A Changing of the Guard: Regional Planning in Ottawa, 1945-1974

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Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of planning in Ottawa's metropolitan region between 1945 and 1974—a period of significant change in the city's planning history. As elsewhere, planners and policy-makers in Ottawa were coming under increasing pressure to make effective public participation a legitimate part of planning activities and to consider more seriously the potential quality-of-life impacts of their planning decisions, most notably those related to the provision of transportation infrastructure. Yet it was also in the late 1960s that the federal government was forced to concede its long-standing, yet unofficial, control of regional planning for the Ottawa area to the newly created Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC). Accordingly, creation of the RMOC's first official plan was a contentious process that, in the end, enabled the continuation of postwar suburban development trends while also incorporating a "transit-first" philosophy granting precedence to public transit over all forms of road construction and widening. The direction taken in its first official plan also enabled the RMOC to demonstrate that it, rather than the federal government, would from then on play the lead in regional planning.

Résumé

L'article se penche sur l'évolution de la planification dans la région métropolitaine d'Ottawa, de 1945 à 1974, années marquées par d'importants changements à l'égard de l'histoire de la planification de la ville. Comme ailleurs, les responsables de la planification et des prises de décision politiques à Ottawa subissaient de plus en plus de pression pour faire en sorte que la participation publique devienne une partie légitime des activités de planification. Il s'agissait également de prendre sérieusement en considération les effets potentiels de leurs décisions sur la qualité de vie, en particulier celles qui étaient liées à la mise en place de l'infrastructure dans le transport. Mais c'est aussi à la fin des années 1960 que le gouvernement fédéral a été forcé de céder son ancien contrôle, quoique non officiel, de la planification de la région d'Ottawa à la nouvelle municipalité régionale d'Ottawa-Carleton (MROC). Ainsi, la création du premier plan officiel de la MROC a été un processus contesté qui a permis, au bout du compte, de poursuivre les tendances de l'après-guerre concernant le développement des banlieues, tout en incorporant une philosophie de « système de transport d'abord », faisant gagner en popularité le transport public sur toutes les formes de construction et d'élargissement de routes. La direction prise dans son premier plan officiel a également permis à la MROC de démontrer qu'elle-même, plutôt que le gouvernement fédéral, occuperait l'avant-scène en matière de planification régionale.

Introduction

Canadian cities experienced unprecedented population and employment growth after World War II. Along with this growth came a significant transformation of the urban built environment. Planning was generally still in its infancy as a government activity at the time, having in most places only recently been accepted as a necessary and legitimate tool for managing urban growth and development. The planners charged with ensuring the efficient development of areas under their jurisdiction subscribed to the prevailing planning theories of the day—which proclaimed planning to be an objective, scientific, and technical exercise—and considered them as rational justification for their activities. Thus there seemed little need for public consultation and input in the planning process.

It was within this context that planners conducted their day-to-day activities, which implemented comprehensive master plans that aimed to achieve three fundamental objectives: to segregate incompatible land uses, maintain low development densities, and accommodate the automobile. In virtually every Canadian city, the result was extensive suburbanization of households, followed by decentralization and dispersal of many other functions, such as retailing, manufacturing, and warehousing, all of which were neatly situated within monofunctional zones. A growing reliance on cars and trucks, the popularity of which was driven largely by the freedom they provided from most accessibility constraints, prompted planners to dwell almost exclusively on road building as the central focus of transportation planning. As a result, the form of postwar urban built environments stood in stark contrast to those of the pre-1945 period, whereby most metropolitan regions were now characterized by the presence of a compact central core in which public transit and walking represented viable means of travelling between activity sites and a much more dispersed suburban realm in which the automobile was frequently the only viable mode of transportation.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the negative consequences of such an approach to planning urban built environments had become increasingly apparent. Urban sprawl—which was consuming agricultural and recreational land at an alarming pace and replacing it with housing subdivisions, commercial strips, and industrial parks that, to many, lacked any sense of place—had become rampant on the edges of most Canadian cities. The dispersal of upper- and middle-class households to suburban communities had left many (but not all) inner-city neighbourhoods in serious decline. The constantly growing dominance of the automobile—as the focus of land use and...
transportation planning, as the target of public investment, and as a mode of intra-urban travel—was making it increasingly difficult to provide efficient public transit. This, in turn, began to induce growing concerns about the negative socio-environmental impacts of these trends, including the rapid depletion of finite energy resources; the emission of air, water, and noise pollution by motor vehicles; the destruction of community cohesion and vitality in high-traffic areas, particularly those affected by the construction of urban expressways; and the reduction of accessibility to necessary goods and services for persons who did not have the use of an automobile. It was in response to concerns such as these that planning underwent a significant transformation starting in the late 1960s. An increasingly vocal public began to argue that unfettered urban growth and its accommodation in the form of automobile-oriented land use and transportation planning was no longer an acceptable approach to city building. Furthermore, the general public began to argue more and more frequently that planners should be giving greater priority to the needs of people, rather than those of buildings or cars. Conflicts of this nature played themselves out in city after city, most frequently in disputes related to plans for the construction of expressways. While the number of disputes in Canada related to transportation planning were fewer than in the United States, where construction of the Interstate highway system had decimated inner-city communities, Canada nonetheless saw its share of such battles. The best known of these was likely the Spadina Expressway conflict in Toronto, which pitted planners, suburban municipalities, and developers against inner-city residents who were vehemently opposed to the construction of a new expressway that would pass through their neighbourhoods in order to funnel commuter traffic between Toronto’s burgeoning suburbs and its downtown core. In that case, a well-organized citizenry, assisted by a sympathetic provincial government, succeeded in fighting pro-expressway forces.

The many planning conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s forced planners to reassess and revise their approaches to city building. As such, this period marked the beginning of a shift from a technocratic and top-down approach to planning, towards one that involved extensive public participation. It also marked a stage at which the social and environmental consequences of decisions about automobile-oriented land use and transportation planning were given much more serious consideration, and concurrently, the previously unquestioned supremacy of the automobile was more frequently challenged. Nevertheless, postwar suburban development trends continued into the 1970s and beyond. Many suburban municipalities, eager to expand their municipal tax-base, continued to approve development proposals that led to further low-density, automobile-oriented sprawl. Earlier in the twentieth century, the problem of urban overspill had often been dealt with by annexation of suburban areas by the government of the central city, who would then attempt to impose more rigid planning controls aimed at intensification of land use, or at least prevention of further sprawl. By the late 1960s, however, the futility of such an approach had become clearer, as each time a city annexed suburban lands the problem simply repeated itself outside the newly created boundaries. Provincial governments were now prompted to create new, regional levels of government or some other type of regional planning body that would have the authority to devise land-use and transportation plans for entire metropolitan regions. It was hoped that regional planning would mitigate—and prevent the repetition of—many problems that resulted from the massive, automobile-oriented postwar expansion of Canadian cities.

