Technology and Law Enforcement: The Transformation of the Calgary Police Force, 1900-1940

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Résumé de l’article

Abstract

As was the case in cities across North America, Calgary’s police force underwent a transformation in the early twentieth century. In particular, new technologies were embraced and utilized, notably in the fields of training, communication, identification, and records. Yet while this process of modernization certainly eased the day-to-day operations of Calgary’s law enforcement, it provided mixed results in increasing the rate of conviction across a wide range of offenses. As such, this article offers a caution against equating modernization and professionalization, per se, with improvements in effective policing.

Résumé

Au début du XXe siècle, le service de police de Calgary subit des transformations, à l’instar d’autres villes nord-américaines. Ces transformations se manifestent surtout par l’emploi de nouvelles technologies, notamment dans les domaines touchant la formation, les communications, l’identification et les comptes rendus. Toutefois, bien que ce processus de modernisation ait facilité les activités des responsables du maintien de l’ordre de Calgary, ses résultats demeuraient mitigés si l’on tient compte de l’augmentation de taux de condamnations parmi un grand nombre d’infractions. Le présent article offre une mise en garde contre l’assimilation de la modernisation et de la professionnalisation, comme telles, et l’amélioration de l’efficacité du maintien de l’ordre.

American historian Eric Monkkonen has identified four innovative features that characterized the “new” police forces created at the end of the nineteenth century. A hierarchical organization; a shift from the judicial to the executive branch of local government; public visibility through the adoption of uniforms; and an emphasis on the active role of officers, entailing regular patrols and free prosecution of criminal offenders, all combined to modernize urban policing. “The new kind of police came as costly service innovations to American cities,” Monkkonen concludes, “stingy city governments often resisting the transition specifically because of their new claim on city budgets.”1 The situation was similar in Canada, where a new sense of professionalism and the adoption of new technologies transformed the nature of municipal policing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 And like their American counterparts, Canadian civic administrations were keen to keep a lid on rising police costs. “The work of policing,” John Weaver writes, “like all work between the 1880s and the 1920s, experienced efficiency campaigns and felt promptly the impact of technology. City councils and police commissions were cost conscious.”3

Unlike the drive for efficiency in industry, however, cost consciousness among civic politicians did not, as Sidney Harring has noted, “reduce the numbers of officers already on the force, but it precluded the necessity of further increases.”4 In the case of Calgary—the subject of this study—the police department’s greater reliance on new technologies in the 1920s actually coincided with a partial restoration of its manpower, from the wartime low of just fifty officers to more than seventy by the end of the decade.5 Yet there is no question that the nature of police work itself, even as it remained an essentially labour-intensive occupation, underwent a substantial transformation with the combined advent of motorized patrols, electronic communications, systematic fingerprinting of suspects, and other technological innovations. What is less certain is just what impact that transformation had on the overall enforcement of law and order. Was there, for example, a significant change in the rate of conviction, and if so among which types of offenses in particular? And did shifts in the patterns of conviction rates among various offenses indicate new priorities when it came to law enforcement?

This article addresses these questions, using the transformation of the Calgary police force in the years 1900–1940 as a case study. First, it reviews the main challenges or difficulties in policing Calgary around the turn of the twentieth century, notably a lack of adequate manpower, the quality and training of the officers themselves, working conditions and remuneration, and associated problems of discipline and morale. Second, it traces the efforts of successive police chiefs before, during, and after World War I to employ newly available technology to overcome some of these problems and to nurture a new sense of professionalism on the force. Finally, it analyzes changes in the conviction rates for various offenses in the interwar years in an attempt to gauge what practical impact the transformation of the police force might have had, first, on overall law enforcement in Calgary and, second, on the changing nature and priorities of police work itself.

Growing rapidly from a population of just 4400 in 1901 to 44,000 a mere decade later, and then doubling to 88,000 by the outbreak of World War II, Calgary experienced an exaggerated form of the problems and challenges described by historians in the case of other cities. Its sudden transformation from a small frontier outpost into a complex urban society required a substantial change in the nature and practice of policing, yet its police department was only one among many public services competing for a share of limited tax revenues.6 In consequence, city council always resisted simply increasing the size of the force, and instead urged successive chiefs to seek greater efficiency with the resources they already had. In March 1924, for example, during a council debate on the civic estimates for that year, Alderman R. C. Thomas pointed out that the Halifax police force had recently trimmed its budget by $24,000, almost 90 per cent of which was in salary cuts. By contrast, Calgary’s force had reduced its own costs over the previous year by a mere $13,000. Part of the problem, Thomas...
The impressionistic observations of Alderman Thomas were continued, that while Halifax had a ratio of ten officers to sixty-four constables, in Calgary it was twenty-three to forty-six, and the top-heavy department could afford to trim some of this fat. Council agreed, at least in principle it would appear, for three days later it voted to reduce the force by five men, thereby saving an additional $4900. Yet even this economy did not satisfy Thomas, who had pushed for a ten-man reduction. “Do you think Calgary is like the slums of Paris?” he asked his fellow aldermen, questioning once more the need for a large police force. “You see them [patrolmen] going around in twos—sometimes triplets.”

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Within a single police force, functions and objectives vary over time. In his study of the police in Des Moines, Doug Wertsch traces that force’s evolution over the course of the twentieth century, from a small, loosely organized force intent on maintaining public order to a complex bureaucracy dedicated to protecting the public from serious crime. Building on Eric Monkkonen’s argument that police objectives shifted from “social control” or “class control” in the late nineteenth century, to a more strictly legalistic “crime control” by the early twentieth century, Wertsch argues,

In the process of professionalization, police departments tended to evolve through three successive types—service, watchman, and legalistic departments—each marked by increasing adherence to the legal preserves established by the early twentieth century. Wertsch argues, and enjoys a close rapport with the public. At the other end, the legalistic department is characterized by strict adherence to the letter of the law and by a tight complex organization that places a premium on specialization of functions within the department.

