Partisan Politics, Civic Priorities, and the Urban Militia: Situating the Calgary Armoury, 1907-1917

P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Résumé de l’article

La présence militaire effective dans les villes canadiennes a suscité peu d’analyses critiques relatives au pouvoir et aux identités locaux, à la gouvernance urbaine et aux visées concurrentes concernant l’utilisation de l’espace public. Avec Calgary comme point d’ancrage, le présent essai aborde la bataille du pouvoir politique entourant l’établissement d’un manège militaire au début du XXe siècle. La prise de décision concernait des intervenants municipaux, provinciaux et fédéraux, de même que des groupes d’intérêt locaux, des citoyens engagés et la presse partisane. Une telle tentative de situer l’enjeu militaire à l’intérieur de l’espace urbain politique et public révèle des processus et des relations complexes, et ce, même à une époque caractérisée de « période de militarisme canadien ». 
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Abstract
The military's physical presence in Canadian cities has received little critical analysis in terms of local power and identities, urban governance, and competing visions for the use of public space. Using the case study of Calgary, this paper explores the political power struggle surrounding the establishment of an armoury in the early twentieth century. Decision-making involved municipal, provincial, and federal stakeholders, as well as local interest groups, concerned citizens, and the partisan press. This attempt to situate the military within urban political and public space reveals complex processes and relationships, even during an era characterized as "the moment of Canadian militarism."

Résumé
La présence militaire effective dans les villes canadiennes a suscité peu d'analyses critiques relativement au pouvoir et aux identités locaux, à la gouvernance urbaine et aux visées concurrentes concernant l'utilisation de l'espace public. Avec Calgary comme point d'ancrage, le présent essai aborde la bataille du pouvoir politique entourant l'établissement d'un manège militaire au début du XXe siècle. La prise de décision concernait des intervenants municipaux, provinciaux et fédéraux, de même que des groupes d'intérêt locaux, des citoyens engagés et la presse partisane. Une telle tentative de situer l'enjeu militaire à l'intérieur de l'espace urbain politique et public révèle des processus et des relations complexes, et ce, même à une époque caractérisée de « période de militarisme canadien ».

The construction of drill halls or armouries was a key component of Canadian militia reform in the early twentieth century. It was the age of the "citizen soldier," wherein governments sought to mould a modern army out of weekend militiamen. Decision-makers in Ottawa felt that a sense of identity and esprit de corps would be strengthened by the construction of permanent militia facilities throughout Canada. Armouries (dungeons for the storage of weapons and equipment) and drill halls (more extensive structures featuring ranges and lecture halls, recreation and mess rooms, even bowling alleys) would provide structured training and leisure activities to forge the national sword. In 1908 the Department of Militia and Defence (DMD) estimated that over 350 new drill halls were required. While this lofty goal was never met, approximately one hundred were completed in the first two decades of the century. The military had a greater physical presence than ever before in urban centres across the dominion.

Armouries and drill halls, like other military facilities, are "ordinary landscapes" rarely subjected to scholarly scrutiny. Their presence, however, provides valuable footprints for the militia (now known as the reserves) and act as visible symbols of the military's enduring presence in communities across Canada. The urban militia, sociologist Terry Willett explained, is both a civic and a military institution serving social and political functions; its inherent hybridity serves as a vital bridge between the military and civilian realms. In the years before the First World War, historian Carman Miller explained, the militia was "a visible and audible feature of Canadian urban life." After all, "in a society captivated by 'nationalistic' imperialism, by Christian soldiers extending the borders of commerce, religion, and government, militia units were often at the centre of patriotic, professional, fraternal, athletic, and business organizations." In theory, the militia's historic connections and access to sources of political and socio-economic power afforded it political leverage beyond that of typical social groups. In practice, the militia's potential influence in urban settings, where military agendas did not necessarily dominate the civic agenda, was limited.

This article focuses on the politics surrounding the assignment of public space to the militia in an urban setting, rather than looking at it as a social institution. The crusade for an armoury site in Calgary from 1907 to 1917 illustrates the interplay between conflicting priorities and jurisdictional impediments to the military's plans for a physical presence in one of the fastest growing cities on the continent. In the early twentieth century, Calgary's population exploded from 4000 in 1904 to 74,000 in 1912, and more than ten thousand new buildings took shape. Despite this expansionist culture, building a prominent armoury proved unexpectedly difficult. Social, political, and legal considerations within and across national, provincial, and local levels significantly affected the pace of developments. Labour and sporting associations mounted local opposition, newspapers framed the debate through partisan perceptions, and politicians juggled competing demands. Even during an era described by Desmond Morton as "the moment of Canadian militarism," complexity and intrigue dominated the politics of military expansion.

If the twentieth century was to belong to Canada, as Wilfrid Laurier envisioned, the dominion could only share in the grandeur of the British Empire by standing on its own feet. "Just as warfare was seen as a rather strenuous sport and an expression of national self-assertiveness and fitness," historian Carl Berger explained, "so too the martial spirit appeared to be synonymous with a masterful and upright manhood, order and stability, a necessary aspect of vital national feeling, and an antidote to the follies of the age." Indeed, a "Son of the Empire" had a duty to volunteer and make his contribution as "a good citizen of Canada, a patriot of the Empire, and a manly warrior." More than seven thousand Canadians volunteered in the South African (Boer) War at the turn of the century, sweeping British Canada with patriotic fervour. Despite 270 dead Canadians, this dirty little conflict left optimism and confidence in its wake. The
last few imperial garrison forces withdrew from Canada in 1905, and military and political leaders believed that the country’s pervasive “militia myth” held the answer to what form domestic defences should take. It was clear, however, that the nation required a strong commitment from citizens in cities, towns and villages across the country.

“Calgarians were not warlike by inclination,” Hugh Dempsey explained, “but there were enough ex-imperial soldiers and mounted policemen around that the idea of having a militia army appealed to them.” Calgary was home to a number of men who had served in the Alberta Field Force of 1885 and to veterans of the South African War; furthermore, “cowboys and ranchers were naturally drawn to cavalry units.” A fledgling military identity was already developing in the western outpost. The military enjoyed strong connections with community leaders like Colonel James Walker, an ex-member of the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) and prominent businessman, whose estate was used for a cavalry summer camp as early as 1903. When a modest two-storey drill hall on 12th Avenue S.W., built from private funds, officially opened in January 1904, the accompanying military ball was attended by the leading citizens of the town: “There was sound of revelry by night and bright lights shone o’er fair women and brave men.” Mounted competitions between the NWMP and the local squadron of the Canadian Mounted Rifles attracted interest at every Calgary exhibition, and the militia used the Victoria Park grounds to hold summer camps. Cavalrymen and cadets featured prominently in local parades, militia bands performed at community functions, and local units helped track down escaped convicts and fight fires. The relationship between Calgarians and the military seemed amicable, if not intimate.

The Canadian militia grew during the first decade of the century, and its local responsibilities in Alberta grew apace. Government officials organized Military District Number 13 in 1907 and selected Calgary as its headquarters. The local militia felt that its existing drill hall no longer provided enough space for an expanding militia. It certainly was an inadequate symbol of Calgary’s growing status as both a city and as Alberta’s military hub. Local interests demanded that the federal government construct a more suitable facility, and Calgary City Council passed a resolution offering five lots of the Alexander Estate (the site of an old isolated hospital) to the federal government, free of charge. The militia and the city passed correspondence back and forth on the subject over the next several years but made little headway. In 1910, the Militia Estimates recommended the construction of a Calgary armoury, and the District Officer Commanding (DOC), Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Cruikshank, approached the city to see if the hospital site was still available. Council’s response was confused and disappointing. City officials suggested several alternative sites, but in Cruikshank’s eyes they were too small and confining—his men needed “sufficient space outside the armoury for the troops to parade and ample room for future enlargement of the building.” The mayor worked out a deal so the military could use a part of Victoria Park for parade grounds until negotiations were finalized.