These transitions were not easy ones, however, as those fighting for change met head-on with the many stakeholders who benefited from the status quo. Planners, guided by their strongly technical-oriented educational backgrounds, often continued to maintain that roads and highways were necessary components of an efficient urban form. Suburban municipalities, eager to accommodate as much development within their boundaries as possible because of its perceived financial benefits, resisted efforts to more effectively and stringently manage growth. The development industry, having already profited significantly from massive postwar urban expansion, found it hard to accept that their activities should be limited in the interest of achieving less financially lucrative social and environmental goals. This period was therefore one that witnessed a significant search for political space, to use Warren Magnusson’s terminology,a struggle that pitted citizens against planners, citizens and environmental groups against developers, central city governments against suburban municipalities, and pro-road forces against anti-automobile lobbyists. Each group sought not only to be heard within the regional planning process, but also to have its own interests reflected in the land-use and transportation policies that were ultimately adopted.

The late 1960s and early 1970s therefore marked an important turning point in Canada’s urban environmental history, and the planning history of Ottawa’s metropolitan region is no exception. As elsewhere, planners and policy makers in Ottawa were coming under increasing pressure to make effective public participation a legitimate part of planning activities and to consider more seriously the potential quality-of-life impacts of their planning decisions, most notably those related to the provision of transportation infrastructure. Yet it was also in the late 1960s that the federal government was forced to concede its long-standing, yet unofficial, control of regional planning for the Ottawa area to the newly created Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton. It was within such a dynamic environment that the creation of the RMOC’s first official plan took place, resulting in a conflict-laden process involving regional planners and a wide variety of stakeholders, including sixteen local municipalities, the provincial government, the federal government, the development industry, a plethora of citizens associations, and numerous other special interest groups and professional organizations.

The result of this process was a document that enabled the continuation—albeit in a more carefully managed fashion—of
postwar suburban development trends, but that also incorporated a "transit-first" philosophy that granted precedence to public transit over all forms of road construction and widening. Thus the land-use planning policies of the 1974 RMOC Official Plan largely served the interests of the suburban municipalities and the development industry, while its pro-transit policies reflected the growing—yet still somewhat weak—influence of an increasingly active and outspoken citizenry in the planning process. The direction taken in its first official plan also enabled the RMOC to demonstrate that it, rather than the federal government, would from then on lead regional planning. However, it also became clear that the cooperation of both levels of government would nonetheless be essential if their concurrent goals of creating an attractive national capital and a good place to live for its citizens were to be achieved.

The Plan for the National Capital, 1945–1969

Ottawa's growth up to World War II followed a pattern similar to the one that had unfolded in most other Canadian and American cities. The original urban area was compact, centred on the many lumberyards situated along the shores of the Ottawa River. Rapid population growth followed Ottawa's designation as capital of the United Canadas in 1857 and even more so after Confederation in 1867. This change, along with the initiation of streetcar-based public transportation service, spawned several waves of suburban development that each time followed the extension of streetcar lines further and further away from the downtown core. By the late 1920s, however, the automobile had become prominent on Ottawa streets and with it had come a significant dispersal of households into areas inaccessible by public transit. By the dawn of World War II this physical growth extended across Ottawa's outer boundaries and well into the rural townships of Nepean and Gloucester, largely in the form of discontinuous development beyond the reach of municipal services.

It was within this context that the first major effort to develop a single plan for Ottawa's metropolitan region took place, one that would be spearheaded by the federal government, despite its lack of constitutional authority in the realm of planning. Troubled by its emerging metropolitan form and, moreover, by the absence of any effective local-government-driven planning initiative aimed at achieving his vision for Ottawa to become a world-class national capital, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King invited the renowned French architect-planner Jacques Gréber to lead development of a comprehensive master plan for a newly designated National Capital Region. Gréber arrived in Ottawa in 1945, and his work culminated in 1950 with the publishing of the Plan for the National Capital, which covered an extensive geographical area measuring 900 square kilometres.

Despite his "celebrity planner" status, the process through which Gréber developed the Plan for the National Capital was not atypical of that employed in most cities at the time. Supported by a small army of planning staff, Greber went about his business autocratically. Although he did occasionally consult with federal departments and the local municipalities, participation by the general public in the planning was limited to occasions on which Greber was invited to speak, in which he typically outlined the planning problems that he felt had to be dealt with and the progress that was being made in developing the plan.

As far as physical planning was concerned, Gréber focused primarily on the growing prevalence of discontinuous urban development on the city's periphery, and on increasing traffic congestion, especially in Ottawa's downtown core. Ultimately, he hoped to encourage the development of a well-defined urban area where workers lived in neighbourhood units located close to their places of employment, and where automobile traffic circulated quickly and freely. To combat the disorderly conversion of rural land to urban uses, Greber borrowed heavily from the ideas of Ebenezer Howard, originator of the Garden City concept, by recommending the creation of a greenbelt in order that "the periphery of the urban area be protected against all undesirable or linear subdivisions or developments." In delineating its potential boundaries, Gréber suggested that future development be confined to locations where sewer and water facilities could be extended at a reasonable cost to taxpayers. He also assumed that, by restricting the supply of vacant land inside the greenbelt, high- and medium-density development might be encouraged there. With this in mind, Gréber felt the supply of undeveloped land inside the proposed greenbelt would meet local needs for several decades and, ultimately, house a population of up to about 600,000 (compared to 250,000 in 1950). He also suggested that several independent satellite cities be created outside the greenbelt once development opportunities inside the greenbelt were exhausted, but that each satellite should be located far enough away to avoid cross-greenbelt commuting.