At first glance, policing in Calgary appears to have undergone a similar transition in the interwar years. From 1926 to 1938, for example, arrests for public or social disorder offenses—drunkenness, prostitution, and vagrancy—fell from slightly under 16 per cent to just 8 per cent of total arrests made. At the same time, arrests for civil or legalistic offenses—violations of local by-laws, vehicle and traffic acts, and the provincial liquor control act—rose from 39 per cent to almost 46 per cent of total arrests. On this basis, it would appear that the Calgary police force’s dual embrace of technology and a new professional ethos at least coincided with a shift in day-to-day policing priorities.

However, other historians have questioned any such conflation of urban growth and complexity, on the one hand, with linear changes in police forces or policing practices on the other. Philip Ethington’s analysis of the San Francisco police force, for example, rejects the idea that improvements in professionalism or efficiency were necessarily a function of the growing complexity of the city in the late 1800s. “Long before the Progressive era and its war on municipal corruption,” he argues, “. . . the San Francisco police had established a department relatively free from partisan control, run by career officers, and staffed by highly-paid, dedicated patrolmen whose jobs were not mere patronage plums.” Similarly, in their study of Toronto’s police force between 1859 and 1955, Helen Boritch and John Hagan challenge the view of Monkkonen and others that there was any unidirectional evolution from “class-control” to “crime-control” policing over the century. Instead, they argue, as one type of problem behavior and one part of the “dangerous classes” receded from police attention, another type of public order offense replaced it. Examination of arrest rates for public order offenses, collectively and individually, showed that the urban reform era did not witness a dramatic change in police priorities but rather an intensification of pro-active, class-control policing.”

Contemporary press accounts in Calgary frequently cited a figure of one police officer per thousand capita as the desired norm in North America. Eric Monkkonen, on the other hand, claims that a ratio of two officers per thousand was in fact the standard by the early twentieth century. A previous study of crime in Calgary, by Thomas Thorner and Neil Watson, shows that the city’s force rarely approached either of these targets. Indeed, as figure 1 demonstrates, between 1900 and 1934 the ratio exceeded one per thousand for only a decade or so and not once came even close to the figure of two per thousand. The restoration of the force’s manpower in the 1920s did not, therefore, result in its strength increasing relative to the city’s growing population. It is within this context that the impact of new technology and a new sense of professionalism on the Calgary police force should be judged.

Any such assessment also depends on the stated or perceived role of the police as agents of law enforcement. In Police in Urban Society, Harlan Hahn argues that police forces properly perform a restrictive, legalistic function. “The proper jurisdiction of police officers,” he writes, “. . . may be confined to the thin barrier that separates permissible social conduct and legal prohibitions. Personal behavior may become police business when these two points are joined, that is, when public activities begin to trespass upon the legal preserves established by government officials.” By contrast, in Policing Liberal Society Steve Uglow outlines a much wider, more invasive role. “The police officer can be seen as crimefighter, bureaucrat, crowd controller, intelligence officer, and social worker simultaneously,” he suggests. “There is very little that is not police business.”

31 Urban History Review / Revue d’histoire urbaine Vol. XXXIII, No. 2 (Spring 2005 printemps)
The reference to arrest rates here raises the question of how best to assess the performance of the police as enforcers of the law. Sharing Boritch and Hagan’s focus on arrest and arrest rates, Ethington argues that these provide “a strong indicator of the determination and assiduity of a policeman’s job on a day-to-day basis.”

This may be true, but arrest rates present their own problem in that they do not separate the guilty from those arrested individuals who, for one reason or another, are never formally charged, sent to trial, or found guilty. Similarly, an equation of all cases that come to trial with the overall rate of actual crime—as in the case of the study by Thorner and Watson—also conflates and blurs the distinction between the two separate categories.

For the purposes of this study, the rate of conviction—the proportion of cases going to trial that resulted in conviction—is used as a measure of law enforcement in Calgary. There are certain limitations to this measurement, admittedly. For example, it does not take into account the “dark figure” of crime, those incidents or offences that never get reported to the police, let alone come to trial. Nor does it reflect the broader role that arrest plays within the criminal justice system. In many cases a court appearance was never the intended fate of those arrested by the police—a night in the cells to sober up or a salutary warning against further transgression was often more appropriate—and so the conviction rate inevitably understates the work performed by the police. Finally, there are obviously many other factors that determine the outcome of a trial apart from the work of the police themselves, such as the relative competency of prosecution and defence lawyers, the leniency (or otherwise) of the presiding magistrate, and the demeanour and disposition of the accused themselves at trial.

However, conviction rates do possess certain advantages in comparison with other measurements of law enforcement, such as arrest rates. First, given that the successful detection of crime—resulting in arrest, trial, and conviction—is an element common both to Hahn’s restrictive and Uglow’s more liberal definitions of the police’s function in society, the rate of conviction is a fair measure of law enforcement. As just mentioned, while not all arrests are intended to go trial, once the criminal justice system has committed itself to a trial in any given case, a conviction is the desired outcome as far as that system is concerned. The rate of conviction thus reflects the effective enforcement of law, both in general and across individual offences. This is the second advantage of using conviction rates: they allow us to compare the relative success of law enforcement for different offences and different categories of offence. Not all categories of offence are prosecuted with equal success, and any discussion of law enforcement in general needs
to consider the implications of variations in conviction rates. As will be seen, in Calgary between the wars these variations were significant, with the conviction rate for some offences being higher than 90 per cent, while for others it was barely 50 per cent. Most important, however, by calculating annual conviction rates it is possible to trace relative shifts in the prosecution of different offences over time. It is one thing to note that certain offences were easier to convict than others; it is something else to explain why the conviction rate for any particular offence should vary significantly during a given period. A focus on conviction rates between the two world wars, then, will provide a complex portrait of law enforcement in Calgary, even as its police force embraced new technologies and a new sense of professionalism in response to the challenges it faced.

For the first two decades of its existence, Calgary’s police force was a small, ramshackle, and amateurish affair. Formed shortly after Calgary’s incorporation in 1884, the municipal force shared jurisdiction and duties with the North-West Mounted Police, an uneasy relationship that resulted in frequent disputes and conflicts. Under the command of Jack Ingram (1885–1888) and Matthew Dillabaugh (1888–1890), the police force remained small in size, consisting of just one or two constables. Moreover, neither chief enjoyed the full support of the town council. Ingram resigned when it became clear to him that he was no longer wanted in the position, while Dillabaugh was fired shortly after being demoted to the rank of constable in an alleged cost-saving measure. His successor, Tom English, served as chief of police for eighteen years from 1891 to 1909, during which time the force rose in size to more than thirty officers. Yet he, too, would endure the wrath of local political and community leaders from time to time, who accused him of turning a blind eye to gambling dens and prostitution houses in the city. “The chief is a most efficient officer and his position will not be affected by this passing episode,” wrote the Calgary Herald in the wake of the most recent gambling scandal in July 1905, “but he should remember that the press speak for the public and he is a paid servant of the public.”

Four years later, another scandal over prostitution in Calgary proved to be the final straw, and the city summarily dismissed the sixty-two-year-old English. The problems in policing Calgary went deeper than mere personality clashes or public concern over vice. In his annual report for 1906, English had complained, not for the first time, that “the numerical strength of the Calgary police force is considerably below that of any other city in Canada in proportion to population.” What was more, he added, there was “no reason why Calgary should be more law abiding than other cities of the west, and that it is so is due largely to the efforts of the police force.” At that time, a total of just six officers was responsible for policing a city of some 12,000, one quarter of the two officers per thousand capita ratio cited by Monkkonen. In fact, it was even worse than this, as English pointed out, for only three of those six officers were actually patrol constables. Police manpower remained at this proportionate level for most of the pre-war period, improving to over one officer per thousand only in the years 1911–1916, until wartime enlistment within the force once again tilted the balance.

Calls for additional men had to be balanced against the cost they represented to the city. In 1909, for example, police salaries amounted to more than $23,000, or 80 per cent of the department’s entire expenditure of $28,610 that year. Policing pre-war Calgary was, in short, a labour-intensive operation, and the chief’s requests for more men were granted only with reluctance by the city. A year before in 1908, English had recommended the hiring of four additional men at a cost of $6000, on top of the $23,000 already budgeted. After much debate, the council agreed to three men.

What kind of men were Calgary taxpayers getting for their money? Judging by a personnel roster for 1911, the main qualifications at this time appear to have been physical size and relative youth. Of the fifty-three officers listed, twenty-five measured six feet tall or over, while none was shorter than five feet ten inches. Twenty-nine officers—55 per cent—were under
the age of thirty, twenty-one were between thirty and thirty-nine, leaving just three aged forty years or older. A corollary, perhaps, was the fact that more than half the men—twenty-eight in total—were unmarried, understandable given the arduous hours and trying lifestyle that serving the police entailed. Yet this was not a rookie department, for many of the men had previous experience with other police forces. Eight had worked elsewhere in Canada, eighteen in Scotland, three in England, two with the Royal Irish Constabulary, and three others in South Africa. In addition, five men had military records of various kinds, bringing the total of experienced officers to thirty-nine, or almost 75 per cent of the total.28 It is less clear, however, whether this experience was a guarantee of suitability. “Because men with prior police experience, however brief, were preferred by many chief constables,” Greg Marquis has noted, “men who had been dismissed as probationers or constables, or found guilty of some criminal act, often were recruited to join [other] police departments.”29 Of perhaps greater relevance was the fact that very few of the men listed in 1911 had been with the Calgary force for any length of time. More than half—thirty-one—had joined that year, while fifteen others had been appointed over the previous two years. That leaves only seven men who had served in Calgary for more than three years, and none for more than five. Any sense of common culture or camaraderie among officers may have been limited by their newness to the force, and perhaps helps explain some of the problems of discipline and morale that plagued both English and his successor, Thomas Mackie.30

Working conditions and long hours must also have played their part in lowering morale. Most shifts lasted for eleven hours (7 a.m. to 6 p.m.; 1 p.m. to midnight; 7 p.m. to 6 a.m.; 10 p.m. to 7 a.m.). “You gentlemen will see that the hours are long on ordinary days,” English advised city council in 1906, “and very much longer on all public and legal holidays.” Two years later, a reporter for the Herald claimed that the city’s police worked “the longest hours and receive comparatively the smallest pay” of all workers in Calgary.31 Police records from that time underline the length of the regular shifts, indicating in fact that constables could expect to work fourteen hours straight each day:

The 1st. Division of day men will report at Police Station at 5.55 A.M. and relieve men on night duty. go for breakfast at 8 A.M. then report at Police Office at 9.55 A.M. Dinner at 2 P.M. till 4 P.M. Report off duty at 8 P.M.

The 2nd. Division of Day men will report at Police Station at 7.55 A.M. previously having breakfast and relieve the men on the 1st. Division. Dinner from 12 till 2 P.M.

Will be allowed one day off duty every week, each in turn according to the emergency of the service.32

In return for such gruelling shifts, a constable’s starting salary was $65 per month. Pay for police was low across the board at this time. In 1910, an inspector’s annual income of $1260 was roughly equivalent to that of a skilled carpenter, while a sergeant’s monthly pay of $85–90 put him on a par with pressmen and machinists. At the lower end, the pay for constables left them little better off than unskilled factory workers.33

The sheer size of Calgary also made the police’s job difficult. In 1910, the recently appointed Mackie commented, “It is impossible with the present number of men to patrol the City, and the people in outlying districts might just as well (as far as police protection is concerned) be outside the city.”34 To help combat the problems that his patrol officers faced, Mackie had already created a mounted police squad; he now recommended the addition of two more horses, plus the erection of three substations in the more remote areas of the town. He also argued for the installation of a patrol signal system, which would enable officers to communicate with the downtown station once every hour from any one of fifty boxes placed around the city. With such ideas, the transformation of policing in Calgary had begun.35

There was an urgency to Mackie’s recommendations, for there were by now clear signs that morale and discipline on the force were in danger of breaking down completely. “That there is discontent among the police is assured,” revealed the Herald...
in February 1911, "but this condition has existed for several months past, and each week something happens to stir up the grievances once more, and the talk is renewed." Mackie himself conceded that "there were some on the force who were giving out information detrimental to the work of the police and these would have to be discharged and got rid of before there would be harmony and peace on the force." Mackie declined to go into more details, but harmony and peace seemed unlikely prospects. A year earlier, he and Constable Bert Fisher had clashed over a case involving the latter's involvement with a prostitute, a dispute that ended with the two officers brawling on the floor of the police station and a subsequent humiliating public inquiry into Mackie's command of the force. "It is evident at the police station that Chief Mackie is not held in respect by several officers under him," the Herald once more observed, "and many say they have grievances against him. It has been learned from good authority that certain policemen are forming a delegation to wait on the commissioners and ask for the chief's dismissal." Mackie hung on for a while, but eventually resigned in January 1912. He was the fourth chief in succession to have left the position under a cloud of scandal or controversy. More than the previous occasions, however, Mackie's departure marked a moment of real crisis for the Calgary police force. For one thing, the city was no longer the small, frontier-style community it had been under Ingram, Dillabaugh, and to some extent English, but instead had become a thriving prairie metropolis, for which a well-run police force was a necessity. For another, Mackie had been chosen to replace English precisely to avoid the disarray that had ended his predecessor's scandal-ridden regime. The Herald's verdict captured the sense of disappointment. "He did his best," the paper wrote of Mackie's exit, "but the duties of the police chief during the past year have been somewhat unusual and he was not always prepared to handle the circumstances in what seemed the most satisfactory way." Thomas Mackie's reign as chief of police in Calgary may have been short—merely two and a half years—but in retrospect it
stands as a turning point in the force’s evolution. He had, as seen, taken the first steps to modernize the Calgary police force, by establishing up a motor vehicle department, substations, and an electronic signal system. As such, he had left his immediate successors—Alfred Cuddy and Dave Ritchie—a legacy on which to build.

It was with considerable care that Calgary’s police commissioners scrutinized the sixty-five applications submitted to succeed Thomas Mackie as chief in the early weeks of 1912. Finally, they settled on Alfred Cuddy, a fifty-year-old inspector from Toronto with twenty-six years of police experience and an impeccable service record. As it turned out, his tenure as chief of police in Calgary would also be relatively brief—just seven years—but in that time he succeeded in reasserting the authority of that position, both among the men on his force and in the eyes of city officials. He also continued the modernization of the force, building on the modest foundations laid down by Mackie. Immediately upon being appointed, he announced a new regime of physical fitness for officers, established a Criminal Investigation Bureau, and opened several new substations in the suburbs of the expanding city.

Much of this Cuddy achieved against the backdrop of a sharp economic recession in 1912–1913, followed by the outbreak of war in which a full third of his force enlisted. He also had to contend with several potentially damaging incidents. These included the sudden disappearance of Police Court Clerk Edward Foot in October 1913, along with the bail and fine money kept in the station’s safe, and the shooting death of Constable Arthur Duncan in July 1917, the force’s first job-related fatality. Cuddy even survived the occasional self-inflicted wounds, such as the time when he went on record as being opposed to the idea of hiring female detectives. “I am firmly of the opinion that the woman who would be suitable for the position has yet to be born,” he told a local reporter in April 1914. “It would be necessary to apply eugenics and special education facilities before we would have a woman who would be of any use on a police force.” Such statements say much about the male culture that pervaded the police force in Calgary, as elsewhere, and coming on the eve of women obtaining the vote in Alberta, it was less than circumspect.

Relations between the police department and city hall improved under Cuddy, but there were still difficulties. The two clashed, for example, over who should have the final say on specific promotions within the force. But it is clear that when Cuddy resigned in 1919 to take up a commission with the newly formed Alberta Provincial Police, city officials were appreciative of what he had achieved and mindful not to risk squandering that achievement. Thus in July 1919, the police commission acknowledged that “too much care cannot be exercised in selecting the new chief.” The list of applicants this time ran to thirty-two names, including several seasoned officers from within the force itself. The commission appears to have been wary about appointing an “inside” candidate, fearing a renewal of internal division and dissent even the appearance of favouritism might spark. But in the end, however, it overcame this fear and selected thirty-seven-year-old Dave Ritchie, then serving as the department’s inspector.

Ritchie was a career policeman, having served on the force in Greenoch, Scotland, before moving to Canada in 1911. He joined the Calgary force that summer and soon worked his way up the ladder of promotion, being appointed to the city detective department within a year. During the war, Ritchie also distinguished himself as captain of the 137th and, later, the 116th Battalions. In the spring of 1917, he was wounded at the Battle of Amiens—for which he later received the Military Cross—and subsequently ruled hors de combat. He was discharged from hospital a week before the November 1918 Armistice and a month later returned to Canada. Ritchie rejoined the Calgary force in January 1919, just as the search for Cuddy’s successor was under way.

Such was the man, then, who would lead Calgary’s police force throughout the entire interwar period. A police officer with
Transformation of the Calgary Police Force, 1900–1940

Figure 6. Police car in Calgary, 1924

more than two decades of experience, much of it in Calgary; a decorated war veteran; and someone who was, as far as it can be ascertained, genuinely popular among his fellow officers. From his appointment in 1919 until his death (during a gall bladder operation) in 1941, Ritchie managed to exploit this reservoir of goodwill to complete the modernization of the force begun by Mackie and Cuddy before him. To the persistent problems of manpower, conditions of work, and officer morale and discipline, Ritchie brought a new ethos of professionalism and the benefits of newly available technology, and in doing so, completed the transformation of the Calgary police force that his two predecessors had begun.