In the district engineer’s annual report for 1910, an even grander armoury scheme was hatched. The existing facilities in Calgary were paltry and inadequate, the ordnance stores were temporarily housed at a former industrial school, and the headquarters were located in a small, rented house. “As a matter of policy and in the interests of efficiency and economy,” Major Carey suggested, the Militia should concentrate “in a good situation in the centre of the Town.” This approach would have important benefits: it would ease administration and would encourage the city to provide a better site, as local authorities usually “prefer to give a site whose value varies directly as the value of the buildings to be erected thereon.” Major-General Colin Mackenzie, the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, agreed that this was the best approach.

The matter was also political, the local press pointed out. In August 1911, the DMD decided to go ahead with the hospital site, which the city had placed back on the table, and sent a military engineer from Winnipeg to look over plans for an impressive $150,000 armoury. The pro-Conservative Calgary News-Telegram found it “somewhat surprising” that the officer had “suddenly appeared in the city” to arrange for immediate construction. This expediency, the newspaper argued, coupled with the government’s recent promise “to grant the western provinces control of their natural resources,” showed that the Liberals in Ottawa were really “going out of [their] way to get into the good graces of the Calgary constituents and thus win out at the polls” in the upcoming federal election. Politically motivated or not, a deal seemed imminent as council approved the transfer of the property, with the condition that construction begin immediately. But the project was delayed yet again because the plans could not be readied in time. Unfortunately for the militia, a change in government quickly rendered the agreement moot.

Robert Borden’s Conservatives toppled Wilfrid Laurier’s Liberals in 1911, and Sam Hughes was appointed Canada’s fifteenth minister of militia and defence. An outspoken advocate of the non-permanent militia, Hughes wasted no time before acting on his military philosophy. He immediately suggested ways in which the citizenry and the militia could be brought closer together. Drill halls fit nicely into his agenda—particularly if they could be used “to encourage closer co-operation between municipalities and their local militia units in sharing defence costs.” After all, an expanded armoury and drill hall program would have value beyond the military realm. It would stimulate preparedness, encourage youth training, and “serve as a public hall, a place of meeting for many local activities not necessarily restricted to members of the militia.” Thus, even as public revenues declined in 1911, “Drill Hall Sam” Hughes demanded more and more money for the militia, boasting that new drill halls would adorn every Canadian community. He had nearly doubled his predecessor’s allotments for construction, buildings, works, and engineering services by the eve of
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...the Great War, and his armoury program won the accolades of such men as imperial Inspector-General Sir Ian Hamilton. Another champion of his local initiatives was Richard Bedford Bennett, the newly elected Conservative member of parliament for Calgary. Although Bennett was not a Calgarian by birth, he became one of Calgary's most renowned citizens by adoption. "R.B.," as he was affectionately known in the West, immigrated to Calgary from the Maritimes in the early 1890s. The lawyer was first elected as a Conservative member to the Assembly of the North-West Territories in 1898, but failed to win a seat in the 1900 federal election and lost his 1905 bid to sit in the newly formed Alberta legislature. In 1909, his political fortunes improved and he was elected to the opposition benches in Alberta, one of only two "straight Conservatives" to do so. Once in Edmonton, Bennett used his intelligence, arrogance, and forceful personality to harass the provincial Liberal government over railways, a proposed Calgary university, and other partisan issues of the day. After his federal election victory in 1911, he sat in Ottawa as the representative for Calgary East. He was the only Conservative elected among the seven members from Alberta. This singularity, coupled with his past Tory loyalty, gave him influence beyond most newly elected MPs. He rewarded his loyal constituency wherever possible.

It is not surprising that R.B. saw an armoury as an important addition to the city. Calgary was the fastest growing urban centre in Canada and one of the most rapidly expanding in North America. Land speculation ran rampant, and city property grew increasingly scarce and expensive. Calgary itself was now home to several militia units, and the city held the first major training camp for southern Alberta in 1911. Yet there was no armoury to accommodate winter training. Local units had to rent buildings scattered throughout the city, and used local school grounds for parades. A substantial facility was needed to consolidate their presence.

Almost immediately after coming to office, Bennett began pressing his federal colleagues for a Calgary armoury. He was well aware of the previous negotiations between the city and the military, but these had been conducted while the Liberals held power. He needed to sell the idea to the Conservative administration. By December 1911 he had won over Hughes, and they pressured the minister of public works for a $250,000 structure. The next month, the matter of a "Western armoury" was discussed in Parliament, and Hughes announced that...
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Figure 2. R. B. Bennett, elected member of parliament for Calgary East in 1911, rewarded his loyal constituents wherever possible.

"towns making offers of valuable sites were most likely to receive favorable consideration of the government." Although several Western Canadian centres were competing for drill hall construction, Calgary’s land offer (valued at $100,000) topped the list of places offering free sites. In June 1912, cabinet approved $50,000 for the Calgary project.

With Bennett on the scene, a salient feature of the past agreements changed. The locations that had been discussed while the Liberals were in power were now too modest in scale. The Conservative MP set his sights on a particular piece of city property that seemed ideally suited for a bold militia building. The city’s main commercial thoroughfare, 8th Avenue, extended west from the CPR station to Mewata Park, a block of land extending north from 9th Avenue to the Bow River. Its twenty-six and one-quarter acres sat on the boundary between Calgary’s downtown and its residential developments. Originally a federal reserve, Mewata (a Cree word meaning “oh be joyful”) was donated to the City of Calgary in 1906 for park and recreational services. If built there, Bennett recognized that the armoury would stand out against its surroundings and Calgarians would pass by it daily.

Mewata Park was already a popular urban recreation area for athletic clubs. At a time when urban reformers were still revealing the horrors afflicting urban-industrial society, part of their prescribed remedy was playground and park space. Designated civic spaces, like Mewata Park, were dedicated to the “public good.” After all, if popular discourse framed the militia as an activity conducive to patriotic, healthy citizenship, so too was sport; it inculcated similar skills and “manly” character traits such as courage, loyalty, and teamwork. From 1910 to 1920, athletic organizations such as the Calgary City and District Football League lobbied city council to improve sports fields and playgrounds. In response, the city parks committee actively expanded the number of athletic facilities in Calgary. Sports clubs had been disappointed when council decided to make Victoria Park an exhibition ground, but the Mewata Park space more than compensated. By 1913, this prime real estate was used entirely as an athletic park, including a bandstand, baseball and football grounds, a running track, jumping pits, and children’s apparatus. It was widely recognized as the “best playground” and sports field in the city. And growing cities like Calgary needed park space to develop healthy civic cultures, even when an evolving, urban militia needed public space.

The selection of Mewata Park therefore had important local political ramifications. While Bennett was determined to procure a piece of prime real estate for the militia, city officials were
dedicated to expanding the amount of park and playground space. Hearing rumours that the military was prepared to divest itself of its old Calgary rifle range, council solicited Bennett’s assistance in October 1912 to obtain this site for a park. The city offered the proposed site at Mewata in exchange. Bennett appeared to be open to this suggestion. “The question of the erection of the Armoury in this City is one of vital importance,” he asserted, and if the city consented to the erection of the building at Mewata, he was “of the opinion that I could do something towards securing the Rifle Range in exchange.” The mayor, receiving Bennett’s optimistic response, immediately replied that the “City would be deeply indebted to you if you can secure this splendid piece of property.” He promised to lay the matter before council at the earliest possible time.

