Abstracts
Abstract
The understanding of disease in the dominant biomedical model involves two components, internalism and individualism, which jointly give rise to an ontological approach towards patients that can be referred to as atomism. I argue against such an approach in philosophy of medicine. I focus on internalism, showing that the inevitable presence of the notions of biological function and statistical normality in the biomedical model renders internalism about diseases untenable. Additionally, I argue that the new externalist individualism offers an alternative ontological approach that escapes the challenges to which the atomistic approach is exposed regarding both the concept of disease and medical practice. Subsequently, I focus on an implication of this new approach which relates to the idea of diseases as natural kinds, demonstrating that it proposes a concept of diseases as natural kinds that is conceptually consistent.
Keywords:
- disease,
- internalism,
- externalism,
- individualism,
- natural kinds
Résumé
La compréhension de la maladie dans le modèle biomédical dominant implique deux composantes, l’internalisme et l’individualisme, qui donnent lieu à une approche ontologique des patients que l’on peut qualifier d’atomisme. Je m’oppose à une telle approche en philosophie de la médecine. Je me concentre sur l’internalisme, en montrant que la présence inévitable des notions de fonction biologique et de normalité statistique dans le modèle biomédical rend l’internalisme sur les maladies intenable. En outre, je soutiens que le nouvel individualisme externaliste offre une approche ontologique alternative qui échappe aux défis auxquels l’approche atomistique est exposée en ce qui concerne à la fois le concept de maladie et la pratique médicale. Ensuite, je me concentre sur une implication de cette nouvelle approche qui se rapporte à l’idée des maladies en tant que types naturels, en démontrant qu’elle propose un concept de maladies en tant que types naturels qui est cohérent d’un point de vue conceptuel.
Mots-clés :
- maladie,
- internalisme,
- externalisme,
- individualisme,
- types naturels
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Appendices
Remerciements / Acknowledgements
Je remercie M. Hossein Khalaj, Leila Afshar et Ben Young pour leurs précieux commentaires sur la version initiale de mon manuscrit. Je suis également reconnaissant envers les étudiants en médecine qui ont suivi mes cours de philosophie de la médecine et de sciences humaines médicales dans diverses universités iraniennes ces dernières années.
I am grateful to M. Hossein Khalaj, Leila Afshar, and Ben Young for their helpful comments on my draft. I am also indebted to the medical students in my Philosophy of Medicine and Medical Humanities courses at various Iranian universities over the past few years.
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