
Stephen J. Randall
but still lacunar knowledge of the evolution of Parisian space. This patchiness is partly to be attributed to the kind of sources historians can use. The archival records and the physical traces of the past in contemporary Paris are infinitely richer and are more abundant for the monumental centre, for the business quarters, and rich residential areas, than they are for the periphery, for the more popular and industrial areas, many of which still survive in present-day Paris despite spreading embourgeoisement. The gaze of contributors to this volume, then, is essentially a bourgeois one, for it follows the westward movement of business and fashionable quarters and rarely turns to the eastern half of the city, more working-class and industrial. They also keep their eyes on the centre rather than the margin and, except for the suggestive analysis offered by Louis Bergeron and Marcel Roncayolo, fail to examine the ways in which successive inner suburbs acted as larders and recreation areas for Paris intra muros, dumping grounds for a variety of urban detritus, space-hungry warehouses, and insanulibrous industries, only to be finally integrated, if often only imperfectly, into Parisian space.

Paris. Genèse d'un paysage, then, should be read for what it reveals about the progress made in our knowledge about the ever-changing Parisian landscape. It should also be read for what it shows about how much historians still need to sharpen the tools of analysis that will enable them to gain a fuller understanding of urban morphology.

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There is a pleasant irony in the fact that Larry Bear’s insightful study of the Temple area of North Philadelphia is published by the University of Washington Press and that Norman Krumholtz’s study of equity planning in Cleveland is published by Temple University Press. The two studies have a good deal in common in their focus on the problems of inner-city America, the nature of political power, the role of private corporations in urban reform, and the prospects for change. Both studies underline the impediments to reform, its urgency and the implications of failing to come to terms with one of the most pressing problems in American society today. Krumholtz’s analysis of Cleveland, however, underscores the lengthy historical tradition of urban reform and the previous efforts which have been made to address the problems.

Krumholtz’s account is essentially a personal memoir of the decade (1969–79) during which he served as the head of the planning staff of Cleveland under three different mayors—Carl Stokes, Ralph Perk and Dennis Kucinich. Krumholtz provides a detailed (overly detailed many readers will conclude) account of the issues that confronted planners in gaining support for their ideas in the political, community and corporate sectors of Cleveland, in particular the frustrations of planners such as Krumholtz who were committed to the idea of equity planning—that is, planning with the specific goal of ameliorating the lives of the weaker and poorer segments of a city population.

Krumholtz divides his study into two sections. The first outlines the experience of the planning department in Cleveland in several specific issues, including the Euclid Beach development, the Clark Freeway and other regional and inner-city transportation issues, low and moderate income housing, tax delinquency and land banking, relations with community groups and other city agencies. The second part of the book attempts to apply the lessons of the Cleveland experience to urban planning in general.

Krumholtz’s account stresses the absence of a clear political mandate for planners in Cleveland and the opportunity this afforded for the planning department to forge its own agenda. In some major areas, such as low-income housing, there were major defeats as they faced racism and class interests. In other areas, such as changes in Ohio’s property tax laws, they experienced success.

In spite of the failures and frustrations that Krumholtz experienced during his ten years in office, there were a sufficient number of victories for him to conclude optimistically that planners can have an impact on those segments of a society which are most in need, that they can contribute to the alleviation of inequality, and that it is possible to resist the pressures of the main power blocs in any community. Krumholtz stresses that in order to make progress planners have to be conscious of both the professional and political dimensions of a planning problem. Some of their failures in Cleveland, especially in the early stages

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of their work, derived from a naive neglect of the power structures of the city. As he indicates, the most important "planning and development initiatives come not from the city but from the developers, utility companies, the Growth Association and major law firms."

Significantly, that lesson also comes through very strongly in Bear's fascinating, beautifully illustrated and effective study of the decision by Bell in the mid-1980s to establish a major computer facility in the Temple area of North Philadelphia. Where the two studies differ most strongly, however, is in their treatments of the roles played by the major corporate players—in the Philadelphia case: Temple University and Bell Telephone. In both cases the institutions were forces for positive community change, especially for positive change in the relationship between the institutions and the communities in which they operated.

In the early 1980s Temple University found itself losing a significant number of its students because of the deteriorating physical and human environment in which it was set in North Philadelphia, an area of largely black and Hispanic populations, high levels of unemployment, significant numbers of families which are female headed and below the poverty line, widespread drug use and violent crime. The desire of Bell to locate its new computer facility in the area provided an opportunity to improve the physical and human environment, and it moved into a logical partnership in attaining its goals, even though this was against considerable odds in the community and in the larger political context of the city and state governments.

Bear demonstrates that Bell, with a longer and better tradition of social responsibility than many American corporations, deserved a significant degree of credit for the initiative. It would have been easy for Bell to have located a new office complex in a largely white, middle class suburb. There was considerable pressure for that decision within the company, from senior executives as well as from average employees who were concerned about the safety of the environment in which they would be working. A series of Bell CEOs fought against the current to achieve their goals in North Philadelphia in cooperation with Temple University. Bell achieved its objectives with careful attention to local community needs and sensitivities. Bear stresses what Bell CEO Raymond Smith argued, that the company had a social responsibility to the public, "that there is in the long term no conflict between community service, social responsibility and corporate profits." With that objective in mind, Bell appointed for a two year period a black executive, Charles Powell, to serve as liaison with the Urban Affairs Partnership. Powell was given an office at Temple for that purpose in order to improve his links with the community. Throughout that period Powell and other Bell officials and Temple University administrators worked with a broad range of interest groups, including the Philadelphia Urban Coalition, the Urban Affairs Partnership, the Institute for the Study of Civic Values, the East of Broad Street Coalition, the mayor, department of commerce, city council.

Opposition from the North Philadelphia community leaders at the outset was strong. Residents feared that the infusion of corporate capital into a high-tech operation would drive up land and housing costs in the area and drive out those residents who could not afford such increases, even though they also believed that such residents had nowhere else to go. Many of them also viewed Temple University as a hostile presence. The children of the area were not Temple's source of students; the institution was simply another outside force, like Bell. Yet, effective liaison, patient and sincere negotiations among the involved interests, gradually reduced community hostility to the project.

In the short term, Bell's new facility in North Philadelphia did little to expand employment opportunities for area residents. At the time of Bear's writing, Bell had hired only eight residents out of one hundred and seventy-three employees in the building. Three of the eight were in management positions. Temple University also made little progress with its Science and Technology Complex and Job Program. Nonetheless, Bear remained optimistic about the future. After the facility opened, for instance, Bell continued to fund the Career Mobility Center.

Bear's carefully documented, well-researched study, for which he had unrestricted access to Bell files and executives, provides important alternatives to the normally gloomy and pessimistic studies of corporate-community relations. As he concludes: "The future of America's inner cities—and by extension the future of our nation—will be determined through the efforts which shape the forces and dimensions of urban renewal."

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