Council moved quickly. On 29 October 1912, it referred the matter to the Finance Committee, which reported two weeks later that a 400-foot-square strip of land in Mewata Park should be donated for the armoury. The proposal also advised the Board of Commissioners to look into purchasing a strip of land immediately north of the park. Council approved the offer and relayed it to the military DOC, Cruikshank, who worked with city officials to acquire the necessary plans.

Given his past experiences in negotiating for militia training sites near Calgary, Cruikshank was likely not surprised with the controversy that ensued. On 17 March 1913, council advised their legal arm to prepare a transfer of the Mewata site. While the city solicitor began to work out the legal implications, Mayor Herbert Sinnott reminded Bennett of the “agreement” that the federal and municipal governments had arranged the year before regarding the rifle range swap, and asked him to take up the matter in Ottawa.

Bennett, however, did not recall any such agreement—perhaps a convenient excuse to simplify the situation and avoid any more delays. His conclusion was somewhat laconic:

All Cities are now supplying sites for armories. Calgary offered a site near the old hospital building. It is very unsuitable. If Calgary wants a $50,000 building it can get it by not providing a decent site. If, on the other hand Mewata Park is available, Calgary will obtain an armory that will be second to none in Western Canada. I am leaving for the West tonight, and hope to see you there.

By the time Bennett’s letter arrived, the Calgary mayor had already felt the first winds of controversy. In March, the secretary of the Calgary Trades and Labor Council (CTLC) informed local politicians that it had unanimously passed a resolution against the transfer of the Mewata site. Its primary argument was that the transfer had not been endorsed by the electorate, but the CTLC’s aversion to militarism ran deeper than that. The federal government frequently used the militia to crush strikes, from Cape Breton to Vancouver Island, in the early 1900s. During an era of labour strife, it is understandable that leaders of the national Trades and Labour Congress of Canada openly opposed war and militarism. Given the increasing tempo of strike activity in Calgary from 1911 to 1913 and the “radicalism” of the city’s labour movement, it is not surprising that the CTLC sympathized with this national stance.
The CTLC’s concern did not end with militarism; they suggested that the armoury proposal threatened the leisure opportunities of Calgarians in general. “Team sports were characterized as status meant nothing on the playing field, where all sportsmen would be “used for the purposes of a public park and for no other purpose . . . whatsoever.” Although section 159 of the City Charter gave the municipal government authority to dispose of its lands, “all lands obtained or held in trust by the City for any special or particular purpose”—such as Mewata Park—were exceptional and could not be transferred “without obtaining special legislation from the Provincial Government authorizing such transfer or in the alternative without obtaining the consent of the ratepayers of the City.” The city’s legal adviser explained that special legislation in Edmonton, while sufficient, could be most practically obtained after holding a local vote on the matter. As it stood, the last council resolution was not legally binding because the city did not have the requisite authority to complete the land transfer.

Council was in a quagmire. Alderman William Ross announced that he would make a motion to reconsider the park’s transfer at the regular meeting on 31 March. In light of the legal brief, council rescinded the previous motion empowering the donation of the site. Aldermen D. Ralph Crichton and T. A. P. “Tappy” Frost suggested that ratepayers should vote on a by-law authorizing the transfer, but council defeated their motion. After vigorous discussion, an ambiguous resolution was passed stating that no portion of Mewata was to be transferred until the commissioners tried to secure an equally desirable site elsewhere.

The search for an armoury site began anew. Several Calgary property owners contacted city officials, offering to sell their land for a drill hall, to no avail. Local militia representatives urged the chairman of the Board of Commissioners to secure an alternative with haste, and he sent out a delegation to determine the options. It suggested a largely vacant block facing Mewata Park, and stressed that time was of the essence. “If the matter is to be settled this year,” the chairman asserted, “and sufficient money placed in the estimates by the Minister of Militia for the undertaking of this work, the matter must be settled at once, and I would therefore advise that some action be taken immediately.”

Council was receptive, and on 12 May authorized the purchase of this block of land. Mayor Sinnott contacted both Bennett and Cruikshank, stating optimistically that this new parcel seemed “to meet with the general approval of the citizens, and many of the militia men of the City.” He repeatedly urged an expedient response so that construction could begin, but Bennett demanded more information. After all, Cruikshank had “unofficially” learned that the government might have to expropriate the new site, delaying its transfer yet again—at considerable expense.

Upon reflection, Bennett only confirmed his earlier choice of Mewata. In early August 1913, Bennett and two aldermen toured all of the potential sites, and the MP still preferred the eastern edge of the park for his handsome project. “It looks as if it must be Mewata Park or nothing,” Alderman S. G. Freeze assured council. “If we want a dinky armoury or a dinky site we may get it, but if we want a fine looking armoury on a good
site we must use Mewata Park.” He thought it would look fine in that location, and arranged for a meeting with local athletic groups the following week. “They are the chief opponents, but I believe they will see the matter in the right light if it is explained to them. It would be foolish to pay out $150,000 just because a site is wanted for a soccer field.” Freeze felt any legal restrictions could be resolved easily. The pressure was on. Council accepted the alderman’s recommendations, and the councillors passed a resolution by the narrowest of margins authorizing that the Mewata site be donated. The militia’s needs appeared paramount to those of athletic organizations, yet not all were as optimistic as Freeze. A media war was raging over the issue, interest groups mobilized, and further delays plagued the process.

The media have always played a prominent role in reflecting and shaping public opinion. In the early twentieth century, Calgary was home to rival newspapers with different political allegiances duelling for daily readership. Coverage and interpretation of the Mewata Park armoury controversy diverged as competing journalists tried to mould the debate according to their respective political interests. The newspapers revealed how an “ostensibly” military concern became a debate about civic space, identity, and partisan influence more broadly.

The Morning Albertan, Calgary’s pro-Liberal daily, had ardently opposed the Conservative-inspired project from the onset. It championed the athletes who rallied against the transfer of the site. In the spring of 1913, it broadcast with pleasure what it had felt was the demise of the plan, and continued to support the anti-Mewata cause throughout the summer and fall. The paper was unabashedly critical of Bennett’s “parliamentary ultimatum” stipulating that it would be Mewata or nothing. “If the matter must be revived,” the Albertan argued, “let the champions of the armoury site come out and meet the athletes openly, and tell what they want with the balancing privileges which they are prepared to grant and see carried into effect.” It was confident that the general public would denounce the proposal as a threat to the city-building program. Although the militia department had suggested that the building might be used for an auditorium or convention hall, the pro-Liberal paper argued that the public would not accredit any benefit from its presence. It would be available only when the militia found it to be convenient; likely, “in a year or so a war-like message would come forth, shutting out the common people.” Although supporters said the armoury would take up only a small portion of the park and would be used for only part of the year, the Albertan’s editor argued that it would “take the heart right out of the park” and destroy a civic playground. The paper cast Bennett’s assertions as either bluff or evidence that the federal authorities were not prepared to deal fairly with Calgarians.

