Legal Pluralism and Analytical Jurisprudence: An Inapposite Contrast

  • Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora

Associate Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York, I am thankful to Stefan Sciaraffa, Michael Giudice, Andrés Botero-Bernal, Enrique Cacéres-Nieto, Gonzalo Villa-Rosas, and Jorge Sánchez-Pérez for helpful discussions about the central ideas of this article. I also thank the anonymous reviewers and the McGill Law Journal editorial team for their insightful comments and recommendations.

Citation: (2021) 67:2 McGill LJ 157

Référence : (2021) 67:2 RD McGill 157

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Cover of Volume 67, Number 2, December 2021, pp. 119-258, McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill