"People and Government Travelling Together": Community Organization, Urban Planning and the Politics of Post-War Reconstruction in Toronto 1943–1953

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Résumé de l’article

La plupart des histoires de la planification urbaine, de la politique urbaine, et du développement de l’état providence ont en grande partie négligé l’existence et l’importance de la participation de citoyen à n’importe quelle période avant les années 60. L’établissement de Toronto Reconstruction Council/Civic Advisory Council en 1943, et de Community Council Co-ordinating Committee (4C’s) en 1947, cependant, illustrer importance populaire participation pour les arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification pendant un crucial période dans histoire de Toronto et Canada dans l’ensemble. Organisé par l’état local le TRC/CAC et le 4C’s a essayé d’armer la montée subite énorme de l’activisme local et l’idéalisme social engendré par Torontonians propres tentatives d’aborder les problèmes sociaux a causé par une décennie et une moitié de dépression et de guerre, aussi bien que par leurs espoirs pour la reconstruction d’après-guerre. Destiné de beaucoup de voies de fabriquer le consentement pour des plans civiques de reconstruction, l’ordre du jour de ces deux organismes était souvent captif au des demandes des moyens citoyens.Cet article examine la seule expérience de Toronto pour armer la participation de citoyen et de communauté à l’aide des arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification. Il argue du fait que l’élévation et la chute ultérieure du mouvement d’organisation de la communauté ont représenté un tournant crucial dans la participation de citoyen à la politique urbaine de planification. La formation le TRC/CAC et le 4C’s a représenté un moment en plastique dans la politique urbaine de planification de Toronto de le moment où les idéaux de la participation locale de démocratie et de citoyen ont semblé réalisables. Cependant, le mouvement d’organisation de la communauté s’est effondré sur les divisions mêmes qu’il a espéré surmonter : classe, appartenance ethnique, et d’une manière primordiale politique. Finalement le manque de ces deux organismes d’incorporer la participation véritable de citoyen aux arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification, comme cas du dégagement de taudis de parc de Regent et du projet de logement public illustre, hanterait la politique de planification urbaine pour les deux décennies suivantes.

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Abstract:
Most histories of urban planning, urban politics, and the development of the welfare state have largely neglected both the existence and the importance of citizen participation in any period prior to the 1960s. The establishment of the Toronto Reconstruction Council/Civic Advisory Council in 1943, and the Community Council Co-ordinating Committee (4C’s) in 1947, however, illustrates the importance of popular involvement in city and social planning during a crucial period in the history of Toronto and Canada as a whole. Organized by the local state both the Reconstruction Council and the 4C’s tried to harness the tremendous surge of local activism and social idealism engendered by Torontonians’ own attempts to tackle the social problems caused by a decade and a half of depression and war, as well as by their hopes for post-war reconstruction. Intended in many ways to manufacture consent for civic reconstruction plans, the agenda of these two organizations was often captive to the demands made by ordinary Torontonians out of necessity and self-interest.

This article examines Toronto’s unique experiment to harness citizen and community participation in aid of social and urban planning schemes. It argues that the rise and subsequent fall of the community organization movement represented a crucial turning point turning in citizen participation in urban planning politics. The formation of the TRC/CAC and the 4C’s represented a plastic moment in Toronto urban planning politics when the ideals of local democracy and citizen participation seemed achievable. However, the community organization movement foundered on the very divisions it hoped to overcome: class, ethnicity, and most importantly political. Ultimately the failure of these two organizations to incorporate genuine citizen participation in social and urban planning schemes, as the case of the Regent Park slum clearance and public housing project illustrates, haunted city planning politics for the next two decades.

Résumé:
La plupart des histoires de la planification urbaine, de la politique urbaine, et du développement de l’état providence ont en grande partie négligé l’existence et l’importance de la participation de citoyen à n’importe quelle période avant les années 60. L’établissement de Toronto Reconstruction Council/Civic Advisory Council en 1943, et de Community Council Co-ordinating Committee (4C’s) en 1947, cependant, illustrer importance populaire participation pour les arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification pendant un crucial période dans histoire de Toronto et Canada dans l’ensemble. Organisé par l’état local le TRC/CAC et le 4C’s a essayé d’armer la montée subite énorme de l’activisme local et l’idéalisme social en-

gle par Torontonians propres tentatives d’aborder les problèmes sociaux a causé par une décennie et une moitié de dépression et de guerre, aussi bien que par leurs espoirs pour la reconstruction d’après-guerre. Destiné de beaucoup de voies de fabriquer le consentement pour des plans citoyens de reconstruction, l’ordre du jour de ces deux organismes était souvent captif au des demandes des moyens citoyens.

Cet article examine la seule expérience de Toronto pour armer la participation de citoyen et de communauté à l’aide des arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification. Il argue du fait que l’élévation et la chute ultérieure du mouvement d’organisation de la communauté ont représenté un tournant crucial dans la participation de citoyen à la politique urbaine de planification. La formation le TRC/CAC et le 4C’s a représenté un moment en plastique dans la politique urbaine de planification de Toronto le moment où les idéaux de la participation locale de démocratie et de citoyen ont semblé réalisables. Cependant, le mouvement d’organisation de la communauté s’est effondré sur les divisions mêmes qu’il a espéré surmonter: classe, appartenance ethnique, et d’une manière primordiale politique. Finalement le manque de ces deux organismes d’incorporer la participation véritable de citoyen aux arrangements sociaux et urbains de planification, comme cas du dégagement de taudis de parc de Regent et du projet de logement public illustre, banterait la politique de planification urbaine pour les deux décennies suivantes.

“The winning of war did not solve the problems of peace. In fact the problems of peace-time living are greater now than before the war,” proclaimed Hugo Wolter, the city’s newly appointed Community Counsellor. A period of temporary unity of purpose for Torontonians, the war years led into post-war reconstruction, which only seemed to produce division and conflict. Beset by the problems of severe housing shortages, juvenile delinquency, labour strife, the ‘spectre’ of communism, and the integration of European immigrants (known derogatorily as “Displaced Persons”) from war-torn Europe, Toronto appeared to Wolter a city under siege. Wolter deemed these problems to be so acute that he claimed the city was “a house divided against itself.” Torontonians could not overcome these problems, Wolter claimed, without re-examining their mid-Victorian political culture which discouraged individual or local initiative. Only by rekindling a spirit of community in which “government and people travelled together” did Wolter believe that Toronto could solve its problems. Wolter realized this would be a difficult task, but what he could not foresee was that his attempts to “rekindle community spirit” would soon be added to the list problems facing the city. 2

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Wolter arrived in Toronto when politics were more open to citizen participation and community organizations than it ever had been. The City Council’s establishment of both the Toronto Reconstruction Council (renamed the Civic Advisory Council in 1948) in 1943, and the Reconstruction Council’s creation of the Community Council Co-ordinating Committee (4C’s) in 1947, illustrates this growing movement towards popular involvement in social and urban planning. Over the previous decade and a half Torontonians had exhibited a tremendous outpouring of local activism and social idealism engendered by their own attempts to tackle the social problems caused by the Depression and the War, as well as by their hopes for post-war reconstruction. The Reconstruction Council and the 4C’s hoped to harness these forces in support of civic reconstruction plans. In doing so, the local state was not only following imperatives to manage conflict or to manufacture consent, but also found itself responding to the claims that citizens made out of necessity and self-interest. During this crucial period of reconstruction the very definition of community, as well as the command of its institutions, became a central arena of social and political contestations.

The following pages examine the intersection between community organization and urban planning during this pivotal period of post-war reconstruction in Toronto. The Toronto Reconstruction Council and its attempts to incorporate citizen participation in its elaboration of a “social” Master Plan for post-war Toronto is important for two reasons. First, the Reconstruction Council’s agenda reveals how central the politics of city planning was to the construction of the welfare state in post-war Canada. By focussing solely on federal and provincial governments many scholars have overlooked the fact that the politics of post-war reconstruction was concerned as much with local matters involving housing, zoning, rent controls, slum clearance, and the regulation of public space as it was with national programs, such as collective bargaining legislation and unemployment benefits. Inherent in the politics of urban post-war reconstruction were key battles between physical planning and comprehensive social planning, and between centralized, scientific rational planning which would supposedly serve the interests of the greater community, and more defensive, “populist” neighbourhood-based planning which would preserve Toronto as a “city of neighbourhoods.” The successes and failures of trying to integrate community organization and civic planning in the immediate post-war years were conditioned by these approaches to planning in “the community’s interest.”