The matter was not only about athletic facilities, its opponents argued, but about playgrounds, park space, and civic planning in general. In the pages of the Albertan, nothing was more important than preserving the site for the people. It chas­tised Bennett for his faulty logic, and believed that the militia would extend its parade grounds over the rest of the park. The Albertan disdained the idea that the militia department would build a $30,000 drill hall if it did not get its way, but would erect a $350,000 to $400,000 building if Mewata was available. This was political manipulation and coercion at its worst. The Albertan summarized its position as follows:

The people of Calgary need Mewata park. It is too small as it is at present. The park will be materially injured by the location of a drill hall. There is no particular advantage in placing the drill hall there. There is no strategic advantage. There is no added convenience. Other sites are quite as central. It is the most desirable site in the city and therefore Col. Sam Hughes must have it and he is attempting to coerce us. It is merely for the self-glori­fication of the department of militia, a sort of monument to Mars, and Mr. Bennett tells us to strip ourselves of our best park, to rob our children of their playgrounds, that the department may demonstrate with a big building. If we do not bow down and do their bidding, a $30,000 building is good enough for us.

At this point, the Albertan did not express a general problem with the erection of a militia facility, only with the Mewata site and Bennett’s heavy-handed tactics.

By contrast, the Calgary Daily Herald supported a Mewata Park armoury. While the Albertan stressed the importance of parkland, the Herald emphasized the militia’s needs and appealed to civic pride to solicit support. It argued that the dramatic increase in the number of militiamen who trained that summer across Canada “show[ed] the trend of the public mind.” Nearly 15 per cent of able-bodied men were devoting their time and energies to actively “prepar[e] themselves for the defence of their country,” suggesting to the pro-Conservative paper that “the big majority of Canadians are in thorough sympathy with the Borden policy of allowing Canada to do its share in home and empire defence.” Framed in this context, the “hundreds” or “thousands” of militiamen in Calgary who were presently ill-accommodated and would use the armoury each week deserved a higher priority than the few athletes who would lose a soccer field.

The Herald found “abundant proof” that Calgarians were proud of their voluntary militiamen and would support the site’s transfer:

It ill-becomes pusillanimous people to attempt to ridicule the citizen soldier, an institution that has studded Canadian history with its most brilliant chapters and which will always form the backbone of the dominion’s defence. As long as Canada is a virile nation it will continue to develop its defensive structure. . . . [The militia consists of] the men whom local agitators, impelled by no motive of public spiritedness, would slur with the sobri­quet of “the amateur soldier.” These are the same men behind whom those who disparage them would take refuge if the call to arms was sounded to Canadians. These are the men who ask the consideration of Calgary; who ask for a little plot in Mewata Park, where a building may be erected in which they can more successfully carry on the work of preparing themselves to serve their country better in time of need.

The people of Calgary are behind “the amateur soldier.” He is a man, without selfish motives; a real man and entitled to consid­eration. He gets no reward for his devotion to his country and his expenditure of time and energy. Give him a place where he can

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at least enjoy reasonable facilities in carrying out his commendable work.\footnote{37}

This passionate appeal tapped into prevailing discourses of manliness and militarism that inculcated ideas of nationhood at the time.\footnote{38} If sports contributed to a robust masculinity, their contribution was still less than that of the military—the most "manly" of all social activities. The reader was left with the sense that nothing less than a magnificent structure in Mewata Park would do justice to the devoted sons of the dominion, who had brought glory to Canada and the Empire.

The \textit{Herald}'s assessments of the situation stressed cooperation and the possibility of a symbiotic militia-civic relationship. While the newspaper conceded on 11 August that opposition fears about losing a corner of the "best athletic park in the city" had some merit, it retorted that the armoury itself would provide "more extensive facilities for the encouragement of healthy sports and exercises" therein.\footnote{39} The \textit{Herald} concluded that donating this parcel would spare the city about $150,000 (the cost of a suitable alternative), and saw no reason why some of these savings could not be used to extend other athletic grounds and parks in the city. It refused to concede that the militia would intrude on the remaining section of the park without city consent; case studies of "big armouries" in Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg illustrated the non-intrusive relationship that could ensue.\footnote{40} In short, more young men would benefit from "healthful recreation" if one-tenth of Mewata's space was used for an armoury than could be found in any other equal area within the park. After all, the Conservative journal reasoned, the volunteers had "at least as much right to consideration in public spaces in Calgary as any other athletic organization."\footnote{41}

The media were only one of many stakeholders involved in this planning decision. A number of local groups rallied around the Mewata Park issue, and relied on sympathetic newspapers to disseminate their views to a wider civic audience.\footnote{42} The local militia, of course, lobbied for an urgent transfer in a matter that they believed was "of the most vital importance to the progress of the City of Calgary as a Military centre."\footnote{43} Business groups like the Calgary Board of Trade Council (CBTC) also favoured the Mewata site—local business interests, especially in construction and related areas, stood to gain from a quick start and a large building project.\footnote{44} At a 15 August 1913 meeting, the CBTC voted unanimously to support Bennett's designs, and a businessmen's committee promptly appealed to city council for support.\footnote{45} In opposition, labour groups allied with
athletic organizations. The Bricklayers', Masons', and Plasterers' International Union of America sent a letter of protest to city council in early September, and the CTCF followed suit later that month when it pleaded to the provincial legislature to protect vital playground space.

Rumours, fed by the Alberitan and anti-Mewata forces, began to suggest publicly that the proposed transfer was illegal. "Several lawyers of repute" argued that every ratepayer in Calgary had equity in the park, and the aldermen could not vote it away without their consent. Furthermore, the Alberitan suggested that "even should the people vote to give the park away, it would not hold if any taxpayer chose to contest it . . . [as] even a majority of the ratepayers could not vote away the equity of the others." Not all were convinced by this argument. Alderman Frost was "somewhat peeved" at the suggestion that he reconsider his vote, stating that he would not "until there is so much frost in a warm place that it will be frozen over." 66

On 22 August 1913 the anti-Mewata faction arranged a "mass meeting" at the Calgary YMCA building to debate the location issue. The hall overflowed with people, who witnessed a spirited affair that featured speeches by athletes, militiamen, spokesmen from various business and professional associations, labour representatives, aldermen, and members of the general public. The debate was vicious, and those who promoted the transfer prevailed and passed a supportive resolution with overwhelming support. It was an unmitigated failure for the organizers, and the disgruntled anti-Mewata troop retreated upstairs to devise a new strategy. There they collected money, secured the services of attorney Clifford T. Jones, and the next day filed injunctions to "force the city fathers to take the matter before the people." 67

Less than a week later, formal legal proceedings began. Jones applied for a summons to quash the council resolution granting the Mewata site, and a Calgary judge granted it. On the morning of 14 September, Jones pleaded before an Edmonton court that the city could not give the park space away without an empowering act from the provincial legislature. City Solicitor C. J. Ford assured Jones that the city had no intention to transfer the property before notifying the provincial legislature. Therefore, he claimed that the resolution was not an illegal act. Ford wanted the judge to interpret the by-law dealing with the transfer of property so that council could obtain the necessary authorizations. To their chagrin, judgment was reserved. 68

Eventually, the court dismissed the application for injunction in light of the city lawyer's willingness to seek provincial approval. Nevertheless, the anti-Mewata forces claimed the legal proceedings as a victory. First, the city did not have the authority to make the grant while the matter was before the court, and as a result work on the armoury was delayed for the rest of the year. 69 Second, and most importantly, the transfer question was now in the hands of the provincial legislature.

