Chinatown and Monster Homes: The Splintered Chinese Diaspora in Vancouver

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Résumé de l'article
Cet article propose une critique de la cohésion et de la solidarité sous-entendues dans de nombreuses études de la diaspora par le biais d'une exploration du rôle de la mémoire historique comme force perturbatrice sur les sites locaux de l'expérience diasporique. L'article porte sur une série de débats controversés autour des questions du logement et du développement à Vancouver des années 1960 aux années 1980, débats impliquant des groupes de Canadiens d'origine chinoise ou de récents immigrants chinois. Grâce à des recherches en archives et des entretiens, la controverse entourant la construction de « maisons monstres » par des investisseurs et immigrants chinois vers la fin des années 1980 se révèle être complètement détachée de la solidarité créée au sein de la communauté chinoise de Vancouver une génération plus tôt par des campagnes pour sauver le quartier résidentiel de Strathcona et la zone commerciale du Chinatown adjacente. L'article conclut que l'absence de mémoires partagées dans un espace local sape le potentiel de mobilisation politique au sein d'une communauté diasporique.
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This article offers a critique of the cohesiveness and solidarity implied in many studies of diaspora by exploring the role of historical memory as a disruptive force in the local sites of the diasporic experience. The focus of the article is on a series of controversial housing and development debates in Vancouver from the 1960s to the 1980s, all of which involved groups of Chinese Canadians or recent Chinese immigrants. Through archival research and interviews, the controversy over the construction of “monster homes” by Chinese investors and immigrants in the late 1980s is shown to be completely divorced from the solidarity generated within the Chinese community in Vancouver a generation earlier as a result of campaigns to save the residential neighbourhood of Strathcona and the adjacent commercial Chinatown area. The article concludes that the absence of shared memories in a local space undermines the potential for political mobilization within a diasporic community.

Cet article propose une critique de la cohésion et de la solidarité sous-entendues dans de nombreuses études de la diaspora par le biais d’une exploration du rôle de la mémoire historique comme force perturbatrice sur les sites locaux de l’expérience diasporique. L’article porte sur une série de débats controversés autour des questions du logement et du développement à Vancouver des années 1960 aux années 1980, débats impliquant des groupes de Canadiens d’origine chinoise ou de récents immigrants chinois. Grâce à des recherches en archives et des entrevues, la controverse entourant la construction de “maisons monstres” par des investisseurs et immigrants chinois vers la fin des années 1980 se révèle être complètement détachée de la solidarité créée au sein de la communauté chinoise de Vancouver une génération plus tôt par des campagnes pour sauver le quartier résidentiel de Strathcona et la zone commerciale du Chinatown adjacente. L’article conclut que l’absence de mémoires partagées dans un espace local sape le potentiel de mobilisation politique au sein d’une communauté diasporique.

Introduction

“Chinatown didn’t matter. It was a part of history,” declared Peter Kwok. Peter is an immigrant, and now a Canadian citizen, from Hong Kong. He arrived in 1988 and soon became embroiled in a protracted housing debate in Vancouver’s exclusive Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale districts that observers viewed as a kind of clash of civilizations: one that pitted Chinese immigrants against white Vancouverites. The conflict emerged as wealthy investors from Hong Kong bought up and transformed properties with seemingly little regard for the traditional aesthetic qualities of these storied neighbourhoods. Those who objected to the developments did so on the grounds of cultural difference, manifested in the size and shape of the homes under construction. It was a polarizing dispute, and for scholars such as David Ley it came to epitomize the state of race relations in British Columbia’s most populous city at the end of the twentieth century.2

Given the original emphasis on race as the explanation for the conflict that divided residents in two of Vancouver’s most affluent communities, Mr. Kwok’s comment is intriguing on several levels, pointing as it does to the temporal position of Chinatown in the mindset of newcomers to the city and the apparent irrelevance of history to contemporary housing debates in Vancouver. Mr. Kwok was one of the 700,000 immigrants who moved to Canada in the fifteen years preceding the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. In doing so, he joined the global Chinese diaspora made up of migrants who maintain ties with others who leave China or Hong Kong to go abroad while maintaining tangible or nostalgic ties to their homelands.3 The idea of a diaspora has become one of the most important ways to understand both contemporary and historical migration experiences, in large part because it shifts the focus of the migration experience away from the nation-state. In the diasporic perspective, migrants do not move alone. They are connected as they journey with fellow migrants, and everyone who leaves a place is understood to retain some kind of connection to it, if not necessarily a desire to return.4 Moreover, the idea of a diasporic community implies some kind of solidarity in sites of migration around the globe. Since the transnational turn of the late 1980s, such analyses tend to rely on ethnicity in particular as a means for migrants to counter the hegemonic impulses of coercive authorities generally and the nation-state specifically.5 However, as Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger suggest, the term diaspora has come to describe groups “which were never conceived of as coherent ethnic entities before the wider dissemination and dispersion of the concept of diaspora.”6