Second, it reveals that citizen participation in the politics of urban planning was not limited to the upheavals of the 1960s. Aside from Shirley Tillotson’s examination of citizen participation in the recreation movement in Brantford Ontario, and Gale Wills’s study of social work in Toronto, the history of community organization and its ties to citizen participation in welfare state provision remains woefully unexplored. Many of the same issues, ideas, sentiments, and even personalities, which occupied community organizations during the 1960s can be traced back to the movement during the post-war period. As Jill Wade similarly argues in her discussion of Vancouver’s social housing movement of the first half of this century, this ‘rupture in historical memory’ left the activists of the 1960s largely unaware of previous crises, older struggles, previous achievements, and important allies.

Indeed, the rise and subsequent fall of citizen participation as a central aspect of the Reconstruction Council’s program of a comprehensive “social” Master Plan represented a turning point in participation of “the people” in urban planning. Both the promises of post-war reconstruction and the tremendous social upheavals, of which Wolter spoke, spurred communities into action while compelling the local state to manage those activities. However, as Wolter would discover, his attempts to reawaken the “principle of community” unleashed forces that established interests in Toronto were not prepared to accommodate. Ironically, the same interests, that employed Wolter to harness citizen participation in support of corporate community interests, ultimately discredited his project as a communist ploy. This failure to incorporate genuine citizen participation in social and urban planning schemes, as the case of Regent Park illustrates, cast a long shadow in city planning politics. Not until the late 1960s would community organizations re-emerge as a powerful force in city planning politics; this time they made their voices heard by bringing the entire post-war program of urban renewal to a standstill.

The Ideology of Community and Community Organization

Despite its prevalent use in historical and sociological literature a definition of community remains highly elusive. However problematic, the definition of community taken in the following paper focuses on a given territory or space as encapsulating the common needs and desires of those who live or work within the area’s geographical boundaries. Residents of particular areas often identify issues affecting their lives and organize around common interests or shared concerns which are spatially based. Much of this is related to the territorial organization of the state, upon whom citizens make demands and receive services. A geographical definition of community also has “a common sense usage that provides a sense of identity, belonging and purpose for people whose lives are otherwise characterized by isolation and alienation.” It was also the way Toronto planners and the Reconstruction Council came to define and identify specific communities and their problems. Of course defining the geographical boundaries of ‘community’ is highly problematic, as the Reconstruction Council and its Community Councilor Hugo Wolter readily discovered.

The elusive nature of ‘community’ is particularly important considering its ideological properties. Groups on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum have been concerned about the deleterious effects of the disappearance of community caused by the rise of the modern industrial metropolis. Conservative advocates of community organization believed that
class tensions could be assuaged by refocusing the energies of working-class communities towards neighbourhood improvement, which would instill a sense of civic consciousness capable of transcending class boundaries. This would be achieved primarily through education; wealthy neighbourhoods would learn "how the other half lived" as well as the need to improve those conditions, while the inhabitants of the slums would come to appreciate the leadership and beneficence of the more upstanding members of the community. Under elite leadership, individual communities were expected to voluntarily improve the conditions in their neighbourhood, without the need for state intervention or state expenditures. However, local interests were to be at all times subordinated to the interests of the larger civic community. The organic unity believed to have existed in pre-modern cities, which it was hoped could be reconstructed anew in the modern city, was not to be threatened by parochial self assertion. This has been a fundamental principle of community organization, which has characterized such diverse schemes as settlement houses, Model cities and citizen participation.

Community organization, however, was more than a means of social control. The idea of community organizations as the foundation of a more participative democratic political culture has been the bedrock of democratic socialism since the nineteenth-century. Like their more conservative counterparts, many radical social activists shared the notion that the idea of community could overcome socially divisive identities based on class, ethnicity and race. However, more radical social activists also organized communities to challenge hegemonic groups and their control over state agendas. Such social activists realized that "community issues," such as the provision and control over housing, social services, and recreational facilities are often of great importance to workers, and have proven to be springboards to class politics rather than an antidote to radicalism. Many also realized that the inclusion of community concerns has also permitted greater scope of activism on the part of women. In short, many social activists believed that the welfare state could be made to serve the interests of its clients only if citizens were actively involved in its decision-making structures. For these reasons, the definition of community, and the control of its institutions, are central to class struggles in capitalist society.

The ideas at the heart of community organization are also at the heart of the ideology of planning. Urban planning, much like community organization, seeks to restore to the urban environment (physical and social) order and harmony, and to lessen the effects of capital accumulation on the uneven development of the urban landscape. Indeed, the central concept of planning is to balance competing forces to produce a rational sociospatial ordering of the built environment. Planners, then, believed that they acted as delegates of the citizenry as a whole, and not on behalf of the whims and desires of individuals or groups. Like community organizers, they also believed that a central aspect of their job was to educate citizens to the principles of planning so that the people could be enlightened as to their true interests. But education through participation was a slow process for which the urgency of the problems of the unplanned city could not wait. Moreover, there were no guarantees that the parochial interests of individual citizens and communities could be overcome. Planners, by virtue of their expertise knew the correct path, and because they operated from 'general principles' their solutions could be depended upon to represent the public good. As a result, planners often presented themselves as 'progressive' defenders of the community. However, although planners professed an overarching concern for an orderly physical environment that applied to both rich and poor neighbourhoods, their ideas of disorder and irrationality often reflected a bias against the perceived disorderliness of the lower and working classes, along with a belief that patterns of social behaviour were directly linked to the condition of the physical environment. These attitudes belonged not only to social conservatives, but pervaded planning thought at both ends of the political spectrum.

Community Planning in Toronto 1930–1950

Toronto's urban reform movement had a long and, compared to other Canadian cities, relatively successful history. Campaigns for comprehensive city planning, improved housing standards and social housing schemes can be traced back to the turn of the century dialogues among enlightened manufacturers, middle-class reformers and socially minded trade union leaders. In the 'Progressive' era, only Toronto reformers succeeded in implementing two modest limited-dividend housing projects. During the Depression, the squalid conditions of the central city, especially the Cabbagetown area, led to a new bible for social housing activists — the report of the Ontario Lieutenant-Governor's Committee on Housing Conditions (popularly known as the Bruce Report) — which advocated sweeping slum clearance plans followed by publicly built low-rental housing. Renewed interest in the housing question also led to the establishment of Canada's first Standard of Housing by-law under which nearly 10,000 houses were repaired and renovated by 1939. Yet, as Toronto voters revealed in their rejection of a municipally funded scheme for slum clearance and public housing during the 1938 municipal elections, increased interest in housing and planning issues was not sufficient to bring the chief objective of the Bruce Report to fruition.

Despite this setback Toronto's planning and social housing movement gained momentum during war for two reasons. First, during the war the trend everywhere was to look to wartime planning as a means to launch a vast program of peace-time reconstruction. Planning had largely lost its ideological stigma and became technical and pragmatic in its outlook. This was the vision of a managerial state, in which planning was simply the means of achieving specific goals. As home to many strains of Canadian reform movements, Toronto was also caught up in the widespread belief that post-war prosperity lay in the powers of scientific and centralized planning.
The severe housing crisis fostered by fifteen years of Depression and war was the second impetus behind the urgent demands for a planned city. The thousands of workers who flocked to the city's war industries often lived doubled up in central city houses and apartments, while others inhabited abandoned stores, trailers, and even tents in the city's parks and ravines. Though Toronto was a chief engine in the Canadian war economy, the city received almost no help from the Federal government's Wartime Housing Program, which built small temporary houses to alleviate the housing shortages for war-workers and their families. Concern for the housing conditions of Torontonians, especially those of servicemen's families, reached a fever pitch by 1944 as Housing Registry lists overflowed and evictions mounted. Faced with the prospects of homelessness, many Torontonians took matters into their own hands by forcibly halting evictions and initiating rent strikes.