Several salient dynamics made this development ripe for controversy. Alberta Premier Arthur L. Sifton's government was Liberal; all of the Calgary's elected members were Conservatives. The local partisan press made sure this became an issue. The Herald claimed that taking the issue to Edmonton was a "political trick designed by Calgary Liberals to embarrass the Borden government" and asserted that the dignity of the legislature was at risk if it interfered in "so purely a local matter." The Liberals tried to make this a political issue, the pro-Conservative newspaper argued, so that they could delay "for political capital." In turn, the Alberitan berated the Herald with accusations of partisanship, asserting that it was the Conservative dailies that had brought politics into the fray. The Herald was staffed with "narrow minded bigots," the Liberal paper argued, "inspired by the partisan jealousy of Mr. Bennett." Predictably, both papers used this controversy as an occasion to heap criticism on one another. 70

In late October 1913, a Calgary aldermanic delegation presented a private bill in the provincial legislature requesting authorization to transfer a portion of Mewata Park for the armoury. The three Calgary members fought hard, alongside other Conservative members, but they faced strong opposition from the Liberal benches. George P. Smith, the MLA from Camrose, tabled a petition carrying the signatures of 1500 Calgarians who opposed the transfer on the grounds that "Mewata Park was originally deeded to the City in trust for park purposes only, and is more needed for the purposes of a park than for the purposes of an armoury." The bill was defeated by a wide margin. 71 The Alberitan insisted that it was a free vote, but every Liberal present voted against it, and the Herald cast this as "the most narrow of petty partisan lines." 72 Of course, the Herald did not mention the fact that all of the Conservatives in the legislature voted for the bill.

Calgary was divided over the decision. The Herald's front page proclaimed that "Calgary Got Raw Deal on Armoury Site" and offered readers the opinions of various city officials. Commissioner A. G. Graves felt it "most regrettable that the question of politics ever was injected" into the debate, and he suggested that "the legislature could at least have permitted the citizens of Calgary to vote on the subject." Furthermore, he saw it as a violation of the city's rights to home rule. Even Alderman Crichton, an avowed Liberal, conceded that the rationale for the decision was "a pretty thin one." In its editorial, the Herald lamented that "certain partizan interests of this city apparently thought that the average intelligence of the people was not such as would permit people to vote sanely," so they pulled wires in Edmonton "and the government was lined up to support the small Calgary faction." The killing of the bill had "ruthlessly and unwarrantedly" abrogated the "self-government rights of the city" and was therefore a "personal affront" to every Calgarian. As expected, the Alberitan's impression differed. It heralded the legislature's decision as courageous. "It would have been much easier to slough off the responsibility on the people of Calgary in the form of a plebiscite," the editor argued, "than to follow through on a principle against bonusing as it was [the MLAs'] duty to do." 73
The notion that a plebiscite was merely a way to "slough off" responsibility was ironic when it appeared in the Albertan. In August, the pro-Liberal journal had promoted the idea that council should have "one big referendum" to answer all the "troublesome questions" it faced at the time, including the Mewata Park issue. In light of the province's judgment, the newspaper was decidedly against the prospect—the plebiscite would only be an expression of opinion without legal weight. Furthermore, the Albertan argued that the vote would be irrelevant because only ratepayers—not all the electors, nor all park users—could express their opinion. Although the paper would abide by popular judgement based on the merits of the case, it now argued that rival newspapers and Conservative partisans were "mixing issues" and fighting only to "register a protest against the government" in Edmonton.

The pro-armoury Herald now became the strongest advocate of a plebiscite to gauge public opinion on the issue. Here was a way to overcome partisanship, the Conservative paper argued; it was a clear means of determining "the exact feeling" of Calgarians. Although the provincial government refused to allow a binding vote on the transfer, it could not "refuse us the right to take a plebiscite to show where the people stand in the matter." If the vote was favourable, the city could ask the federal government to expropriate the necessary land and proceed with construction. Succumbing to the pressure of the pro-Mewata forces, the Herald at the helm, city council resolved on 10 November 1913 to place the question of transferring a "small portion" of the park before ratepayers at the next municipal vote. Although it would not be legally binding, the city councilors must have realized that the Sifton government would be hard pressed to justify its opposition in the face of clear civic support.

The prospect of a plebiscite gave the Mewata Park debate renewed vigour. It became a major election issue. At a crowded North Hill meeting held on 1 December 1913, all of the candidates who touched on the subject made "a strong plea in favour" of locating an armoury there. Five days later, candidates "ran the gauntlet of question and jibe, interruption and criticism"
at a meeting held under the auspices of the Calgary Trades and Labour Council. Commissioner Graves said he would abide by the ratepayers' verdict and would not oppose the land transfer if they desired it. Someone in the crowd, displeased that the plebiscite was limited to ratepayers, queried, "Why not let us all have a chance at that corruption?" Graves replied that an open vote "would be putting a dangerous weapon into the hands of an unscrupulous class." The CTLC would not have been impressed. Candidate Thomas Knight opposed the Mewata Park site outright, while E. D. Benson said the transfer was in the city's best interests. "Tappy" Frost was personally against giving up park property, but he explained that he would vote in favour of the Mewata transfer to uphold the previous city council's promise. Various interest groups also joined the fray during the campaign. The CTLC, for example, again felt it prudent to issue a strong statement against the transfer, advising its members to vote against it. Individual citizens voiced their opinions in letters to the editor, trying to sway ratepayers to cast their vote in one particular direction or the other.

The newspapers were, of course, heavily involved in canvassing points of view. The Herald denounced the "little coterie of anti-armory partizans" that had "turned loose their mud batteries in a last and deadly earnest attempt" to overturn the city's promise. The editor was confident that, if the principle of the greatest good to the greatest number still held, they would ratify a Mewata armoury. The Albertan, perhaps sensing a defeat, escalated its onslaught into new areas. It not only opposed the erection of an armoury at Mewata, but now called into question the wisdom of spending vast sums of money on the military in general:

The Albertan believes that an expenditure of such an amount would be a lavish and inexcusable waste of money. A similar building would be erected in Edmonton, others in Red Deer, Medicine Hat and Lethbridge. Before the province is thoroughly equipped, we shall have an outlay for armories alone of a million dollars at least. We have in Alberta 400,000 people. If the expenditure in the other provinces throughout Canada is equally generous, the total equipment for armories alone will be $20,000,000. That is for the armories alone . . . and the annual interest charge is about one million dollars a year. The militia in 1912 numbered 18,872. The militia of Calgary does not number 308 men. Under . . . any circumstances the expenditure is unnecessary and wasteful. The department of militia is doing its utmost to have Canada imitate the European nations and follow in their folly in the insane race for armies and armaments. And it is unnecessary. From the Calgary drill hall no man will ever go forth for war. This country will never be attacked and the mother country will not need our assistance in any great war. The whole thing is one vast, foolish, fearful, terrible game.

This was a dramatic departure from previous statements that had not explicitly disparaged the military. It is ironic that the Albertan exploited Calgarians' military pride during the 1911 election campaign when it chastised Bennett for not enlisting in the South African War. In this case, its negativity was a calculated, last-minute effort to sway opinion. Regardless, its attempt to garner a decisive "no" vote was in vain.

In the 1913 municipal election, a majority of ratepayers in every polling division and subdivision in the city voted "yes" to the transfer of Mewata land to the federal government. The result was indisputable and resounding. The Herald boasted that over 70 per cent of voting ratepayers favoured a "magnificent" armoury building in the park. This verdict, it reflected, had a threefold meaning. First, it showed that the citizenry wanted "to give the militia a square deal" and appreciated its "public-spirited work." Second, it completely repudiated "the tactics adopted by local political forces, headed by the Liberal organ, to keep the armoury out of Calgary." And finally, it stood as a reminder to Sifton's government in Edmonton that "its policy of handicapping Calgary at every turn" would not be tolerated. The city had demonstrated its faith and interest in the local militia, and had placed a higher priority on securing an armoury than on preserving the integrity of Mewata Park. The Herald felt that council should call on the federal government to expropriate the property to circumvent any further delay.