Inspired by Münz and Ohliger’s pointed critique, this article explores historical memory as a disruptive force in the outwardly cohesive diasporic impulse. The first housing debate to engage the Chinese community in Vancouver occurred in the Strathcona neighbourhood in the 1960s, yet both its legacy and any kind of ethnic solidarity were absent from the housing debate of the 1980s. This silence is particularly serious when, as Paul Gilroy suggests, diasporic identity “is focused less on common territory and more on memory.”7 This article is therefore concerned...

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with what happens when members of an ethnic diaspora do not have shared memories of a local space. Simply stated, I argue that without shared memories, diasporic solidarity is undermined. To illustrate this phenomenon, I explore debates that involved Chinese residents and migrants in the shape and future of residential communities in Vancouver over the course of thirty years. Some of the most formative experiences for the Chinese community in Vancouver were the campaigns to preserve and defend the residential neighbourhood of Strathcona throughout the 1960s. These localized memories translate across time and space with difficulty. Exposing the fractured nature of the Chinese community in the city not only dispels notions of diasporic unity but also reveals how depictions of the housing debates as racial conflicts, rather than economic or aesthetic ones, perpetuate a trope of ethnic solidarity that longer-term, “outsider” residents, regardless of their racial categorizations, can use to conceal, suppress, and ignore the dynamism and internal complexity of migrant communities in a city.

Setting the Stage: Strathcona

Bounded by the city's financial and tourist districts as well as the Downtown Eastside, one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Canada, Vancouver's Chinatown has experienced a decline in recent years, reinforcing a long history of highs and lows, fortune and decay. During the exclusion era from 1885 to 1947, when Chinese migrants were subject to punitive head taxes and eventually an almost total ban on migration, the neighbourhood assumed the conventional characteristics of an ethnic enclave. Chinese migrants who came to Canada as merchants and labourers found many of the city's neighbourhoods hostile to their residential aspirations and sought refuge among their fellow countrymen. The vast majority of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Chinese migrants came from the southern Chinese province of Guangdong, and economic and political constraints limited female migration. In 1901, Chinatown's population numbered 2,053 men, twenty-seven women, and twenty-six children. As a result, Chinatown acquired a reputation as a den of vice and a bachelor society. Migrants relied on clan and village associations for contacts and business opportunities. After the Second World War, migration laws evolved, and gradually opportunities for Chinese migrants to once again live on Canadian soil increased. The government permitted limited family sponsorships, and in 1962 it removed quota restrictions so that skilled workers and independent migrants from China could come to Canada on the same basis as migrants from Europe and the United Kingdom.

At first, new waves of migrants were drawn to Vancouver's Chinatown where their families were well established and as a result, Chinatown grew rapidly. Many residents then moved to the nearby neighbourhood of Strathcona, which bordered Chinatown and was close enough to the city to preserve and defend the residential neighbourhood of Strathcona throughout the 1960s. These localized memories translate across time and space with difficulty. Exposing the fractured nature of the Chinese community in the city not only dispels notions of diasporic unity but also reveals how depictions of the housing debates as racial conflicts, rather than economic or aesthetic ones, perpetuate a trope of ethnic solidarity that longer-term, “outsider” residents, regardless of their racial categorizations, can use to conceal, suppress, and ignore the dynamism and internal complexity of migrant communities in a city.

Strathcona and 1960s Urban Renewal in Vancouver

Fights to save Strathcona and Chinatown brought the community together in the 1960s. Moreover, the historian Wing Ching Ng says, “The preservation of Chinatown acquired symbolic significance in the quest for local belonging” and created an upsurge in “local consciousness among the Vancouver Chinese” that spilled over to local politics. Shirley Chan, who participated in the campaign to save Strathcona, recalls, “Never before had the city seen the level of organization and cooperation of citizens from diverse neighbourhoods working together to oppose bad public policy. These citizens took personal responsibility for the development of their city and in the process transformed the way the City of Vancouver did its business.”