Gréber's second major concern had been Ottawa's increasing traffic congestion problems, which he attributed to two factors: an inadequate road network, and delays caused by trains at level crossings and by streetcars along major thoroughfares. Accordingly, he proposed that most of the city's railway tracks—which extended over 100 kilometres in length in 1945—and all of its streetcar lines be removed. The railway lines and, subsequently, rail-dependent industrial activities would be relocated from the central city to the urban periphery. Streetcars would be replaced by diesel buses, which in turn would share the road with automobiles. Not only would this create a more attractive urban landscape and reduce traffic congestion, Gréber argued, but a vast road transportation network could also be constructed along the former railroad rights-of-way to facilitate even further the circulation of automobile traffic. Among these would be several parkways that would provide visitors to Ottawa with scenic routes upon which to explore the capital beyond its downtown core.

Greber also recommended the decentralization of federal government offices as a solution to the city's growing automo-
bile traffic problems. The size of Canada's civil service had risen dramatically through the 1940s, first to assist in the war effort, and subsequently to serve Canada's rapidly growing postwar population. The increasing number of commuters converging daily in the downtown core had been exacerbating congestion, and Gréber therefore proposed the dispersal of government offices throughout the capital region. This move, he argued, would serve three purposes. First, it would reduce traffic volumes in the downtown core. Second, it would allow public servants to purchase suburban homes within close proximity to their workplaces. Third, it would enable the demolition of the many unattractive government buildings hastily constructed during World War II to house civil servants, which in turn would make room for the construction of new and more attractive national institutions, such as a national library and art gallery.

The Plan for the National Capital was published in 1950 and had a significant influence on physical planning within the National Capital Region for most of the following two decades. Responsibility for implementing the plan fell upon the Federal District Commission (FDC), which was renamed the National Capital Commission (NCC) in 1959. As a result of the federal government's lack of constitutional authority over urban planning, however, much of the plan's successful implementation was contingent upon the co-operation of the municipal governments.

The relocation of railways and offices was easily implemented because matters related to railroads and public administration lay within the federal government's jurisdictional authority. Between 1950 and 1970, most crosstown railway lines were removed, a new passenger railway station was built three kilometres from Ottawa's downtown core, and new railway yards were built on the city's southeastern fringe. Civic officials also acted upon Gréber's proposal to remove streetcars and their tracks from city streets, with the last streetcar runs made in 1959 amid much ceremony. While some observers on this day may have been longing for a return to the streetcar’s heyday, likely most people were happy to see the streetcars go. The city of Ottawa had taken ownership of the local public transportation system in 1946 and with it inherited a fleet of streetcars several decades old and in a very sad state of repair. Furthermore, their physical condition was made worse by the fact that they carried record-setting passenger loads in response to fuel rationing during World War II. Thus, as in most Canadian cities, it is likely that Ottawa residents were quite eager to enter the next phase in the evolution of public transit, the era of the motor bus. In conjunction with the shift from rail-based to wheel-based transit, several arterial roads and scenic parkways were also built along the former railway rights-of-way, including the Rockcliffe Parkway, the Ottawa River Parkway, and Colonel By Drive. A new crosstown freeway, the “Queensway,” was also built on a former railway line, the cost of which was shared between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments. The federal government also accepted Gréber’s recommendation on office decentralization. This undertaking involved the construction en masse of several office complexes throughout the Ottawa area between 1957 and 1968.

The city of Ottawa was generally a willing participant in much of the Plan’s implementation, not only because of its long-standing
interest in promoting orderly urban growth but perhaps more because the federal government paid most, if not all, costs involved in implementing projects within its boundaries. A similar degree of cooperation was not forthcoming from the townships of Nepean and Gloucester, because the FDC/NCC was not giving something to them, as it had to Ottawa on so many recent occasions. Instead, from the rural townships' perspective, it was taking something away. In this case, the conflict related to the decision to create Gréber's proposed greenbelt, the assembly of which was complicated by the fact that the federal government did not have the legal authority to do so by enacting zoning bylaws. Instead, constitutional authority over municipal planning legislation rested with the provincial government, which had in turn delegated this power to the local municipalities. As a result, collaboration with Nepean and Gloucester, in whose jurisdiction the greenbelt would be located, was necessary. Both municipalities were still smarting from Ottawa's 1950 annexation, however, and thus were adamantly opposed to giving up even more substantial portions of their developable land and potential tax base than they already had. As a result, Nepean and Gloucester refused to enact the zoning bylaws necessary for the creation of a greenbelt. The only remaining solution available to the FDC was to take direct ownership of the necessary lands. Thus, through the purchase of 20,000 hectares of privately owned land, a greenbelt measuring 44.8 kilometres in length and averaging about 4 kilometres in width was fully in place by 1966.

Despite the federal government's persistent efforts, it was apparent even before the Greenbelt was fully assembled that it would not achieve its primary purpose of containing urban sprawl. Beyond their refusal to assist in the creation of a greenbelt, Nepean and Gloucester also ignored Gréber's recommendation to direct extra-Greenbelt development to newly built satellite cities located outside the Ottawa commuter-eshed. Instead, housing construction, fully sanctioned by the two townships, began to intensify on the Greenbelt's immediate outer edges. By 1962, a study conducted by the NCC found that significant urban development was set to unfold along the eastern, southern, and western outer edges of the Greenbelt. One year later, the NCC published a statistical review in which it was predicted that, by the year 2001, there would be some 65,000 people living on the eastern outer edge of the Greenbelt, 120,000 people to the south, and 180,000 along the western edge, if development trends continued without the imposition of planning controls.

The RMOCs 1974 Official Plan: Putting Transit First

The ongoing lack of voluntary inter-municipal planning cooperation prompted the government of Ontario to legislate a second tier of local government, the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC), which came into being on 1 January 1969. One of the first tasks set forth for the RMOC was to develop a new official plan. Under the provincial legislation, the official plans and zoning bylaws of the RMOC's sixteen constituent municipalities would be required to conform to the region's planning policies once they were adopted.

The creation of the RMOC's first official plan began in 1969 with the hiring of a planning staff and the commencement of several technical studies aimed mainly at documenting and projecting regional population and employment growth, traffic volumes and patterns, and land development trends. Unlike the process involved in creating the plan for the National Capital, which was crafted almost entirely by Jacques Gréber and with little public input, the intention this time was for the RMOC to engage in a broad public participation program. This approach was likely stimulated by the mounting pressure being felt by planners and policy makers throughout Canada and the United States for greater citizen input into community planning. As noted earlier, by the late 1960s planners had come to be accused of focusing far too heavily on physical aspects of city building rather than on addressing the needs and concerns of the people living in their communities. Following a meeting with the Ottawa Federation of Citizens Associations in which this group made a plea for active public involvement in the planning process, the regional planning committee endorsed an extensive public participation program. This opportunity for public input was welcomed with much optimism by many stakeholders. For example, at an early public hearing a representative of the Ottawa Chapter of the Town Planning Institute of Canada made the following comment that conveyed well the novelty of such an approach: "Thank you for taking this unusual step of soliciting comment before the plan is prepared and asking people who are interested, whether as individuals or institutions, to make comment [and] to make note what they think is important about it, rather than being asked to comment after the fact."