The Albertan did not inform readers of the results. It simply lobbied for a continued fight by the anti-Mewata forces. The decision carried no legal weight, it told readers, and a significant number had voted against it. The message fell on increasingly deaf ears. Opposition waned in the weeks and months ahead. The vote had proven decisive, and most of the newly elected city officials had issued support for the transfer during their campaigns. Even the anti-military rhetoric tapered off substantially. The anti-Mewata lobby had failed.

The new council was prepared to concede to the ratepayers' decision. Mayor Sinnott stated unequivocally that the voters' edict was now mandate. "While I have not personally investigated the legal details in the matter," he told reporters, "there is no question in my mind that with both the vote of the council and an overwhelming mandate from the people in favor of placing the armoury in Mewata park, there is nothing now to prevent the building going there." Almost all of the new councillors had supported a transfer while on the campaign stump, and fulfilled their promises. At the first council meeting, even Alderman H. B. Adshead—one of the strongest opponents of an armoury in the park—expressed his belief that the site was now settled. The will of the people was clear, he asserted, and the fight against the proposal should cease.

The city instructed its solicitor to deal with the federal government and complete the transfer. For some months the process seemed to stagnate while they awaited instructions from Ottawa. Mayor Sinnott wrote to Bennett with words of encouragement in mid-March 1914. Satisfied that his council would do everything within their power to execute the transfer, he advised a prompt settlement before conditions changed. He found, however, that Bennett's tone had changed. The militia department was still considering the Mewata site, he explained, "but, owing to financial conditions, I am perfectly frank in saying to you that there is no great desire on the part of anybody to spend money, and the interference with my plans of last year has [d] very much disorganized" his arrangements for Calgary.
his typical tactics. He hit the mayor with this blunt, threatening telegram and immediately followed it up with a more moderate prescription outlining what needed to be done to salvage matters. He laid out the military’s requirements to the mayor, estimated a call for tenders totalling $300,000 within two months of a site transfer, and insisted that Sinnott “better have it staked, defined and transferred” in short order.

Further correspondence did not ameliorate the situation, and Bennett’s frustration became increasingly apparent. The plebiscite and council vote only called for the transfer of 90,000 sq. ft., a plot smaller than the military required. When the mayor asked Bennett whether the lot could be reduced, he received a sharp rebuke:

Plebiscite asked for Willingness of citizens to grant about ninety thousand square feet to the crown for an armoury. Difference of ten thousand feet will not materially affect the question and no smaller area can be taken if we are to obtain a building equal to that now under construction at Regina and Edmonton. The original offer of council was for a site four hundred feet square. Your action last summer delayed construction one year. Do I understand that no further action is to be taken?

The mayor’s inability to overcome trivial details was killing the process. Bennett followed up with another telegram, confident that he had caught the mayor’s attention. He laid out in explicit legal terms to whom the land was to be transferred. Sinnott, sensing that Bennett would not tolerate any further complications, acquired yet another council resolution that summer, this time formally authorizing the transfer of the Mewata Park land, and sent a deed of transfer Ottawa.

The city fulfilled its end of the bargain, but contrary to the Albertan’s earlier prophecies, the winds of war did sweep Canada in August 1914. Proud “Sons of the Empire” again answered the call, and armoury construction was quickly relegated to secondary or tertiary importance. After all, most of the buildings that Minister Hughes had authorized were complete and flooded with eager recruits. The pressing issue was how to obtain camps to train volunteers for overseas service.

Although the city of Calgary was finally prepared to move ahead on the Mewata project, it was no longer a key priority of the defence department. Bennett and a powerful Calgary senator, James Lougheed, continued to support the plans in principle. But Ottawa's political, military, and bureaucratic corridors were filled with other wartime priorities, which inhibited any forward momentum on the Calgary armoury plans.

It was now the city’s turn to bemoan the lack of progress. At the 4 January 1915 council meeting, Alderman Freeze questioned whether the mayor had taken any steps to “induce” the federal government to commence construction. Commissioner Graves, who had visited Ottawa a few weeks before, replied
that Bennett was hopeful the work would begin soon—a comment repeated by the daily press. In April, Bennett passed along plans for an “exceedingly handsome” armoury to the Herald, and tenders were called. The Herald praised Bennett and his efforts, reassuring readers that it was “something really worth waiting for.” And the waiting continued. That summer, when businesses began to probe city officials about their tenders, they were told to watch the papers and await a public announcement. Although federal funds were allocated for the project, legal ambiguities remained unsettled. More than a year passed before the federal government obtained official title, and construction finally began in the fall of 1916.

When the finished building was turned over to the army in September 1918, Bennett must have been pleased with his accomplishment. The armoury stood proudly in Mewata Park, its Tudor and Gothic revival architecture resembling a medieval fortress or castle. Thomas W. Fuller of the Chief Architect’s Branch of Public Works designed the building and modified the typical drill hall design of the period. The building incorporated local brick and sandstone, delivered from two brick factories built specifically for the project. Despite the pressures that the city had faced, and the strains on federal–municipal relations that had accompanied the project, the magnificent building was complete just as Bennett had envisioned.

Based on annual reports prepared by Calgary Parks and Recreation officials, Mewata continued to function as a public park after the armoury was built. Soldiers and citizens co-habited the grounds in a mutually respectful manner. Sports facilities were improved and playgrounds expanded, even while the armoury was being built and used. In 1965, journalist Tom Moore reflected that ever since the armoury was built it had “bulged” with civic activity, from boxing matches, to ball games and badminton on its big parade floor, to B’nai B’rith charity bazaars. The armoury was used for indoor track meets, famous riflemen burned powder on its rifle ranges, and a Calgary Boy Scout team once won a Commonwealth championship there. The dining room had hosted the Prince of Wales and prime ministers. The armoury’s “central location has been one of its major advantages,” Moore explained, “not only for its special projects but for its day-in-day-out cadet and militia activity that would probably fall off considerably if it were moved to the outskirts of the city.” It looked “old-fashioned,” but the armoury had become “a tremendous community centre for which Calgary has no substitute. To tear it down to make room for something else, no matter how worthy the other project may be, would be a tragedy that would affect thousands of Calgarians for many years to come.” His analysis was a fitting rebuttal to the predictions that his predecessors at the Albertan had made fifty years earlier. In the late 1980s, the Calgary Herald called the armoury one of the “most loved landmarks” in a city that cherished its military connection.

Recent scholarship has directly linked sport and militarism, with athleticism serving as a form of “war culture” intimately tied to imperial and national identities in the years leading up to the First World War. “In an environment where war, sports and athletics were so closely related,” Mark Moss suggests, “it was not much of a leap to perceive athletics and war as training grounds for manliness.” If so, the search for training grounds in urban centres could still lead to competition between militarism and athleticism, particularly when engaged by the partisan press, politicians, and interest groups. The public debate over the Mewata Park armoury site sheds light on the significant constraints and conflicting demands that myriad community institutions, groups, and individuals place upon municipal and federal decision-makers. Both the federal and provincial governments were partisan and used their powers to influence the process according to their designs. An active city council forwarded its own agenda while delicately balancing conflicting interests within the community. Local interest groups forged alliances and joined in coalitions with other organizations on an issue and partisan political basis. The local media disseminated and debated their points of view, connecting this military issue to concerns about urban identities and civic expectations. Municipal politicians, in turn, engaged in divisive public debate and acted according to personal conviction and the pragmatic consideration of re-election. If discussions of intergovernmental relations tend to portray the municipal level as a “passive observer” dictated to by the province or adversely affected by inconsiderate federal action, this case study suggests that local political actors can considerably influence federal development plans in their own right.

