaly of having the municipal agents "paid by the city . . . under the immediate direction of the Superintendent [of police]." The council or its Police Committee should be exercising sole supervision.

After the formation of the Liberal-Conservative coalition of 1854, the city's leading municipal figures were again closely aligned with the governing party on the provincial level. A redrafting of the city's charter in 1855 clearly intended to empower the city to raise its own force, but failed to do so. Remedial legislation was passed through the Assembly, and on March 7, 1858 a by-law was passed establishing a police force for Quebec City, nearly 20 years after Durham's ordinance.

The new force was very explicitly a municipal one. Its function was the "preservation of the peace, quiet and good order of the City" and the enforcement of the "laws, bye-laws, rules and regulations thereof." The Chief of Police and the Deputy Chief were to be named by the council, while the Police Committee appointed the Chief Constables and policemen. A significant aspect of the bill was the fusion of the Fire Companies with the force. Quebec now possessed but one body for the protection of its safety from human and natural threats and for the implementation of its urban policies.

It is thus evident that police organization in the city developed from a highly formalized body, clearly conceived in terms of British practice, into the sort of municipally controlled force characteristic of American cities before the full impact of the London model. It is also apparent that this seemingly retrograde step was the result of the partisan evolution of municipal politics. The question then presents itself: did this evolution significantly affect the intended nature of the police?

II Concepts of Policing

On the administrative, as opposed to the political, level, the centrally appointed Superintendents of Police were not anxious to provoke conflict. T.A. Young in 1842 emphasized that "the men practically will be under the direction of the Mayor." Mayor Charles Alleyn commented that W.K. McCord "was always ready to second the views of this Council" and thus diminish the problems of a joint municipal force and judicial police. A development in the office of the Superintendent also served to minimize immediate conflict. Young's successor in 1843 was Joseph-André Taschereau, a prominent resident of the city appointed as a piece of political patronage. While McCord was appointed in 1847 by a government largely hostile to the dominant party on the municipal council, his successor in 1852 was John Maguire, a Liberal organizer. Maguire was also the representative of Champlain ward, the violent and largely Irish quarter, from 1846 to 1854. In addition, he sat on the Police Committee from 1850 to 1854. Thus the Superintendent was a member of the Committee. The central government's control over the police was exercised by a member of the local elite, and indeed often by a member of the city council. The integration of the local leadership into province-wide political structures helped to defuse possible conflicts over municipal policy. As a result, policing in Quebec City achieved through political means a balance between local and central authority.

A general consensus among the city's official leadership over policing was also supported by continuity among those involved in the issue. This was particularly marked in the Police Committee. Between 1842 and 1858, Édouard Glackemeyer held the Chairmanship of the committee five times, and George Hall held it seven times. An even more important force for continuity was the term of office of Captain Robert Henry Russell, formerly of the Scots Fusiliers Guards, who served as Chief of Police from 1840 to 1858. His conduct was variously praised by the council, the Board of Trade, and the policemen themselves.

The discussions in the council also show that the city corporation was fully committed to the idea of a police force, and accepted the general goals set out by W.F. Coffin. The council was not, of course, representative of the city as a whole; indeed, the council was very deliberately not representative of the city's elites. Sydenham's 1840 ordinance incorporating the city had established the artificial predominance of the commercial,
largely English-speaking, minority in the urban wards. With minor changes this system was to last formally until 1855. This division of power was, during the early years, closely mirrored by the allocation of police resources. Two police stations were established in the city, one within the walls in Haute-Ville, the other on St Pierre, the heart of the mercantile district in Basse-Ville. In 1843, 12 of the 28 men of the force were patrolling St Louis and Palais in Haute-Ville. The operation of policing thus becomes a part of another of Artibise and Linteau's themes, that of the "Distribution of Power" within the city. In many respects, the debate over the scale of police operations in the city became an expression of the struggle for control of the city between the small, affluent, anglophone wards and the sprawling, poorer French-Canadian suburbs.

Initial support for the police came as a result of the crime wave of 1835 and 1836, and was concentrated in the wealthier wards. A petition for the continuation of the police in 1841 declared "although differences of opinion may exist as to political questions there can be none with respect to the necessity of suppressing by all possible means Robberies — Murders and Arsons such as it is well known occurred previous to the existence of a Police Force." Its signatories were the leading members of the English-speaking community: bankers, timber merchants and professionals. There is a conspicuous absence of French-Canadian names. It was not until the reorganization in 1858 that a ward-by-ward system was entrenched and the entire city divided into five Police Districts. It is to be noted that this development only took place after the expansion of the representation of the suburbs in 1855 and the emergence of such suburban leaders as J.-Ulric Tessier and L.-H. Langevin as mayors.