As work got under way, it quickly became clear that much of the planning debate would focus on three central issues: (1) how much population and employment growth should be accommodated; (2) where and at what densities such growth should take place; and (3) what mode(s) of transportation should link the various parts of the region. The quantity of growth to be accommodated was a cause of significant contention between the regional planners and the citizens associations and special interest groups. On the basis of findings in several technical reports, the planners had asserted that Ottawa-Carleton's population would grow from some four hundred thousand to about one million by the year 2000. To many, this number was far too optimistic. For others, it was simply too much. As a result, many participants raised a question about population growth that was being asked much more frequently throughout North America in the early 1970s: "How much is too much?" For example, a member of Pollution Probe, one of the most active and vocal participants in the planning process, argued that there was an "implied sanction of continuous and long-term population growth in the density of people in the Ottawa-Carleton Region. Probe members suggest that viable alternatives to this 'growth ethic' be provided." A member of the Dow's Lake Property Owners' Association put it more succinctly: "It is no longer ac-
cepted implicitly that "growth is good."22 These and many other opinions put forth reflected the growing popular sentiment that stronger controls should be placed on population growth in the Region, and that more emphasis should be placed on improving quality-of-life for those already living there along with, at the very most, a smaller number of new residents.

Regarding the location of future development activity, several local municipalities wanted to see at least some residential and employment growth directed their way, particularly those in the urban core (Ottawa and Vanier) and the suburban townships (Gloucester and Nepean). Members of the development industry also sought to have their land holdings considered in the delineation of future urban growth, often invoking the argument that, since they had assembled their lands before the RMOC was created, they should not be prevented from developing them as originally intended.23 However, other groups, including municipalities and neighbourhood associations, wanted just the opposite. The councils of villages like Manotick and Stittsville, for example, indicated that their residents valued the small-town character of their communities and wanted to maintain it by ensuring that those places were not designated for future urban growth. Similarly, many neighbourhood groups stressed that, in the interest of preserving community cohesion, they did not want to see the intensification of development in their areas included in the official plan as a means of accommodating future population growth. While these groups were primarily those located in the urban core, such as the Glebe, Sandy Hill, and Centretown, this view was also held by the residents of suburban communities, such as Kanata.

The third subject of much attention throughout the planning process was transportation. Early on, it had become clear that the almost-universal preference of citizens and many lower-tier municipalities would be for public transportation, rather than the automobile, to receive priority in future regional transportation planning and investment. Perhaps surprisingly, RMOC residents shared this perspective, regardless of where they lived. Central city residents felt this way primarily because, by this time, they were experiencing many of the negative impacts of Ottawa's automobile-oriented suburban growth that had coincided with the implementation of the Plan for the National Capital through the 1950s and 1960s. As suburban neighbourhoods grew in the rural townships that for the most part were not served by public transit, Ottawa's downtown core remained the focal point of regional employment. Most inner-city neighbourhoods were therefore experiencing the negative environmental impacts of the growing rush hour traffic congestion caused by suburban dwellers travelling to and from their downtown workplaces, such as noise and air pollution. Suburban residents were also largely in favour of promoting public transit ahead of the automobile, in this case because traffic congestion had become so severe in downtown Ottawa that shifting commuters to public transit was often seen as the only viable solution to this problem. Furthermore, this planning process was taking place at a time when the finite nature of the world's oil supply was becoming more fully realized and fuel prices were rising to unprecedented levels. Thus there was also surely an economic motivation to the suburbanites' support for public transit.

One of the earliest documents released for public feedback was a report originally submitted by regional planners to the RMOC council in 1971 that identified eight alternative development concepts and also provided an evaluation of the merits and weaknesses of each (figure 3).24 These included the following:

- Options 1 and 2: situating most future urban development inside the Greenbelt at high densities, with the possibility of further growth being concentrated at locations along the Greenbelt's outer periphery
- Option 3: allowing the complete development of lands inside the Greenbelt, at medium densities, then directing further growth to a limited number of satellite cities located outside, but adjacent to, the Greenbelt
- Options 4, 5, and 6: accommodating growth within a principal medium-density urban centre, with linear fingers of suburban development extending outward along a small number of transportation corridors
- Options 7 and 8: maintaining the status quo, in light of prevailing growth and development trends, by creating a medium-density central city that would be surrounded by scattered, low-density urban development outside the Greenbelt

After considering the options—which, it is important to note, they themselves had identified—regional planners recommended that preference be given to the "satellite" or "corridor" options, or some combination of the two. This conclusion, they argued, was based on considerations such as the suitability of land for urban development, the cost of providing municipal infrastructure, and potential transportation impacts. Perhaps most importantly, however, they also seriously questioned whether or not the potential locations were those where developers had already applied for development approval or where the local municipalities had designated land for urban development in their own pre-existing official plans.

Despite the potential for the "core" approaches (Options 1 and 2) to assist in efficiently containing urban sprawl and providing municipal services, the planners argued that these alternatives should nonetheless be discarded, primarily because—with only a small amount of undeveloped land remaining inside the Greenbelt—the creation of a compact city would have been possible only through the widespread demolition and reconstruction of existing neighbourhoods. This was deemed an unattractive approach, not because of the deleterious effects that such drastic measures would have on the lives of local residents, such as the destruction of community cohesion and the loss of historic sites, but also because it would require the widespread expansion of roadways in order to accommodate the larger
number of travellers moving throughout the central city. The “dispersed” options (7 and 8) were also presented as being unfavourable, because they promoted automobile dependence and would involve further consumption of agricultural lands and other natural resources, two of the major problems that had actually provided the impetus for the RMOC's creation. Also, scattered development would prevent efficient provision of municipal services and facilities.