While group dynamics are important to understanding political decision-making, political parties, governments, and interest groups are first and foremost composed of individuals. Conservative-voting Calgary did not receive one of the many urban armories built across Canada while Laurier’s Liberals were in power, despite an identifiable need. The desire of Minister of Defence Sam Hughes to foster a sense of community—military camaraderie, and at the same time reward loyal constituencies, meant that Calgary was shortlisted for an armoury in 1912. R. B. Bennett, in his zealous and even callous manner, handled the political lobbying from and in Ottawa. He demanded a prime location—Mewata Park—and he laboured to secure it, even though the municipal government dragged its heels and sat on the political fence for as long as possible. Bennett’s repeated urgings and threats eventually compelled council to dispense with its waffling, accept his agenda, or face the consequences. As a result of his pressure and council’s decision to hold a plebiscite, a bold building stands where he wanted. The Mewata armoury still serves the Calgary militia (reserves) today, its distinctive architectural presence in the city ensuring its place as an enduring local landmark.

If a significant minority of Calgary’s population opposed the armoury project in 1913, the war likely dissipated its wariness of the militia. Calgary’s high enlistment rates became a source of civic pride, and the armoury was a visible reminder that war had become a part of Calgarians’ consciousness. In the 1930s, with the Depression holding the Prairies in its grip, Bennett be-
came the prime minister of Canada. He had already proven that, as a parliamentarian, he could deliver. He adopted an even more ambitious project to offer his loyal constituents a margin of relief from the Depression. When proposals and plans for a permanent force barracks divided Calgarians and precipitated a cacophony of public and political opposition, instead of being surprised, Bennett was ready for the challenge.106

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Notes
1. Janet Wright, *Crown Assets: The Architecture of the Department of Public Works, 1867–1967* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 95; Carman Miller, “Sir Frederick William Borden and Militia Reform, 1896–1911,” *Canadian Historical Review* 50, no. 3 (September 1969): 265–84. The terms drill hall and armoury are used interchangeably in this article, as they were during the debate discussed herein. The Calgary building is popularly known today as Mewata Armories or Armoury.


12. Quoted in Dick Cunniffe, “Calgary: A Military History, 1885–1914,” *Roundup,* undated article in history files at the Museum of the Regiments, Calgary. Walker was an important figure in local real estate, lumbering, mining, ranching, and petroleum development, and served as Calgary’s first (unofficial) mayor. He went on to organize provincial Boy Scout and Cadet corps, and a forestry battalion during the Great War, and was named Calgary’s “Citizen of the Century” in 1975. Paul Voisey, “In Search of Wealth and Status: An Economic and Social Study of Entrepreneurs in Early Calgary,” in *Frontier Calgary,* eds. Anthony Raspornich and Henry Klassen (Calgary: McClelland and Stewart West, 1975), 231.

13. Cunniffe, *Riflegreen and Khaki,* 10–11. The Canadian Mounted Rifles were a cavalry unit created during the South African War.

14. Ibid., 3–11; city clerk to Col. S. B. Steele, 22 October 1907, District Officer Commanding Military District (DOC MD) 13; Steele to city clerk, 23 October 1907, file 412, box 51, RG 26: City Clerk’s (1887–1945), Series I (hereafter cited as RG 26), City of Calgary Archives (hereafter cited as CCA).

15. Cruikshank to mayor, 21 July 1910; Cruikshank to chairman, City Commissioners, 9 September 1910; Cruikshank to W. D. Spence, 13 December 1910; mayor to Cruikshank, 6 January 1911; Cruikshank to mayor, 7 January 1911, ibid. See also “Extracts from Minutes of Council,” City Solicitor’s Correspondence, A–B, 1913, file 483, box 60, RG 26, CCA.


17. Cruikshank to mayor, 3 August 1911; chairman of board of commissions to Cruikshank, 9 August 1910. This selection was confirmed by the acting deputy minister of DMD to the mayor, 14 August 1911, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA.


19. Mayor to Cruikshank, 22 August 1911, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA; Cruikshank to J. W. Mitchell, 23 August 1911; chairman, Commissioners, to Cruikshank, 6 February 1912, file: Commissioners’ Estimates re: Contracts and Estimates, M–Z, 1913, box 46, Board of Commissioners files (hereafter cited as BoC), CCA; “Extracts from Minutes of Council, City of Calgary,” City Solicitor’s Correspondence, A–B, 1913, file 483, box 60, RG 26, CCA.


25. Moose Jaw offered a site valued at $40,000, Regina a site worth $75,000, and Edmonton a site worth $40,000. Red Deer, Minnedosa, Port Arthur, Fort Williams, and a number of BC towns also offered sites. Canada, *House of Commons Debates* (24 January 1912), pp. 1815–16; News-Telegram, 25 January 1912.

26. File 433 no. 5, vol. 3148, RG 11, LAC.


29. Thanks to Don Smith for sharing copies of undated articles from the scrapbook of former Calgary alderman Ralph Crichton, held in a private collection, that relate to Mewata Park. As the 1913 Annual Report of Calgary Parks and Recreation concluded, the park’s facilities were “thoroughly appreciated”; during the season, 352 baseball, 174 soccer, and 29 rugby games were played there. Annual Report 1913, pp. 1, 5–6, file 3, Annual Reports, 483-19, box 1, Parks and Recreation, RGA 23, CCA. See also Wetherell and Kmet, Useful Pleasures, 134.


31. Chairman to Bennett, 8 October 1912; Bennett to Mitchell, 16 October 1912, and reply, 16 October 1912, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA. See also file: Contracts and Estimates, M–Z, 1913, box 46, BoC, CCA.


34. City solicitor to city clerk, 19 March 1913; reply, 24 March 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA; mayor to R. B. Bennett, 20 March 1913, file: Contracts and Estimates, M–Z, 1913, box 46, BoC, CCA.

35. R. B. Bennett to Sinnott, 28 March 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence with Other Municipalities, L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA.

36. D. Morton, “Aid to the Civil Power. The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867–1914,” Canadian Historical Review 51, no. 4 (December 1970); David Bright, The Limits of Labour: Class Formation and the Labour Movement in Calgary, 1883–1929 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 76–96. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for these insights on the national TLC position. Indeed, alongside “anti-Mewata” edicts, the Liberal newspaper criticized Canadian militiamen who were acting in an aid to the civil power capacity to put down labour disputes on the West coast. See, for example, Calgary Morning Albertan (hereafter cited as Albertan), 30 August 1913, 3.

37. Wetherell and Kmet, Useful Pleasures, 126.

38. Bright, Limits of Labour, 56–57.

39. J. E. Young to mayor and commissioners of Calgary, 22 March 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence with Other Municipalities, L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA.

40. Mayor of Calgary to J. E. Young, 27 March 1913, ibid.; Liverant, “Patterns on the Land.” 119. Mawson was on a lecture tour of Canada in 1912 and addressed the Canadian Club of Calgary. His “landscape artistry,” which blended the “City Beautiful Tradition” with the symmetry and totality of the architectural grand design,” captured the imagination of Calgarians. Through 1913 he worked with the town planning commission in Calgary before delivering a final report in 1914. Max Foran, “The Mawson Report in Historical Perspective,” Alberta History 28, no. 3 (Summer 1980): 32–33.

41. Municipalities, unlike the provincial and federal levels of government, do not have any constitutional right to exist, and from a legal viewpoint exist only and take such form as their respective provincial governments provide. C. R. Tindal and S. N. Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995), 190, 221.

42. City solicitor to mayor and aldermen, 31 March 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA.

43. “Extracts from Minutes of Council,” City Solicitor’s Correspondence, A–B, 1913, file 483, box 60, RG 26, CCA.