Demand for police resources was not restricted to the wealthy wards. Petitions for the establishment of police stations in Champlain, St Roch and St Jean multiply throughout this period. In these petitions and requests there is not, however, the same preoccupation with violent and life-threatening crime that was expressed in the petition of 1841. Rather than a fear for lives and property, there is a concern for civic standards. This is expressed in a Report of the Committee calling for the establishment of four policemen in the suburbs, "to exercise a proper vigilance on the houses of ill fame which may be found in their neighbourhood" and repress the "scandal occasioned by the inmates of such houses." The behaviour of gangs of young men who assembled in the Palace Market provoked another numerous signed request for a police station in 1858, on the eve of the force's reorganization. The double objective of suppression and regulation matched the force's dual nature as both a municipal and judicial body.

The force's responsibilities for municipal regulation in fact expanded in response to needs in the urban community. The cholera epidemics of the nineteenth century had a profound impact on concepts of urbanism as they related to public health. An increasing range of municipal by-laws designed to protect the health and safety of the community were introduced. Thus, the city's constables found themselves seizing pigs found on the street, poisoning dogs during rabies scares and clearing unlicensed peddlers from the city markets. Appointed officers of public health, the police became responsible for the prosecution of those contributing to filth in the city. A public pound was established. The Chief of Police found himself responsible for supervising the exhumation of bodies from cemeteries within the city.

The enforcement of other city by-laws also became a police responsibility. With the abolition of the office of High Constable, the supervision of carters was transferred to the Chief of Police. The enforcement of tavern licensing became more important as the city gained control over its procedures and profits. The city's markets were a major source of profit, and the police were in constant demand to exclude independent pedlars from undercutting established merchants. Russell was ordered to supervise the weighing of bread from bakers' shops to ensure honesty.

The apparent rationality of such measures nonetheless masks the tensions generated by a new urbanism defined by middle-class desires for a clean, orderly and healthy environment. Many of Quebec's residents were too poor to be able to afford such standards. Each of the events mentioned above created a conflict between the police and the people. The seizure of pigs proved abortive. The carters engaged for the task "refused to go any further . . . stating that they did not want to get their heads broken." The responsibility for poisoning dogs proved so onerous that the constables petitioned for exemption from a duty "calculated to bring on us the contempt of the respectable Inhabitants & revenge from the humbler class of Citizens." Finally, it required the Chief of Police to disperse a mob in the market who had gathered to resist the police attempt to exclude peddlers. This resistance was not always restricted to small protests. In 1849, at the height of the cholera epidemic, the council decided to use the police barracks in Basse-Ville as an emergency hospital. A large mob razed the building to prevent the establishment of the hospital.

It can be seen, then, that both the Sydenhamite advocates of the police as a tool for social control and the supporters of the force as an agent of improving community standards could be anxious for a strong, well-disciplined body of men. One index of this consensus was the requirement that the men reside in barracks. W.F. Coffin commented that the "most useful improvement" introduced by Lord Sydenham was the creation of a police barracks. Coffin justified this in terms of increased economy and efficiency; local leaders did not engage in such rationalizations. In 1845 the city asked the Provincial Secretary for the use of the New
Policing in Quebec City, 1838-58

Custom House in Champlain as a police barracks because "it has been found from experience that the Police force is much more efficient when they do not reside among the people whose irregularities they are intended to suppress." In 1849 the Comité de Police resolved that "tous les hommes de police soient logés à la caserne." Finally, the by-law establishing the new municipal police in 1858 declared that the "Officers and Men . . . shall be lodged and shall mess in such Barracks . . ." as this Council may determine.

At the beginning of 1848, W.K. McCord produced his "Regulations for the Governance of the Police Force." His image of the ideal member of the force was clearly a professional, career policeman, with strong military overtones. He started with the premise that "every Member of the Police Force may expect to rise to superior situations by his intelligence activity & general good conduct . . . A knowledge of the French & English languages, combined with reading & writing & good character will ensure promotion." The men were to be sober, obedient, and, except by special permission, wear full police dress at all times. The city by-law of 1858 was informed by exactly the same spirit. Indeed, under McCord, policemen were required to give only a month's notice of intention to quit; after 1858, the Chief Constable and men were bound to three year terms by legal penalties.

It can thus be seen that while the administrative structure and many of the functions of the police force had evolved since 1838, the fundamental model for the force had changed little. It was conceived primarily as an arm of order separate and distinct from the community. The extent to which this conception matched the reality of the city's policemen is crucial in understanding the nature of police evolution in Quebec. Only then can an assessment of the police as an instrument of social control in Quebec City be made.