On the face of it, adequate police manpower levels continued to be a problem in the first decade after World War I. Returning veterans—and only four officers failed to return—boosted the force in 1919, as did a brief flurry of recruitment in 1920–1921. After then, however, the city made a series of cuts, and by 1925–1926 had reduced the force to just sixty-one officers, the lowest it had been in more than two decades. By 1929 there had been a slight recovery to seventy-five officers, but with the city growing from 63,000 to 83,000 during the decade, this left the force at well below the desired level of one man per 1000 capita.47

Rather than battle city hall over the issue, however, Chief Ritchie focused on securing support for his efforts to improve the men he did have on the force. His aim was to foster a new sense of professionalism among the police. In his report for 1921, for example, he noted that there had been “a marked increase of
interest shown by the men in their work, and a stronger tendency to remain with the Police Force. For this reason I would strongly urge that every possible consideration be given to the betterment of their condition, training and development as Police Officers. It is possible, of course, that the tight labour market of the postwar period encouraged men to stay on the force, but in any event Ritchie viewed this trend as an opportunity to build a new sense of professionalism among the ranks. A year later, he reiterated the need to address this matter:

The duties of the Police are each year becoming more onerous and intricate, having regard to new legislation that is continuously coming into effect. For this reason it is essential that only highly trained men be used for the purpose of enforcing law and order, and it is necessary that the Police should have the best possible service conditions, to induce the men to stay in the service.

In other words, Ritchie implied, money spent on improving the force in the short run would be money saved in the long run, as a result of a reduced level in turnover. Others in Calgary echoed Ritchie in this belief, including Police Magistrate Colonel Gilbert Sanders. "The administrators and the people have had a rude awakening from their lethargic treatment of the police force," he argued shortly after the labour unrest of 1919. "They took them for granted for example as part of everyday life which would continue in spite of universally changed conditions. . . . The police were blamed if anything went wrong. No inquiry was made to see if they were undermanned, underpaid or interfered with." Sanders's words were, at once, a criticism of those who believed a modern police force could be purchased on the cheap and a call for a greater autonomy from political intervention.

Police officers themselves would have to demonstrate that they merited this new measure of independence and respect. To this end, new recruits were encouraged to attend public lectures on subjects of relevance to their work. In 1923, for example, Colonel Sanders spoke on "The Powers of the Constable," while Mr. Poole, the police crown prosecutor, delivered a talk entitled "Evidence." Both lectures, Ritchie noted, were given in a "very forcible and instructive manner" and "aroused a great deal of interest and created an appetite for knowledge in the Department." Certainly, if Ritchie's own annual reports for the 1920s are to be believed, such activities did help to improve discipline and morale on the force, for there are no mentions of any serious problem in either respect.

Ritchie's new emphasis on policing as a vocation, rather than a mere job, was a further sign of the new spirit of professionalism that he hoped to instill in the force. In his study of the San Francisco police department, Philip Ethington defines professionalism as a "long-term commitment to a career in accordance with the 'service ideal,'" noting that it thus was desirable to attract new recruits at as early an age as possible. Ritchie had come to the same conclusion. In 1927, he lowered the maximum age of recruitment to twenty-five, noting that he was "confident that this will be in the best interests of this department and the City generally, and will be reflected in an increased efficiency. To make the best of any men in this business, it is essential that he commences his training young, and usually having selected a vocation in life, will remain with it and carry on with enthusiasm." A year later, Ritchie repeated this belief, adding that new recruits were now "joining up at an age when they fit in more readily, and are much easier educated in Police Work, and further men joining up now are apparently more anxious to make the Police Service their life work. Having that in mind they are more interested and consequently more efficient." By now, the occasional lecture or two had given way to a series of educational tests designed to gauge the aptitude of applicants. "In this way we are reasonably assured of getting the best candidates and this helps to raise the standard of the department and the Police generally," Ritchie explained. "I am very well satisfied with the caliber of recruits taken on in recent months and am already assured they will reflect credit on the department."

The creation of a modern, professional police force required more than harder exams and better training, however. Just as important was the employment of new technologies to overcome the problem of sheer size that Calgary presented and the difficulties the police faced in keeping track of a growing and largely mobile population. As seen already, before the war both Mackie and Cuddy had already begun the development of a signal box system that—together with a number of new substations—helped Calgary police to patrol the city more effectively. During the war, Cuddy oversaw the installation of
The third major impact that technology had on policing at the same time, Ritchie also set about equipping the force with system of wireless radio. "Crime detection with the aid of the wireless will undoubtedly become in time an essential branch of the work carried on by any Police department," he argued in 1924, "and recent experiments conducted by authorities prove conclusively that this branch of modern science is destined to be put to important use." Citing a few recent examples in which police possession of radio had indeed helped them to locate and arrest suspects, Ritchie concluded by recommending that "consideration be given to the establishment of a receiving set in this department, which could be done at a cost not in excess of $200.00." A second innovation initially adopted by Cuddy and then expanded by Ritchie was the police department's motor vehicle squad. In 1912, Cuddy had purchased a single motorcar and a pair of motorcycles to assist officers in their patrol of their city. At once, Cuddy noted in his report for that year, the vehicles "added greatly to our ability to give prompt and efficient service and to provide for any emergency." Much of the new squad's time was spent in policing the new volume of traffic on Calgary's streets, which had grown from fewer than 500 privately owned cars as recently as 1911 to more than 1600 just five years later. "The control of traffic is becoming an increasingly important factor in the work of the Department," Ritchie noted in his report for 1921. For example, new civic by-laws designed to regulate the speed and safety of vehicles inevitably resulted in violations and infractions for the police to deal with. By 1928, the department's fleet of motorcycles had grown to four, and Ritchie praised their ability to cover all areas of the city effectively. "They patrol the suburbs and out-lying districts which are seldom covered by men on beat duty," he noted, "attend emergency calls, and generally are of great help in maintaining quick and efficient service." Throughout the 1930s, each year the motorcycles covered more than 20,000 miles in their patrols, reaching a pre-war peak of more than 35,000 miles in 1938.