44. See, for example, Annie McDougall to mayor and commissioners, 29 April 1913, and Toole, Peet & Co. to city clerk, 28 April 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA; Toole to city commissioners, 14 June 1913; to mayor, 23 June 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence with Other Municipalities, L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA. As late as December private offers were made and considered. See, for example, Charles Watson to Sinnott, 19 November 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA; mayor to city clerk, 1 December 1913. ibid.

45. Chairman to mayor and aldermen, 12 May 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA.

46. City clerk to mayor, 12 May 1913; Sinnott to Bennett, 13 May 1913, 29 May 1913, reply, 2 June 1913; Sinnott to Cruikshank, 17 May 1913; reply, 30 May 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence . . . , L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA; DOC to secretary, Militia Council, 12 June 1913, file H.Q. 14-14-8, vol. 6234, RG 24, LAC.

47. News-Telegram, 9 August 1913. Aldermen Crichton and Freeze formed a special committee to solicit Bennett’s views. Hughes had visited the potential sites in June 1913. See “Extracts from Minutes of Council, City of Calgary;” 4 August 1913, City Solicitor’s Correspondence, A–B, 1913, file 483, box 60, RG 26, CCA.

48. The vote carried 6–5. Extract from Minutes of Council, 18 August 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA.

49. I have selected for comparison the two newspapers described by Kesterton as representative of competing journalism in Calgary. The Calgary Herald was purchased by Southam in 1908. Its rival, the Morning Albertan, became a daily in 1902 when the Calgary Tribune and the Calgary Albertan were merged by W. M. Davidson. W. H. Kesterton, A History of Journalism in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Publishers, 1967), 114–15.

50. Albertan, 9 August 1913, 1.

51. Ibid., 12 August 1913, 3.

52. On the Albertan tying the Mewata Park issue to the larger issues of civic playground and park space, see “Save Our Playgrounds,” 29 August 1913, 3, and “Calgary and Its Parks,” 12 September 1913, 3.

53. Albertan, 15 August 1913, 3.

54. Herald, 9 August 1913. Donald Wetherell and Irene Kmet suggest that the Herald earlier took a more pro-sports stance, even calling into question “the manliness of city council” for thinking of surrendering a playing field. Wetherell and Kmet, Useful Pleasures, 135.

55. Sentinel, 9 August 1913, 3.

56. Wetherell and Kmet, Useful Pleasures, 136.

57. Bright, Limits of Labour, 56–57.


59. Herald, 11 August 1913, 6. A 26 June 1913 Herald editorial on Hughes’s visit to Calgary and his demand for Mewata Park stood in sharp contrast to its tone in August, when it supported Col. Hughes and R. B. Bennett’s choice to the fullest. The Albertan took issue with this change in opinion. See 4 December 1913, 1; 5 December 1913, 3, 6 December 1913, 3.
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68. Herald, 21 August 1913, 6; 27 August 1913, 6; 29 August 1913, 6.
69. Ibid., 28 August 1913, 10; Herald, 16 August 1913, 1.
70. C. J. Ford to mayor and commissioners, 25 September 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence . . . , L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA; Albertan, 20 September 1913, 1; 22 September 1913, 3; 21 October 1913, 3. The Alberta staunchly supported labour opponents, and denied rumours that their opposition was politically motivated.
71. Ibid.; 22 August 1913, 1.
72. Herald, 23 August 1913, 15; Albertan, 23 August 1913, 1, 11.
73. Ibid., 28 August 1913, 10; Herald, 15 September 1913, 1, 12.
75. Albertan, 16 August 1913, 1.
76. Mayor to J. M. Miller, city clerk, 2 September 1913, file: Commissions Correspondence . . . , L–R, 1913, box 39, BoC, CCA; Albertan, 20 September 1913, 1; 22 September 1913, 3; 21 October 1913, 3. The Alberta staunchly supported labour opponents, and denied rumours that their opposition was politically motivated.
77. Ibid.; 22 August 1913, 1.
78. Herald, 23 August 1913, 15; Albertan, 23 August 1913, 1, 11.
79. Ibid., 28 August 1913, 10; Herald, 15 September 1913, 1, 12.
80. Herald, 1 October 1913, 6; 27 August 1913, 6; 29 August 1913, 6.
81. Herald, 1 December 1913, 1; Albertan, 27 December 1913, 4. For examples of letters to the editor, see “Save Mewata Park for the Children,” Albertan, 6 December 1913, 3; “Case of Armoury Site Placed Before Voters,” ibid., 8 December 1913, 12.
82. Herald, 2 December 1913, 1; 1 December 1913, 6; 6 December 1913, 1.
83. Albertan, 8 December 1913, 1. See also “Col. Sam’s Armed Forces,” 16 December 1913, 3, and “Excessive Expenditure,” 18 December 1913, 3. The figures were clearly weighted to serve the paper’s point of view. A week and a half later the Alberta stated that “Calgary has about 700 volunteers.” 18 December 1913, 3.
84. Election Results, 8 December 1913, Election Returns, Oaths and Correspondence, 1913, file 452, box 56, RG 26, CCA. The official figures were 3644 for, 1459 against. City of Calgary, Municipal Handbook 1994, 23.
85. Herald, 9 December 1913, 6.
86. Albertan, 10 December 1913, 3.
87. Herald, 9 December 1913, 1; 10 December 1913, 9.
88. Ibid.; 9 December 1913, 1; council meeting, 16 February 1914, 86, January 1910–May 1914, reel CC 1, Notes from City Clerk’s Council Minutes, CCA; city clerk to city solicitor, 16 December 1913, file 412, box 51, RG 26, CCA; mayor to Bennett, 10 March 1914, file: Commissioners’ Correspondence . . . , M–P, 1914, box 47, BoC, CCA.
89. Bennett to Sinnott, 17 March 1914, ibid.
90. Bennett to Sinnott, 17 April 1914, ibid.
91. Sinnott to Bennett, 18 April and 21 April 1914, ibid.
92. Two telegrams, Bennett to mayor, 24 April 1914; acting mayor to city clerk, 6 June 1914, ibid; council meeting, 6 July 1914, p. 489. Notes from City Clerk’s Council Minutes, January 1910–May 1914, reel CC 1; Bennett to C. H. Hunter, 16 July 1914, file H.Q. 14–14–8, vol. 6234, RG 24, LAC.
93. The creation of Sarcee Camp, which quickly became a “tent city” on leased Tsu T'ina land near Calgary, was the recipient of those energies devoted to military development in the area. See Lackenbauer, “Vanishing Indian,” 66–99.
94. See correspondence in file H.Q. 14–14–8, vol. 6234, RG 24, LAC.
95. Council meeting, 4 January 1916, p. 9, Notes from City Clerk’s Council Minutes, reel CC 1, January 1910–May 1914.
96. Herald, 14 April 1915, 6; 17 April 1915, 1; 19 April 1915, 6. See also DM, DPW to DM, DMD, 23 April 1915, file H.Q. 14-14-8, vol. 6234, RG 24, LAC.
103. Patrick Tivy in Municipal Handbook 1994, 76.427/3, PAA. Several government members lobbied for a three-fifths clause to be inserted in the bill (stipulating that a clear majority of Calgary voters would have to endorse a transfer by plebiscite), but the bill was still defeated by a margin of 25 to 16.
104. Election Results, 8 December 1913, Election Returns, Oaths and Correspondence, 1913, file 452, box 56, RG 26, CCA. The official figures were 3644 for, 1459 against. City of Calgary, Municipal Handbook 1994, 23.