III The Composition of the Force

One single factor shaped the selection of policemen and the attractiveness of their occupation. As T.W. Acheson remarks, "All nineteenth-century cities were woefully underfinanced;" and Quebec City was in a constant state of financial chaos. The amateurism of its municipal officials and the perennial optimism of its municipal leaders made fiscal caution rare. The old capital's anxiety to recover from Montreal its status as British North America's foremost city lead it into major expenditures for gas lighting, road construction, water development and railway promotion. The resulting web of bonds, loans and debentures left the city with little room for retrenchment in periods of depression. One of the few areas where the city had direct, year-to-year control over expenses was the police force. Temporary patrols, expansions of the force during the summer and a variety of other expedients were attempted. The formal strength of the force ranged from a high of 42 in 1840 to 27 in 1849. In 1858 there were 34 men in the force. These shifts matched the succeeding waves of prosperity and crisis in the city's accounts. It is to be borne in mind that during this period the city's population grew from a little over 30,000 to nearly 57,000. The policing ratio thus changed from approximately 1:715 to approximately 1:1680.

These figures make it immediately apparent that, despite Durham's invocation of Robert Peel's example, policing in Quebec City followed the pattern of British provincial boroughs rather than of London. As Palmer points out, "the Government did not foresee . . . that municipal ratepayers would often be more committed to fiscal economy than to paying the costs of preserving public order." While in England the lowest possible effective policing ratio had been calculated at 1:1,000, the great majority of English boroughs fell well below this standard. Indeed, Quebec would appear to have had about the same policing ratio as that of a representative city of its size in England in 1856. Thus the Corporation's ambition for a disciplined and professional force was checked by its disinclination or inability to pay for it. In 1840, under Sydenham's ordinance, the police accounted for 14.4 percent of municipal expenditures; by 1850 this had fallen to 7.8 percent.

The city police were consequently recruited from the general pool of unskilled labour. Policing followed the seasonal cycle of all of Quebec's labour force. Wages were raised from 2/6 to 3s. from the first of May to the end of November, and six men were added to the force. Not only was there then a greater threat of disorder; there was also more employment available and hence more competition. For many, policing was but one of many seasonal jobs. This situation seriously weakened the city's ability to control its men. Strike action proved effective. 1854 was a year of economic expansion. As a result of the "general prosperity" food prices had more than doubled. On parade, the police demanded that their pay be raised from 4s. to 6s. a day in summer, and 5s. in winter. The strike lasted less than a week, and was resolved finally in favour of the men.

The clearest indication, however, of the city's inability to maintain its control over the force lay in its failure to enforce its barracks rules. In 1849, the Police Committee noted that several policemen had moved from the barracks without permission. Russell's consequent attempts to enforce the regulations resulted in at least one act of violence. While by 1850 the police again seem to have been lodged in barracks, the system had collapsed completely by 1854. A return of police men for that year shows them scattered throughout the city. The same situation obtained in 1856, on the eve of the Corporation's re-establishment of its regulations.

McCord's 1848 Regulations had sketched an image of the force as a career with the prospects of promotion through the ranks. It is true that Russell's immediate subordinates, the constables, were usually men of long
In 1858, of the nine men of this rank, six had more than a dozen years in the service. Two of these had been in the force since 1841. The following patterns of enlistments reflect more accurately the enlistment pattern.

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<td>1845</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>31 men</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the light of all this, the number of policemen requesting readmission to the force is striking. For many of them, it was the best job available. John Murphy, a subconstable of ten years' standing, requested readmission to force after being dismissed for drunkenness. Of the six constables, four were Irish, one was English Canadian, and one was English.

McCord had also emphasized the importance of literacy as a characteristic of the professional policeman he was trying to create. Of the 108 subconstables listed on the pay lists before the city took over control of the force in 1843, as many as 37 could not sign their own name. Many of the petitions presented by individual policemen to the police committee were also marked with a cross. These included the petition, in 1855, of Joseph Bechette, a veteran of 11 years on the force. Clearly, even the most basic literacy was not a prerequisite for a prolonged career in the force.

Gentlemen I hope yous will forgive me for this time, it is a hard time in the year to go to travel I will never trouble yous agane for the same occxion.(sic) This particular nature of the force is best explained by its social composition. The most striking characteristic of the force is its predominantly anglophone nature in a majority francophone city.