Demobilization in 1945 only added to the crisis. Through the late 1940s social service agencies reported that poor and cramped housing conditions were responsible for family breakdowns and increased rates of juvenile delinquency. Equally shocking was the fact that poor housing conditions had escaped the boundaries of Toronto's slums. Unlike the housing conditions of the 1930s, families endured such squalor, claimed one report, not because better housing was out of their reach, "but through an absence of anything better." The City Planning Board's 1944 Annual Report confirmed these fears claiming that 50% of the city's seventy-eight neighbourhoods were in serious stages of decline and another two percent were in a serious and unredeemable condition of "blight." Torontonians would have to act now to save their city.

To this end the city council established the two main planning bodies that would determine the shape of post-war Toronto: The City Planning Board (CPB) in 1942 and the Toronto Reconstruction Council (TRC) in 1943. Both planning bodies represented an amalgam of Tory and Populist planning ideas. Tory planning placed value in the ideas of order, rationality, centralization, and hierarchy in decision making. Tory ideology imagined the community as a corporate entity within which one could determine a common public interest. Moreover, because planning was deemed to be in the 'public interest' planning was a non-political means to restore order to the city. Populist planning ideology extolled the virtues of common citizens and sought to protect them from the experts, the interests, big government, big business, and big labour. Order and rationality were less important than providing access points for public input into the political system. Populist ideas were voiced primarily by city councillors who remained suspicious of the Planning Board and the Reconstruction Council, which they saw as usurping their role to represent the interests of constituents.

However, as the case of Toronto illustrates, "Tory" and "populist" ideas should not be seen as mutually exclusive or inherently conflicting categories, but rather as tendencies present at the very heart of planning ideology. The difficulties faced by planners, politicians, and citizen activists alike resulted from their attempts to balance the ideals of democratic citizenship and participation with those of order and rationality.

The establishment of the City Planning Board, the first in Canada, represented the culmination of the previous forty years of urban planning and reform. Formed with popular support, including endorsement from the Association of Women Electors, the Board of Trade and both city labour councils, the Planning Board was established as a quasi-independent board with only an advisory relationship with the City Council. The beliefs in pluralist and non-partisan citizen participation in the planning process were incorporated into the structure of the Board, which was composed of eight members, six of whom represented 'community interests' such as labour, women, and business, while the remaining two positions were held by the mayor and one alderman nominated yearly by the city council. The Board was restructured and formally instituted as a department of city government in 1946 after the passage of the Ontario Planning Act. The newly instituted planning board stressed that its ideas and plans would be developed in the interests of the whole city and for the economic and social benefit of all:

Heretofore, City Planning has been considered by many Toronto citizens either as a measure to improve traffic and transportation or to beautify our streets, in terms of a rigid plan. This inevitably draws the attention of those citizens who may consider themselves adversely affected, to the damage they may possibly suffer, rather than to the future benefits to the city as a whole. The public should be informed that a city plan does not aim at localized improvements only, but the improvement of the whole city for the economic and social benefit of all ...

Not wasting any time getting down to business the Planning Board spent its first two years composing a Master Plan for the city. Released in its 1944 Annual Report, the CPB's Master Plan for the City of Toronto is a key document in understanding urban planning in Toronto. The plan represented the culmination of idealist and modernist planning ideas of the last half century, drawing particularly on the ideas of Ebenezer Howard's Garden City, Patrick Geddes social survey approach, and Clarence Perry's notion of the self contained 'neighbourhood unit.' The chief innovation of the 1944 report was the CPB division of the city into 78 neighbourhoods and its classification of neighbourhoods according to 5 types — sound, vulnerable, declining, blighted and slums.

The Planning Board defined a neighbourhood as "a more or less homogeneous area large enough to function as a social unit and not too small to stand on its own feet, with well-defined boundaries such as main roads, railway, ravines, etc., and in which the economic and social status of the residents [was] fairly uniform or in which one racial group predominates, and there [was] a similarity in age, quality and architectural character of the houses." According to the Planning Board's definition an ideal or 'sound' neighbourhood was one characterized
by low densities, modern and/or well-kept houses and grounds, little or no through traffic, an abundance of modern well-located parks, schools, churches and shops, and an active neighbourhood association. Clearly what the planners had in mind was the classic suburb that would soon come to dominate the post-war urban landscape. The Planning Board, however, found only 11 of Toronto’s 78 neighbourhoods met these conditions. Most of these neighbourhoods were located in the newer and more affluent areas of the city’s North-End, the fashionable Beaches district, and High Park. The rest of the city was either vulnerable to decline (32%), already in decline (50%), or slums (2%) ripe for clearance and redevelopment. In contrast to sound neighbourhoods, these areas were generally located south of the Canadian Pacific Railway’s North Toronto line and were characterized by high population density, small narrow lots, excessive curb parking, heavy through traffic, inadequate park facilities, obsolete house architecture, second-rate shopping facilities, old-fashioned schools and intrusions of non-conforming land uses. In short, these neighbourhoods broke every rule of modernist city planning.

According to the report, the history of Toronto’s neighbourhoods “had been one of progressive decline, which in its final stage, has resulted in what have been generally termed blighted areas.” Such decline was in some ways inevitable due to age, and new trends. However, in Toronto the Board recognized that decline had set in despite the modernity of the houses, services and community facilities. The reasons for the decline of residential standards were varied and complex, but undoubtedly linked to the intensification of densities and lack of improvements caused by fifteen years of depression and war. The conversion of many single family homes from owner occupancy to rental occupancy, often through mortgage default, threatened Toronto’s cherished image as a ‘city of homes.’ Indeed, the tremendous increase in the number of Torontonians living in rented dwellings during the Depression and the war led the Planning Board to warn in the preface of its 1945 Report that unless proper planning measures were introduced, single family dwellings would disappear from the central city to be replaced by apartments. It also reminded them of the detrimental effects on family life that would ensue from such a development. The planners, then, were not simply prejudiced against central city neighbourhoods because they were old. Rather there was something even more objectionable behind their classification of Toronto neighbourhoods — the “character” of the residents. As the Board observed:

The decline in residential character has been coincident with the changes in the character of residents which takes place following or towards the end of the period of initial occupancy and ownership, and that the incidence of such changes is greatest in those areas which are occupied by families in the upper middle class … no decline would take place were the original class of residents willing and content to remain permanently in the neighbourhood and to maintain and improve their properties instead of abandoning them. The comment reflected both the planners’ misunderstanding of the housing needs and traditional living places of working-class Torontonians, as well as concern over the effect middle- and upper-class flight to the suburbs had on the moral and social environment of the city.

Nonetheless, the answer to saving these neighbourhoods from sinking into slums was not wholesale redevelopment; only blighted and slum areas would be forced to suffer such a program. Rather, the planners advocated a judicious mix of public enforcement of by-law provisions, the extension and upgrading of parks, recreation, and school facilities and the re-routing of traffic onto main traffic corridors. But the bulk of the responsibility was to rest with individual property owners to keep their properties in proper repair and to modernize them, and to keep watch on conditions within their neighbourhood. To do this, planners advocated that the residents form community associations.

To ensure the Master Plan would come to fruition the city council established the Toronto Reconstruction Council in December 1943 to study and report on the needs of the city in the immediate post-war period. Composed of more than 65 member organizations and almost 1000 individuals the TRC represented a broad cross section of the city. Although the organization was dominated by benevolent institutions, prominent businessmen, and Rosedale charity ladies, there was significant representation from labour and left social reform groups including the two city labour councils, the Workers’ Educational Association, and the communist-led Housewives’ Consumer Association. Moreover, the Housing committee was led by prominent CCFers such P.A. Deacon and Humphrey Carver who were responsible for drafting the party’s housing and town planning platforms. The TRC hoped to draw upon the great outpouring of community action during the war. At the same time, it tried to organize and direct opinion in support of government-inspired post-war reconstruction projects. In doing so it hoped to expand the “social basis of consent” by dispelling the “pessimistic and defeatist attitude of Torontonians about post-war possibilities,” and to “promote individual initiative in the program of post-war reconstruction.”

