Abstracts
Résumé
L’objectif de cet article est d’établir, empiriquement, la relation entre le régime de changes et la cyclicité budgétaire. Pour cela, nous estimons plusieurs variantes de la fonction de réaction des dépenses de consommation publique spécifiées en panel dynamique pour un échantillon de 34 pays africains sur la période 1980-2012. En utilisant la méthode des moments généralisés en différence (DIFF-GMM) telle que développée par Arellano et Bond (1991), et en adoptant la classification de facto de Reinhart et Rogoff (2004), nous parvenons à deux principaux résultats : (1) en régimes de change fixe et intermédiaire, la procyclicité budgétaire est amplifiée; (2) en régime flexible, celle-ci est affaiblie.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to establish empirically the relationship between the exchange rate regime and fiscal cyclicality. To this end, we estimate several variants of the reaction function of government consumption expenditures specified as a dynamic panel based on a sample of 34 African countries over the period 1980-2012. Implementing the GMM method in difference (DIFF-GMM) as developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and adopting the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we found that fiscal procyclicality is amplified in fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes while it is weakened in flexible exchange rate regime.
Appendices
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