The names of the men throughout the period give a strong impression that the force was dominated by the Irish. Only for 1854 is precise data available. The nationality, age, and marital status of all 36 men are given:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>30-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The turnover rate was certainly high. At least 121 different men served in the force between April 1841 and December 1842. Only twelve of these appear on the police list of 1844. Of 23 men taken on between 4 May and June 24, 1853, for example, 4 resigned and 3 were dismissed or resigned during that period. Some left for better situations: Joseph Dubé was discharged after receiving a tavern license in 1844. On the other hand, three policemen died of cholera during the epidemic of 1849. The corporation was not a good employer. Its seasonal reductions were not based on seniority, and this created a sense of grievance. Illness was common. In 1855, Russell testified that 9 of his 35 men were unfit for duty. Some policemen, after recovering from illness, found themselves unemployed and unpaid. The constant changes in numbers and wages must also have discouraged many.

It is clear that McCord had not created a professional police force; indeed it is to be noted that no one who enlisted under him was still a serving policeman in 1858.

On April 22, 1858 the Comité de Police expanded the force as part of its new organization. The 155 applicants for the vacancies included applications from many ex-soldiers, labourers, carters, a tailor and the
unemployed. Of these, 19 were hired. The level of literacy of these recruits was the following:\textsuperscript{95}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Read and Write</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Manifestly, the corporation was taking advantage of the restructuring of the force to increase the number of French-speaking policemen. One of the consequences of this was to keep the literacy level of the force lower than it might otherwise have been. This was not simply the result of a lower literacy level among the French Canadians. Of the French-Canadian applicants, 29 were at least partially literate.

An examination of surviving certificates of character suggest another factor: municipal politics. Six of the newly-appointed French-Canadians resided on St Olivier, in St Roch and all but one policeman resided in the suburbs. The successful applicants were those whose certificates were endorsed by prominent French-Canadian suburban figures. Germain Guay, Edouard Rousseau and J.-G. Tourangeau had all represented St Roch. Two illiterates were endorsed by Jean-Baptiste Bureau, the Councillor for St Jean who was about to resign to become the new Police Chief. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the integration of the police force into the municipal power structure had made it another arena for local patronage, where loyalty and services rendered in politics were more important than specific competence. In short, the exigencies of local politics were more important than statist concepts of policing.

These figures strongly suggest that the police force in many ways resembled the 'dangerous classes' that it was designed to counteract. Irish immigrants between 20 and 40 years old were the mainstay of the force, and there was a strong bachelor contingent. The single, young, male anglophone was the mainstay of the city's criminality. Jean-Marie Facteau, in outlining the urban and anglophone nature of the "population-cible" of the justice system, emphasizes the over-representation of soldiers, servants and sailors among those arrested in the Québec District.\textsuperscript{96} Among the police, dismissals and suspensions for drunkenness and brutality were common, and readmissions were frequent. A certain level of violence was accepted among the police; in 1854, Martin Mullroney (sic) was only censured for "attentat à la pudner sur une femme arrêtée."\textsuperscript{97} While in this study of policing a quantitative analysis of criminality in the city would be out of place, the annual return for the Quebec Gaol for 1849 is illustrative. Only male prisoners are here given.\textsuperscript{98}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Irish</th>
<th>18-36</th>
<th>non-literate*</th>
<th>single</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such isolated figures cannot be conclusive, but they strongly suggest a close parallel between the two groups. The recruitment of men from the lowest social orders was, of course, the mainstay of such organisms of social control as the British army. The city had, however, neither the financial nor disciplinary resources to maintain the paramilitary structure to which it aspired.

IV: The Social Function of Policing

In 1852 Russell outlined the resulting schedule for his 34-man force:

A policeman never has a whole night in bed, all he can ever have is half of each alternate night during the whole year, should a fire occur at night, he is deprived of that small measure of natural rest, he must remain at the fire until it is extinguished & see that the goods & furniture saved are lodged in a place of safety. At 9 A. M. on he comes again for the next 24 hours, wet perhaps to the skin, no change of dress, that is impossible, he has but the one, he has a similar duty to perform. More than once it has fallen to the lot of the same division to be 2 days & 3 nights without rest . . . The bushes of the Plains have to be cleared constantly during the summer of Robbers, Thieves & Vagabonds who resort there from all parts . . . Races, Public Assemblies, Lectures, Elections, Processions, Exhibitions, Plays, arrival & departures of steamers must also be attended to. A policeman's life, where the numbers are so limited, is most assuredly perpetual motion.\textsuperscript{99}

It is difficult to imagine this small, unskilled, usually exhausted, police force as an effective agent of control in the face of any major challenge to social order. In fact, the city police force never played the role of guarantor of social order. Recent authors have commented on "the often critical role that British garrison troops played in the historical
Policing in Quebec City, 1838-58

development of the Canadian police” and that their withdrawal created a vacuum in the civil power. Palmer has commented on the way that reliance on the military impeded the development of policing outside London. During the class and ethnic tension surrounding the by-election of 1850, W. K. McCord planned to swear in 500 special constables to maintain order. In the end, he depended on the garrison. This was a role that the military, although unwillingly, played throughout the period. In the election riots of 1854 and 1857, the military again had to be called in. Large scale religious and ethnic conflicts also resulted in military intervention. On October 8, 1844, a mob of four or five hundred men marched along Champlain, Sous-le-Fort and Cul-de-Sac smashing windows, particularly those of French Canadians. The pretext was that they had refused to illuminate their houses in honour of O’Connell. The police were again ineffective, and the military were called in. The Gavazzi riot of 1853 is only the most famous failure of the police to control religious tensions.