The TRC’s attempt to reassert control over the planning agenda was also an attempt to circumvent the rising support for more radical CCF and Communist-inspired plans. While in many respects Toronto remained politically conservative over this period, working-class radicals and reformers began to chip away at the foundations of Tory Toronto. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the CCF and the Communist Party (renamed the Labour Progressive Party (LPP) during the war) made successful inroads on Toronto politics by organizing communities around issues of unemployment, housing and relief payments. By 1943 the CCF and LPP used their community organizations to elect a total of four aldermen to City Council. After the crushing defeat of the CCF slate in the 1944 civic elections the Communists became the dominant voice of working-class Torontonians throughout the 1940s capturing the central city wards 4, 5 and...
The desire of the local state to expand the social basis of consent was most evident in the composition of the council. Taking its cue from the experience of the labour and social unrest which followed demobilization after World War I, organized labour and veterans were granted greater representation on the council than social service and business organizations. In addition, the council made special provision for women and for youth representation. In short, the TRC was an exercise in community-based corporatism. Nonetheless, the TRC importance cannot be underestimated as it was evidence of the remarkable permeability of the local state in the 1940s. For this reason, community activists in Toronto were much more successful, and their struggles much less confrontational, than similar urban-based movements across the country.  

While the Planning Board focussed on the ordering of the built environment, the TRC’s mandate focussed on the social aspects of city planning. As such, the TRC was composed of a number of sub-committees to deal with everything from demobilization of veterans to employment and post-war works. Considering the scope and gravity of the housing problem throughout the 1940s in Toronto, this was the chief focus of the council’s energies and reports. Housing and town-planning issues were not simply problems of bricks and mortar but were seen by many groups in the community as the means to circumvent poverty and unemployment that might otherwise return in peacetime. Though the financing and creation of public policy for housing and urban renewal were expected to come from the senior levels of government, municipal authorities looked upon housing and town-planning schemes as their fundamental task in post-war reconstruction. Large-scale works to provide new traffic arteries and slum clearance were central to the reconstruction and modernization of Canadian cities. The future of Canada’s cities, including Toronto, “depended in large measure on the effectiveness of measures taken to stop the decline and begin the restoration and redevelopment of the main residential areas.” The TRC was adamant that urban planning in the post-war years, unlike that of the previous four decades, should emphasize social concerns rather than ‘showy’ projects such as civic centres, war memorials or grand boulevards. Moreover, the chairman of the Public Relations Committee said of the TRC: “any report submitted as representing the post-war plans for the City of Toronto should be devoid of selfish planning, that it should be acceptable and popular with the people of Canada generally, as Toronto’s situation reflects the situation of the Dominion as a whole.”

In theory the TRC’s strength lay in its representation of a broad cross-section of the community through its members and organizations represented on the Council. Nonetheless, there existed a tension within the TRC between providing expertise in the drafting of social policy and representing and engendering community action and approval. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the TRC played itself up as offering “the views of well-informed citizens at little or no expense to local government. Harnessing the best minds in the private sector and academia to the tasks of post-war planning.” As a result, the TRC increasingly functioned as a series of mini “Royal Commissions” composed of a small self-perpetuating group of technicians and activists. Members claimed that this was due to the fact that many of the problems the Council was called upon to investigate and solve needed expert opinion rather than citizen opinion. There was also the difficulty of implementing democratic procedure in such a large and multifarious organization. Yet, according to Eric Hardy, head of the Bureau of Municipal Research and an active council member, actual democratic participation in the Reconstruction Council was less important than maintaining the image of democratic participation.

Nonetheless, many key Reconstruction Council members were eager to experiment with new approaches to community organization and citizen participation in social planning. As Gale Wills notes in her study of social work in Toronto during this period, both the Toronto Welfare Council and the University of Toronto’s School of Social Work were moving toward more decentralized and direct-action approaches to social work and social planning. Many of the key personalities involved in the TRC came from these two organizations. Henry Cassidy, the director of the School of Social Work was vice-chair of the Reconstruction Council. Other important TRC members included Charles E. Hendry, and Murray Ross, two of North America’s leading experts on community organization who later became members of the Community Council Co-ordinating Committee. Albert Rose, also a faculty member at the School of Social Work, was the research director at both the Welfare Council and later the Reconstruction Council. Rose, in particular, was a key advocate of citizen participation in urban planning and would become a key player in Toronto’s urban renewal planning and politics over the next three decades. Social workers’ and housing reformers’ emphasis on an active program of engendering community support for urban planning and social-housing projects lay in the belief that former city planning projects had failed because they neglected to stimulate the interest and participation of ‘the average citizen.’ They were determined that this would not happen again.

These ideas were not limited to Toronto social workers and reformers, but were shared by members of Canada’s fledgling urban planning community who together formed the Community Planning Association of Canada (CPAC) in 1945 to promote public education and participation in urban planning and social housing issues. The CPAC emphasized that it was not a body of experts which planned for communities. Rather the building of good communities, it claimed, rested on its efforts in making community planning “a people’s movement.” Neighbours, they believed, were the “nursery of citizen participation...
in public affairs. " City dwellers," argued Humphrey Carver, Canada's leading advocate of urban planning and a prominent member of the TRC's housing committee, "[were] in need of reassurance that [their] views and predilections are taken into account in shaping [their] increasingly complicated environment. To enlist the cooperation of citizen groups and to convince them of the importance of their active help in plotting the future course of their community would be a necessary precur-
sor to any effective planning action." Carver warned planners and government officials to avoid the temptations of immediate results by "bulldozing the people of the community for their own good."36

Central to the ideas of community-planning advocates was the assumption that communities existed and that their interests could be determined. However, many believed communities and the ethic of community were rapidly disappearing in the modern metropolis. As E.G. Faludi, author of the City's Master Plan and Canada's premier town planner lamented:

Today the neighbourhood as a locality has all but disappeared in urban America. One of the most unfortunate consequences of excessive urbanization has been the loss of community interests which form the basis of the neighbour-
hood. While our system of government is based on the assumption that people living in the same locality have interest in common, and that they may be relied upon to act together for the common welfare, this assumption, unfortunately, is invalid for large cities. Mobility, lack of home owner-
ship, and distance, the distinguishing marks of large urban centres, all have contributed to the disappearance of the neighbourhood as an entity possessing social values.37

Many observers directly linked this loss of "neighbourhood val-
ues" to the physical, economic and moral deterioration of the city, which was most evident in its slums and blighted areas.

Community organization through the planning process was the most effective way to promote this organic view of the city among community residents. The job was not simply to get them involved in the development and management of their own community, but to see that their own particular interests were linked to a greater community interest. As one commentator said about the Planning Board's exhibition of the City's Master Plan at the Art Gallery of Ontario:

All [visitors] showed a very great interest in their own neigh-
bourhood — of course, they wanted to know what the plan would mean to their home and their street — and the interest was just as great, if not greater on the part of people who lived in slum and blighted areas as it was among those from healthy parts, though they were very sensitive about the con-
ditions in which they lived. ... The community council move-
ment is another expression of the same thing, groups of local people getting together and trying to improve their neigh-
bourhood. Such movements properly directed will have at least three results. First of all, something of the old community spirit of the 19th century will be recaptured. Secondly, the replanning of the community will be from the neighbour-
hood up, by the people themselves and not superimposed from on top by a bunch of technicians and specialists. And thirdly, such neighbourhood groups once they begin to get active to improve their neighbourhood, they will speedily dis-
cover that the solution of some of their problems or the cause of some of their troubles lie outside their immediate neigh-
bourhood and hence they will be forced, whether they want to or not, to take an interest in the wider area, of the whole city and ultimately of the whole region. ... If neighbourhood councils were formed within each of the seventy neighbour-
hoods ... I think we would soon find that the interest of each of these groups would not be confined to its own neighbour-
hood or district. Before long we would have such a wave of public opinion sweeping across the city that our elected rep-
resentatives would lose no time in seeing that machinery and funds are provided for proper planning and adequate hous-
ing.38

Members of the Reconstruction Council agreed with these senti-
ments. They hoped that the formation of a committee to co-ordi-
rate the activities of community groups would effectively mobilize the latent energies of civic consciousness in the city in the promotion of municipal government projects. Reconstruction Council members believed that the wartime activities of Tor-
tonians were ample proof of their desire to organize collectively to improve their city. The principal task of a co-
ordinating committee would be to bridge the gap between the voluntary community service of Torontonians and the local municipal government, especially the newly formed Planning Board. Indeed, the committee saw its role as a promoter of the Planning Board's Master Plan and sought to acquaint the public with the Plan and "interpret it to them."39 Moreover, in a period of waning public and political support for the Reconstruction Council, its members saw community councils as the "missing link" without which Council projects would never be under-
taken.40