Two battles to preserve Strathcona stand out as defining moments in the community’s history. The first began in 1957 when the City of Vancouver put forward a three-phase, twenty-year $100 million slum clearance scheme, known as the Urban Renewal Project. At the heart of this scheme was a plan to bulldoze apparently derelict housing in Strathcona, identified as an area of blight by the city planners. Leonard Marsh, author of a 1950 report entitled Rebuilding a Neighbourhood: Report on a Demonstration Slum Clearance and Urban Rehabilitation Project in a Key Central Area in Vancouver, called the area’s housing conditions “intolerable,” proposing the “acquisition and clearance of the existing housing and redevelopment with three types of rental housing; apartments, row-housing and small suites.” No private housing was proposed. Yet as community historian Hayne Wai has shown, while Strathcona “was a low-income working-class area, it was not a slum.” Rather, “it was a low-crime area and had a strong sense of community.” The fact that city planners failed to make this distinction made many residents feel that the area was being targeted because of its largely ethnic, and seemingly voiceless, Chinese population.
Differences in perception about life in the community among outside planners and experts and residents resulted in a prolonged debate about the nature of proposed changes to the area. As urban renewal plans went forward, the residents of Strathcona found themselves in a difficult position. The city froze repair permits and ceased regular maintenance of the area, hoping to convince residents that they would be better off in more modern public housing.\(^\text{21}\) Residents were unable to improve their homes but they did not want to leave. For property owners, the expropriation of their homes meant dispersal, and many found the offer of $6,000–$8,000 for their homes unjust. Bessie Lee, a resident of Strathcona, claimed that to find a home anywhere else in the city would cost $14,000–$21,000, “and even at that, it would be hard to find a decent house.”\(^\text{22}\) Opponents claimed that urban renewal and the loss of single-dwelling residents was particularly injurious to the Chinese, many of whom were seniors and had known no other home in Canada.\(^\text{23}\)

Ironically, while residents felt that the urban renewal plans discriminated against them because of their Chinese origins, they drew attention to the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the community in their defence. So persistent were proponents in pushing the argument about the Chinese character of Strathcona that the battle to preserve the community became one implicitly tied to the nature of multicultural Canada, which had become official federal government policy in 1971. The community’s defenders highlighted and essentialized the unique characteristics of the Chinese residents in the hopes that city planners would be convinced that a distinct heritage and way of life was at stake. City officials were told that the “Chinese, especially the elderly men, were not adept [sic] to living in high rise apartments.”\(^\text{24}\) Newspaper accounts noted that the proposed clearance “clashes with one great fear in the Chinese mind—the prospect of change.”\(^\text{25}\) In this respect, the conflict over the future of Strathcona was not only about what constituted appropriate housing but also a clash of values that pitted modernity and progress versus heritage and culture along ethnic lines. Ethnicity became the means to preserve the community. Counsel Charles Locke, acting on behalf of his Chinese clients, declared that the urban renewal plans would lead to the “destruction of Chinese merchants and could ruin the international flavor of the area.”\(^\text{26}\)

Building on a perceived threat to the self-identified unique ethnic community, the campaign to preserve the heritage homes in Strathcona hinged on strategic appeals to Chinese identity and heritage. The earliest stages of the battle to save Strathcona fused the survival of the residential area with the survival of the Chinese community in Vancouver, rendering other residents, particularly those of European heritage, invisible in the fight to save their homes. Richard Nann, professor in the School of Social Work at the University of British Columbia, described Strathcona and Chinatown as a “Chinese village” that “developed within the confines of a large Occidental city.” Nann declared, “This village has developed to the point where today it is a socially self-sufficient community.”\(^\text{27}\) Equally significant, Nann alluded to a culture of property ownership because of the migrants’ backgrounds: since “most Chinese in Vancouver come from a background of poor, peasant tenant farmers, they place a great importance and significance upon property ownership.”\(^\text{28}\) So not only were property ownership rates high compared to other neighbourhoods in the city, but the very concept of owning property was linked to cultural practices.

Furthering the argument that Strathcona deserved protection because it was a Chinese community and home to a distinctive way of life, opponents to the city’s urban renewal plans argued that in addition to the disruption that the relocation would cause residents, the plans would ruin the social life of the community, as it would be difficult for members of the many community organizations to attend social functions if they were not resident in the vicinity.\(^\text{29}\) There was concern that the fraternal associations, so central to the social life of the community, would be dispersed. The Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA) expressed fears about the continued livelihood of commercial Chinatown and of Vancouver’s Chinese community and argued that what the City was proposing was racist.\(^\text{30}\) The CBA’s leader, Foon Sien, wrote to City Hall in 1963, declaring, “Experience taught us that forced evacuation of Japanese Canadians from Vancouver’s ‘Little Tokyo’ created much hardship and suffering. Now twenty-one years later, the authorities intend to disperse the Chinese similarly. To me it is discrimination of the rankest kind.”\(^\text{31}\) Mainstream media such as the Vancouver Sun did not support such claims, arguing that Strathcona residents should take advantage of the opportunity for “comfortable, fine new housing.”\(^\text{32}\) Jack Stepler of the Province suggested that there was nothing worth preserving, declaring, “Chinatown isn’t what it used to be.”\(^\text{33}\)