Low-level class confrontations took place frequently along the docks and coves. Again, it is important to emphasize that the city police were not usually directly involved in the administration of the Seaman’s Act. The extent to which local authorities in major ports enforced the strict control over sailors exercised by merchant captains has been studied by Judith Fingard in her Jack in Port. In Quebec, the River Police had been created by the same legislation that established the city force. Administered by the Board of Trade, the River Police had the principal responsibility for maintaining order along the river front. Among its responsibilities was the suppression of incipient strike action. In existence during the shipping season, this force, at a strength of 28, was nearly as numerous as the city police and could be better paid. Co-operation between the two bodies of men was ensured by the fact that Russell commanded both under the supervision of the Inspector and Superintendent of Police. Nonetheless, the city police were thus removed from the city’s principal source of class-based violence.

On occasion major industrial strife occurred. During August 1849, seamen and others rioted in Basse-Ville, destroying the shipping office. Departures from the port were delayed “from the sailors refusing to ship, except at enormous wages.” Despite the best efforts of the police the rioting continued for four days, and finally the military were placed on the alert. In 1855, reports of “secret meetings held among the labouring class, with a view of fixing wages at high rate” in the ship yards reached the Board of Trade. The board found the police inadequate to deal with the five hundred men who participated in the riot.

These confrontations make one aspect of policing in Quebec clear. Unlike many other cities, the principal threat to established order did not come from within a changing urban community. As early as 1841, W.F. Coffin commented that the “class of Disorderlies . . . is limited to particular parts of the Town and to certain seasons of the year.” He identified in particular the summer arrival of seamen and immigrants as the source of much of the problem in the city, and commented on the concentration of crime in Lower Town. The transient sailors and emigrants posed the greatest social problem, but were themselves not part of the city. The tensions that did have their roots within Quebec were based on religious and political lines, rather than class lines.

The city’s experience with the military reinforces this image. Soldiers, drunken and in the company of ‘girls of illfame,’ figure in many of the entries of the Police Diary. Their separate internal structures and sense of solidarity made them extremely difficult to prosecute. The most violent incidents in the Diary involve soldiers, yet it is apparent that the police were powerless to challenge them. It is important to note that this problem was most marked, not with the private soldiers, but with their officers. The following is but an example:

At 2 A. M. Constables Miller and Quart on patrol arrested two officers in St. Johns Street for creating a noise and disturbance . . . immediately after they were rescued by five or six other officers who came up at the time and turned out the St. Johns Gate Guard upon being rescued they all passed through the Gate Shouting and Screaming . . . the Police followed them to the Suburbs, observed five of them coming out of a house of illfame they immediately attacked the adjoining house (house of illfame) by throwing stones at the door & windows . . . and screaming and shouting in the street.

The frequency of these clashes with the gentlemen of the garrison was the reason assigned for the assignment of over a third of the force to the city within the walls, which contained only 15% of the urban population.

It is clear that the sorts of crime with which the Quebec City police force dealt closely resembled that in Britain. Drunkenness and vagrancy remained the largest concerns. Again as in Britain, this is reflected in the slow development of anything like a criminal investigation department. Patrols in plainclothes began at least as early as 1843. Their function was, however, to arrest "loose and idle persons." By 1851, ‘detective’ police had appeared on the force. It appears that this group never exceeded three members of the force, two of whom were usually constables. The French term for detective — “police secrete” — gives an indication of the general opinion of these plainclothesmen.