By June 1947 the Reconstruction Council brought such a plan to fruition with the foundation of an official Community Council Co-ordinating Committee, known by its members as the "4Cs". The Committee, headed by prominent Conservative politician George H. Hees, drew largely upon social service and social work organizations such as the YMCA, the Red Cross and the Junior League. The close ties between community organization and urban planning were underlined by the inclusion of Bessie Luffman, a member of the newly formed Housing Authority of Toronto which would oversee the construction and manage-
ment of Canada's first slum clearance and public housing proj-
ect, Regent Park. Mrs. W.N. Robertson, a member of the CPAC, and Professor C. E. Hendry who also served on the Reconstruc-
tion Council's Housing Committee, were also prominent mem-
bears of the 4C's. However, despite the rhetoric of "organizing
people to take part in the affairs of their community of the city as a whole only one member of the committee. Mrs. E.W. Coleman, Secretary of the Beaches Community Council, came from the so-called ‘grassroots’. The first task of the newly formed committee was the hiring of a Counsellor who would mobilize and, more importantly, coordinate community organizations in Toronto. The committee selected Hugo Wolter whom the City hired in September of 1947 for the initial term of one year. Wolter, an American, with a long history of welfare and community organizing, had recently served as an assistant project director at the Gila River Relocation project in Arizona where he was responsible for the administration of social and community services for Japanese evacuees. Wolter was an archetypal modern liberal who believed wholly in the benefits of pluralist democracy. He envisaged his role as ultimately encouraging all social constituencies, including labour, youth, and ethnic groups, to become auxiliaries to state programs. Wolter fervently believed that democratic processes would yield democratic results. He insisted, that all elements of the community had the right to be heard, and once they won the right to state their case they could make those in power responsive to their needs. As he stated in his introductory press release:

Community councils are a means of organizing the people to take part in the affairs of their communities and of the city as a whole. Through them citizens become the active associates of the Board of Control, the Municipal Council and the administrators of the city departments. Through them local problem situations are placed directly into the hands of citizens who are intimately concerned in securing satisfactory solutions. A tremendous amount of official time is saved by solving problems in the areas in which they arise. Community councils are not a cure-all but they are a definite step in including the ordinary citizen in the responsibility of government. The phrase “The city must do something” changes to “We must do something.”

Wolter attempted to overcome what he called the “top-down” approach to community planning by stressing to more established interests that local citizens must be allowed to “take the stage ... as actors.” Wolter poured his heart into assisting ordinary Torontonians to become active citizens. Within the first 6 months of his appointment he attend over 300 meetings, worked 12 to 14 hour days including week-ends, and travelled more than 1000 miles per month by car spreading his message of local democracy.

The work of Wolter and the Community Council Co-ordinating Committee provides a rare glimpse into what still remains the shadowy nature of community organization in 1940s Toronto. Community councils grew out of the experience of depression and wartime Toronto from diverse sources including Air Raid Patrol groups, local political and service clubs, and ‘Tidy Block Associations’ affiliated with the annual Beautify Toronto campaigns. Others revived dormant ratepayer associations in Rosedale, the Annex, and Oriole Park, where the latter carried on a protracted, but unsuccessful, campaign to halt the building of the Toronto Transit Commission’s subway yards in the neighbourhood. The housing crisis, especially concern over evictions, led to the formation of various community and civic groups including the Communist-inspired Toronto District Emergency Housing Committee and the Homes Protective Association of York Township. Working-class residents, in co-operation with the Toronto Welfare Council, organized neighbourhood councils to provide recreational facilities and programs for young people to head off the growing ‘gang problem’ which plagued Toronto throughout the 1940s. This issue was especially important in the Junction and Riverdale area neighbourhoods, but also in the central city slums such as Moss Park, Ward 4 South, and the Emergency Housing Projects (converted army barracks which housed those displaced by the city’s wartime and post-war housing shortage) where parks and playgrounds were scarce. It was also very important to city officials who believed that delinquency was no longer due to conditions in individual families but “primarily a problem of neighbourhood relationships, standards and traditions.” Organizing area residents to combat the conditions in neighbourhoods that contributed to delinquency was necessary unless new residents would “inherit the evil conditions of the area.”

Upon coming to the position Wolter surveyed the landscape of community and neighbourhoud organizations in Toronto. He found 37 community organizations in existence loosely representing the interests of over 150,000 people in the city and surrounding area. Much like the Planning Board’s 1944 Neighbourhood Plan, Wolter classified these associations according to their feasibility of forming part of the larger community council — active, moribund and “Area Projects.” Active groups were those which could easily and immediately be incorporated into a central community council. For the most part these groups came from the newer and more affluent ‘sound’ neighbourhoods in the North of the city such as Rosedale, North Toronto and Forest Hill. However, also included in this group were a significant number of community organizations from working-class neighbourhoods in the city’s west-end including the Perth-Royce Community Council, Maybank St. Clair Community Council, the Weston Community Council, and the Fairbanks Community Council. Wolter also identified a number of associations that were active, but due mostly to the presence of partisan politics, needed some assistance before they could be incorporated into the central committee. Once again these may be said to correspond to the vulnerable and declining areas of the city areas such as Parkdale and Riverdale.

Finally, there were those areas desperately in need of community organization but that could only be developed as an “Area Project” staffed and organized by social workers. These areas corresponded to the blighted and slum areas outlined in Planning Board reports — Regent Park, the city’s notorious “Ward” district; and the Emergency Housing projects. Wolter focussed a great deal of his time and energy organizing community coun-
As Wolter soon discovered, the largest problem plaguing the
"unity of the neighbourhoods" was the deep political divisions
that had emerged in Toronto over the previous two decades.
Many community organizations developed out of local political
associations, especially those of the CCF and LPP. At the same
time, local community groups not only found themselves part of
the battleground between these two rivals, but they also ran up
against a growing, vicious anti-red hysteria, which painted
almost all grassroots activism as subversive. Many Tor-
ontoians thus became wary of community associations, con-
stantly worried that such organizations were either
communist-inspired or fostered by City Hall to "put one over on
us."48

The growing polarization of community politics in Toronto pro-
vided Wolter with an interesting set of paradoxes. Wolter
believed that part of his duties was to lead an activist role of
community organization which would support the voices of lab-
our, youth and ethnic groups in defence of their rights. Wolter
believed that these groups, which made up nearly seventy per-
cent of the population, had not been "granted a feeling of
mutual importance." Yet, he also believed that unless organized
on a constructive basis (i.e. into community organisations) such
elements might be pushed "into the hands of subversive forces
... because in their opinion 'anything would be better than what
we have.'"49 Communists, Wolter believed, had made deep
inroads among these groups precisely because they made
these people feel important. The only way to block such action
Wolter continued, "is to work with these groups at all times and
to incorporate their suggestions into the day-to-day policies in
the neighbourhoods, the cities and the nation." In short, Wolter
believed that defeating the communists at their own game was
his most difficult, but most important task. "As he related to
Mayor Hiram McCallum: "I am more concerned over the meth-
ods of the Communist group than I am over putting the Beanery
Gang in jail."50

Wolter, however, was a reluctant 'cold warrior.' Though he
believed that organizing communities acting on their own behalf
would subvert communism's appeal, he rejected community
organization as a blunt instrument of social control. For Wolter
gross-roots community organization was subversive, but
democracy at its fullest development. Unfortunately, many mem-
bers of the Reconstruction Council and City Council actively
opposed his vision of democracy. As Wolter lamented:

More than a year ago I reported to you that I felt it necessary
to expand our Committee and to get the cooperation of three
groups in particular ... labor-management, ethnic and nation-
ality, and youth. I felt that if these could be brought to an
understanding of the importance of neighbourhood organiza-
tion, mobilized and coached, they would join to become the
most active force not only in their neighbourhood organiza-
tion, but in the promotion of democracy as well. ... I realized
that such a combination, once organized even in a single
neighborhood, was in danger of a communist coup. In order
to safeguard this type of social engineering, I suggested the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly as a fundamental guide for
all thought and action. It seemed to contain the elements of
local autonomy as well as to be a safe-guard of human
rights. You will be interested to know that I was contacted by
various communist front groups and promised various kinds
of help; so that it became necessary to make frequent trips
to the police and check with those in charge of keeping tabs
on subversive activities. The moment I openly and publicly
advocated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I
received a series of annoying and threatening telephone
calls attempting to find out whether I had any relatives living
in the Russian Zone of Germany! Some of you thought that I
was going far afield in referring to the Declaration as a basis
for community organization.51

This lack of support from City Council and established leaders
and organizations subverted much of Wolter's already fragile
authority.