Arguing for the preservation of a residential community based on a unique way of life and heritage proved fruitless. In 1959, the City began Scheme I of its Urban Renewal plans with the construction of a public housing project at MacLean Park, followed by the clearing of ten acres of homes along Campbell Avenue. Scheme II got underway in 1965 with a 260-unit extension to MacLean Park. Until 1968, all efforts to prevent the expropriation of homes were unsuccessful, and over thirty acres of land were cleared while 3,300 people, most of whom were ethnic Chinese, were dispersed.

**Showdown: Strathcona Gets Strategic**

By December 1968, the first two phases of slum clearance were complete and the City was preparing for the third and final phase. In a last-ditch effort to save the community, the Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association (SPOTA), claiming many ethnic ties to Chinatown, was formed to prevent further destruction and to demand community involvement in city planning. SPOTA proved successful in this final standoff, exhibiting a high degree of sophistication and political strategizing in its battle with City Hall. The executive was composed of both Chinese and non-Chinese community members, and the organization deftly used the public arena to advance its cause. SPOTA brought municipal, provincial, and federal politicians to the community to see for themselves the kinds of homes that were under attack. Invitations for “highly visible, symbolic roles, from ribbon cutting to sod-turning ceremonies,” brought politicians to Strathcona.\(^\text{34}\) Walking tours were organized as well as bus tours.

Shirley Chan recalls being the twenty-one-year-old English voice of SPOTA. Acting as an interlocutor, Chan sat next to the federal minister responsible for housing, Paul Hellyer, on a bus tour around Strathcona carefully pointing out the care that was being taken to maintain homes slated for destruction.\(^\text{35}\) Another young activist, Jo-Anne Lee, recalls the hours of door-to-door canvassing that she and her mother engaged in, and the significance of large banquets involving municipal and federal
politicians in the community. Lee explains that residents “found ways to present themselves in terms that best suited their objective. To this end, it is clear that they were fully conscious and aware of how they were being interpreted by the media and politicians.”46 Lee believes that once politicians appeared in Strathcona, it was difficult for them to go against the will of the increasingly vocal residents. When the federal government withdrew funding for urban renewal schemes across Canada in 1969, the City of Vancouver was forced to abandon its plans for Phase III. According to one participant, “The federal government seemed to recognize that the Strathcona Community was a group with special needs because of their distinct ethnic origin and the location of the community in relation to Chinatown.”37

The successful battle to save Strathcona brought the ethnic Chinese community together at a time when new waves of Chinese immigration from Hong Kong and Taiwan threatened to fracture traditional ties.38 In observing the politicization of the Chinese community in Chinatown during the 1960s and 1970s, historian Wing Ching Ng argues, “Not only did the neighbourhood residents themselves participate in the struggle for Chinatown, but other Chinese who had not previously been involved in Chinatown activities now found reasons to embrace their ethnic community.”39 The fight to save Strathcona came to define the Chinese community in Vancouver, linked as it was to the broader emergence of vocal minority rights groups in Canada in these years.40

No Time to Rest: Freeways on the Horizon

The campaign to save Strathcona enabled the community to mobilize concurrently against another plan that would have transformed the geography of the neighbourhood. In 1967, news stories started to appear regarding the City’s proposal to construct a freeway right through the heart of Chinatown’s commercial district, eliminating a historic area known as Shanghai Alley that now hosts the Chinese Cultural Centre and the award-winning Sun-Yat Sen Classical Garden. Although opposition to the project was city-wide, Chinatown was unique in making claims to heritage and history to block the construction of the freeway. At two successive City Council meetings, SPOTA packed the galleries with protesters, and organizations such as the Chinese Benevolent Association made vigorous pronouncements about how the freeway would be the death of Vancouver’s Chinatown.41