It appears, then, that serious crime, while cited as a motive for the creation and maintenance of the police, was but a small part of actual crime. It is important to note, however, that only part of police dealing with the ‘Disorderlies’ was repressive. In 1850, the
Police Committee enquired into the discrepancy between Russell's "statistics for crimes" and "Annual return of the Quebec Gaol for 1849." The former cited 1068 committals, while the latter referred to 1190. The "discrepancies arose . . . from the fact that many prisoners are recommitted to gaol at their own demand, without the knowledge of the Chief of Police."119

Russell was in fact very well aware of the role the Gaol played as a place of temporary shelter. Entries similar to the following abound in the Police Diary: "Mrs McConkey a drunken wretched vagabond called at the Jesuit Station with her two children and requested to be sent to Gaol she having no other place of shelter for the Night."120

It is in fact extremely difficult to decide to what extent the arrests of vagrants and drunkards served as a form of social regulation, and to what extent they acted as a crude social policy in the face of Quebec's intermperate climate. That in 1850, nearly 10 percent of prisoners should choose to remain in prison suggests that the proportion may have been considerable. While there are reference to men requesting shelter in the gaol,121 it is clear that the group for whom this dimension of policing was most significant was women. This is not surprising. From 1831 to 1851 the number of women in the city always exceeded the number of men, and the discrepancy was most marked in the 20-29 age bracket.122 The social problem posed by this group was widely recognized, and prostitution became an important issue.123 The "girls of ill fame" formed a large portion of those who requested the shelter of prison.124

In 1851 a petition from the suburbs asked McCord to outline the extent of prostitution in the city. The Superintendent responded that there were 15 brothels in St Jean and St Louis wards containing 71 prostitutes, but that this number did not include 50 "who during the summer resort to the plains and cove fields (sic), and in winter inhabit the gaol."125 The case of Anne McCullagh, while extreme, shows the extent of this dependence. Between January 18, 1845 and May 14, 1847, she appeared before the magistrates 19 times, and was sentenced to, in total, 23 months and 1 week in gaol.126 This welfare function of the Gaol was not restricted to the criminal classes. The dilapidated building served variously as a hospital, a house of relief and a lunatic asylum.127 In 1847, "One of the Jury" reported that Russell had found a desperately ill woman in an unheated garret, and be forced to take her to the gaol. She remained there, although no charge was laid against her, for lack of anywhere else to go.128

Conclusion

The Quebec City police force was created in the image of the London Police with the mission of restraining political dissent. It was soon relashioned along Utilitarian lines as a force for social order. The specific circumstances of its creation led to the city's rejection of a centrally-directed agency and the pursuit of a locally controlled structure.

The city's local elite, however, shared with imperial officials assumptions about the nature of a police force. It endorsed Sydenham's image of a disciplined and semi-military agency apart from the population at large. The motive for its concern was not, in contrast, radical and class politics but the enforcement of new standards of middle-class urban life.

The constraints of local and provincial politics, the city's finances, and the quality of recruits available made these large concepts irrelevant. The small and ill-trained city force was not able to cope with any challenge to civil order larger than a drunken brawl. In an era when specialized social institutions were just developing, its responsibility was dealing with the marginalized elements of the community. Often its functions can better be classified as social welfare than social control.

This was made possible by two factors specific to Quebec. First, more specialized bodies, the garrison and the River Police, bore the brunt of major class, political and cultural confrontations. Secondly, the principal criminal groups, the "Disorderlies," were transient and largely external to the community. Thus, no articulated division between the police and the citizens occurred.

It can be seen, then, that the development of the police force in Quebec from 1838 to 1858 was more the result of changing urban conditions than the emergence of a class-based society. Indeed, its evolution more closely parallels the experience of Hornchurch, where local concerns rapidly transformed a police force modelled on a central, professional plan.129 In this sense, the Quebec police force fits into neither the model of "bureaucratization" nor the model of "social control." For reasons specific to the city, an inappropriate model of policing evolved in an unplanned way into a general utility. Its history is an illustration of the importance of specific studies as qualifications of over-large concepts.

Notes

7 Monkkonen, op. cit., 55.


10 Rogers, op. cit., 123.


13 Palmer, op. cit., xiv.

14 John C. Weaver, 1967 communication.

15 M. Greg Marquis, op. cit., 277.

16 see John Hare, Marc Lafrance and David-Thierry Ruddel, Histoire de la Ville de Québec, Boreal/Musée canadien des civilisations, 1987, 154-255 for an overview of social and economic developments during these “années de grande croissance”


19 Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs: W. F. Coffin, Commissioner of Police, to the Corporation of Quebec, December 31, 1841, Archives de la Ville de Québec (hereafter AVQ).

20 Palmer, op. cit., especially pp. 216-294. Also see Galen Brooker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1892-1836 (University of Toronto Press, 1970). Eleanor Senior, in “The Influence of the British Garrison On the Development of the Montreal Police, 1832 to 1853,” Military Affairs, April, 1979, 64, discusses the impact of Irish and Jamaican police models on other forces created by Durham in Canada.


22 Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs: W. F. Coffin, Commissioner of Police, to the Corporation of Quebec, December 31, 1841, AVQ.