Nowhere was this paradox more evident than in re-organizing
the tenants of the Emergency Housing projects. As early as the
summer of 1947 residents at each camp formed community
councils to lobby City Council to secure better living conditions,
including school and recreational facilities for the hundreds of
children housed in each camp. After meeting opposition and
delay, as well as a 25% increase in rent from City Hall, the resi-
dents under the direction of the LPP, the Housewives' Con-
sumer Association, and the Toronto Labour Council (CCL)
united under the Citizens' Emergency Housing Council. Led by
the diminuitive, but fierce Dorothy Marchment, the CEHC
 Demand that the city provide adequate recreational facilities,
bring the apartments up to minimum health standards, prevent
 evictions, and reduce rents because of the rising cost of liv-
 ing.52

Throughout their ten-year operation the Emergency Housing
projects represented a constant source of aggravation for the
city, not to mention a constant drain on city finances. The City
fathers believed that despite the conditions at the camps, the
City provided good service to the residents. Besides, the
camps were only ever meant to be temporary shelter for evict-
ees and their families. Instead of complaining, residents should
have spent their energies looking for new accommodation.
Nonetheless, to head off the rising discontent within the camps
the City asked Wolter and the Community Council Committee to
inverne and provide new leadership to the tenants. Given the
mounting tensions between the City and the tenants Wolter and
the Community Council Committee were trapped in a very awk-
ward position. For one, the tenants viewed Wolter, as an
employee of the City, and his legion of social workers with a

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great deal of suspicion, which made it extremely difficult to gain their confidence. At the same time, Wolter knew why he had been directed by the City Council to the camps: to weed out the malcontents from the tenant councils. Adopting the Residents' Associations' point of view thus made Wolter rather unpopular with City Councillors. Yet on the whole, Wolter and his associates were more likely to agree with the City's opinion of the residents and their associations. According to Wolter, the residents were so "demoralized" that they needed to be instructed in the benefits of co-operation and in doing things for themselves. Too often, he claimed, "special concessions were requested by residents without the ordinary citizen's desire to do things with the people of his neighbourhood." Considering the spontaneous rise of the community groups within the camps, residents needed little instruction in doing things for themselves. The real problem was that the labour council and the communists had beaten Wolter to the punch in organizing the tenants. Indeed, Wolter reported that his chief task was to "keep the residents from communistic tendencies." The problem of political divisions that complicated Wolter's attempt to organize the Emergency Housing projects was not limited to that milieu. Political divisions plagued the community council movement across the city. Community organizations in Perth Royce, St. Clair-Maybank, the Beaches Community Council, Fairbanks, and Ward 3 North in York township all had strong ties to local CCF organizations. In particular, political divisions in West Toronto were the chief barrier to the unity of existing neighbourhood councils in the area. A strong CCF organization in the Beaches area caused conservative political, business and social clubs to withdraw from the Beaches Community Council to form the Ward 8 Central Executive Committee. The organization opposed labour representation on the committee, arguing that workers could not act independently of their unions. That the Ward 8 Committee referred to the Beaches Community Council as "that bunch of CCF cranks" is perhaps more revealing as to the council's exclusion of working-class organizations. Community organizations in Wards 4 and 5 were also dominated by the political left (communists) who used this base to elect city aldermen and provincial MPPs throughout the 1940s. The strong communist presence in home-and-school associations and ratepayer organizations represented a threat to established interests in the city. Communist dominance of these inner-city wards fostered the establishment of counter organizations such as the Brown Home and School association in the northern part of Ward 3, established under the leadership of the Women Electors Association to combat juvenile delinquency and "left-wing elements." Political and ethnic divisions, however, were most acute in the very heart of the inner city — Ward 4 South. The area bounded by Queen, College, Spadina and Bathurst streets had become the new centre of Toronto's notorious "Ward." Wolter's intensive study of the community revealed a number of processes underway in this inner city community, but which were representative of the massive post-war transformations affecting the entire Toronto region. A long time centre of the Jewish settlement in Toronto, Ward 4 South was a community in flux in the immediate post-war period. The community was strongly divided along national, religious, age and political lines. Over sixty percent of the residents of the area surveyed wished to leave, mostly for the suburbs. Most of these were young people, who cited the lack of recreational facilities as well as crowded conditions as reasons for their desired exodus. After the war the area continued to act as a magnet for immigrants, this time drawing European immigrants, in particular Ukrainians and Poles. The newcomers formed their own ethnic and political organizations, often in defiance of long-established ones. As a result, tense relations developed between and among Jews, Poles and Ukrainians. Political tensions intensified between more right-wing immigrants and Communists, whose offices were located on Cecil Street in the heart of the community. To counterbalance the influence of the communists Wolter attempted to organize more conservative and even right-wing members of various ethnic groups in the area into an Inter-Ethnic Citizens council, devoted to "inter-racial understanding and appreciation." Wolter hoped that this move would beat the communists at their own game. As he stated to Mayor McCallum: "the unity of the neighbourhoods is something which the Communists fear most and in my opinion is a most effective weapon against them." In addition, the integration of ethnic groups through the community council would help assimilate these groups into the city. The presence of these national groups who chose to "take care of their own" instead of looking to the city, was commendable, but it did create a community problem. Moreover, Wolter deemed these organizations as "underdemocratic" because they subordinated citizenship to "other interests." Finally, the integration of ethnic groups in the area through the community council would aid the city planning department which was looking to redevelop the area into high density apartments and commercial developments.

Ethnic and political antagonisms were not limited to the slums of Ward 4, but also frustrated attempts to organize a community council in the more stable neighbourhoods of West Toronto. West Toronto, however, was far from a homogenous community. Differences in economic status, voting behaviour and social attitudes marked the boundaries between the relatively affluent Anglo Saxon south and the more working-class and heterogeneous national and ethnic population of the Junction area to the north. Mutual antagonism existed between the two areas as the more affluent residents of the south looked upon the residents of the Junction as 'foreigners'. The firmly middle-class south also felt well served and saw little need for community organization, especially in concert with their northern neighbours. The residents of the Junction, in contrast, were more receptive to the idea of community organization to combat juvenile delinquency and provide better recreational facilities.
alcohol consumption also set Junction residents apart from their more puritanical High Park neighbours. Yet even given the presence of vibrant neighbourhood organizations, such as the Perth Royce Community Council, most people in the area did not participate socially on the basis of common residence.\textsuperscript{50}

**Regent Park and Community Planning as Citizen Movement: Milestone or Millstone?\textsuperscript{74}\textsuperscript{75}**

On October 29, 1948, as clouds threatened rain, Mayor McCallum dedicated the cornerstone of the Regent Park Housing Project, capping almost fifteen years of concerted action for public low-rental housing. Members of City Council and the newly formed Housing Authority took most of the bows while a small audience of volunteer lay and professional members who had fought long and hard for this project stood quietly in the background. Also hidden in the background, among the “motley array of dilapidated sheds, flat roofs and clotheslines” were Regent Park residents themselves who silently watched the death of their neighbourhood, mere spectators to an event which for better or worse would transform their neighbourhood and their lives.\textsuperscript{62}

As the centrepiece of Toronto’s post-war reconstruction plans, the clearance and reconstruction of Regent Park represented the best chance to put the ideals of democratic community planning into action. Clearing Cabbagetown’s ramshackle houses for public housing had been a long time goal of Toronto’s social reform movement. Regent Park was perhaps the closest thing that Toronto had to a classic slum. As numerous studies revealed, Cabbagetown’s houses were grossly overcrowded, lacked basic amenities such as central heat and indoor plumbing, were vermin infested, and many were in need of major internal and external repairs. Inadequate living conditions were also linked to the high rates of ‘deviancy’ and delinquency of area residents. According to the Bruce Report, Cabbagetown was “a disgrace to the city.”\textsuperscript{63} Regent Park, then, was more than just a project of social reform: it was an experiment in proper community planning. As Humphrey Carver explained to Canadian Welfare Council and Reconstruction Council president R.E.G. Davis:

> In the Conference I endeavoured to express what I believed to be the attitude of the Welfare Council towards Community Planning. I particularly took the opportunity of saying that a great deal of planning would be quite unrealistic until new legislation had provided for low-rental subsidized housing; the Canadian Welfare Council believed that only through the introduction of such measures would proper Community Planning be able to embrace all ... levels of the population.\textsuperscript{54}

Here was a chance to implement the latest theories of urban planning in concert with those who experienced the unplanned city at its worst — slum dwellers.