People opposed to the freeway project emphasized Chinatown as a residential as well as a business area. After a decade of protesting the planned destruction of Strathcona, housing had become an integral part of Chinatown’s identity.42 A symbiotic relationship developed between commercial and residential interests in Strathcona and Chinatown, each using the other to pursue its own agenda.43 Both SPOTA and the Chinese Benevolent Association went beyond earlier arguments about the community being home to a unique way of life, with deeply entrenched social relations that deserved to be protected. Instead, SPOTA used the Chinatown business area to convince urban planners that it would be a mistake to destroy what remained of the Strathcona residential area.44 The commodification of Chinatown, and the fusion of residential and commercial interests between merchants and residents in Strathcona, became an immutable force at a time when civic activism was on the rise across the country.45 Opponents to the project were victorious, and the freeway project was cancelled. It was another success story for community activists in Chinatown and Strathcona. However, the history of civic activism in Vancouver, especially when it is rooted in particular neighbourhoods, is easily lost and fragmented, and despite parallels with later housing conflicts in the city, the history of the preservation of Strathcona and Chinatown increasingly belongs to the former activists alone.

Monster Homes: Whither Chinatown?

A few kilometres across the Burrard Inlet and up the Granville rise, but a world away from Strathcona and Chinatown, are two of Vancouver’s most exclusive postal codes: Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale. Home to some of the oldest houses and properties in the city, the two communities have long drawn aspiring homeowners for their aesthetic appeal. Residents chose the neighbourhoods specifically for the peace and quiet they projected, the historical nature of the homes, many of which were built at the turn of the twentieth century, and the equally majestic trees.46 In 1988, these same “long-time residents,” self-declared after sometimes a mere two decades in the area, petitioned City Hall to prevent the construction of the large homes that were transforming their streetscapes. The so-called monster homes maximized the allowable building sizes on the lots and in many instances involved the clearing of older homes and trees. The new properties, many of them shoddily constructed, nevertheless sold for millions of dollars as developers targeted an emerging and fabulously lucrative market: wealthy migrants from Hong Kong who were looking for business and investment opportunities before the 1997 handover of the colony to the People’s Republic of China and who found it in “prime real estate territory.”47 The spacious lots for sale in Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy were seen as a bargain compared to the cost of real estate in Hong Kong.48

The monster homes controversy of the 1990s and the most recent debate over multi-family residences in Surrey represent a successive series of confrontations over the construction of aesthetically questionable homes in Vancouver.49 The geographer Katharyne Mitchell traces the origins of the debate to housing controversies over Vancouver Specials that were built in east-side communities in the 1960s and 1970s. The Vancouver Specials were distinguished by their large box-like structures with imposing balconies stretched across the front. According to Mitchell, the Specials, which maximized allowable zoning rules, provoked fear that the “carefully regulated borders demarcating communities would be lost in the advent of rapid urban transformation.”50 The campaign against the monster homes in Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy was also about bounded communities, but in this case, the boundaries were not simply geographic. They appeared to be racial as well. The campaign against housing developments in these exclusive areas soon took on intolerant overtones as evidenced by this excerpt from a letter to City councillors:

The face of Vancouver is changing far too quickly. We—the fairly reasonable people—fear the power that the Hong Kong money wields. We resent the fact that because they come here with pots of money they are able to mutilate the areas they choose to settle in. Our trees are part of our heritage. These people come—with no concern for our past. They have not been part of the growth and development of our beautiful city. They have not been paying taxes for years. They have no right to devastate the residential areas.51
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Such inflammatory comments prompted Mayor Gordon Campbell to declare that the battle over housing was to be understood as a zoning issue, not a racial one. Yet it was difficult for both sides of the debate to distinguish between the two. One builder, who worked on more than one hundred homes in the 1980s and 1990s, recalls finishing a home to be put on the market, only to discover on the day of the open-house that someone had spray-painted “ugly” on the side in large letters. On other occasions, his properties were picketed by local residents. However, Barry Hersh rejects suggestions that the debate was racist, asserting that it was not migration residents who were objecting to, “it was the homes they didn’t want.”

The federal government had been encouraging business-class migrants to invest in Canada since the late 1970s. However, the City of Vancouver was not prepared for the fact that new migration meant new aesthetic and political values. Moreover, the mayor’s insistence on framing the controversy as anything but a racial issue disguised the fact that mobile capital and mobile migrants from Hong Kong brought with them political views that were far more liberal and laissez-faire than those prevailing in the municipal culture of Vancouver, including among the established Chinese community. Residents and business people in Chinatown, while establishing and maintaining an extensive network of contact and social ties, frequently sought support from City Hall to guarantee the security of their community after the urban renewal and freeway battles of the 1960s. Heritage preservation had been welcomed in Chinatown, particularly since 1971 when the City designated the area a historical district. Not so by new Chinese migrants in Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy who were seeking freedom to invest and prosper. The rigidity of the residential spirit in Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale and the governmental controls and zoning by-laws residents welcomed to curb perceived excesses were neither anticipated nor appreciated by the new arrivals.

