Volume 16, Number 2, Fall 1989

FR:

Peut-on formuler des conditions non empiriques pour qu'un objet ou un fait soit reconnu comme ayant fonction de symbole ? Si oui, il conviendrait de les nommer conditions proto-logiques, car elles concernent des formes, comme la logique, mais sont plus primitives que les déterminations logiques mêmes. L'objet de cet article est de discuter cinq notions qui peuvent être présentées comme candidates à cette fonction d'universels proto- logiques pour les langues naturelles : la pluralité des niveaux d'« articu- lation», l'énoncé complet, la notion d'« ancrage» de l'énoncé à renonciation, le nom propre, la corrélation rhème-thème. De tels universaux ne sont pas présentés comme des classes de symboles, mais des types de fonctions diversement réalisées dans des structures grammaticales. Les mettre en évidence - ou en découvrir d'autres - devrait être l'une des tâches de la philosophie du langage dans sa relation à la science linguistique.

EN:

Is it possible to state non-empirical requisites for an object, fact or artefact, to obtain symbolical functioning ? If so, their status could be named proto-logical, in so far as they bear upon forms, like logic, but ought to be more primitive than logical determinations. The purpose of this paper is to discuss five notions which may be considered candidates for the functional role of proto-logical universals of natural languages : plurality of the levels of " articulations ", the concept of full-fledged sentence, " anchorage " of enunciated sentences to enunciation, proper names, the correlation rheme-theme. Such universals are not meant to correspond to classes of symbols, but to typical functions, diversely embodied in grammatical structures. To trace them - or others - should be one of the tasks of philosophy of language, in its relationship with linguistic investigations.

FR:

L'entreprise fondationnelle traditionnelle en éthique a abouti à un échec, c'est-à-dire à la victoire du relativisme moral. De son côté, la métaéthique a contribué largement à renforcer ce relativisme en voulant caractériser l'éthique négativement en prenant pour point de référence le discours scientifique (ou les énoncés descriptifs). Mais n'y aurait-il pas une autre façon de fonder l'éthique et la bioéthique ? Le présent texte voudrait apporter réponse à cette question en adoptant une perspective épistémologique.

EN:

In our view, the field of ethics is in jeopardy : the traditional approaches wanting to give an ontological foundation to ethics has lead on the contrary (by it's constant failure to find them) to the victory of moral relativism ; on the other hand, further support has been provided for relativism with the intervention of metaethics which defines ethics negatively in contrast to science (or descriptive sentences). Could there be another way to secure the foundation of ethics ? In this paper, we try to see whether the perspective of the philosophy of science could not help us to choose rationally between moral rules and in this way to provide an indirect foundation for ethics and bioethics but nevertheless a foundation.

FR:

Cet article a comme principal objectif d'effectuer un bilan critique de certaines thèses du réformisme pénal (doctrine sociale privilégiant une approche thérapeutique de la criminalité par rapport à une approche punitive). La perspective retenue est celle de la responsabilité dans les différentes constructions théoriques du projet réformiste (médico-légale, déterministe et de « responsabilité stricte »). Je rendrai compte des thèses respectives sur le sujet et je ferai, en conclusion, certains commentaires critiques sur les difficultés pour ces approches réformistes de la responsabilité d'offrir un point de vue cohérent et moralement acceptable de la question.

EN:

The main objective of this paper is to criticize some propositions of the social doctrine of penal reformism (the social doctrine which favors a therapeutic attitude toward a criminal rather than a punitive one). The perspective adopted is that of the responsability in the different theoritical constructions of the penal reformism doctrine (medico-legal, determinist and the strict-liability). I will explicite some thesis on the subject and I will do, in my conclusion, some critical commentaries on the difficulties that these three versions of penal reformism face when they have to give a coherent and morally acceptable point of view of the problem of responsibility.

EN:

My paper is divided into two parts. In the first one, I try to categorize the different strands in the criticism of development. In the second part, I discuss the values which could give a sound direction to development.I distinguish five different kinds of criticism.- First, the Marxist inspired approach. Development is seen as the result of imperialism, the satellization of a periphery around and for the benefit of a center or a class in a center.- Second, the criticism of the extreme left. According to it, development no longer has either subjects or ends. The anonymous industrial system feeds on itself.- Third, the Greens' criticism. Ecological considerations are becoming more and more intractable limits to development.- A fourth kind of criticism is the culturalist one : development tends to suppress the originalities of the world's different cultures.- Fifth, some critics reject the technical mastery of the universe and seek a more convivial and more receptive attitude. The two last criticisms are still more radical. But we cannot turn the clock back, our only choice is to limit and repair the damage development has already done. We must redirect it, not refuse it. In the second part of my paper, I indicate the direction develop- ment should take : an utilitarian direction, that is to say, a maximization of collective utilities within a plan. But I stress three shortcomings of such an approach which need to be corrected by entrenched funda- mental rights.- First, utilitarianism aims at collective benefit but can be blind to the distribution of costs and to the rights of persons and minorities.- Second, planning inevitably ignores those ends whose beneficial consequences cannot be factored in. For example, the health of the elderly is a dead end whereas the health of the labour force of the future is desirable for the stream of benefits it promises.- Third, our values change, so planning has to be a process of constant revision. A democratic process, founded on and protected by fundamental rights can counter these three shortcomings.- First, defending each person's rights is a way to limit sacrifices imposed on individuals in the name of a collective good or development.- Second, rights of association and political expression for the poorest ensure that they have a say in choosing social policies.- Third, the respect of each person's fundamental rights is an ultimate end and gives a sense of direction to all social policies.