The most prominent ‘citizen’ organization involved in the campaign to rebuild Regent Park was the Citizen’s Housing and Planning Association (CHPA). The association came together during 1944 to place pressure on the municipal and federal governments to take immediate steps to solve the wartime housing crisis and start on a project of slum clearance and public housing in Regent Park. The mastermind behind the CHPA was W. Harold Clark, the head of the Toronto Branch of Canada Trust. Like the TRC the CHPA represented a broad cross section of Toronto society including social welfare and philanthropic organizations, professional town planners and architects such as future CMHC policy planner Humphrey Carver, highly influential social workers such as Albert Rose and Stuart Jaffary, Rosedale ladies, and labour organizations. Despite the number of distinguished luminaries in the association, working-class organizations, especially the Communist Party, composed a significant portion of the membership and played key roles in the organization. The presence of so many prominent social democrats and communists in the CHPA worried its members who feared that their moderate plans for social housing would be branded a communist plot. Indeed, the RCMP eventually investigated Clark as a suspected Communist.\textsuperscript{65}

In many ways the CHPA represented the paradoxical nature of citizen participation as envisaged by planning enthusiasts. Many CHPA members, such as Carver, Rose and Clark believed that the primary objective of the association was to “conduct an educational program which would acquaint the citizens of the community with housing and planning problems and to make specific recommendations for the improvement and ultimate solution of those problems.”\textsuperscript{66} The CHPA believed that it could educate people as to proper housing and planning programs and then “plump to get them.”\textsuperscript{67} In short, they believed that despite the urgency of slum clearance and the necessity of public housing, area residents had to be included in these crucial decisions which affected their lives. Yet, at the same time the many experts and activists in the organization claimed to know the solutions. Rather than listening to the community, its job was to struggle against public inertia and to interpret the planners’ ideas to the people. In this it was successful when it convinced both City Council and Torontonians to finance and build Regent Park out of local taxes.\textsuperscript{68}

Despite the CHPA’s victory for what would be Canada’s first public low-rental housing project, area residents remained wary of the project to be constructed for their “benefit.” Ever since the first groups of town planners, architects, clergymen, and public spirited people roamed the streets of Cabbagetown in the 1930s, area residents remained sceptical, if not hostile, to plans to clear their area of its so-called slums. These fears resurfaced during the post-war campaign for Regent Park. The crux of residents’ dissatisfaction with the scheme lay with the city’s inadequate compensation to area home owners.\textsuperscript{69} Equally significant was the residents’ complaint that they had been left out of the decision making. The Community Council Co-ordinating Committee did nothing to help area residents organize around the most important issue affecting their neighbourhood. Instead, the Council left the area under the jurisdic-
tation of the Toronto Welfare Council, which was working with local residents to combat juvenile delinquency and improve morals in the neighbourhood. It was as if community organizers and social housing activists believed that the issue of the actual plans for the neighbourhood had already been decided by the Bruce Report, the 1943 Master Plan, and subsequent reports from city planners. Community workers assumed that the residents of Cabbagetown accepted the idea that the road to their salvation lay in the demolition of their neighbourhood and its resurrection as a public housing project. Even then they believed that Regent Park would create a “community problem” because area residents would still need to be shown how to “take advantage of the opportunities the new housing will give them[!]”

Regent Park residents clearly illustrated to community organizers that they were not so apathetic, and not willing to idly accept the pearls of wisdom handed down to them by city planners. Area residents formed a ratepayer organization which hounded City Hall throughout the planning, clearance and reconstruction stages. During the entire period of planning and construction, despite their numerous depositions to City Council, the residents of Regent Park received almost no explanation of the city’s plans, or the project’s progress. No public meetings were held with residents to discuss the rent scale or eligibility for tenancy in the housing project. Despite pleas from area residents and certain members of the planning community, there was no provision made on the Housing Authority for community representation. As a result, area residents remained interested yet sceptical of the project. Briefs submitted to City Council by area residents claimed that “80% of the residents were opposed to the scheme if there was any way they could avoid it.” City politicians and members of the CHPA scoffed at the dissatisfaction of area residents. Yet a report prepared by the newly formed Toronto Housing Authority revealed that area residents referred to Regent Park as “the project rather than our project.” Residents felt so helpless in directing changes to their neighbourhood that they turned to more antagonistic tactics to voice their concerns about the project. Instead of turning to the community council movement, residents turned to more antagonistic tactics to voice their concerns about the project. Instead of turning to the community council movement residents turned to more traditional forms of support including their local CCF MPP, William Dennison, and to the two city labour councils, to represent their interests. The Toronto & Lakeshore Labour Council (CLC) was the only organization that consistently came to the aid of area residents throughout the entire process, and perhaps only because Sylvester (“Ves”) Perry, a Regent Park resident and member of the ratepayer’s organization, was also a prominent member of the United Packinghouse Workers’ union. Dissatisfied with the City’s approach to urban renewal Perry campaigned, unsuccessfully, for Ward 2 alderman in 1948 and 1949 to represent the interests of Cabbagetown residents facing expropriation. Regent Park may have been a success for the social housing movement, but as Albert Rose and Alison Hopwood, two prominent members of the Reconstruction Council and CHPA believed, as an experiment in democratic community planning, the project was more a ‘millstone’ than a ‘milestone.’

Conclusion:
Late in 1949 Hugo Wolter dourly reflected on the state of community organization in Toronto. He claimed that, unlike his experience in the United States, there was no idea of “people and government travelling together” in all phases of community life. This assessment discounted the well-springs of grassroots organization which he found in Toronto, while overstating his American experiences. Indeed, the Civic Advisory Council, the successor to the Reconstruction Council, reviewed the program after its first year and declared it a tremendous success. Hoping to place the experiment on more solid ground the Advisory Council recommended that the Welfare Council take responsibility for the project. The problem with community organization in Toronto was not so much apathy in the “grassroots,” but rather distrust of local autonomy from above. Here Wolter’s assessments were clear. As he outlined in his report, much of the initiative and sense of responsibility for neighbourhood action came from those considered “beyond the pale” of Toronto society, which only seemed to make dominant cultural groups more determined to thwart grassroots neighbourhood action. Moreover, there was little support from city politicians who viewed neighbourhood organizations as threats to their power. That social service organizations were at the centre of the community council movement also created problems for grassroots community organizing. These organizations represented few people in the community, both in terms of numbers and in terms of differing social, ethnic and age groups. They also generated a great deal of suspicion among neighbours who felt that they were out to “make good [citizens] of us.” Yet, social service groups were extremely reluctant to broaden the councils to give a real voice to ethnic, youth and labour interests. As Wolter lamented, grassroots action was stymied at every opportunity, not necessarily by outright opposition but by lack of support from established community interests. Their attitude was that every thing which ought to be done was being done. Their ideas in regard to how people and organizations should conduct themselves were deeply ingrained in Toronto’s Tory political culture. Attempts to push social and cultural development contrary to local traditions were labelled “Red.” The anti-communist hysteria that characterized Toronto’s post-war political landscape ultimately discredited the whole idea of community organization. As a result, Toronto’s bold experiment with community organization lapsed after 1949 when the Community Chest refused to fund the project on a more permanent basis as part of the Welfare Council’s social planning activities.