Although the regional planners favoured the “satellite” or “corridor” options, they proposed that these be located immediately adjacent to the Greenbelt in lieu of Jacques Gréber’s earlier suggestion that any extra-Greenbelt satellite cities be established farther away from Ottawa. First, they felt compelled to heed the numerous requests from developers to include lands that they had assembled before the RMOC was created, on the assumption that these would be the location of future development. (In many cases, developers noted that their land purchases had followed the NCC's aforementioned statistical review of 1964, which had predicted major population growth on the Greenbelt's outer periphery. The fact that this was a projection rather than an endorsement of a particular growth and development scenario had clearly not been a concern to the developers.) Second, the planners considered it unlikely that more distant satellite cities could become self-contained entities with their own independent economic bases, at least in the short term. Third, they argued that the cost of providing infrastructure, such as sewer and water services, to communities farther away would be prohibitive, compared to the cost of simply extending such services to locations on the Greenbelt's outer edge, since these could be efficiently installed along the proposed transportation corridors. RMOC council agreed with the planners' recommendations and permitted them to proceed with the “satellite” or “corridor” development concepts as the guiding framework for the remainder of the plan's formulation.

In 1972, regional planning staff prepared and released yet another discussion document intended primarily to inform stakeholders about the progress made thus far and to generate further feedback on the directions the plan should take. In this report, written in very general and deliberately vague terms, the planners asserted that

- on the basis of population projections, the area inside the Greenbelt would be fully built up in twenty-five to forty years, with some six hundred and fifty thousand people living in this area,
- given a total regional population expected to reach one million by the year 2000, up to three hundred and fifty thousand people would have to be housed outside the Greenbelt,
- large urban communities should be developed on the eastern and western outer edges of the Greenbelt, because they would be the most suitable when it came to the provision of municipal infrastructure (although each did have some deficiencies that would have to be addressed),
- lands situated to the south, southwest, and southeast of the Greenbelt also had the potential to become suitable locations for the creation of extra-Greenbelt communities, pending further investigation, and
- although specific recommendations on the future location of employment had not yet been formulated, the option of directing substantial employment growth into Ottawa's downtown core would be far less attractive in terms of its transportation implications than that of decentralizing jobs throughout the region.

Nine major public meetings and eleven smaller meetings, the latter of which were mostly held in rural areas, followed the release of the report. At most of these meetings it had become quite obvious that the planners and the other stakeholders were not reading from the same page. With this division came growing sentiment that, as much as the Region had promised effective public participation, the voices of those attempting to contribute to the process were not being heard. Many of the oral presentations given at the sessions therefore included criticism of one or more assertions made by the planners in the report, most commonly related to the variety and creativity of development concepts considered before choosing to pursue the "satellite" or "corridor" options and the emphasis currently being placed on different modes of transportation. For example, it was argued that the "core" options were dismissed far too easily on the assumptions that they would disrupt communities and require the construction and expansion of too many roadways in order to accommodate the large number of trips that would be made within the Greenbelt. Why not, some argued, concentrate development at higher densities within the Greenbelt, but with rapid transit as the primary backbone of the transportation system? While it had been made clear that central city residents
would not accept further high-rise development in their neigh-
bourhoods beyond the significant amount that had taken place
in the previous decades, some groups pointed out that they
were not averse to higher densities if dwellings were creatively
designed low-rises.

The second main criticism of the planners to this point was
their lack of explicit detail on future transportation planning.
The discussion document had indicated in general terms that
the plan would be strongly oriented to public transit, but at the
same time showed the construction of numerous new road­
ways as part of the future transportation network. As a result,
many of the public meetings were the scenes of further pleas
from residents to reconsider this approach. For example, the
Citizens’ Committee for Planning in Sandy Hill stated, “The ap­
parent planning approach of the Region is dangerously narrow
and unimaginative. The starting point has not been the essential
human needs of present and future residents of the region;”
while a joint committee representing seven local groups noted,
“Community planning is paramount to transportation planning!
The function of transportation is to serve the community, not to
dominate it. Transportation corridors must avoid disruption of
existing communities.”

The conflict between residents and the RMOC planners on
the extent to which public voices were being heard was only
one of two major fights going on at the time. A second conflict
pitted the local governments and members of the development
industry against the provincial and federal governments. In this
case, the struggle concerned the RMOC’s decision on where
to situate future extra-Greenbelt growth. The Region had by this
point committed itself to allowing future development on the
eastern and western flanks of the Greenbelt, in the Kanata and
Orleans areas, but these would hold only a portion of the total
population that would be expected to live outside the Green­
belt by 2000. The developers, and with them the reeves of Nepean
and Gloucester, felt that further satellite-city development
should take place to the south of Ottawa, along both the east
and west shores of the Rideau River. The provincial and federal
governments, on the other hand, had assembled a large tract
of land to the southeast of the city, in the vicinity of Carlsbad
Springs. Their desire was to have this land bank included as an
urban growth area in support of their plan to develop a model
community that would ultimately hold some hundred thousand
residents and be linked to the central city by a rapid transit sys­
tem. Each group tried not only to assert the merits of their pro­
posals, but also to dismiss the other group’s claims that theirs
was the ideal place to situate further growth. The developers
argued that sewer and water services could be provided more
easily on their lands and that the current road network could ac­
accommodate the increase in traffic that would accompany their
devvelopments. They also argued that the federal-provincial land
bank was unsuitable for development because it was situated
on an unstable leda clay deposit that was susceptible to slump­
ing; furthermore, the high water table in that area made danger­
ous landslides a possibility. The provincial and federal govern­
ments, for their part, argued that technical studies had shown
these claims to be false, and that their land holdings were
perfectly suitable for urban development. They also argued that
the construction of social housing would be a major priority in
developing the new community, something that would otherwise
not likely take place elsewhere if their plans were not adopted
as part of the larger regional strategy.

A draft official plan was finally submitted to council and re­
leased for public discussion in August 1973. In the draft, the
planners appear to have tried a compromise solution that would
 placate many of these interests. However, they also maintained
a steadfast commitment to many of the assumptions that had
guided them throughout the planning process, most notably
the projected regional population of one million by the year
2000 and the expected requirement of four hundred and fifty
thousand jobs. With these figures in mind, the draft plan called
for the complete development of residential lands inside the
Greenbelt, which would house up to six hundred and thirty
thousand people, and the staging of further development in
four satellite communities. The first stage of extra-Greenbelt
development would take place in the Kanata–Glen Cairn area to
the west, with a maximum of a hundred thousand residents and
thirty-five thousand jobs, and in the Orleans area to the east,
with a population of up to thirty-five thousand and six thousand
jobs. Also, between fifteen thousand and twenty thousand peo­
ple would be accommodated in Barrhaven, to the south of the
Greenbelt, although this area would not initially be the site of a
major employment centre. The second stage of extra-Greenbelt
development would occur at Carlsbad Springs, primarily on the
provincial-federal land bank. Again, this area would hold up to a
hundred thousand residents and thirty-five thousand jobs. The
third stage of development outside the Greenbelt would occur
on lands adjacent to the Barrhaven community and extend east
to span the Nepean and Gloucester shores of the Rideau River.