While the public hearings and the media controversy were noted in international publications such as the South China Morning Post, archival evidence and interviews with representatives of Chinatown’s heritage and business interests reveal an almost complete lack of interest by Chinatown’s representatives in lending support to this particular housing battle. When the City organized public hearings to debate the issue, the hastily convened Shaughnessy Property Owners’ Rights Committee, of which Peter Kwok was a member, asked its members to find supporters among the Chinese in the Lower Mainland so that their presence at local hearings would be more forcibly felt. Few residents of Strathcona or the Chinatown business community attended, revealing how superficial the ties between the ethnic Chinese non-residents and Vancouver’s Chinatown were, twenty years after the successful battle to save Strathcona. The values and culture that defined the Chinese community in Strathcona were not shared by new arrivals to Vancouver.

On social, political, and economic levels, the residents of Strathcona and Chinatown had little connection with the Chinese newcomers to Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy. These differences were compounded by the stark contrast between Chinese migrants and the more settled Chinese-Canadian community in Vancouver and their respective relationships with the residential communities of which they were a part or in which they wished to invest. Those interested in the Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale neighbourhoods used arguments to stake their claims that were very different from those evidenced in 1960s Strathcona. Where community organizations had cited a unique heritage and a distinct way of life to make their case against the modernist vision at City Hall, the investors of the 1980s resorted to ideological and economic arguments. Many appealed to liberalism and democracy—traits they identified with Canadian society generally—to argue for their right to build homes according to their wishes. At one hearing, one investor (speaking through a translator) declared, “We had planned to build a home that we liked very much. But now we can’t do it anymore. So our only choice was to build a house that is not even adequate for our own use . . . That’s against our wish.” With this line of argumentation, new homeowners and investors made rights-based claims based on liberal democratic discourse, epitomized by freedom of choice, rather than the appeals to unique heritage and community preservation, as evidenced by the residents of Strathcona and businesses in Chinatown in the 1960s. Rather, it was the residents of Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy who appealed to a sense of history to battle the developers and investors. One opponent declared, “Our sense of historic links and continuity with the past will and is being destroyed at a rate that is unheard of in the history of a modern community.”

City Council eventually introduced design controls and retained rules on the possible size of developments. The City also passed by-laws on the removal of trees from neighbourhood residences. The compromise seemed to satisfy most parties as investors had the option of trading off historical design for more space and the “long-term residents” note with approval the manner in which newer constructions generally blend into the scenery. According to some scholars, it was the monetary power of the new Chinese investors and homeowners that enabled them to forge an alliance with local politicians who understood the economic value, and potential investments, that they and possible future migrants represented. City Hall’s desire to facilitate their migration is seen as the key element in the compromise. As such, ethnic solidarity was unnecessary for Hong Kong migrants to muster the support required to ensure their investment opportunities. Nevertheless, the newer migration had a significant impact on the Chinese residents of Vancouver who had been in Canada for generations and who were content with seeing themselves, and their history, in a particular light. As a result, long-time Chinese residents of Vancouver and British Columbia’s Lower Mainland were rendered uncomfortable by the fact that great gulfs of aesthetic and economic difference separated generations of Chinese Canadians from newer and wealthier migrants from Hong Kong who embodied the “astronaut” lifestyle. Albert Fok of the Chinatown Business Improvement Association affirms that it was the fear of renewed racism, provoked by the monster home debate, that most interested residents of Strathcona and the Chinatown business district.

Colleen Leung, a local journalist with BCTV and a self-identified Chinese Canadian told CBC’s Peter Gzowski during a national broadcast of Morningside, “Conspicuous consumption . . . That bothers non-Asians, and makes people like me feel self-conscious.” In describing her series on racism in British Columbia, Leung explained, “I wanted to make the point that it wasn’t fair that the Chinese were being criticized. But at the same time, the Chinese, in a way, are not blameless either for bringing
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this on. Because some are arrogant.” Returning to her point about con-
spicuous consumption, Leung claimed that buying BMWs for teens or paying for annual trips to Hawaii made those with “generations of Cana-
dianhood” sensitive to the possibility that their social positions were
being usurped. Leung concluded that the money, power, and clout of
new migrants “disturbs Canadians who are not Asians.” Yet Leung’s
comments suggest that Chinese Canadians were also disturbed by
events in Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale. Where did established Chinese
Canadians fit into this new power dynamic? The brief answer is that
they did not. So distant were the prosperity and real estate interests of
the new migrant families that, despite the apparent diasporic unity, a
complete paradigm shift had taken place.