The failure of community organization also reflected a general movement away from comprehensive social planning which plagued the Reconstruction Council. By 1950 the TRC, now renamed the Civic Advisory Council, was but a mere shell of its former self. Popular membership, participation and support for the council fell precipitously. Part of this was due to the shift in

55 Urban History Review / Revue d'histoire urbaine Vol XXVII, No. 2 (March, 1999)
the focus of the Council's work from the immediate problems of peace-time reconversion to more long-range planning concerns, such as the fiscal and constitutional issues surrounding the creation of Metropolitan Toronto. Further hampering its credibility as an organization representative of broad community opinion was City Hall's increased control over the council's agenda. After years of struggling to maintain its funding and its independence from City Hall, the CAC disbanded in January 1953 when its members refused to allow it to become an adjunct of the city clerk's office. The legacy of community organization in 1940s Toronto, then, is an ambivalent one. The need for communities to organize, and the local state's need to organize communities, arose out the urgent social problems of Toronto's neighbourhoods fostered by two decades of depression and war. The tremendous social upheavals created by the housing crisis, suburbanisation, immigration, and the rise of the political left spurred communities into action while compelling the state to control those activities. However, attempts by the state to reawaken the 'principle of community,' unleashed forces with which it could not nor did not want to deal. In essence, the work of the Reconstruction Council and its Community Council Co-ordinating Committee embodied the fundamental contradictions of a welfare state, which simultaneously seeks to enhance social welfare, to develop the power of individuals, to exert control over the play of remote socio-economic forces, while seeking to regulate people's actions and ideas, adapting them to the requirements of the state and capital. The conditions which fostered the rise of community organizations, however, were also responsible for their decline. Community-based organizations have always tended to be oriented to single issues and few have continuous histories of activism. Despite widespread anxiety about the condition of Toronto's neighbourhoods, community organization rested on limited and shifting foundations. It was not only that the social idealism fostered by the hopes of democratic planning had been significantly dampened by the widespread anti-communism that dominated post-war Toronto. More important, community activism both rose and fell because of the instability of Toronto's neighbourhoods. Many working-class and lower middle-class inner-city neighbourhoods disintegrated under the pressures of post-war suburbanisation, which extracted their most stable and most active members leaving these neighbourhoods to newly arrived immigrants, single mothers, welfare recipients and other members of the city's casual working class. As one social worker operating in the Ward 4 neighbourhood of Alexandra Park, a 'slum' slated for urban renewal in the late 1950s, lamented: "There were once [local] leaders in this neighbourhood. ... But the old established leaders who were concerned about the conditions of their homes and surroundings have gone." Indeed, the tremendous movement of population into and out of the city after 1945 did much to undermine communal solidarities, or indeed, any single coherent vision of the social structure. Finally, the TRC's vision of comprehensive social planning failed because of its inability to articulate a clear vision of community. Who ultimately decided what was in the best interests of the community or communities of Toronto? The inability to reconcile competing visions of community was most clearly evident in the reconstruction of Regent Park, which represented both the crowning glory of Toronto's post-war reconstruction program, as well as its ultimate failure. Many Torontonians undoubtedly benefited from the provision of housing where rent was geared to income, but as many social-housing advocates feared, the "bulldozing" of the community and the interests of its residents ultimately discredited the whole program of urban renewal. Indeed, planners ignored local interests at their own peril, for Cabbagetown residents ultimately had the final say twenty years later when community organizations in Don Vale and Treffan Court, remembering Regent Park, brought the city's and the federal government's urban renewal program to its knees.

Notes
3. A recent correction to this oversight is James Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario 1920-1970 (Toronto, 1994), which reminds us that the local state was very much involved in the delivery and planning of welfare services.
“People and Government Travelling Together”


22. CPB, Annual Report, 1944, 16.

23. National Archives of Canada (hereafter NA), MG 28 I 14, Community Planning Association of Canada (hereafter CPAC), vol. 1, file 17, R.E.G. Davis, Presidential Address to the 1947 CPAC Conference. In the speech Davis described the middle class flight to the suburbs as bad for them spiritually and a financial drain on the city.


26. CTA, RG 249, Box 1, file 11, Public Relations Committee Minutes, Feb. 13, 1944. Comments by G.F. Davies. See also the comments of J.G. Johnston, ibid., March 17, 1944.

27. S. Prentice, “Militant Mothers in Domestic Times: Toronto’s Post-War Child Care Struggle,” 86–93; and J. Wade, Houses for All, Ch. 5, passim.


29. CTA, RG 32, (City of Toronto Planning Board, hereafter CPB) Series B1, Box 7, file 3, Tracey LeMay Papers, Memo on Neighbourhood Improvement (submitted by Councillor Stewart Smith).


31. CTA, RG 249, Box 3, file 1, Dodge Re CAC Objectives and Activities, n.d.

32. CTA, RG 249, Box 1, File 5, Executive Committee Minutes, June 15, 1948.

33. Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience, 118–119.

34. CTA, SC 61, WH Clark Papers, Box 1, file 1, Transcript of broadcast “Toronto Tomorrow,” (CJBC), August 1, 1945.

35. NA, MG 28 I 14, vol. 1, file 2, Executive correspondence, R.E.G. Davis to A. Armstrong, 2 September, 1947.


38. CTA, SC 61, Box 1, file 1, Transcript of broadcast CJBC August 1, 1945. Emphasis mine.

39. CTA, RG 249, Box 1, file 14, Community Council Committee Minutes, December 3, 1947.


41. CTA, RG 16 (City of Toronto Property Department), Box 10, file 61, “Community Councils and a Community Counsellor”, October 1947.


44. CTA, RG 249, Box 5, file 10, Press release Mayors Office September 17, 1947; and “Report of the Community Counsellor to the Community Council Committee of the Civic Advisory Committee, City of Toronto, Ont.” (September 1949), passim.


47. CTA, RG 249, Box 3, file 2, Survey Of Community Councils And Associations: Re Future Of The Position Of Community Counsellor.


50. CTA, RG 007 A1, (Mayor’s Papers – Correspondence), Box 59, file 1, Wolter to Mayor McCallum, March 1, 1949.
52. CTA, RG 002, (Board of Control – Correspondence), #3200 – Memo from Toronto and District Emergency Housing Committee, August 29, 1947.
53. CTA, RG 249, Box 1, File 3, Joint Committee on the Future of the Position of Community Counsellor, June 6, 1949, 4.
54. CTA, RG 249, Box 6, File 1, Draft Report of Community Counsellor, September 1949.
55. Ibid.
57. CTA, RG 007 A1, Box 59, file 1, H. Wolter to H. McCallum, March 1, 1949.
58. Ibid.
64. NA, MG 28 I 14 Vol 1, file 1, H. Carver to R.E.G. Davis, June 28, 1946.
65. H. Carver, Compassionate Landscape, 82-83; and J. Bacher, Keeping to the Marketplace, 23. Of the approximately 90 members of the organization one quarter had connections to working-class organizations. Communist Party Controller Stewart Smith and local United Electrical Workers organizer Ross Russell played a prominent role on the executive committee, and regularly spoke on behalf of the organization. Bacher claims that both Clark and the Communist members of the Association were careful not to visit each other’s houses for fear of discrediting social housing as a party plot. John Bacher, Personal Correspondence with the author, June 10, 1998.
66. A. Rose, Regent Park, 47.
67. NA, MG 28 I 14, Volume 1, file 1, Memo, December 4, 1946.
68. For a full account of the CHPA’s role in the battle for Regent Park see A. Rose, Regent Park, 47-60.
69. CTA, RG 007 A1, Box 36, files 2-4 Various letters from The Regent Park Ratepayers Association to Mayor H. McCallum and the Board of Control, May 12, 1947; May 27, May 31, 1948, April 27, May 4, 1949. CTA, RG 002, Records of the City Executive, Board of Control Correspondence 1947, Minute # 1151 – May 30, 1947.
71. J. Sewell, The Shape of the City, 72.
77. For a history of community organization in the United States during this period see R. Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighbourhood Organizing in America Updated Edition (New York, 1994).
78. CTA, RG 249, Box 6, file 5, Analysis of the Success and Failures of Community Councils and Associations in Toronto. Gale Wills also attributes the failure of the community council movement to corporate forces within the Community Chest who were fearful of a more decentralized and democratic approach to social planning and welfare provision. See Marriage of Convenience, 117–118.
79. CTA, RG 249, Box 1, file 5, Executive Committee Minutes #590, December 29, 1952; and RG 249, Box 3, file 2, W.H. Clark to Mayor A. Lamport, January 6, 1953.