23 P. G. Roy, Recherches Historiques, t. 44, 123.


25 Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs: W. F. Coffin, Commissioner of Police, to the Corporation of Quebec, December 31, 1841, AVQ.


28 Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs; émeutes 1844-1919: William F. Coffin to George Futvoye, October 5, 1840, AVQ.


31 Correspondance de la Corporation, vol. 2, George Olliv Stuart to Jean Chabot, 2 April, 1849, AVQ.

32 MG 11 C. 0.42, Q 272 pt. 1, p. 151, Charles Poulet Thomson to Lord John Russell, May 22, 1840 (Confidential).

33 McCulloch, op. cit., especially chaps. 2-4.

34 Palmer, op. cit., 8.

35 Conseil; Procès-verbaux ; Registre 3: 1 octobre, 1841, AVQ.

36 Le Canadien, 11 octobre, 1841.

37 John Hare, Marc Lafrance, David-Thierry Ruddel, op. cit., p. 202, treat this as a threat to strike by the police.

38 Conseil; Conseil et Comités 13; Police: Rapport des Comités réunis de Finance et de Police, 7 janvier, 1843, AVQ.

39 ibid, 19 janvier, 1843, AVQ.

40 ibid: 18ème Rapport du Comité de Police, 30 janvier, 1843, AVQ.

41 Police; Administration; Dossiers administratifs (1832-1938); Personnel (1844-1921): William K. McCord to F. X. Garneau, City Clerk, 15 January, 9, October, 1848, AVQ.


44 Conseil; Conseil et Comités; Dossiers Police et Pompiers (boîte 80); 63rd Report of the Police Committee, 26 December, 1848, AVQ.


46 Police; Administration: Dossiers administratifs (1832-1938); Règlementations, Résolutions, Ordonnances (1833-1925): “A By-law to Establish a Police Force for the City of Quebec.” It is to be noted that the City of London experimented with a fused Police and Fire service in 1856.

47 Palmer, op. cit., 19.

48 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs; Estimations (1842-1869): T. A. Young, January 30, 1842, AVQ.

49 Annual Reports: Quebec 1841-1855.

50 Antonio Drolet, La Ville de Québec, histoire municipale, t. 3, La Société historique de Québec, 1983, p. 52 gives a different sequence of Superintendents and Police Chiefs.

51 In Toronto, a similar balance was achieved through legislation; see Rogers, op. cit., 123.

52 Conseil de la Ville; Procès-verbaux; registres 3-11, 1840-1855, AVQ.

53 Conseil; Procès-verbaux; Registre 7, 25 février, 1846, AVQ. Quebec Board of Trade, Minute Book, vol. 2 (1842-1852), Annual General Meeting, April 6, 1846, ANQ. Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1832-1939); Requêtes des policiers (1841-1859) April 26, 1851, AVQ.

54 M. E. McCulloch, “The Defeat of Imperial Urbanism in Quebec City, 1840-1855,” unpublished paper.

55 Police; Operations; Police Diary vol. 1, series 2, 20 July, 1843, AVQ.


57 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1832-1938); Requêtes 1, October 6, 1841, AVQ.
Policing in Quebec City, 1838-58

56 ibid.; Requêtes 1, (1840-1852), 1846, 1850, 1851, 1852; Requêtes 2 (1853-1857) 1855, AVQ.

57 Conseil; Conseil et comités; Police 13; 83rd Report of the Police Committee, 21 January, 1852, AVQ.

58 Dossiers Administratifs; Comité de Police; émeutes 1844-1819: 16 juillet, 1858, AVQ.


60 Police Diary, v. i, series 2, August 17, 1843, AVQ.

61 Comité de Police; Administration; Dossiers administratifs; Requêtes des policiers, 8 septembre 1858.

62 Police Diary, v. i, series 2, October 7, 1843, AVQ.

63 Correspondance de la Ville, t. 2, G. O. Stuart, Mayor, to James Leslie, Provincial Secretary, 12 July, 1849, AVQ.

64 Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs; W. F. Coffin, Commissioner of Police, to the Corporation of Quebec, December 31, 1841, AVQ.

65 Correspondence de la Corporation, vol. 1 #696 F-X. Garneau to Dominic Daly, May 30, 1846, AVQ.

66 Police; Administration: Dossiers administratifs (1832-1938); Règlements, Résolutions, Ordinances (1833-1925): "A By-Law to Establish a Police Force For The City of Quebec." AVQ.

67 Police; Dossiers Administratifs; Personnel: 7 January, 1848, "Regulations for the Governance of the Police Force" AVQ.


69 Le Canadien, 16 janvier, 1854.

70 Police; Dossiers Administratifs; Finances avril 1841-décembre 1842. Police; Administration; Personnel (1844-1921) AVQ.