By the late 1980s, residents of Strathcona and Chinatown were
engaged with a different set of concerns—ones that, in turn, did not
even engage Chinese newcomers to Shaughnessy and Kerrisdale. China-
town’s commercial district was once again struggling. Crime in the
Downtown Eastside was on the increase, and new malls that catered
specifically to Chinese clients (particularly newer immigrants) were
being built in the neighbouring city of Richmond. Fewer and fewer peo-
ple were making their way to Chinatown to buy products. Merchants in
Vancouver’s Chinatown worried that the cost of real estate and limited
parking spaces were crippling their potential to turn a profit. Campaigns
to save Chinatown became specifically geared to promoting commer-
cial interests.

Strathcona’s population was also changing. According to the 2006 cen-
sus, English was the mother tongue of 49.1 per cent of the residents,
while 25.3 per cent identified as Chinese-language speakers. Half of
the population had moved either to or from the area since 2001. The
neighbourhood was become increasingly gentrified and did not escape
the housing boom that makes Vancouver one of the most expensive
cities in Canada to live in. Only 26.6 per cent of the population lived
in low-income housing, as compared to 64 per cent in 1996. When
the first million-dollar home sold in Strathcona in 2007, one that prob-
ably would have been destroyed under the urban renewal plans of the
1960s, it was a sign that the community had indeed been transformed
and that the historical and cultural ties that once held Strathcona close
to Chinatown were also weakening. Chinatown now focuses on the
business of heritage and tourism, as opposed to community interests,
to survive. Hayne Wai regrets that “Chinatown’s role as a community
focus has diminished.”

Conclusion

The history that defined the experience of so many Chinese migrants to
Vancouver slowly disappeared after the fights to save Strathcona and
Chinatown were won, and vanished almost completely as migrants from
Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s discovered new neighbourhoods
and new places to settle. Ironically, given the centrality of homeland in
theories of diaspora, it was the location of people’s homes in the city of
Vancouver that most reflected the social, economic, cultural, and politi-
cal divides in the localized diaspora. Newer migrants, however perma-
nent or unsettled their time in Vancouver, disrupted diasporic unity as
their aesthetic and social values clashed with those of more permanent
and settled residents. While the clash was rarely overt among members
of the so-called diaspora, its reverberations affected all those identifying
with a sense of Chinese community in Vancouver or the global Chinese
diaspora.

In moving beyond Chinatown, new Chinese migrants transformed the
historic ties to Strathcona and Chinatown and the privileged positions
that these two sites had occupied for decades in the collective memory
of the Chinese in Vancouver. The housing debates in Shaughnessy and
Kerrisdale were not about Chinese migrants fighting to save a com-

community, as had been the case in Strathcona in the 1960s. That role fell
to longer-term residents who resented aesthetic encroachments on
neighbourhoods to which they felt a strong sense of entitlement, hav-
ing moved there “first.” Rather, Chinese migrants were fighting for the
right to pursue the laissez-faire economic policies and the investment
freedom they had enjoyed in Hong Kong and expected in Canada.

Most newcomers were unaware of the sense of empowerment that had
been fostered among Chinese-Canadian residents of Vancouver as a
result of the civic campaigns and activism three decades earlier. To this
end, the masses of archival material and research conducted on the
Strathcona campaigns, is revealing in itself. The 1980s housing debate,
by contrast, is rarely contextualized in terms of its enduring impact on
participants or the older Chinese community in Vancouver. While earlier
campaigns were rooted in a particular place, the 1980s controversy
involved a very transient group, and the perspective of the investors
and speculative homeowners is much harder to extricate.

The fallout of the monster home debate had profound implications for
the Chinese who identified with the politics and culture of Vancouver’s
historic Chinatown. Chinese Canadians whose families had been in
Canada for generations had to confront what it meant to be Chinese in
Vancouver as new migrants, propelled by concerns about their eco-
nomic and political futures in Hong Kong, moved to a city that had long
been a site of racial conflict and therefore self-definition in the Chinese-
Canadian imagination. As Colleen Leung’s positionality reveals, there
was a dual impulse at play: concern for the apparent racism that fuelled
the housing debate, mixed with discomfort about displays of wealth
and liberalism that were in excess of what conservative Canadians
considered appropriate. The housing debates in Shaughnessy and
Kerrisdale disrupted the narratives of good behaviour, community-
based activism, and loyal citizenry that had been forged, in part, by the
historic campaigns to save Strathcona. The migrants of the 1980s were
loyal to different pursuits: their family’s welfare and global economic
interests. The apparent lack of any sense of community among new
migrants or curiosity about Vancouver’s heritage afforded residents in
Kerrisdale and Shaughnessy and further separated newcomers cultura-