The third major impact that technology had on policing during the interwar years was in the field of identification. Developments in fingerprinting and photography in the late 1800s had made possible the production and accumulation of an immense data bank of arrested suspects across North America, information that individual departments could and did share with each other. Shortly after his appointment in 1912, Alfred Cuddy told reporters that an efficient and effective system of identification was "the chief accessory of every well conducted police office on the continent," and at once he set about modernizing Calgary's own practices. Under his regime, the department began to record full details of each arrested individual's physical appearance (height, weight, complexion, distinguishing marks, etc.) and to photograph them, both face-front and in profile. For the first time, too, officers began to collect and record the suspects' fingerprints. To oversee this new collection of data, Cuddy established a Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) within the department, staffed by a small group of officers assigned to that specific task. Within a year of its formation, Cuddy was able to boast that the CIB could "obtain the career and identification of criminals as indelibly as if they were engraved in marble." Claiming that Calgary now possessed one of the largest such bureaus in western Canada, he added, "The fingerprint system is very thorough, and enables a ready reference to any record sought with regard to the name of the criminal or prisoner." In fact, Cuddy concluded, "Names are no longer essential in establishing the identity of any person sought once the finger impressions of the man have been obtained. Aliases are no longer much of an aid to a criminal in trying to escape prosecution." After the war, Ritchie once again built on the earlier work of Cuddy, and by 1921 the CIB contained over 11,000 fingerprint cards. With an average of 260 cards being added each month, by the end of 1924 this total had more than doubled to 25,000 cards. The bureau had also purchased a new photographic lamp that enabled officers to photograph suspects at any time of the day or night. Indeed, the bureau's capacity to grow seemed almost limitless. "The work of this department must be persisted in and kept abreast of the times," Ritchie wrote in his report for 1924, adding—somewhat awkwardly—that "the returns for the amount of time and money spent is negligible compared with the results attained in this direction [sic], and no Police department can afford to be without an Identification branch and be classified as efficient." Ritchie's assertion was underlined the following year, when the bureau had to be moved into a new office to accommodate all the files and equipment it had amassed since the end of the war. By the end of the 1920s, the CIB had collected more than 45,000 individual photographic and fingerprint records. The result, Ritchie declared, was that, "should anyone of this number come to the attention of this department he could at once be confronted with evidence of his criminal history." Furthermore, he added, the bureau itself was a "very valuable means of recognizing on the streets, undesirable persons from other parts of the country, as a matter of fact, identifications are made almost daily. The value of this work cannot be overestimated." Using CIB records, the Calgary police force was sending information on suspects daily to other departments across Canada and the northwestern United States, receiving a similar volume of data in return. As a result, Calgary became one part of a continental network of police information that greatly reduced the ability of criminals to escape detection and capture. "The criminal will shortly realize that he is not safe when he happens to move away from a district in which he is wanted," Ritchie warned in...
1925, "the system of identification and co-operation making it impossible to keep clear for any length of time."68

The Calgary police force's embrace of new technologies in the 1920s—in communications, transportation, and identification—had an impact on the nature of the department itself. By 1924, it had become necessary to appoint a full-time identification officer to manage all the files generated by the new system. At the same time, two full-time drivers plus a mechanic had been assigned specifically to the motor vehicle squad. Elsewhere in the station, three operators were hired to run the station's telephones and signal system. There were other changes, too. The growing volume and complexity of civic legislation after the war made it necessary to appoint an assistant licence inspector and two clerks. Finally, to help maintain the day-to-day functioning of the station, Ritchie had to hire janitorial workers, a jail matron, an electrician, an elevator operator, a secretary, and an interpreter. As a result, this group of support workers represented a full quarter of the department's personnel by the end of the 1920s.69

At the same time, the greater complexity of police work had created new openings and opportunities at the officer level. The detective branch of the force, for example, now consisted of ten detective officers plus an inspector and a sergeant, while the regular force included a chief constable, a chief inspector, three station sergeants, and three patrol sergeants—all told, a total of twenty officers. By comparison, the thirty-six patrol constables now comprised little more than half of the entire police force.70

The nature of policing itself had also changed in the process. "The power of the police," Greg Marquis has written, "...stemmed in no little measure from their ability to trace the movements of repeat—and potential—offenders. For all its practical application to police work, criminal identification has served as a means of ordering elements of the population."71 In the case of Calgary, by 1931 the CIB had classified and filed 70,000 separate fingerprint cards. This was more than ten times the number of court cases tried the previous year, and only slightly less than the city's entire population of 83,000. Indeed, it took forty bound albums to contain all the photographs and detailed descriptions of those individuals categorized as known "habitual" criminals alone.72 Yet it was not just known or convicted criminals whose personal details were being systematically filed by the CIB, but also all those who had been arrested, yet never tried, and those who had been tried and declared not guilty. As such, these files represented a significant blurring of the line between the criminal and non-criminal in society.

Did this transformation of the Calgary police force after World War I translate into improvements in law enforcement in the city, as reflected in the rate of conviction? The police were certainly helping to prosecute more individuals in this period, with the number of cases going to trial up by 51 per cent, from 4534 in 1926 to 6843 by 1936. However, the proportion of those cases resulting in conviction rose by just 31.5 per cent, from 3353 to 4410, underlining the danger of using arrests as a measure of proven criminal activity. Yet as already seen, in his annual reports in the 1920s and 1930s Police Chief Dave Ritchie repeatedly used the words efficient and efficiency in his characterization of the revamped police force's performance. In order to resolve the apparent contradiction between this belief and the relative decline in convictions, it is necessary to turn to the data themselves in more detail.

Ritchie's unpublished annual reports are available for the entire interwar period. Those for the years 1926–1938 contain detailed information for all cases tried in police court and for convictions obtained as a result. From these reports, it is possible to reconstruct conviction rates, both for overall crime and for individual offences. As more than eighty separate offences are identified and enumerated in each report, for the sake of convenience and comparison here they have been grouped into ten broad categories: assault, burglary, by-law violations, drunkenness, fraud, house of ill-fame offences, liquor control act violations, theft, traffic and vehicle act violations, and vagrancy.73 Together, these account for more than 85 per cent of all offences recorded each year.

In turn, these ten categories have been subdivided into three distinct groups. Group A consists of what may be termed "serious" crime, in which there is usually a clear and identifiable victim. Assault, burglary, theft, and fraud comprise this group. Group B consists of "civil" crime, those infractions of the law that may or may not involve an identifiable victim, but in which any criminal intent is less likely. Violations of local by-laws, traffic or vehicle acts, and the provincial liquor control act make up this group. Finally, Group C consists of "social" or "moral" crimes, offences in which in which there may or may not be a specific victim involved, but which more broadly represent a breach of society's dominant morality, as expressed through the law. Public drunkenness, house of ill-fame offences, and vagrancy comprise Group C.74

Table 1 displays the total number of cases and convictions for all offences and for each group in this period. It also extrapolates the overall conviction rate for each. From this it can be seen that more than half of all police work—in terms of cases that went to trial—dealt with relatively non-serious violations of the law (Group C). By contrast, only one-fifth dealt with moral or public order offences (Group B), perhaps suggesting that policing in Calgary had shifted its focus from "class control" to "crime control," or from a "service" or "watchman" function (to use Wertsch's terminology) to one that was more "legalistic." Serious crime (Group A) accounted for slightly less than 16 per cent of court cases.