The draft official plan was once again introduced as be­
ing strongly oriented to public transit. Yet further reading led
many to wonder whether this was truly the case. It stated that
“planners are confident that traffic jams can be avoided in the
Ottawa-Carleton region, but only if an efficient public transit
system is provided, particularly in the core area.” The plan
called for at least 80 per cent of work trips to the downtown
core to be made by public transit, which would be facilitated
by the construction of several rapid transit corridors that would
ultimately extend to western, eastern, southwestern, and south­
estern corners of the RMOC’s urban areas. Not only did the
80 per cent figure seem to have been ambitious, even without
further road construction or expansion, but the practicality of
this proposal was brought further into question by the inclusion
of several road construction initiatives in the draft plan. While it
did not call for the construction of any new urban freeways, it
was still replete with plans for the construction of new bridges
and multi-lane arterial roadways, along with the expansion of
several existing arteries. This plan included two new bridges
over the Ottawa River, three over the Rideau River, and one
over the Rideau Canal. It also called for the replacement of the
Pretoria Bridge, which crossed the Rideau Canal, by two new
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bridges paralleling the Queensway. Furthermore, it proposed an inner ring road meant to allow crosstown traffic to avoid the central core and to take some pressure off growing Queensway traffic, as well as an outer ring road outside the Greenbelt that was to provide a bypass around Ottawa for through traffic. These transportation policies were given the following justification: “Through implementation of the rapid transit system, improvements to surface transit, and provision of bypass facilities, future travel can be accommodated in an efficient manner with minimum undesirable socio-economic impact.” Clearly, many local residents would not buy this argument.

Vocal and widespread debate did not abate in the months leading up to the plan’s ultimate adoption by regional council. The mayor of Ottawa criticized the plan for its policies aimed at the decentralization of housing and employment, and called instead for the continued concentration of jobs in the central core and more intensive development inside the Greenbelt.32 The Reeves of Nepean and Gloucester, staunch supporters of the development industry’s desire to have their lands included and no doubt also by now tired of the long history of federal meddling in their planning jurisdiction, wanted to see the South Gloucester and South Nepean lands receive priority over the federal-provincial land bank.33 The developers argued that housing prices had skyrocketed in the Ottawa metro area over the past few years, largely because insufficient land had been allotted for construction of low-density, single-family dwellings.34 They also cried foul at involvement of the public sector in housing construction, reasoning that there was no evidence that the public sector could provide housing more efficiently than they could.35

The emphasis on public transit seemingly advocated in the draft official plan was also questioned once again. The inclusion of so many road and bridge projects was scorned by local groups. For example, the New Edinburgh residents association came out against the proposed Vanier Arterial, which would cut right through their neighbourhoods; several groups from Sandy Hill were against the proposed crossing of the Rideau River that would divert traffic through their area; the Centretown association was against roadway expansion through their community, located directly south of the downtown core; and several community groups were staunchly opposed to the proposal that would see the replacement of the Pretoria Bridge, across the Rideau Canal, with two new roadways and bridges that would cut through and destroy housing in one of Ottawa’s oldest neighbourhoods. Further away from the core, residents of Britannia had organized themselves to combat the proposal for an arterial roadway that would connect to a proposed interprovincial bridge, but only by cutting through their neighbourhood and cutting off access to one of Ottawa’s most popular recreational areas, Britannia Park.

The decision on a final official plan was further complicated by the NCC in 1974, which had remained uncharacteristically quiet throughout most of the planning process. Its silence was a blessing to the region and the local municipalities, who at the time were trying to assert their legislative right to control urban and regional planning and were therefore pleased that the NCC was minding its own affairs. At the same time, the NCC’s lack of comment on the regional planning proposals was disconcerting because it was seen as the primary voice of the federal government, which was, after all, the largest employer and landowner in the region. Thus, there had been many calls throughout the planning period for the NCC to reveal the federal government’s plans for future employment in Ottawa-Carleton.36 Most importantly, perhaps, the projected population of one million was largely contingent on the continued growth of public sector employment. If this was not to be the case, it was argued, the fact should be made known so that the regional plan would not be tailored to accommodate it.

When the NCC did finally enter the picture, at the eleventh hour and just before the regional plan was formally adopted, its input came in a surprising form. It involved the release of a document entitled Tomorrow’s Capital, which presented an alternative development concept for the National Capital Region and largely contradicted many of the RMOC’s proposals.37 As opposed to the strong southwest–northeast orientation for urban development advocated by the RMOC, the NCC proposed that future development might follow a southeast–northwest trajectory, which would include its proposed southeast satellite at Carlsbad Springs. It also offered several arguments in support of this approach. First, it would serve to balance growth on the Ontario and Quebec sides of the Ottawa River, which, until then, had already been strongly southwest–northeast. Second, it would facilitate the provision of high-quality rapid transit by enabling residents of all four corners of the National Capital Region to reach downtown efficiently and without the use of a car. Finally, and for a reason more related to the NCC’s mandate to shape a capital that represented the nation’s peoples than for planning reasons, it argued that this approach would counter a population trend that it deemed a threat to the National Capital Region’s bilingual identity. In recent years, many English-speaking households had relocated to the Quebec side of the interprovincial boundary in search of an affordable home that was also within reasonable commuting distance of the downtown core. The problem here was that this trend had the potential to dilute the strong francophone character of the Quebec side of the National Capital Region; thus, the NCC argued that the provision of affordable housing on the Ontario side that was also easily accessible to the downtown core had the potential to stem this tide.