lly from the Chinese community defined by earlier housing battles in
Strathcona. The lack of diasporic solidarity during the housing debates
of the 1980s suggests that the power of ethnicity to bind members of
diaspora together crumbles in the face of both localized politics
and globalized capital flows. The idea of an ethnic diaspora, bound by
nostalgic dreams of the homeland, suppresses the significance of local
experiences and local histories in the fostering of community identities
and therefore supports imagined linkages over the concrete evidence of
splintered and divergent diasporic life.
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Notes
1. Peter Kwok, interview with the author, Vancouver, British Columbia, 10 June 2010.
13. Until the 1970s, the majority of migrants to Canada came from Hong Kong, but there were also significant numbers from Taiwan and, by the 1990s, the People’s Republic of China. Peter Li, “The Rise and Fall of Chinese Immigration to Canada: Newcomers from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China and Mainland China, 1980–2000,” International Migration 43, no. 3 (2006): 2. David Li describes the new migrants as “urban dwellers, who did not need Old Chinatown as a transitional place.” Lai, Chinatown, 279.
15. Albert Fok (chair of the Chinatown Business Improvement Association), interview with the author, 1 May 2009.
17. Presentation to the Strathcona Residents Association by Shirley Chan, 2 May 2007.
18. Chinese residents made up 75 per cent of the community’s population by the 1970s so that the area became known as “China Valley,” Ng, Chinese in Vancouver, 97.
19. Folder 2, file 583-C-6, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.
23. Hayne Wai describes their residences as “bachelor homes,” “a type of communal household, which had been forced upon them as the Exclusion Act and the War in Asia prevented any reunion with their families,” Wai, “Vancouver Chinatown,” 5.
27. The idea of a self-contained village had important repercussions. As Nann himself observed, those who were not born in the “village” were not tied to its “traditions” and therefore had no vested interest in fighting redevelopment. Richard Nann, “Why Chinese Oppose Redevelopment,” Chinatown News 8, no. 7 (3 December 1960), 5.
28. Ibid., 7.
29. Ng, Chinese in Vancouver, 98.
30. “History of Strathcona,” folder 2, file 583-C-6, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.
35. Shirley Chan (CEO, Building Opportunities with Business), interview with the author, 1 May 2009.
36. Jo-Anne Lee (professor, Department of Women’s Studies, University of Victoria), interview with the author, 26 May 2009. See also Jo-Anne Lee, “Gender, Ethnicity,” 395.
38. Ng notes that in 1961–62, the Chinese Benevolent Association resisted demands from a “younger generation of postwar immigrants” to admit
representatives from their group. Ng, Chinese in Vancouver, 4.

39. Ibid., 109.

40. Hayne Wai calls the Strathcona Rehabilitation Project, begun in 1971, “a model for national programs of urban rehabilitation.” Wai, “Vancouver Chinatown,” 14. Jo-Anne Lee contends that the campaign to save Strathcona is evidence of a grassroots campaign that was energized by the activities of ethnic minority women. Jo-Anne Lee, “Gender, Ethnicity,” 397.


43. For an interesting study of the nature of Asian Canadian activism, see Xiaoping Li, Voices Rising: Asian Canadian Cultural Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).

44. Folder 4, “The Strathcona Story,” file 583-C-6, Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.

45. The proposed schemes eventually failed when the federal government withdrew its proposed funding in 1972.


47. Ley, “Between Europe and Asia,” 191.

48. Peter Kwok, interview.


54. For instance, in 2009, the City of Vancouver and Proponent Group (a community organization) submitted a nomination package to the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada to have Vancouver’s Chinatown designated a National Historic Site of Canada.


58. Folder 7, file 937-E-4, City Council and Office of the City Clerk Fonds, Public Record Series #62, City of Vancouver Archives.


60. Walking tour with resident of Shaughnessy, 15 June 2010.


62. The astronaut lifestyle refers to elite migrants who maintain multiple households on the basis of calculated decisions about the locations of the best places to work, play, educate their children, and eventually retire. Sahota, “Ideas of Home.”

63. Albert Fok, interview.


65. Wing Chung Ng made similar observations about the ability of community organizations to represent the increasingly diverse Chinese community. He singles out the Chinese Cultural Centre in particular. Ng, Chinese in Vancouver, 3.

66. The decline was the subject of much media attention. See “Distance, Parking Keep Chinatown Visitors Away,” Vancouver Sun, 2 June 2001.


72. Barry Hersh, interview.