This paper examines the ideological and political collapse of laws regulating corporate crime in North America. In an era where social control and criminalization are steadily increasing, corporate crime has been normalized, shorn of its negative, criminal implications, de-regulated in law. The paper asks why this has happened, looking first at the century-long battle waged by labour and other counter-hegemonic groups to censure and control the antisocial acts of corporations through the passage of criminal legislation. Second, it examines the role criminology as a discipline played in this process, and the subsequent replacement of criminological discourse and influence by the newly-ascendent law and economics movement, which has provided the much of the academic support for de-regulation. Both developments, it is argued, are linked to changes in global capitalism and the weakened nation-state. Finally, the paper argues that the removal of regulation through criminal or administrative law, and of its accompanying rhetorics of denunciation, has grave consequences for social policy. The structural and ideological forces of global capitalism that have normalized corporate crime have also provided ideal conditions for increases in its incidence and impact.
This article examines the growth of financial measures against 'organised crime' in the form of money-laundering and asset confiscation. After discussing the implications of conflicts over what crimes should be included in money-laundering statutes —e.g. drugs-only or all 'serious' crime —it summarises the findings of a research study conducted by the author into the impact of money-laundering reporting in the UK upon criminal investigation by the police and customs, and into the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. It concludes that these measures have had a very limited effect and will continue to do so, unless more technological and human resources are put into the investigation process. Furthermore, the tendency of offenders at all but the highest levels to spend their money as they go along places limits on the likely impact of these measures, based as they are on a model of criminal organisation that is more than the reality.
The professional smuggling of mass consumption products develops when demand for a product is not adequately fulfilled by the legitimate market. The difficulties encountered in supplying are, in most contemporary cases, caused by real rarity of the desired product. For other cases, however, the rarity is largely virtual in that government taxes aimed at the product in question lead to increasing the product's price to a prohibitive end. This was the case with cigarettes in Canada between 1985 and 1994. Before both, the federal and provincial, governments decided to drastically decrease cigarette taxes in February 1994, the price for a pack of cigarettes was five to six times higher than the same product in the United States. This article begins with a brief review of the contribution made by economists in regard to contemporary smuggling. Focus will be aimed at common characteristics of the smuggling phenomenon across the world. Elements which are more particular to the Canadian smuggling situation will be identified as well. While the difference in the price of cigarettes between Canada and the United States would seem to be the undeniable driving force behind the development of smuggling activities at the countries ' border, one key question remains unexplained. Why was the volume of contraband unequally distributed across Canada even though the price of cigarettes remained largely consistent throughout all provinces? The level of organization of smuggling networks was much higher in Eastern Canada, and particularly in Quebec, than it was in the western provinces. It is argued that the reasons for this are not only due to price, but to a series of political, historical, and geographical factors which allowed cigarette smugglers to function better in Quebec than in the rest of the country.
Research into the determining factors in arson cases has traditionally focused on factors linked to the characteristics of the burned building. One of our basic hypotheses is that deliberately set fires also have an underlying economic motivation.
In this case, the present study confirms the hypothesis that there appears to be an indisputable link between the unemployment rate and mortgage burdens and arson rates, regardless of the phase of the economic cycle in which the arson occurs.
Moreover, the study corroborates the idea that increased surveillance is necessary in areas presenting a higher risk of fraud and having a specific socioeconomic and financial profile. A lower incidence of arson and the improvement of insurers ' ability to predict losses due to arson could lead to a significant reduction in the number of claims, and consequently, in the amount of premiums.
By looking more specifically at the economic motivations influencing arson throughout the different phases of the economic cycle, this study evokes the establisment of a forecasting system that would allow insurance companies to identify the areas of Montreal that present a higher risk level for arson, thus allowing them to establish their rates in a more equitable manner.
This paper provides an assessment of the impact ofCCTV cameras on the monthly incidence of crimes committed in Montreal's underground subway network. Since 13 of the 65 Montreal's underground stations were provided with such cameras (about 10 on average per target station) between August 1991 and January 1993, we examined the monthly volume of reported offenses in both target and control stations between January 1991 and December 1993. Our analyses have been unable to detect any overall impact of CCTV cameras on the behavior of offenders. And controlling for kinds of crime or for specific areas and places within subway stations (depending on the location of cameras) did not change or qualify the initial overall no-effect finding.
The goal of this article is to improve our knowledge concerning the social and personal characteristics of the female gang members. Data have been collected from 150 girls who were convicted by the juvenile court of Montreal during 1992 and 1993. The analysis shows that girls who join gangs have serious handicaps which are related to their social adaptation, their personality and their deviant and delinquent conducts. Consequently, female gang membership responds to a selection process, as it does with the male membership. The profile of the female also changes depending on the structure of the gang to which they join. As the gang becomes more organized, the girls' personality gets worst. However, the context of the organized gangs seems to limit the girls to auxiliary roles rather then being an opportunity to discharge their antisocial potential.