Several other developments transpired between 1972 and 1974 that, although not directly related to the formulation of the regional official plan, further validated the many arguments in favour of developing a transit-oriented growth and development strategy. A move by the RMOC itself began this process. Although the Region’s responsibilities did not initially include the administration of public transit service, it had become clear by the early 1970s that this mode of transportation would play a critical role in achieving regional planning goals, with or with-
out the expansion of road capacity. Thus, in order to provide
the RMOC with direct control over public transit throughout
its urbanized area, and so a greater ability to implement its
rapid transit strategy, the provincial government amended
the RMOC Act in 1972. This resulted in the dissolution of the
Ottawa Transportation Commission and its replacement with
the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Transit Commission (marketed as
“OC Transpo”).39 The creation of OC Transpo was immediately
followed by several service enhancements.39 Almost immedi­
ately, new buses were purchased, new drivers were hired, and
six new routes were established to serve suburban areas that
previously had not been made part of the transit route network.
A dial-a-bus service was also created to serve three low-density
suburban communities where the provision of conventional
transit service was not yet economically feasible.40 Finally, the
RMOC designated exclusive bus lanes on several main thor­
oughfares in downtown Ottawa that gave transit vehicles priority
over automobile traffic. This served to considerably alleviate
major congestion associated with the large concentration of
employment in Ottawa’s core area.

Despite its continuing conflict with the RMOC on the future
direction of regional planning in Ottawa, most notably in the
form of the Carlsbad Springs debate and later its release of the
Tomorrow’s Capital document, the federal government
also made several moves that facilitated provision of effect­
ive public transit in Ottawa during this time. First, the Treasury
Board agreed to eliminate the free parking that had long been
provided to public servants working in downtown Ottawa, a
concession that local and provincial officials had been seeking
for some time as a means of improving transit’s attractiveness
relative to the automobile.41 Public servants would ultimately
pay approximately three-quarters of the rate being charged at
privately owned parking lots downtown. A second move was
the decision to stagger the working hours of public servants
employed within the central area.42 Instead of requiring workers
to arrive at their offices just before 9 a.m. and to return home
around 5 p.m., the staggered hours policy enabled them to ar­
rive at 7:00 am and at 9:30 am and to leave any time
between 3:00 and 6:00 p.m.

The third federal initiative also came after considerable lobby­
ing by local governments. In this case, the NCC backed away
from a long-standing policy that forbade the use of commercial
vehicles on its parkway system, which was initially conceived
by Jacques Gréber as a way of providing visitors to Ottawa
with the ability to travel between major attractions along scenic
routes.43 The parkways had already become major conduits for
commuter traffic moving between the city’s burgeoning sub­
urbs and the downtown core, as many drivers found this to be
a more scenic and much quicker alternative to the congested
Queensway. In March 1974, during the same week that the
staggered hours policy came into effect, the NCC began to
close a section of the Ottawa River Parkway to vehicular traffic
in one direction during each peak period so that the roadways
could be used exclusively by buses. In the morning, buses trav­
elling from Ottawa’s western reaches could use the westbound
lanes to travel eastbound towards downtown, while they would
travel westbound in the eastbound lanes during the afternoon
rush hour. The remaining lanes would remain accessible to
automobile traffic travelling in the direction of the prevailing
peak hour traffic flow. These moves resulted in a considerable
reduction of traffic congestion not only in the downtown core,
but also throughout the city. Shortly after the policy went into
effect in March 1974, OC Transpo was reporting that the time it
took for some routes to travel between suburban communities
in Ottawa’s west end and the downtown was cut by as much as
half. This made transit more attractive to commuters by provid­
ing them with quicker service, and also enabled OC Transpo to
use its fleet of buses more efficiently by allowing the same bus
to be used for several trips throughout the extended rush hour
periods. Previously, the flow of commuters had been so heavily
concentrated that many buses could only make one trip during
each peak period.

The general public’s vocal anti-automobile/pro-transit senti­
ment, combined with the early success of the regional transit
system and the various federal government initiatives discussed
above, effectively demonstrated that public transit could and
should be given the foremost priority in shaping the region’s
growth and development. In October 1974—two years after
the initial deadline for preparing a plan—the RMOC finally
approved its first official plan, as largely, but not completely, a
“transit-focused” document. Regional council adopted a strat­

gy whereby medium-density development would occur inside
the Greenbelt, further growth would be channelled to three or
four well-defined satellite communities along the Greenbelt’s
immediate outer boundaries, and an extensive rapid transit sys­
tem would link these areas (figure 4). Each satellite community
would be separated from the others and from the central city
by farmland or open space. Several factors played a role in this
decision. First, if development activities were channelled to only
one satellite community, the resulting cross-Greenbelt traffic
flows would have unacceptable impacts on the inner-Greenbelt
communities through which they passed. Second, the pres­
ence of satellite communities located in close proximity to
one another would enable commuters to travel between these
locations without having to enter the central city, thus reducing
cross-Greenbelt travel flows once adequate employment bases
were developed in each satellite community. Third, concentrat­
ing travel between only a small number of satellite communities
and the central city, as well as within and between the satellite
communities themselves, would provide the population and
employment densities necessary for the provision of efficient
public transit services.

The other major conflict during creation of the regional official
plan—the location of the satellite communities and the tim­
ing of their construction—saw the development industry and
the local townships emerge as the primary victors. On the
Greenbelt’s western outer edge, Kanata and Glen Cairn were
chosen to form the nuclei of a community (later named the
“Kanata Urban Centre”) that would ultimately house up to one
hundred thousand people. A second community, the “Orleans
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Figure 4: Adopted concept and urban structure plan, RMOC Official Plan, 1974


Urban Centre,” would be developed on the Greenbelt’s eastern outer edge surrounding the pre-existing Convent Glen and Queenswood Heights housing developments. This area was slated to house a smaller population of somewhere between thirty-five thousand and fifty thousand, as a result of the limited road access between Orleans and the urban area inside the Greenbelt. A third community straddling the Rideau River and located to the immediate south of the Greenbelt (tentatively called the “Southern Urban Community”) would also be developed later. Despite the planners’ earlier arguments that a southeast satellite should receive second priority, the federal-provincial land bank at Carlsbad Springs would be designated for future development only “subject to removing the misgivings concerning the area.”