Of more interest to this study is the variation in conviction rates. These ranged widely among individual offences, from as low as 51 per cent in the case of liquor control act and house of ill-fame violations to 92 per cent for public drunkenness. On the other hand, while the average conviction rates for offences falling within Group B and Group C, respectively, were more or less identical (about 70 per cent), they were significantly
Table 2 shows annual conviction rates for overall crime in bi-annual increments. Ritchie had begun to modernize Calgary’s police force, a "legalistic" police force, characterized by an "increasing adherence to the letter of the law in deciding enforcement policies." There are nuances to be explored, for sure. For example, the relative distribution of offences remained remarkably constant through this period, rarely varying by more than a few percentage points. For example, assault never accounted for less than 1.5 per cent of all cases coming to court, and never more than 2.6 per cent. Drunkenness ranged between 5.1 and 11 per cent, while traffic act violations fell between 12.2 and 15.1 per cent of the total. The implication is that the embrace of new technology in itself did not produce a dramatic change in the pattern of arrests in Calgary. There is a slight decline in vagrancy and drunkenness offences as a proportion of all cases coming to trial, which perhaps reflects the exercise of discretion by officers on the beat during the Depression. But the only real exception is in the case of by-law violations, which increased from 28.8 per cent of the total in 1926 to 35.2 per cent by 1938. That a third of all court appearances now resulted from violations of civil rather than criminal legislation again echoes Wertsch’s definition of a "legalistic" police force, characterized by an “increasing adherence to the letter of the law in deciding enforcement policies.”

Table 2 shows annual conviction rates for overall crime in Calgary between 1926 and 1938. In the years 1926–1932, approximately one case in four ended in acquittal. For 1933–1938, the figure was closer to one case in three. It is, obviously, easy to speculate why this was so. A greater leniency on the part of magistrates may have made them reluctant to convict certain offences in the context of the Great Depression; or perhaps there was a growing disinclination among witnesses to testify in court or plaintiffs to press for prosecution after an arrest had been made. Whatever the precise cause or causes, however, the fact remains that two decades after Cuddy and Ritchie had begun to modernize Calgary’s police force, a lesser—not greater—proportion of its work was resulting in successful convictions. The rate actually went up, perhaps reflecting a greater success in securing the necessary evidence or testimony to convict. But in the majority of offences, the trend was downwards. For some—assault, theft, and drunkenness—the decline was relatively small, lower than 10 per cent. But in the case of by-law violations (13.1 per cent), traffic act violations (15.5 per cent) and vagrancy (30.9 per cent), the falling conviction rates were substantial. Taken together, offences that recorded a decline in conviction rates themselves. For certain offences—burglary, fraud, and liquor control act and house of ill-fame violations—there are nuances to be explored, for sure. For example, the conviction rate for by-law violations fell from 87 per cent in 1926 to 35.2 per cent by 1938. That a third of all court appearances now resulted from violations of civil rather than criminal legislation again echoes Wertsch’s definition of a "legalistic" police force, characterized by an “increasing adherence to the letter of the law in deciding enforcement policies.”

What do these figures indicate? First, the relative distribution of offences remained remarkably constant through this period, rarely varying by more than a few percentage points. For example, assault never accounted for less than 1.5 per cent of all cases coming to court, and never more than 2.6 per cent. Drunkenness ranged between 5.1 and 11 per cent, while traffic act violations fell between 12.2 and 15.1 per cent of the total. The implication is that the embrace of new technology in itself did not produce a dramatic change in the pattern of arrests in Calgary. There is a slight decline in vagrancy and drunkenness offences as a proportion of all cases coming to trial, which perhaps reflects the exercise of discretion by officers on the beat during the Depression. But the only real exception is in the case of by-law violations, which increased from 28.8 per cent of the total in 1926 to 35.2 per cent by 1938. That a third of all court appearances now resulted from violations of civil rather than criminal legislation again echoes Wertsch’s definition of a "legalistic" police force, characterized by an “increasing adherence to the letter of the law in deciding enforcement policies.”

Second, and in contrast, there is a wide variation among the conviction rates themselves. For certain offences—burglary, fraud, and liquor control act and house of ill-fame violations—the rate actually went up, perhaps reflecting a greater success in securing the necessary evidence or testimony to convict. But in the majority of offences, the trend was downwards. For some—assault, theft, and drunkenness—the decline was relatively small, lower than 10 per cent. But in the case of by-law violations (13.1 per cent), traffic act violations (15.5 per cent) and vagrancy (30.9 per cent), the falling conviction rates were substantial. Taken together, offences that recorded a decline in conviction rate accounted for almost 75 per cent of all cases that went to trial during the years 1926–1938. In other words, three-quarters of all law enforcement resulted, ultimately, in fewer, not more, convictions being made.