71 Palmer, op. cit., 400.

72 ibid, 511.

73 John Hare, Marc Lafrance, David-Thierry Ruddel, op. cit.; 324.

74 Police; Comité de Police, Procès-verbaux; 5 juin, 1851, AVQ.

75 Conseil; Conseil et comités; Dossiers — employés — Nadeau à Pelletier: septembre 1854, AVQ.

76 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs; Requêtes des policiers (1841-1859): 2 May, 1854, AVQ.

77 Police; Comité de Police; Procès-verbaux: 30 août, 1854, AVQ. New recruits were not to receive the 6s. until after a year of service. It is to be noted that the Provincial River Police had gained an equivalent wage increase by strike action in 1851.

78 Police; Comité de Police; Procès-verbaux: 2 mai, 23 mai, 1849, AVQ.

79 W. K. McCord to F-X. Garneau, 10 May, 1850, 26 June, 1851, Letter Book. Wages for the River Police ranged from 6s. to 4s. a day.

80 Police; Dossiers Administratifs; Personnel 1844-1921: 24 February, 1854, AVQ.

81 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1833-1938); Personnel: 1 January 1858, AVQ.

82 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1844-1921) Personnel: 24 February 1854, Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs 1833-1938; Personnel: 1 January 1858.

83 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1832-1938); listes de paie, AVQ.

84 Police; Dossiers Administratifs; Personnel (1844-1921) " List of Men comprising the City Police ... 31 May, 1844." AVQ The recurrence of certain Irish names, and Russell's variable orthography makes such figures only approximate.

85 ibid; List of Men taken on since 1st May, 1853, AVQ.

86 ibid; A List of Men Comprising the City Force, 31 May, 1844, AVQ.

87 Police; Comité de Police; Procès-verbaux: 17 octobre, 1849, AVQ.

88 Police; Administration; Dossiers Administratifs (1832-1938); demandes d'emplois: 22 mars, 1855, AVQ.

89 Police; Dossiers Administratifs; Personnel 1844-1921; Listes des hommes 1858; Police; Comité de Police; Procès-verbaux: 22 avril, 1858, AVQ.

90 Jean-Marie Facteau, "Régulation sociale et répression de la déviance au Bas-Canada au tournant du 19e siècle (1791-1815), RHAF, vol. 38, no. 4, 512-514.

91 Police; Comité de Police; Procès-verbaux: 13 mars 1854, AVQ. One member of the Committee felt that he should be dismissed.

92 Return of Crime and Offences in the City and District of Quebec ... from 1st January to 31st December, 1849 , AVQ.

93 Police Committee; 87th Report, 23 February, 1852, AVQ.


95 Palmer, op. cit., 400.


98 Police; Operations, Police Diary, vol. 2, series 2, October 8, 9, 1844, AVQ.

It was, for example, the River Police who arrested in 1843 "Michael Walsh, John McDonnell & Hugh Ramsay for being combined together to rise the wages and threatening violence to any of Mr. Gilmour's men who should work under certain wages." Police Diary, v. 1, series 2, July 1, 1843 River Police, AVQ.

James Leslie to W. K. McCord, 26 June, 1851, Letter Book. Wages for the River Police ranged from 6s. to 4s. a day.

Board of Trade: Minutes; 24 August, 1849 Archives Nationales du Québec (hereafter ANQ).

Council of the Board of Trade to L. T. Drummond, Attorney-General, 23 May, 1855, Quebec Board of Trade Minute Book, 1852-1878, ANQ.

ibid, 26 May, 1855.

Comité de Police; Dossiers administratifs: W. F. Coffin, Commissioner of Police, to the Corporation of Quebec, December 31, 1841, AVQ.

Police Journal, July 12, 1843, AVQ.

ibid, July 20, 1843.


The usual nature of crime in Quebec is apparent from a brief recapitulation of convictions in the city for 1846 and 1854, two relatively orderly years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>1846</th>
<th></th>
<th>1854</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%F</td>
<td>%T</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault and Battery</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>14:13</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>15:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>4:17</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>18:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vagrants</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>64:10</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>70:13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats, Insults and Vagrants</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>26:4</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30:4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamen's Act</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>0:19</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>0:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2490</td>
<td>16:63</td>
<td>2616</td>
<td>23:78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Offences: 3983 11:100 3363 22:100

In 1846, there were no persons charged with murder or arson. 649 of those arrested for other offences than against the Seamen's Act were seamen.

In 1854, there were two people charged with murder and one person charged with arson. 664 of those arrested for offences other than against the Seaman's Act were seamen.

%F expresses the percentage of those arrested who were female; %T expresses the percentage of total arrests.