In terms of transportation, the adoption of the first regional plan marked an important victory for local residents, particularly those in the anti-automobile camp. Most notably, the official plan stated that roadway construction and expansions would take place only to the extent required to meet travel needs that could not be met under the guidelines established for public transport use. The most critical component of this strategy would be the eventual construction of a region-wide rapid transit system that would link the three urban centres with the central city. Because this was proposed only in conceptual terms and as a long-term initiative, the RMOC also sought to accommodate transportation demands over the short-term by making considerable investments in the improvement of its bus-based public transit service. It also included two other long-term objectives in the official plan that would further increase the attractiveness of public transit. First, planning policies would encourage the location of workplaces at strategic nodes located throughout the Region, especially within the urban centres outside the Greenbelt. It was hoped that this would provide employees with opportunities to reside close to their workplaces, and thus to reduce transportation demands. Second, the RMOC would encourage employers in the Ottawa metropolitan area to stagger working hours so that commuting trips would be distributed over a wider time frame. As part of this proposal, it would request that the federal government extend its staggered hours policy to all of its offices located within the urban area (rather than just downtown), so that its many benefits could be more widely experienced.

From Autocracy to (Limited) Participation

Although the Plan for the National Capital and the RMOC’s Official Plan both sought to promote efficient planning and development, the means by which these plans were produced and the methods proposed for achieving their common goals differed considerably. The Plan for the National Capital represented an autocratic approach to regional planning that accorded superiority to the automobile over all other modes of transportation. The Plan was created during a period when automobile ownership was increasing at an unprecedented pace and, as a result, Jacques Gréber had been especially concerned about ways to deal with traffic congestion. However,
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rather than seeking to curtail automobile use in Ottawa’s downtown core by promoting the provision of a built environment conducive to using public transportation, the Plan for the National Capital sought to accommodate growing demands for automobile transportation by relocating government offices to suburban settings, removing railway and streetcar tracks, and constructing an extensive intra-urban road network. Although Gréber’s plan also included the creation of a greenbelt that was intended to act as a physical barrier to urban sprawl, its effectiveness was limited in large part by lack of co-ordination between the office decentralization project and the development of nearby housing opportunities, and by the unwillingness of rural municipalities that were both unhappy about the NCC’s heavy-handed approach and unwilling to direct extra-greenbelt development to distant satellite cities. With government offices relocated close to the greenbelt’s inner boundary or, in some cases, directly on greenbelt lands, public servants were able to buy homes outside the greenbelt and travel short distances to work on the other side—but only by car.

In its 1974 Official Plan, and subsequently later versions of this document, the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton also sought to curtail sprawl and to prevent automobile traffic congestion. In contrast to Jacques Gréber’s approach, however, the RMOC placed a much stronger emphasis on public participation in shaping the content of its first regional plan. The result was a political dogfight, fought on many fronts. In the end, the development industry and the suburban municipalities got their way at the expense of the federal and provincial governments by having the bulk of population growth directed where they wanted it to be. Although “post-1970 development outside the Greenbelt has been largely conventional suburban development with few redeeming features,” this part of the plan was nonetheless at least partially successful in containing extra-Greenbelt sprawl by limiting growth to only a few well-defined satellite communities. Local residents also achieved a victory of sorts in this process, albeit to a lesser extent. Despite RMOC planners’ continued assertions that more and bigger roads were absolutely essential for the development of an efficient regional transportation system, the well-organized expression of pro-transit and anti-automobile sentiment ensured that the 1974 RMOC Official Plan would make public transit the highest priority and that any road expansion or construction would take place only as a last resort. Beyond this, the participation of the general citizenry clearly did not have a strong influence on the region’s planning decisions. However, this early exercise in public participation did set the stage for much more extensive public involvement throughout the entire planning process in subsequent updates of the regional official plan.

Although its influence in planning Ottawa’s metropolitan region was clearly usurped by the RMOC, the federal government may not have lost as much in this battle as it at first seems, given its mandate to assist in the development of a world-class capital city. At the conclusion of the planning process, the RMOC did not place priority on the establishment of a satellite community at Carlsbad Springs, and it also chose to ignore the planning scenario put forth by the NCC in its Tomorrow’s Capital document. However, the RMOC’s subsequent implementation of its rapid transit strategy has resulted in Ottawa’s having the highest rate of public transit ridership of all medium-sized North American cities and has also earned the city the reputation of a “transit-friendly” metropolis, capturing the attention of cities throughout the world. Given that these achievements came largely as a result of events where the NCC and RMOC cooperated—for example, through the staggering of office hours, the dedication of federal parkway lanes to rush-hour bus traffic, and later, the provision of federal lands for the construction of the Transitway—perhaps the greatest lesson is that the goals of the NCC and RMOC can best be achieved when adequate political space is provided for all stakeholders to make an effective contribution to planning.

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Notes

1. Primarily as a result of space limitations, this paper focuses almost exclusively on the Ontario side of the Ottawa River, fully recognizing that urban development on the Quebec side of the river (the Outaouais region) has also had an impact on transportation and other planning issues in the area. Further analysis of planning and development in the Outaouais, see Chad Gaffield, History of the Outaouais (Montreal: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1997).
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12. At this time, the size of the National Capital Region was increased from 900 square kilometres, as it had been defined in the Plan for the National Capital, to 1800 square kilometres.


14. Ibid.


18. This was also an extremely controversial solution, as many properties were expropriated as a result of landowners’ unwillingness to sell at the price being offered by the federal government. See Elliott, The City Beyond: A History of Nepean, Birthplace of Canada’s Capital, 1792–1990 (Nepean, ON: City of Nepean, 1991).


20. Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton Planning Department, Transcripts of Hearings and Briefs Received, vol. 1, Official Plan Public Participation Program (Ottawa: RMOC Planning Department, 1971), 132.


22. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


26. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the National Capital Region, RMOC Submission to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the National Capital Region: Remarks to Committee by John M. Wright, Planning Commissioner, on March 2, 1976, Re: Official Plan Ottawa-Carleton Planning Area.

27. Wright, “The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton.”


38. The Ottawa Transportation Commission was created in 1948 after the city of Ottawa purchased all assets of the Ottawa Electric Railway and assumed responsibility for public transit service within city limits. See Hendricks and Philpott, Ottawa Transportation.


40. Several years later, once population densities had sufficiently increased, dial-a-bus service in these areas was replaced by conventional, fixed-route transit service.


44. See Wright, “The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton.”

45. Special Joint Committee, RMOC Submission, 10.


47. RMOC planner John Wright would later comment that, although the RMOC draft plan and the NCC’s Tomorrow’s Capital document clearly demonstrated their mutual desire to ensure a compact urban form and to preserve natural resources and the natural environment, it was also clear that their philosophies about urban structure differed considerably. See Wright, “The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton.”