

**Johnson, Eric A. *Urbanization and Crime. Germany 1871–1914.***  
**Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. X, 246**

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matter. The book also includes a chapter broadly covering the entire country for the period 1945 to 1985, and here a lot of data are shown that would also have been useful in the earlier chapters, but this chapter is out of place and detracts from the focus of the book.

Mark Rose has provided a useful, though limited, contribution to the history of urban energy infrastructures, a field that has not been served well by urban or technological historians.

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Johnson, Eric A. *Urbanization and Crime. Germany 1871–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. X, 246.

Rosenmontag in Cologne! Anybody familiar with the long tradition of carnival in catholic Cologne will agree with the author that it is a fitting time and place to conclude a study on crime in Germany (Preface). After all, it is only on Rosenmontag that public revelry is permitted to break with the orderly routine of daily life in the city. And as carnival frolicking peaks on Rosenmontag, so does criminal activity—petty theft, drunken brawls, assault etc. However, this is not the topic under investigation. From the author's perspective crime has little to do with local traditions or opportunities for crime, and even less with any causal connection to city living. In fact, the author wishes to refute the public image of the past and present that cities are more crime prone than rural areas. He also wishes to correct existing scholarship which sees a "civilizing" process at work in modernizing society, that is, a causal linkage between industrialization and urbanization on the one hand, and on the other hand, an increase in property crimes while, concurrently, personal violence decreases.

Anybody acquainted with the author's articles on the subject will know his rejection of the modernization theory, and will also remember that his interpretation rests exclusively on statistical data and analysis. Again, the example of Cologne is informative, precisely because the city deviates statistically from the norm. Unlike other big German cities, Cologne advanced from a low crime city for most of the nineteenth century to become the crime capitol of the nation by 1900 when Germany was experiencing rapid economic expansion. As the author points out economics play no role whatsoever in the city's transformation; but statistical changes do. In 1888, Cologne extended its borders substantially, incorporating surrounding commercial/industrial areas, including the harbour. This geographic expansion changed the city's character, population make up, and most important for this study, crime statistics. It also raises the question whether it is always possible to differentiate clearly statistically between rural and urban areas in Imperial Germany. Densely populated industrial areas remained quite often legally

rural, for political reasons. One example which comes to mind is industrial Borbeck in the Ruhr Valley which, with a population of 77,000, was the largest "village" in Imperial Germany before the the First World War. Using regional statistics, as the author does, deals with the problem to some extent. But it would have been informative to know more about how the author dealt methodologically and conceptually with the rather blurred statistical distinction between urban and rural in Imperial Germany.

Although only a statistical entity in the author's investigation, the example of Cologne serves well to highlight other major findings of this study. Cologne was a bastion of Catholicism, and as the author shows, Catholics had distinctly higher crime rates than Protestants in Imperial Germany. Of course, Poles and Lithuanians in Germany, who figured prominently in the crime statistics, were also mostly Catholic. What significance does this finding have when assessing rising crime rates and also rising homicides in Imperial Germany? Supported by an analysis of the political press as well as statistical evidence, the author argues convincingly that it was the legacy of Bismarck's repressive anti-Catholic and anti-Socialist policies. And during the prosperous years of Wilhelm II's rule systemic discrimination and political repression increased, as did popular anti-foreign sentiment. Who was hardest hit? Here, the author detects a direct relationship between poverty, ethnic discrimination and crime. High death rates in neighbourhoods with large Polish speaking populations correlated with rising crime, statistically, and in the perception of contemporaries. And young catholic men in their prime working age were statistically most likely to become the victims of rising incidents of homicide. But were they indeed victims of crimes? The author uses coroner's statistics as evidence which show a decided increase in homicides while trials and convictions in the courts for homicide go down. To believe in the increasing benevolence or even negligence of the German judicial system, as the author seems to suggest, in order to explain this statistical discrepancy is difficult. In contrast, the author makes a very convincing argument that rising crime rates in Wilhelmine Germany reflected first and foremost an increasingly repressive political system groping to assert control over a deeply fragmented society.

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Clark, Katerina, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. Pp. xii, 377. Index.

As the title indicates, this book explains the origins of the relatively little-known Soviet Cultural Revolution that started in 1928 along with the Economic Revolution of the First Five-Year Plan and Collectivization; Stalin reined in the Cultural Revolution abruptly in 1930 while pursuing his economic aims. Professor