Once again, however, these figures may be misleading. Even if the overall rate of conviction now reflected a diminishing rate of return for the efforts of the police, the rate was not declining uniformly among the various offences, or even declining for each and every offence. Table 3, below, therefore provides a more detailed breakdown of conviction rates per offence (for the sake of clarity expressed here in bi-annual increments).
Table 3. Cases Tried and Conviction Rates by Offence, 1926–1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
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<td>Assault</td>
<td>(a) 2.5</td>
<td>(b) 53.5</td>
<td>(a) 2.0</td>
<td>(b) 55.3</td>
<td>(a) 2.4</td>
<td>(b) 58.4</td>
<td>(a) 2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>(a) 1.0</td>
<td>(b) 48.9</td>
<td>(a) 1.1</td>
<td>(b) 62.3</td>
<td>(a) 1.6</td>
<td>(b) 81.3</td>
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<td>Theft</td>
<td>(a) 5.6</td>
<td>(b) 56.9</td>
<td>(a) 5.2</td>
<td>(b) 68.4</td>
<td>(a) 6.1</td>
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<td>Fraud</td>
<td>(a) 3.2</td>
<td>(b) 64.3</td>
<td>(a) 3.5</td>
<td>(b) 61.1</td>
<td>(a) 5.4</td>
<td>(b) 51.9</td>
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<td>By-laws</td>
<td>(a) 28.8</td>
<td>(b) 87.1</td>
<td>(a) 29.3</td>
<td>(b) 95.4</td>
<td>(a) 27.3</td>
<td>(b) 91.6</td>
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<td>Liquor Control Act</td>
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<td>(b) 47.5</td>
<td>(a) 4.3</td>
<td>(b) 52.5</td>
<td>(a) 4.7</td>
<td>(b) 44.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic Act</td>
<td>(a) 12.9</td>
<td>(b) 88.1</td>
<td>(a) 13.4</td>
<td>(b) 85.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drunkenness</td>
<td>(a) 8.6</td>
<td>(b) 88.9</td>
<td>(a) 11.0</td>
<td>(b) 89.0</td>
<td>(a) 8.9</td>
<td>(b) 89.6</td>
<td>(a) 7.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>House of Ill-fame</td>
<td>(a) 1.4</td>
<td>(b) 57.8</td>
<td>(a) 0.8</td>
<td>(b) 45.0</td>
<td>(a) 1.7</td>
<td>(b) 50.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vagrancy</td>
<td>(a) 10.7</td>
<td>(b) 68.2</td>
<td>(a) 12.4</td>
<td>(b) 76.5</td>
<td>(a) 10.2</td>
<td>(b) 57.8</td>
<td>(a) 10.5</td>
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(a) = percentage of all cases tried
(b) = conviction rate (%)

Table 3- Cases Tried and Conviction Rates by Offence, 1926–1928

2.5 to 74 per cent in 1938 (after peaking at over 95 per cent in 1928); but the latter figure was still substantially higher than the 61 per cent conviction rate for burglary in 1938, even though this itself had risen by more than 11 per cent since 1926. Thus, in relative terms, law enforcement was still more effective in the prosecution of by-law offenders than burglars by 1938, but it was becoming more effective in prosecuting burglary, and less effective when it came to by-law offences. What are we to make of that? But matters are even more complex than this. As a proportion of all offences going to trial, by-law violations rose from just under 29 per cent in 1926 to over 35 per cent twelve years later. Burglary, on the other hand, barely rose from just 1.0 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Should the conviction rate for each offence—in each year—thus be weighted in order to take into account this wide discrepancy in proportion? And if so, what would the resulting figure—a percentage of a percentage—in fact represent?

More importantly, what accounts for the shifting pattern—mostly downward—in conviction rates? How can a decline in effective law enforcement—as measured by conviction rates—be squared with a greater use of and dependence on new technologies? To answer such questions, the role of the police as enforcers of law and order needs to be set within the broader workings of the criminal justice system. In his study of the police in Hamilton, John Weaver notes, "While science and technology may have helped to solve a very few cases, the real story of police work in criminal detection in the twentieth century took place in the courts, not in the labs. It was in the courts where professionals on both sides clashed over statements by
the accused, alleged accomplices, and witnesses.” If Weaver is right, and I suspect he is, a decline in the rate of conviction in Calgary should not be read as an indictment of the police themselves or as a criticism of their new reliance on technology. Instead, more attention needs to be paid to the relationship between arresting police officers and the evidence they gathered, the accused, alleged accomplices, and witnesses."

In Calgary, at least, this simply was not the case.

**Notes**


7. *Calgary Herald* (hereafter cited as *CH*), 29 March 1924, 3 April 1924.


14. All arrest and conviction figures in this paper, unless otherwise stated, are drawn from the drafts of annual reports prepared by the chief of police. See 92,34, Chief’s Office, City of Calgary Police Archives (hereafter cited as CPA).


22. On English, see Gilkes and Simons, Calgary’s Finest, 37–45.


24. Ibid.


30. For details of Mackie, see Gilkes and Simons, Calgary’s Finest, 47–53.


32. Personnel file, file 7, box 1, 92,34, Chief’s Office, CPA.


36. *CH*, 2 February 1911, 4 February 1911.
38. CH, 22 June 1910.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 29 January 1912, 15 February 1912.
41. Ibid., 8 March 1912, 15 March 1912, 25 March 1912.
42. Ibid., 23 October 1913, 24 October 1913, 3 July 1917.
43. Ibid., 28 April 1914, 29 April 1914.
44. Ibid., 22 July 1919, 24 July 1919.
46. CH, 15 August 1918, 12 May 1919, 16 September 1919.
47. Thorner and Watson, “Patterns of Prairie Crime,” 254.
49. Ibid. (1922), 19.
50. Quoted in Marquis, Policing Canada’s Century, 120–21.
54. Ibid. (1928), 9–10.
55. Ibid., 10.
56. See Marquis, Policing Canada’s Century, 168–74.
58. Ibid. (1914–21), passim.
59. Ibid. (1924), 12.
60. City of Calgary, Annual Report (Calgary, 1912), 158.
64. CH, 8 March 1912.
65. City of Calgary, Annual Report (Calgary, 1913), 211.
66. “Annual Report” (1921), 8; ibid (1924), 10.
67. Ibid. (1929), 39.
68. Ibid. (1925), 11.
69. Ibid. (1924), 26.
70. Ibid.
73. The category of burglary includes house-breaking and shop-breaking; theft includes theft from a car and theft of a car; fraud includes false pretences and forgery; drunkenness includes drunk and disorderly and drunken in charge of a vehicle; house of ill-fame offences include keepers, inmates, and frequenters of such houses.
74. However, see the discussion of such categorization of offences in Boritch and Hagan, “Crime and the Changing Forms of Class Control,” especially 313–19.
76. Weaver, Crimes, Constables, and Courts, 171.